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Citizens minimize information costs by obtaining political guidance from others who have already assumed the costs of acquiring and processing political information. A problem occurs because ideal informants, typically characterized by the joint presence of political expertise and shared viewpoints, are frequently unavailable or rare within the groups where individuals are located. Hence, individuals must often look beyond their own group boundaries to find such informants. The problem is that obtaining information from individuals located beyond their own groups produces additional costs. Moreover, the availability of ideal informants varies across groups and settings, with the potential to produce (1) context‐dependent patterns of informant centrality, which in turn generate (2) varying levels of polarization among groups and (3) biases in favor of some groups at the expense of others. The article's analysis is based on a series of small‐group experiments, with aggregate implications addressed using a simple agent‐based model.

The impact of the cardinal relationships among pecuniary payoffs, & of social history & reputation, on the choice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games is experimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoff values linked to "fear" & 'greed" are important as predictors of behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoff dominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games also increases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. The effect of past play is strongest when individuals are matched repeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted to being matched randomly with another player. 6 Tables, 4 Figures, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

Secure property rights result from a combination of public enforcement, private protective measures, and voluntary norm-compliance. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how culture interacts with institutions in shaping individuals' behaviors and group outcomes in a property rights dilemma. The experiment is conducted in five countries: Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. We find that the security of property varies with the experimentally available institutions and country-level indicators such as trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust are more likely to abstain initially from theft, devote more resources to production and support funding public protection of property through taxation. Our findings highlight the relevance of cultural and institutional factors, and their interaction, in addressing the collective action problem of safeguarding property rights. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries - Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries' success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries - Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are the correlations between experimental choices with indicators regarding the security of property, trust and the quality of government. We show that subjects from countries with: (1) higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain from plundering and devote less resources to protect their property; and (2) high-quality political institutions support collective protection of property through taxation more often. Our results highlight the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries' success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries- Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries' success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries - Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries' success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.