Suchergebnisse

THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO CLARIFY THE CONTINUING DEBATE ABOUT THE THEORETICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF VOTE TRADING. IT FIRST EMPHASIZES EXISTING DISTINCTIONS AMONG TYPES OF VOTE TRADING SYSTEMS, IN PARTICULAR EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT SYSTEMS. VOTE TRADING OVER INDIVIDUAL ISSUES, IT IS ARGUED, MAY BE STABLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

Although, conventionally, vote trading in legislatures has been condemned as socially undesirable by both scholars and lay citizens, a recently popular school of scholarship has argued that vote trading improves the traders' welfare in the direction of Pareto-optimal allocations. This essay is an attempt to reconcile the disagreement by showing formally that vote trading does improve the position of the traders but that at the same time trading may impose an external cost on nontraders. In sum, it turns out that sporadic and occasional trading is probably socially beneficial but that systematic trading may engender a paradox of vote trading. This paradox has the property that, while trading is immediately advantageous for the traders, still, when everybody trades, everybody is worse off. Furthermore, vote trading may not produce a stable equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal either for individual members or for coalitions of members.

THROUGH THE USE OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVE THE FOLLOWING THEOREM TO THIS EFFECT: IN EVERY LEGISLATURE MEETING CERTAIN APPARENTLY REALISTIC CONDITIONS, THE OUTCOME THAT WOULD PREVAIL IN THE ABSENCE OF VOTE TRADING HAS GOT TO BE PARETO INEFFICIENT; THERE MOST EXIST AT LEAST ONE POTENTIAL VOTE TRADE THAT WOULD MAKE EVERY LEGISLATOR BETTER OFF THAN HE WOULD BE IN THE ABSENCE OF VOTES

It is argued in this article that legislative vote trading by representatives is both ethically permissible and may be ethically required in many cases. This conclusion is an implication of a thin, general account of representation that requires representatives to vote on the basis of the perceived preferences or interests of their constituents. These special duties arise from a thin account of representation and create a weak, defeasible duty for representatives to engage in what they believe will be beneficial vote trades. After establishing this claim, the article considers two objections to this duty. One is based on equating legislative vote trading with corruption, and the other argues that logrolling iolates the 'duty of civility'. Neither objection undermines the main claim that there is a weak duty to engage in logrolling. Nevertheless, the implications of this duty may be troubling for other reasons.

In recent time, the method of electoral democracy in Nigeria reflects the form of vote trading where exchange of cash and material goods become prevalent. This undue influence and subversion of electorate vote by political parties and candidates leaves significant gap in election and electoral process which are critical to promoting electoral governance. This study assessed the impact of vote trading on voter's behaviour, and examined the implication of vote trading on electoral governance in Osun State 2018 governorship election in Nigeria.