Trade Imbalances and Multilateral Trade Cooperation
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4050
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4050
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Working paper
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 340-346
A system of multilateral trade means no more, fundamentally, than the right of exporters of a country to sell in any market and the right of importers to buy in any market. The right to export must be without discrimination and with complete freedom to transfer the proceeds of exports; and the right to import must be without discrimination and with complete freedom to transfer the funds to pay for imports. In short, multilateral trade involves the convertibility of currencies for current payments and the absence of any discrimination in exports and imports on the basis of the country with which or the currency in which the trade is undertaken.On the face of it, multilateral trade yields the greatest benefits to each country from any given volume of exports and imports. As the exports can be sold in the highest-priced markets, without regard to the currency in which payment is received, the money value of the exports will be maximized. And as the imports can be bought in the lowest-priced markets, without regard to the currency in which payment is made, the money cost of the imports will be minimized. On the other hand, under bilateral trade, it becomes necessary to import, even at higher cost, from those markets whose currencies are available from export proceeds. And it becomes desirable to export, even at lower price, to those markets whose currencies are needed to pay for more essential imports. Because it is difficult to direct exports on the basis of social need for currencies, there will be a strong tendency to secure the bilateral balancing of payments through a restriction of imports by the country with a bilateral deficit.
Rising current account and merchandise trade imbalances marked the years before the global financial and economic crisis. These imbalances either contributed to or precipitated the crisis and to the extent that they create systemic risks, it is desirable that they be reduced. There are many factors related to macroeconomic, structural, exchange rate and financial policies that contributed to the imbalances. The inability to manage these issues at the international level reflects the coherence gap in global governance. This paper examines the contribution that the WTO can make in its three areas of activities - negotiations, rule-making and dispute settlement - to deal with trade imbalances and with the main factors leading to them, including exchange rate misalignments. First, market opening efforts in services, including in the area of financial services, can reduce policy-related distortions and market imperfections in surplus countries that lead to the build-up of unsustainable imbalances. Second, in the context of a broad international effort to coordinate macroeconomic, exchange rate and structural policies to deal with the roots of imbalances (the first-best solution), there is a general efficiency argument that could be made for the use of WTO-triggered trade actions to enforce cooperative behaviour towards rebalancing. Absent this first-best response, trade rules alone would not provide an efficient instrument to compensate for the weaknesses in international co-operation in macroeconomic, exchange rate and structural policies.
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In: Global governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 313-325
ISSN: 1942-6720
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 349-358
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
In: Nord-Süd aktuell: Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Nord-Süd und Süd-Süd-Entwicklungen, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 463-469
ISSN: 0933-1743
World Affairs Online
In: Economica, Band 65, Heft 258, S. 161-177
ISSN: 1468-0335
We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries' aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries' objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core).
In: International organization, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 353-354
ISSN: 1531-5088
By April 1949 Australia had ratified the ITO Charter, contingent on its being put into effect by the United States and the United Kingdom. Other countries were awaiting action by the United States, where President Truman was about to submit the Charter to the Congress for decision. With the acceptance of the Havana Charter by twenty countries necessary for the creation of ITO, Eric Wyndham White, Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission, stressed the importance of bringing ITO into being without delay. He described the organization as essentially a business-like approach towards the reduction of trade barriers and the expansion of trade on a multilateral, permanent basis.
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 1-21
ISSN: 1468-0491
In Economy and Society, Max Weber posits that bureaucracies that are not reined in by either democratic controls or market discipline will eventually start to pursue public policies that are detrimental to those whose lives these policies should enable or improve. During the last ten years, a number of scholars, activists, parliamentarians, journalists and whistleblowers have come to argue that Weber's hypothesis has often held up for the functioning of multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. At least, it appears that little democratic control or market discipline has been imposed on multilateral organizations. Moreover, critics from both the left and the right have severely criticized such multilateral policies as development lending, deregulation of financial markets, and structural adjustment programs. Yet it remains difficult to agree upon appropriate remedies. Many proposals—ranging from outright abolishment of large international organizations to the establishment of global parliaments at the United Nations—have been tabled, but little consensus reigns and various disadvantages (as well as advantages) cling to each of these proposals. This special issue of Governance considers yet another way in which to make multilateral organizations more democratic and pluralistic: by making these organizations more deliberatively democratic. This introduction clarifies what is meant by deliberative decision–making and why it is worthwhile to consider making multilateral organizations more deliberative. It also sets out the other contributions to the issue, which offer different justifications for increased deliberation and discuss alternative forms in which multilateral organizations can be made more deliberatively democratic.
In: International Law - Book Archive pre-2000
In: Nijhoff Law Specials 26
In which ways do UN organizations carry out their multilateral development cooperation individually, as well as in cooperation with other organizations? This study answers this question from a public- management perspective. Such a perspective has rarely been used in the study of international organizations. In particular, the theoretical topics of governance, program management, and coordination in and among UN organizations are reviewed. More research on management may lead to adaptations within the UN system or information which will neutralize ill-founded criticism. An improved understanding of the internal functioning of UN organizations may enhance their efficiency and impact. Moreover, sometimes member states have such high expectations that the UN system cannot live up to them. In this way, UN members regulate their own disappointments with the UN system. A critical assessment of the limitations under which the UN organizations operate may prevent some of these high hopes and thus forestall some member state dissatisfaction. This study deals in particular with the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and their coordinated behaviour in the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP). This work will interest and be useful for managers in multilateral organizations and academics studying the functioning of these organizations
In: National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlets 59
In: An International Committee Report
In: The Committee on International Policy
In: Trade and development series
In: NBER-East Asia Seminar on Economics v.v. 69
In: National Bureau of Economic Research East Asia Seminar on Economics v.6
There is no doubt that the open multilateral trading system after World War II was a key ingredient in the rapid economic development of the entire world. Especially in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, exports increased dramatically both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GNP. In the 1980s, however, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) began to emerge as significant factors affecting world trade. This volume contains thirteen papers that analyze the tensions between multilateral trading systems and preferential trade arrangements and the impact of these tensions on East Asia
In: Integration Europas und Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft 36
In: American journal of international law, Band 91, Heft 4, S. 767-768
ISSN: 0002-9300