Suchergebnisse

More than four years after the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed, the conventional arms control process in Europe remains deadlocked. The main sticking point continues to be Russia's non-compliance with the commitments it made at the 1999 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul Summit, particularly those regarding the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia and Moldova. The second wave of NATO enlargement caused Russia to intensify its diplomatic and political rhetoric in 2003 and early 2004, alleging that enlargement would deal a 'fatal blow' to the European conventional arms control regime. The resulting confrontation has made both NATO and Russia aware of the need to find a means to deal with the problem. In 2003 the OSCE participating states remained focused on improving certain norm- and standard-setting measures (NSSMs) and developing new ones in order to better respond to the various threats and challenges facing Europe and its perimeter. In 2003 a Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was published to assist participating states in implementing the 2000 OSCE SALW Document. A great deal of work was also done to promote the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (COC) in the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus and in other former Soviet states. The OSCE's efforts to combat terrorism led the participating states to propose new arms control-related initiatives. Most significantly, at the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition was adopted, setting out a process whereby requesting states would receive assistance with the destruction of their surplus ammunition. The Treaty on Open Skies had a smooth second year of implementation. Three states ratified the treaty in 2003, and several others are in the process of doing so. In the Balkans, regional arms control continues to work well, evidently unaffected by political, economic and other factors in the region. Although the European conventional arms control regime is by far the most advanced of its type in the world, significant progress is being made in other regions. Within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), headway was made in 2003 in elaborating the confidence -- and security -- building measures (CSBMs) process in the western hemisphere. A Meeting of Experts on CSBMs took place in Miami, Florida, which built on earlier meetings organized during the 1990s. Recommendations were made on voluntary CSBMs dealing with both traditional and new security threats. At the November Meeting of States Parties to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention), Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) was adopted. Among other things, the protocol commits signatories to clear or assist in the clearance of ERW following armed conflicts. The protocol was opened for signature and ratification. The attention given to restricting the use of anti-vehicle mines demonstrates the willingness of states to mitigate the consequences of the use of weapons that predominantly affect civilians. Adapted from the source document.

New START is slated to expire in February 2026 and cannot be extended. The next chapter in U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control, if there is to be one, may not be written until rulers in Moscow ease repression at home, pull troops out of Ukraine, and recognize the mutual benefits of reducing, rather than stoking, nuclear tensions.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime came under growing pressure in 2002. North Korea restarted the nuclear facilities 'frozen' by the 1994 Agreed Framework & announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran's acknowledgement of the existence of hitherto undeclared nuclear facilities fuelled suspicion about its nuclear weapon ambitions. In May, Russia & the US signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. The treaty gives the parties considerable flexibility to reduce their nuclear forces to between 1700 & 2200 warheads each by 2012 & marks a new approach to nuclear arms control. In Dec, the US announced a plan to deploy an anti-missile system to defend its territory. 2 Tables, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

With the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, trilateral arms control - meaning arms control between the United States, Russia, and China - has gained center stage. Only shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. President Trump declared that he wants a new nuclear pact to be signed by both Russia and China. Other U.S. administration officials have set the goal of including China in a future follow-on framework to the New START agreement, which expires in February 2021. Then again, could trilateral arms control be possible at all? What would be necessary conditions? Why should Washington, Moscow, and Beijing engage in an uncertain endeavor that promises to significantly affect their strategic relationships? The authors of this study address those and other questions.

The regional dynamic in South Asia is both extravagant and complicated. For centuries various empires have risen, thrived, and fallen, as numerous wars and clashes for control over resources spread across the geography. South Asian history writ large has seen hypothetical borders redrawn several times, leaving in question the viability of state control and perpetuating ethnic tensions. Though the great partition of India in 1947 ought to have politically resolved communal disharmony, the haste of British withdrawal created a geopolitical quagmire that has resulted in an "enduring rivalry" between the nations of India and Pakistan, one that has lasted for more than sixty years.

The article examines four cases of the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from international arms control agreements in the first two decades of the 21st century from the legislative branch perspective. Each of the four precedents is analyzed through the resolutions, which were submitted by legislators, in order to determine the difference in the approaches of Democrats and Republicans to arms control issues. Also, the paper discusses the constitutionality of presidential action and the exercise of congressional constitutional authority in the circumstances of the U.S. withdrawals from international agreements.

Reports on Russian-Georgian talks regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Chronology -- The Late 15th-Century Army -- The Army of Ivan the Terrible -- The 17th Century: New Threats, New Horizons -- 17th-Century Military Organization -- Fortification -- Russia's Frontiers -- Further Reading -- The Plates -- Index -- Author info & -- Illustrator info.