Suchergebnisse

Among other social and political changes, post-materialist theory anticipated the need to strengthen democracy in political institutions in post-industrial societies. This change in political values would mean that in addition to growth in post-materialist values, parties would be pushed to take an alternative view of politics that would entail greater assimilation of democratic procedures. This paper partially and empirically tests the validity of this explanation in four European party systems. The Greens are the focus, since they are considered the parties that best fit the post-materialist profile. In particular, the paper aims to ascertain whether the Greens display a significantly better positioning in respect to support for democracy and the congruence of their voters than other parties, as theory leads us to believe. The explanation of higher levels of party congruence is also expected to be related to post-materialist party features. The findings of this research did not show enough evidence to validate our theoretical expectations.

Do European political parties represent the ideology of their voters well? This research aims to provide an empirical appreciation of the levels to which Members of Parliament (MPs) ideologically represent their electorate within political parties in 12 European countries. The variable used is left–right self-placement and representation is measured through congruence. Three main hypotheses are tested. First, MPs express greater ideological extremism than voters. Second, MPs have biased perceptions on the positioning of their electorate. Third, New Left parties exhibit higher levels of representation than the other parties. This article's findings reveal that only the second hypothesis can be supported without restrictions

One of the social and political changes that post-materialist theory anticipated was the need for the democratic deepening of political institutions in modern democracies. This change in political values would mean that, together with an expansion in post-materialist values, parties would be pushed towards an alternative view of politics which would mean greater assimilation of democratic procedures. This paper tests the validity of this explanation in four European party systems. Specifically, it aims to ascertain if most post-materialist parties (the Greens) display a significantly better position in their support for democracy and voter representation than other parties, as post-materialist theory leads us to believe. It also tests whether the explanation for higher levels of party representation is related to post-materialist party features. The findings of this research do not show enough evidence to validate the literature"s theoretical expectations. ; Entre outras mudanças sociais e políticas, a teoria pós-materialista antecipou a necessidade de aprofundamento democrático das instituições políticas nas democracias modernas. Esta mudança nos valores políticos significaria que os partidos, a par do crescimento dos valores pós-materialistas, seriam levados a adoptar uma perspectiva alternativa sobre a política que implicaria uma maior assimilação dos procedimentos democráticos. Este paper pretende testar a validade desta explicação em quatro sistemas partidários europeus. Visa, especificamente, confirmar se os partidos mais pós-materialistas (os Verdes) detêm uma posição significativamente melhor no que respeita ao apoio à democracia e à representação dos seus eleitores, por comparação aos outros partidos, como a teoria pós-materialista sugere. Pretende ainda verificar se a explicação de níveis mais elevados de representação partidária está relacionada com características partidárias pós-materialistas. Os resultados da pesquisa não fornecem evidência suficiente que permita validar estas expectativas teóricas.

This study analyses the degree to which Portuguese parties represent their electorates. In this instance, representation is measured by the degree of congruence between those who vote and those who are elected. The analysis has two dimensions: ideological positioning and attitudes towards democracy. On the first dimension, it appears that, compared to the voters, the parliamentary elite is ideologically more extreme. On the second dimension, one finds that elites are more favourable towards democracy than the electorates they represent.

The article focuses on the impact of education on policy representation. It examines degrees of congruence between political elites and citizens on policy preferences across different policy issues, trying to discern whether there is a representation gap between the so-called "winners" and "losers" of globalization in Europe as captured via the proxy measure of educational attainment. Additionally, we examine whether this representation gap, as well as overall levels of congruence, are affected by contextual factors related to the economy and the ideological orientation of governments. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, our findings largely confirm the existence of a representation gap along educational lines. Contextual factors related to the economy present weak or no direct and moderating effects whereas ideologically left-leaning governments accentuate, for the most part, the representation gap between individuals of low and high educational attainment.

AbstractResearch on the fulfilment of electoral promises has been particularly fruitful over the past decades. Most of it focused on examining pledge fulfilment at the cabinet level, and little emphasis was placed on the reasons underlying the level of compliance. As a consequence, core factors in explaining pledge fulfilment have not yet been explored. One such factor might be instability in a government's internal functioning. We argue that ministerial instability is relevant for explaining a government's broken promises, and that its importance increases at the junior minister level and among the most salient ministries. Relying on data on the fulfilment of electoral promises and ministerial instability in Portugal between 1995 and 2019, backed by interviews with former ministers and junior ministers, we provide evidence that the fulfilment of electoral promises is significantly influenced by portfolio volatility, particularly at the junior ministerial level and in the most important ministries.

Cabinets are the engine of policy change in parliamentary systems. Yet, we still know little about how cabinets micro-manage the content of their multifaceted agenda during their term in office. Drawing on the party and agenda-setting literature, this article addresses this gap by focusing on three main determinants of cabinet priorities: issue priorities in the electoral platforms of majority and opposition parties, and new and unforeseen problems as conveyed by the media. Our analysis reveals that (1) majority platforms have a stronger impact on the cabinet agenda than those of opposition parties, but this effect decreases as the legislative term progresses; (2) cabinet agendas do take into consideration opposition electoral priorities but only when the latter are expressed by mainstream competitors or when the media focus on them and (3) an externally imposed adjustment programme can also create the conditions for strengthening the congruence between electoral and cabinet agendas.

In the literature elite–mass congruence is usually measured in terms of either issue preferences or left–right self-placement. The two forms of congruence are only occasionally used together and are seldom used with the purpose of seeing if levels of congruence were similar. With this intention Portugal is used as an extreme case (due to its low level of clarity regarding party policy alternatives, and its relatively low levels of education, media exposure and political interest). It was found that in many situations the results for MPs–mass congruence were different depending on the use of left–right self-placement or substantive issue preferences.