Suchergebnisse

The power of capital allocation -- Capital allocation in a slow-growth world -- Optimizing the capital structure : advantages of an alternatives-based capital allocation framework -- Five stress test rules for downturns -- The rise and fall of the General Electric empire -- Capital spending -- Dividends and the case for returning excess capital to shareholders -- The "regular-special" dividend : a new way to allocate excess capital -- The (alleged) seven deadly sins of share repurchase -- Autozone : the power of intelligent share repurchase -- Acquisitions -- Complex transactions -- Superior businesses with lower valuations -- Private deals -- Distressed sellers -- Non-core divestitures -- Short-term challenges, long-term benefits -- Inferior businesses with higher valuations -- Low-return, strategic acquisitions : a cautionary tale -- Supply/demand imbalance -- Short-term plug deal -- Spin-offs -- Restructurings -- Secular challenges -- Best board practices : the 14 point strategic plan -- Capital allocation : establishing a long-term focus and good corporate citizenship.

"This review article describes recent literature on asset allocation, covering both static and dynamic models. The article focuses on the bond--stock decision and on the implications of return predictability. In the static setting, investors are assumed to be Bayesian, and the role of various prior beliefs and specifications of the likelihood are explored. In the dynamic setting, recursive utility is assumed, and attention is paid to obtaining analytical results when possible. Results under both full and limited-information assumptions are discussed"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Supported by Office of Water Research and Technology, USDI project no. B-175-CAL and University of California, Water Resources Center project UCAL-WRC-W-495. ; "Prepared for 'Assessment, management & politics of water', 13th American Water Resources Conference, Tucson, November 1977." ; With: Emergency water allocation : implementation of a preparedness program / R. Schinzinger . [et al.] Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] -- Emergency water allocation : restoration of a water distribution network / G. Urbach, R. Schinzinger, and H. Fagin. Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] -- Emergency water allocation : improving emeergency preparedness / H. Fagin, T. Edwards, and R. Schinzinger. Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] ; Mode of access: Internet.

Studies on the European Parliament have largely overlooked the impact of the inter-institutional context on its internal organisation. This paper argues that the stronger legislative powers of the Parliament vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers under the co-decision than under the consultation procedure affect the intra-parliamentary allocation of different types of legislative report. The analysis of the period 2004-07 shows that legislators from the centre-right party group coalition and loyal party group members are privileged in the allocation of co-decision reports. In contrast, legislators with outlying special interests and experts are given systematic access to drafting only consultation reports. The higher competition for co-decision versus consultation reports left unchecked by the formal EP rules has thus been exploited by party group leaders to promote group cohesion and coalition-building, producing clear winners and losers. Adapted from the source document.

Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Professor Campbell employs a formal and abstract model of a mechanism that brings into prominence the criteria by which the performance of an economy is to be judged. The mechanism approach is used to prove some fundamental theorems about the possibility of designing an economic system satisfying the criteria. It also establishes a way of thinking about economic issues that is becoming increasingly useful in special branches of economics, such as industrial organization and public finance. This book can be viewed as two different texts: one constitutes an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and the other is a treatment of welfare economics with conventional emphasis on Pareto optimality as well as providing substantial material on incentives, uncertainty, and existence of equilibrium