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This article aims to analyse New Delhi's role in post-war Nepal, understood as part of its search for security in its periphery. India has been deeply involved in Nepali affairs since Independence, holding an influential position which has often engendered resentment, but which was nevertheless important in negotiating an end to the Maoists' People's War in 2006. Since engaging the Maoists, with whom New Delhi had a historically hostile relationship, India has appeared inclined to be seen as a supportive larger neighbour rather than an imposing regional hegemon. This, as an attempt to improve regional relations, can still be understood as an approach heavily defined by security concerns, supporting actors and strategies considered most conducive to stability; indeed Indian actors have a multitude of interests in Nepal, from border security to hydropower. In the post-war period Nepal faces many challenges, chief among which are the ever inconclusive constitution and peace process; these are essential to forging a Nepali state that is balanced between the many diverse political groups and inclusive of ethno-regional minorities, in order to ensure stability in Nepal and India's sensitive Himalayan border region. It can thus be considered in India's interests to support and engage the often divergent Nepali political groups, while avoiding appearing intrusive, to overcome the protracted and tumultuous political impasse and form a durable government.

AbstractThe empirical evidence indicates that ethnic autonomy arrangements (EAAs) survive more often than not, but this mixed track record raises an important question. What accounts for the survival of some systems and not others? We theorize that that this differential survival rate is partly a function of variation in their internal structure. EAAs that are structured to create and best sustain an equilibrium in bargaining relations between center d periphery have the highest probability of survival. It follows logically that the more unbalanced the system in favor of either the center or periphery, the less likely to survive. We test the theory using logit analysis on an original data set drawn from the universe of post‐1945 EAAs. After controlling for level of democracy and wealth disparity, the key finding is that the internal structure of an EAA matters for its survival. One important implication of these findings is that, for any given level of democracy, ethnofederal systems can be systematically designed to maximize survival prospects

The current struggle to define the basic contours of Iraq's political system pits those who support a loose federal arrangement against advocates of a return to centralized rule. Increasingly, this struggle is being defined in ethnic terms, with (mainly) Kurds defending the constitutional status quo against concerted efforts on the part of (Arab) Iraqi nationalists to reconfigure the balance of power between the center and the regions. The March 2010 election seems certain to strengthen the latter at the expense of the former. This paper outlines an alternative approach to Iraq's federalism dilemma. Using the exemplar case of the Aringland Islands, it is argued that a strongly centralized Arab Iraq is not inherently incompatible with an autonomous Kurdistan Region, and that by anchoring the Kurds' autonomous status in international law, a destructive descent towards violent ethnic conflict can be avoided. Adapted from the source document.