Suchergebnisse

Fighting cartels is a major priority of EU competition policy. Acting in concert with national competition authorities in the EU, the European Commission (EC) has made considerable efforts to promote competitiveness by detecting and punishing cartels. These efforts are visible not only in the increasing number of cartel cases, but also in the substantial rise in the average fines imposed per cartel member. While the successes of past years in fighting cartels clearly hinge to some extent on various policy reforms, many commentators argue that the introduction of the EC leniency programme (LP) in 1996 is likely a key enabler. Generally, LPs offer violators a fine reduction or even full amnesty from fines if they disclose an infringement to the responsible authority and cooperate during the subsequent investigation. Below, the key results of an empirical ZEW study on the determinants of self-reporting under the European LP are presented. Given the substantial increase in both the number of detected cartels and the average fine per cartel member, it comes as no surprise that an increasing number of convicted firms have considered filing an appeal against EC decisions. Below, the characteristics of firms filing an appeal and the factors that determine their success in terms of fine reduction are discussed. ; Die Bekämpfung von Kartellen hat einen außerordentlich hohen Stellenwert im Rahmen der EU-Wettbewerbspolitik. In Zusammenarbeit mit den nationalen Wettbewerbsbehörden der EU-Mitgliedstaaten hat die Europäische Kommission (EC) durch die Aufdeckung und Verfolgung von Kartellen erhebliche Anstrengungen zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit unternommen. Zahlreiche Beobachter argumentieren, dass die von der Kommission 1996 eingeführte Kronzeugenregelung ("Leniency Programme", LP) in diesem Zusammenhang ein Schlüsselelement darstelle. Angesichts der steigenden Anzahl aufgedeckter Kartelle und der erhöhten durchschnittlichen Bußgeldstrafen pro Kartellmitglied ist es nicht überraschend, dass verurteilte Unternehmen immer häufiger erwägen, gegen die Entscheidungen der Kommission in Berufung zu gehen. Das vorliegende Paper präsentiert die zentralen Ergebnisse einer empirischen ZEW-Studie zu den Voraussetzungen einer Selbstanzeige im Rahmen des europäischen LP. Es diskutiert zudem die Merkmale der Unternehmen, die Berufung einlegen, sowie die Erfolgsfaktoren, die zu einer Bußgeldverminderung führen.

We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission's speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.

We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commissions speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel enforcement process in the European Union - subdivided further into its duration, types of cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The challenges facing the criminalisation of cartel activity in the European Union are threefold: theoretical, legal, and practical. This book analyses these crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalisation can be accurately understood.

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.