Suchergebnisse

As a response to the global financial crisis that started in 2008, many countries established dedicated resolution regimes that seek to limit the use of taxpayer money while maintaining the functions of failing banks that are critical for financial stability. This paper extends the existing research by zooming in on the specific topic of liquidity provision to banks in resolution. It examines the provision of liquidity in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and the banking union of the European Union (thereafter: the "banking union"). The paper observes the differences and commonalities of policy choices across jurisdictions with regard to both the relationship between private prefunding and temporary public liquidity provision and the roles of the public budget and the central bank. The comparison also reveals that the role of fiscal authorities is strong and that guarantees from a public budget are a common feature. The framework for the provision of liquidity in the banking union is not yet complete as the construction of a public sector backstop of sufficient size and speed is comparatively more complex in the banking union than in other jurisdictions. Therefore, the idea of establishing a European-level guarantee framework - which would allow access to Eurosystem liquidity for banks coming out of resolution with limited collateral - is being further investigated.

This paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on performance and a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The results show that banks exert less effort and take higher risks with discretionary monitoring policy. With public information about monitoring rules, there is more central bank monitoring and less need to provide emergency financing. Public information about monitoring resolves the multiple equilibria that arise with discretion and a unique equilibrium emerges where the probability of banking crisis is reduced.

We study the reaction of more than 60,000 firms to a large unexpected liquidity shock in Spain during a severe recessionary period. The Spanish central government repaid in 2012 almost 30bn euros (approximately 3% of GDP) of arrears that Territorial Administrations had been accumulating for years. We assess the economic impact of the plan using two alternative estimation strategies. First, we use a differences-in-differences (DID) approach that exploits heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms. Second, we take advantage of the plan's plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation and run a DID procedure using as control group some firms that were paid a year later. Overall, we find that a governmental liquidity injection during a recession increases corporate investment significantly: on average firms use 4% of cash transfers for investment. This effect is stronger for firms with lower default risk and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher default risk are more prone to repay financial debt. On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers to repay financial debt. ; Vicente also acknowledges nancial assistance from the International Mobility Program UC3M.