Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe explore the effects of mainbanks on investment efficiency in financial distress. The previous literature argues that firms with close financial relationships with banks have lower costs of financial distress because of a reduced underinvestment problem. Although benefits may accrue to such close relationships, we contend shortcomings are possible as well. A firm in financial distress without a mainbank may be forced to reduce investment or sell assets to a buyer who has a higher value. However, for a firm with a mainbank, this disciplinary force is weakened. To firms with poor investment opportunities, the presence of mainbanks may actually induce an overinvestment problem. The empirical findings reported here are consistent with this idea.JEL classification: G31, G33, G34.

AbstractPrior studies on financial distress focus on the restructuring of one aspect of the firm. By examining various forms of restructuring, we provide empirical evidence that asset restructuring and governance restructuring play significant roles before bankruptcy filing. Our analysis shows that financial restructuring before bankruptcy is influenced by the holdout problem among creditor groups. Evidence suggests that the fraudulent conveyance provision does not pose a serious impediment to divestitures during the two years before bankruptcy. The evidence also indicates that Chapter 11 reorganization is lenient toward management. Although Chapter 11 allows the firm to breach burdensome executory contracts with employees, our findings suggest that union busting is not an important part of the reorganization process. Finally, we identify various financial characteristics to predict the different types of restructuring a firm may undertake.