Suchergebnisse

It is estimated that a number between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters have been flocking to Iraq and Syria since the breakout of the war in 2011. An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq shows that there is a significant increase in the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria. Data provided by the Soufan Group in 2014 estimated that the identifiable number of foreign fighters is approximately 12,000 from 81 countries. It was also believed that the number of foreign Jihadists coming form Western countries does not exceed 3000: "Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand", according to Soufan's initial report on Foreign Fighters in Syria. Now the number exceeds 27,000 foreign fighters from at least 86 countries.

The threat represented by foreign fighters to their home state has rarely materialised, yet states have increasingly legislated against foreign fighters over the course of the last 300 years. This observation points to the act of legislating as fulfilling some function other than the protection of the state against a physical threat presented by foreign fighter returnees. This paper asks what is problematic about foreign-fighter returnees from the point of view of lawmakers if they do not represent a physical threat? It argues that returnees generate ontological insecurity on the part of lawmakers. Consequently, the act of legislating against them serves to reify the identity of individual lawmakers. This argument is supported using historical case comparison of Westminster parliamentary debates on foreign fighting. This paper finds that what is at stake in foreign-fighter legislation is not the physical security of the national state but the ontological security of lawmakers. These findings point to the need for a shift of the research on foreign fighters that moves beyond the potential terrorist threat they represent to an understanding of what they mean for International Relations.

The threat represented by foreign fighters to their home state has rarely materialised, yet states have increasingly legislated against foreign fighters over the course of the last 300 years. This observation points to the act of legislating as fulfilling some function other than the protection of the state against a physical threat presented by foreign fighter returnees. This paper asks what is problematic about foreign-fighter returnees from the point of view of lawmakers if they do not represent a physical threat? It argues that returnees generate ontological insecurity on the part of lawmakers. Consequently, the act of legislating against them serves to reify the identity of individual lawmakers. This argument is supported using historical case comparison of Westminster parliamentary debates on foreign fighting. This paper finds that what is at stake in foreign-fighter legislation is not the physical security of the national state but the ontological security of lawmakers. These findings point to the need for a shift of the research on foreign fighters that moves beyond the potential terrorist threat they represent to an understanding of what they mean for International Relations.

States should avoid arbitrability in decision-making processes concerning foreign fighters by amending their current legislature including criminal prosecution of foreign fighters. Authorization regime similar to the one in Poland may offer higher guarantees, control and monitoring of medium to high-threat individuals whilst offering states direct targeting of prevention and mitigation policies. States should create a transparent and clear framework for evaluation of applications to travel abroad for the purpose of fighting with lawfully set discretion for state organs that will enable them to deny applications for political, social or even economic reasons.

Negli ultimi anni migliaia di foreign fighters sono partiti da più di 100 paesi per unirsi a gruppi armati, specialmente di matrice jihadista, in Siria e Iraq e in altri teatri di guerra.Il fenomeno ha interessato anche l'Italia, anche se in misura assai più ridotta rispetto ad altri paesi europei.I foreign fighters d'Italia sono, infatti, circa 130. Quali sono le caratteristiche socio-demografiche di questi individui?Dove risiedevano prima di partire? Facevano parte di network estremistici in Italia e in Europa? Quale ruolo hanno assunto nell'area del conflitto? Quanti sono già ritornati? Esistono profili comuni?Questi sono solo alcuni degli interrogativi a cui questo Rapporto ISPI cerca di dare una risposta.Tramite un'analisi dettagliata dei profili dei foreign fighters legati all'Italia, sulla base di dati originali, vengono messe in evidenza, per la prima volta, le peculiarità dell'intero contingente nazionale, anche grazie al confronto con gli altri paesi occidentali.[Testo dell'editore]

Negli ultimi anni migliaia di foreign fighters sono partiti da più di 100 paesi per unirsi a gruppi armati, specialmente di matrice jihadista, in Siria e Iraq e in altri teatri di guerra. Il fenomeno ha interessato anche l'Italia, anche se in misura assai più ridotta rispetto ad altri paesi europei. I foreign fighters d'Italia sono, infatti, circa 130. Quali sono le caratteristiche socio-demografiche di questi individui? Dove risiedevano prima di partire? Facevano parte di network estremistici in Italia e in Europa? Quale ruolo hanno assunto nell'area del conflitto? Quanti sono già ritornati? Esistono profili comuni? Questi sono solo alcuni degli interrogativi a cui questo Rapporto ISPI cerca di dare una risposta. Tramite un'analisi dettagliata dei profili dei foreign fighters legati all'Italia, sulla base di dati originali, vengono messe in evidenza, per la prima volta, le peculiarità dell'intero contingente nazionale, anche grazie al confronto con gli altri paesi occidentali.

In recent years, thousands of foreign fighters have left over 100 countries to join armed groups, especially jihadist groups, in Syria and Iraq and in other theaters of war. The phenomenon has also affected Italy, although to a much lesser extent than in other European countries. The foreign fighters of Italy are, in fact, about 130. What are the socio-demographic characteristics of these individuals? Where did they live before they left? Were they part of extremist networks in Italy and in Europe? What role did they play in the conflict area? How many have already returned? Are there common profiles? These are just some of the questions that this ISPI Report tries to answer. Through a detailed analysis of the profiles of foreign fighters linked to Italy, on the basis of original data, the peculiarities of the entire national contingent are highlighted for the first time, also thanks to the comparison with other Western countries.

(...) The study here aims to provide a sample of British and German foreign fighters in order to gain an insight into their profiles. The results are interesting as many differences can be noted between the two country samples, especially relating to socio-economic and educational backgrounds. The German foreign fighters are less educated and coming from lower socio-economic strata than the British ones. Also a higher proportion of the German foreign fighters had been previously involved in crime, some in terrorism related offences. In terms of similarities, the majority of recruits from both countries are male, young, and were single at the time of leaving to Syria. (IFSH/Pll)

I 'foreign fighters' sono un gruppo estremamente eterogeneo di migliaia di persone che proviene da un centinaio di paesi in tutto il mondo. Questa ondata di miliziani si muove dai propri paesi di origine, o di immigrazione, per cercare di raggiungere altri estremisti radicali in Siria ed Iraq. Attualmente circa 30.000 persone hanno già raggiunto quelle terre dove nel 2014 è stato fondato il Califfato e tra morti in battaglia, bombardamenti e foreign fighters di ritorno ad oggi nello spazio compreso tra Siria ed Iraq ve ne potrebbero essere ancora circa dodicimila. Tra costoro circa 4-5.000 verrebbero dai Paesi dell'Unione Europea e quasi 3-4.000 da solamente Francia, Germania, Regno Unito e Belgio. Le cifre vanno prese con molta cautela e variano a seconda della fonte utilizzata. La variabilità dei dati è molto ampia anche per quanto concerne le cifre fornite sui rientri in Europa. Secondo le autorità italiane dovrebbero essere un migliaio circa. L'identikit che descrive i 'foreign fighters' provenienti dai Paesi europei è abbastanza chiaro: per lo più si tratta di soggetti giovani e di sesso maschile, ma le donne pare costituiscono una quota decisamente significativa del gruppo dei foreign fighters, vale a dire il 17%. Sono per lo più di origine maghrebina o balcanica ma non mancano quelli di origine asiatica. Soprattutto tra coloro, che provengono dal Regno Unito, il livello di istruzione e lo status socio-economico, generalmente basso, si fa più elevato. ; Foreign fighters (FF) are an extremely heterogeneous group composed of thousands of people from a hundred countries worldwide. This wave of militia moves from their countries of origin and immigration, to reach other radical extremists in Syria and Iraq, where in 2014 was established the Caliphate. About 30,000 FF have already reached these lands - - and at the present, after bombings and battles, and returns, around twelve thousand FF might still be in the region. Among them, about 4-5,000 are estimated to be from EU countries, of which 3-4,000 from France, Germany, United Kingdom and Belgium only. These figures should be taken with great caution, because they vary depending on the source used. The variability of the data is very wide with regard to figures on return waves to Europe Italian authorities estimate the number of FF that have already found their way back to Europe to be approximately one thousand. The profile of the FF coming from European countries is quite clear: they are mostly young males, although women seem to account for ~ 17% of total FFs. Their origin is mostly from North African or Balkan countries, but there are also those of Asian descent. Generally, the education level and socioeconomic status among FFs are generally low; interestingly however they seem higher among the United Kingdom's militias.