Mutual optimsm as a cause of conflict: secret alliances and conflict onset
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 552-564
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
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In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 552-564
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 655-31
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: The review of international organizations, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 1-28
ISSN: 1559-7431
World Affairs Online
In: The review of international organizations, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 1-28
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 4, S. 651-674
ISSN: 1552-8766
The authors present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. The authors illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in precolonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 4, S. 651-674
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The Korean journal of international studies, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 165-189
ISSN: 2288-5072
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 86, Heft 1, S. 113-125
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 3-34
We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, r, which denotes the correlation between two agents' private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where r=0 and r=1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < r < 1, a class of games which have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to estimate r, as well as parameters associated with utilities. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 3-34
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 3-34
ISSN: 1460-3667
We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, ρ, which denotes the correlation between two agents' private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where ρ=0 and ρ=1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < ρ < 1, a class of games which have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to estimate ρ, as well as parameters associated with utilities.
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 777-800
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 21-40
ISSN: 1476-4989
We present a simple method for estimating regressions based on recursive extensive-form games. Our procedure, which can be implemented in most standard statistical packages, involves sequentially estimating standard logits (or probits) in a manner analogous to backwards induction. We demonstrate that the technique produces consistent parameter estimates and show how to calculate consistent standard errors. To illustrate the method, we replicate Leblang's (2003) study of speculative attacks by financial markets and government responses to these attacks. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political analysis: official journal of the Society for Political Methodology, the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 21-40
ISSN: 1047-1987
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 21-40
ISSN: 1476-4989
We present a simple method for estimating regressions based on recursive extensive-form games. Our procedure, which can be implemented in most standard statistical packages, involves sequentially estimating standard logits (or probits) in a manner analogous to backwards induction. We demonstrate that the technique produces consistent parameter estimates and show how to calculate consistent standard errors. To illustrate the method, we replicate Leblang's (2003) study of speculative attacks by financial markets and government responses to these attacks.