Defending the "Acquisition-Use Presumption" in Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 774-778
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractIn an important article, McIntosh and Storey (2018) challenge the "acquisition-use presumption" that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would inevitably seek to detonate it in an attack. They argue that a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons has more attractive options than conducting a direct nuclear attack, that organizational politics mean that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to seek to detonate it, and that a nuclear attack would escalate the threats the terrorist organization faced. I argue that these arguments are ultimately unpersuasive and that the acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.