Suchergebnisse

This article proposes a methodology for assessing the results of a technical and economic comparison of camouflage options for an armored combat vehicle to maintain its functions during a march or position when an adversary uses active and passive systems of technical intelligence in the frequency ranges: in radar; infrared from thermal radiation; optical, as well as in the range of acoustic waves from engine noise, in order to damage the armored combat vehicle. For a tactical and economic comparison, mathematical calculations were performed on the basis of the proposed possible alternative masking options, ranging from the zero option (no masking) to the masking option simultaneously in five wavelengths (radar; infrared; optical; thermal; acoustic). A comparison is made of options that are carried out according to the criterion of "effi ciency-cost" for various alternatives to camoufl age an armored combat vehicle. When the enemy uses various types of reconnaissance equipment, it is proposed to use radar absorbing ferrite materials to reduce radar visibility, to protect information on the coordinates of the deployment and on the direction of movement of military automotive equipment, in the course of their intended use. In turn, this will increase the survivability of armored combat vehicle in general and allow them to perform combat missions with their artillery and anti-aircraft units, communications units, radiation, chemical and biological defense units, military aviation units and other units.The introduction of the proposed methodology for a comparative quantitative assessment of the options for protecting an armored vehicle and choosing an acceptable one helps to better navigate the fi eld of possible decisions based on a comparative quantitative assessment of risks and wins when making a decision. ; В статті запропонована методика оцінки результатів техніко-економічного порівняння варіантів маскування бойової броньованої машини для збереження її функцій в ході маршу або на позиції під час застосування противником активних і пасивних засобів технічної розвідки в діапазонах частот: радіолокаційному; інфрачервоному від теплового випромінювання; оптичному, а також в діапазоні акустичних хвиль від шумів двигуна, з метою пошкодження бойової броньованої машини. Зіставлення варіантів здійснюється за критерієм «ефективність − вартість» для різних альтернатив маскування. Пропонується застосування радіопоглинаючих феритових матеріалів для зменшення радіолокаційної помітності, захисту інформації про координати в ході застосування бойової броньованої машини підрозділами, під час застосування противником технічних засобів розвідки.Впровадження запропонованої методики для порівняльно ї кількісної оцінки варіантів захисту бойової броньованої машини і вибору прийнятного допомагає краще зорієнтуватися в полі можливих рішень на основі порівняльної кількісної оцінки ризиків і виграшів під час прийняття рішень.

The goal of my project is a detailed analysis of the technological culture of the United States Air Force from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) perspective. In particular, using the metaphor of the Air Force as religion helps in understanding a culture built on matters of life-and-death. This religious narrativewith the organizational roles of actors such as priests, prophets, and laity, and the institutional connotations of theological terms such as sacrednessis a unique approach to the Air Force. An analysis of how the Air Force interacts with technologythe very thing that gives it meaningfrom the social construction of technology approach will provide a broader understanding of this relationship. Mitcham's dichotomy of the engineering philosophy of technology (EPT) and the humanities philosophy of technology (HPT) perspectives provides a methodology for analyzing Air Force decisions and priorities. I examine the overarching discourse and metaphorconsisting of techniques, technologies, experiences, language, and religionin a range of historical case studies describing the sociological and philosophical issues of the Air Force. As the Air Force is the offspring of the U.S. Army, these examples begin with the Civil War era and the invention of the Gatling gun before moving to the interwar period's Air Corps Tactical School and its seminal organizational thinking about the aircraft. Moving to the more modern times after the birth of the Air Force, I describe and compare the Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center and the Air Mobility Warfare Center, two organizations interacting with technology from different organizational archetypes. The final example is the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, an information technology application at the focal point of cultural change affecting not just the Air Force but the entire Department of Defense. Finally, I will conclude with a chapter on policy considerations and recommendations for the Air Force based on the Air Force religion, a balance of both people and technology, and with an eye toward the future of U.S. military operations. The primary goal is to answer three questions: is the U.S. Air Force truly a religion? If so, how should that affect its approach to technology and technological change? With an eye toward consciously building the future, how has the Air Force religion shaped the organization in the past? [The attached document is cleared by the Department of Defense for public release (OSR Case 09-S-0496).] ; Ph. D.

2008/2009 ; Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is the service responsible to guarantee that the available capacity of the air transportation system is efficiently used and never exceeded. It guarantees safety of air transportation by adopting a series of measures which range from strategic long-term ones to the imposition of ground delays to flights at a tactical level. These ATFM delays are imposed to individual flights at the departure airport prior to their take-off, since it is safer and less costly to anticipate on the ground any delay predicted somewhere in the system. They are assigned by a central authority according to a First-Planned-First-Served principle, without taking into account individual Airlines' preferences. This criteria of assignment can cause an aggregated cost of delay experienced by users, higher than the minimal one, due to the fact that the cost of delay is a non-linear function of the duration and it depends on many variables such as the type of aircraft, the specific origin-destination pair, ecc. This thesis tackles the issue of formalizing and analyzing alternative models for the assignment of ATFM resources which take into account individual airlines preferences. In particular mathematical programming models are analyzed, that extend the concept of ATFM slot currently adopted to the one of Target Window, as proposed in the CATS European project. Such a concept is in line with the SESAR program, recently adopted in Europe to develop the new generation system of Air Traffic Management, which imposes a direct involvement of Airspace users whenever external constraints need to be enforced that modify their original requests. The first Chapter provides a general introduction to the context of Air Traffic Management and Air Traffic Control. In the second Chapter the principles, methods and performances of the ATFM system are described according to the current situation as well as to the SESAR target concept. The problem of optimally assign ATFM resources is then described mathematically and then analyzed to uncover two fundamental structures that determine its tractability: one corresponds to the case in which there is a unique capacity constrained resource while in the second there is an unrestricted number of constrained resources. In Chapter three a number of properties are proved that give insight into the applicability of different mechanisms for a central calculation of the optimal solution by the ATFM authority. Since such mechanisms involve cost minimization for several agents they are formulated as exchanges, i.e. particular types of auctions in which each participant may buy and/or sell several indivisible goods. The last part of the thesis included in Chapter four deals with the design of iterative exchange mechanisms, whose application in real world presents several advantages with respect to centralized models, from the distribution of computational complexity among participants to the preservation of disclosure of private information by Aircraft Operators. In this case an optimal model based on the Lagrangian relaxation of the separable central problem is first formulated and analyzed. To overcome practical issues possibly deriving from its application in real operations, an heuristic iterative Market-based mechanism is finally formalized. This algorithm exploits some of the underlying characteristics specific to the problem to derive near-optimal solutions in an acceptable time. Computational results are obtained by simulating its implementation on real traffic data and they show that considerable cost savings are possible with respect to a First-Planned-First-Served central allocation. The contribute of this thesis is twofold. The first is to provide a mathematical description, modeling and analysis of the ATFM resource exchange problem faced by Airspace users when network capacity needs to be rationed among them. The second consists in the methodological innovation represented by the formulation of the Market Mechanism which is compliant with several requirements represented by legislative and practical constraints and whose simulation provided encouraging results. ; XXII Ciclo

The article looks at the current state of training of cadets-pilots in terms HMEI to air combat missions. Analyzes the nature and composition of their component preparation to combat missions.Flight training, which includes a subsystem for professional training is a complex psychological and educational system aimed at building the skills of piloting, navigation, combat use and Flight Training.Analysis of domestic and foreign literature over the past 20 years shows that the problem of preparation of students-pilots to combat use (combat missions) remains insufficiently developed. The preparation for a combat flight conditions HMEI as the educational system is practically not been studied. This creates gaps in the chain of continuous formation of highly flyer.Therefore, the organization of vocational training should provide such an integrated link between the various pedagogical influences, which subordinates their functioning to the sole goal – the formation of professional readiness of future pilots to flight activities.Inclusion of the elements in a certain way is arranged. The main instruments of orderly interaction of elements of the system are the results of the educational process, organization stabilizing system.Elements of the system for training crews are preparing means certain disciplines that make up the system and perform specific functions. Regarding the training system, each element is a subsystem. Elements of the system of training include educational and professional activities; theoretical training; training; psychological training; general physical (special physical) training.Direct training of cadets for combat training and flight tactical training in the flight training process should be preceded by appropriate training that would allow them to adapt quickly and effectively to the development of professional qualities. The current state of preparation of students for the first course of study does not meet these requirements.Professional training of crews is in the process of theoretical and practical training. Practical training consists of two types: training – training on the ground (quasi-professional activity) and flight training – training in the air (professional activity). System analysis of the process of professional training of future military pilots based on the study of psychological and pedagogical literature on the issue of research, curricula and programs, guidance and regulatory documents regulating flight work, existing practice of training, showed that for all types of flight training – general theoretical, general-military, physical, ground (training and preparation for flight), flight, psychological and physiological – from the point of view of formation I piloting skills leading role with gym and flight training. In turn, flight training, included as a subsystem for vocational training, is a complex pedagogical system aimed at developing skills and abilities of piloting, aircrafts, combat applications, and flight and tactical training.Thus, the following conclusions can be made regarding the system of training pilots: for the purpose of professional training of cadet pilots it is necessary to provide a qualitatively new level of their competence as pilots of military aviation, on issues of organization and carrying out of all types of training in aviation detachments on the basis of the introduction of a new subject- Subjective paradigm; The content of their training should include a set of general, professional and value concepts, concepts, judgments, values of professional activity of pilots of military aviation. ; В статье рассматривается современное состояние профессиональной подготовки курсантов-летчиков в условиях авиационных ВВУЗ к выполнению боевых задач. Анализируется сущность и компонентный состав их подготовки к выполнению боевых задач. Определяются направления моделирования процесса обучения курсантов-летчиков по различным условиям тактической обстановки выполнения боевой задачи. Показывается, что профессиональная подготовка курсантов-летчиков к выполнению боевых задач является психолого-педагогической проблемой организации процесса их обучения. ; В статті розглядається сучасний стан розвитку професійної підготовки курсантів-льотчиків в умовах авіаційних ВВНЗ до виконання бойових завдань. Аналізується сутність і компонентний склад їх підготовки до виконання бойових завдань. Окреслюються напрямки моделювання процесу навчання курсантів-льотчиків щодо різних умов тактичної обстановки виконання бойового завдання. Показується, що професійна підготовка курсантів-льотчиків до виконання бойових завдань є психолого-педагогічною проблемою організації процесу їх навчання.

American Aid for the Soviet Union under Lend Lease.
The article deals with the military and civil aid which the United States made available to the USSR during the Second World War.
The authors begins by outlining the historical, political, military and economic circumstances which led up to and accompanied the granting of aid under Lend-lease to the USSR ; the article describes how Lend-lease functioned, and analyses the important part played by the transfer of American technology in the Red Army's potential and its victories. The author takes a fresh look at a number of questions, including particularly the following : Would Stalin have capitulated in 1942 if he had not received immediate aid from abroad ? Could the USSR have fed, clothed and shod its army, transported it and equipped it, without the delivery of 115 million metres of cloth, 14.5 million boots, and shoes, 1 million tonnes of cereals, 2 000 locomotives, 1 1 000 wagons and other rolling-stock ? Could the Red Army have maintained tactical communication among troops dispersed over several fronts without the assistance of some 38 000 radio receiver-transmitters, tens of millions of kilometres of wire and cable ? Could Stalin's headquarters seriously have thought it possible to ensure the security of their northern frontiers, particularly at Murmansk, their main supply port, without having obtained from the Americans the exclusive use of 735 boats and warships ? Could the Battle of Stalingrad ever have proved a turning-point in the war without American technology, without the Fords, Dodges and Studebakers which enabled 10 Russian divisions, organized in the greatest secrecy far from Stalingrad, to be moved up over several hundred kilometres in a single night ? Finally, could the Soviet army in 1945 have moved ahead of the Allied Forces in several East European countries, had it not been for the 12 000 American aircraft, 13 000 combat vehicles (including 6 000 tanks) and 409 000 lorries and other rapid transport vehicles ?
The author goes on to assess the value, in monetary and in relative terms, of the American contribution to the successes of the USSR in 1941-45. He calculates this contribution at a minimum of 17.9 % and a maximum of 26.9 % of the Soviet military- financial effort. The value of American aid appears comparable to the value of the net material product of the USSR for 1950. The last two sections of the article examine the question of the final settlement of the Soviet Union's contractual obligations under Lend-lease, and the reasons why the Soviet people are kept uninformed about the part played by the transfer of Western technology in their country.
An appendix to the article contains lists of American material supplied to the USSR during the period 1941-45 under Lend-lease.

In many equipment-intensive organizations in the manufacturing, service and particularly the defense sectors, service parts inventories constitute a significant source of tactical and operational costs and consume a significant portion of capital investment. For instance, the Defense Logistics Agency manages about 4 million consumable service parts and provides about 93% of all consumable service parts used by the military services. These items required about US$1.9 billion over the fiscal years 1999-2002. During the same time, the US General Accountability Office discovered that, in the United States Navy, there were about 3.7 billion ship and submarine parts that were not needed. The Federal Aviation Administration says that 26 million aircraft parts are changed each year. In 2002, the holding cost of service parts for the aviation industry was estimated to be US$50 billion. The US Army Institute of Land Warfare reports that, at the beginning of the 2003 fiscal year, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom the aviation service parts alone was in excess of US$1 billion. This situation makes the management of these items a very critical tactical and strategic issue that is worthy of further study. The key challenge is to maintain high equipment availability with low service cost (e.g., holding, warehousing, transportation, technicians, overhead, etc.). For instance, despite reporting US$10.5 billion in appropriations spent on purchasing service parts in 2000, the United States Air Force (USAF) continues to report shortages of service parts. The USAF estimates that, if the investment on service parts decreases to about US$5.3 billion, weapons systems availability would range from 73 to 100 percent. Thus, better management of service parts inventories should create opportunities for cost savings caused by the efficient management of these inventories. Unfortunately, service parts belong to a class of inventory that continually makes them difficult to manage. Moreover, it can be said that the general function of service parts inventories is to support maintenance actions; therefore, service parts inventory policies are highly related to the resident maintenance policies. However, the interrelationship between service parts inventory management and maintenance policies is often overlooked, both in practice and in the academic literature, when it comes to optimizing maintenance and service parts inventory policies. Hence, there exists a great divide between maintenance and service parts inventory theory and practice. This research investigation specifically considers the aspect of joint maintenance and service part inventory optimization. We decompose the joint maintenance and service part inventory optimization problem into the supplier's problem and the customer's problem. Long-run expected cost functions for each problem that include the most common maintenance cost parameters and service parts inventory cost parameters are presented. Computational experiments are conducted for a single-supplier two-echelon service parts supply chain configuration varying the number of customers in the network. Lateral transshipments (LTs) of service parts between customers are not allowed. For this configuration, we optimize the cost functions using a traditional, or decoupled, approach, where each supply chain entity optimizes its cost individually, and a joint approach, where the cost objectives of both the supplier and customers are optimized simultaneously. We show that the multiple objective optimization approach outperforms the traditional decoupled optimization approach by generating lower system-wide supply chain network costs. The model formulations are extended by relaxing the assumption of no LTs between customers in the supply chain network. Similar to those for the no LTs configuration, the results for the LTs configuration show that the multiobjective optimization outperforms the decoupled optimization in terms of system-wide cost. Hence, it is economically beneficial to jointly consider all parties within the supply network. Further, we compare the model configurations – LTs versus no LTs, and we show that using LTs improves the overall savings of the system. It is observed that the improvement is mostly derived from reduced shortage costs since the equipment downtime is reduced due to the proximity of the supply. The models and results of this research have significant practical implications as they can be used to assist decision-makers to determine when and where to pre-position parts inventories to maximize equipment availability. Furthermore, these models can assist in the preparation of the terms of long-term service agreements and maintenance contracts between original equipment manufacturers and their customers (i.e., equipment owners and/or operators), including determining the equitable allocation of all system-wide cost savings under the agreement. ; 2008-12-01 ; Ph.D. ; Engineering and Computer Science, Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Systems ; Doctorate ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

When setting a tactical-technical task on constructing a sample of armament, not only its characteristics related to purpose are considered, but its operational and technical, technological, economic, and other characteristics as well. The totality of characteristics defines the military-technical level of the armament sample. Typically, such variants of armament sample are considered that differ by the set of characteristics. For comparative estimation of armament sample variants in terms of military-technical level, it is necessary to apply appropriate methodical provisions.Resolving the task on comparative evaluation of armament sample options was made possible by consistently solving four problems.In solving the first problem, the decomposition of the totality of characteristics of an armament sample into the following three levels has been performed: properties, properties' components, indicators. The scientific result from the first problem is a methodological approach to comparative evaluation of armament sample options based on the consideration of the characteristics' significance when ranking the variants of an armament sample using a method of multi-criteria analysis.Solving the second problem helped establish the order of staged expert estimation of coefficients for the properties' significance, properties' components, and indicators, using a pairwise comparison method, which makes it possible to take into consideration their impact on the military-technical level of an armament sample.The result from solving the third problem of the current study is the algorithm for comparative evaluation of an armament sample using a taxonomy method. The reported algorithm makes it possible to rank the variants of an armament sample taking into consideration the significance of indicators that define their military-technical level.Our decomposition of characteristics, using a pairwise comparison method for expert estimation of their significance, as well as a taxonomy method, has made it possible to obtain an integrated procedure for the comparative evaluation of an armament sample variants in terms of the military-technical level.When solving the fourth task of this study, we have considered the order of application of the devised procedure using an example of comparative estimation of the military-technical level of variants for an anti-aircraft missile system.The methodology could be used in substantiating a tactical-technical task on the development of armament samples. ; При формуванні тактико-технічного завдання на створення зразка озброєння розглядаються не тільки його характеристики за призначенням, а й експлуатаційно-технічні, технологічні, економічні та інші характеристики. Сукупність характеристик визначає військово-технічний рівень зразка озброєння. Звичайно розглядаються варіанти зразка озброєння, які відрізняються сукупністю характеристик. Для порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння за військово-технічним рівнем необхідно застосовувати відповідні методичні положення.Вирішення завдання – порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння стало можливим шляхом послідовного вирішення чотирьох задач.При вирішенні першої задачі здійснена декомпозиція сукупності характеристик зразка озброєння на три рівні: властивості, складові властивостей, показники. Науковим результатом першої задачі є методичний підхід до порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння на підставі урахування важливостей характеристик при ранжируванні варіантів зразка озброєння з використанням методу багатокритеріального аналізу.При вирішенні другої задачі отримано порядок поетапного експертного оцінювання коефіцієнтів важливостей властивостей, складових властивостей, показників з використанням методу парних порівнянь, що дозволяє урахувати їх вплив на військово-технічний рівень зразка озброєння.Результатом вирішення третьої задачі дослідження є алгоритм порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння з використанням методу таксономії. Наведений алгоритм дозволяє ранжирувати варіанти зразка озброєння з урахуванням важливості показників, які визначають їх військово-технічний рівень.Проведення декомпозиції характеристик, застосування методу парних порівнянь для експертного оцінювання їх важливості, методу таксономії дозволило отримати цілісну методику порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння за військово-технічним рівнем.При вирішенні четвертої задачі дослідження розглянуто порядок застосування розробленої методики на прикладі порівняльного оцінювання військово-технічного рівня варіантів зенітної ракетної системи.Методика може застосовуватися при обґрунтуванні тактико-технічного завдання на розробку зразків озброєння ; При формировании тактико-технического задания на создание образца вооружения рассматриваются не только его характеристики по назначению, но и эксплуатационно-технические, технологические, экономические и другие характеристики. Совокупность характеристик определяет военно-технический уровень образца вооружения. Обычно рассматриваются варианты образца вооружения, которые отличаются совокупностью характеристик. Для сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения по военно-техническому уровню необходимо применять соответствующие методические положения.Решение задания – сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения стало возможным путем последовательного решения четырех задач.При решении первой задачи осуществлена декомпозиция совокупности характеристик образца вооружения на три уровня: свойства, составляющие свойств, показатели. Научным результатом первой задачи является методический подход к сравнительной оценке вариантов образца вооружения на основании учета важности характеристик при ранжировании вариантов образца вооружения с использованием метода многокритериального анализа.При решении второй задачи определен порядок поэтапной экспертной оценки коэффициентов важности свойств, составляющих свойств, характеристик с использованием метода парных сравнений, который позволяет учесть их влияние на военно-технический уровень образца вооружения.Результатом решения третьей задачи исследования стал алгоритм сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения с использованием метода таксономии. Приведенный алгоритм позволяет ранжировать варианты образца вооружения с учетом важности показателей, которые определяют их военно-технический уровень.Проведение декомпозиции характеристик, применения метода парных сравнений для экспертной оценки их важности, использование метода таксономии позволило получить целостную методику сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения по военно-техническому уровню.При решении четвертой задачи исследования рассмотрен порядок применения разработанной методики на примере сравнительной оценки военно-технического уровня вариантов зенитной ракетной системы.Методика может быть применена в ходе обоснования тактико-технического задания на разработку образцов вооружения

When setting a tactical-technical task on constructing a sample of armament, not only its characteristics related to purpose are considered, but its operational and technical, technological, economic, and other characteristics as well. The totality of characteristics defines the military-technical level of the armament sample. Typically, such variants of armament sample are considered that differ by the set of characteristics. For comparative estimation of armament sample variants in terms of military-technical level, it is necessary to apply appropriate methodical provisions.Resolving the task on comparative evaluation of armament sample options was made possible by consistently solving four problems.In solving the first problem, the decomposition of the totality of characteristics of an armament sample into the following three levels has been performed: properties, properties' components, indicators. The scientific result from the first problem is a methodological approach to comparative evaluation of armament sample options based on the consideration of the characteristics' significance when ranking the variants of an armament sample using a method of multi-criteria analysis.Solving the second problem helped establish the order of staged expert estimation of coefficients for the properties' significance, properties' components, and indicators, using a pairwise comparison method, which makes it possible to take into consideration their impact on the military-technical level of an armament sample.The result from solving the third problem of the current study is the algorithm for comparative evaluation of an armament sample using a taxonomy method. The reported algorithm makes it possible to rank the variants of an armament sample taking into consideration the significance of indicators that define their military-technical level.Our decomposition of characteristics, using a pairwise comparison method for expert estimation of their significance, as well as a taxonomy method, has made it possible to obtain an integrated procedure for the comparative evaluation of an armament sample variants in terms of the military-technical level.When solving the fourth task of this study, we have considered the order of application of the devised procedure using an example of comparative estimation of the military-technical level of variants for an anti-aircraft missile system.The methodology could be used in substantiating a tactical-technical task on the development of armament samples. ; При формуванні тактико-технічного завдання на створення зразка озброєння розглядаються не тільки його характеристики за призначенням, а й експлуатаційно-технічні, технологічні, економічні та інші характеристики. Сукупність характеристик визначає військово-технічний рівень зразка озброєння. Звичайно розглядаються варіанти зразка озброєння, які відрізняються сукупністю характеристик. Для порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння за військово-технічним рівнем необхідно застосовувати відповідні методичні положення.Вирішення завдання – порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння стало можливим шляхом послідовного вирішення чотирьох задач.При вирішенні першої задачі здійснена декомпозиція сукупності характеристик зразка озброєння на три рівні: властивості, складові властивостей, показники. Науковим результатом першої задачі є методичний підхід до порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння на підставі урахування важливостей характеристик при ранжируванні варіантів зразка озброєння з використанням методу багатокритеріального аналізу.При вирішенні другої задачі отримано порядок поетапного експертного оцінювання коефіцієнтів важливостей властивостей, складових властивостей, показників з використанням методу парних порівнянь, що дозволяє урахувати їх вплив на військово-технічний рівень зразка озброєння.Результатом вирішення третьої задачі дослідження є алгоритм порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння з використанням методу таксономії. Наведений алгоритм дозволяє ранжирувати варіанти зразка озброєння з урахуванням важливості показників, які визначають їх військово-технічний рівень.Проведення декомпозиції характеристик, застосування методу парних порівнянь для експертного оцінювання їх важливості, методу таксономії дозволило отримати цілісну методику порівняльного оцінювання варіантів зразка озброєння за військово-технічним рівнем.При вирішенні четвертої задачі дослідження розглянуто порядок застосування розробленої методики на прикладі порівняльного оцінювання військово-технічного рівня варіантів зенітної ракетної системи.Методика може застосовуватися при обґрунтуванні тактико-технічного завдання на розробку зразків озброєння ; При формировании тактико-технического задания на создание образца вооружения рассматриваются не только его характеристики по назначению, но и эксплуатационно-технические, технологические, экономические и другие характеристики. Совокупность характеристик определяет военно-технический уровень образца вооружения. Обычно рассматриваются варианты образца вооружения, которые отличаются совокупностью характеристик. Для сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения по военно-техническому уровню необходимо применять соответствующие методические положения.Решение задания – сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения стало возможным путем последовательного решения четырех задач.При решении первой задачи осуществлена декомпозиция совокупности характеристик образца вооружения на три уровня: свойства, составляющие свойств, показатели. Научным результатом первой задачи является методический подход к сравнительной оценке вариантов образца вооружения на основании учета важности характеристик при ранжировании вариантов образца вооружения с использованием метода многокритериального анализа.При решении второй задачи определен порядок поэтапной экспертной оценки коэффициентов важности свойств, составляющих свойств, характеристик с использованием метода парных сравнений, который позволяет учесть их влияние на военно-технический уровень образца вооружения.Результатом решения третьей задачи исследования стал алгоритм сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения с использованием метода таксономии. Приведенный алгоритм позволяет ранжировать варианты образца вооружения с учетом важности показателей, которые определяют их военно-технический уровень.Проведение декомпозиции характеристик, применения метода парных сравнений для экспертной оценки их важности, использование метода таксономии позволило получить целостную методику сравнительной оценки вариантов образца вооружения по военно-техническому уровню.При решении четвертой задачи исследования рассмотрен порядок применения разработанной методики на примере сравнительной оценки военно-технического уровня вариантов зенитной ракетной системы.Методика может быть применена в ходе обоснования тактико-технического задания на разработку образцов вооружения

The article provides a retrospective analysis of the glorious path taken by the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School and its significant contribution to the formation of many generations of highly qualified professional aviation engineers for their dedicated service in the aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Interesting facts about the main stages of formation of the school, changes in its leadership, structure, tasks and outstanding personalities are given. As a result of the study it was found that the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (KHMAES) was formed on September 1, 1951 as the Kyiv Higher Engineering Radio Engineering School of the Air Force, receiving the Battle Flag on February 23, 1952. In April 1956, the school was renamed the Kyiv Higher Air Force Engineering and Aviation School. In May 1973, the school became known as the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. The main positive aspects in the organization of the institution for the entire period of its existence are: command and departments paid constant attention to research work, which aimed to set the educational process on a scientific basis, increase the professional training of teaching staff; more than 70% of school teachers had academic degrees and titles; during the whole period of the school's existence the educational and material base at all faculties and departments was actively and successfully improved; with the expansion of research and raising their scientific level, the school's ties with the Air Force, research organizations, higher military educational institutions, the aviation industry, etc. were constantly strengthened;experience in combat use, operation and repair of new aircraft was comprehensively and deeply discussed at scientific and technical conferences, methodological meetings and seminars held at the school with the active participation of representatives of aviation units and taken into account in course programs. The Aviation and Air Defense Institute of the National Defense University of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskyi is currently considered to be the legal successor and a kind of custodian of the glorious traditions of the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. The tasks have changed, now the university trains officers of tactical, operational and strategic levels within the master's program, on courses of professional military education of officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine L-2, L-3, L-4 and on advanced training courses. Accordingly, approaches to the organization of the educational process have changed. However, in spite of this, according to the authors, the management and all personnel of the Institute of Aviation and Air Defense must take into account the invaluable experience of organizing the operation of Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, use scientific, methodological, technical, etc. optimization of processes of training highly qualified aviation engineers-professionals for aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Keywords. Тhe Motherland defender, KHMAES, historical path, aviation engineer, traditions. ; У статті проведено ретроспективний аналіз славетного шляху, пройденого Київським вищим військовим авіаційним інженерним училищем (далі — КВВАІУ), та його значного вкладу у формуванні багатьох поколінь висококваліфікованих авіаційних інженерів-професіоналів для їх самовідданої служби у лавах авіації Збройних Сил України. Наведені цікаві факти щодо основних етапів формування училища, змін у його керівництві, структурі, завданнях та видатних особистостей. Показано, що натепер правонаступником славетного вишу є Інститут авіації та протиповітряної оборони Національного університету оборони України імені Івана Черняховського, який уособлює собою спадкоємність поколінь і гідно продовжує почесну справу підготовки високопрофесійного кадрового резерву військових інженерів-авіаторів. Ключові слова: захисник Батьківщини, КВВАІУ, історичний шлях, авіаційний інженер, традиції

The article provides a retrospective analysis of the glorious path taken by the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School and its significant contribution to the formation of many generations of highly qualified professional aviation engineers for their dedicated service in the aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Interesting facts about the main stages of formation of the school, changes in its leadership, structure, tasks and outstanding personalities are given. As a result of the study it was found that the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School (KHMAES) was formed on September 1, 1951 as the Kyiv Higher Engineering Radio Engineering School of the Air Force, receiving the Battle Flag on February 23, 1952. In April 1956, the school was renamed the Kyiv Higher Air Force Engineering and Aviation School. In May 1973, the school became known as the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. The main positive aspects in the organization of the institution for the entire period of its existence are: command and departments paid constant attention to research work, which aimed to set the educational process on a scientific basis, increase the professional training of teaching staff; more than 70% of school teachers had academic degrees and titles; during the whole period of the school's existence the educational and material base at all faculties and departments was actively and successfully improved; with the expansion of research and raising their scientific level, the school's ties with the Air Force, research organizations, higher military educational institutions, the aviation industry, etc. were constantly strengthened;experience in combat use, operation and repair of new aircraft was comprehensively and deeply discussed at scientific and technical conferences, methodological meetings and seminars held at the school with the active participation of representatives of aviation units and taken into account in course programs. The Aviation and Air Defense Institute of the National Defense University of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskyi is currently considered to be the legal successor and a kind of custodian of the glorious traditions of the Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School. The tasks have changed, now the university trains officers of tactical, operational and strategic levels within the master's program, on courses of professional military education of officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine L-2, L-3, L-4 and on advanced training courses. Accordingly, approaches to the organization of the educational process have changed. However, in spite of this, according to the authors, the management and all personnel of the Institute of Aviation and Air Defense must take into account the invaluable experience of organizing the operation of Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, use scientific, methodological, technical, etc. optimization of processes of training highly qualified aviation engineers-professionals for aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Keywords. Тhe Motherland defender, KHMAES, historical path, aviation engineer, traditions. ; У статті проведено ретроспективний аналіз славетного шляху, пройденого Київським вищим військовим авіаційним інженерним училищем (далі — КВВАІУ), та його значного вкладу у формуванні багатьох поколінь висококваліфікованих авіаційних інженерів-професіоналів для їх самовідданої служби у лавах авіації Збройних Сил України. Наведені цікаві факти щодо основних етапів формування училища, змін у його керівництві, структурі, завданнях та видатних особистостей. Показано, що натепер правонаступником славетного вишу є Інститут авіації та протиповітряної оборони Національного університету оборони України імені Івана Черняховського, який уособлює собою спадкоємність поколінь і гідно продовжує почесну справу підготовки високопрофесійного кадрового резерву військових інженерів-авіаторів. Ключові слова: захисник Батьківщини, КВВАІУ, історичний шлях, авіаційний інженер, традиції

Many are seeing the current impasse over the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine as the ultimate manifestation of congressional dysfunction. Following several attempts, the Senate in February passed a $95 billion bill that includes most of the Biden administration's previous requests, minus border funding. That bill sits in limbo in the House, with Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), who, while signaling he wants a vote on it, has so far been unwilling to bring it to the floor. Last month House Democrats introduced an arcane "motion to discharge" petition, which could allow supporters to bring the bill to a vote if 218 members agree. While 191 have signed the petition, the odds of finding another 27 appear daunting, given the number of progressive Democrats who oppose military assistance for Israel, and opposition by Republicans to bypassing the Speaker.This situation — while distressing to the Ukrainians, and it seems, the foreign policy establishment — presents an opportunity to reestablish some measure of congressional control, if only in a limited area. Members of Congress wary of presidential overreach and endless military intervention can use this delay to push the administration to define its strategy for Ukraine more transparently. Such a definition is essential for Congress, and the voters they represent, to evaluate the total costs, in treasure and risk of escalation, of our current policy.A common task for government bureaucrats is drafting responses to congressional questions for the record sent to their agencies. These QFRs range from in-the-weeds clarifications of budgets to essentially rhetorical questions on why a particular senior administration official is clueless, and everything in between. The best QFRs can cause policymakers to question some of their assumptions. Since the Ukraine war began, the administration's statements have been opaque, often contradictory, and sometimes lacking in elementary logic. We are past the point where the American people deserve straight answers on where this war is going, what our real critical interests are, and how we can best achieve them.Before approving further military assistance for Ukraine, lawmakers should ask, preferably in hearings with administration officials, or at least in detailed letters, a number of overarching questions.The first should be: Can you define what constitutes victory in this war? Does it require Ukraine recapturing all its internationally recognized territory, as President Zelensky and others maintain? Or can victory be defined more simply as preventing the collapse of the current government? What do we mean by providing Ukraine aid "as long as it takes"? The Biden administration should provide actual analysis, based on U.S. national interests, and not simply Ukrainian government talking points.Second, if our definition of victory is the expulsion of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, how plausible is that from a military perspective? Can the Biden administration provide a historical example in which a numerically smaller force, without air superiority, successfully attacked a larger force entrenched in strong defensive positions hundreds of miles long, dislodged that force, and inflicted more casualties on the defender than it suffered itself while on the offensive?Next, there has been much speculation about the risks of nuclear escalation, and whether Russian statements are merely aggressive bluffing, with no likelihood such weapons would be used. During the Cold War, wasn't it U.S. doctrine to implicitly threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons, not just to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the US homeland or using nuclear weapons in Europe, but to deter a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact? If those threats were credible, why would Putin not consider using tactical nuclear weapons if he were facing a conventional defeat in which Ukraine threatened to retake Crimea and the Donbas, areas Russia now considers part of its territory?Fourth, a major talking point has been that a Russian defeat would deter China from attacking Taiwan, and represent a victory for the democratic world over an authoritarian axis. If this is a rationale to keep the war going, wouldn't China take us at our word, and decide that a Russian defeat is an unacceptable red line? Why wouldn't China begin providing munitions, artillery, tanks, and aircraft to Russia to prevent such an outcome?Fifth, in addition to Ukraine's shortage of ammunition and weapons, we increasingly hear about a manpower shortage, and an inability to replace casualties. Despite the battlefield situation, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men remain outside the country or are in Ukraine but making extraordinary efforts to avoid being drafted. Is this due to dissatisfaction with the current government, or a sense that while it was important to save the country in 2022, it's not worth continued fighting to retake Crimea and Donbas, or something else? Regardless of its cause, why should the American taxpayer be more committed to a Ukrainian victory than hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens themselves are?And finally, following Ukraine's unsuccessful counteroffensive last year, Russia is now undertaking limited attacks in several areas, using its superiority in artillery and airpower to wear down Ukrainian defenses. The Biden administration often states that its objective is to give Ukraine as strong a position on the battlefield as possible going into any negotiations. Is it possible that Ukraine is now in the best position militarily that it can reasonably hope for? Is it time for us to urge Ukraine to begin negotiations now, based on realities on the ground, rather than strive for maximum objectives, before it loses any more territory, and its bargaining position is further weakened?***Questions such as these would help start the dialogue on how our policy should evolve. The result may be a security assistance package much smaller than what the administration is proposing. There may be consensus to include, for example, artillery ammunition and shorter range air defense missiles to defend Ukraine's current positions, while excluding longer range munitions and aircraft. Those systems, by allowing strikes inside Russia, might encourage Ukraine to pursue unrealistic victory conditions, reducing the chances for diplomacy.For this approach to succeed, two elements are essential. First, members of Congress must make clear their sympathy for the Ukrainian people and their suffering. The point is not whether Ukraine is justified in seeking the return of its territory — it certainly is. The question is whether this goal is in any way realistic. Since the answer is likely "no," to continue throwing away lives as a performative gesture is immoral as well as pointless. Congress might consider a bill that separates out humanitarian assistance and voting for that now, since those funds are needed regardless of military policy.Second, this approach must be a bipartisan effort, with lawmakers on the left and right working together toward a common goal. So far certain Republicans have been in the lead on this issue, with Democrats lagging behind. More than a year has elapsed since the fiasco in late 2022, when the Congressional Progressive Caucus was forced to retract its already anodyne call for diplomacy. Progressives must overcome their fear of White House displeasure and attack from the Washington foreign policy establishment. People will take notice when similar questions are raised by members of both the Freedom Caucus and "the Squad." Members of Congress who favor endless military intervention have no problem with bipartisan cooperation, and those who think differently need to catch up.With the current effort in the House to act on the Senate's bill, the window is closing to ask tough questions. If Congress is to have any meaningful voice, these issues must be addressed as soon as possible.

Eric and I next to the one staffedaircraft on display  Yesterday, I spent much of the day at CANSEC, which is the tradeshow for the Canadian defence industry.  I was able to go because one of the former participants in the CDSN Summer Institute, Eric Dion, had an invite and could have me as his +1.  I was most grateful because of two basic elements of my personality: I am deeply curious and I have a serious case of FOMO (fear of missing out).  And, yes, some good networking opportunities as well--mostly the government types, less the industry types, including one senior officer who will be on the podcast soon.I missed the protests the day before--perhaps because the Minister of National Defence was there.  Some may wonder if going to this show makes me a tainted part of the military-industrial-academic complex.  I, of course, don't think so, since I am critical of the defence contractors most of the time, and their swag wasn't that great.  If they had given me a ride in an F-35, maybe I'd be a bigger fan?  Anyhow, as always, I think engagement pays off.  I learned a lot from walking the floor and chatting with people.  Such as: tear gas antidote!What a vast array of firms/products there are.  I was going there expecting mostly guns, armored vehicles, planes, artillery, etc.  But armies do run on their stomachs/logistics, so there were folks pushing their cables, their popup tents/buildings, clothing (lots of arctic gear), red team hackers, drones, medical stuff (including antidotes to tear gas--I was tempted to ask if they sold to protest groups), and much more.  There were artillery shells, but not much arty, no tanks.  But all of the major shipbuilders of Canada and many from Europe were there. The biggest displays/terrain were Lockheed, General Dynamics, and a few of random initial folks.Small pic, big displayThey even had firms pushing theirboxes and racks! There's more than one way for a firm to get attention. These folks wearing Pac-man suits also had a pac-man game.  They obviously knew that their market is folks in their mid-50's, I guess.    The place is kind of like Disneyland or Universal Studios--if you want to do the coolest things, go their first thing.  I didn't, so I didn't do any of the flight simulators.  Carleton STEM undergrad are quite employable, as I met several on the convention floor, part of various firms hawking their wares.Culture change has a long way to go in this sector as a friend from CPCC (the culture change agency) that the only non-dude tactical dummy in the place was a tactical dog dummy.  I did spot one firm with a pregnant mannequin for a display of base layers, but apparently women in infantry is not something these folks are really building for. If you grab some swag from a firm, you end up talking for a few minutes.  The swag was not that great, so I was not so motivated.  My partner in crime was more interested in each spot, so he did a lot of chatting.  I didn't have that many questions for most of the firms, but I did learn that ...The GD LAV displayCanada sent its best light armored vehicles, not its castoffs, to Ukraine, as the General Dynamcs display of their ambulance variant (nice play to Canadians who prefer not to think about the  shooting part of, um, war) had friendly folks tell us about their systems.  The outside display area was otherwise not that exciting.   Speaking of Ukraine, Zelensky was used to sell some pop up buildings:Drones are hip--heaps of drone displays          My fave display was explained by an aforementioned Carleton undergrad STEM student.  It featured an anti-drone missile system, where the missiles drop rubber spaghetti when they get close to the drone, aiming to foul up the drone's propellers (the red thing in the banner behind the system).  The missiles can be 3D printed!  One key in the anti-aircraft fight is whether one's system's ammunition is cheaper and easier to make than the incoming threat.   We are coming close to the technicals with this GMC Colorado SUV converted to Mad Max vehicle   This comms company caused me the greatest temptation to snark about my work on multilateral military ops--that these systems may be filled with curses as countries learn what their allies can't/won't do.That defence contractors hate the offset game but play it anyway.  I talked with one defence contractor at a reception two days before about how much it adds costs to appeal to Canadian politicians by promising jobs in Canada.  They apparently need tech to help figure this stuff out -->To play the game, they do stuff like this:        I raised with one defence contractor that those jobs in Canada (which
might not be the best investment for jobs) depend on selling weapons to
unsavory places like Saudi Arabia, and they were, like, yep. That baby F-35s like to cuddle:         The defence community is small.  Great to bump into some twitter pals.  

У статті аналізуються військово-політичні події на Сході України у вересні – грудні 2014 р., розглядаються тактичні прорахунки Штабу АТО. Відзначається, що з вересня 2014 р. сили АТО були значно обмежені в діях заборонами «мінських домовленостей». Попри те, що «мінський меморандум» був де-факто зірваний проросійськими терористами вже на початку жовтня 2014 р., українська військова авіація з вересня 2014 р. не використовувалась взагалі, а артилерія перебувала під постійними обмеженнями та наказами «згори» не відкривати вогонь. Це дало можливість терористичним формуванням ЛНР/ДНР перегрупуватися для подальших агресивних дій та під керівництвом кремлівських кураторів створити з розрізнених бандформувань два «армійських корпуси» за зразком сучасних корпусів ЗС РФ. Доводиться, що з початку збройного протистояння навесні 2014 р. на Сході України в складі проросійських угруповань перебувала значна кількість бойовиків з Північного Кавказу, підконтрольних Р. Кадирову. З «кадирівців» були сформовані окремі штурмові підрозділи, зокрема такі угруповання діяли в районі Донецького аеропорту (ДАПу) у жовтні – листопаді 2014 р. Відзначається, що внаслідок бойових дій 4 грудня 2014 р. в м. Грозний (Російська Федерація) значні сили терористичних формувань «кадирівців» були вимушено відведені з України на територію РФ (Північний Кавказ). Це значною мірою послабило сили ДНР, в першу чергу на позиціях біля ДАПу, перегрупування та ротація проросійських терористів відбувались протягом декількох днів. Попри це тодішні вищі українські чиновники жодним чином не скористалися тимчасовим скрутним становищем країни-агресора. Більше того, на засіданні РНБО був проголошений режим припинення вогню, хоча на той час по всій лінії зіткнення зберігалася напружена ситуація, а в районі ДАПу відбувались жорстокі бойові зіткнення. Відзначається, що затишшя було вигідне терористичним угрупованням для термінової ротації кадирівських бойовиків, які перекидались на Північний Кавказ. Наголошується, що аналіз подій 2014 р. надзвичайно актуальний через можливу ескалацію збройної агресії кремлівського режиму. ; The article analyzes military and political events in eastern Ukraine in September–December 2014, considers tactical miscalculations of ATO headquarters. It is noted that since September 2014, ATO forces have been significantly limited in their actions by the President and the Government of Ukraine, who justified their prohibitions by the Minsk Protocol. Despite the fact that the dubious "Minsk Memorandum" was de facto thwarted by pro-Russian terrorists in early October 2014, Ukrainian military aircraft had not been used at all since September 2014, and artillery was under constant restrictions and orders "from above" to hold fire. This enabled the LPR / DPR terrorist groups to rearrange for further aggressive actions, and, under the Kremlin leadership, to create two "army corps" from separate gangs, modelled on modern corps of the Russian Armed Forces. It is argued that since the beginning of the armed confrontation in the spring of 2014 in eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian groups have included a significant number of militants from the Northern Caucasus, controlled by R. Kadyrov. Separate assault units were formed from "Kadyrov soldiers"; such groups, in particular, operated in the Donetsk International Airport area in October–November 2014. It is noted that as a result of the fighting on December 4, 2014 in Grozny (Russian Federation), significant forces of Kadyrov's terrorist groups were urgently withdrawn from Ukraine to the territory of the Russian Federation (North Caucasus). This significantly weakened the DPR forces, especially in the positions near the Donetsk International Airport, the regrouping and rotation of pro-Russian terrorists lasting for several days. Despite this, the then top Ukrainian officials did not take advantage of the temporary predicament of the aggressor country. Moreover, a ceasefire was declared at the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council, although at that time a tense situation persisted along the entire confrontation line, and violent clashes took place in the area of the Donetsk International Airport. Thus, the lull was beneficial to the terrorist group for the urgent rotation of Kadyrov's militants, who were spreading to the North Caucasus. It is noted that the analysis of the events of 2014 is extremely relevant due to the possible escalation of the armed aggression of the Kremlin regime.