Suchergebnisse

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira ; Este estudo oferece uma análise empírica sobre o impacto da comunicação de política económica conduzida pelo BCE e a Comissão Europeia no mercado de títulos de divida soberana. Com este objetivo, foram recolhidas noticias relacionadas com a política monetária e orçamental desde do início do Euro até 2013. Os resultados do estudo mostram que os spreads dos títulos de divida soberana refletem três tipos de risco, risco de crédito através da atividade económica e competitividade, risco de liquidez e risco internacional. Os eventos de política monetária têm um papel relevante no mercado de títulos de divida soberana e parecem ser antecipados. Por outro lado, os eventos de política orçamental relacionados com os "braços" do PEC não têm um papel fundamental neste mercado. ; This study provides an empirical analysis on how the communication of economic policy conducted by the ECB and the European Commission affects the European bond market. For this purpose, it was collected a set of periodic news from the beginning of the Euro until 2013, related with the monetary and fiscal policy events. The results of the study show that sovereign spreads reflect three sources of risk, credit risk through economic activity and competiveness, liquidity risk and international risk. The monetary events play a role in the bond market and they seem to be anticipated. On the other hand, fiscal policy events related with the "arms" of the SGP do not have a key role in this context.

We expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in democratic polities by analysing the determinants of sovereign spreads of EU member states over the course of the past two decades. Our analysis builds on the "democratic advantage" argument which suggests democracies enjoy preferential treatment on the international market of sovereign debt because of their better ability to make credible commitments. We suggest that, when it comes to the market's evaluation of internal political instability and risk in democratic polities, there actually exists a "consolidated democracy advantage". In times of political instability, older and more consolidated democracies pay less of a premium on their debt than their younger and less consolidated counterparts. In other words, the market indeed views the commitment of consolidated democracies with long track records of democratic competition and survival as something qualitatively diferent than the commitment of new democracies with short track records.

We expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in democratic polities by analysing the determinants of sovereign spreads of EU member states over the course of the past two decades. Our analysis builds on the "democratic advantage" argument which suggests democracies enjoy preferential treatment on the international market of sovereign debt because of their better ability to make credible commitments. We suggest that, when it comes to the market's evaluation of internal political instability and risk in democratic polities, there actually exists a "consolidated democracy advantage". In times of political instability, older and more consolidated democracies pay less of a premium on their debt than their younger and less consolidated counterparts. In other words, the market indeed views the commitment of consolidated democracies with long track records of democratic competition and survival as something qualitatively diferent than the commitment of new democracies with short track records.