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Powerpoint presentation prepared for the Institute of Public Policy concerning communication between researchers and policy-makers.

The thesis is presented that a change in the opinion of the majority of the public is not necessary for successful desegregation; but while the prior racial att's of the public are irrelevant to the success of desegregation, the actions of the policy-makers are crucial & provide a strategic key to the success or failure of desegregation. The conditions associated with successful introduction of desegregation are summarized. The testimony of the Superintendent of the Louisville Sch's is cited as a case in point. M. Maxfield.

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multitask problems typically have some outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and policy-makers have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes for some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level. ; ISSN:1097-3923 ; ISSN:1467-9779

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.

"Crowdfunding is already transforming the way many entrepreneurs and enterprises around the globe think about community engagement and fundraising for various causes. This book puts forth the belief that policy makers, public servants and various governments, municipalities and regions can significantly benefit from crowdfunding through employing crowd-related mechanisms within their frameworks and using their crowd as an asset - a crowdasset. Using real-world examples, this book explores the opportunities presented by crowdfunding and crowdfunded innovation, and how major policy makers are already using crowdfunding and crowd mechanisms to accelerate innovation, engagement and community transformation. A guide for those involved in crowdfunding, CrowdAsset brings readers through the journey of maximizing crowd impact"--

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some scholars have argued that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser induces the adviser to act more in line with the policy maker's interests. The idea is that the adviser's desire to put a stamp on future policy reduces his incentive to manipulate information. This paper shows that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser may harm her. The reason is that this power may have an adverse effect on the behavior of good advisers.

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