Suchergebnisse

This report addresses the Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress of the Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals.

An alternative minimum tax (AMT) is often regarded as desirable. We analyze a wealth tax at corporate and personal level that is designed as an AMT as proposed by the German Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to profit taxes and is hence intended to prevent multiple (multistage) taxation. Referring to data from annual reports and the German Central Bank we model enterprises of different structure, industry, size and legal status. We show that companies in the service sector which generally maintain rather high gearing rates are more frequently subjected to the wealth tax than capital intensive industries. This result runs counter to well-known effects of a common wealth tax. Capital intensive firms, e.g. in the metal industry, are levied with definitive wealth tax only if they have large loss carry-forwards or extremely volatile profits. Furthermore, partnerships often enjoy wealth tax privileges due to uniform taxation at individual level whereas corporations may suffer from the wealth tax at corporate and personal level caused by imputation backlogs. Obviously, the underlying AMT influences corporate dividend policy evoking a push-out effect. We prove that this kind of wealth taxation usually favors financial rather than real investment and encourages outbound investment. Consequently, introducing an AMT discriminates against many firms and investment projects, especially if economic income is lower than taxable income. This proves that whenever income is taxed correctly, AMT is dispensable.

This report addresses Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress regarding the Alternative Minimum Tax For Individuals.

This report addresses Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress of the Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals.

This report describes the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), specifically revenue effects of modifying AMT and Legislative Initiatives.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the alternative minimum tax (AMT) system, focusing on: (1) the rationale for establishing AMT; (2) how AMT affects taxpayers' tax liability; (3) the expected increase in AMT coverage and additional tax liability and the major reasons for the increase; and (4) the impact of the projected increase in AMT coverage on taxpayers' compliance burden and economic incentives and on the distribution of the tax burden."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony focuses on the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), its interaction with the regular tax system, and its projected growth in coverage. GAO found that (1) AMT was designed to ensure that high-income individuals do not avoid significant income tax liabilities--for tax year 1997, about 14,000 taxpayers would not have paid any income taxes absent AMT, (2) AMT operates as a separate tax system that parallels the regular individual income tax system but with different rules for determining taxable income, different tax rates for computing tax liability, and different rules for allowing the use of tax credits, (3) AMT affected about one percent of taxpayers in 2000 and accounted for about $5.8 billion in additional tax revenue; by 2010, it is expected to increase the tax liabilities of about one out of six taxpayers and account for about $189 billion in tax revenues over the period, (4) the projected increase in AMT coverage is, for the most part, attributable to inflation and to the scheduled expiration of legislation temporarily excluding some tax credits from AMT rules, and (5) AMT's impacts include increased taxpayer compliance burden; increased Internal Revenue Service administrative cost; redistribution of the tax burden among taxpayers; changed economic incentives; and the potential to neutralize, for some taxpayers, changes to the tax system. This testimony summarized an August report (GGD-00-180)"

This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers real resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers real resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

This report describes the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), specifically revenue effects of modifying the AMT and Legislative Initiatives.

"Bringing together leading experts in the field of tax law, this book comprehensively analyses the new global minimum taxation regime for multinational companies. Not only does it consider this unprecedented diplomatic achievement in its historic, economic, and political context, but the book also explores the intricate technical detail of the GloBE model rules. Key Features: Exploration of the Pillar Two proposal's formative development. Detailed discussion of key concepts such as process legitimacy. Examination of the Pillar Two objectives and the reasons which led to its adoption. Assessment of the interaction between the GloBE rules and national law, European law, and existing bilateral tax treaties. Consideration of the impact of the new regime on multinational businesses and the future interaction of states through tax competition. Step-by-step analysis of the complex set of GloBE model rules that have been put in place to make the minimum taxation regime effective. This authoritative book is an essential resource for legal practitioners practising in tax law, fiscal policy, and commercial law. The applied nature of the text is also of great benefit to policymakers working in the taxation sphere. Scholars and students of international taxation will similarly find this to be a useful reference."

Abstract
This paper examines the progressivity of tax benefits for child care over time. We find that the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) became more progressive between 1989 and 1998. However, total tax benefits for child care, which include the employer exclusion for child care, were less progressive than the CDCTC alone and became less progressive over time. In simple simulations using 1998 data as the base, we find that the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) increases the progressivity of the CDCTC and total tax benefits for child care.