Suchergebnisse

The terrorist attack on New York on 11 September 2001 caused considerable disruption to the US economy, and especially to the US financial markets. The initial reaction of the financial markets was to increase the discount factor on future profits and reduce future profit projections, and hence stock market valuations fell markedly, as can be seen from charts 1 and 2. This fall has been largely reversed since the attack, but markets have in general continued their decline from their peaks a year or so ago. Falls have been particularly precipitate since July 2001, with the German and French stock market indices falling by 20 per cent over the last three months, whilst the Canadian markets have fallen even more. Stock market falls of the scale we have seen since July are almost bound to impact on the level of economic activity in the major economies. They are likely to reduce the rate of growth of the world economy over the medium term as well as change the structure of saving and investment.

The analysis of the processes determining unemployment in an open
economy has been considerably advanced by the work of Layard, Nickell
and Jackman in their book Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance
and the Labour Market. Reviews their contribution. They have
developed an analysis based on the role of the "wedge"
between the producer and consumer wages. This wedge depends, in part, on
the real exchange rate. A change in the wedge may change the bargain
between unions and employers. If it does, then a change in the real
exchange rate may change the equilibrium level of unemployment. It is
frequently claimed that this is, indeed, the case. Argues that the
theoretical and empirical support for this proposition is rather weak.

Macroeconomic performance in Europe was generally agreed to have been poor in the 1970s, with high inflation and low growth. The 1980s saw a significant improvement, with inflation being reduced to under 5 per cent by the end of the decade, and growth reaching some sort of peak in 1989. There were many factors contributing to this improved performance, and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) has been given much of the credit. The ERM was supposed to have given the monetary authorities in France and Italy increased anti-inflationary credibility. Their decision to link their exchange rates to the D-Mark involved a commitment to follow German monetary policy and hence involved taking on German anti-inflationary credibility.

The Delors report on monetary union in Europe has enlivened the debate on European monetary integration. We would argue that the debate has avoided one of the major issues it should be addressing. There has been very little discussion of the performance of a monetary union when there are external shocks. It is not obvious that a monetary union would cope better with external shocks than would the individual components of the union if they were free to respond. Both exchange-rate and monetary policies can be seen as shock absorbers. Their use can reflect the structural differences between economies, allowing both for differences in comparative advantage that arise from natural endowments such as oil reserves and for differences in wage and price behaviour which, although not immutable, may take some time to remove.

Policymakers need to know if the structure of competition and the degree of banking market concentration change the incidence of financial crises. Previous studies have not always come to clear conclusions. We use a new dataset of 19 countries where we include capital adequacy and house price growth as factors affecting crisis incidence, and we find a positive role for bank concentration in reducing incidence. In addition, we look at New Industrial Economics indicators of market structure and find that increased market power also reduces crisis incidence. We conclude that attempts to increase competition in banking, although welcome for welfare reasons, should be accompanied by increases in capital standards.

This note looks at estimates of the current scale of the output gap in the UK and at the factors that affect estimates of the trend rate of growth. These issues are central to the debate on macroeconomic policy, both in the short and the long run. The speed at which the economy returns to full capacity, along with the scale of the output gap, will be important factors affecting average growth over the next five years. In the longer term, trend growth at full capacity is not immutable, but rather depends upon the rate of labour augmenting technical progress and the growth of the labour force. In the medium term these factors can be added to by temporary bursts of capital augmenting technical progress and by changes in the user cost of capital that may change the optimal capital-output ratio. Other factors, such as the cost of materials, also affect potential output. Over the past few months there has also been a significant rise in oil prices, and we judge this to have a strong permanent component which will reduce trend growth in the short term and trend output in the longer term. Its implications are more fully discussed in Barrell, Delannoy and Holland in this Review.

In June the Coalition Government produced a budget that aimed to reduce the government deficit quickly. The plan was based mainly on cuts in current expenditure and reductions in transfers to individuals. There are four possible reasons for reducing the deficit, and all have been used to justify the policy. The first reason might be that the cost of borrowing is currently too high, and the second could be that if deficits persist the markets could lose confidence and the cost of borrowing would rise. The third reason might be that we have to reduce the debt stock in order that we prepare for the next crisis, whilst the fourth, and perhaps most persuasive in the long run, is that it is unfair to borrow so much and therefore reduce the consumption of future generations. If either of the first two had merit there would be a case for swift consolidation, whilst if the third or fourth predominate, we should not be in any rush to act until output is nearer full capacity.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Abbey plc, Bank of England, Barclays Bank plc, HM Treasury, Nomura Research Institute Europe Ltd, and the Office for National Statistics.

The UK is restructuring the fiscal policy framework once again, with an intention to move toward independent assessment and forecasting in the budget process. At the same time a large-scale, if delayed, fiscal consolidation is planned at a time when there is significant spare capacity in the economy. Economic growth is also projected to be below trend, at least this year and perhaps next. It is unusual to see a fiscal tightening when the output gap appears to be widening. These policy settings should be seen in the context of the most radical change in the nature of the relationship between the government and the economy for at least thirty years. This note assesses the impact of the new programme on the economy as well as setting out a projection for the medium-term public finances.

The financial crisis and the recession it induced have wrought havoc with our understanding and decision-making on the medium-term fiscal position. The crisis will leave us with a higher debt stock and a lower level of sustainable output, and both of these will have implications for the optimal paths for spending and for taxes. If sustainable output has changed then spending plans need to be revised, even if there is no excessive accumulation of debt. If debt has been accumulated in excess of that seen as wise before the crisis, then a plan must be in place to raise taxes and reduce spending in order to return to (or towards) a desired level of debt, even if sustainable output has not been affected. In addition to adjustments in response to changes in trend output and in the debt stock, there may also be a need for an adjustment in response to any structural deficit that existed before the crisis broke.

The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 and worsened in the autumn of 2008 has involved a repricing of risk and a reduction in the level of potential output in the OECD of between 3 and 5 per cent. In addition it has caused a major recession, leaving output gaps in the UK, the US and the Euro Area currently standing at 3 to 5 per cent of potential GDP despite active policy responses. We show that monetary policy (and especially quantitative easing) has increased output growth in the US and the UK by half a per cent in 2009, and will do the same in 2010Q1. Fiscal policy is also shown to have been effective, but we argue that more could have been done if unfounded worries about excess borrowing had not arisen.