Suchergebnisse

International audience ; A lot of cases had arouse in the past decade about agreements between regional airports and low-cost carriers. These agreements are challenged on the basis of the State Aids European control as they rise concerns not only about competition distortions between airlines but also about fiscal competition risks among Member States or local governments. Such phenomena could be expected as regional airports are characterized by significant overcapacities and overlapping inducing a substitutability for airlines. Surprisingly, the new 2014 guidelines on State Aids granted to airlines open the way to transitory operating aid schemes, an option apparently at odds with the European longstanding principles. Our purpose in this paper is to demonstrate with the help of the development of a model, that such agreements can make sense from the economic point of view provided that the relationship between the carrier and the airport is no longer analyzed as a vertical chain, inducing an assessment in terms of economic dependence, but as a two-sided market. The favorable usage terms granted to low cost carriers generate additional flows on the other side, with commercial revenues from shops or parking. Consequently, subsidizing operating costs might be rational, even for a private investor in a market economy, and might be a perennial device.

International audience ; A variety of public economic policy measures have been designed and implemented in an effort to enable SMEs to limit damages resulting from the adverse sanitary and economic shocks associated with COVID-19. The originality of our study is to propose a rating of the various economic policy measures, the rating being expressed by SMEs owners conditional to their business expectations. In so doing, our contribution is to highlight the policy measures to be implemented in order to support resilient and ambitious ventures with the most positive prospects, which are likely to contribute the most to economic recovery. We exploit an original and rich dataset derived from a survey conducted in May 2020 among a representative sample of more than 2100 Belgian (Walloon) SMEs. The Belgian experience is remarkable because the wide variety of measures it undertook echoes many of the measures taken by OECD countries. Our results suggest that the respondents have an overall positive evaluation of the various economic and social policy measures implemented by the Belgian authorities. More importantly, the rating by SME owners with the most favorable expectations are, however, significantly different than their counterpart. Measures helping firms to maintain their workforce are particularly highly rated by firms with the best prospects. It also appears that those firms prefer short-term and transitory measures.

This study is aimed to survey the international literature on economies of scale in the water and sanitation sector, to synthesize it, and to extract a common thread. In the whole world they are been discussing how to provide a more equitable access and a more efficient provision. One issue related with efficiency is the possibility of taking advantage from economies of scale. The sector industrial structures had been changing in many places, through consolidation of highly atomized services, or the split of concentrated providers, or by changes in the pattern of providers' property, and those changes had been matter of heavy discussions. Some decisions could be very complex, because of political and social interests. The theoretical discussion and empirical results on scale economics in water and sanitation are useful to discover the trade-offs between concentration and de-concentration of services as policy measures.The studies from an important set of countries show scale economies (in different countries with different situations) in population served between 100 thousand to 1 million (in some cases extending to many millions), or with population densities of until 250 inhabitants per square kilometers, or with volumes up to 70 million of cubic meters per year. With lower populations, volumes or densities, first we can expect constant returns to scale, and next, in the larger enterprises, diseconomies of scale; in smaller providers, there are gains of agglomerating services. ; Este estudio se ocupa de relevar la literatura internacional sobre economías de escala en el sector de agua y saneamiento, reseñarla y extraer hilos conductores. En todo el mundo está en discusión cómo lograr un acceso más equitativo y una prestación más eficiente. Un tema vinculado con la eficiencia es la posibilidad de aprovechar economías de escala al dimensionar la prestación de agua potable y alcantarillado. La discusión teórica y los resultados empíricos sobre economías de escala en agua y saneamiento sirven para detectar si hay ...

The existence of a peak at 49 employees in the firm size distribution in France, followed by a permanent decrease in the number of firms has been the starting point of political discourses and academic studies on the cost of size-dependent regulations at 50-employee. These features of the distribution are visible when firm size is declared by employers in fiscal data but not when it is reconstructed from individual-level social security data. This working paper explores these differences both from statistical and institutional viewpoints. It provides evidence showing that a large proportion of employers manipulate the firm size they declare in their fiscal documents. This manipulation generates the particular shape of the size distribution in the fiscal data. We discuss the rationale for such behavior: the key point is that the under-declaration in fiscal data is not subject to substantial sanctions and it can allow firms not to comply with the labor law. Event studies and comparisons of firms below and above the 50-employee threshold suggest that this threshold may only have limited effects on firm performance or growth potential. Consequently the welfare costs of the regulations at 50-employee might be smaller than what was found by some of the studies that assume a perfect compliance with the law.

The existence of a peak at 49 employees in the firm size distribution in France, followed by a permanent decrease in the number of firms has been the starting point of political discourses and academic studies on the cost of size-dependent regulations at 50-employee. These features of the distribution are visible when firm size is declared by employers in fiscal data but not when it is reconstructed from individual-level social security data. This working paper explores these differences both from statistical and institutional viewpoints. It provides evidence showing that a large proportion of employers manipulate the firm size they declare in their fiscal documents. This manipulation generates the particular shape of the size distribution in the fiscal data. We discuss the rationale for such behavior: the key point is that the under-declaration in fiscal data is not subject to substantial sanctions and it can allow firms not to comply with the labor law. Event studies and comparisons of firms below and above the 50-employee threshold suggest that this threshold may only have limited effects on firm performance or growth potential. Consequently the welfare costs of the regulations at 50-employee might be smaller than what was found by some of the studies that assume a perfect compliance with the law.

The existence of a peak at 49 employees in the firm size distribution in France, followed by a permanent decrease in the number of firms has been the starting point of political discourses and academic studies on the cost of size-dependent regulations at 50-employee. These features of the distribution are visible when firm size is declared by employers in fiscal data but not when it is reconstructed from individual-level social security data. This working paper explores these differences both from statistical and institutional viewpoints. It provides evidence showing that a large proportion of employers manipulate the firm size they declare in their fiscal documents. This manipulation generates the particular shape of the size distribution in the fiscal data. We discuss the rationale for such behavior: the key point is that the under-declaration in fiscal data is not subject to substantial sanctions and it can allow firms not to comply with the labor law. Event studies and comparisons of firms below and above the 50-employee threshold suggest that this threshold may only have limited effects on firm performance or growth potential. Consequently the welfare costs of the regulations at 50-employee might be smaller than what was found by some of the studies that assume a perfect compliance with the law.

The existence of a peak at 49 employees in the firm size distribution in France, followed by a permanent decrease in the number of firms has been the starting point of political discourses and academic studies on the cost of size-dependent regulations at 50-employee. These features of the distribution are visible when firm size is declared by employers in fiscal data but not when it is reconstructed from individual-level social security data. This working paper explores these differences both from statistical and institutional viewpoints. It provides evidence showing that a large proportion of employers manipulate the firm size they declare in their fiscal documents. This manipulation generates the particular shape of the size distribution in the fiscal data. We discuss the rationale for such behavior: the key point is that the under-declaration in fiscal data is not subject to substantial sanctions and it can allow firms not to comply with the labor law. Event studies and comparisons of firms below and above the 50-employee threshold suggest that this threshold may only have limited effects on firm performance or growth potential. Consequently the welfare costs of the regulations at 50-employee might be smaller than what was found by some of the studies that assume a perfect compliance with the law.

International audience ; The article elaborates on an empirical investigation of the use and impact of Konver budgets on local economies in Lombardy (Italy), in the Manchester area (UK), and in Aquitaine (France). The article explains that previous regional development trajectories and institutional arrangements explain the differentiation between uses of Konver budgets with local public policies. The article (1) explores the diversity of trajectories, (2) investigates the rationales for regional policies linked to the conversion of Defense industries, and (3) provides with a neo-institutionalist analysis of the impact of Konver budgets and explains why local and European policies remain of marginal impact on Defense conversion. ; Fondée sur un travail empirique d"enquête sur les usages des fonds Konver en Lombardie, dans la région de Manchester et en Aquitaine, l'article montre combien les trajectoires passées des régions et la teneur des dispositifs locaux d'action publique ont généré une très forte différenciation des logiques dans lesquelles ces aides ont été employées. Après avoir présenté la diversité des trajectoires des systèmes productifs territoriaux (I) et le rôle tenu dans leur détermination par les politiques publiques régionales (II), nous développons une grille d'analyse sectorielle institutionnaliste qui permet de comprendre pourquoi la place des politiques publiques régionales et européenne demeure marginale dans la définition des trajectoires productives du secteur de la Défense.

Asymetric regulation in networks industries have impacted regulatory and competitive contexts. Questions of economic efficiency, collusion or fundings of sunk stranded costs go with asymetric regulation. Thus, regulators must adapt their policies to internalise these questions and to maximise the welfare. We show with a Cournot model regulators could fund sunk stranded costs, keeping allocative efficiency constant. Positive results on welfare rely on incumbent's efficiency and on prices of alternative supplies. ; Les régulations asymétriques modifient les contextes réglementaires et concurrentiels des industries de réseaux. L'efficacité économique, la collusion ou le financement des coûts échoués irrécupérables sont autant de questions qui émergent avec ces mesures réglementaires. Les régulateurs se doivent d'adapter leur politique de régulation afin d'internaliser ces questions et de maximiser le welfare. Nous montrons à l'aide d'un modèle oligopolistique « à la Cournot » qu'il est possible pour un régulateur de financer les coûts échoués irrécupérables et de conserver l'efficacité productive. Le succès de cette politique dépend de l'efficacité de l'OH et du prix des sources alternatives d'approvisionnement.

Asymetric regulation in networks industries have impacted regulatory and competitive contexts. Questions of economic efficiency, collusion or fundings of sunk stranded costs go with asymetric regulation. Thus, regulators must adapt their policies to internalise these questions and to maximise the welfare. We show with a Cournot model regulators could fund sunk stranded costs, keeping allocative efficiency constant. Positive results on welfare rely on incumbent's efficiency and on prices of alternative supplies. ; Les régulations asymétriques modifient les contextes réglementaires et concurrentiels des industries de réseaux. L'efficacité économique, la collusion ou le financement des coûts échoués irrécupérables sont autant de questions qui émergent avec ces mesures réglementaires. Les régulateurs se doivent d'adapter leur politique de régulation afin d'internaliser ces questions et de maximiser le welfare. Nous montrons à l'aide d'un modèle oligopolistique « à la Cournot » qu'il est possible pour un régulateur de financer les coûts échoués irrécupérables et de conserver l'efficacité productive. Le succès de cette politique dépend de l'efficacité de l'OH et du prix des sources alternatives d'approvisionnement.

The experience of the war economy during the First World War in the United States reinforced the influence of arguments in favour of managed competition. By extending the principles of scientific management to the economy as a whole, this approach aimed to coordinate firms through the exchange of information, which was seen as a necessity both in terms of economic efficiency and response to cyclical fluctuations. Such a stance greatly reduced the application of competition rules. Nevertheless, the proposals that emerged during the 1929 crisis – leading to the reproduction of the war-economy experience in peacetime at the risk of steering the US economy towards the formation of cartels under the supervision of the federal government – were rejected by President Herbert Hoover, despite his defence of a model for regulated competition in the 1920s. The paradox was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's resumption of these projects within the framework of the First New Deal. This paper deals with the arguments that were put forward to evade competition rules and explains why the Democratic administration ultimately decided to return to a resolute enforcement of the Sherman Act.

The experience of the war economy during the First World War in the United States reinforced the influence of arguments in favour of managed competition. By extending the principles of scientific management to the economy as a whole, this approach aimed to coordinate firms through the exchange of information, which was seen as a necessity both in terms of economic efficiency and response to cyclical fluctuations. Such a stance greatly reduced the application of competition rules. Nevertheless, the proposals that emerged during the 1929 crisis – leading to the reproduction of the war-economy experience in peacetime at the risk of steering the US economy towards the formation of cartels under the supervision of the federal government – were rejected by President Herbert Hoover, despite his defence of a model for regulated competition in the 1920s. The paradox was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's resumption of these projects within the framework of the First New Deal. This paper deals with the arguments that were put forward to evade competition rules and explains why the Democratic administration ultimately decided to return to a resolute enforcement of the Sherman Act.

The experience of the war economy during the First World War in the United States reinforced the influence of arguments in favour of managed competition. By extending the principles of scientific management to the economy as a whole, this approach aimed to coordinate firms through the exchange of information, which was seen as a necessity both in terms of economic efficiency and response to cyclical fluctuations. Such a stance greatly reduced the application of competition rules. Nevertheless, the proposals that emerged during the 1929 crisis – leading to the reproduction of the war-economy experience in peacetime at the risk of steering the US economy towards the formation of cartels under the supervision of the federal government – were rejected by President Herbert Hoover, despite his defence of a model for regulated competition in the 1920s. The paradox was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's resumption of these projects within the framework of the First New Deal. This paper deals with the arguments that were put forward to evade competition rules and explains why the Democratic administration ultimately decided to return to a resolute enforcement of the Sherman Act.

The experience of the war economy during the First World War in the United States reinforced the influence of arguments in favour of managed competition. By extending the principles of scientific management to the economy as a whole, this approach aimed to coordinate firms through the exchange of information, which was seen as a necessity both in terms of economic efficiency and response to cyclical fluctuations. Such a stance greatly reduced the application of competition rules. Nevertheless, the proposals that emerged during the 1929 crisis – leading to the reproduction of the war-economy experience in peacetime at the risk of steering the US economy towards the formation of cartels under the supervision of the federal government – were rejected by President Herbert Hoover, despite his defence of a model for regulated competition in the 1920s. The paradox was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's resumption of these projects within the framework of the First New Deal. This paper deals with the arguments that were put forward to evade competition rules and explains why the Democratic administration ultimately decided to return to a resolute enforcement of the Sherman Act.

The existence of a peak at 49 employees in the firm size distribution in France, followed by a permanent decrease in the number of firms has been the starting point of political discourses and academic studies on the cost of size-dependent regulations at 50-employee. These features of the distribution are visible when firm size is declared by employers in fiscal data but not when it is reconstructed from individual-level social security data. This working paper explores these differences both from statistical and institutional viewpoints. It provides evidence showing that a large proportion of employers manipulate the firm size they declare in their fiscal documents. This manipulation generates the particular shape of the size distribution in the fiscal data. We discuss the rationale for such behavior: the key point is that the under-declaration in fiscal data is not subject to substantial sanctions and it can allow firms not to comply with the labor law. Event studies and comparisons of firms below and above the 50-employee threshold suggest that this threshold may only have limited effects on firm performance or growth potential. Consequently the welfare costs of the regulations at 50-employee might be smaller than what was found by some of the studies that assume a perfect compliance with the law.