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In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies. These rescues were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive's freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international financial rescues. I argue that the interests of private actors (district constituencies and interest groups) have an important effect on member voting. Following Stolper‐Samuelson reasoning, I find that a member is significantly more likely to favor (oppose) rescues as the proportion of high‐skilled (low‐skilled) workers in a district increases. In addition, I find that campaign contributions from international banks increase the probability that a member will vote in favor of rescues. Overall, the findings suggest that the distributional effects of rescues find expression in Congress and constrain U.S. international financial policymaking.

In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies.These rescue, were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive's freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international financial rescues. I argue that the interests of private actors (district constituencies and interest groups) have an important effect on member voting. Following Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, I find that a member is significantly more likely to favor (oppose) rescues as the proportion of high-skilled (low-skilled) workers in a district increases. In addition, I find that campaign contributions from international banks increase the probability that a member will vote in favor of rescues. Overall, the findings suggest that the distributional effects of rescues find expression in Congress and constrain U.S. international financial policymaking.

Die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank (UdZ) und feste Wechselkurse sind alternativ e Festlegungen der Geldpolitik die sich in ihrer Transparenz unterscheiden. Während die UdZ diffus und schwierig zu überwachen ist, kann ein fester Wechselkurs leicht beobachtet werden. Politische Systeme unterscheiden sich ebenfalls in ihrer Transparenz. Dieser Artikel vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Transparenz geldpolitischer Verpflichtungen und die Transparenz politischer Systeme Substitute sind. Wo politisch Entscheidungen undurchsichtig sind (Autokratien) müssen Regierungen eine Verpflichtung suchen, die transparenter ist als die Regierung selbst (feste Wechselkurse). Die Transparenz der geldpolitischen Festlegung ersetzt die Transparenz des politischen Systems um niedrige Inflation zu schaffen. Wo der politische Prozess transparent ist (Demokratien), kann die formale Festlegung auf eine unabhängige Zentralbank niedrigere Inflation schaffen, weil private Akteure und die politische Opposition frei sind, eine Einflussnahme der Regierung auf die Zentralbank festzustellen und zu bestrafen. Statistische Ergebnisse zeigen, dass (1) Autokratien eher feste Wechselkurs haben als Demokratien und (2) die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank die Inflation in Ländern mit hoher politischer Transparenz effektiv begrenzt. (SWP-Jns)

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are alternative monetary commitments that differ intransparency. While CBI is opaque and difficult to monitor, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is easily observed. Political systems also vary in terms of transparency. I argue that the transparency of monetary commitments and the transparency of political systems aresubstitutes. Where political decision making is opaque (autocracies), governments must look to a commitment that is more transparent and constrained (fixed exchange rates) than the government itself. The transparency of the monetary commitment substitutes for the transparency of the political system to engender low inflation. Where the political process is transparent (democracies), a formal commitment to CBI can produce lower inflation because private agents and the political opposition are free to detect and punish government interference with the central bank. Statistical results indicate that (1) autocracies are more likely to adopt exchange-rate pegs than democracies, and (2) CBI is effective in limiting inflation in nations with high levels of political transparency.

Im Jahre 1913 wurde die Federal Reserve Bank mit der Zielsetzung gegründet, ein stabiles nationales Finanzsystem zu gewährleisten. Der Autor erläutert die gemeinsamen Motive vor allem der Banken, die zum Erlaß des Zentralbankgesetzes führten. Ein zentrales Motiv war der internationalisierte Gebrauch des US-Dollar, aus dem insbesondere die Banken einen Nutzen zogen. Die Banken internalisierten die Kosten zur Errichtung der Fed, da die Gewinne aus der Internationalisierung der Währung nicht zu trennen waren von der Stabilität des Finanzsystems. (SWP-Clv)

The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 to provide the public good of domestic financial system stability. Its main purpose was to safeguard the nation from banking panics and other economically costly financial disturbances. In this article, I explain the collective action behind the Federal Reserve Act by way of the joint products (selective incentives) model. The selective inducement that motivated lobbying for the Federal Reserve was the desire to internationalize usage of the U.S. dollar, a benefit restricted primarily to money-center bankers. Bankers internalized the costs of producing the Federal Reserve because the private gains associated with internationalizing the currency could not be disassociated from production of domestic financial stability. The article provides a road map of the joint products model and demonstrates empirically the supply technology that bound together the public and private goods of the Federal Reserve Act.

This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.

der artikel befaßt sich mit den ursprüngen des zentralbankwesens und erklärt die unterschiede der zentralbanken in den verschiedenen ländern. die ursprünge des zentralbankwesens liegen u.a. in der kriegsfinanzierung, wobei die kreditwürdigkeit und die finanzpolitik der kriegsführenden regierung öffentliche güter darstellten, die problematischerweise dem trittbrettfahrerproblem unterlagen. die unterschiede in der ausformung des zentralbankwesens in den einzelnen staaten hängen nach ansicht des autors von dem grad der politischen dezentralisierung ab. länder mit stark dezentralisiertem politischen system beeinflussen dabei die stärke und dauerhaftigkeit ihrer zentralbank im negativen sinne nachhaltiger, als dies zentral organisierte staaten tun. (swp-clv)

Property rights are essential to economic development but vary with the political environment. We develop and test the claim that government partisanship influences the security of business firms' property rights: the perceived security of property rights increases when right‐wing parties take power and declines with the election of left‐leaning parties. Unlike research that uses country‐level aggregates to draw inferences about the determinants of secure property rights, we analyze survey responses of over 7,400 firm owners from 73 countries using a novel difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that the political partisanship of the government in power strongly affects individual perceptions of property rights: firm owners are more likely to perceive that their property rights are secure under right‐leaning governments. Our results are robust to firm‐ and country‐level economic performance as well as controls for political institutions that might induce more stability to property rights, such as the number of checks and balances (veto players) in a system. Overall, our results indicate that business owners' beliefs about the security of property rights are highly responsive to changes in government partisanship.