Suchergebnisse

The European Employment Strategy (EES) aims to promote convergence of domestic labour market policies by soft law instruments. Previous studies on the impact of the EES are mainly focused on active labour market policies. The present study aims at explaining cross national variation in national passive labour market policies and unemployment benefit levels. Building on the most recent measures and pooled time series data, the empirical findings reveal the presence of a convergence process among the most advanced economies regarding passive labour market policy efforts, with the EES fostering this trend even further. Furthermore, our findings support the argument that the EES creates pressure on governments to reform domestic labour market policies, but this pressure varies across countries and over time. The results suggest that the recommendations from the European Council have contributed to unemployment benefit reform processes. ; (VLID)1771269

EU soft law is like a mythological creature of the EU governance: like a satyr is half man and half goat, so EU soft law is half law, half non-law. Its twofold nature unrestrained by legislative procedure has facilitated its proliferation, but controversy continues arising concerning its role in the EU and in the Member States. Two recent cases add to the saga on the effects of EU soft law: BT v. Balgarska Narodna Banka and Fédération bancaire française v. Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution. These two judgments, being the fruit of two preliminary ruling requests, are to a certain extent extraordinary: the Court of Justice of the European Union has for the first time considered the validity of EU recommendations and guidelines, EU soft law measures par excellence, in the context of preliminary ruling requests. But beside their outcomes, these decisions have also casted shadows on the effects of EU soft law. After illustrating the opinions of the Advocates General and the judgments of the Court of Justice, the paper moves on to tackle three issues: the loopholes in the concept of 'legally binding effects' under EU law, the (unclear) guidance on the use of EU soft law in national courts, and the evolution of validity review of EU soft law. To be or not to be (legally binding?) That is the question for EU soft law.

El soft law de la UE es como una criatura mitológica de la gobernanza de la UE: si un sátiro es mitad hombre y mitad cabra, así la ley blanda de la UE es mitad derecho y mitad no-derecho. Su doble naturaleza irrestricta por el procedimiento legislativo ha facilitado su proliferación, pero sigue surgiendo la controversia sobre su papel en la UE y en los Estados miembros. Dos casos recientes se suman a la saga sobre los efectos del soft law de la UE: BT contra Balgarska Narodna Banka y Fédération bancaire française contra Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution. Estas dos sentencias, fruto de dos cuestiones prejudiciales, son en cierta medida extraordinarias: el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea ha analizado por primera vez la validez de las recomendaciones y directrices de la UE, medidas de soft law de la UE por excelencia, en el contexto de las solicitudes de cuestiones prejudiciales. Pero además de sus resultados, estas decisiones también han arrojado dudas sobre los efectos del soft law de la UE. Tras exponer las conclusiones de los abogados generales y las sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia, el trabajo aborda tres cuestiones: las lagunas en el concepto de «efectos jurídicamente vinculantes» en el derecho de la UE, las orientaciones (poco claras) sobre el uso del soft law de la UE en los tribunales nacionales y la evolución de la revisión de la validez del soft law de la UE. Ser o no ser (¿jurídicamente vinculante?) Esa es la cuestión del soft law de la UE.

The increased recourse to soft law by the European Union (EU) as a flexible solution to complex social and policy issues has raised several questions about the democratic legitimacy of decision-making at the EU level. With the aim to provide a normative direction for future empirical assessment of EU soft law, this article explores the democratic credentials that EU soft law measures should fulfil to ensure their legitimacy. Drawing from the intersections of liberal, republican and deliberative conceptions of democracy, this article proposes four democratic legitimacy standards for the evaluation of soft law measures in practice: parliamentary involvement, transparency, participatory quality and reviewability.

In the judgment in case BT v Balgarska Narodna Banka, the Court of Justice of the EU declared, for the first time, invalid a part of a legally non-binding EU act – a recommendation adopted by the European Banking Authority and addressed to the Bulgarian National Bank. It also confirmed that the referring court deciding upon damages has a duty to take such a recommendation into consideration. Moreover, the individuals in the national proceedings should have a right to rely upon the content of the recommendation even if they are not addressees of such an act. However, when assessed in more detail, the case points out to several interesting aspects related to EU soft law that have not been properly discussed yet.

The increased recourse to soft law by the European Union (EU) as a flexible solution to complex social and policy issues has raised several questions about the democratic legitimacy of decision-making at the EU level. With the aim to provide a normative direction for future empirical assessment of EU soft law, this article explores the democratic credentials that EU soft law measures should fulfil to ensure their legitimacy. Drawing from the intersections of liberal, republican and deliberative conceptions of democracy, this article proposes four democratic legitimacy standards for the evaluation of soft law measures in practice: parliamentary involvement, transparency, participatory quality and reviewability.