Suchergebnisse

The thesis is focused on solving an important theoretical and applied problem of substantiating theoretical and methodological grounds for the international economic policy through identifying the patterns and novel forms of protectionism, and substantiating the integral scientific concept of neo-protectionism. The objective of the thesis is to develop theoretical and methodological grounds of protectionism, and to create, on this basis, an integral scientific concept of neo-protectionism in the international economic policy in the context of liberalizing global economic relations, to formulate an integrative conceptual approach to the application of neoprotectionism in the economic development policy of Ukraine.The interdisciplinary multi-criteria approach to defining protectionism from the perspective of ideology, idea, policy and practice is proposed, which allowed for investigating the transformation of its manifestation forms in the process of evolutionary development of the international economic relations. The international economic policy was studied as an unbroken continuum of the economic and political practice of the states by methodological tools of the international political economy. It is found that from the international political economy perspective a choice between protectionism and free trade as the principles for implementation of the economic policy of the state is conditional on the pattern of global economic processes with their immanent contradictions, the specifics of regionalization and integration processes, and the global economy tendencies. The choice between the government's commitment to the policy of minimizing costs and maximizing benefits, and the character of its participation in the international economic cooperation is determined by the pattern of international trade and international movement of production factors, on the one hand, and determine it, on the other hand. It is demonstrated that the choice of protectionist policy, as follows from the international political economy discourse, is conditional on: operation of public and non-public economic entities; effects from the implementation of national economic policies; the coordinating equilibrium between national, regional, interstate and global level of decision making; the existing mechanisms for global control of international economic interests.Interpretation of the international economic policy by the methodological tools of the international political economy allowed to identify the endogenous character of the external economic policy (recognizing thereby the protectionism as a policy that can be potentially demanded by the public (represented by voters), business people (represented by lobbying groups), government (which implements economic interests of the nation), and to reveal the variety of entities involved in the international economic relations, which have exogenous impact on the policy implemented by national governments (by signing trade agreements), limiting thereby the conditions for the protectionist policy implementation.Theoretical modeling of protectionist intentions in the international economic cooperation on the basis of the interdisciplinary economic-political approach laid grounds for rethinking the conclusions made by the classical and neo-classical theories of trade and the theory of correlation of production factors about the unconditional impact of the free trade principle on the population's welfare as a derivative from the function of consumption. The analysis of two groups of protectionism theories – the ones based on studies of the structure of protectionism within the countries, and the ones investigating the level of protectionism between countries in time – demonstrated that the voters' welfare or the so called "win of the majority" are the determinants of protectionist initiatives. The factors underlying the voters' demand for protectionism are highlighted: welfare measured by economic as well as social and ecological effects; social solidarity; social protection; commitment to social values; commitment to national identity; adherence to ideological principles of the policy of economic nationalism; mitigation of effects from the information asymmetry of rational voters. The pressure by lobbying groups on the choice of the principle underlying government's implementation of the external trade policy is explained by: phase of business cycle; hysteresis effects in the economy; the level of competitiveness in export-oriented sectors; the extent of import dependence in the economy; distributive and allocation effects of the economic activities.The author's concept of neo-protectionism in the international economic policy is substantiated, which is defined as a complex hierarchical set of principles, rules and instruments of protective, stimulating, discriminative and restrictive nature, implemented at mega-, meta-, macro- and mesolevel of the international economic policy. A multilevel typology of neo-protectionism is proposed, based on specific features: the level of international economic policy, generating entities, manifestation environment, instruments for the international economic policy with indirect impact. It was used to identify its essential characteristics in all the forms of manifestation of the international economic relations; to define the functions of neo-protectionism by its type (ideological, institutional, integrative, conjuncture-formative, factor-based, infrastructural, monetary, currency-based, financial, debt-based, fiscal) and sub-types (ecological, migrational, sectoral, based on primary commodities, resource-based, energy-based, technological, innovative, informational, digital, investment-based). This allowed to identify the purpose for applications of neo-protectionism at mega-, meta-, macro- and mesolevel of the international economic policy, and to visualize the degree of its functional and structural complexity and dimensionality as a phenomenon and a process, which realization varies depending on the entities applying it, the objects for which it is applying, its coverage and objectives.A theoretical and methodological approach for macro- and meta-level assessment of the international economic policy based on neo-protectionist instruments is developed. Its application enabled for outlining and describing the policy of economic nationalism (which motivation basis is formed by domination, expansion, domestic extended reproduction by creating new comparative advantages), and the policy of economic patriotism (which motivation basis is formed by rehabilitation of economic growth, curbing of the expansionary potentials of partner countries, creating new comparative advantages and achieving sustainable development), with distinguishing its sub-types: supranational, local, liberal, and conservative. The distinctive features of neo-mercantilist policy are defined, and the ways of its implementation are revealed. It is shown that the neo-mercantilist policy generates anti-competitive market distortions affecting not only foreign producers, but domestic ones as well, considering the scales of the latter involvement in global value added chains, and causes market imbalances resulting from the unfair competition. Theoretical and methodological grounds for studies of the international economic policy are improved, which is based on the principles of stability, hierarchy, adaptability, complementarity, subsidiarity, and balance, by including legitimation as a novel principle of the international economic policy implementation, which involves a combination of regulatory, de-regulatory and re-regulatory mechanisms of impact on the international economic relations, and results in the implementation of the institutional norms and rules that directly or indirectly ignore/deny/distort the agreements that exist at international/regional level, lead to anti-competitive market distortions, trade and investment imbalances, and open up opportunities for gaining new comparative advantages. Self-legitimation is defined as an attributive characteristic of the entities involved in the international economic policy at mega-, meta- and macrolevel, which enables for implementation of the neoprotectionist policy.The thesis substantiates multiple combinations in implementation of neoprotectionism through multidirectional manifestations of deregulation-regulation, integration-disintegration, coordination-de-coordination, expansion-fragmentation, balancing-unbalancing, stimulation-restriction, protection-discrimination, and the reasonability of neo-protectionist measures in the economic development policy of Ukraine.The structural components of the global economy as an environment for neoprotectionist manifestations are revealed: production and investment activities, research and development, international monetary relations. The functions of neoprotectionism within the international economic system are revealed: allocative (sectoral neo-protectionism; infrastructural neo-protectionism; factor-based neoprotectionism; integrative neo-protectionism; financial neo-protectionism; investment-based neo-protectionism); distributive (institutional neo-protectionism; fiscal neoprotectionism; financial neo-protectionism; investment-based neo-protectionism); stabilizing (monetary neo-protectionism; currency-based neo-protectionism; debtbased neo-protectionism; financial neo-protectionism; investment-based neoprotectionism). The instruments for the international economic policy with indirect impact, enabling for the implementation of neo-protectionism, are outlined as follows: fiscal, monetary and currency policies.Modeling of clustering processes in the Ukrainian economy by use of Boston matrix and Leontiev model enabled to identify four productive clusters: innovation (manufacturing of computers, electronic and optical devices; telecommunications; computer software design, consulting and information services; professional, R&D activities; information and telecommunications; printing and publishing activities; production of movies and video-films); auxiliary (supply of electricity, gas, steam and conditioned air; wholesale and retail trade; repair of automobiles and motorcycles; hotels and restaurants; financial and insurance activities); traditional (agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing industries; construction; transport; storage; postal and courier services; production chemical substances and chemical products; car making and mechanical engineering; light industry), and to define the industries driving the economic growth, generating net income and having direct impact on the rates of GDP growth.A methodological approach to the assessment of the effectiveness of tax preferences and other preferences provided for residents of industrial parks is proposed, which, contrary to the existing approaches, uses applied models of the overall equilibrium for identifying the industries that have to be priority recipients of government assistance through the network of industrial parks, in the context of the intensified and leading development of the country by key macroeconomic indicators, and for quantitative optimization of the preferences considering the stable revenues of the public budget, which enabled to substantiate the nomenclature of efficient stimuli for residents of industrial parks, to achieve the objectives: to make the national industry move up in the value added chains and create a closed-loop innovation cycle in Ukraine.The system of tax and other preferences for residents of industrial parks, intended to recover and further the innovation-driven development of the production and export capacities of the Ukrainian economy, is assessed, which enabled to adapt international experiences of using the mechanism of free economic zones to the domestic practice, to create a favorable investment environment for high tech productions in the national economy for the period required by them to form competitive advantages. ; У дисертації розроблено цілісну наукову концепцію неопротекціонізму у міжнародній економічній політиці в умовах лібералізації світогосподарських зв'язків і на цій основі сформульовано інтегративний концептуальний підхід застосування неопротекціонізму в політиці економічного розвитку України.В роботі запропоновано міждисциплінарний багатокатегоріальний підхід до визначення протекціонізму з позицій ідеології, ідеї, політики і практики, що дозволило дослідити трансформацію форм його прояву в процесі еволюційного розвитку міжнародних економічних відносин. Міжнародна економічна політика досліджувалась в нерозривній єдності економічної й політичної практики держав методологічним інструментарієм міжнародної політичної економії. Встановлено, що з позиції міжнародної політичної економії, на вибір між протекціонізмом чи вільною торгівлею як принципами реалізації економічної політики держави впливають стан світогосподарських процесів з іманентними їм суперечностями, особливості протікання процесів регіоналізації та інтеграції і тенденції розвитку світової економіки. Вибір між сповідуванням державою політики мінімізації втрат чи максимізації вигод, а також характер її участі в міжнародному економічному співробітництві, з одного боку, детермінується станом міжнародної торгівлі і міжнародного переміщення факторів виробництва, а, з іншого боку, визначає його. Виявлено, що на вибір протекціоністської політики, згідно теоретичного дискурсу міжнародної політичної економії, впливають: діяльність державних і недержавних суб'єктів господарювання; ефекти від реалізації національних економічних політик; стан координаційної рівноваги між національним, регіональним, міждержавним і глобальним рівнями прийняття рішень; формування механізмів глобального управління міжнародними економічними процесами.Інтерпретація міжнародної економічної політики методологічним інструментарієм міжнародної політичної економії дозволила виявити ендогенний характер зовнішньоекономічної політики (тим самим визнаючи протекціонізм як політику, на яку потенційно може формувати запит суспільство (в особі виборців), підприємці (в особі лобістських груп), уряд (що реалізує економічні інтереси держави)) й водночас ідентифікувати різноманіття суб'єктів міжнародних економічних відносин, що чинять екзогенний вплив на реалізацію політики національних держав (шляхом підписання торговельних угод), тим самим обмежуючи умови для реалізації протекціоністської політики.Теоретичне моделювання протекціоністських інтенцій в міжнародному економічному співробітництві на основі міждисциплінарного економікополітичного підходу дало підстави до переосмислення висновків класичної, неокласичної теорій торгівлі і теорії співвідношення факторів виробництва про беззастережний вплив принципу вільної торгівлі на «добробут» населення як похідну від функції споживання. Аналіз двох груп теорій протекціонізму – як тих, що базуються на дослідженні структури протекціонізму в межах країн, так і тих, що досліджують рівень протекціонізму між країнами в часі – дозволив встановити, що добробут виборців або т.зв. виграш більшості лежить в основі ініціювання вжиття протекціоністських заходів. Встановлено, що з боку населення затребуваність на протекціонізм може бути продиктована запитом на: добробут, що вимірюється, окрім економічних, ще й соціальними і екологічними ефектами; соціальну солідарність; соціальне забезпечення; відстоювання соціальних цінностей; відстоювання національної ідентичності; сповідування ідеологічних принципів політики економічного націоналізму; нівелювання ефектів інформаційної асиметрії раціональних виборців. З боку лобістських груп тиск на вибір принципу реалізації зовнішньоторговельної політики урядом пояснюється: стадією бізнес-циклу; ефектами гістерезису в економіці; рівнем конкурентоспроможності експортоорієнтованих секторів; ступенем імпортозалежності економіки; дистрибутивними й алокаційними ефектами економічної діяльності.В дисертації обґрунтовано авторську концепцію неопротекціонізму в міжнародній економічній політиці, під яким розуміється складноієрархічна сукупність принципів, правил та інструментів захисного, стимулюючого, дискримінаційного та рестрикційного характеру, що реалізується на мега-, мета-, макро- і мезорівнях міжнародної економічної політики. В дослідженні запропоновано багаторівневу типологізацію неопротекціонізму за конкретними ознаками, до яких віднесено: рівень міжнародної економічної політики, суб'єкти генерування, середовище прояву, інструменти міжнародної економічної політики непрямого впливу, що дало змогу виявити його сутнісні характеристики у всіх формах прояву міжнародних економічних відносин; встановити функції, що виконує неопротекціонізм залежно від його типів (ідеологічний, інституційний, інтеграційний, кон'юнктуро-формуючий/ галузевий, факторний, інфраструктурний, монетарний, валютний, фінансовий, борговий, фіскальний) та підтипів (екологічний, міграційний, сировинний, ресурсний, енергетичний, технологічний, інноваційний, інформаційний, цифровий, інвестиційний). Це дозволило ідентифікувати мету застосування неопротекціонізму на мега-, мета-, макро- і мезорівні міжнародної економічної політики, та візуалізувати ступінь його функціонально-структурної складності та розмірності як явища та процесу, реалізація якого видозмінюється залежно від суб'єктів, які його застосовують, об'єктів, на які розповсюджується його дія, простору застосування, цілей здійснення.В роботі розроблено науково-методичний підхід оцінювання міжнародної економічної політики на макро- і мета- рівнях, зумовленої використанням інструментарію неопротекціонізму, застосування якого дозволило виокремити і охарактеризувати політику економічного націоналізму (мотиваційною основою якого виступають домінування, експансія, забезпечення національного розширеного відтворення шляхом створення нових порівняльних переваг) і політику економічного патріотизму (мотиваційною основою якого виступають відновлення економічного зростання, стримування експансійного потенціалу країн-партнерів, створення нових порівняльних переваг й досягнення сталого розвитку) з виокремленням таких його підтипів, як наднаціональний, локальний, ліберальний, консервативний. Визначено характерні риси політики неомеркантилізму і встановлено способи, в які вона може реалізовуватись. Встановлено, що політика неомеркантилізму продукує антиконкурентні ринкові викривлення, які зачіпають не лише іноземних виробників, але й національних, беручи до уваги ступінь залучення останніх до глобальних ланцюгів створення доданої вартості, і призводить до ринкових дисбалансів внаслідок несправедливої конкуренції.Удосконалено теоретико-методологічні засади дослідження міжнародної економічної політики, що визначається принципами стійкості, ієрархічності, адаптивності, комплементарності, субсидіарності та збалансованості, шляхом включення легітимації як новітнього принципу здійснення міжнародної економічної політики, що передбачає комбінування регуляторних, дерегуляторних та ререгуляторних механізмів впливу на міжнародні економічні відносини, результується в імплементації таких інституційних норм і правил, які прямо чи опосередковано нехтують/спростовують/викривлюють домовленості, що існують на міжнародному/регіональному рівні, призводять до антиконкурентних ринкових деформацій, торговельних й інвестиційних дисбалансів та уможливлюють отримання нових порівняльних переваг. Самолегітимація визначена як атрибутивна характеристика суб'єктів міжнародної економічної політики на мега-, мета- і макрорівнях, що уможливлює реалізацію політики неопротекціонізму.В дисертаційному дослідженні обґрунтовано множинні комбінації реалізації неопротекціонізму через різноспрямовані прояви дерегуляціїрегуляції, інтеграції-дезінтеграції, координації-декоординації, розширенняфрагментації, врівноваження-розбалансування, стимулювання-обмеження, захисту-дискримінації та доцільність застосування неопротекціонізму в політиці економічного розвитку України.Встановлено, що структурними елементами світового господарства як середовища прояву неопротекціонізму виступають: виробничо-інвестиційна сфера діяльності, науково-технічна сфера, сфера міжнародної торгівлі, міжнародні валютно-фінансові та кредитні відносини. Виявлено, що неопротекціонізм в межах міжнародної економічної системи виконує наступні функції: регуляторну (ідеологіний неопротекціонізм; інтеграційний неопротекціонізм; факторний неопротекціонізм; монетарний неопротекціонізм; валютний неопротекціонізм; борговий неопротекціонізм; фінансовий неопротекціонізм; інвестиційний неопротекціонізм); алокаційну (кон'юнктурноформуючий/галузевий неопротекціонізм; інфраструктурний неопротекціонізм; факторний неопротекціонізм; інтеграційний неопротекціонізм; фінансовий неопротекціонізм; інвестиційний неопротекціонізм); дистрибутивну (інституційний неопротекціонізм; фіскальний неопротекціонізм; фінансовий неопротекціонізм; інвестиційний неопротекціонізм); стабілізаційну (монетарний неопротекціонізм; валютний неопротекціонізм; борговий неопротекціонізм; фінансовий неопротекціонізм; інвестиційний неопротекціонізм).Моделювання процесів кластерізації української економіки із використанням бостонської матриці та моделі Леонтьєва дозволило виділити чотири продуктивні кластери: інноваційний (виробництво комп'ютерів, електронної та оптичної продукції; телекомунікації (електрозв'язок); комп'ютерне програмування, консультування та надання інформаційних послуг; професійна, наукова та технічна діяльність; інформація та телекомунікації; видавнича діяльність; виробництво кіно- та відеофільмів; допоміжний (постачання електроенергії, газу, пари та кондиційованого повітря; оптова та роздрібна торгівля; ремонт автотранспортних засобів і мотоциклів; тимчасове розміщування й організація харчування; фінансова та страхова діяльність), традиційний (сільське, лісове та рибне господарство; добувна промисловість і розроблення кар'єрів; переробна промисловість; будівництво; транспорт, складське господарство, поштова та кур'єрська діяльність; виробництво хімічних речовин і хімічної продукції), стратегічний (транспорт, складське господарство, поштова та кур'єрська діяльність; виробництво хімічних речовин і хімічної продукції; автомобіле- та машинобудування; легка промисловість) та визначити галузі-драйвери економічного зростання, в яких можливе отримання високого чистого валового доходу та які безпосередньо впливають на темпи зростання ВВП.Запропоновано методологічний підхід до оцінювання ефективності надання податкових пільг й інших преференцій резидентам індустріальних парків, який, на відміну від існуючих підходів, передбачає використання прикладних моделей загальної рівноваги для ідентифікації пріоритетних галузей-реципієнтів державної допомоги через мережу індустріальних парків у контексті активізації випереджаючого розвитку країни за ключовими макроекономічними показниками, а також визначення оптимального обсягу відповідних преференцій з міркувань сталих надходжень державного бюджету, що дозволило обґрунтувати перелік перспективних стимулів резидентам індустріальних парків для досягнення цілей висхідного руху вітчизняної промисловості ланцюгами доданої вартості й створення замкнутого циклу інновацій в Україні.В роботі проведено оцінку використання системи податкових й інших преференцій для резидентів індустріальних парків з метою відновлення та забезпечення подальшого інноваційного розвитку виробничо-експортного потенціалу України, що дало змогу адаптувати міжнародний досвід використання механізму вільних економічних зон до вітчизняної практики задля створення сприятливого інвестиційного середовища для нових високотехнологічних виробництв у національній економіці на період формування ними конкурентних переваг.

n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting

The Pacific region is in the midst of an information and communications technology (ICT) revolution in which small island countries are increasingly connected to the global economy. The regions improving internet connectivity presents an opportunity for Pacific Island countries (PICs) to overcome their inherent limitations, and help address the long-standing issues of employment and income generation, which is vital to accelerate progress towards ending poverty and creating an inclusive society. The PICs possess unique vulnerabilities that make addressing poverty and development challenges particularly difficult and complex. The purpose of this study is to examine the feasibility of leveraging ICT to help generate job opportunities in the PICs. This is because of the positive experiences that several countries, including small island economies, have had in generating new types of employment opportunities. The study's main focus is on cities and urban areas, given the still low availability of internet infrastructure and services in rural and remote areas and islands in the Pacific region. The study focuses specifically on the information technology (IT) - enabled global outsourcing services (GOS) industry. ICT covers diverse subsectors that include telecommunications and IT hardware and software.

The Pacific region is in the midst of an information and communications technology (ICT) revolution in which small island countries are increasingly connected to the global economy. The regions improving internet connectivity presents an opportunity for Pacific Island countries (PICs) to overcome their inherent limitations, and help address the long-standing issues of employment and income generation, which is vital to accelerate progress towards ending poverty and creating an inclusive society. The PICs possess unique vulnerabilities that make addressing poverty and development challenges particularly difficult and complex. The purpose of this study is to examine the feasibility of leveraging ICT to help generate job opportunities in the PICs. This is because of the positive experiences that several countries, including small island economies, have had in generating new types of employment opportunities. The study's main focus is on cities and urban areas, given the still low availability of internet infrastructure and services in rural and remote areas and islands in the Pacific region. The study focuses specifically on the information technology (IT) - enabled global outsourcing services (GOS) industry. ICT covers diverse subsectors that include telecommunications and IT hardware and software.

Doing business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 10 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. In a series of annual reports doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. This economy profile presents the doing business indicators for Mauritius. To allow useful comparison, it also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2011 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January-December 2010).

학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :국제대학원 국제학과(국제통상전공),2019. 8. 김종섭. ; 본 연구의 목적은 글로벌 가치사슬 (global value chain, GVC), 혹은 여러 국가에 걸친 생산 단계의 분화 과정에 참여하여 특정 형태의 중간재 무역이 증가할 때, 숙련도가 다른 한국 노동자들의 임금에 차별적인 영향이 발생하는 가의 여부를 실증적 분석을 통해 검증하는 것이다. 최근 여러 개발도상국과 선진국에서 국가 내 불평등이 심화되는 현상이 관측되고 있으며, 이는 학계 및 정책입안자들 뿐만 아니라 일반인들의 주요 관심 대상이 되었다. 불평등이 정치적 안정성과 사회 통합에 영향을 미친다는 사실은 오랜 시간 인지되었다. 많은 국가 내에서 포퓰리즘과 시위가 늘어나는 등 정치적 갈등이 심화되고 있으며, 세계에서 경제 규모로 각각 1, 2위를 차지하는 미국과 중국 간의 무역 분쟁으로 현실화된 보호무역주의의 재등장은 오늘날 세계화와 불평등 사이의 상관 관계가 정치적으로 더욱 심각한 의의를 가진다는 것을 보여준다. 그러나 국제 생산 네트워크는 여러 국경을 넘나드는 글로벌 공급망 무역을 통해 촘촘하게 이어지는데, 이러한 글로벌 밸류 체인이 확산된 오늘날에는 관세, 쿼터, 그리고 기타 수입·수출 규제와 같은 비관세장벽의 비용이 더욱 높아졌다. 다시 말해 GVC 시대에서는 각 생산 단계를 거치며 수입 중간재가 국경을 여러 번 넘나들면서 관세의 비용이 누적·증폭되며, 전통적으로 내수형으로 여겨지는 농업과 서비스 같은 산업에 속한 생산과 고용 역시 해외 시장에 의존하는 경향이 커지는데, 이는 내수형 산업들조차 직접적으로 수출되는 제조업품 속의 부가가치로 체화되어 간접적으로 부가가치를 수출하기 때문이다. 따라서 과거 시대에 비해 무역 장벽은 고용과 임금에 더욱 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있을 뿐만 아니라, 양자간 무역의 직접적인 당사자 뿐만 아니라 간접적으로 국제 공급 사슬 무역에 참여하는 수많은 관련 국가와 산업들 모두에게 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 따라서 현대 사회에서 보호무역의 비용이 유래없이 높아진 만큼, 과연 그러한 정책의 밑바탕이 된 불평등 문제가 정말 무역에서 비롯된 것인지 정밀하게 연구하는 것은 아주 중요한 문제라고 할 수 있다. 1980년대와 90년대 초반까지 주류 경제학자들의 전반적인 의견은 무역이 불평등에 미친 영향이 미미했으며, 고숙련·저숙련 노동자들의 임금 격차가 벌어진 데에는 숙련 편향적 기술 진보와 같은 다른 요인들이 훨씬 중대한 효과를 미쳤다는 것이었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 세계화와 불평등의 관계에 대한 정책 입안자들과 일부 학계의 염려는 계속되어 왔으며, 특히 해외 아웃소싱 혹은 오프쇼어링과 임금 불평등의 관계에 대한 최근의 경험적 연구들은 여러 상반되는 결과들을 도출하였다. 한편, 글로벌 밸류 체인과 생산의 파편화가 확산된 상황에서는 무역의 잠재적인 숙련 편향적 효과를 새로운 GVC와 부가가치 무역 지수들로 연구하는 것이 중요하다. 이는 리카르도나 애덤 스미스 시대처럼 수출 속 부가가치가 거의 100% 국내에서 생산되는 것이 아니라 해외에서 수입한 중간재 혹은 다른 투입 요소가 차지하는 해외창출 부가가치 비중이 매우 커졌기 때문이다. GVC참여가 노동시장의 소득 재분배에 미치는 영향에 대한 최신의 경험적 연구들 역시 서로 상충되는 결과들을 내놓은 점에서, 더욱 정교한 방법론으로 다듬어진 실증 분석의 필요성이 제기된다. 특히 국제 공급 사슬 무역 속에 체화된 기술과 노동은 전통적 무역 이상으로 산업 고도화나 추가적인 노동 수요와 공급의 이동을 유발할 수 있기 때문에, 같은 GVC무역이라도 산업 혹은 국가에 따라 다른 영향을 미칠 수가 있다. 글로벌 가치 사슬에 가장 활발하게 참여하는 국가 중 하나인 한국의 사례가 중요한 또다른 이유는, 많은 경제학자들이 대학교와 같은 고등 교육에 투자를 해서 고숙련 노동의 비중을 높이는 것이 고숙련·저숙련 노동자 간의 임금 불평등을 해소할 수 있는 효과적 방안으로 제시하고 있고, OECD에서 가장 높은 비율의 고숙련 노동자를 보유하고 있는 한국의 경우 대학 교육 이수자의 지속적인 증가가 있었음에도 불구하고 임금 불평등이 해소되기는커녕 심화되었다는 점이다. 따라서 GVC와 임금 불평등의 구조를 연구하는 것은 GVC참여를 통해서 한국과 비슷한 방식으로 산업들의 기술 구조를 고도화하고자 하는 개발도상국들에게 좋은 참고가 될 수 있을 것이다. 한국의 예는 또한 선진국들에게도 중요한 의의를 가질 수 있다. 한국은 선진국 중에서 특이하게도 강건한 제조업 기반을 유지하고 있으며 반면에 서비스 산업이 상대적으로 낮은 비중을 차지하고 있다. 이런 산업 구조를 가지고 있음에도 GVC참여가 숙련 편향적인 효과를 보인다면, 최근 미국과 같은 선진국들이 보호무역을 통해 억지로 자국으로 (점점 낮은 부가가치를 차지하는) 생산·조립 단계 공정을 되돌리려는 "리쇼어링"을 유도하더라도 그들이 원하는 불평등의 개선 효과가 없을 수도 있다는 점을 함의한다. 산업 구조, 국가의 위치와 규모 등 수많은 요인에 따라 GVC참여가 노동 시장에 미치는 영향이 상이할 수 있는 바, 본 연구는 최근 축적된 국제 생산 분업에 대한 전반적인 선행 연구 분석과 함께 한국의 오프쇼어링, GVC관련 무역, 해외직접투자, 그리고 개발 및 산업 고도화 등의 다방면적인 질적 특성을 살펴봄으로써 이질적인 여러 종류의 GVC참여 방식이 국내 노동자들의 숙련도에 따라 임금에 어떤 상이한 영향을 미칠 수 있는지에 대한 가설을 설정한다. 본격적인 양적 회귀분석에 앞서 질적인 분석을 겸하는 이유는 GVC 무역 내에 체화된 업무와 숙련도를 알아야 노동 시장에 미치는 영향을 보다 정확히 파악할 수 있는 상황 속에서, 현재의 부가가치기준 무역 데이터조차 가치사슬 내의 정확한 산업 고도화 방향과 직무의 구성을 알기 어렵기 때문이다. 연구 가설들을 검정하기 위해 먼저 한국고용노동패널데이터 (KLIPS)에서 추출한 7,689명의 개인과 총 31,974개의 관측치로 이루어진 표본을 구성한 후 2018년 발표된 가장 최신 형태의 경제협력개발기구 (OECD) – 세계무역기구 (WTO) 부가가치 기준 무역 (TiVA) 지표들을 병합한다. 이 실증 분석 모형은 2005년부터 2015년까지 64개국간의 부가가치 무역을 추정하는 TiVA의 36개 산업 수준 지표들을 2009년부터 2017년까지의 개인 수준의 한국 노동자 데이터와 연결한다. 교육 수준으로 측정된 노동의 숙련 수준을 각 노동자가 속한 산업의 세 종류의 GVC 참여 지수 (총 참여율, 전방 참여도, 후방 참여도)와 함께 교차항에 넣어 상호 작용 효과 존재 여부를 살펴본다. 실증 분석을 위해 우선 변형된 Mincer 형태의 임금 모형에 종속변수인 각 개인 수준의 임금과 핵심 독립 변수인 노동 숙련도와 GVC참여율로 구성된 교차항과 함께 다양한 통제 변수와 고정 효과를 넣은 후, 패널 회귀분석을 실시한다. 이처럼 산업 수준 GVC 무역 지표를 개인 수준 임금 데이터와 통합시키는 방법론은 산업 수준 GVC 교역 지수를 산업 수준 임금 데이터와 연결 지은 기존 선행 연구에 비해서 동시적 인과관계로 인해 발생할 수 있는 내생성 편의 문제를 어느 정도 통제할 수 있다는 점에서 상당한 이점을 가진다. 실증 분석 결과 전반적으로 산업 수준에서의 GVC참여가 여러 숙련도로 나뉜 개인 노동자 수준의 임금에 유의미한 차등적인 효과를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 우선 교차항을 고려하지 않았을 때 전방, 후방 및 총 GVC참여율 모두 다른 변수들을 통제했을 때에도 통계적으로 매우 유의미하게 임금을 높이는 것으로 보였다. 하지만 이와 동시에 GVC참여는 고숙련 노동자들에게 상대적으로 더욱 큰 긍정적 임금 효과를 주는 숙련 편향적 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 여러 종류의 GVC참여 중에서도 전방 참여가 가장 큰 숙련 편향성을 나타내는 것을 드러냄으로써, 본 연구는 GVC참여의 종류를 구분하는 것이 매우 중요하다는 점을 확인하였다. 이는 한국의 노동 시장에 대한 선행 연구들이 거의 다루지 않은 부분일 뿐만 아니라, 최근에 세계 단위로 분석한 연구와 정 반대의 결과를 보여주기 때문에 기존 연구에 상당 부분 기여한다고 할 수 있다. 본 논문의 결과는 또한 동일한 형태의 GVC무역도 국가의 개별적 특성에 따라 체화된 숙련수준과 생산활동의 구성비에 따라 노동시장에 미치는 영향이 다를 수 있다는 점을 시사한다. 한편, 결과의 강건성 검증을 위해 다른 형태의 통제 변수와 모형, 그리고 대안적인 핵심 설명 변수로 시간 래그 변수와 총수출액 대비 부가가치 수출액의 비율(VAX Ratio)을 사용했을 때에도 전반적인 회귀 분석 결과는 유사하게 나오는 것으로 확인하였다. 본 연구는 한국의 경우 글로벌 공급 사슬 무역에 참여하는 것이 적어도 미시적인 수준에서 노동 시장에 숙련 편향적인 효과를 가져온다는 것을 밝히면서도, 동시에 모든 종류의 GVC참여가 노동자들의 전반적인 임금 수준에 긍정적인 영향을 미친다는 점을 보여줌으로써, 최근 불평등을 해소하는 정책으로 확산되는 보호무역주의는 최적의 해결책이 아니라는 경제학의 관점을 경험적 분석을 통해 확인하였다. 본 논문에서 무역과 노동 경제학이 가장 많은 부분을 차지하지만, GVC와 관련된 연구가 여러 학제간 교류가 활발한 간학문적인 분야라는 점과 최근의 무역 전쟁 및 불평등 문제가 정책적으로도 중대한 사안인만큼, 본 연구에 포함된 여러가지 이론 및 실증 분석의 결과들은 정치학, 국제관계학, 정치경제학, 사회학, 교육학, 행정학, 그리고 경영학과 같은 다양한 분야의 연구자들에게 유용한 결과를 제시한다. ; The main objective of this study is to elucidate how exposure to globalization in the form of participation in global value chains (GVCs), or the fragmentation of different stages of production across national and regional borders, has affected the wages of workers with different skill levels in the labor market of South Korea. The rise of income inequality within many developed and developing countries has once again captured the interest of academia, the public, and politicians. It has long been known that inequality affects political stability and social cohesion. Nowadays, political tensions run high in many nations, and as can be seen from various social phenomena such as the rise of populism, civil protests, and protectionism in the form of an ongoing trade war between the world's two largest economies, the U.S. and China, the potential relationship between globalization and inequality continues to have ever more serious political implications. However, the costs of trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers such as import or export restrictions are now higher than ever, due to the importance of cross-border supply chain trade that links international production networks. In an era of GVCs, tariffs are escalated because inputs must cross borders multiple times, while production and employment in many seemingly domestic-oriented industries such as agriculture and services actually depend on foreign markets, because their value-added is indirectly embodied as inputs in manufactured exports. Thus, trade restrictions may lead to significantly greater negative impacts on wages and employment than in previous eras. Moreover, barriers aimed bilaterally at one country can affect numerous other countries that participate in production sharing. In light of the high costs of protectionism in the contemporary world, an examination of whether trade actually has adverse distributional effects is crucial. Until the 1980s and early 90s, the consensus of neoclassical economists was that trade only had a minor impact on inequality while skill-biased technical or technological change and other factors were far more important drivers of divergences in the income of high and low skilled workers. Nevertheless, public suspicion and concern over the relationship has been unabated, and more recent literature on the relationship between offshoring and income inequality has shown conflicting results. At the same time, the expansion of global value chains and fragmentation of production increases the importance of studying the potential effects of a skill bias in trade with new GVC and value added trade indicators, since nowadays foreign intermediate goods and services are significantly embodied in the final product exports of a country, unlike the age of David Ricardo or Adam Smith, when exports were only domestically produced. Empirical findings regarding the relation between GVC participation and its distributional impacts on labor have been mixed, furthering the case for continued empirical investigation. The case of Korea, one of the most heavily integrated developed countries in GVCs, is also important because many economists have suggested that more investment in the tertiary education of unskilled workers can alleviate income inequality, but Korea has been experiencing a rise in inequality in spite of having the largest proportion of high skilled workers among OECD countries when following ISCED classifications. As such, a careful examination of how GVCs affect wage inequality can provide useful insights for developing countries that want to consistently upgrade their industries akin to the path that Korea has followed. Likewise, Korea's case has important implications for developed nations: Korea is an outlier among developed nations because it has a remarkably robust manufacturing sector as compared to services, yet, the existence of a skill bias of global supply chain trade in spite of this may imply that current high income economies tempted to engage in protectionism to "re-shore" overseas production back into national borders (such as the U.S.) might not achieve the distributional results they intended. The lower value-added assembly stages of manufacturing coming back would not necessarily contribute to reducing inequality in the home country. A careful examination of the literature on the labor market impacts of international production sharing, as well as the qualitative characteristics of Korea's offshoring, GVC-related trade, foreign direct investment, and development - industrial upgrading trajectory are factored into the formulation of several hypotheses on how heterogeneous types of GVC participation might impact workers of different skills in Korea. This is to complement the limitations of value added trade data in showing the composition of business functions as well as direction of industrial upgrading, as finding the specific mix of tasks and skills embodied in GVC trade is crucial to understanding labor market impacts. To test these hypotheses, a panel data set consisting of 7,689 individuals and 31,974 individual-year observations is constructed by merging and matching data from the Korea Labor Income Panel Survey (KLIPS) with the updated 2018 version of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade in Value Added (TiVA) indicators, which are derived from the Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) database. This empirical model links the 36 industry-level indicators of TiVA, which covers 64 economies for 2005-2015, with the micro-individual level data of Korean workers from 2009-2017. The skill level of labor, measured in terms of educational attainment, is interacted with three different types of GVC participation indices (total, forward, and backward) of the respective industries in which the workers are employed each year. The wages of each individual worker, the dependent variable, are regressed on this product term of skills and GVC participation, using a variation of the Mincerian human capital wage equation along with various controls and fixed effects appropriate for this multi-dimensional panel data analysis. This approach of investigating the relationship between industry-level cross-border production sharing indicators on individual-level variables has a significant methodological advantage compared to many earlier studies using industry-level wage variables. Combining the two different levels can mitigate endogeneity concerns that may arise due to simultaneity bias. Overall, the findings of this study show that differences in GVC integration at the industry level indeed have heterogeneous effects on wages of individual workers classified in different skill groups. While all three types of GVC participation have positive effects on wages when controlling for other variables, the direction and magnitude of coefficients for each group of workers suggests the existence of a "skill-bias," in which increased GVC participation has a relatively favorable impact toward higher skilled employees as opposed to low or mid-skilled workers. This skill bias is strongest for forward participation, which underlines the importance of distinguishing between different types of GVC participation, a factor which was neglected in previous empirical studies combining sector-level GVC indicators with individual-level labor data. The fact that these results directly contrast with a recent cross-country study that found skill-biased effects for backward GVC trade rather than forward supply chain linkages, suggests that the country-specific business functions, skills, and tasks embodied within intermediate inputs trade affect the causal relationship between both types of GVC participation and labor market impacts, in line with this dissertation's analysis of Korea's specific position in GVC trade and development trajectory. Moreover, robustness checks show that the results are generally stable when estimated with complementary or alternative specifications of variables and models, including time lags and the Value Added Exports (VAX) ratio. At the same time, although there is a skill bias of global supply chain trade, this research shows that overall wages of workers are positively affected through all types of GVC trade, hence leading to the suggestion that the current protectionist sentiment spreading in the global economy is not the optimal answer to deal with inequality. Although the study mostly draws insights from and fills in the gap in contemporary international trade literature and labor economics, the multi-disciplinary relevance of the findings with respect to global value chains and within-country income inequality should be of interest to scholars and policymakers of many fields, including political science, international relations, political economy, sociology, educational studies, public policy, and business management among others. ; Abstract i Table of Contents v List of Tables and Figures vii I. Introduction 1 1. Background and Research Motivation 1 2. Overview of the Study 12 II. Literature, Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 17 1. Literature Review 17 1.1. Global Value Chains (GVCs) 17 1.1.1 Concept, History and Terminology 22 1.1.2 GVCs and Value Added Trade Data 33 1.1.3 Importance of Trade in Value Added 42 1.1.4 The Role of Services 44 1.2. Labor Market Impacts of Trade and Offshoring 46 1.2.1 Benefits of Trade 51 1.2.2 Traditional Trade and Inequality 53 1.2.3 Trade in Tasks and Wage Effects 59 1.3 Traditional Proxy Measures of Offshoring Trade 64 1.3.1 Broad and Narrow Offshoring 64 1.4. Second Generation Offshoring Statistics 68 1.4.1 Vertical Specialization 70 1.4.2 VAX Ratio 73 1.5. The GVC Participation Index 76 1.5.1 Backward Participation (Foreign VA in Gross Exports) 78 1.5.2 Forward Participation (Domestic VA in Exports to third countries) 79 1.5.3 Total GVC Participation 79 1.5.4 Data Limitation: Absence of Business Functions and Tasks 81 1.6 Additional Labor Market Impacts of GVC Participation 83 1.6.1 The Smile Curve and Industrial Upgrading 85 1.6.2 Higher growth, development and productivity 93 1.6.3 Empirical Analyses on GVCs and Employment 96 1.6.4 Cross-country Analyses on GVCs and Wages 97 1.7 Korea and Global Value Chains 101 1.7.1 Korea's Prominent Role in GVC Trade 101 1.7.2 Factors underlying Korea's GVC participation 114 1.7.3 Korea's Export-Led Growth and Industrial Upgrading Path 116 1.7.4 Shifting to Higher Value Added Activities and Offshoring Assembly 122 1.7.5 Empirical Literature on the Labor Market Impacts of Globalization in Korea 128 2. Hypotheses Formulation 144 2.1. Model Predictions 144 2.2. Summary of Hypotheses 153 III. Data and Empirical Methodology 155 1. Data Sources and Sample 155 1.1. OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Indicators 155 1.2. Korea Labor Income Panel Survey (KLIPS) 158 2. Econometric Analysis 161 2.1. Baseline Panel Regression Wage Equation Model 161 3. Variable Construction 163 3.1. Constructing Variables from KLIPS 163 3.2. Skills and Educational Attainment Variables 166 3.3. Constructing GVC Trade Variables from OECD TiVA 170 3.4. Alternative GVC Measures for Robustness Checks 172 3.5. Matching GVC Industries with KLIPS 174 IV. Results and Interpretation 177 1. Main Specification 177 1.1. Total GVC Participation 180 1.2. Forward GVC Participation 187 1.3. Backward GVC Participation 192 2. Further Robustness Checks 195 2.1. International ISCED Definition of Skills 196 2.2. Robustness to Endogeneity and Simultaneous Equation Bias 198 2.3. Individual Fixed Effects 199 2.4. Alternative Specifications: Time-Lagged GVC Trade Variables 202 2.5. Alternative Specifications: Value Added Export (VAX) Ratio 208 V. Conclusion 218 1. Contribution to Economics Literature 218 2. Contribution to Policy-Making and Other Academic Fields 222 3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 223 List of References (Bibliography) 228 국문 초록 (Abstract in Korean) 260 ; Master

A review article devoted to the book of Andrzej
Blikle – Doktryna jakości. Rzecz o skutecznym
zarządzaniu. As pointed out by the Author,
the book is a case of a work rare on the Polish
publishing market, written by an outstanding
scientist, who successfully runs a business
activity. The combination of practical experience
with theoretical knowledge gave a result
that may be satisfying both for practitioners
as well as theorists, and also those who want
to get to know the ins and outs of an effective
and efficient business management. The Author
of the review believes that it is an important
voice for shaping an inclusive socio-economic
system, which constitutes a value in itself. Although
the book is mainly concerned with
business management, its message has a much
wider dimension and is concerned with real
measures of wealth, money and people's lives.
The book was awarded The SGH Collegium of
Business Administration Award "For the best
scientific work in the field of business administration
in the years 2014-2015".

Andrzej Jacek Blikle Doktryna jakości. Rzecz o skutecznym zarządzaniu (The Doctrine of Quality. On Effective Management) Gliwice, Helion Publishing Company, 2014, p. 546

Introduction

One of the distinctive features of the contemporary economy and contemporary world is a kind of obsession of quantity which is related to thoughtless consumerism, unfavourable to the care for the quality of the work and the quality of the produced and consumed goods and services. It is accompanied by culture (or rather non-culture) of singleness. Therefore, the book The Doctrine of Quality by Andrzej Blikle is like a breath of fresh air.

It is a different perspective on the economy and the model of operation of enterprises, on the model of work and life of people. A. Blikle proves that it can be done otherwise. He proves it on the basis of careful studies of the source literature – as expected from a professor of mathematics and an economist, but also on the basis of his own experience gained during the scientific and educational work, and most of all through the economic practice. In the world governed by the obsession of quantity, characterised by fragility, shortness of human relationships, including the relationship of the entrepreneur – employee, A. Blikle chooses durability of these relations, creativity, responsibility, quality of work and production, and ethics. The Doctrine of Quality is a rare example of the work on the Polish publishing market, whose author is a prominent scientist, successfully conducting a business activity for more than two decades, which has contributed to the development of the family company – a known confectionery brand "A. Blikle". The combination of practical experience with theoretical knowledge gave a result that may be satisfying both for practitioners as well as theorists, and also those who want to get to know the ins and outs of an effective and efficient business management, or develop the knowledge on this topic. In an attractive, clear narrative form, the author comprehensively presents the complexities of business management, indicating the sources of success, but also the reasons and the foundations of failures.

At the same time, he presents these issues with an interdisciplinary approach, which contributes to thoroughness of the arguments and deeper reflections.

Holism, typical to this book, is also expressed in the focus of A. Blikle not only on the economic, but also on social and ecological issues. Here, the author points to the possibility and need of reconciliation of the economic interests with social interests, and the care for the public good. Analyses of this subject are presented using the achievements of many areas of studies, in addition to economic sciences, including mathematics, sociology, psychology, medicine, and others. This gives a comprehensive picture of the complexity of business management – taking into account its close and distant environment.

There are no longueurs in the book, although extensive (over 500 pages), or lengthy, or even unnecessary reasoning overwhelming the reader, as the text is illustrated with a number of examples from practice, and coloured with anecdotes. At the same time, the author does not avoid using expressions popular in the world of (not only) business. He proves that a motivational system which is not based on the approach of "carrot and stick" and without a devastating competition of a "rat race" is possible. The author supports his arguments with references not only to the interdisciplinary scientific achievements, but also to the economic historical experiences and to a variety of older and newer business models.

There is a clear fascination with the reserves of creativity and productivity in the humanization of work. In fact, the author strongly exposes the potential of productivity and creativity in creating the conditions and atmosphere of work fostering elimination of fear of the future. He shows that such fear destroys creativity. It is not a coincidence that A. Blikle refers to the Fordist principles, including the warning that manufacturing and business do not consist of cheap buying and expensive selling. He reminds that Henry Ford, a legendary creator of the development of the automotive industry in the United States, put serving the public before the profit. The Doctrine of Quality is at the same time a book – proof that one of the most dangerous misconceptions or errors in the contemporary understanding of economics is finding that it is a science of making money, chremastics. Edmund Phelps and others warned against this in the year of the outbreak of the financial crisis in the USA in 2008, reminding that economics is not a science of making money but a science of relations between the economy and social life [Phelps, 2008]. Economics is a science of people in the process of management. Therefore, by definition, it applies to social values and ethos. Ethos is a general set of values, standards and models of proceedings adopted by a particular group of people. In this sense, ethos and economics as a science of people in the process of management are inseparable. Detaching economics from morality is in contradiction to the classical Smithian concept of economics, as Adam Smith combined the idea of the free market with morality. He treated his first work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, as an inseparable basis for deliberations on the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, which was the subject of the subsequent work of this thinker [Smith, 1989; Smith, 2012]. Identifying economics with chremastics would then mean that all actions are acceptable and desired, if their outcome is earnings, profit, money. The book of A. Blikle denies it. It contains a number of case studies, which also stimulate broader reflections. Therefore, and also due to the features indicated above, it can be a very useful teaching aid in teaching entrepreneurship and management.

The appearance of a book promoting the doctrine of quality and exposing the meaning of ethos of work is especially important because today the phenomenon of product adulteration becomes increasingly widespread, which is ironically referred to in literature as the "gold-plating" of products [Sennett, 2010, pp. 115-118], and the trend as "antifeatures", that is intentionally limiting the efficiency and durability of products of daily use to create demand for new products. A model example of antifeature is a sim-lock installed in some telephones which makes it impossible to use SIM cards of foreign operators [Rohwetter, 2011, p. 48; Miszewski, 2013]. These types of negative phenomena are also promoted by the development of systemic solutions aiming at the diffusion of responsibility [Sennett, 2010]. This issue is presented among others by Nassim N.N. Taleb, in the book with a meaningful title Antifragile: How to Live in a World We Don't Understand? The author proves that the economy and society lose their natural durability as a result of the introduction of numerous tools and methods of insurance against risks, but mostly by shifting the burden of risks on other entities [Taleb, 2012]. N.N. Taleb illustrates his arguments with numerous convincing examples and references to history, recalling, inter alia, that in ancient times there was no building control, but the constructors, e.g. of bridges had to sleep under them for some time after their construction, and the ancient aqueducts are still working well until today. So, he shows that a contemporary world, focused on quantitative effects, does not create a sound base for ethical behaviours and the care for the quality of work and manufacturing.

Andrzej Blikle points to the need and possibility of opposing this, and opposing to what the Noble Price Winner for Economics, Joseph Stiglitz described as avarice triumphs over prudence [Stiglitz, 2015, p. 277]. The phrase emphasised in the book "Live and work with a purpose" is the opposition to the dangerous phenomena listed above, such as for example antifeatures.

convincing that although the business activity is essentially focused on profits, making money, limited to this, it would be led to the syndrome of King Midas, who wanted to turn everything he touched into gold, but he soon realised that he was at risk of dying of starvation, as even the food turned into gold. What distinguishes this book is that almost every part of it forces in-depth reflections on the social and economic relations and brings to mind the works of other authors, but at the same time, creates a new context for them.

So, A. Blikle clearly proves that both the economy and businesses need social rooting. This corresponds to the theses of the Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi, who in his renowned work The Great Transformation, already in 1944 argued that the economy is not rooted in the social relations [Polanyi, 2010, p. 70]. He pointed to the risk resulting from commodification of everything, and warned that allowing the market mechanism and competition to control the human life and environment would result in disintegration of society. Although K. Polanyi's warnings were concerned with the industrial civilization, they are still valid, even now – when the digital revolution brings fundamental changes, among others, on the labour market – they strengthen it. The dynamics of these changes is so high that it seems that the thesis of Jeremy Rifkin on the end of work [Rifkin, 2003] becomes more plausible. It is also confirmed by recent analyses included in the book of this author, concerning the society of zero marginal cost and sharing economy [Rifkin, 2016], and the analyses concerning uberisation [Uberworld, 2016].

The book of Andrzej Blikle also evokes one of the basic asymmetries of the contemporary world, which is the inadequacy of the dynamics and sizes of the supply of products and services to the dynamics and sizes of the demand for them. Insufficient demand collides with the rapidly increasing, as a result of technological changes, possibilities of growth of production and services. This leads to overproduction and related therewith large negative implications, with features of wasteful economy of excess [Kornai, 2014]. It is accompanied by phenomena with features of some kind of market bulimia, sick consumerism, detrimental both to people and the environment [Rist, 2015]. One of the more compromising signs of the economy of excess and wasting of resources is wasting of food by rich countries, when simultaneously, there are areas of hunger in some parts of the world [Stuart, 2009].

At the same time, the economy of excess does not translate to the comfort of the buyers of goods – as in theory attributed to the consumer market. It is indicated in the publication of Janos Kornai concerning a comparative analysis of the features of socio-economic systems. While exposing his deep critical evaluation of socialist non-market systems, as economies of constant deficiency, he does not spare critical opinions on the capitalist economy of excess, with its quest for the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) and profits. As an example of the economy of excess, he indicates the pharmaceutical industry, with strong monopolistic competition, dynamic innovativeness, wide selection for the buyers, flood of advertisements, manipulation of customers, and often bribing the doctors prescribing products [Kornai 2014, p. 202]. This type of abnormalities is not alien to other industries. Although J. Konrai appreciates that in the economy of excess, including the excess of production capacities, the excess is "grease" calming down and soothing clashes that occur in the mechanisms of adaptation, he also sees that those who claim that in the economy of excess (or more generally in the market economy), sovereignty of consumers dominates, exaggerate [Kornai, 2014, pp. 171-172], as the manufacturers, creating the supply, manipulate the consumers. Thus, there is an excess of supply – both of values as well as junk [Kornai, 2014, p. 176]. Analysing the economy of excess, J. Kornai brings this issue to the question of domination and subordination. It corresponds with the opinion of Jerzy Wilkin, according to whom, the free market can also enslave, so take away individual freedom; on the other hand, the lack of the free market can lead to enslavement as well. Economists willingly talk about the free market, and less about the free man [Wilkin, 2014, p. 4].

The economy of excess is one of the consequences of making a fetish of the economic growth and its measure, which is the gross domestic product (GDP) and treating it as the basis of social and economic activity. In such a system, the pressure of growth is created, so you must grow to avoid death! The system is thus comparable to a cyclist, who has to move forwards to keep his balance [Rist, 2015, p. 181]. It corresponds with the known, unflattering to economists, saying of Kenneth E. Boulding [1956], criticising the focus of economics on the economic growth, while ignoring social implications and consequences to the environment: Anyone who believes in indefinite growth in anything physical, on a physically finite planet, is either mad or an economist. [from: Rist, 2015, p. 268].

GDP is a very much needed or even indispensable measure for evaluation of the material level of the economies of individual countries and for comparing their economic health. However, it is insufficient for evaluation of the real level of welfare and quality of life. It requires supplementation with other measures, as it takes into account only the values created by the market purchase and sale transactions. It reflects only the market results of the activity of enterprises and households. Additionally, the GDP account threats the socially desirable and not desirable activities equally. Thus, the market activity related to social pathologies (e.g. functioning of prisons, prostitution, and drug dealing) also increase the GDP. It was accurately expressed already in 1968 by Robert Kennedy, who concluded the discussion on this issue saying that: the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile [The Guardian, 2012].

While Grzegorz W. Kołodko even states that it should be surprising how it is possible that despite a number of alternative measures of social and economic progress, we are still in the corset of narrow measure of the gross product, which completely omits many significant aspects of the social process of reproduction [Kołodko, 2013, p. 44]. In this context he points to the necessity of triple sustainable growth – economic, social, and ecological [Kołodko, 2013, p. 377]. Transition from the industrial civilisation model to the new model of economy, to the age of information, causes a kind of cultural regression, a phenomenon of cultural anchoring in the old system. This type of lock-in effect - described in the source literature, that is the effect of locking in the existing frames and systemic solutions, is a barrier to development. The practice more and more often and clearer demonstrates that in the conditions of the new economy, the tools and traditional solutions turn out to be not only ineffective, but they even increase the risk of wrong social and economic decisions, made at different institutional levels.

All this proves that new development models must be searched for and implemented, to allow counteraction to dysfunctions of the contemporary economy and wasting the development potential, resulting from a variety of maladjustments generated by the crisis of civilisation. Polish authors who devote much of their work to these issues include G.W. Kołodko, Jerzy Kleer, or Maciej Bałtowski. Studies confirm that there is a need for a new pragmatism, new, proinclusive model of shaping the social and economic reality, a model which is more socially rooted, aiming at reconciling social, economic and ecological objectives, with simultaneous optimisation of the use of the social and economic potential [Kołodko, 2013; Bałtowski, 2016; Kleer, 2015]. There is more and more evidence that the barriers to economic development growing in the global economy are closely related with the rooting of the economy in social relations. The book of A. Blikle becomes a part of this trend in a new and original manner. Although the author concentrates on the analyses of social relations mainly at the level of an enterprise, at the same time, he comments them at a macroeconomic, sociological and ethical level, and interdisciplinary contexts constitute an original value of the book.

Conclusion

I treat the book of Andrzej Blike as an important voice in favour of shaping an inclusive social and economic system, in favour of shaping inclusive enterprises, that is oriented on an optimal absorption of knowledge, innovation and effective reconciliation of the interests of entrepreneurs with the interests of employees and the interests of society. Inclusiveness is indeed a value in itself. It is understood as a mechanism/system limiting wasting of material resources and human capital, and counteracting environmental degradation. An inclusive social and economic system is a system oriented on optimisation of the production resources and reducing the span between the actual and potential level of economic growth and social development [Reforma, 2015]. And this is the system addressed by Andrzej Blikle in his book. At least this is how I see it. Although the book is mainly concerned with business management, its message has a much wider dimension and is concerned with real measures of wealth, money and people's lives.

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This book builds on the lessons from public institutions and programs to support innovation, both successful and failed, from Europe and Central Asia (ECA) as well as China, Finland, Israel, and the United States. Field visits to these countries were hosted by the innovation and scientific agencies of the respective governments, strengthening the international experiences presented here. This book is a culmination of ten years of analytic and operational work led by the private and financial sector development department and the chief economist's office of the ECA region of the World Bank. Several regional reports and country policy notes exploring these issues have been published over the years. The book also reflects the lively discussion in the ongoing series of flagship events to promote knowledge based economies in the region. The most recent knowledge economy forum was held in Berlin in 2010, hosted by the fraunhofer center for Central and Eastern Europe. The book identifies policies that have an adverse affect on innovation. It also identifies policy gaps that, if filled, could have a catalytic effect on private sector innovation.

Energy efficiency (EE) is critical to help Turkey continue its trajectory of economic growth in a sustainable manner. The Government of Turkey recognizes this and has placed EE as a key component of its energy strategy and National Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Over the past 5-10 years, it has made considerable advances in establishing a strong policy and legal framework, creating a robust institutional set-up and developing programs to support EE implementation. Institutionally, the General Directorate of Electric Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (EIE) had been mandated with EE policy making, implementation and promotion since 1981, and an Energy Efficiency Coordination Board (EECB) was established under the 2007 EE Law to coordinate various EE policies, programs and other efforts. In November 2011, EIE was converted into the General Directorate for Renewable Energy (GDRE) and absorbed within the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR). The World Bank conducted an EE institutional review in consultation with the Turkish Government with the objective to enhance their ability to more effectively manage EE policies and programs and thus contribute to helping meet its stated national EE targets. The review consisted of a detailed assessment of the current institutional set-up, including roles and responsibilities for EE in Turkey, along with a comparison with international experience and best practices. A final set of institutional options and recommendations are provided at the end of the report.

In 1928, Utah Construction Company completed its first project outside of the United States with the 110 mile railroad for Southern Pacific of Mexico. Over the next 30 years, UCC continued to work on projects in Mexico including dams, roads, mining, and canals. The collection contains several booklets and correspondence along with approximately 500 photographs. ; 8.5 x 11 in. paper ; 96) Return to Harry McNev Mexico- Copper & Exploration ABSTRACT CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT MINING EXPLORATION AND MINING PRODUCTION IN MEXICO Private mining industry is experiencing difficult times in many countries that are or have been large mineral producers. Would Mexico offer opportunities for exploration and production? Mexico is a mineral rich country. For the exploration en-gineer this is the most vital point. If the exploration groups are professionally adept, they will find mineralization. A broad review of metallogenetic provinces and of past and present production in Mexico can be used as a guide to explora-tion. Although Mexico is well endowed with minerals, there are many factors that must be considered before a determination can be made that the mineral discovered is ore; (a) restrictive factors in-cluca governmental policy such as taxes, Mexicanization, commodity prices and certain laws; (b) favorable factors include a stable government, strong and freely-convertible peso, and relatively low direct-production costs. -The Mexican mining industry offers an opportunity to those willing to study the problems, accept the law, and invest in the social -as well as financial- future of Mexico. CONDITIONS THAT AffECT MINING EXPLORATION AND MINING PRODUCTION IN MEXICO I. INTRODUCTION. The potential foreign investor in Mexico's Mining In-dustry must carefully consider many facets of the industry and of the country. On the positive side, a stable govern-ment, a healthy monetary position and. above all, a mineral-iy rich country can be found. However, no investments should be made until the potential investor has investigated the min-ing law with its Mexicanization requirements, the mining taxes, the technical manpower regulations and the power of the ex-ecutive branch to set commodity prices. The official mining policy during the period 1930 to 1954, did not encourage investments in the mining industry. However, the future looks much brighter, for now Mexicanization has been accomplished for over 90% of the industry and the gov-ernment realizes that mine products provide a base for Mexico's currency and bring in foreign exchange, that mining provides an important source of government revenue and is an important con-sumer of power, supplies, and transportation services. Also, and of great future importance, Mexico's expanding industry will be in need of more raw materials to supply its demand and its increasing export of manufactured goods. II. HISTORY. The Spanish conquistadores were obsessed by the riches found in Mexico - particularly gold and silver. Thus began the systematic plundering of the new colony and the beginning of mining as the basis of Mexico's economy, Mexico became known as the ""mine and mint of Spain"". Major mining districts such as Taxco, Zacatecas, Santa Brbara and Guanajuato were discovered and brought into pro-duction between 1520 and 1550. It is interesting to note that these selected districts are ail still in production. From 1810, which saw the start, of independence from Spain to 1910 when the Mexican Revolution broke out, mining continued to play a leading role in the national economy. It probably would be fair to say that it sustained the economy. From 1875 to 1900, for example, mining accounted for 70% of the value of Mexico's exports. During the period of the 1910-1917 Revolution mineral pro-duction sharply declined. Silver, lead, and zinc, however, hit their peaks in the late 1920's nut then the general depression followed by governmental restrictions and high taxes reduced exploration which then was followed by reduced production and to date the peaks of production of the late 1920's have not been reached. Under the progressive regime of President Diaz Ordaz, which started in 1964, governmental stimulation to the mining industry has led to greater exploration which is now showing up in increased production. Today Mexico ranks as the leading producer of silver and is the fourth largest producer of lead, fifth of zinc and fourteenth of copper. Mexico also produces major amounts of mercury, bismuth, sulphur, antimony and is the leading producer of fluorite. The entire mineral industry accounts for over 20 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings although this amounts to less than 2% of the Gross National Product. III. CONDITIONS IN THE MINING INDUSTRY OF MEXICO THAT AFFECT IN-VESTMENT. A. Mexicanization. The term Mexicanization has often been misinterpreted as nationalization. Mexicanization only implies the control of a company in Mexican hands. The transfer of control from foreign to Mexican hands proceeds on a private level by negotiations between local and foreign businessman. Although foreign capital is welcomed, the investor should not expect more favorable treatment than that accorded domestic investors. In Mexicanization it is implicit that as a country progres-ses and matures it must create a body of national capital. For if the profit earned leaves the country (although it created jobs, paid taxes, etc.) the servicing of loans and repatriation of capital would likely endanger the balance of payments leading to an unsound economy. Instead, by retaining within the country at least 51% of the profit, a national capital can be created which is so necessary for further economic expansion and industrialization. - 3 - In 1961 a mining law was passed providing that new mining concessions can be granted only to Mexican nationals, and companies in which a minimum of 51 percent of their capital stock (or 66 per-cent in some instances) is owned by Mexican nationals. This same law, however, granted tax privileges to Mexicanized companies. B. Immigration Restrictions. To protect their skilled and unskilled labor, the Mexican Government has regulated the immigration of foreign technicians in-to Mexico. However, if for the good of the country it is felt that a foreign expert is vitally needed, he can be permitted to enter generally with the stipulation that he train his replacement. Mexican universities are training mining engineers, metal lurgists and geologists but their training is principally academic and an industrial training period is necessary to make these en-gineers capable of filling normal production positions, C. The mining law of Mexico was completely redrafted in 1961, This is an extensive law and only a few of the points will be discussed, 1. Only Mexicans or Mexicanized companies have the right to obtain concessions. 2. A concession shall have a maximum surface area of 500 hectares l hr = 10,000 sq. meters). The sides of the con-cession are limited by vertical planes, 3. The total maximum concession area for a company or an individual is limited depending on the substance. However, three times this maximum can be held for a five-year exploration period. As an example for gold, silver, copper, lead and zinc, a maximum of 9000 hectares can be held for the first five years. After this five year period, a maximum of only 3000 hectares can be held. 4. Mining concessions are issued for 25 years but may be extended on proof of effective exploitation. 5. Assessment work is required. D. Taxes. Taxes paid by mining companies include: 4 1. Income Tax. This tax is modarate and has a maximum of 42%. 2. Production and Export Tax. These taxes are based on price set monthly by the Treasury Department. This official value is arbitrary and can change but generally reflects world prices. These taxes are levied whether the Company is making an operating profit or not. 3. Surface Tax. This tax is a rental on mineral concession of $1.20 dollars per hectare per year. 4. Capital Gains. Capital gains are included in gross income but at a reduced percentage depending on the length of time that assets have been held. 5. Depletion. There is no deduction allowed for depletion. 6. Amortization and Depreciation. It can be stated that deductions allowed are those that the tax authorities regard as normal and necessary for conduct of business. 7. Reduction in Taxes for New Mines. A directive calls for a five year reduction of up to 40% income tax and up to 100% of the federal portion of the production and export taxes, and accelerated depreciation and amortization for certain investment in new operations. 8. Other Taxes. Other taxes such as social security payments and distribution of a portion of annual profits to employees are required. E. Metal Prices. Metal prices for sale in Mexico are set by a govern- - 5 - merit agency. These prices are lower than world prices and act to subsidize Mexico's metal-using industries at the expense of the mining industry. F. Favorable Conditions. 1. Stable Government. The Mexican Government is stable and this stability will be entrenched each passing year with the development of a larger middle class and the strong emphasis on education. 2. Financial Stability. Exchange restrictions have never been imposed and funds are freely convertible and transferable to and from Mexico. The exchange rate has remained at 12.50 pesos per U.S. dollar since 1954. An exchange stabilisation agreement exists between Mexico and the International Monetary Fund which permits Mexico to draw on foreign currencies to maintain the parity of the peso. However, Mexico has maintained a favorable balance of payments for numerous years. 3. Low cost labor. Although there is a notable lack of qualified mining and exploration personnel of the highly technical and supervisory calibre, there is plentiful mining labor in the mining regions. In general, the mining labor is efficient and the costs are reason-able. Recent wage raises have been higher than increased productivity and management must work for higher productivity. In recent years strikes of over 15 days duration have been exceptional and peaceful labor relations are the rule. 4. High mineral potential. We can start with the premise that Mexico is a country extremely well endowed with minerals and many ore bodies await to be discovered. The fact that there has not been more than possibly three major metallic mineral discoveries in the last two decades is not that the bodies do not exist but that fiscal conditions have been such that no search has been made - 6 - for them. Now methods and philosophies of exploration have not been tried until very recently but in them lies the great ex-ploration potential of Mexico. There are three general geologic zones in Mexico. The nor-thern zone is separated from the southern zone by the volcanic-rift belt which runs east-west through Mexico City and Guadalaja-ra and has as its most obvious surface feature a belt of Cenozoic volcanics. Most of the mining in Mexico has taken place in the northern zone in which the more acidic intrusive rocks are found. The southern zone contains more basic rocks, and although there are numerous mineral occurrences, the mines are small in size and number. The scarcity of mines in this zone is undoubt-edly due, in great part, to the lack of exploration which is made difficult due to lack of roads and facilities and to the heavy vegetation covering the outcrops. The volcanic-rift belt exhibits difficult exploration con-ditions; the principal ones being the great amount of volcanic cover and the intense faulting. As in the southern zone this area has not received intensive exploration; however, the famous silver deposits of Pachuca, Taxco, El Oro and Guanajuato lie within this region or at its edge. In the northern zone a long, large northwest trending belt of middle Cenozoic volcanics is found, which constitutes the Sierra Madre Occidental. Pew large mines are known within this belt of very thick volcanics; but where the rocks below the volcanics have been exposed, they are abnormally well mineralized. Therefore, here again the scarcity of mines is due to lack of out-crops. In order to investigate the exploration possibilities in greater detail, let us evaluate the situation of various metals. a. Silver. Mexico is and has been for many years (except 1968) the world's leading producer of silver. In the past a majority of the silver came from such bonanza camps as Pachuca, Guanajuato and Tax co where the silver was found in very high-grade deposits with very minor amounts of other metals. Today. most of Mexico's silver is produced as an accessory mineral in the lead and zinc deposits. This means that with lower lead and zinc prices there has been a reduction in the production of silver although silver prices have advanced. Although the bonanza camps have been reported as ""worked out"", there are definite signs that this may not be the case. Recant high-grade discoveries in Guanajuato and Taxco indicate that if modern techniques and vigorous exploration are carried out, it is quite possible that bonanza deposits will be discovered. Silver is well distributed in many parts of Mexico and it would be difficult to pin-point exact locations favorable for exploration. Slide No.2 shows in general the major distribution of silver. Since the environments vary widely, so also would the exploration techniques. In parts of Mexico numerous silver deposits have been known but left unexploited due to lack of roads and facilities. Large, low-grade deposits probably exist but as yet company philosophies have not been such that they would explore for this type of deposit. b. Copper. Copper, like silver, appears to have a future at favor-able prices. Added to this is the great increase in demand for copper by Mexico to satisfy its rapidly expanding industry. Until this year (1970), there has been only one copper mine in Mexico that could be considered major; the Cananea mine which produces approximately 70% of Mexico's copper. The Santa Rosalia mine in Baja California could be considered a medium sized mine and the rest of the present copper production comes from very small mines or as a minor mineral from other base metal mines. Because of this limited production, Mexico is presently producing just enough copper to supply its internal demand. This picture, however, is changing rapidly. In early 1971, Asarco Mexicana, S.A. will bring into production their Inguarn mine, in the State of Michoacn, which will have a mill capacity of 2000 metric tons per day of 1.8% copper which will more than take care of Mexico's immediate industrial demands for copper. Then in the future lies the immense deposit, La Ca-ridad, of Mexicana de Cobre, which has reserves in excess of 600 million metric tons of 0.75% copper with values in molybdenum. The exact size of this deposit is as yet unknown. Work is now underway to bring this deposit into production in 1974. -8- The reason for not producing more copper in Mexico has been the lack of exploration incentive by the mining companies. The small prospector is not equipped to explore for bulk, low-grade copper deposits and only in the last year or so have major companies made an exerted effort in this field. A very favorable copper mineral province exists in the State of Sonora, Perhaps the most important structural characteristic of this area is its location (Slide #3) along the north-trending Wasatch-Jerome crustal lineament at or near its intersection with the northwest-trending Texas lineament. Correlation between these lineaments and the distribution of the bulk low-grade deposits has been remarkable. Mexico's largest copper producer at Cananea and the previously mentioned La Caridad deposit lie along the Wasatch-Jerome near the intersection with the Texas lineament. Although northern Sonora is a most favorable area in which to explore for copper, this area should not be considered as the only target area since favorable areas exist in other parts of Mexico. Molybdenum can often be expected as an accessory metal with the copper mineralization. If unfavorable conditions for mining investment in Zambia, Peru and Chile -all major copper producing countries- continue or worsen, Mexico will become a major exporter of copper within the next ten years. Even if conditions become better in those countries, Mexico will still play a major role as a copper producing country. c. Lead and Zinc. Although the long term picture for lead and zinc, with silver as an accessory metal, may not be as bright as for copper, established smelter capacity and both local and foreign markets exist and, therefore, exploration for lead and zinc can be con-sidered by both large and small companies. For many years there has been little exploration for new lead and zinc deposits and there has been no exploration with the use of modern tools for locating unexposed bodies. The greatest exploration provinces for lead and zinc are shown on Slide #5. In these areas substantial silver values associated with the lead and zinc could be expected. - 9 d. Other Metals and Minerals. Mexico is a major producer of fluorite, barite, mercury, tungsten and antimony. Exploration will continue for these ma-terials depending primarily on world prices. i IV. SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS. Prom the foregoing, we can quickly summarize the conditions that exist in Mexico that directly affect investment in the mining industry. A. Regulatory. 1. Mexicanization. The requirement of majority investment by Mexican nationals by itself is certainly not unfavorable; however, risk capital is difficult to find. 2. Immigration Restrictions. It is often difficult to obtain highly technical personnel and companies are limited to the number of foreign personnel they can hire. 3. Mining Law. The mining law has been updated and is meant to broaden the mining industry base in Mexico. However restrictions and control are an essential part of the law. 4. Taxes. Income Taxes are moderate but production and ex-port, taxes are a severance tax not based on profit. There is no reduction in taxes for depletion. 5. Metal Prices. Mexico's industry is subsidised at the expense of the mining industry through official prices set slightly lower than world prices -10- B. Favorable. l. Mexico is a mineral-rich country. 2. Mexico has a stable government. 3. Mexico has a strong-convertible currency. 4. Direct production costs for medium to large operations are low. 5. The proximity to the United States assures a large market in addition to the growing market in Mexico. Future. The most striking feature about Mexico today is the tremendous social gains. Education receives, by far, the largest share of the national budget; health facilities are readily available and are ex-panding; electricity and roads are coming to the small villages and wages are being raised in an attempt to make even the poor farmer a consumer. Mexico is expanding industrially to keep in step with the local demands and manufacturing more and more of its necessities in or-der to reduce the need to import, which makes its trade balance more favorable. Mexico yearly increases the export of manufactured goods where previously the country had only been an exporter of raw material and crafts. Politically Mexicans are, and should be, proud of their ancient past and their recant history. They are, therefore, ready and anxious to work with foreign companies if this partership will assist in the development of Mexico as a country and to the advantage of the Mexican people. The exploitation of Mexico to the advantage of other peoples is a thing of the past. Mexico is a developed country and expects to be treated as such. The Mexican mining industry offers an opportunity to those willing to study the problems accept the laws and invest in the social -as well as financial- future of Mexico. D.F. Coolbaugh Mexico, D.F. Mexico, May 1970. DFC/mfb. - 11 -

The Ethiopia Investment Climate Program, managed by the World Bank Group's Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice aims at streamlining and simplifying high priority regulatory practices and processes burdensome to the private sector and address investment climate issues that are holding back investment and productivity growth in Ethiopia. This report presents a summary of the major findings about the business registration and licensing regime in Ethiopia and develops recommendations for streamlining and improving it. The report is based on an in-depth review of the country's more than 1,300 licenses; a detailed analysis at a sector level is presented in Annex three. This report consists of two main parts: in Chapter two, we present an estimate of the costs which the registration and licensing regime in Ethiopia imposes on the business sector in the country. Chapter three then presents the key findings and recommendations based on the detailed analysis of Ethiopia's licensing regime and implementation practice, the details of which are presented in the Inventory of Business Licenses. A brief concluding chapter summarizes the recommendations and provides an estimate of the positive effects which they could have both for businesses and Government.

This regional profile presents the Doing Business indicators for economies in The g7+. It also shows the regional average, the best performance globally for each indicator and data for the following comparator regions: Small island states, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, European Union, and OECD high income. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2013, except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January to December 2012. Regional Doing Business reports capture differences in business regulations and their enforcement across countries in a single region. They provide data on the ease of doing business, rank each location, and recommend reforms to improve performance in each of the indicator areas. The report sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 11 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and employing workers. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. The data set covers 47 economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 33 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 25 in East Asia and the Pacific, 25 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 20 in the Middle East and North Africa and 8 in South Asia, as well as 31 OECD high-income economies. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where and why.

For the purposes of this project, the East African countries included in the study were Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The focus for this project was Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) as for-profit or nonprofit organizations with less than 50 employees and not exceeding USD 1,000,000 in annual revenues/turnover. The main output of this project was a proposed program of interventions to drive transformational change. To succeed in this ambitious endeavor, the project articulated clear objectives and designed a blueprint for implementation including levels of resourcing, budget and monitoring metrics. Over the course of the project the team conducted brief surveys with over 90 entrepreneurs, over 50 percent of who had 3-10 years of experience in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector and primarily worked at companies with 5 employees or less.

Without a doubt agriculture sector is vital part of modern Ukrainian economy. Agriculture is ranked 3rd largest contributor to the national GDP with approx. 17% in 2018 (compared to 14.4% in 2016) of total GDP, followed with industrial sector (26.3%) and services sector (59.3%). It should be noted that it is very promising field in terms of potential economic growth and both regional and international investment opportunities. Food products being a necessity in everyday life of every person. Food and processing industries are the large industries that are interconnected to agricultural cultivation. These industries have great potential to increase the value of agricultural products due to the added value, as not raw materials are sold but finished products that can be consumed in the domestic market and exported. Meanwhile the global process of urbanization and changes in national politics, have had their impact on Ukrainian economy. The number of urban populations is continuing to increase, while great number of work force is migrating to neighboring countries. Several studies state that number of Ukrainian workers living aboard is around 2.5 million people. In this context we plan to investigate and build general forecast model on how urbanization is impacting agricultural land use and certain factors of its impact on economic development of region. On the other hand, we have examples of modern issues, such as climate change caused by rapid urbanization and the irrational use of natural resources. The study showed that urban development requires substantial land rescue for its expansion. By examining closely spatial data of urban and suburban areas, for example that of Kyiv city, agricultural land in suburban areas is used for new construction sites and infrastructural development. Another indirect effect of urban development is ecological changes to the surrounding areas. The affected areas become much less suitable for agricultural uses, require large financial investment and high technologies to renew the soil fertility.Research work that have been conducted in this area focused mostly on financial resources, international politics, and large agricultural holdings of agricultural land use. A lot of work has been done to highlight importance of advocating open land market in Ukraine. While other researchers in their research analyzed specific crop or certain agricultural industry markets. In general, the focus of previous publications was either on the current agricultural export or land use data in Ukraine. The goal of this research paper is to find, establish connections between urbanization and agricultural land use, while focusing attention on possibilities for economic growth and development of effective land use policies. This paper will consider open land market as future possibility; however, it is relations and impact with urbanization falls outside of current research work scope.With this research we plan to describe the connection between rapid urbanization process and changes in agricultural land use from economical perspective. The author focuses his research work and economical modeling on case Ukraine. We plan to showcase changes of agricultural enterprise income, in case of population migration to large urban centers. Additionally, we will study the cases of effective land resource management, where we will study whether it is more profitable for companies to establish the new enterprise closer or inside urban areas as opposed to farmland regions. In this research we plan to highlight the major economical differences of company's startup and operations costs based on available transportation network, land resources and local agricultural specialization. The research work should introduce possible outcomes for small, medium companies, also separating those that are part of international corporate structure and local business. The research will cover whether local company can benefit from urbanization and what are its effects on individual famers earnings. One of the expected research outcomes is to describe how to increase added value of agricultural products with focus on city markets.For this study we used data mining and analytics approaches. During research work we placed great emphasis on determining, locating, and analyzing statistical data from multiple sources. Important art of the research work is identifying right data in context of our research, the one that has clear connection to urbanization process. Spatial data visualization was used to determine key urban centers in Ukraine, as well as locations of agricultural, food and processing companies. Other types of material used are official notional statistics data, European Union public reports, U.S. Department of Commerce datasheets, Kyiv city council, Municipal Enterprise "Kyivgenplan", private companies report, economists' publications, and Public cadastral map of Ukraine. Mathematical framework was used to build robust forecast model. The methodology of the study employed various mathematical tools, such as statistical analytics, polynomial and linear approximations, mathematical correlation, ratio analysis. Besides profit and utility curves were used for growth modeling and global forecast. Spatial data have been outlined as highly effective for predictions modeling and establishing connections with the existing urbanization growth models. Urbanization processes serve as catalyst for land use change and shift in economic activities . As more population migrate to urban centers, remote villages and towns shrink in size, lose work force and often local enterprise become bankrupt or shut down. There is a consequent indirect effect of urbanization on agriculture land use that is when local community become poor or bankrupt, the farmlands are rented by large agricultural holdings. Many researchers noted that agricultural holdings have no interest in development of local communities or investment in local business. Even though they employ local people, the average income of holdings farm employees is much lesser, then those farmers whose lands are in private use or those working in agricultural sector in neighboring European Union countries. The average salary is important factor when looking at land use by large companies since agricultural holdings business goals centered about exporting raw resources and they are registered as business entities in offshore countries.The scope of current research works is limited to the analyses of medium to large size food and processing companies, that operate in local Ukrainian market, with brief overview of food products export business. To build economical model the existing transport infrastructure in Ukraine and its neighboring European countries was studied and used in system analyses. Author analyzed available human resources, amount of investments, industry type and available transportation connections. As a part of research work, physical geographical placement (distance by road) of food and processing production companies relative to closest and regional urban center positions have been outlined. A large array of economical and spatial data has been processed. It was determined that parts of this data have low correlation levels, which makes it difficult to include for modeling purposes. Author made decision to make the necessary edits, generalization to simplify the initial economical model.To build a research model we will make the following assumptions and data sets. Let us use the city of Kyiv as the main market for food products, i.e. it is the largest city in Ukraine, with a huge number of food products consumers and significant financial resources. We shall label it as an urban center for this research work. It is important to note that new companies and international corporations choose to establish their business in the Kyiv or in the 50-kilometer zone from it. For modeling we will choose 12 enterprises, which are located both in the capital and in different regions of Ukraine - west, south, east and center. We rank the selected enterprises by the number of employees.In the context of our economic modeling, consider the land market, namely: the average cost of rent of 1 hectare per year, the location of the enterprise in an industrial region or in a separate settlement. Note that the production capacity of the investigated enterprises is concentrated in one production site (complex). However, the exception is the corporation "Milk Alliance" which has 5 separate production facilities, we will focus on the largest of them, located in the city of Yagotyn (others are located in Peratyn, Zolotonosha, Bashtanka).It is reported that the total area of land plots in Ukraine is 60.4 million hectares, of which 42.4 million hectares are agricultural land (32 million hectares are cultivated per year), the area of built-up land plots is 2550.4 thousand hectares. Land for industrial purposes, which includes the food industry is 224.1 thousand hectares. The cost of annual lease of land in Ukraine for 2019 population 3518 UAH/hectare per year.At the same time, the statistics by region are as follows: Kyiv - 2694 UAH per year; Kyiv region - 3474 UAH per year; Zhytomyr and region – 4000 UAH per year; Mykolaiv Oblast – 4103 UAH per year; Kharkiv and oblast – 3152 UAH per year; Odessa region – 4065 UAH per year; Lviv region - 4172 UAH per year; Donetsk oblast - 1832 UAH per year. It is planned that in 2020 the total revenues to local budgets from land rent will amount to 185,714,285 UAH per year.To understand the general picture of the relationship and economic performance of enterprises located in Kyiv and different regions of Ukraine, we shall consider Kyiv as a self-sufficient object, both in terms of products sales and production. The largest food retailers have opened more than 575 stores in Kyiv as of 2018, and more than 60 new stores are opened each year. The production of food, beverages and tobacco by Kyiv enterprises is 46.6% of the total industrial production, which employs 1,730,000 people (7.4% of total in Kyiv), and the average wage in industry is from 16,511 UAH/month in 2019. In total, there are 9069 industrial enterprises in the capital, which employ 278,863 people, the volume of products sold by industrial enterprises of Kyiv in 2019 amounted to 892,1765,46.2 thousand UAH. At the same time, there are 7351 natural persons-entrepreneurs operating in the capital (11,877 people are employed, the volume of sold products is 5,622,011.9 thousand UAH) in industry, including the volume of products sold by food industry enterprises – 125,140,998.9 thousand UAH according to 2019 data.It should be noted that in Kyiv the main industrial capacities of food and processing enterprises are concentrated in the following areas: Industrial zone " Degtyarivska Street" covers an area of 17.7 hectares; Podilsko-Kurenivskyi industrial district - 539.5 hectares, Pirogovo industrial zone - 121.9 hectares; Voskresensky industrial district - 107.2 hectares.For economic analysis we focused on comparison of three large enterprises of Ukraine, typical for the agricultural sector and food industry, one of which is in Kyiv – "Astrata", "Sandora" and "Kyivhlib". For calculations of transportation costs let's use the following data, 20 to 22 tons van will charge 27 UAH per km outside of Kyiv, while 10 tons van charges 20 UAH per km outside of Kyiv and 250 UAH per km within Kyiv.The "Astrata" corpopration, a large agricultural enterprise, has 5,470 employees, 230,000 hectares of land (aprox. 1514090000 UAH per yar for land rent), with Net profit of 12,631,155,000, Gross profit of 2,432,488,000 UAH, and a total salary expenditure of UAH 427,597,000 (average per employee 6514 UAH per month). For our research we are using one of the sugar processing factories that is part of Astrata holding, it is in Hlobyne, Poltavska oblast. The distance from Hlobyne to Kyiv center is 287 km, so it will cost 7749 UAH per large van to transport products to Kyiv.One of the largest food manufacturers in Ukraine is "Sandora". It consists of 3230 employees, total salary expenses - 630 128 thousand UAH (average per employee 16,257 UAH per month), have a land area of 1.3646 hectares (aprox. 5600 UAH per yar for land rent) and a unit cost of production - 22.66 UAH per liter of apple. Single 10-ton van will charge 10020 UAH to transport products to Kyiv (501km distance to the city center).For Kyiv study we picked "Kyivhlib", which has 1911 employees, total salary expenses – 168,227 thousand UAH (average per employee 14,019 UAH per month), have a land area of 8 hectares (aprox. 21552 UAH per yar for land rent) and the unit cost of production - 14.9 UAH per kg of rye-wheat bread. It will cost 7500 UAH to transport products within 30 km of Kyiv center by 10-ton van. Distance from the production location to the market is not always proportional to net profit. The research results have proved that it is worth examining the data from the same sub-industries companies in several regions, with focus on large cities as main market for those companies' products. ; The paper is devoted to studying the economic and social connections between the urbanization process and agricultural land use in Ukraine. It is worth noting that both urbanization and agriculture require new lands for their future development. The important part of this connection is ecology and effective use of the available resources, as well as land use in the context of urbanization. After all, the process of urbanization can have a significant negative impact on the state of land resources. The research work determines which economic factors of urbanization are the most relevant to the land use in city suburbs and agricultural regions. The article introduces the notion of economic feasibility of land use by purpose and studies cases of food and processing companies. Food and processing industries were chosen as the main research subjects since they are the most promising fields for the future economic development of each individual region and country as a whole. These industries are centered around both import and export, besides producing added value products. Cities without a doubt are the main consumers of food products and at the same time, they drain labor resources from the countryside. In this research work, we studied the global situation in Ukraine, how 21-century urbanization has affected the agricultural sector in the country. This sector has experienced rapid growth in past decades, as opposed to industrial and manufacturing sectors, and increased the national wide level of land use. While the national wide level of urbanization might not be the highest in modern history (20th to 21st century), it continues to have a wide impact on the national economy. The scope of this impact falls outside of this research work as it consists of multidimensional data and a wide range of interdependencies, including policies and regulations. Research models require a large amount of data and cases, that's why we focused on the food and processing sector in this paper. They proved to be a good test ground to study the urbanization impact patterns as well as make economical modeling more convenient. In this context, the peculiarities of land use models were studied, as food and processing industries use land resources, can be located both inside the city, suburban area, or in remote farmland region. It is evident that cities and businesses form large supply and demand of natural resources, labor, and financial investments.

The use of chemicals is one of the key factors in the sustainability and has a particular relevance in the textile and clothing sector, due not only to the legislation related with chemicals used (specially REACH, CLP and BPR Regulations) but also to clients RSL (restricted substance list) and campaigns from non-governmental organizations, such as the Detox campaign and ZDHC programme. As response to this challenges some methodologies and tools are available:ZDHC toolsOEKO-TEX® products: STANDARD 100 (appendix 6) and DETOX TO ZEROGM SUB toolZDHC toolsThe ZDHC (Zero Zero Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals) Programme main objective is to eliminate the use of priority chemicals (11 category of chemicals) and for that has developed some tools that the companies can use, including:Manufacturing Restricted Substances List (version 1.1, from 2015) provides a list of priority chemicals and specifies the maximum concentration limit of each substance within commercial chemical formulations. It has 2 chapters, one for textiles and synthetic leather processing and the other for natural leather processing. And 2 groups, group A for raw material and finished product (substances that are banned from intentional use in facilities that process raw materials and manufacture finished products), and group B for chemical supplier (substances are restricted to concentration limits in chemical formulations commercially available from chemical suppliers)Interim MRSL Conformance Guidance, help brands and suppliers judge their confidence in whether a perceived MRSL compliant formulation from a supplier actually meets the requirements of the ZDHC MRSL standardMRSL Supplier Acknowledgement Letter (template letter)Chemical Guidance Sheets (substance use, reason for restriction, and safer alternatives), for chlorobenzenes, chlorophenols, halogenated solvents, organotins, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons/ naphthalene, toluene, long-chain perfluoroalkyl acids (LCPFAAs), nonylphenol (NP), nonylphenol ethoxylates (NPEOs), phthalates and short-chain chlorinated paraffinsChemical Management Systems (CMS) Guidance Manual (from 2015), focuses on the approach, structure and documentation needed to create and support a ZDHC Programme. The CMS is structured in five sections that follow the plan-do-check-act: commitment to CMS (plan phase), assessment, planning and prioritisation (plan phase), chemicals management (do phase), monitoring (check phase) and management review (act phase)Right to Know Disclosure Methodology Research (2014), present the ZDHC team research results on chemical compliance and disclosure methodologiesZDHC Academy provides brands and manufacturers with ZDHC certified training to improve their knowledge and practice of responsible chemical management STANDARD 100 by OEKO-TEX® (appendix 6)STANDARD 100 by OEKO-TEX® is a worldwide consistent, independent testing and certification system for raw, semi-finished, and finished textile products at all processing levels, as well as accessory materials used. The certified textile products are tested for harmful substances, legally banned and controlled substances, chemicals known to be harmful to the health (but not yet legally controlled) and parameters for health protection.Appendix 6 of STANDARD 100 by OEKO-TEX® was specially developed for companies focused in Detox campaign. The limits in this annex does not take from human ecological point of view but considering special environmental friendly production conditions, therefore the limit values are stricter (than in appendix 4) DETOX TO ZERO by OEKO-TEX®DETOX TO ZERO by OEKO-TEX® is a comprehensive verification and reporting system that prepares facilities along the textile chain for the requirements requested by the Detox campaign of Greenpeace. The DETOX TO ZERO by OEKO-TEX® service is focused on:the establishment of a transparent chemical management systema continuous improvement plan to reduce hazardous substances in the production process, e.g. comprehensive MRSL examinationwastewater and sludge measurementsimprovement of protective measures for the protection of the environmentDETOX TO ZERO provides an annual status report about chemicals used, evaluation of waste and wastewater treatment analysis and environmental protection measures so the facility and its buyers have a continuous monitoring tool focused on achieving Detox campaign alignment. In addition, OEKO-TEX® pays particular attention to the following:Elimination:Eliminating all release of toxic chemicals and recognising that there are no environmentally safe levels for hazardous substances according to Greenpeace's priority list of 11 hazardous chemicals/chemical groups.Prevention and precaution:Review and analysis of processes and measures for continuous improvement regarding preventive measures for the handling and the use of hazardous substances.Right to know:Documentation of the company's operations including training, environmental reporting, internal and external communications. One of the targets is a publicly available register on the OEKO-TEX website.Within the scope of DETOX TO ZERO by OEKO-TEX®, tests are conducted to check against the requirements of the Detox campaign, but OEKO-TEX® has added incremental elements such as, for example, resource efficiency, health protection, environmental protection and prevention of water pollution, and occupational safety.This procedure for this OEKO-TEX® service is the following:Online-application or contact an OEKO-TEX® instituteUser accesses an online questionnaire (DETOX assessment tool) to gather information about the Chemical Management System, inventory of chemicals used including CAS number, MSDS information as well as main ingredients, components additives and, if possible, information about impurities, wastewater and sludge informationOn-site visit from an OEKO-TEX® specialist to verify the stated company data and process information.Final status report including improvements and compliance level. This validity of the report is one year. A renewal can be applied for up to three months before the end of the validity period GM SUBGM SUB is a software tool for SDS (safety data sheets) and chemical management, developed by CITEVE and MACWIN company. The information is based on the chemicals used in a company, considering their SDS, places where they are used, legislation and chemical incompatibilities.Based on that information, GM-SUB automatically creates communication documents in a quick and effective manner, such as:Safety data sheet (on paper or in digital format), the complete version or a summary of the most relevant information (to be available in the places where chemicals are stored or used)Labels (for instance when the original recipient losses the label or for new recipients, when collecting samples for laboratory use, for example, or for repackaging)Awareness posters, like posters with safety alerts/ hazard and precautionary statements, like storage incompatibilities and good practice for handling and storing chemical substancesIt also allows the user to search specific substances and/or mixtures used in the company (indicating the workplaces where they are used), based on:CAS Number, EC Number or REACH registration number,Hazard classes or R-, S-, H- and P-phrasesRisk assessment of chemicals is a key issue in companies, and one of the biggest difficulties is related to determining chemical incompatibility. So GM SUB permits to check for compatibility between chemical substances used in a company, based on the hazard class and CAS number.As the protection of workers when handling chemical substances is very important, GM-SUB allows the identification of the necessary personal protective equipment, by chemical and/or by workplace, within a given workplace, when handling a particular chemical, moreover, it permits to identify the personal protective equipment for each worker.GM-SUB is continuously updated in accordance with the latestSVHClist (Substances of Very High Concern). This way at any time the user can access information on whether a substance used in the company has been placed on the candidate list or a new substance the company intend to use is already on the candidate list. These methodologies and tools are essential to the new sustainable chemistry, including reduction of hazardous chemicals (hazardous for humans or for the environment), specially to answer the challenges of the chemicals used in textile sector, namely the legislation related with chemicals speciallyREACH,CLPandBPR Regulations) but also to clients RSL (restricted substance list) and campaigns from non-governmental organizations, such as the Detox campaign and ZDHC programme.Since 2006, with the publication of theREACH(Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals) Regulation (Regulation CE 1907/2006), the chemicals start to be analyses in a more comprehensive way, which means, this Regulation was adopted to improve the protection of human health and the environment from the risks that can be posed by chemicals, so the legislation includes the articles, beside the chemical substances and the mixtures. The application of the REACH Regulation in textile articles (from fibres to final products) has three possible levels of application:The registration of substances in articles (when the substance, in quantity superior to 1 ton/year, is intended to be released from articles to provide added value)The authorization, including the candidate list of substances of very high concern (SVHC) for authorization (if an article has a substance in theSVHClist in quantity superior to 0,1%, the supplier has to provide to the client enough information to allow the safe use of the article, as a minimum the name of the substance in question has to be communicated. And if thatSVHCis present in these articles in quantities totaling over 1 ton/year, the company have to notify ECHA, no later than six months after the inclusion of the substance in the candidate list), and the annex XIV – list of substances subject to authorization (these substances cannot be placed on the market or used after a given date, unless an authorisation is granted for their specific use, or the use is exempted from authorization)The restriction defined in annex XVII (includes specific restriction for textile articles and some general restriction that are relevant to textile articles)TheBPR(Biocidal Product Regulation), Regulation EU 528/2012, concerns the placing on the market and use of biocidal products, which are used to protect humans, animals, materials or articles against harmful organisms, like pests or bacteria, by the action of the active substances contained in the biocidal product. This regulation defines that biocidal products need an authorization before they can be placed on the market, and the active substances contained in that biocidal product must be previously approved. There rules applies to several types of products (PT), including two that are relevant to textile articles, the PT2: Disinfectants and algaecides not intended for direct application to humans or animals, used to be incorporated in textiles, tissues, masks, paints and other articles or materials with the purpose of producing treated articles with disinfecting properties, and PT9: Fibre, leather, rubber and polymerized materials preservatives, used for the preservation of fibrous or polymerised materials, such as leather, rubber or paper or textile products by the control of microbiological deterioration. This product-type includes biocidal products which antagonise the settlement of micro-organisms on the surface of materials and therefore hamper or prevent the development of odour and/or offer other kinds of benefits.The Detox campaign was launched in 2011, by Greenpeace, with the main objective of remove from the textile supply chain a group of 11 categories of chemicals, until 2020. A company commitment with this campaign represent the adoption of measures to phase out the use and release of some chemicals from their global supply chain and products. The commitment is based in three fundamental principles:Zero discharge of all hazardous chemicals: this means really eliminating all releases: whether via waste water pipe discharges, other production emissions (e.g. air and solid wastes) or later life "losses" from the final product — recognising that there are no environmentally safe levels for hazardous substancesPrevention and Precaution: this means taking preventative action towards the elimination of hazardous chemicals in the face of scientific uncertainty. This should be focused on elimination at source through substitution with sustainable alternatives or even product redesignRight to know. this means that brands and their supply chains need to be fully transparent and that they need to publicly disclose information about the hazardous chemicals used and discharged when making their productsUntil now the Detox campaign has been public adopted by nineteen brands, namely,Nike, Adidas,Puma,H&M,M&S,C&A, Li-Ning,Zara,Mango, Esprit,Levi's,Uniqlo,Benetton,Victoria's Secret,G-Star RawValentino,Coop,Canepa,BurberryandPrimark. The group of 11 categories of chemicals that must be eliminated arealkylphenols,phthalates,brominated and chlorinated flame retardants,azo dyes,organotin compounds,perfluorinated chemicals,chlorobenzenes,chlorinated solvents,chlorophenols,short-chain chlorinated paraffinsandheavy metals: cadmium, lead, mercury and chromium (VI).The ZDHC (Zero Zero Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals) Programme, developed by ZDHC Foundation, takes a holistic approach to tackling the issue of hazardous chemicals in the global textile and footwear value chain. The objective is to eliminate the use of priority chemicals by focussing on the following areas:Manufacturing Restricted Substances List (MRSL): is a list of chemical substances banned from intentional use in facilities that process textile materials and trim parts in apparel and footwear. It establishes acceptable concentration limits for these substances as impurities or by-products in chemical formulations used within manufacturing facilities. It is supported by the documentZDHC MRSL V1.1, from 2015.Wastewater Quality: Well-designed, properly functioning wastewater treatment plants, good process controls and effective chemicals management are key to minimizing chemical, physical and biological pollutants discharged into the environmentAudit Protocol: was developed to ensure consistency in environmental auditing across the supply chain and sharing of audit findings. The Audit Protocol is supported by the ZDHC Chemical Management System (CMS) Guidance Manual, released in 2015Research: Research List is a list of prioritized chemical substances for which there are no safer alternatives in the market today. It lists priority chemical substances that require additional research or substitutionData and Disclosure: While implementing the Joint Roadmap, the need for integrated data management became apparent. The ZDHC Programme and its value chain participants including mills, tanneries, chemical companies and third-party service providers began exploring the challenges in data capture, reporting and global synchronizationTraining: is designed to support implementation of ZDHC standards throughout the value chain. Training is aimed at all parts of the value chain, including, brands, chemical suppliers, manufacturers and other intermediaries to adopt ambitious chemical management standardsDue to this new challenges the textile sector must implement a chemical management system that, in a first step, identify the problematic chemicals and in a second phase, look for safer alternatives. Considering that the textile wet or chemical processes (like dyeing, printing, coating, etc.), uses a huge quantity of chemicals, the management of those chemicals can only be effective if supported by tools and structured methodologies that help the chemical textile user to move for a sustainable chemistry. Relevant links:REACH Regulation:https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach/SVHC candidate list:https://echa.europa.eu/candidate-list-tableAuthorization list:https://echa.europa.eu/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/authorisation/recommendation-for-inclusion-in-the-authorisation-list/authorisation-listRestrictions:https://echa.europa.eu/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/restrictions/substances-restricted-under-reachCLP Regulation:https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/clpBPR regulation:https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/biocidal-products-regulationList of authorised biocidal products:https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals/biocidal-productsDetox campaign:http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/detox/water/detox/intro/ZDHC programmehttp://www.roadmaptozero.com/programme/OEKO-TEX® Products:https://www.oeko-tex.com/en/business/business_home/business_home.xhtml