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"The fifth edition of Constitutional Law represents a significant update of the fourth edition, published in 2013. During this period, the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to develop the jurisprudence in all areas of constitutional law, including freedom of association, equality rights, Indigenous title, and inter-jurisdictional immunity. This book includes the complete text of the Canadian Constitution, including explanatory footnotes as consolidated by the federal Department of Justice. Professor Monahan authored the first three editions of this text, and invited Mr. Byron Shaw to join him as a co-author for the fourth edition. Mr. Padraic Ryan has now joined in this most recent revision. As with earlier editions, the aim of this text is to provide lawyers, academics, and law students with a general introduction to, and overview of, the basic elements of the Canadian Constitution. The authors discuss issues in sufficient detail so that the book will be of value to lawyers who encounter constitutional issues in their daily practice. Constitutional Law has been cited with approval by provincial and territorial appellate courts, as well as by the Supreme Court of Canada."--

The idea of supra-constitutionality was formulated in the science of constitutional law in the second quarter of the 20th century and associated with the names of M.Hauriou and K.Schmitt, who for the first time noticed the possibility of the existence of norms that are higher than the constitution. This article is an attempt to give the doctrine of supra-constitutionality an actual theoretical and dogmatic meaning in the context of the study of the material limits of constitutional changes. The doctrine of supra-constitutionality claims to play an important role in explaining that unchangeable norms can exist in constitutional law and that they cannot be excluded, changed, limited, overcome, affected by the other sources of constitutional law, including the constitution itself. Supra-constitutionality is viewed as a characteristic of unchangeable constitutional norms that constitute the material limits of constitutional changes. Supra-constitutionality presupposes the existence of norms that surpass the rest of the constitutional norms and predetermine their content through the definition of what can, should and should not be included in the constitution or excluded from it. The basis of constitutional supra-constitutionality is the argument of hierarchical differentiation. In addition to recognizing unchangeable constitutional norms as supra-constitutional, the article raises the question of the existence of natural law and international law supra-constitutional norms. Natural law supra-constitutional norms have an external and non-positive character. They are not enshrined in the constitution, but stem from a reasonably understood concept of what is due in the most civilized societies, which is determined by the constitutional court. International law supra-constitutionality is understood as the superiority of the norms of international law over the constitution. It has an external and positive character. International law supra-constitutionality can cause political objections from opponents of the absolute rule of international law. Supra-constitutional constitutional, natural and international law norms can come into conflict with each other. The paradox of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality lies in the fact that it creates a hierarchy of norms within the constitution itself, distinguishing between simple and supra-constitutional constitutional norms, or distinguishes certain non-positive norms that are outside the constitution, as having priority over the constitution, or puts some norms of international law over all norms of national law, including the constitution. The purpose of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality is to preserve the inviolable fundamental (natural or generally recognized) values, which justifies its logical flaws and paradoxicality.

The authors survey the recent developments in Florida constitutional law, focusing on the powers and duties of the three branches of state government. Their discussion includes an analysis of the recent constitutional amendment modifying the jurisdiction of the supreme court.

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

This Article identifies the causes and consequences of a puzzling asymmetry in constitutional law. Of the three facets of adjudicative factfinding-evidence, procedure, and rules of decision- only two are constitutionalized. Constitutional law regulates procedural and decisional rules, but not whether the evidence that factfinders use is adequate. Constitutional law regulates procedure through a set of rules that determine a person's power to control the trial by adducing evidence in support of her case and by examining the evidence of her adversary. Constitutional law regulates decisionmaking by setting probability requirements for findings of fact-standards of proof-and by allocating the burdens of proof among the prosecution, plaintiffs, and defendants. Constitutional law, however, does not control adequacy of the evidence upon which factfinders determine the probability of contested allegations and apply the burdens of proof. This is so because the Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause, as related to evidence, very narrowly. Under this interpretation, any evidence is constitutionally adequate when its use is not "fundamentally unfair." Moreover, "fundamental unfairness" occurs only in extreme cases such as those which exhibit a serious prosecutorial misuse of the trial process. Examples include when the government knowingly procures the defendant's conviction by false evidence or by evidence from which factfinders can draw no rational inferences. Anything less is not "fundamentally unfair." As a result, virtually any rule that controls evidential admissibility and identifies evidence that does or does not require corroboration is constitutional. The "fundamental unfairness" criterion practically exempts evidential adequacy from constitutional scrutiny.

Intro -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- About the Editors -- Contributors -- 1 Introduction: The City as a Multifaceted and Dynamic Constitutional Entity -- 1.1 The City as an Undervalued Constitutional Trope -- 1.2 Cities Within National Power Structures -- 1.3 Cities and Citizens -- 1.4 Cities and the International Arena -- 1.5 Constitutional Law in the Age of the City -- References -- Part ICities Within National Power Structures -- 2 Cities and the Dutch Constitution -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 What to Call a City? -- 2.2 Historical Background -- 2.3 Constitutional Leeway -- 2.3.1 Institutional Leeway -- 2.3.2 Substantive Leeway -- 2.4 Carving Out a Specific Legal Position for Cities? -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Modes of Urban Autonomy-The Constitutional Characteristics of Self-governance in Amsterdam, Paris and Hamburg -- 3.1 Cities and Constitutional Law -- 3.1.1 Urban Self-government -- 3.1.2 Amsterdam, Paris and Hamburg -- 3.2 The City as a Decentralized Local Authority: Amsterdam -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.2.2 Institutions and Democracy -- 3.2.3 Powers -- 3.2.4 Relations with Other Public Bodies -- 3.3 The City as a Special Local Authority: Paris -- 3.3.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.3.2 Institutions and Democracy -- 3.3.3 Powers -- 3.3.4 Relations with Other Public Bodies -- 3.4 The City as a Federal Entity: Hamburg -- 3.4.1 Constitutional Identity -- 3.4.2 Institutions and Democracy -- 3.4.3 Powers -- 3.4.4 Relations with Other Public Bodies -- 3.5 Three Cities in Constitutional Law: Some Characteristics -- 3.5.1 The Constitutional Relevance of Cities -- 3.5.2 Integral Governance: Combining the Local and the Regional -- 3.5.3 Mayors of Big Cities: Legitimacy and Special Qualities -- 3.5.4 Powers and Differentiation -- 3.5.5 Representation and Participation -- 3.6 Conclusions -- References.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- The Author -- Table of Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- General Introduction -- 1. An Outline of Bulgarian Constitutional History -- 2. Characteristics of the Bulgarian State -- I. Parliamentary Republic -- II. Unitary State with Local Self-Government -- III. Popular Sovereignty and Democracy -- IV. The Separation of Powers -- V. Rechtsstaat, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law -- VI. Welfare State -- 3. State Territory, Population and Demographics -- Part I. Sources of Constitutional Law -- Chapter 1. The Constitution -- 1. Characteristics -- 2. Amending the Constitution -- I. A Two-Track Procedure -- II. The Role of the Constitutional Court in Delimiting the Competences Between the Grand National Assembly and the National Assembly -- III. Constitutional Amendment by Forms of Direct Democracy -- IV. Entrenched Clause -- V. The Constitutional Amendments Which Have Already Been Accomplished -- 3. Hierarchy -- Chapter 2. Treaties -- 1. The Treaty-Making Power: Types of International Treaties According to the Bulgarian Constitutional Law -- 2. Hierarchy -- 3. System for Implementation of the International Treaties -- 4. Mixed Agreements Concluded Jointly by the EU and Its Member States and Third Parties -- Chapter 3. Legislation -- 1. Types of Legislation -- I. Acts of Parliament -- II. Special Majority Acts -- III. Reasons for the Lack of Delegated Legislation -- IV. Reasons for the Lack of Subnational Legislation -- 2. Hierarchy -- Chapter 4. Case Law -- Chapter 5. Unwritten Law -- 1. Conventions -- 2. General Principles of Law -- Chapter 6. Administrative Regulations and Orders -- 1. Classification -- 2. Hierarchy -- Chapter 7. Codification, Interpretation and Publication -- 1. Codification -- 2. Interpretation -- 3. Publication -- Part II. Form of Government.