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Amid Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, erosion of the rule of law is deepening not only internationally but also domestically. This is evidenced by the destruction of independent media in Russia, citizens' inability to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, and the intensification of political repression against antiwar citizens and anyone who otherwise demonstrates disloyalty to the Kremlin. Alongside these practices, which can be considered traditional for authoritarian regimes, an informal practice of disciplining society is actively developing. This practice, existing outside the realm of law, is a new "tradition" of public apologies and repentance. According to the human rights project OVD-Info, between February 24, 2022, and June 2023, ninety-four cases of public apologies for disagreeing with the Russian authorities were recorded.Breaking a Person from WithinThe practice of public apologies in Russia stems mainly from the Chechen Republic, where it has been documented since 2015. The first high-profile case was the apology, on Chechen television, of Aishat Inayeva, a Chechen resident. At one point she had complained publicly about the difficult economic conditions and high cost of living, including housing and utilities costs. She was then forced to retract her words at a televised meeting with the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov.Over the next few years, public apologies spread throughout Russia. In 2021, following protests in support of Alexei Navalny, the press services of the Investigative Committee and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs released videos in which detained demonstrators apologized for participating in or calling for protests.After February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion of Ukraine, a wave of public apologies by people who had previously professed an antiwar position spread over the official media outlets of the Russian security agencies and other platforms. The reasons for apologizing could be anything from expressing an antiwar viewpoint in public to videotaping the work of the air defense forces.Apologizing publicly is a humiliating procedure. It is meant to be that. Often, people are forced to apologize for things that cannot be formally recognized as crimes. A public apology affects both the person's own human dignity and his or her public standing. As Russian anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova observes, "You'll support an unyielding opposition leader, but you won't support a person who bleats something on camera and says he's wrong."Through this practice, the state asserts its claim not only on citizens' freedoms but also on their consciousness. As a result, people often end up broken from within and unable to resist. From Apology to RepentanceAt the end of 2023, the phenomenon of public apology in Russia acquired a new form, the public act of repentance. The difference between apology and repentance is that in the latter, a person is forced to admit to a moral offense, such as wearing "indecent" clothing, rather than to a civic one, such as taking part in a protest event.The phenomenon of public repentance surfaced in December 2023 after a nationwide controversy sparked by the "almost naked" party at the Moscow club Mutabor. Photos of the party participants in revealing outfits, including many famous Russian artists loyal to the Kremlin, hit the internet and became the focus of mass denunciations. Russia's war supporters claimed that such an event was unacceptable in a country that stands for traditional values and is conducting a "special military operation" against "Nazis."One of the party attendees, a rap performer who goes by the name of Vacio (Nikolai Vasilyev), arrived at the venue wearing only a white sock to cover his genitals, an homage to the famous Red Hot Chili Peppers poster from the 1980s. He was charged with petty hooliganism, a misdemeanor, and with spreading "gay propaganda." The artist, who is twenty-five years old, was incarcerated for twenty-five days and was served a summons to the military recruitment office immediately thereafter. Lawsuits were also filed against the organizer of the event, the Instagram influencer Nastia Ivleyeva, for "inflicting moral harm," with a demand for compensation of one billion rubles (approximately $11 million). The activity of the Mutabor club itself has been suspended for three months by a court order.A veritable wave of public repentance ensued. The party attendees posted videos on their social media in which they asked the Russian people to forgive their immoral behavior. Some of the artists donated money to emergency relief programs or visited the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Ukraine's territories annexed by Russia. The club's owner publicly gave a Moscow church fragments of alleged relics of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker that he had purchased in Vatican City. In January 2024 the Russian singer Charlot, arrested for publicly criticizing the Russian authorities, wrote a letter of repentance to Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his address from the detention center, the singer, who is also twenty-five years old, said that he now "writes patriotic works and is ready to perform them later." He asked to be released but remains in jail. Disciplining Russian Society on Many LevelsPublic repentance is an instrument of ideological warfare. Young, edgy artists are presented to Russian society as carriers of "Western values." By publicly shaming them, the Russian authorities purport to demonstrate the West's degradation and flimsiness and the existential superiority of Russia's "traditional values."At the same time, the Russian authorities are demonstratively going beyond the limits of the law and actually engaging in new practices of state coercion that combine legal and quasi-religious procedures. The Russian nationalist philosopher Ivan Ilyin probably had something similar in mind when he wrote in 1951 about the "Russian law": "Russian law must save itself from Western formalism, from self-indulgent legal dogma, from legal unprincipledness. Russia needs a new legal consciousness, national in its roots, Christian-Orthodox in its spirit and creative in its purpose."By proposing repentance as one of the conditions for returning to Russia, the state offers dissenters a deal, the price of which is betrayal of their beliefs and loss of their civic agency. At the same time, the loan of mercy declared by the state will obviously be issued under the obligation of political loyalty and secured by the threat of severe punishment in case of repeated misbehavior.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

Amid Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, erosion of the rule of law is deepening not only internationally but also domestically. This is evidenced by the destruction of independent media in Russia, citizens' inability to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, and the intensification of political repression against antiwar citizens and anyone who otherwise demonstrates disloyalty to the Kremlin. Alongside these practices, which can be considered traditional for authoritarian regimes, an informal practice of disciplining society is actively developing. This practice, existing outside the realm of law, is a new "tradition" of public apologies and repentance. According to the human rights project OVD-Info, between February 24, 2022, and June 2023, ninety-four cases of public apologies for disagreeing with the Russian authorities were recorded.Breaking a Person from WithinThe practice of public apologies in Russia stems mainly from the Chechen Republic, where it has been documented since 2015. The first high-profile case was the apology, on Chechen television, of Aishat Inayeva, a Chechen resident. At one point she had complained publicly about the difficult economic conditions and high cost of living, including housing and utilities costs. She was then forced to retract her words at a televised meeting with the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov.Over the next few years, public apologies spread throughout Russia. In 2021, following protests in support of Alexei Navalny, the press services of the Investigative Committee and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs released videos in which detained demonstrators apologized for participating in or calling for protests.After February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion of Ukraine, a wave of public apologies by people who had previously professed an antiwar position spread over the official media outlets of the Russian security agencies and other platforms. The reasons for apologizing could be anything from expressing an antiwar viewpoint in public to videotaping the work of the air defense forces.Apologizing publicly is a humiliating procedure. It is meant to be that. Often, people are forced to apologize for things that cannot be formally recognized as crimes. A public apology affects both the person's own human dignity and his or her public standing. As Russian anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova observes, "You'll support an unyielding opposition leader, but you won't support a person who bleats something on camera and says he's wrong."Through this practice, the state asserts its claim not only on citizens' freedoms but also on their consciousness. As a result, people often end up broken from within and unable to resist. From Apology to RepentanceAt the end of 2023, the phenomenon of public apology in Russia acquired a new form, the public act of repentance. The difference between apology and repentance is that in the latter, a person is forced to admit to a moral offense, such as wearing "indecent" clothing, rather than to a civic one, such as taking part in a protest event.The phenomenon of public repentance surfaced in December 2023 after a nationwide controversy sparked by the "almost naked" party at the Moscow club Mutabor. Photos of the party participants in revealing outfits, including many famous Russian artists loyal to the Kremlin, hit the internet and became the focus of mass denunciations. Russia's war supporters claimed that such an event was unacceptable in a country that stands for traditional values and is conducting a "special military operation" against "Nazis."One of the party attendees, a rap performer who goes by the name of Vacio (Nikolai Vasilyev), arrived at the venue wearing only a white sock to cover his genitals, an homage to the famous Red Hot Chili Peppers poster from the 1980s. He was charged with petty hooliganism, a misdemeanor, and with spreading "gay propaganda." The artist, who is twenty-five years old, was incarcerated for twenty-five days and was served a summons to the military recruitment office immediately thereafter. Lawsuits were also filed against the organizer of the event, the Instagram influencer Nastia Ivleyeva, for "inflicting moral harm," with a demand for compensation of one billion rubles (approximately $11 million). The activity of the Mutabor club itself has been suspended for three months by a court order.A veritable wave of public repentance ensued. The party attendees posted videos on their social media in which they asked the Russian people to forgive their immoral behavior. Some of the artists donated money to emergency relief programs or visited the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Ukraine's territories annexed by Russia. The club's owner publicly gave a Moscow church fragments of alleged relics of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker that he had purchased in Vatican City. In January 2024 the Russian singer Charlot, arrested for publicly criticizing the Russian authorities, wrote a letter of repentance to Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his address from the detention center, the singer, who is also twenty-five years old, said that he now "writes patriotic works and is ready to perform them later." He asked to be released but remains in jail. Disciplining Russian Society on Many LevelsPublic repentance is an instrument of ideological warfare. Young, edgy artists are presented to Russian society as carriers of "Western values." By publicly shaming them, the Russian authorities purport to demonstrate the West's degradation and flimsiness and the existential superiority of Russia's "traditional values."At the same time, the Russian authorities are demonstratively going beyond the limits of the law and actually engaging in new practices of state coercion that combine legal and quasi-religious procedures. The Russian nationalist philosopher Ivan Ilyin probably had something similar in mind when he wrote in 1951 about the "Russian law": "Russian law must save itself from Western formalism, from self-indulgent legal dogma, from legal unprincipledness. Russia needs a new legal consciousness, national in its roots, Christian-Orthodox in its spirit and creative in its purpose."By proposing repentance as one of the conditions for returning to Russia, the state offers dissenters a deal, the price of which is betrayal of their beliefs and loss of their civic agency. At the same time, the loan of mercy declared by the state will obviously be issued under the obligation of political loyalty and secured by the threat of severe punishment in case of repeated misbehavior.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

The article is devoted to a comparative legal study of the European principle of proportionality and the American method of weighing interests, their origins, common and distinctive features, socio-cultural and historical foundations, the application of the principle of proportionality in the Russian legal order. Historically, the origins (roots) of the European principle of proportionality go back to the German administrative-legal doctrine, and the American method of weighing as an initial principle is associated with private law and only later was extended to the public law sphere. The article assesses the impact of these principles on the Russian legal doctrine and law enforcement practice.Purpose: The main purpose of the article is to identify the general and distinctive features of the European principle of proportionality and the American method of balancing interests in order to comprehend on this basis the Russian legal model for ensuring the balance of private and public interests. Tasks: to explore the historical, socio-cultural, doctrinal foundations of the genesis of the European principle of proportionality and the American method of weighing interests; to identify the common and special features characteristic of these methods; to show the influence of these methods on Russian doctrine and law enforcement practice; compare the Russian principle of balance between private and public interests with the European principle of proportionality; formulate recommendations and suggestions for improving Russian law enforcement practice.Methods: historical and legal, logical, formal and legal, systemic and structural, method of interdisciplinary legal research, method of system analysis.Discussion: the European principle of proportionality and the American method of weighing interests, although they do not belong to new phenomena of legal thought, nevertheless, due to their fundamental importance both at the constitutional and other sectoral levels of development of law, are constantly in the center of the field of vision of legal thought abroad, as well as in Russia. The emergence of various approaches to understanding the legal provision of the balance of private and public interests is causing lively, sometimes quite sharp, discussions in the scientific field. The article focuses on the historical, socio-cultural, political and legal features of the development of the European principle of proportionality and the American method of balancing interests, which leads to both close interaction and convergence, as well as the need for their joint scientific research, which can give a significant theoretical and practical effect.Conclusion: the article states that the distinctive features of the European principle of proportionality and the American method of weighing interests are not of an essential, paradigmatic nature, which allows us to conclude that in this case there are no grounds for a fundamental opposition to each other of the above-named constructive models as methods of understanding legal reality, as well as legal means of ensuring a balance of private and public interests. The development of the European principle of proportionality has a significant impact and impact on the formation of Russian political and legal thought and practice in the field of interaction between private and public law, ensuring an organic combination of private and public interests, which is reflected in the legal position formulated by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation concerning the principle of ensuring proportional observance, balance of private and public interests in the implementation of legal regulation of public relations. ; O artigo é dedicado a um estudo jurídico comparativo do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade e do método americano de ponderar interesses, suas origens, características comuns e distintivas, fundamentos socioculturais e históricos, a aplicação do princípio da proporcionalidade na ordem jurídica russa. Historicamente, as origens (raízes) do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade remontam à doutrina administrativa-jurídica alemã, e o método americano de ponderação como princípio inicial está associado ao direito privado e só mais tarde foi estendido à esfera do direito público. O artigo avalia o impacto desses princípios na doutrina russa e na prática de aplicação da lei.Objetivo: O objetivo principal do artigo é identificar as características gerais e distintivas do princípio europeu de proporcionalidade e o método americano de equilibrar interesses, a fim de compreender, com base nisso, o modelo jurídico russo para garantir o equilíbrio de interesses públicos e privados.Tarefas: explorar os fundamentos históricos, socioculturais e doutrinários da gênese do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade e do método americano de ponderar interesses; identificar características comuns e especiais características desses métodos; mostrar a influência desses métodos na doutrina russa e na prática da aplicação da lei; comparar o princípio russo de equilíbrio entre interesses públicos e privados com o princípio europeu de proporcionalidade; formular recomendações e sugestões para melhorar as práticas de aplicação da lei na Rússia.Métodos: histórico e jurídico, lógico, formal e jurídico, sistêmico e estrutural, método de pesquisa jurídica intersetorial, método de análise de sistemas.Discussão: o princípio europeu da proporcionalidade e o método americano de ponderar interesses, embora não pertençam a novos fenômenos do pensamento jurídico, no entanto, devido à sua importância fundamental, tanto nos níveis constitucionais quanto em outros setores do desenvolvimento do direito, estão constantemente no centro do campo de visão do pensamento jurídico. no exterior, bem como na Rússia. O surgimento de várias abordagens para entender a provisão legal da balança de interesses privados e públicos está causando discussões animadas, às vezes bastante acentuadas, no campo científico. O artigo enfoca as características históricas, socioculturais, políticas e legais do desenvolvimento do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade e o método americano de equilibrar interesses, o que leva a uma interação e convergência próximas, bem como a necessidade de sua pesquisa científica conjunta, o que pode dar um efeito teórico e prático significativo.Conclusão: o artigo afirma que as características distintivas do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade e do método americano de ponderação de interesses não são de natureza paradigmática essencial, o que nos permite concluir que, neste caso, não há fundamento para uma oposição fundamental entre si dos modelos construtivos acima mencionados como métodos de compreensão jurídica. realidade, bem como meios legais para garantir um equilíbrio de interesses públicos e privados. O desenvolvimento do princípio europeu da proporcionalidade tem um impacto significativo na formação do pensamento e das práticas políticas e jurídicas russas no campo da interação entre direito privado e público, garantindo uma combinação orgânica de interesses privados e públicos, o que se reflete na posição jurídica formulada pelo Tribunal Constitucional da Federação da Rússia sobre o princípio de garantir proporcionalidade. observância, equilíbrio de interesses privados e públicos na implementação da regulamentação legal das relações públicas.

У статті проаналізовано як, починаючи з 1991 р., в українських шкільних підручниках з історії (підручники з всесвітньої історії тут не розглядаються) мінялися інтерпретації подій 1939–1945 рр.; відбувалася поступовавідмова від успадкованого з радянської історіографії поняття «Велика Вітчизняна війна» і запроваджувалося поняття «українського виміруДругої світової війни». Оглянуто підходи до оцінювання підручників з історії, запропоновані європейськими науковцями багатоперспективність, критичне мислення, сформоване на підставі аналізу різноманітних джерел,а завдяки цьому – виховання толерантності й уникання однобічності).Зауважено, що, поділяючи настанови щодо багатоперспективності й критичності, українські науковці наголошують також на потребі надати «відімені науки» згусток знань, потрібних молодій людині для ототожненнясебе з країною (Н. Яковенко), дати молодій людині уяву про пов'язаністьіз своїм суспільством і його минулим (Я. Грицак), та деконструюватифундаментальний радянський міф, котрий залишається стрижневим компонентом ідеологічного колоніалізму щодо України – міф «ВеликоїВітчизняної війни» і «Великої Перемоги» (Л. Зашкільняк). У статті показано, що перші українські підручники хронологічно йконцептуально відповідали радянському наративу про «Велику Вітчизнянувійну». Натомість кожне нове покоління підручників, написаних згідноз оновленими та удосконаленими програмами викладання, серед авторів яких науковці – фахівці з цієї тематики, висвітлювало події Другоїсвітової війни дедалі повніше й адекватніше, поступово відмовляючисьвід радянської міфології, використовуючи новітні методики викладанняі різноманітні джерела. Висвітлено процес формування «українськоговиміру Другої світової війни», покликаний відірвати освітній простірУкраїни від міфології Великої Вітчизняної війни та культу Перемоги,мусив конкурувати з істотним політичним, медійним та культурнимвпливом Росії на український культурний і освітній простір. Окрім того,автори підручників зіткнулися з потужним опором частини українськихполітичних еліт – комуністів, прихильників ідей «русского мира», серед яких було чимало народних депутатів, науковців, освітян, діячів культури. Вони критикували підручники цього періоду, звинувачуючи авторів у перекручуванні правди та відмові від «Великої Перемоги». Названо ключові чинники створення і постійного удосконалення/переписування підручників з історії України: суспільна трансформація, політична свобода, світоглядне й культурне різноманіття, інтелектуальна сміливість, можливість проводити вільні дискусії, а також – потребаформування нової української ідентичності задля ототожнення себе ізкраїною. Ключові слова: історична освіта, наратив, підручник історії,історіографія, міфологія Великої Вітчизняної війни, український вимірДругої світової війни. ; The article analyzes changes in the interpretations of events during the period1939–1945 that have occurred in the writing of Ukrainian school historytextbooks since 1991 (World history textbooks are not considered here). Therewas a gradual rejection of the concept of the "Great Patriotic War" inheritedfrom Soviet historiography, superceded by the introduction of the conceptof the "Ukrainian dimension of the Second World War". The article examinesapproaches proposed by European scholars for evaluating history textbooks. These comprise multiple viewpoints based on the analysis of varioussources of the formation of critical thinking, perspectives that enable the developmentof tolerance and avoidance of one-sidedness. It has been pointed outthat while sharing guidelines for multiple views and critical judgment, Ukrainian scholars also emphasize the need to provide a complex of knowledge "onbehalf of science" necessary for young people in order to promote their senseof identification with the country (N. Yakovenko); solidly grounded knowledgeso as to provide them with conceptions about their connection to their society and their past (Y. Hrytsak), and to counter and critically reflect on the fundamentalSoviet myth that remains the core component of ideological colonialismin Ukraine – namely the myth of the "Great Patriotic War" and the "GreatVictory" (L. Zashkilnyak). The article shows that the first Ukrainian textbooks corresponded chronologicallyand conceptually to the Soviet narrative about the "Great PatrioticWar". However, each new generation of textbooks – by authors who are expertson this subject, and written following updated and improved teaching programs– presented the events of the Second World War more adequately, graduallyabandoning Soviet mythology, employing the newest teaching methodologiesand various sources. The previously documented process of the formation of the "Ukrainian dimension of the Second World War" – designed to removethe Ukrainian educational space from the mythology of the "Great Patrioticcultural and educational space. Moreover, Ukrainian textbook authors faceda powerful opposition by a segment of the Ukrainian political elite – communists,supporters of ideas from the "Russian world" ("Russkiy mir"). Amongthese were many MPs, scholars, educators, and cultural activists. They criticizedvarious textbooks, accusing the authors of distorting the truth and in denialof the "Great Victory". The article seeks to identify the key factors underlying the creating and continuousimprovement and rewriting of history in Ukrainian textbooks: socialtransformation, political freedom, ideological and cultural diversity, intellectualcourage, the possibility for free discussion, and the need to shape a new sense of Ukrainian identity to link citizens with the country. Keywords: historical education, narrative, history textbooks, historiography,mythology of the "Great Patriotic War", the Ukrainian dimension of the SecondWorld War. ; В статье проанализировано как, начиная с 1991 г., в украинских школьных учебниках по истории (учебники по всемирной истории здесь не рассматриваются) менялись интерпретации событий 1939-1945 гг.; происходил постепенный отказ от унаследованного из советской историографии понятия «Великая Отечественная война» и внедрялось понятие «украинского измерения Второй мировой войны». Рассмотрены подходы к оценке учебников по истории, предложенные европейскими исследователями (многоперспективность, критическое мышление, сформированное на основании анализа разнообразных источников, а благодаря этому – воспитание толерантности и избежание односторонности). Отмечено, что, разделяя наставления касательно многоперспективности и критичности, украинские ученые подчеркивают также на потребности предоставить «от имени науки» сгусток знаний, необходимых молодому человеку для отождествления себя со страной (Н. Яковенко), дать молодежи представление о связанности со своим обществом и его прошлым (Я. Грицак), а также деконструировать фундаментальный советский миф, который остается стержневым компонентом идеологического колониализма относительно Украины – миф «Великой Отечественной войны» и «Великой Победы» (Л. Зашкильняк). В статье показано, что первые украинские учебники хронологически и концептуально соответствовали советскому нарративу о «Великой Отечественной войне». В то же время каждое новое поколение учебников, написанных в соответствии с обновленными и усовершенствованными программами преподавания, среди авторов которых ученые – специалисты по этой тематике, освещало события Второй мировой войны все полнее и адекватнее, постепенно отказываясь от советской мифологии, используя новейшие методики преподавания и разнообразные источники. Освещен процесс формирования «украинского измерения Второй мировой войны», призванный оторвать образовательное пространство Украины от мифологии Великой Отечественной войны и культа Победы, который должен конкурировать с существенным политическим, медийным и культурным влиянием России на украинское культурное и образовательное пространство. Кроме того, авторы учебников столкнулись с мощным сопротивлением части украинских политических элит – коммунистов, сторонников идей «русского мира», среди которых было множество народных депутатов, ученых, педагогов, деятелей культуры. Они критиковали учебники этого периода, обвиняя авторов в перекручивании правды и отказе от «Великой Победы». Названы ключевые факторы создания и постоянного усовершенствования / переписывания учебников по истории Украины: общественная трансформация, политическая свобода, мировоззренческое и культурное разнообразие, интеллектуальная смелость, возможность проводить свободные дискуссии, а также – необходимость формирования новой украинской идентичности ради отождествления себя со страной. Ключевые слова: историческое образование, нарратив, учебник истории, историография, мифология Великой Отечественной войны, украинское измерение Второй мировой войны.

From the early 1980s until President Barack Obama announced his intention to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations ten years ago on December 17, 2014, Cuban American voters in South Florida held a virtual veto over U.S. policy toward Cuba. Well organized and amply funded, the Cuba lobby could deliver a significant bloc of voters in a strategic swing state, voters who would cast their ballots for or against a candidate based on their position on Cuba. Presidential candidates of both parties felt compelled to seek their support—or at least avoid antagonizing them. That leverage, however, is waning. Last week, Florida International University's Cuba Research Center released the fifteenth in its series of surveys of Cuban Americans in South Florida, providing an invaluable record of how the community's views have evolved over time. It largely confirmed the results of the last several FIU polls. "There were no surprises," co-author Guillermo Grenier said in his presentation of the results. A majority of Cuban American voters in South Florida are Republican partisans, outnumbering registered Democrats three-to-one, a gap that has grown since 2022. 59% describe themselves as conservative, only 25% as liberal. There are variations in attitudes depending on the respondent's age, when they arrived in the United States, or were born in the United States, but not as much variation as FIU's prior surveys found.See Leogrande's 2024 Quincy Institute paper, Cuba's Role in U.S. Presidential Elections From 1991 to 2016, the polls told a consistent story. The community's deep anti-communist sympathies and vehement opposition to any U.S. engagement with Cuba gradually mellowed. As the generation of political refugees that left Cuba in the 1960s, when Fidel Castro declared the revolution socialist, gave way to a younger generation of more recent arrivals and U.S.-born citizens of Cuban heritage, the polls showed a steady increase in support for selling food and medicine to Cuba, traveling and sending remittances to family on the island, and even lifting the embargo. Even the Cuban American National Foundation, the group most identified lobbying for a hardline U.S. policy, moderated its positions to favor U.S. policies that fostered family ties across the Florida Strait. President Barack Obama recognized these changes and based his initial Cuba policy on family engagement, lifting all restrictions on family travel and remittances. By the time he and Raúl Castro announced the restoration of diplomatic relations, Obama was able to count on support from half the Cuban American community. But then the story took an unexpected turn. Donald Trump was able to re-energize the Cuban American right by promising to finally overthrow the Cuban government. He followed through with a policy of "maximum pressure," the most intensive set of economic sanctions since the start of the embargo. Early signs of change in the Cuban American community were visible in the 2018 FIU poll, which for the first time reported some retreat from engagement, with support for ending the embargo falling back below 50%. The Democrats' share of registered Cuban American voters was also slipping and in the 2018 mid-term elections, Cuban Americans preferred Republican candidates for governor, U.S. Senate, and House of Representatives by 70 to 30%.Yet this Republican landslide was not entirely attributable to Trump's Cuba policies. In a list of ten major issues of concern mentioned in the FIU poll, Cuba ranked last. The top issues were the economy, healthcare, and gun control. The 2020 and 2022 FIU polls confirmed what the 2018 poll foreshadowed. Support for the embargo rose to over 60%, but Cuba still ranked no better than fourth among people's priority issues. Both polls showed that Cuban American support for Trump and dislike of Biden were not issue-specific, but extended across the full range of policies. In the 2020 poll, approval of Trump's handling of a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues was never below 62%. In 2022, Biden's approval rating on similar questions never rose above 38 %. Notably, 72% of respondents disapproved of Biden's Cuba policy even though it was not very different than Trump's. In both 2020 and 2022, domestic issues topped the list of respondents' major concerns, while Cuba policy was last out of six in 2020 and sixth out of nine in 2022. The most recent FIU poll underscores this new reality. Between 60% and 70% of Cuban Americans disapproved of every Biden policy, from Cuba to Gaza, China, Russia, and Ukraine. When asked, 68% of them said they would vote for Trump, rising to 94% among Republicans. Yet the issue of Cuba policy again ranked sixth out of nine in importance. And once again, the issues that concerned Cuban Americans most were the same ones that concern all Americans: the economy, health care, and immigration.The four FIU polls since 2018, have important implications for the domestic political calculations that have so long dominated U.S. policy toward Cuba. A solid majority of Cuban Americans identify as Republican partisans and they vote overwhelmingly along party lines, just like other partisans. Partisanship in Miami has become almost tribal, just as it has in so much of the United States. The Republican Party has come to be seen as the party of Cuban Americans, just as the Democratic Party is seen as the party of African Americans. A candidate's position on Cuba is no longer the driving factor behind Cuban American voting. The salience of the Cuba issue has faded and it now ranks relatively low compared to domestic concerns. The issues that Cuban Americans cite as important to them are the same issues other voters cite. Conventional wisdom among Democratic politicians has been that if they mimic Republicans on Cuba, other issues more favorable to Democrats would come to the fore and win them a larger slice of the Cuban American electorate. Bill Clinton's relative success among Cuban Americans in 1992 and 1996 seemed to confirm this strategy. Yet as those issues have come to the fore, Cuban Americans have voted Republican anyway — just like other registered Republicans.Even then, if Florida were still a swing state, it might make sense for a Democratic candidate to try to make small gains among this solidly Republican Cuban American electorate, just as both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are currently trying to break off small pieces of their opponent's coalition in states where the race will be decided by a fraction of a percentage point. Florida, however, is no longer a swing state and Cuban Americans are not a swing constituency. That's why neither Harris nor Trump has spent time campaigning there and why Cuba has not been an issue in the campaign. Cuban Americans have become such loyal Republicans that they have lost their leverage with Democrats. The Democratic National Convention offered the most graphic evidence. While delegates from the swing states sat right in front of the stage, the Florida contingent was relegated to the very back of the hall.If Kamala Harris wins the election, she will owe no political debt to Cuban Americans in Miami and will not need to compromise her foreign policy toward Cuba to keep them happy. To be sure, there are prominent Cuban American Democrats who deserve a seat at the table because they can be valuable partners in fashioning a Cuba policy that serves the national interest of the United States rather than the parochial interests of Little Havana. But the majority of Cuban Americans have picked their side and, as President Obama said, elections have consequences.

The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled — again — that ultra-Orthodox men can no longer claim their customary exemption from national military service.
This has sparked massive protest and speculation that it will lead to the collapse of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition should he comply with the court's ruling. The underlying hopes, or fears, depending on one's view of the government, is that Netanyahu will have no choice but to implement the ruling and that, if he does, the religious and ultra-right parties will have no choice but to bolt. Not so fast.

When Israel's first prime minister was assembling a workable government after establishment of the state, he made a deal with the ultra-orthodox community to secure the exemption of students in religious academies (yeshivas) from military service. The deal was incorporated into the framework of defense regulations under the 1949 Defense law. The terms of the deal were simply that students would be exempt until the age of 40 when they were no longer liable for military service. After that, they could seek employment outside of the world of Torah study.

As a practical matter, they were allowed to leave their yeshivas and find employment when they were 30 years old. This was a good deal, but affected only the very few males who were studying in those days in yeshivas, perhaps about 40 in number.

As the number of Haredis grew and organized politically, they became powerful swing parties, prepared to help push the coalition most prepared to meet their demands over the top following close elections. Even politicians who swept into office would still reward religious parties who joined their governing coalition as, for example, Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin did in 1977, when he toppled the prevailing Labor ascendancy in an astounding victory. In so doing, however, he seeded a backlash that lay mostly dormant until the late 1990s, when Labor returned briefly to lead the country.

In 1998, in the case of Rubenstein v. Minister of Defense, the High Court of Justice ruled that the defense minister had no legal authority to exempt Israeli Jews from military service. The Labor government appointed Zvi Tal, a High Court justice, to develop a durable legal solution to what was, in essence, a political problem. As the then Chief Justice framed the issue, he wrote "the current situation, in which a significant portion of these individuals of service age do not risk their lives for the security of the State is very discriminatory." This study led to the Tal law enacted by the Knesset in 2002.

The law was meant to be a temporary measure, to be renewed by the Knesset every 5 years, pending a long term solution to the conundrum the Chief Justice had spelled out four years before. It provided that exemptions could be made until the age of 23 — a 5-year span beginning with the normal age of conscription at 18, to be followed by a 16-month enlistment, half the normal time, a year of civilian service, or full time Torah study. This was catnip to Haredim, who seized it as a blank check for their men to evade military service permanently by enjoying subsidized devotional scholarship. The High Court of Justice shared this view of the law, although not from the same perspective, and shot it down in 2012 for violating the Human Dignity section of Israel's Basic Law.

When Netanyahu formed a government with a secular centrist party, Yesh Atid, in 2012, he embraced the Yesh Atid slogan that the ultra-orthodox should "share the burden." Once again, a commission to find a way out of the legal and political cul de sac was formed by the science and technology minister, Yaakov Peri. Pending his report, the High Court allowed the defense minister to set the rules for service exemptions.

In 2014 another bill was passed that gave the Haredi community three years to usher 60% of hitherto exempt students into military service. If that goal were not met then all Haredi men eligible for service but not in uniform would face criminal and financial penalties. During the three-year runup to implementation, however, there would be no penalties. The following year, the Haredi parties were back in government and got the 2014 law amended to make it friendlier to Haredi interests. Criminal penalties were dropped, and additional three years were added to the time frame preceding implementation.

The High Court of Justice, by that point, was fed up and struck down the amended law and instructed the government to come up with yet another one.

The Court's demand coincided with a long period of political instability. There was a moment when Likud's then leader, Naftali Bennett, and centrist Yair Lapid paired up to form a government and tasked the defense minister, Benny Gantz to come up with a plan to make progress toward Haredi conscription. His approach took a page from older playbooks and stipulated that exemptions expire at the age of 21. The bill however went nowhere, reflecting as it did the government's evident weakness.

When Netanyahu came back in 2022 at the helm of a far right government, the Haredim were in a position to push back. The plan was to pass a law that would enable the Knesset to override High Court rulings. For the far right generally and the Haredim in particular, this would be the universal solvent. The move to draft and pass the law, however, sparked widespread demonstrations against "judicial reform" as the Knesset coup was called, and highlighted the question of Haredi exemptions.

Hamas' October 7 attack temporarily pushed the issue to the back burner, but as the fighting dragged on, had the opposite of effect. As the IDF command was complaining that it lacked the personnel to prosecute the war effectively even as Israeli casualties climbed, questions about Haredi exemptions once again came to the fore. Public protests swirled around the issue and combined with demands that the government focus more on release of the hostages. The High Court and the attorney general both warned that the government would have to begin conscripting Haredi students in the near future.

The latest ruling included a firm deadline, which in turn has raised questions about the viability Netanyahu's government. The narrative goes something like this: Netanyahu's coalition depends on the religious far right, which opposes conscription, and the Haredi parties themselves. If therefore Netanyahu were to heed to court's ruling, these parties would bolt, bringing down the government.

But this narrative ignores inconvenient facts. The first is that Netanyahu has some maneuvering room vis a vis the demands of the court and his own attorney general. He can meet these through partial compliance, assurances that he will bring to the Knesset a new bill that will make both the Haredis and the court happy, or stall in ways that don't come immediately to mind of observers but are under consideration within the government.

Second, the Haredis and the religious far right understand the public resentment regarding Haredi exemptions — even Bezalel Smotrich, the leader of a far-right religious party in Netanyahu's coalition — has made conciliatory noises. And they understand that however much Netanyahu might move to accommodate to the requirements of the court and attorney general, he's not going to go as far as the center or center right.

They are therefore unlikely to bolt. And the mainstream Likud party leaders would rather work with Netanyahu to fashion compromise solutions than see the government fall and themselves in the opposition or in a tortured and torturous coalition with centrist parties. So those anticipating the fall of the government, are advised to wait sitting down.

As the nearly $100 billion Senate-passed national security supplemental continues to stall in the House of Representatives, lawmakers are looking for alternatives. One idea that has been circulating Capitol Hill this week: formatting the next tranche of funding as a waivable loan instead of a grant in an effort to convince skeptical Republican members. But so far, the plan seems to have caused confusion among supporters of further aid to Kyiv, and has seemingly not meaningfully moved its opponents — and Johnson's striking of a deal with Democrats to fund the government has put him in an ever more precarious political position. The House passed its government funding legislation on Friday before heading off on a two-week recess. Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) has said that he expects to tackle the foreign aid supplemental next without committing to what the legislative vehicle will do."There's a number of avenues that we've been looking at to address that. And I'm not going to say today what that is," Johnson said about how he will approach the bill. "I have not specifically talked about the mechanism of funding Ukraine. We're talking about the whole supplemental and all these pieces, whether they would go individually or as a package, all those things are being debated and discussed internally."The speaker has refused to bring the Senate-passed supplemental package — which includes $60 billion for Kyiv, $17 billion for Tel Aviv— to the House floor. While he has maintained that the House GOP conference was searching for other ways to pass foreign funding, his dithering inspired two groups of House members to pursue discharge petitions that would force a bill to the floor over leadership's objections. One, introduced by Rep, Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), would bring the Senate-passed bill to the House floor, currently has 186 signatures. On Thursday, Rep. Ken Buck (R-Colo.), who is retiring on Friday, became the first Republican member to add his name to the petition. The other, a bipartisan measure led by Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.) that would provide $66 billion in defense-only funding for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan — removing the humanitarian assistance for Kyiv and Gaza that is in the Senate bill — and includes border security provisions, has 15 signatures. Either petition would need 218 signatures in order to succeed,Former President Donald Trump floated the idea of loaning aid to Ukraine in February amid the Senate battle over the supplemental. "They want to give them $60 billion more," Trump said. "Do it this way. Loan them the money. If they can make it, they pay us back. If they can't make it, they don't have to pay us back."Although at first it appeared like just another off-the-cuff idea from the 45th president, a series of reports this week indicate that congressional proponents of sending more aid to Ukraine are either supportive of the idea or understand that it may be the only way to get enough members on board to pass Ukraine-related legislation. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), one of the few senators to endorse the idea during floor debate in February, said he raised the idea with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a recent visit to Kyiv. Graham, in a statement released on Monday, said that he told Zelensky "no-interest, waivable loan is the most likely path forward."According to reporting from Politico, about $12 billion of the $60 billion in aid would be loaned, since the remaining funds will technically be spent to support the U.S. weapons industry. Johnson has also offered support for the idea, calling it "a common sense suggestion." But he will likely continue to feel political pressure from both sides over Ukraine aid. Members of the Freedom Caucus sharply criticized Johnson for his handling of government funding negotiations, which could limit his political capital on other issues. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) has already filed a "motion to vacate" that could possibly remove Johnson from the speakership, though it is unclear whether the motion will ever be voted on. Some Democratic members have already pledged to save Johnson if he agrees to bring the national security supplemental to the floor. Mitch McConnell, the Senate minority leader, has also come out in opposition to the loan idea, telling reporters that the process would take too long and "the best way we can get Ukraine the help they need is for the House to pass the Senate bill." Democrats have offered similar hesitations. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Rep. Pete Aguilar (D-Calif.) both noted that time was of the essence and passing already-existing legislation was their preferred path.Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) said that it was "one of those back-of-the-napkin ideas that sounds really good until you actually try to operationalize it." Nonetheless, the Democratic members were not willing to completely dismiss the plan. Murphy said he would be "interested to hear more" and Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said it would be "worth considering."Given that the plan is associated with Trump, many Democrats have neglected to wholeheartedly back it. But if they sense that it is a way to win over enough Republican votes it's possible that they could change their minds. "If there's a way to structure money to Ukraine in a way that gets Republican votes, then I'd sure take a hard look at that," said Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) "Democrats support aid to Ukraine. Whether you call it a loan, or whatever, get 'em some resources," added Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), the ranking member on the Homeland Security Committee. "You've got to get them some help. So if it comes in a loan, it's help; if it comes as an aid package with no requirements, it's still help."The U.S. occasionally offers foreign aid in the form of a loan. Approximately 10% of the post-World War II Marshall Plan, which totaled about $13.3 billion in aid — or more than $200 billion adjusted for inflation, was implemented through loans. On Monday, the State Department announced that it will loan $2 billion to help Poland rebuild its military. It represented the first use of a military aid loan via the State Department's Foreign Military Financing since 2017, according to Defense One. As Sen. Mitt Romney (R-Utah), has already acknowledged, the loan will ultimately serve the same purpose as a grant. "If that gets some people over the line, fine, because ultimately, Ukraine is not going to pay back the loan to the U.S., it's going to be a loan that's forgiven," he said. That reality seems to pose a problem for long-time opponents of Ukraine aid. ""My question would be, what are you going to collect? You've got a war-torn country that basically doesn't have an economy," Rep. Ralph Norman (R-S.C.) told Business Insider on Thursday. "So how do you get paid back?"While the growing popularity of this option signals that supporters of Ukraine aid are searching for a Plan B, so far those who have voiced support for it are primarily those who already supported aid to Ukraine to a certain extent. Ultimately, if Johnson wants to keep the support of his caucus, and perhaps his job, he will need to convince long-time skeptics of aid to go along with this proposal. So far, there is little evidence of movement on that front.

A brutal attack by militants "mercilessly slaughtering" civilians in their homes occurred simultaneously with attacks against military targets of an occupying power. These attacks resulted in an overwhelming military retaliation that killed so many people, one soldier wrote, "they had to be buried with bulldozers." While this sounds like coverage of October 7 and the current Gaza War, these are descriptions of the 1955 "Philippeville massacre" in Algeria. That event marked a major turning point in the Algerian War of Independence against 125 years of French occupation. It led to seven more years of brutality that killed 300,000 to one million Algerians and threatened a civil war in France. It also sowed seeds for future violence in Algeria and around the world. Americans should reflect on the history of the French experience in Algeria in the context of the current Gaza War and the longer history of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The United States has played a major role in this conflict, one which people across the Middle East clearly recognize and resent, even if most Americans do not. It is important to recognize the bigger picture and historical context in which events occur. Confusing specific actions, such as the Philippeville massacre or Hamas's 7 October attacks with the overall goals of an insurgency risks mistaking means for ends, resulting in a fundamental misunderstanding of the overall situation. Prior to the Philippeville massacre, Algerian nationalists struggled for over a century against French rule. Emir Abd al-Qadir resisted French occupation for over a decade in the 1830s, and other major revolts occurred in the 1860s-70s. Moderate Algerians called for reforms, a constitution, and amelioration of social and economic concerns. Unanswered petitions escalated to demands for autonomy, peaceful demands for independence, and eventually support for new armed resistance. Yet the French refused to seriously consider addressing these longer-term political grievances, viewing resistance solely from a military perspective. Some fixated on FLN (National Liberation Front) terror tactics, with one French leader exhorting, "Let us swear before these coffins to do everything…to revenge those who have been taken away from us." Another French military official viewed the Algerian revolt as part of a larger "march of Communism." Other French perspectives claimed: "We have not come here to defend colonialism. We are the defenders of liberty and of a new order." Others, including much of the French public and settlers in Algeria, staunchly defended French colonialism and viewed Algeria as an indissoluble part of France, refusing to entertain Algerian desires for independence. Hamas's ultimate "end," like that of the FLN, is not the violence of October 7 itself, but the establishment of an independent state. Like the Algerians, Palestinians have long advocated for Palestinian statehood, the just resolution of the conflict, protection of human rights, opposition to settlements and settler violence, restructuring of Palestinian institutions, modification of U.S. policies, access to services and resources, and redress of inequality and discrimination. When the Arab Center surveyed Arab public opinion about reasons motivating Hamas's attack, they found widespread understanding of the historical context and nationalist aims: While 35% of respondents stated that the most important reason was the continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 24% stated that it was Israel's targeting of Al-Aqsa Mosque, 8% said it was the ongoing siege on the Gaza Strip, and 6% attributed it to the continuation of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories.Most Western observers' attention on Hamas focuses on its intent to destroy Israel, as outlined in Hamas's founding charter. This focus ignores its 2008 offer of a truce based on acceptance of the 1967 borders and implicit recognition of Israel. It ignores Hamas's publication of a new "manifesto" in 2017 which announced it would accept the 1967 borders and details of any deal, including the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, approved by referendum of the Palestinian people, upon implementation of that deal. It also ignores the potential to negotiate any alternative resolution than that espoused by the rhetoric of key Hamas leaders. This also assumes that Hamas's original and maximalist position is the only option for an acceptable resolution among Palestinians. This assumption ignores historical precedent for negotiated settlements, including missed opportunities for negotiated peace in Algeria. A second lesson from the French experience in Algeria is also a warning: excessive French violence against Algerians, including explicit orders to implement "collective responsibility," ultimately increased support for armed resistance. One French administrator observed: "To send in tank units, to destroy villages…it is using a sledgehammer to kill fleas. And what is much more serious, it is to encourage the young – and sometimes the less young – to go into the maquis." An Algerian leader similarly noted: "The French ratissages operations were 'our best recruiting agent.'" A later FLN statement declared "to colonialism's policy of collective repression we must reply with collective reprisals against the Europeans, military and civil, who are all united behind the crimes committed upon our people. For them, no pity, no quarter!"This also convinced moderate Algerians to support hardline resistance, reducing avenues and interlocutors for political compromise. "My role, today, is to stand aside for the chiefs of the armed resistance," declared one moderate leader. "The methods that I have upheld for the last fifteen years — co-operation, discussion, persuasion — have shown themselves to be ineffective".Another devastating French policy that achieved some short-term military success but ultimately proved counterproductive was forced displacement, which was aimed at "isolating communities from the FLN and thus denying it refuge and supplies." This forced over one million civilians from their homes, into spaces where they were "crammed together in unbroken wretchedness" and where "children [died] from hunger" and cold. Other brutal practices included mass detentions, widespread torture, and abuse of detainees. While French officials argued that these methods achieved short-term military success, historian Alistair Horne argues that they were ultimately self-defeating: "[Colonel] Massu won the Battle of Algiers; but that meant losing the war." The shocking death toll, displacement, disproportionate destruction, allegations of collective punishment, and inhumane treatment and possible torture of detainees in Gaza offer chilling parallels between current Israeli military operations and the French in Algeria. Like the Algerians, displaced Palestinians in Gaza currently face starvation and receive woefully insufficient humanitarian assistance and medical care. These reports are important for investigating allegations of violations of international law, which are examined elsewhere, but they are also generating global outrage similar to the international condemnation of French actions in Algeria. Likewise, these actions are counterproductive as they increase support for armed Palestinian resistance, as indicated in an Arab Barometer survey.The French ultimately accepted Algerian independence in 1962, five years after the French "victory" in the Battle of Algiers, seven years after the Philippeville massacre, 18 years after Algerian demands for federal autonomy, and 132 years after Algerian nationalists first used armed resistance against French occupation. Nonetheless, violence continued because of seeds sown during the war, shaping authoritarian rule in Algeria, the 1990s Algerian civil war, and connections to global terrorism. The current Gaza War mirrors the French experience of repeated resistance, as demonstrated by armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which emerged largely as a result of Israel's occupation of south Lebanon after its 1982 war against the PLO in that country. This demonstrates that even if Hamas is militarily defeated, if Palestinian political demands and underlying grievances are not addressed, another armed resistance group will emerge. Americans must learn from these lessons by understanding the full context of the current war in Gaza and recognize the ultimately self-defeating impact of Israel's pursuit of an overwhelmingly brutal military "total victory," facilitated by unconditional U.S. support.

October 3, 2023 marks the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, when American forces engaged in a pitched battle with a Somali militia in a densely populated residential neighborhood in Mogadishu, Somalia. This battle has become popularly known as "Black Hawk Down" in reference to the several UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters shot down during the battle, leading to the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and at least 300 Somali casualties, including militia and civilians. Much has been written about how this event, and the wider U.S. military intervention in Somalia, was a watershed moment heralding a new "world order" led by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, one of the most consequential impacts of U.S. interventions in Somalia has been the hindrance of local socio-political processes that might have, with time, provided an exit from the condition of permanent conflict. In so doing, these interventions have contributed to the continuation of conflict and historical paralysis in Somalia. The Battle of Mogadishu was the culmination of a U.S.-led UN intervention in Somalia which went through several iterations that progressively became more militarized. It began in April 1992 with United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), which was mandated to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties in Mogadishu following the fall of the Somali state in early 1991. The ceasefire, however, never took hold, gravely hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid in the midst of an appalling famine. The harrowing images of starving children broadcasted across the globe partly informed the U.S. decision to offer to organize and lead a multinational force, United Task Force (UNITAF). The UN accepted the offer and UNITAF forces arrived in Somalia in December 1992 with the objective and mandate to provide security and facilitate humanitarian relief efforts. UNITAF was succeeded by UNOSOM II in March 1995 with a force of about 30,000 from 27 countries. The U.S. contributed a little over 1,000 personnel to this force, but exercised significant control over the operations. UNOSOM II not only took over the mandate of UNITAF in terms of securing and facilitating aid delivery, but was further tasked with nation-building, including forcible disarmament. This led to a confrontation between UNOSOM II and one of the militias, Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. U.S. forces led this confrontation carrying out raids against SNA militia and Aidid. After a series of increasingly violent reprisal attacks, U.S. forces raided a hotel in Mogadishu October 3, 1993 to capture high ranking SNA personnel. The disastrous result of the raid ultimately led the Clinton administration to change course and withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia in the spring of 1994. The U.N. followed suit and was out of Somalia by early 1995. There has been widespread criticism of various aspects of the U.S./UN intervention: the militarization of the intervention with the inevitably high civilian casualties, the racist violence and abuse of Somali civilians, the caricature and reduction of the crisis to images of starving children and drug-crazed militias, the UN's insistence that its failure to act quickly to avert the famine was entirely due to security concerns and not bureaucratic inertia, and the claim that 80% of food supplies meant for famine victims were being looted. Despite the criticism of the intervention, many also felt that the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the termination of UNOSOM II would lead to a resumption of violence and upsurge in the suffering of the population. The fact that this did not happen is a testament to the dynamics of the conflict and social processes that worked to overcome the conflict. Subsequent to the U.S. and UN withdrawal in early 1995, Somalia not only did not return to a cycle of violence, but experienced relative stability in what one commentator referred to as "governance without government." This period lasting about a decade, 1995-2004/05, was characterized by the formation of various self-governance arrangements based on locality and kinship relations as well as the emergence of conflict adjudication/arbitration centers in urban settings like Mogadishu.The best examples of the autonomous and semi-autonomous local administrations that emerged are Somaliland and Puntland in the north and northeast of the country. While no similarly successful administration emerged in the central and southern regions of the country, large-scale conflicts dissipated there as well as conflicts became localized. With the localization of conflicts, it became easier for communities to find locally-grounded solutions led by a mixture of traditional elders, business people, and civic groups. In some urban centers, meanwhile, there emerged adjudication/arbitration centers that utilized a mixture of sharia and Somali customs (heer) to resolve disputes. The most well-known and successful of these are the sharia courts of Mogadishu. These courts emerged within a year of the disintegration of the central government in 1991 as an expression of neighborhood residents' desire to address the disorder and anarchy. Given the centrality of sharia to the very idea of justice and law in Somali society, the centers began to be referred to as sharia courts. The sharia courts of Mogadishu brought a certain level of security to some neighborhoods in Mogadishu throughout the 90s and early 2000s despite the opposition of warlords and militias. The return of large-scale violence to Somalia coincided with the next U.S. intervention. The sharia courts of Mogadishu attracted the attention of American officials in Nairobi starting in the early 2000s because of a suspicion that individuals associated with some of the sharia courts might be harboring suspects in the 1998 U.S. East African embassy bombings. To help find and capture these suspects, the CIA started funneling money to warlords in Mogadishu. This strategy backfired as the sharia courts, with the massive support of Mogadishu residents, defeated the warlords. Whether perpetrators of the bombings were in Mogadishu or not, it was short-sighted to enlist the support of the warlords and target the sharia courts, as the State Department's political officer for Somalia pointed out at the time, because the courts were not a homogenous entity. They were an assortment of independent adjudication centers reflecting the entire spectrum of Islamist views in Somalia. Moreover, the warlords had a terrible reputation and were disliked by the people. When the warlords failed, the U.S. then supported an Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in mid-2006 that eventually disbanded the sharia courts. This invasion also backfired because it conferred legitimacy to the most radical elements within the sharia courts, thus, setting the stage for the rise of al-Shabaab and transformation of Somalia into a frontline state in the global war on terror. These American interventions in Somalia can be critiqued from many angles, but what is often overlooked and more damaging in the long run is the impact they had on local historical processes that might have led to Somalia overcoming its protracted conflict. Every time the U.S. intervenes directly or indirectly, through local or regional proxies, it reshuffles the decks, putting an end to organic political and social processes, thus contributing to the perpetuation of the Somali conflict that is now over three decades old. This is not to suggest that local processes of adaptation and governance will necessarily lead to a centralized government or a liberal democracy. But the presumption that this is the only way for Somalia to exit from conflict is part of the problem.

The critical state of society can be measured by a system of interrelated indicators - economic, technologi­cal, political, cultural, ethnic and demographic. However, it is no exaggeration to state that they originally focused on the social aspects of life people lead to an integrated life crisis at a time of social transformations. There is no universal model of social dialogue; it is a means of improving productivity and competitiveness. Social dialogue - not only a form of crisis management, sometimes governments are turning to social part­ners only in case of economic crisis, seeking their support in taking unpopular measures. This approach is fundamentally wrong, because the dialogue is based on mutual trust and confidence, cooperation achieved over the years. That social dialogue should be used not only in adverse but also in favorable socio-economic circumstances. Opposition, competition, conflict, alternative, dissent is not only inevitable characteristics of a complex human world, but necessary factors that discourage stagnation, stagnation of society, the condi­tions of its constant renewal and development. Clarification of the nature and essence of social conflict as a specific manifestation of the contradictions of social relations requires consideration of a number of interre­© І.З. Держко, 2015 lated factors. First of all, we should take into account the fact that modern society is the very course of change in scientific thinking, social structure, is drawn into a new state, which is accompanied by adapting social transformation. That is why these problems require analysis of the conditions of its emergence, development methods and tools for forecasting and warning deviation from social norms. Social process includes ways of interaction between state and society, institutions and groups, political system and social environment, government and citizens. Social dialogue is one way of interaction between state and society; its interests are represented, including trade unions and organizations. Under the social dialogue process should be under­stood that includes all types of negotiation, consultation and exchange of information aimed at the successful solution of social and economic policy. The whole history of the formation of social, political, ethical thought is an attempt to find optimal development of society, get rid of unpleasant disorders that often the danger to life and well-being, deviations from accepted values and standards. All social human history represents a continuous process of self-education and self-organization of the individual and society, the development and changes of various types and forms of regulation relationships, their ordering, discipline and regulation. Society through social factors governing rules create institutions of social control over the behavior of people in order to guarantee public order and tranquility; They include a huge number of methods and means of in­fluence, habits, moral principles, traditions, customs, common rules, regulations, standards and enforcement points. Synthesis same concept is the social norm, as an important means of targeting individual or social group in a rather complex personal, group, social ties and relations in the period of social transformation. ; Кризовий стан суспільства можна виміряти цілою системою взаємозв'язаних показників - економічних, технологічних, політичних, культурологічних, національно-етнічних, демографічних та ін. Однак не буде перебільшенням стверджувати, що всі вони своєрідно фокусуються у соціальні сфери життя людей, зумовлюють інтегральну кризу життя людини у час суспільних трансформацій. Не існує універсаль­ної моделі соціального діалогу, він є засобом підвищення продуктивності праці та конкурентоздатності. Соціальний діалог - не лише форма управління кризою, іноді уряди звертаються до соціальних партне­рів лише у випадку економічної кризи, шукаючи їх підтримки у вжитті непопулярних заходів. Такий підхід докорінно помилковий, оскільки діалог повинен ґрунтуватися на взаємній довірі та впевненості, що досягаються роками співробітництва. Тобто соціальний діалог повинен використовуватися не лише за несприятливих, але й за сприятливих соціально-економічних обставин. Протистояння, опозиція, конкуренція, конфлікт, альтернативність, інакомислення є не тільки не­минучими характеристиками складного світу життя людей, а й необхідними факторами, що відвертають застій, стагнацію суспільства, умови його постійного оновлення і розвитку. З'ясування природи і суті соціального конфлікту, як специфічного прояву суперечності суспільних відносин вимагає врахування цілої низки взаємопов'язаних факторів. Насамперед слід взяти до уваги ту обставину, що сучасне сус­пільство самим ходом змін, що відбуваються у науковому мисленні, соціальній структурі суспільства, втягується в якісно новий стан, адаптація до якого супроводжується суспільними трансформаціями. От чому названа проблема вимагає аналізу умов її появи, розробки методів і засобів попередження і прогно­зування відхилень від соціальних норм. Соціальний процес включає способи взаємодії держави і суспільства, інститутів і груп, політичної системи і соціального середовища, уряду і громадянина. Соціальний діалог є одним із способів взаємо­дії держави і суспільства, його інтереси представляють, у тому числі, професійні спілки та організації. Під соціальним діалогом слід розуміти процес, що включає всі типи переговорів, консультацій та обміну інформацією, спрямований на успішне вирішення питань соціально-економічної політики. Вся історія становлення суспільно-політичної, етичної думки є спробою знайти оптимальні шляхи розвитку сус­пільства, тобто звільнитися від неприємних порушень, які нерідко є небезпекою для життя і благополуч­чя людей, відхиленнями від загальноприйнятих цінностей і стандартів. Вся соціальна історія людства уособлює безупинний процес самовиховання і самоорганізації індивіда і суспільства, розвитку і зміни різних типів і форм регулювання взаємин, їх упорядкування, дисциплінованості та нормування. Сус­пільство за допомогою соціальних чинників регулює норми, створює інститути соціального контролю за поводженням людей з метою гарантування суспільного порядку і спокою; вони включають величезну кількість методів і засобів впливу: звички, моральні принципи, традиції, звичаї, загальноприйняті пра­вила, розпорядження, норми та моменти примусу. Узагальнюючим же поняттям є соціальна норма, як один з важливих засобів орієнтації індивіда чи соціальної групи в досить складних особистісних, групових, соціальних зв'язках і відносинах у період суспільних трансформацій. ; Кризовий стан суспільства можна виміряти цілою системою взаємозв'язаних показників - економічних, технологічних, політичних, культурологічних, національно-етнічних, демографічних та ін. Однак не буде перебільшенням стверджувати, що всі вони своєрідно фокусуються у соціальні сфери життя людей, зумовлюють інтегральну кризу життя людини у час суспільних трансформацій. Не існує універсаль­ної моделі соціального діалогу, він є засобом підвищення продуктивності праці та конкурентоздатності. Соціальний діалог - не лише форма управління кризою, іноді уряди звертаються до соціальних партне­рів лише у випадку економічної кризи, шукаючи їх підтримки у вжитті непопулярних заходів. Такий підхід докорінно помилковий, оскільки діалог повинен ґрунтуватися на взаємній довірі та впевненості, що досягаються роками співробітництва. Тобто соціальний діалог повинен використовуватися не лише за несприятливих, але й за сприятливих соціально-економічних обставин. Протистояння, опозиція, конкуренція, конфлікт, альтернативність, інакомислення є не тільки не­минучими характеристиками складного світу життя людей, а й необхідними факторами, що відвертають застій, стагнацію суспільства, умови його постійного оновлення і розвитку. З'ясування природи і суті соціального конфлікту, як специфічного прояву суперечності суспільних відносин вимагає врахування цілої низки взаємопов'язаних факторів. Насамперед слід взяти до уваги ту обставину, що сучасне сус­пільство самим ходом змін, що відбуваються у науковому мисленні, соціальній структурі суспільства, втягується в якісно новий стан, адаптація до якого супроводжується суспільними трансформаціями. От чому названа проблема вимагає аналізу умов її появи, розробки методів і засобів попередження і прогно­зування відхилень від соціальних норм. Соціальний процес включає способи взаємодії держави і суспільства, інститутів і груп, політичної системи і соціального середовища, уряду і громадянина. Соціальний діалог є одним із способів взаємо­дії держави і суспільства, його інтереси представляють, у тому числі, професійні спілки та організації. Під соціальним діалогом слід розуміти процес, що включає всі типи переговорів, консультацій та обміну інформацією, спрямований на успішне вирішення питань соціально-економічної політики. Вся історія становлення суспільно-політичної, етичної думки є спробою знайти оптимальні шляхи розвитку сус­пільства, тобто звільнитися від неприємних порушень, які нерідко є небезпекою для життя і благополуч­чя людей, відхиленнями від загальноприйнятих цінностей і стандартів. Вся соціальна історія людства уособлює безупинний процес самовиховання і самоорганізації індивіда і суспільства, розвитку і зміни різних типів і форм регулювання взаємин, їх упорядкування, дисциплінованості та нормування. Сус­пільство за допомогою соціальних чинників регулює норми, створює інститути соціального контролю за поводженням людей з метою гарантування суспільного порядку і спокою; вони включають величезну кількість методів і засобів впливу: звички, моральні принципи, традиції, звичаї, загальноприйняті пра­вила, розпорядження, норми та моменти примусу. Узагальнюючим же поняттям є соціальна норма, як один з важливих засобів орієнтації індивіда чи соціальної групи в досить складних особистісних, групових, соціальних зв'язках і відносинах у період суспільних трансформацій.

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa, società, politica, istituzioni (xix-xx) ; L'obbiettivo di questo lavoro è tracciare una storia istituzionale dell'università, inquadrandola nel più generale contesto sociale ed economico che determinò le politiche formative del paese dall'immediato dopo guerra, passando per gli anni dell'espansione economica e quelli successivi della stagnazione, giungendo fino ai primi anni ottanta. La ricerca ha seguito due direttive: da un lato l'evoluzione dell'università determinata dalla politica istituzionale e i cambiamenti della struttura universitaria, dall'altro lo stravolgimento del ruolo sociale dell'università, determinato dal passaggio dal modello liberale di università d'elitè funzionale alla formazione di una ristretta classe dirigente, a indispensabile strumento per la formazione di numerose e ampie categorie di forza lavoro in un paese avviato verso la completa industrializzazione, verso l'enorme sviluppo del settore terziario e in un contesto di profonda urbanizzazione e in generale di superamento dei rapporti sociali dei decenni precedenti alla guerra. La prima traccia di ricerca è stata sviluppata su due categorie di fonti principali: da un lato il dibattito politico-parlamentare intorno ai progetti di legge (le aperture degli accessi del '61 e specialmente del '69, le liberalizzazioni dei piani di studio dello stesso anno, i provvedimenti sulla docenza degli anni settanta), alle indagini conoscitive (quella promossa dal ministro Gonella nel '47 e quella varata da Medici e conclusa con Gui ministro tra il '63 e il '65), alle proposte di riforma (i progetti n. 2.314 del '65, n. 612 del '69, l'elaborazione della "Bozza Cervone" fra '77 e '78), alla regolazione dell'assetto giuridico ed economico del personale docente, ai piani di finanziamento e sviluppo dell'università; dall'altro attraverso lo studio del dibattito interno e fra i partiti utilizzando come fonti i periodici ad essi vicini o attenti al tema ("Riforma della Scuola" e "Rinascita" per il PCI, "Scuola e Città" e "Il Ponte" per il PSI, "La Discussione" e "Tuttoscuola" per la DC, in seguito riviste come "Universitas", ecc.), oltre che atti di convegni e pubblicazioni curate dai protagonisti dell'epoca. Nella ricerca, un ampio spazio è dato al tema della pianificazione scolastica (animato dagli studi di tecnici dell'economia e della formazione), strettamente connessa al dibattito sulla pianificazione economica sviluppatosi prevalentemente negli anni del centrosinistra. La seconda traccia di studio, quella relativa ai cambiamenti sociali e culturali causa ed effetto dell'espansione dell'utenza universitaria, è stata analizzata attraverso lo studio di fonti inconsuete per la storiografia tradizionale, come gli studi di sociologia e di scienze della formazione sviluppatisi a partire dagli anni settanta, i quali fecero largo uso delle cifre sistematizzate da ISTAT e CENSIS sistematizzate nelle tabelle statistiche che completano il presente lavoro. Analizzare l'evoluzione delle componenti sociali ha significato anche indagare le vicende legate alla docenza universitaria, al suo ruolo rispetto al dibattito politico, alle richieste portate avanti e alle funzioni assunte all'interno delle facoltà di fronte ai profondi cambiamenti descritti. Per quanto riguarda gli estremi cronologici della ricerca, la scelta di interrompere la ricerca alla prima metà degli anni '80 risponde all'analisi più complessiva che si fa di quel periodo della storia politica ed economica non soltanto italiana, le cui successive vicende di riforma dell'università rappresentano a mio avviso l'emblema del netto cambio di fase vissuto dalla politica e dalla società anche per quanto riguarda l'istruzione superiore. La suddivisione in capitoli rispecchia invece più fedelmente le fasi della politica universitaria. Nel primo capitolo si fa il punto sull'eredità dell'apparato normativo ereditato dal fascismo e sulle effettive possibilità che si aprirono o meno alle forze politiche per inaugurare una nuova fase, mettendo in luce anche le prime strategie d'intervento abbozzate dai principali partiti nel corso degli anni '50. Nel secondo capitolo sono affrontate le previsioni scolastiche e i progetti di riforma ad esse più o meno legate: dagli studi della SVIMEZ in poi (influenzati da quelli più ampi condotti dall'OCSE), la programmazione scolastica e le previsioni sullo sviluppo economico del paese assunsero un ruolo determinante per la politica di riforma di scuola e università, politica che nei primi anni sessanta si concretizzò nell'istituzione della scuola media unica (1962), nelle prime aperture dell'università ai diplomati di istituti e soprattutto nella prima vera proposta di riforma dell'università, quella di Luigi Gui del 1966, l'unica inserita in un progetto organico di riforma di tutta l'istruzione, il Piano Gui, dichiaratamente ispirato dagli studi di previsione (anche se non sempre coerente con essi). Con il terzo capitolo si affronta la lunga discussione dentro e fuori il Parlamento in merito al più ambizioso progetto di riforma del periodo, il n. 612, sostenuto dai socialisti proprio mentre l'esperienza dei governi di centrosinistra andava esaurendosi nei primi anni settanta; dello stesso periodo (1969) è l'apertura degli accessi all'università a qualsiasi tipologia di diplomato e le liberalizzazioni dei piani di studio, veri spartiacque della storia dell'università italiana. Il terzo capitolo si chiude infine con l'analisi dei "provvedimenti urgenti" del 1973, emblema di un modello di sviluppo dell'università fortemente precario, sintomo dell'incapacità di riformare e investire seriamente nella qualità dell'istruzione universitaria a vantaggio di una strategia prettamente quantitativa. Le tematiche affrontate nel quarto e ultimo capitolo sono invece determinate dall'inedita fase politica vissuta dal paese dalla metà degli anni settanta, caratterizzata dall'avvicinamento fra maggioranza e opposizione fino alla creazione dei governi di "solidarietà nazionale", nati ufficialmente per far fronte a crisi economica e terrorismo politico. Mentre l'attenzione sulla riforma universitaria andava velocemente calando (nonostante un ennesimo dibattito durato anni in Parlamento su un altro complesso progetto di riforma, la "bozza Cervone"), si verificarono gli ultimi cambiamenti sostanziali della struttura accademica attraverso l'ultimo capitolo del riformismo per decreti, tramite il quale furono istituiti i dipartimenti e le figure di ricercatore e docente associato nei primi anni ottanta. Chiude il lavoro l'Appendice Statistica in cui sono raccolte le cifre dell'università italiana (studenti, docenti, rapporti quantitativi e distribuzione, finanziamenti) dal 1946 al 1985. ; The aim of this study is tracing an istitutional history of university, by focusing in the wider social and economic context that determined the higher education policies after Second World War – spanning from the economic espansion years and the later stagnation to the early eighties. The research follows two main paths: on the one hand the university evolution and change of structure as determined by institutional factors; on the other hand the revolutionized social role of universities over the period under investigation. Indeed, the passage from a liberal model of élite universities – destined to the education of ruling classes – to a mass university – an essential instrument in training numerous labor force categories – took place in a rapidly and profoundly changing context. At that time Italy was headed towards full industrialization, was experiencing a massive development of the third sector and mass urbanization. In general, Italy was overcoming the social relations of the decades before Second world war. The First research line was developed on the basis of two main sources. On the one hand I analyzed the political-parliamentary debate on Education Bill proposals (the opening of the access of 1961 and especially of 1969, the curriculum liberalizations of the same year, the measures on univerity teaching in the seventies), on the investigations (the one proposed by Minister Gonella in 1947, launched from Minister Medici and concluded by Gui which was Education Minister from 1963 to 1965), on the various reform proposals of the analyzed decades (projects n. 2.314 of '65, n. 612 of '69, the elaboration of the "Bozza Cervone" between '77 and '78) and about the regulation of the legal and economic framework of higher education teachers and the plans of university funding and development. On the other hand, I studied the internal party debates by employing periodicals close to political parties or particularly sensitive to higher education issues ("Riforma della Scuola" and "Rinascita" for the communist party PCI, "Scuola e Città" and "Il Ponte" for the socialist party PSI, "La Discussione" and "Tuttoscuola" for the Christian democrat party DC, for more recent years periodical such as "Universitas", etcetera). Furthermore I used as sources conference proceedings and pubblications edited by the key actors of the debate. In the research I gave a significant space to the scholastic planning issue. This debate was strictly connected to the one on the economic planning of the country, developed mostly in the center-left wing years. The second part of the study, as said above, focuses on the social and cultural changes which were cause and consequences of the widening of the university students. This was analyzed through the study of source that are unusual to the tradition historiography, such as sociology or higher education studies which were developed from the 1970s and largely employed ISTAT and CENSIS data and researches. I have rationalized these studies in the statistics tables present in this thesis. The analysis of the evolution of social components regarded also university teaching activity issues, its role in relation to the political debate, and the role of teaching staffs within faculties in the profoundly changing circumstances described above. For what concerns the historical time range of this work, the choice to stop in the early eighties answers to a more general analysis of a chapter of the political and economic history that started in that eighties, not only in Italy. In my opinion, the following sequence of events regarding higher education reforms represent the symbol of the clear and abrupt phase change that politics and society experienced at that time. The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter takes stock of the legislation inherited from the fascism and of the first debates on university in the Assemblea Costituente and in the Parliament, sheding light on the first intervention strategies of major political parties during the fifties. The second chapter addresses the forecasts on school attendendence and the consequent projects of reform. On the basis of first studies of SVIMEZ – influenced by the broader ones of OCSE – the education planning and the forecasts on the country development played a crucial role for the reform policies of schools and universities. Policies embodied in the early sisxties by the institution of the scuola media unica in 1962, by the first opening of access to professional high school graduates; and, in particolar, in 1966 by the first real proposal of university reform, the Piano Gui of Luigi Gui, the only one included in an integral reform plan of all education levels and explicitely inspired from the educational planning studies. The third chapter focuses on the long discussion – inside an outside the Parliament – concernig the most ambitiuos reform project of the period, the n. 612. The latter, while the experience of the center-left wing goverments were extinguishing, was backed by the socialists. However, the socialist were responsabile for the actual watershed in Italian university history, the opening of university accesses to any category of high school graduated students. Lastly, the third chapter ends with the analysis of 1973's "provvedimenti urgenti", emblem of a model of university development heavily based on precarious work. A synthom of the incapacity both in reforming and in seriously invest in education quality, favoring only quantitative strategies. While, in the fourth and last chapter, focuses on the second halph of the seventies a complete new political phase for the country, characterized by the approach between the parliamentary majority (hold by Christian democrat) and the communist opposition until the creation of natonal solidarity governments, ufficially borned to tackle the economic crisic and political terrorism. In the early eighties, while the attention on university reforms was rapidly decreasing, the last substantial change to the academic structure were made after those of 1969. During the last chapter of the "reformism by decrees", the departments and the roles of researcher and associate professor were established. The statistical appendix ends the thesis. Covering a time window that goes from 1946 to 1985, it reports all data on students, teachers, funding and their distribution in the ltalian

The death of three Americans in Jordan due to an attack by the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" was an avoidable tragedy. It should prompt the United States to speed up its exit from Syria and Iraq, something policy makers have been contemplating for some time. Washington must minimize its risks. To dig in and escalate would be a mistake that is likely to lead to more Americans killed. The mission that brought U.S. troops to Iraq and Syria – to destroy ISIS – has been accomplished. Residual policing of ISIS remnants can be undertaken from bases in Qatar, Kuwait and Turkey.Hawks in Washington insist that by striking Iran directly and hard, the U.S. can bring security to its troops, the danger will subside because Iran understands force. But this analysis misunderstands the region and minimizes the dangers arrayed against U.S. troops. Iran has been committed to pushing U.S. troops out of Iraq and Syria, something its leaders articulated clearly following an earlier use of U.S. force, the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Suleimani in 2020. Iran will not back down if the U.S. assassinates more of its leaders or strikes infrastructure in Iran for the simple reason that it has the upper hand in the region.But Iran is far from being the only government that wants U.S. troops out. Turkey, Iraq and Syria are equally determined to drive the U.S. from its bases. Every single government in the region is demanding that U.S. troops leave. Turkey has escalated its war against America, not by sending missiles and drones against U.S. bases, but by sending them against America's allies in northeast Syria and the Kurdish region of Iraq. Turkey has assassinated dozens of YPG leaders and destroyed important infrastructure. It has mobilized Syrian opposition groups under its control to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces that Washington relies on. These attacks are designed to weaken the U.S. position in the region and eventually drive it from northeast Syria.The Syrian government is also determined to drive Americans from its soil. It accuses Washington of illegally occupying 30% of its territory and stealing its oil to subsidize the quasi-independent territory the U.S. has established in northeast Syria. As a consequence, the majority of Syrians languish in poverty and must survive with only a few hours of electricity per day, while the economy remains paralyzed by U.S. sanctions. They want the U.S. out.The Iraqi government is also demanding that U.S. troops leave. It was provoked into doing so by Washington's January 4 assassination of Mushtaq al-Jawari, a leader of Harakat al-Nujaba, one of the Shi'a militias that belongs to the popular mobilization forces. Washington targeted him in retribution for an earlier attack on a U.S. base. Did this show of force cow the Harakat al-Nujaba or the popular mobilization forces? No. On the contrary, it led to an escalating drumbeat of missile and drone attacks on American bases.But the militias were not the only forces to go on the offensive, the Iraqi government did as well. Because the popular mobilization forces are officially under Baghdad's control, the U.S. found itself effectively at war with the central government. Prime Minister Sudani cannot ignore them. To save his government, Sudani had to ask U.S. forces to leave. Both he and Iraq's president, as well as almost every Iraqi politician, insist that Iraq not be turned into a proxy battleground.Striking Iran will not solve America's problems in the region. Biden's support for Israel's war against the Palestinians has inflamed anti-American and anti-Western feelings across the entire Arab world. It has breathed new life into the resistance front. Only yesterday, most Arabs scoffed at it for being impotent and doing nothing to deter Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinians. Because of Gaza, Arabs are once again rooting for resistance.Lastly, the forces allied with Iran that stretch from Lebanon to Iraq are not foreign to the region. They cannot be rolled back by U.S. power and retaliatory strikes. There are more Shiite Arabs in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq combined than there are Sunni Arabs. The power of the Shiite militias today may seem like an aberration or some Iranian feat of levitation, but it is not. Centuries of discrimination against Shiites meant that they were the dispossessed and a political minority in a region where they were in fact the demographic majority. It is for good reason that the area stretching from Beirut to Busra is today called the Shiite Crescent.The notion that several thousand American soldiers can be kept safe while hunkered down in desert bases sprinkled across the great expanse of this region is a mirage. No one wants them there, not the governments and not the people. All are sharpening their knives and devising new ways to weaken them and force them to leave. It is pointless for Washington to keep them there for a mission that has long since passed its expiration date or to escalate a war it cannot win.

The drone attack on Sunday that killed three U.S. service members at an outpost in Jordan near the Syria border is more likely to increase rather than decrease U.S. military involvement in the region.
This is unfortunate, and doubly so coming at a time when the Biden administration was showing signs of considering a withdrawal of the 900 U.S. troops in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq. Just last week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin intimated that a joint U.S.-Iraqi review might lead to a drawdown of at least some of the troops in Iraq. Other reporting points to discussions within the administration about possibly removing the troops now in Syria.
It is unclear why the administration chose this time to consider what was already a long-overdue withdrawal of these troops. The answer probably involves the upsurge in regional violence stemming from Israel's devastating assault on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and associated anger against the United States for its backing of Israel. Since the Israeli assault began, U.S. military installations in Iraq have been attacked more than 60 times and those in Syria more than 90 times.
The attacks underscore how much these residual U.S. deployments have entailed costs and risks far out of proportion to any positive gains they can achieve. They have been sitting-duck targets within easy reach of militias and other elements wishing to make a violent anti-U.S. statement. Even without deaths, U.S. service members have paid a price, such as in the form of traumatic brain injuries from missile attacks.
The now-familiar tit-for-tat sequence in which American airstrikes against militias in Iraq or Syria alternate with more militia attacks on the U.S. installations illustrates a perverse form of mission creep. Whatever was the original mission of the U.S. troop presence gets sidelined as protection of the troop presence itself becomes the main concern. The tit-for-tats also carry the risk of escalation into a larger conflict.
This weekend's attack just across the border in Jordan is likely to become part of the same risk-laden sequence. A White House statement promised to "hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing."
This will lead the administration to shelve for the time being any ideas it had about bringing home the troops — out of fear of showing weakness amid the inevitable criticism from domestic political opponents. The better course would be to interpret the attack as one more demonstration of how the troop presence in Syria and Iraq represents a needless vulnerability that ought to be ended sooner rather than later.
The official rationale for the presence on both those countries is to prevent a rise of the group known as Islamic State or ISIS. But the motivations have always involved more than that. The presence in Iraq is in some respects a legacy of the U.S. war begun there in 2003, which has imparted the sense of ownership that often follows a large-scale military intervention. The fixation with Iran and a desire to match Iranian presence and influence in these countries have constituted another motivation.
As for ISIS, although it has shown resilience, it is nowhere near what it was in 2014 when it ruled a de facto mini-state across much of western Iraq and northeastern Syria. If the group ever were to begin approaching that status again, much more than the small U.S. contingents in Syria and Iraq would be needed to counter it. To those who might argue that ISIS already is resurgent, one is entitled to ask exactly what good the presence of those contingents is doing in keeping ISIS down.
With regard to any terrorist group, the foremost U.S. concern ought to be not how the group plays in some local conflict but rather the risk of it striking U.S. interests, either at home or abroad. In that regard, the most relevant fact, repeatedly demonstrated with other terrorist groups in other places, is that anger at a foreign military presence is one of the chief motivations for terrorist attacks.
To the extent that ISIS has been kept down, this is partly due to popular opposition in Iraq and Syria to the group's brutal methods that it displayed when it had its mini-state. It is partly due to the efforts of security forces in those two countries. And it is partly due to the efforts of the foreign state most extensively involved in those countries — Iran.
Iran is very much an enemy of ISIS. It has been a victim of highly lethal ISIS attacks within Iran, including bombings in the heart of Tehran in 2017 and, earlier this month, an attack on a memorial ceremony in the city of Kerman that killed nearly 100 Iranians. Iran was a major player in the earlier efforts to undo the ISIS mini-state.Combating ISIS is a shared interest of Iran and the United States, as illustrated by the United States reportedly sharing — quite properly, in conformity with the duty to warn — information about the planned ISIS attack in Kerman. It would be in U.S. interests to have Iran continue to do the heavy lifting in holding down ISIS — and to have Iran, not the United States, risk any resulting terrorist reprisals.

The world is going through a moment of democratic regression characterized by increasing resistance to democratization and the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism. However, even in non-democratic contexts, power legitimation remains relevant: since regimes cannot rely on repression and coercion alone, incumbents need to generate some level of consent. This research proposes a model of analysis to contribute to the understanding of the legitimation strategies developed by personalized, semi-authoritarian and resilient regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa through a comparison between two case studies: the regime led by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe (1980-2017) and the regime led by Paul Kagame in Rwanda (1994-2017). Because legitimation is a multidimensional concept, the model of analysis proposed is based on five distinct domains corresponding to sites where strategies and narratives of power justification are constructed and challenged: History and historiography; constitution, legal framework and institutional architecture; economic and developmental performance; the state-civil society relation and the regime's positioning in the regional and international spheres. Through the application of this model of analysis to these two case studies it is possible to conclude that history was a key platform from which narratives of power legitimation were produced, to the extent that it provided for categories of belonging and shaped the constitutional and legal frameworks which, in turn, determined the rules of power competition. Economic and developmental performance also provided critical arguments for processes of both power legitimation and power delegitimation. Zimbabwe's poor performance contributed to strengthen the opposition, both internally and internationally. In Rwanda, in turn, the regime has successfully constructed a narrative of renaissance based on economic and developmental gains. The deterioration of living conditions in Zimbabwe led to rising levels of popular mobilization, in a context where state-civil society relations were marked by contestation and confrontation. In Rwanda, in turn, state – civil society relations were characterized by cooperation and co-optation. The research also concludes that strategies of legitimation in the regional and international spheres impacted the capacity of these regimes to justify power in face of domestic audiences. In Zimbabwe, international criticism provided the opponents of the regime with strong arguments to challenge the status quo. In Rwanda, in turn, the regime managed to navigate international concerns and secure political and material support while keeping a relative degree of agency and autonomy. ; O mundo atravessa um período de retrocesso democrático, que se caracteriza pelo aumento da resistência às pressões de democratização e o aparecimento de novas formas de autoritarismo. No entanto, mesmo em contextos não democráticos, a legitimação do poder é uma necessidade: uma vez que os regimes não podem depender exclusivamente de mecanismos de repressão e coerção, necessitam gerar algum nível de consentimento. Esta investigação propõe um modelo de análise que visa contribuir para a compreensão das estratégias de legitimação do poder desenvolvidas por regimes personalizados, semi-autoritários e resilientes na África Subsaariana, através de uma comparação entre dois casos: o regime de Robert Mugabe no Zimbabwe (1980-2017) e o regime de Paul Kagame no Ruanda (1994-2017). Uma vez que o conceito de legitimação é multidimensional, o modelo de análise proposto parte de cinco domínios distintos, cada um correspondendo a espaços onde as estratégias e narrativas de justificação de poder se constroem e são contestadas: história e historiografia; constituição, enquadramento jurídico e institucional; performance económica e de desenvolvimento; relações Estado-sociedade civil e o posicionamento do regime nas esferas regional e internacional. Aplicando o modelo de análise aos dois casos, é possível concluir que o passado é um lugar-chave a partir do qual se produzem narrativas de legitimação do poder no presente, na medida em que define categorias de pertença e molda o enquadramento constitucional e jurídico dos regimes que, por sua vez, determina as regras formais de competição pelo poder. Mas para além da história, a performance económica e de desenvolvimento dos regimes também gera importantes narrativas de legitimação ou contestação do poder. A crise económica e deterioração das condições de vida no Zimbabwe, sobretudo a partir de 2008, contribuiu para fortalecer a oposição ao regime, tanto no plano doméstico quanto no plano internacional. Pelo contrário, no caso do Ruanda, o regime foi capaz de criar uma poderosa narrativa de renascimento assente nos ganhos económicos e de desenvolvimento que caraterizaram o período pós-genocídio. No Zimbabwe, a deterioração das condições de vida levou a um aumento da mobilização popular, num contexto em que as relações entre o Estado e a sociedade civil se caracterizavam por dinâmicas de contestação e confronto. No caso do Ruanda, estas relações caracterizavam-se por dinâmicas de cooperação e cooptação. Os resultados da investigação também indicam que o posicionamento destes países nos planos regional e internacional impactou a capacidade dos incumbentes justificarem a sua permanência no poder perante as audiências internas. No Zimbabwe, o isolamento do regime no plano internacional traduziu-se em argumentos fortes para a oposição e obrigou à prossecução de estratégias e alianças alternativas. No Ruanda, o regime foi capaz de superar as preocupações e críticas dos doadores tradicionais, mantendo não apenas apoio político e material, mas também um grau significativo de autonomia e agência.

Realization an investigation by temporary investigative commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is one of the leading forms of parliamentary control in Ukraine. Nevertheless, their legal framework still needs to be improved, and parliamentary investigations are relatively infrequent with insufficient efficiency. In this regard, there is a need to study the current legal framework for the formation of temporary investigative commissions. The purpose of the work is an in-depth analysis of the principles and procedure for forming temporary investigative commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, determination their essence and features, as well as substantiation the priority directions for improving the constitutional and legal framework of their organization and activities. Methods. To solve the problems of the research, a number of methods of scientific knowledge were used, including formal-legal method, which determined the current state and problems of legal regulation of the formation of temporary investigative commissions. System-structural method – the unity and interrelation of the procedure of formation and termination of powers of temporary investigative commissions, staffing of their personnel are characterized; logical-semantic method – the essence of the grounds for the formation of temporary investigative commissions is revealed. Results. It is established that the formation of temporary investigative commissions for investigation certain «issues of public interest» allows to take into account the variability of such public interest and the objective impossibility of its exhaustive legal definition. However, this does not preclude the abuse of the right to form temporary investigative commissions in the absence of established parliamentary practice, traditions and political culture. The formation of the staff of the temporary investigative commissions based on proportional representation of each parliamentary faction (group) provides a majority in the temporary investigative commissions to the parliamentary coalition, which may be disinterested in conducting a thorough parliamentary investigation. Conclusions. It is substantiated that the development of constitutional and legal bases for the formation of temporary investigative commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should include expansion of constitutional guarantees for the formation of temporary investigative commissions and clarification of issues that cannot be the subject of parliamentary investigation. Other measures should be bringing the rules of procedure of the parliament in line with the relevant Law of Ukraine, taking into account the modern parliamentary practice of Ukraine and the experience of democratic countries, as well as application of disciplinary measures to members of the temporary investigative commission in case it fails to submit a report. It is also advisable prohibition of conducting parliamentary investigations into issues pending before the court, guaranteeing the opposition at least half of the seats in the temporary investigative commission, as well as legislative establishment of its minimum and maximum quantitative composition. The following measures should be establishing requirements for the professionalism and competence of the members of the temporary investigative commission and prohibition of combining senior positions in temporary commissions and committees of parliament. ; Постановка проблеми. Проведення розслідування тимчасовими слідчими комісіями Верховної Ради України є однією з провідних форм парламентського контролю в Україні. Попри це законодавчі засади їх діяльності все ще потребують удосконалення, парламентські розслідування проводяться порівняно нечасто з суперечливою ефективністю. У зв'язку із цим існує необхідність дослідження сучасних правових засад формування тимчасових слідчих комісій. Метою роботи є поглиблений аналізу засад і порядку формування тимчасових слідчих комісій Верховної Ради України, визначення їх сутності та особливостей, а також обґрунтування пріоритетних напрямків удосконалення конституційно-правових засад їх організації та діяльності. Методи. Для вирішення задач дослідження використано низку методів наукового пізнання, серед яких формально-юридичний, за яким визначено сучасний стан і проблеми правового регулювання формування тимчасових слідчих комісій; системно-структурний – охарактеризовано єдність та взаємозв'язок порядку утворення та припинення повноважень тимчасових слідчих комісій, комплектування їх персонального складу; логіко-семантичний – розкрито сутність підстав утворення тимчасових слідчих комісій. Результати. Встановлено, що утворення тимчасових слідчих комісій для розслідування певних «питань, що становлять суспільний інтерес» дозволяє врахувати мінливість такого суспільного інтересу і об'єктивну неможливість його вичерпного правового визначення. Проте це не виключає зловживання правом утворювати тимчасові слідчі комісії в умовах відсутності усталеної парламентської практики, традицій і політичної культури. Формування персонального складу тимчасової слідчої комісії на основі пропорційного представництва кожної депутатської фракції (групи) надає більшість у складі тимчасової слідчої комісії парламентській коаліції, що може бути незацікавлена у проведенні ґрунтовного парламентського розслідування. Висновки. Обґрунтовано, що розвиток конституційно-правових засад формування тимчасових слідчих комісій Верховної Ради України має передбачати: розширення конституційних гарантій формування тимчасових слідчих комісій та уточнення питань, які не можуть бути предметом парламентського розслідування; приведення регламенту парламенту у відповідність із профільним Законом України, врахування сучасної парламентської практики України та досвіду демократичних країн; застосування заходів дисциплінарного впливу до членів тимчасової слідчої комісії у разі ненадання нею звіту; заборону проведення парламентського розслідування з питань, які знаходяться на розгляді суду; гарантування опозиції не менше половини місць у складі тимчасової слідчої комісії; законодавче встановлення її мінімального та максимального кількісного складу; встановлення вимог до професійності та компетентності членів тимчасової слідчої комісії; заборону суміщення керівних посад у тимчасових комісіях і комітетах парламенту.