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This paper analyzes the optimal transition of the exchange rate regime in the People's Republic of China (PRC). How the PRC can successfully reach the desired regime - whether a basket peg or floating regime - from the current dollar-peg regime remains a major question. To answer it, we develop a dynamic small open-economy general equilibrium model. We construct four transition policies toward the basket-peg or floating regime and compare the welfare gains of these policies to those of maintaining the dollar-peg regime. Quantitative analysis using PRC data from Q1 1999 to Q4 2010 leads to two conclusions. First, a gradual adjustment toward a basket-peg regime seems the most appropriate option for the PRC, and would minimize the welfare losses associated with a shift in the exchange rate regime. Second, a sudden shift to a basket peg is the second-best solution. This is preferable to a sudden shift to a floating regime, since it would enable the authorities to implement optimal weights efficiently in order to achieve policy goals once a decision has been made to adopt a basket-peg regime.

Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper explains these stylized facts within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults. The model also accords with an additional fact: lower recovery rates (high NPV haircuts) are associated with increases in spreads at renegotiation.--Abstract

This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13 that occurred outside of an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external liquidity concerns while the latter was motivated by a substantial increase in the coupon rates and future fiscal solvency concerns. Despite differential treatment between residents and non-residents, both 2006–07 and 2012–13 debt exchanges were executed through collaborative engagement, due in part to the exi