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This work is an essay on privileged groups in Peru. More than evidencing the findings of some research, the objective is to put some questions to the debate. This can allow us to rethink some things that we believed to be true about the Peruvian elites from the social sciences. Therefore, this essay is first dedicated to characterizing who would be the most privileged groups in Peru. Later, we argue how it has an origin, common reproduction mechanisms and a country project based on an ideology. Thus, an interesting agenda can be pened in the academy to analyze how it maintains its privileges within a "democratic" society and how to face the imposition of a society project. ; El presente trabajo es un ensayo sobre los grupos privilegiados en el Perú. Más que evidenciar los hallazgos de alguna investigación, el objetivo es poner algunas cuestiones al debate. Esto nos puede permitir repensar algunas cosas que creíamos ciertas sobre las elites peruanas desde las ciencias sociales. Por ende, en este ensayo primero nos dedicamos a caracterizar quiénes a los grupos más privilegiados en el Perú. Después, argumentamos como estos cuentan con un origen, mecanismos de reproducción comunes y un proyecto de país basado en una ideología. Así, se puede abrir una agenda interesante en la academia para analizar como mantiene sus privilegios dentro de una sociedad "democrática" y cómo hacer frente a la imposición de un proyecto de sociedad.

The Israeli citizenship regime is a moving target. Some basic social, ethnic and political divisions which are captured by the categories of nationality, ethnicity, class, gender and religiosity are redefined by day-to-day administrative, regulatory and political processes. In these ways, Israeli citizenship is not so much a matter of constitutional debates on abstract rights of all or parts of the citizenry, it is also and more importantly, a manifestation of regulatory processes. The basic divisions are explored here with regard to a newly defined "credit ranking" regime which has been constructed by various state actors during the past two decades. This regime promotes the establishment of a new kind of citizenship, a financial citizenship. As part of its activity, each citizen is categorized according to his or her 'financial worth', and their personal financial profile is constructed as a device for identifying, locating and classifying targeted populations. Under these information markets citizens are no longer seen as individual customers, but as varying degrees of commercial risks and revenues. The new regime is expected to enhance competition in the highly centralized banking sector and encourage more competitions in this field. In this sense, these market-building initiatives are part of an extension of the credit based culture (or Financialization) of Israeli citizenship. The research, which is the first academic research on this issue in Israel, analyzes the policy process and extends the discussion around it by analyzing the economic, social and political aspects of Israeli citizenship in general and regarding minority and disadvantaged groups in particular.

Many movements are strengthened by the support of outside parties yet we know little about how members of privileged groups develop an insurgent mentality. In this article, I explain how some white, middle class North Americans developed oppositional consciousness that led them to resist U.S. policy toward Central America. I argue that solidarity organizers, many of whom were former missionaries, facilitated this cognitive shift within the free spaces provided by progressive U.S. churches. In this context, missionaries cultivated a Christian culture of resistance by conveying "moral shocks" and politicizing the religious themes of conversion and resurrection. As time progressed and this oppositional culture and consciousness waned, they also created transmovement free spaces where rituals were used to reinforce this insurgent mentality.

We present a model of deliberative inclusion, focusing on reciprocity in the interaction between structural minorities/disadvantaged groups and majorities/privileged groups. Our model, however, comes with a 'friendly amendment': we have put the 'burden of reciprocity' mainly on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Empirically, we apply our model to the interaction of linguistic groups in the Swiss parliament. We find a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode of interaction between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities. The German-speaking majority seems to be willing to take the 'burden of reciprocity' when linguistic minorities' vital interests are concerned. Conversely, linguistic minorities are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions.

We present a model of deliberative inclusion, focusing on reciprocity in the interaction between structural minorities/disadvantaged groups and majorities/privileged groups. Our model, however, comes with a 'friendly amendment': we have put the 'burden of reciprocity' mainly on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Empirically, we apply our model to the interaction of linguistic groups in the Swiss parliament. We find a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode of interaction between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities. The German-speaking majority seems to be willing to take the 'burden of reciprocity' when linguistic minorities' vital interests are concerned. Conversely, linguistic minorities are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions.

We present a model of deliberative inclusion, focusing on reciprocity in the interaction between structural minorities/disadvantaged groups and majorities/privileged groups. Our model, however, comes with a 'friendly amendment': we have put the 'burden of reciprocity' mainly on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Empirically, we apply our model to the interaction of linguistic groups in the Swiss parliament. We find a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode of interaction between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities. The German-speaking majority seems to be willing to take the 'burden of reciprocity' when linguistic minorities' vital interests are concerned. Conversely, linguistic minorities are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions.

The effect of solo status was investigated in 32 same-sex small groups in which the racial status of one of the four members was systematically varied to reflect African American and White group majorities. During one task-oriented session, each group member made ratings of one another and selected one member to be leader on a future task. Judgments of solos varied as a function of their racial status. African American solos were judged more favorably and were more often selected to be leader than were White targets in both African American and White majorities. More generally, these findings indicate that theories of relative numbers and salience effects that explain group processes in gender contexts do not apply in the same way to race contexts. Implications of these findings for organizational settings, and interracial interaction in small groups are discussed.

This article speaks to an established interest of International Relations scholars in the construction of the 'China threat' in US political discourse. We advance recent works which have argued that the rise of China has contributed to the success of populism in the United States and Western liberal democracies more widely. Specifically, we transpose the concept of the 'populism of the privileged' to the international realm to understand how narratives of status loss nurture perceptions of collective trauma and victimhood. We argue that the concept helps explain why Trump's anti-China populism is centred on the counterintuitive articulation of an American underdog identity at the domestic and international levels. It sheds light on why populist narratives of unjust suffering have grip even if supporters stem from comparatively privileged groups. Victimhood-centric narratives are always relational and, as we show, the imaginary of lost status is a powerful device in the populist toolbox.

A growing literature documents that public policy in modern democracies fails to represent the preferences of traditionally marginalized subconstituencies. By dissecting party agendas, I show that inequality already permeates the very politicization of issues before democratic decision-making even begins. Election platforms worldwide predominantly reflect the concerns of male, educated and affluent citizens. That parties disregard large voter groups at this early stage seems surprising given that campaign agendas are inherently public. My analysis reveals that looming electoral backlash is anticipated by a strategy of "discreet" inequality. In particular, agendas are designed to appear inconspicuous and agreeable by exempting issues from unequal responsiveness that voters perceive as divisive or threatening. Discreet inequality thus appeases marginalized groups while ignoring their views on the large majority of more ordinary issues. The article demonstrates these patterns for gender, education, and income using comparative survey and manifesto data covering 42 countries.

In defining international free trade as a public good, "hegemonic stability theory" posited early in the 1970s that its reliable supply depended upon a distribution of international power analogous to that within a privileged group. More recently, however, critics have challenged three assumptions fundamental to hegemonic theory: its premises of free trade, public goods, and privileged groups. They have concluded that hegemony is not necessary for, and indeed may be antithetical to, a stable world economy based on market exchange.The author argues that the critics overstate their case. The assumptions they attack allow hegemonic theory to represent analytically several critically important barriers to free trade among states. Among these are the existence of strategic interdependence among the actors and the prevalence of informational asymmetries. The most significant flaw in hegemonic theory is its neglect of the essence of the domain to which it applies: the politics of inter-state trade in an anarchic world.

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire including both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media campaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively, hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to decision-making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contacts and mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies – an administrative, a parliamentary, a media and a mobilization strategy – finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pursuance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis-à-vis decision makers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privileged position does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensively pursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members.

"Book Summary This book is a collection of essays and anecdotes in which the author recounts some of her lived experiences. She shares these anecdotes to unpack her privilege while exposing the toxicity of privileged groups in Mexican society; the documented, wealthy, middle-class, white, white-passing, bilingual, non-Black, non-Indigenous, educated, catholic, heterosexual, cisgender, and able-bodied. While talking about herself, her family, and the education system as she experienced it, the author talks about her process of unlearning ingrained nocive values such as colorblindness, ethnocentrism, and toxic nationalism. Also touched upon are some of the nocive behaviors and rhetoric that privileged Mexicans (in Mexico) carry with themselves because of their failure to challenge the multiple systems of oppression that they benefit from. Y tú ¿qué hora traes? represents but a tiny fraction of the problems, power structures and social injustices that remain unchallenged in Mexico. It is the author's hope to continue to grow her understanding of the issues that are presented here and to continue working from a self-reflective perspective"--

"Counter-revolution has long been a tool of propagandists to redirect populist movements from achieving actual liberation for themselves. But what happens when counter-revolutionaries begin to believe their own claims of genuine revolution? What leads to such a phenomenon? And how big a role does mainstream political ideology and policy play in the mass ignorance and revisionism that has now allowed nationalism to influence national elections? Privileged Populists sets out to answer these questions while aiming to understand the organic emergence of anti-political populism within the context of late-stage capitalism in the West. This book analyses how these elements inform and validate each other as means of appealing to the growing sense of cultural angst and economic unrest within the conservative working class-and unwittingly giving undue credence to some of the most extreme right-wing ideological claims in the process. What results is a journey through the history of revolutionary thought (and how that history has been distorted over time), as well as an anthropological investigation of populism itself as a naturally occurring logic within groups-and how it can be exploited in the absence of substantive mainstream solutions to present-day economic crises."