State, Labour and Market in Post-Revolution Serbia
In: Capital & class: CC, Heft 89, S. 1-30
ISSN: 0309-8168
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In: Capital & class: CC, Heft 89, S. 1-30
ISSN: 0309-8168
In: East European politics and societies: EEPS, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 879-900
ISSN: 1533-8371
The article presents a comparative examination of the structure of political ideology in two post-communist countries, Serbia and Hungary. A broad set of indicators of specific political attitudes is reduced to a smaller number of latent ideological dimensions via factor analysis. The precise meaning of the dimensions is determined after the analysis of their relationships with authoritarianism, out-group sympathy, prejudices, ideological self-identification, party-preference, and socio-demographic variables. Hungarian mass attitudes vary along dimensions of (1) alienation—socialism and (2) nationalist—antisocialism. Results for Serbia revealed the convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes into a single dimension while another factor joined egalitarianism with social alienation. In both countries, authoritarianism is an important determinant of ideological dimensions, especially of pro-communist nationalism in Serbia and alienation— socialism in Hungary. Socio-demographic background variables are weaker determinants of ideological dimensions in Serbia compared with Hungary. In both countries, attitudinal factors differentiate supporters of the main political parties.
In: Citizenship studies, Band 16, Heft 3-4, S. 323-336
ISSN: 1469-3593
In: Nationalities papers: the journal of nationalism and ethnicity, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 205-226
ISSN: 0090-5992
Describes the present situation of the Roma in the former Yugoslavia, drawing on interview & other data. It is shown that the condition of the Roma in the post-1989 period has deteriorated. The collapse of communism has caused rampant unemployment, especially among factory workers. Moreover, the majority of Romani are undereducated & unskilled. War & ethnic cleansing have forced thousands of Roma individuals to migrate across the region, often without proper travel documents. Because the Roma do not belong to any particular region of the former Yugoslavia, they have been denied citizenship in most of the new territories because of rabid nationalism. The condition of the Roma today is likened to that of the Jews in 1930s Germany. Romani leaders are attempting to educate their community & many young Romani have participated in a human rights movement. However, these positive efforts have not diminished the dire situation of the Roma in the post-1989 former Yugoslavia. D. Ryfe
In: The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century; Routledge Studies of Societies in Transition
In: International journal of politics, culture and society, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 147-168
ISSN: 0891-4486
A discussion of how the collective retreat into a mythical past of ethnic unity & purity has been used to justify Serbian nationalistic violence. It is argued that the Balkan genocide has in effect ended the twentieth century. The former peaceful coexistence of different cultures in Yugoslavia has been shattered by Serbian insistence on cultural superiority. The emphasis on personal mythologies & the depoliticization of literature in the writing of young Slovene authors is argued to be a tactic for defending freedom through defending introspective verses. These stories about ordinary people express the consequences of social change for people throughout former Yugoslavia. D. Schwartz
In: International journal of media and cultural politics: MCP, Band 5, Heft 1-2, S. 89-101
ISSN: 2040-0918
In: Nations and nationalism: journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 21-43
ISSN: 1469-8129
This paper investigates electoral outcomes produced by the two-round majority system in ethnically divided societies. Earlier studies, focused mainly on the Southern American states, have revealed that in ethnically mixed environments, competitors with radical positions on ethnic issues perform particularly well. This paper extends this idea to municipal elections in Serbia, showing how radical majority nationalist parties exhibit particularly strong performances in ethnically mixed municipalities. While this effect is also apparent under proportional representation, we argue that it is much stronger when a two-round majority vote system is employed. Adapted from the source document.
In the context of understanding elite dynamics in Serbia, elite theories are overviewed & a definition of elites proffered before discussing how class & elite theoretical perspectives are applied to the study of state socialist collapse & consequent social change. Arguing that it is not useful to speak of elite circulation & reproduction, a distinction is drawn between the failure of the nomenklatura as the former ruling class & a new class structuration wherein elites play a formative role. Favored is the idea of the "adaptive reconstruction of elites." How members of the socialist ruling class used a "blocked transformation" in the former Yugoslavia to convert their monopolistic positions into focused forms of economic & political capital more suitable to postsocialist conditions is demonstrated. The dynamics of personnel reconstruction are addressed, along with the reconstruction of material positions of social strata. Attention turns to how shifts in elite reproduction processes have gone together with an ideological shift. It is concluded that this process of elite reconstruction underpins a new social order whereby old socialist cadres & outsiders will form the heart of a new ruling class. 5 Tables, 19 References. J. Zendejas
In: Osteuropa, Band 63, Heft 11-12
ISSN: 0030-6428
In Serbia, a fashion and music style of the Milosevic era is experiencing a revival. Young people are once again wearing the same gym shoes and listening to the same dance music as the Dizelasi of the 1990s. In doing so, most young people are associating nostalgic memories with a time that they did not experience. Very few know that they are imitating the style of a subculture that was dominated by criminals. Adapted from the source document.
In: Peace review: the international quarterly of world peace, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 249-254
ISSN: 1040-2659
Reasons to distinguish between the elites responsible for war & violence in the former Yugoslavia & the rest of the Serbian population are advanced. The war in Yugoslavia has been portrayed in black & white terms; ie, all Serbians supported the aggressive & nationalistic policies of the elites. However, more recent reports show that many Serbs were not properly informed about political decisions by elites & were subjected to exploitation & manipulation. After the war, in 1997, demonstrations against the elites reached a high point, but the international community has not recognized differences between the incumbent, Slobodan Milosevic, & the opposition parties, nor the differences between civil & nationalistic demonstrations. It appears that the international community is reluctant to punish the elites for war crimes for fear that a less manipulatable leader than Milosevic may appear. It is recommended that the West impose punishment & sanctions on those responsible for war crimes, not on the entire populace, & assist the opposition coalition with the country's increasing economic difficulties. Adapted from the source document.
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 601-619
ISSN: 2325-7784
As is well known, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was founded on December 1,1918, did not achieve the success envisaged for it. It is generally assumed that the state was the direct product of Yugoslavism, a Croatian concept formulated in the nineteenth century, which found adherents among the Serbs and Slovenes. Although there is no consensus among scholars concerning the precise definition of Yugoslavism, in its basic terms the concept called for the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one state. The proponents of Yugoslavism argued that as long as the three nations remained separate they were subject to domination by their stronger neighbors, whereas united they would be in a better position to determine their own future. These proponents never agreed on the exact political organization of the union, whether it should be a centralized or federalized state, but they assumed that the kingdom would have one army and a single foreign and trade policy, and that each nation would retain considerable local autonomy, for example, in education, religious affairs, and police jurisdiction. Yet the ultimate success of Yugoslavism was dependent on the acceptance by Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the basic premise that they were in essence one people, and that eventually they would no longer give primacy to their Serbianism, Croatianism, and Slovenianism but would offer their undivided loyalty to the larger Yugoslav concept.
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 601-619
ISSN: 0037-6779
In: Praxis international: a philosophical journal, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 405-415
ISSN: 0260-8448
Examines one cause of the war in the former Yugoslavia -- the political articulation of the Serbian state issue over the last five years -- focusing on Serbian ethnicity & the political vacuum created by the demise of the communist state. Interethnic relations in communist & postcommunist Serbia & the Serbian regime's turn toward authoritarianism in 1988 are explored, & it is contended that the changes in Serbia's political system that took place in 1990 were the result of pressure brought on by political developments in other Yugoslav republics & other socialist countries in Europe. W. Howard
In: International journal of politics, culture and society, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 149-167
ISSN: 0891-4486
Analysis of historical & current economic conditions shows that the costs of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia are staggering. Historically, all eight constitutional entities have claimed that the national association led to economic exploitation & loss, & that economic prosperity would come with secession. However, since secession, only Slovenia has retained its economic position, because so much of its economy is in exports. Croatia & Bosnia have had tremendous losses in population & infrastructure as a result of the war. Macedonia was always a net recipient of federal funds, which no longer exist. Transportation costs in Serbia & Montenegro have soared, creating economic drains. A new elite class has been created throughout the former Yugoslavia because of privatization & economic fragmentation, while the prevously powerful middle class has disappeared. It appears that a framework of internal markets, as in the former state, are vital to a future successful external market, if economic cooperation between the different states ensues after the true economic costs of secession are assessed. 2 Tables. M. Pflum