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In the past two decades, in a series of banking crises around the world, banks have become systematically insolvent. These crises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike. To make such financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur, policymakers feel the need for financial safety nets. These include such policies as implicit or explicit deposit insurance, a lender of last resort function of the central bank, bank insolvency resolution procedures, and bank regulation and supervision. Of these policies, explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years. Since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes almost tripled, with most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing economies adopting some form of explicit depositor protection. In 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the European Union. Establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing economies.

This paper examines the relationship between market discipline and the deposit insurance system in Japan using unique data set on bank-level weekly deposit rates in Japan. I find that when the government provided an unlimited coverage for all bank deposits, the risk profile of banks had no effect on either interest rates of deposits or the quantity of deposits. That is, depositors failed to monitor and punish risky banks. On the other hand, when the government imposed an insurance limit on time deposits, 10 million yen (approximately $100,000) per depositor per bank, risky banks started offering higher interest rates on time deposits and attracting less time deposits than financially strong banks. In addition, as expected, the interest rates differential between partially insured time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for financially weak banks. These two pieces of evidence indicate the emergence of market discipline. However, after the reform, the implicit guarantee provided by the government became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit growth, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of deposit insurance reform on market discipline. Because of this implicit guarantee, overall effects of deposit insurance reform on market discipline are likely to be small.

This study analyzes the valuation and bank risk incentive effects of deposit insurance using an approach based on options theory. While the value of deposit insurance can obviously be set under existing regulatory measures such as capital adequacy and reserve requirements, the actual and expected behaviour of the regulator is shown to exert an effect on bank risk policy, and thus, on the stability of the banking sector.The following factors are identified as possible causes of increased preference for risk on the part of banks: · an expectation that in the event of insolvency the deposit insurance will cover claim holders not otherwise initially insured; · an expectation on the part of shareholders that they are not threatened with losing their position; and · underpricing of deposit insurance premium in relation to a bank's market-valued capital adequacy. These expectations increase preference for higher risk because they remove both the need for debt holders to require any risk premium for their investment and the threat that shareholders might lose their participation in the bank's future earnings.Thus, banks are not "penalized" for taking on risk.Instead, the costs of higher risk are borne by the deposit insurer, which in Finland's case, is ultimately the government and taxpayers.A related issue is that the efficiency of the bank inspection authority seems to affect the risk-taking behaviour of banks (i.e. if a bank believes that the bank inspection authority is incapable of determining its true financial condition and actual risk exposure, it has incentive to take a riskier position). Using bank stock prices, point estimates of the value of deposit insurance are calculated for listed Finnish banks between 1987-1993.The results indicate that the value of the insurance has varied among banks and over time.Generally, charged deposit premia have been underpriced in comparison to the risk position of the studied banks.Thus, one consequence of the shakeout in Finland's banking sector appears to be that a sizable wealth transfer from the government to bank shareholders has taken place.

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicates that a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates the cost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14 economies to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and their corporate governance structure. The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownership engage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, as a proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has some power in predicting bank distress

We offer a theory of the "boundary of the firm" tailored to banks as it builds on a single risk-shifting inefficiency and takes into account interbank lending, as an alternative to integration, and insured deposit financing. It explains why deeper economic integration should cause also greater, though still incomplete, financial integration, through both bank mergers and interbank lending, and why economic disintegration, as currently witnessed in the European Union, should cause less interbank exposure. Recent policy measures such as the preferential treatment of retail deposits, the extension of deposit insurance, or penalties on "connectedness" could reduce welfare.

Bank failures are widely feared because depositors may suffer losses in the value of their deposits and restrictions in access to their deposits. In the United States, this is not true for insured deposits, which are made fully available to depositors almost immediately. But both problems may occur for uninsured deposits. One way to mitigate liquidity loss to uninsured depositors is to make the estimated recovery value of their deposits quickly available to them by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Such a policy would greatly enhance the FDIC's ability to resolve large bank insolvencies without having to protect uninsured depositors through too‐big‐to‐fail policies. (JEL G21, G28, G10)

According to Pozsar, there is a new kind of "Triffin Dilemma." Due to rising inequality, a shrinking numbers of large banks, and a ceiling on Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured deposits, there is a shortage of "safe assets." The private supply of safe assets has occurred through the system of shadow banks, and is based on repos, or Treasury Bonds. But the supply of US Treasury bonds is limited by the ceiling on public debt, and is constrained by neoliberal theories of limits to the size of government. As a result, there is a presumed shortage of safe assets, just when the levels of inequality have increased the order of magnitude of assets under management which are in need of protection. There are also large accumulations of cash pools by large multinational corporations, often held overseas to evade taxes. The private provision of safe assets tends to reduce liquidity and increase costs of information, potentially leading to financial instability. Possible resolutions of this issue include (1) progressive taxes to reduce the size of the cash pools, (2) an increase in the ceiling for insured deposits, and (3) increasing support by the Fed for the role of "market maker of last resort." This paper concludes with the implications of each alternative. JEL Classification: B5, E44, G01, P1

This note focuses on the deposit insurance scheme. An analysis of the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) is provided to the extent that it is relevant to the management of the deposit insurance scheme and no detail analysis of the other functions performed by the DIA, e.g. bank resolution, is included. Policy recommendations on the bank resolution are included in the Aide Memoire. DIA revenue sources are volatile and Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) related revenues are used to subsidize non-DIF related activities. The legal framework is ambiguous as to whether DIF resources can be used to cover running costs of the DIA. To improve transparency and ensure sustainability of the DIF, the legal framework should be amended to clarify the use of DIF resources and cap use for operating costs. The authorities should develop a medium term strategy for the DIA, including a funding strategy for non-DIF related activities

National audience ; Traditional banking is built on four pillars: SME lending, insured deposit taking, access to lender of last resort, and prudential supervision. This paper unveils the logic of the quadrilogy by showing that it emerges naturally as an equilibrium outcome in a game between banks and the government. A key insight is that regulation and public insurance services (LOLR, deposit insurance) are complementary. The model also shows how prudential regulation must adjust to the emergence of shadow banking, and rationalizes structural remedies to counter bogus liquidity hoarding and financial contagion: ring-fencing between regulated and shadow banking and the sharing of liquidity in centralized platforms.

To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large - just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China. The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the "E" in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it. Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes. These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC's strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly - in the event the member bank fails - 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered. In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.

To complete banking union, there should be a single European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) alongside the single supervisor and the single resolution authority. This would ensure uniformity across the Eurozone and facilitate the removal of barriers to the mobility of liquidity and capital within the single market. That in turn would promote efficiency in the banking sector and in the economy at large — just at the time that the EU needs to boost growth in order to remain competitive with the US and China. The EDIS promise to promptly reimburse insured deposits at a failed bank in the Eurozone should be unconditional. But who will stand behind that commitment? Who is the "E" in EDIS? Is its promise credible, even in a crisis? If a deposit guarantee scheme fails to deliver what people expect, panic would very likely erupt. Instead of strengthening financial stability, deposit insurance could destroy it. Yet this is the risk that current proposals pose. They create the impression that there will be a single deposit guarantee scheme. There will not. Instead, there will be a complex set of liquidity and reinsurance arrangements among Member State schemes. These defects need to be remedied. To do so, we propose creating a European Deposit Insurance Corporation (EDIC) alongside national schemes. For banks that meet EDIC's strict entry criteria and decide to become members, EDIC will promise to reimburse promptly — in the event the member bank fails — 100 cents on the euro in euro for each euro of insured deposits, regardless of the Eurozone Member State in which the bank is headquartered. In effect, the single deposit guarantee scheme would be created via migration to EDIC rather than mutualisation of existing schemes. This would increase the mobility of capital and liquidity and lead to a convergence of interest rates across the Eurozone. That in turn will improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, foster integration and promote growth.

We offer a theory of the "boundary of the …rm" that is tailored to banking, as it builds on a single ine¢ ciency arising from risk-shifting and as it takes into account both interbank lending as an alternative to integration and the role of possibly insured deposit funding. Amongst others, it explains both why deeper economic integration should cause also greater financial integration through both bank mergers and interbank lending, albeit this typically remains ine¢ ciently incomplete, and why economic disintegration (or "desychronization"), as currently witnessed in the European Union, should cause less interbank exposure. It also suggests that recent policy measures such as the preferential treatment of retail deposits, the extension of deposit insurance, or penalties on "connectedness" could all lead to substantial welfare losses.

We offer a theory of the "boundary of the firm" that is tailored to banking, as it builds on a single inefficiency arising from risk-shifting and as it takes into account both interbank lending as an alternative to integration and the role of possibly insured deposit funding. Amongst others, it explains both why deeper economic integration should cause also greater financial integration through both bank mergers and interbank lending, albeit this typically remains inefficiently incomplete, and why economic disintegration (or "desychronization"), as currently witnessed in the European Union, should cause less interbank exposure. It also suggests that recent policy measures such as the preferential treatment of retail deposits, the extension of deposit insurance, or penalties on "connectedness" could all lead to substantial welfare losses.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This mandated report responds to Congressional concerns that provisions in section 43 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) are not being enforced. Since 1991, section 43 has required, among other things, depository institutions lacking federal deposit insurance to conspicuously disclose that deposits in these institutions are not federally insured. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the current status of the enforcement of provisions in section 43; (2) determine the extent of compliance with each provision and the potential impact on consumers if the provisions were not enforced; and (3) evaluate which federal agency could most effectively enforce the provisions."

This paper presents an appraisal of the studies of the deposit insurance system submitted to Congress by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in compliance with the Garn‐St. German legislation of 1982. The purpose of these studies was to assess the current structure of the deposit insurance system in light of the changes in the regulation of depository institutions mandated in recent legislationMany observers of the financial system believe that, as a result of recent regulatory changes, the deposit insurance agencies do not have sufficient power to control risk‐taking of insured institutions. These two reports present an assessment of mechanism which could be used to limit the risk of the deposit insurance agenciesThe emphasis in both reports is on ways in which the amount of market discipline applied to insured institutions could be increased. Both reports identify essentially three ways in which this might be accomplished. First, risk‐adjusted deposit insurance prices might be employed. Second, the volume of uninsured creditors might be increased, either through changes in limits of insurance coverage or through imposition of requirements for use of subordinated debt. Third, the current public deposit insurance system might be partially supplanted by one that is private. This paper evaluates the merits of each of these proposals and compares the positions taken by the FHLBB and the FDIC on the issues