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These studies concentrate on preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction. A common argument runs through all of the papers: that, while complacency must be avoided, much of the post-Cold War focus among Western governments on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is alarmist.

Nonproliferation Issues for Weapons of Mass Destruction provides an understanding of WMD proliferation risks by bridging complex technical and political issues. The text begins by defining the world conditions that foster proliferation, followed by an analysis of characteristics of various classes of WMDs, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It then explores the effectiveness of arms control, discussing current nonproliferation problems, nonproliferation prior to the fall of the USSR, and weapons safeguards. The book analyzes the future of these weapons, discussing delivery systems and potential use by states, terrorist groups, and individuals. The text concludes with a discussion of what can be done to limit the impact of WMDs. This volume enables a realistic understanding of the relative risks that WMDs present to our way of life.

AbstractNegotiations to control and perhaps eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appeared to achieve positive results in the 1990s. But these positive trends reversed direction in 2001–2004 under President George W. Bush. Why? This essay weighs six possible explanations. 1. progress in the 1990s as a mirage; 2. cultural differences; 3. distrust of international agreements; 4. perceptions regarding the utility of WMD; 5. internal divisions within each government and society; and 6. ulterior motives.The evidence suggests that the sixth explanation carries the most weight. Top leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as in the United States had priorities other than arms control. Each side used arms control negotiations as an instrument to promote its political and economic agenda in other realms. Pyongyang demanded large and certain rewards to give up its main bargaining chips. North Korea's negotiating behavior suggested some willingness to freeze or eliminate WMD programs if the price were right. But Kim Jong Il's regime clearly saw its nuclear and missile capabilities as major assets not to be traded away except for very substantial security and economic rewards. For its part, the Bush White House probably worried that any accord with Pyongyang would impede Washington's larger political, military, and economic ambitions, including deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). There was also a subjective element: President Bush probably loathed Kim Jong Il and did not relish the prospect of making any compromises with evil incarnate. For enlightened self-interest to prevail, the parties could benefit from greater empathy and a quest for mutual rather than one-sided gain.

George W. Bush administration plan for protecting against and responding to proliferation of biological, chemical, and atomic weapons. Document released Dec. 11, 2002 is based on the classified National Security Presidential Directive 17, signed by President Bush in Sept. 2002.

Reports on the United States Department of Defense's postponing of a controversial chemical weapons disposal study.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- 1. The Problems of Our Time: Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism -- 2. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons -- 3. An Overview of International Law and Arms Control -- 4. The Cornerstone of Security: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- 5. The Political Value of Nuclear Weapons -- 6. Stopping Nuclear Explosions: The Test Ban -- 7. Missile Defense -- 8. Outer Space -- 9. Cleaning Up After Past Wars: Land Mines and Small Arms -- 10. Poison Gas and Microbes: Chemical and Biological Weapons -- 11. Controlling Nuclear Materials: The Situation in Russia -- 12. Regional Issues: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East and Nuclear Weapons in South and Northeast Asia -- 13. America's Role -- Conclusion -- Epilogue -- Acknowledgments -- Appendix 1: Global Nuclear Status -- Appendix 2: Global Nuclear Stockpiles -- Appendix 3: Weapon Development Milestones -- Chronology -- Glossary -- Index.