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Explores cosmopolitanism in terms of political communities that transcend state borders, situating this treatment in the field of cosmopolitan democracy that views human needs as best served by global political institutions. Discussion opens with a consideration of various interpretations of cosmopolitanism, contending that political theorists employ the term without any idea of a global community of citizens. It is asserted that two ways exist for building political communities beyond national identities, assimilation into larger communities that replicate particularistic nationhood traits or federalization that fosters loyalties to the larger unit. The latter, multinational federalism, appears most promising. However, such a cosmopolitan project must address issues of asymmetry, enlargement, & democratization. In this light, it is asked whether current conditions of globalization even allow for the emergence of a global political community before even considering the possibility of cosmopolitan democracy. Thus, various patterns of extant supranational political community are examined to determine their impact on democratic citizenship. Four boundary regimes through which political communities can relate in a larger supranational context are identified: separate, nested, multilevel, or overlapping. It is argued that, in fact, the state system is transforming via a combination of the nested, multilevel, & overlapping patterns. In this light, the UN & EU are assessed. Focus turns to overlapping affiliations as manifest in transborder national minorities, global networks of indigenous groups, & transnational migrant communities. It is concluded that a cosmopolitan democracy might arise from this overlapping pattern of minority communities should an endogenous development of liberal norms emerge in response to challenges raised by the claims of these transnational communities' leaders. J. Zendejas

This article critically examines the extent to which the European Public Prosecutor's Office can be claimed to constitute a prime example of supranational criminal law. The article observes that among policymakers and commentators, the Office appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity. The article discusses the scope, nature and limits to the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as its operating structure in light of Article 86 TFEU and the recently adopted EPPO Regulation. It departs from the basic assumption that the EPPO stands in the midst of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Whilst the EPPO is envisaged to be independent of the Member States, the Office's complicated, multifaceted and vertical structure means that Member States are able to direct, to some extent, its activities. The article argues, however, that a general assessment of the Office's operational and strategic direction (where its operational activities are managed and supervised by centralized 'European' prosecutors), and the type (direct criminal enforcement powers) of powers it has makes it distinctive as the most 'integrated' and 'supranational' EU agency.

This article critically examines the claim that EPPO is a proper federal supranational prosecutor. The article observes that the EPPO among policymakers and commentators appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity. The EPPO primarily stands out among other EU agencies by having been conferred with an independent competence to prosecute crimes relating to the common EU financial interest. By establishing the EPPO, the Union has practically assumed such competences that traditionally belong to the central government in a federal state. The article discusses comprehensively the scope, nature and limits to the EPPO's powers as well as its operating structure in light of Article 86 TFEU and the recently adopted EPPO Regulation. It departs from the basic assumption that the EPPO stands in the midst of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Whilst the EPPO is envisaged to be independent from the Member States, the EPPO's complicated, multifaceted and vertical structure entails that Member States maintain a certain direction of its activities. It, however, argues that a general assessment of the EPPO's operational and strategic direction (where its operational activities are managed and supervised by centralised 'European' prosecutors), and the type (direct criminal enforcement powers) and nature of its powers (criminal prosecutorial powers) makes it distinctive as the most 'integrated' and 'supranational' EU agency.

We present a theory of European legal integration that relies on three causal factors: transnational exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and the production of legal norms. After stating the theory in abstract terms, we explain the construction of the legal system and test the relationship among our three variables over the life of the European Community. We then examine the effect of the EC legal system on policy outcomes at both the national and supranational levels in two policy domains: the free movement of goods and gender equality. Our theory outperforms its leading rival, intergovernmentalism. The evidence shows that European integration has generally been driven by transnational activity and the efforts of EC institutions to reduce transaction costs, behavior which governments react to but do not control.

We present a theory of European legal integration that relies on three causal factors: transnational exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and the production of legal norms. After stating the theory in abstract terms, we explain the construction of the legal system and test the relationship among our three variables over the life of the European Community. We then examine the effect of the EC legal system on policy outcomes at both the national and supranational levels in two policy domains: the free movement of goods and gender equality. Our theory outperforms its leading rival, intergovernmentalism. The evidence shows that European integration has generally been driven by transnational activity and the efforts of EC institutions to reduce transaction costs, behavior which governments react to but do not control. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Grieves reviews 'Law Above Nations: Supranational Courts and the Legalization of Politics' edited by Mary L. Volcansek.

This article critically examines the claim that EPPO is a proper federal supranational prosecutor. The article observes that the EPPO among policymakers and commentators appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity. The EPPO primarily stands out among other EU agencies by having been conferred with an independent competence to prosecute crimes relating to the common EU financial interest. By establishing the EPPO, the Union has practically assumed such competences that traditionally belong to the central government in a federal state. The article discusses comprehensively the scope, nature and limits to the EPPO's powers as well as its operating structure in light of Article 86 TFEU and the recently adopted EPPO Regulation. It departs from the basic assumption that the EPPO stands in the midst of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Whilst the EPPO is envisaged to be independent from the Member States, the EPPO's complicated, multifaceted and vertical structure entails that Member States maintain a certain direction of its activities. It, however, argues that a general assessment of the EPPO's operational and strategic direction (where its operational activities are managed and supervised by centralised 'European' prosecutors), and the type (direct criminal enforcement powers) and nature of its powers (criminal prosecutorial powers) makes it distinctive as the most 'integrated' and 'supranational' EU agency.