DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: EIAs in the Indian Ocean
In: Commonwealth currents, Heft 2, S. 11
ISSN: 0141-8513
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In: Commonwealth currents, Heft 2, S. 11
ISSN: 0141-8513
In: South African journal of international affairs: journal of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 51-59
ISSN: 1938-0275
In: The Statesman’s Yearbook; The Stateman’s Yearbook, S. 72-73
In: The Statesman’s Yearbook; The Stateman’s Yearbook, S. 71-71
In: The Statesman’s Yearbook; The Stateman’s Yearbook, S. 70-70
In: The Stateman’s Yearbook; The Statesman’s Yearbook 2008, S. 71-72
In: The Stateman’s Yearbook; The Statesman’s Yearbook 2016, S. 71-71
After the economic reform in 1978, China experienced a rapid economic growth. The open door policy adopted on economic reforms succeeded in attracting many foreign investors in the sector of manufacture. Along with its status as a new power of the world economy, China is also ambitious to become the largest maritime power. The Indian Ocean is a strategic area to strengthen China's steps to support economic needs and become a maritime power. To achieve strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region, China joins as an IORA partner. China's effort to dominate at the IORA is not only to recruiting rival countries, but also to built strategic partnerships with the countries in the Indian Ocean region. Besides Pakistan and Myanmar, China has also established strategic partnerships with Iran, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. For strategic partner, China is seen as an alliance in strengthening politics in their country and is a supplier of military weapons and technology with affordable prices. This paper will explain the China's interests in the IORA and China's position compared to other IORA member, and also China's strategy. The results obtained shows that China has the potential to become a maritime power at the IORA.
BASE
In: Strategic analysis: articles on current developments, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 131-140
ISSN: 0970-0161
World Affairs Online
In recent years, the Indian Ocean Rim Association has witnessed an increasing trend in the use of non-tariff measures (NTMs). This study evaluated the impact of NTMs in the Indian Ocean Rim Association through estimations of their ad valorem equivalents at the HS chapter and country levels. A gravity model using NTM count data (intensity) was specified and estimated to derive the importer-specific ad valorem equivalents for the four (4) most used NTMs in the region. The results showed the presence of both import-impeding and import-promoting effects of NTMs; however, the import-impeding effects dominated in the region. The quantitative restriction and safeguard measures were more restrictive compared to the sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade. This was expected since quantitative restrictions are trade-distorting by design. This calls for reforming trade policy in the region toward NTMs that are more transparent and trade enhancing for successful subsequent trade negotiations in the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which would support the sustainable economic development of the region.
BASE
The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceanic divisions. As a critical sea trade route marked with the presence of strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, and the Mandeb Strait, Its ever strategic position has eventually led to a potential turbulent security environment, as states fall deeper into a sense of vulnerability because of the fragile security of the region. Connecting the continents of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and consisting of tens of littoral states, contemporarily the Indian Ocean has been home to coercively interpreted policies which among them include China's "String of Pearls,' and the numerous naval exercises conducted such as the MALABAR and AUSINDEX, acting as an offensive military posturing to many. As the Indian Ocean slowly evolves being a centre stage of geopolitical supremacy contestation, the paper argues for the urgent need for the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to adopt measures in advance of the tempestuous security environment. Being the Chairman of IORA for 2015-2017, Jokowi's 'Global Maritime Axis' will be tested by how he plans to respond towards the growing volatile security situation. It further argues of possible engagements Jokowi can take in order to solidify the very concept of 'Global Maritime Axis' that he conceived, by arguing the need for him to establish foundations of cooperation that would bind IORA member states as well as great powers which are critical towards the Indian Ocean's sea-lanes of communication, and the need to take the step of replacing the highest authority of the IORA, to a Heads of State Summit, in order to clout more of a significant political influence in the region.Keywords: Indonesia, Indian Ocean, Regionalism, Institutionalism, Foreign Policy
BASE
This article analyzed the opportunities and challenges of Indonesia maritime diplomacy in the context of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). As part of the effort to realize the policy of global maritime fulcrum, Indonesia utilizes maritime diplomacy to look for the close cooperation and agreements with IORA member countries. Up to date, Indonesian foreign policy, specifically in the maritime field is tending to be more dominant to the Pacific Ocean rather than the Indian Ocean. Thus, this paper will explain how Indonesia implements its maritime diplomacy within IORA, and what the opportunities and challenges faced by Indonesia inside the association. Using the method of literature study, this descriptive paper uses the concept of maritime diplomacy and global maritime fulcrum in order to explain the study. This paper argues that IORA's strategic policy in maritime security and economic policies, links with Indonesia policy in global maritime fulcrum. Thus, Indonesia uses maritime diplomacy to take the advantages and opportunities to enhance maritime connectivity and cooperation with IORA members. Nevertheless, several issues challenge Indonesia like the increasing of great power states maritime influence such as India and China in the Indian Ocean, as well as challenges in integrating IORA member states.
BASE
In: African security review, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 44-49
ISSN: 2154-0128
In: The Pakistan development review: PDR, S. 933-941
Recently, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) completed two decades of its existence. The heads of states or governments of its member countries, viz. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, once again would meet in Dhaka and reaffirm their faith in the organisation and its charter. Considering the political reality within the individual SAARC nations, and especially the relationship between the two biggest members of the association, one could feel satisfied that the association has survived so far. But its movement in terms of achieving the objectives for which it was formed has been slow and it is criticised as a house of cards or a house built on sand, which can fall apart any time. There is a big stress in the interrelationship between neighbours.