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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 116, Heft 514, S. 1037-1056
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 299-311
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SSRN
Working paper
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 47-57
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTA solution to Rubinstein (1982)'s open‐ended, alternating‐offer bargaining problem for two equally patient bargainers who exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion is presented. Inequality‐averse bargainers may experience envy if they are worse off, and guilt if they are better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information. If the guilt felt is strong, then the inequality‐averse bargainers split a pie of size one equally regardless of their degree of envy. If the guilt experienced is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a more unequal split whenever the degree of envy is smaller than the discounted degree of guilt. Envy and weak guilt have opposite effects on the equilibrium division of the pie, and envy has a greater marginal impact than weak guilt. Equally inequality‐averse bargainers agree on the Rubinstein division if the degree of envy equals the discounted degree of guilt. As both bargainers' sensation of inequality aversion diminishes, the bargaining outcome converges to the Rubinstein division.
In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante.
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In: Post-communist economies, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 436-448
ISSN: 1465-3958
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1918-1923
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 1-11
In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 47-57
SSRN
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1906-1911
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: British journal of political science, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 793-805
ISSN: 1469-2112
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1912-1917
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study whether exposure to COVID-19 has affected individual aversion to health and income inequality in the UK, Italy, and Germany, as well as the effect of personal shocks on employment (redundancies, government replacement salary and unemployment), income and health directly linked to COVID-19. We find that conditioned on risk aversion and relevant covariates (income, education, demographics), individuals who have experienced either a health or an financial shock during the COVID-19 pandemic, exhibit lower inequality aversion in terms of health and income, compared to those who have not experienced these shocks. Comparing levels of health and income inequality aversion in the UK between the years 2016 and 2020 we find a significant increase in inequality aversion from 2016 to 2020 in both health (17.3%) and income domains (8.8%). However, our difference-in-differences (DiD) for treatment (risk) groups defined in terms of age, region and personal exposure to health and income shocks in 2020 compared to 2016, does not indicate any additional difference in inequality aversion. The exception being individuals who are both in a high-risk age group and at the same time also experienced a health shock in 2020 compared to 2016, which are significantly more inequality averse in both health and income domains.
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