Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining
In: Foreign Policy Analysis, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 233-250
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In: Foreign Policy Analysis, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 233-250
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 351-365
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 351-366
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 955-975
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 60, Heft 7, S. 1278-1311
ISSN: 1552-8766
Third parties are thought to face a trade-off in that those actions most likely to bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long-run stability. Yet the trade-off between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated. Analyzing an iterated three-player bargaining model with both information and commitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may produce lasting peace through conditional subsidies, even without addressing underlying informational or commitment problems. Second, we illustrate this possibility by analyzing the impact of US foreign aid on patterns of conflict and peace between Israel and her neighbors. Our analysis indicates that the termination of the rivalry between Israel and Egypt was most likely not brought about by the Camp David accords or peacekeeping operations, but by sustained foreign aid provision. We discuss the implications for both this conflict and conflict management more broadly.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 60, Heft 7, S. 1278-1311
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: International theory: a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 391-416
ISSN: 1752-9727
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.
In: International theory: IT ; a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 391-416
ISSN: 1752-9719
World Affairs Online