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Abstract:Nobody doubts that present populism has spurred sentiments of hope and concern. Even among those who react hopefully, it seems necessary to take others´ concern seriously. In effect, present populism shakes a state of affairs that once seemed unmodifiable. It is therefore worth trying to understand it.In this context, this work aims at a double purpose. In the first place, we will afford the problem of conceptualizing populism, through a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, we will approach the main historical instantiations of populism, in view of displaying its heterogeneous nature. On the other hand, this heterogeneity reveals itself in a variety of intents of conceptualization, which explains the convenience of focusing our own conceptualization on only some of its main features: its causes, its reactive nature, the charismatic leader, and the people underlying it. This two-fold strategy will allow us to prove that discussions concerning populism have reached a dead end, and we propose a way of surpassing it. The second purpose of this study is to understand the way in which populism threatens present liberal democracies. After discussing some of the available levels of analysis, we present an alternative methodology, intending to reach the core of the problem: populism is, above all, a sign of the problems of our own understanding of the realm of politics, that which is a part of our imaginary and takes root in modern thought. ; Resumen:Nadie duda que los actuales fenómenos populistas han generado esperanza en unos y preocupación en otros. Incluso entre quienes genera esperanza parece necesario tomarse en serio la preocupación ajena. En este punto, el populismo actual supone negar un estado de cosas que parecía inconmovible. De ahí que valga la pena hacer un esfuerzo por comprenderlo. En este sentido, el propósito de este trabajo es doble. En primer lugar, vamos a afrontar el problema de la conceptualización del populismo. Para eso se sigue un doble acceso. Por un lado, se pretende mostrar la heterogeneidad de los populismos mediante una aproximación, a través de los estudios más canónicos, a sus principales manifestaciones históricas. Por otro lado, dicha heterogeneidad se manifiesta también en los intentos de caracterizarlo. A este respecto, la literatura académica es tan abundante y los rasgos que se le han dado son tan numerosos, que nos centraremos en algunos elementos fundamentales. En concreto, la cuestión de sus causas, su condición de fenómeno reactivo (o anti), la figura central del líder carismático populista y la comprensión del pueblo que subyace. Con esta doble vía de acceso al problema se pretende mostrar que el debate ha llegado a un callejón sin salida y se propone una manera operativa de evitarlo. Las dificultades de su conceptualización dan la medida del segundo propósito de estas líneas. Y es que como parece inasible, se hace más perentorio comprender bien cómo el populismo presente desafía las democracias liberales contemporáneas. Este reto ha sido analizado de nuevo de manera abundante. Tras mostrar algunos ejemplos de los distintos niveles de análisis posibles, se presenta uno propio que intenta llegar al fondo de la cuestión: el populismo es ante todo un síntoma de las dificultades de nuestra comprensión de lo político, de esa que forma parte de nuestro imaginario y que hunde sus raíces en el pensamiento moderno. Summary:1. The concept of populism. 1.1 An historical approach. 1.2. Some attempts of characterization. 1.3. The remains of the concept of populism. 2. Populism, democracy and liberalism. 2.1. Status quaestionis. 2.2. Populism and modern meaning of Politics. 3. Conclusion. Abstract:Nobody doubts that present populism has spurred sentiments of hope and concern. Even among those who react hopefully, it seems necessary to take others´ concern seriously. In effect, present populism shakes a state of affairs that once seemed unmodifiable. It is therefore worth trying to understand it.In this context, this work aims at a double purpose. In the first place, we will afford the problem of conceptualizing populism, through a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, we will approach the main historical instantiations of populism, in view of displaying its heterogeneous nature. On the other hand, this heterogeneity reveals itself in a variety of intents of conceptualization, which explains the convenience of focusing our own conceptualization on only some of its main features: its causes, its reactive nature, the charismatic leader, and the people underlying it. This two-fold strategy will allow us to prove that discussions concerning populism have reached a dead end, and we propose a way of surpassing it. The second purpose of this study is to understand the way in which populism threatens present liberal democracies. After discussing some of the available levels of analysis, we present an alternative methodology, intending to reach the core of the problem: populism is, above all, a sign of the problems of our own understanding of the realm of politics, that which is a part of our imaginary and takes root in modern thought.

Terrorism has always been a part of human history with various forms. However, it had not been such a clear and present danger till the 9/11 attacks. With the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has evolved into a new terrorism, mega terrorism, which only aims to change the system with sensational attacks causing so many deaths. And today, it poses a threat with the form of nuclear terrorism. Its potential rate of lethality would not be compared with any other forms of terrorism if terrorists managed to detonate an intact nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device. In addition, psychological effects of sabotaging a nuclear facility or exploding a "dirty bomb" would be much more powerful than any other forms of terrorism. Yet, as a response, states have already started to cooperate against the threat of nuclear terrorism through various international responses which are known as nuclear security. But, nuclear security is still developing and seems not strong enough to effectively cope with the threat of nuclear terrorism. On the other hand, there is the international nuclear nonproliferation regime based on three pillars of nuclear nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. However, its scope is limited to address threats stemming from traditional state actors such as nuclear war and proliferation. Nonetheless, this regime still offers a useful base for nuclear security to develop itself. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt to propose a more effective framework for the international responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism which would lead to more effective nuclear security with the guidance and inspiration of international nuclear nonproliferation regime. ; KABUL VE ONAY . i BİLDİRİM . ii YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI. iii ETİK BEYAN . iv ÖZET . v ABSTRACT . vi TABLE OF CONTENTS . vii ABBREVIATIONS . ix FIGURE . xii TABLES . xii INTRODUCTION . 1 CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK . 8 1.1. CHANGING NATURE OF WAR . 8 1.2 TERRORISM . 13 1.2.1. Evolution of Terrorism . 15 1.2.2. Nuclear Terrorism . 20 1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO COOPERATION . 24 1.3.1. Realism . 25 1.3.2. Liberalism. 27 CHAPTER II: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND NUCLEAR SECURITY . 36 2.1 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME . 37 2.1.1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) . 39 2.1.2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . 43 2.1.3. Conference on Disarmament (CD) . 47 2.1.4. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) . 49 2.1.5. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) . 50 2.1.6. Zangger Committee (ZAC) . 51 2.1.7. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) . 52 2.1.8. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones . 54 2.2 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM . 60 2.2.1. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 . 61 2.2.2. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 . 62 2.2.3. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and 2005 Amendment . 63 2.2.4. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) . 66 2.2.5. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and 2005 Protocol (SUA Convention) . 68 2.2.6. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) . 69 2.2.7 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) . 70 2.2.8. Nuclear Security Summits . 70 2.2.9. World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) . 72 2.2.10. International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) 73 CHAPTER III: NUCLEAR TERRORISM . 75 3.1. WHO MIGHT BE A NUCLEAR TERRORIST?. 76 3.1.1. Politico-Religious Groups . 77 3.1.2. Nationalist/Separatist Terrorist Groups . 80 3.1.3. Single-issue Terrorist Groups. 81 3.2. THE FOUR FACES OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM . 83 3.2.1. Acquisition of a Nuclear Weapon . 84 3.2.2. Manufacturing an Improvised Nuclear Device . 88 3.2.3. Sabotage of a Nuclear Facility . 92 3.2.3.1 Targeting Critical Infrastructure . 92 3.2.3.2 Suicidal Airplane Crashes . 94 3.2.3.3 Other Sabotage Methods . 95 3.2.4. Radiological Dispersal Device (Dirty Bomb) . 95 3.3 PROPOSED APPROACH TO NUCLEAR SECURITY . 98 CONCLUSION . 105 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 110 APPENDIX 1: Thesis Originality Report . 132 APPENDIX 2: Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu . 133 APPENDIX 3: Ethics Board Waiver Form for Thesis Work . 134 APPENDIX 4: Etik Kurul İzin Muafiyeti Formu . 135 ; Terörizm, çeşitli şekilleriyle her zaman insanlık tarihinin bir parçası olmuş, fakat 11 Eylül saldırılarına kadar hiç bu kadar net ve hissedilir bir tehdit olmamıştı. 11 Eylül saldırılarıyla birlikte, terörizm beraberinde çok fazla ölüm getirecek çarpıcı saldırılarla sistemi değiştirmeyi hedefleyen bir terörizme, mega-terörizme dönüştü. Ve bugün, terörizm nükleer terörizm şekliyle bir tehdit oluşturuyor. Eğer teröristler bir nükleer silahı veya kendi hazırladıkları bir nükleer cihazı patlatacak olursa, nükleer terörün muhtemel ölüm oranı diğer terör ölüm oranlarıyla kıyaslanamayacak kadar büyük olacaktır. Ayrıca, nükleer santralleri sabotaj etmek veya "kirli bomba" patlatmak gibi saldırıların da psikolojik etkileri diğer terörizm şekillerinden çok daha fazla etkili olacaktır. Bu noktada, bu tehdide karşı olarak ülkeler nükleer emniyet olarak bilinen çeşitli uluslararası tepkilerle işbirliği yapmaktadır. Fakat nükleer emniyet hala gelişme aşamasında olup, nükleer terörizmle etkili biçimde mücadele edecek kadar güçlü görünmemektedir. Diğer taraftan, nükleer silahsızlanma, nükleer enerjinin barışçıl amaçlarla kullanımı ve nükleer silahsızlanma üzerine kurulu uluslararası nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejimi bulunmaktadır. Ama bu rejimin kapsamı geleneksel devlet aktörlerinden kaynaklı nükleer savaş ve nükleer silahlanma gibi tehditleri içermektedir. Yine de, bu rejim nükleer emniyetin kendisini geliştirmesinde bir üs görevi görebilir. Bu nedenle, bu tez uluslararası nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejiminden esinlenerek, nükleer terör tehdidine karşı geliştirilen uluslararası tepkilerin daha etkili bir nükleer emniyet oluşturabilmesi için bir yapı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

This master thesis deals in general with the effects of liberal revolutions in France, Spain, and Portugal at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, to explain the changes in political systems in the Iberian Peninsula. For this, the definitions of streams of thought, ideas and concepts according to their historicity are being considered, in order to understand the meaning ascribed to them at the time. For that reason, the first chapter is about the change from absolutism to liberalism. The two concepts and streams of thought are explained and compared and the theoretical part of the thesis is started with this. At the end of this part a small amount of information on constitutional monarchism is given with this special form of monarchy being the following system of government after the absolute monarchism. In this connection, the following chapter deals with the concept definitions at around 1780 – 1815 as to be named the concept of (nation) "state", the concept of "empire", and the concepts of "peace" and "war". In this stage, the historicity of each idea was analyzed, from the origin to the time of this study. In a third part of the thesis a case study is made showing the situation in and the political relations between France, Spain, and Portugal in these times. The first subchapter deals with France and the precursors of the French Revolution, the second one with the absolute monarchy of Spain, and the third describes the circumstances in Portugal. The fourth chapter of the thesis is the most important one as it is describing and analyzing the turning point, meaning the switch, to new governmental forms with the help of liberal revolutions. The reasons why it came to the French Revolution are covered in this part, too, with this event being the starting signal for a number of revolutions all over the continent. The questions of What changed?, How did it affect France?, How did it affect Spain?, and How did it affect Portugal? are answered and similarities and differences are shown at the end. In the conclusion, the remnants of the 'new' ideas that can still be found today are discussed and a parallel is drawn that even nowadays revolutions or even wars are taking place to change existing political systems as seen in the Arabic world, for example. To come to an end of the thesis, this is combined with a profound personal opinion on the topic in which the subjective opinion of the author is evaluating the processes in the three discussed countries. ; Esta dissertação tem por objeto a contextualização e análise dos efeitos das revoluções liberais na França, Espanha e Portugal, nos finais do século XVIII e inícios do século XIX, visando explicar as mudanças nos sistemas políticos da Península Ibérica. Para isso, consideramos muito importante apoiar o nosso estudo na definição preliminar dos conceitos base e das correntes de pensamento político de acordo com sua historicidade, com o fim de compreender o significado que lhes é atribuído no momento. Por essa razão, o primeiro capítulo é dedicado à distinção entre o regime do absolutismo e do liberalismo. Os dois conceitos e correntes de pensamento são explicados e comparados, sendo iniciada a tese com esta abordagem teórica. No final desta parte, são realçadas as principais caraterísticas da monarquia constitucional enquanto uma forma especial de monarquia que sucedeu ao sistema de governo da monarquia absoluta. Neste alinhamento, o capítulo seguinte debruça-se sobre definições conceituais relevantes, no período de 1780-1815, como o conceito de (nação) "Estado", de "império", e os conceitos de "paz" e de "guerra". Neste capótulo, foi realçada a historicidade de cada um destes conceitos, desde a origem até ao tempo do nosso estudo. No terceiro capítulo da tese é executado o estudo de caso mostrando a evolução das relações políticas entre França, Espanha e Portugal no período histórico definido. O primeiro subcapítulos é dedicado à França e aos antecedentes directos da Revolução Francesa, o segundo reporta-se à caraterização da monarquia absoluta em Espanha, e a terceira descreve as vicissitudes políticas de Portugal. O quarto capítulo da tese é o mais importante, sendo dedicado à descrição e análise do ponto de viragem, ou seja, a mudança e a rutura consumadas, com a emergência de novas formas de governo, por efeito das revoluções liberais. As principais razões pelas quais ocorreu esta mudança das estruturas políticas no período subsequente à Revolução Francesa são abordadas nesta parte, considerando que este evento foi o ponto de partida para uma série de revoluções em todo o continente europeu. Procuramos responder a algumas questões: O que mudou?, Como isso afetou a França? , Como isso afetou a Espanha? e Como isso afetou Portugal? As respostas às questões, bem como as semelhanças e as diferenças são apresentadas no final. Na conclusão, o remanescente das «novas» ideias revolucionárias que podem ainda hoje ser descortinadas são discutidas, considerando que num plano paralelo as revoluções dos nossos dias, ou mesmo guerras, ocorrem igualmente com o intuito de mudar os sistemas políticos existentes, como se tem observado mais recentemente no mundo árabe, por exemplo. No fecho deste estudo é apresentada uma opinião pessoal sustentada sobre o tema, na qual a opinião subjetiva do autor perspetiva uma avaliação dos processos políticos nos três países abordados.

Die Unterscheidung des Guten und Gerechten sowie die Vorrangstellung des Gerechten vor dem Guten werden für eine Kantische Ethik als unumgänglich angesehen. Die Frage nach der genauen Bestimmung der Unterscheidung sowie der Vorrangrelation hat weite Teile der praktischen und politischen Philosophie in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark geprägt. Vereinfachend werden oft Theorien, die eine Priorität des Gerechten vor dem Guten behaupten, als "liberal" bezeichnet. Denn als begründungsbedürftig und begründungspflichtig werden "nur" diejenigen Verpflichtungen angesehen, welche Interaktionen von Personen untereinander regulieren; das gute Leben des Einzelnen ist weder allgemein begründungsfähig noch begründungspflichtig. Klassisch liberale Theorien nehmen eine Sortierung von Belangen vor in solche, die das eigene Leben betreffen, und solche, die das Zusammenleben (in bestimmter Weise) betreffen. Bezweifelt wird vielfach, dass diese Sortierung überhaupt allgemein vorzunehmen möglich ist. Weiterhin wird moniert, die Bedeutung von Gerechtigkeit sei nicht angemessen wiedergegeben in einer Theorie, die sie unabhängig vom Guten inhaltlich festlegt; gerade weil und insofern ein Gutes geschützt wird, sei Gerechtigkeit der prioritäre praktische Beurteilungsgesichtspunkt. Theorien, die das Gerechte als Teil des Guten begreifen sind nicht so einfach unter einen Begriff zu subsumieren: denn sie argumentieren sehr verschieden gegen die Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung und/oder die behauptete Priorität und werden unter ganz verschiedenen Titeln geführt wie Essentialismus, Kontextualismus, Kommunitarismus usw. Eine wichtige diese Theorien einigende These ist, dass Gerechtigkeit in Verschränkung mit dem Guten allererst ihre Bedeutung erhält. Als politische Philosophien sind sie in Gestalt republikanischer Theorien, die gemeinsame Prozesse der Meinungs- und Willensbildung zentral vorsehen, wichtige Gegenspieler liberaler Theorien. Die gegenwärtig neu entwickelten deliberativen Theorien der Gerechtigkeit, wie ich sie nenne, haben einen Ausweg aus dieser Lage versucht zu explizieren: Sie sind liberal, indem sie die Unterscheidungs- und Vorrangthese vertreten; sie vertreten zugleich aber die Verschränkungsthese, mithin die These, dass das Gerechte auf das Gute zu beziehen ist, um prioritäre Gerechtigkeitsurteile allererst zu gewinnen. Auch sind sie in unterschiedlicher Weise auf Prozesse der gemeinsamen Meinungs- und Willensbildung ausgerichtet, sind demnach auch republikanisch. Deliberative Theorien der Gerechtigkeit begreifen die Richtigkeit moralischer Urteile, auch Urteile der Gerechtigkeit, vermittels ihrer vernünftigen Akzeptabilität, in Gestalt vernünftiger Zustimmung oder eines vernünftigen Konsenses. Als Vertreter deliberativer Theorien werden in diesem Text analysiert die Autoren John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon und Jürgen Habermas, da sie breit angelegte Theorien vorgelegt haben, die wesentliche Alternativen solcher Ansätze abmessen. Zudem haben sie methodisch ausgefeilte Deliberationsmodelle entwickelt, die es ermöglichen, vernünftige Akzeptabilität auszubuchstabieren: Rawls mit seinem Überlegungsgleichgewichtsmodell, Scanlon mit seiner Konzeption substanzieller Gründe und Habermas mit seinem Diskursmodell. Wie genau ein kantisches, liberales, Gerechtigkeitsverständnis auszubuchstabieren ist, ist unter den genannten Autoren deliberativer Theorien der Gerechtigkeit strittig. Einig sind sie darin, das Gute und das Gerechte begrifflich voneinander unabhängig zu bestimmen, inhaltlich aber miteinander zu verschränken; einig sind sie mithin in einem bestimmten Modell der Scheidung und zugleich Verschränkung des Guten und Gerechten. Nicht aber darin, wie genau dieses Modell zu explizieren ist. Rawls, Scanlon und Habermas haben je bestimmte Modelle der Gut/Gerecht-Unterscheidung entwickelt. Das prominenteste ist sicherlich das Komplementaritätsmodell, bei dem das Gute die Hinsicht der Gerechtigkeit bildet (Rawls). Das Integrationsmodell sieht vor, diejenigen Aspekte des guten Lebens in die Gerechtigkeit einzuschreiben, die allgemein begründbar sind (Habermas). Ein Modell, das das Verhältnis als offene Komplemente fasst (Scanlon), verneint, dass das gute Leben für die Zwecke der inhaltlichen Bestimmung von Gerechtigkeit einheitlich konzipiert werden kann. Die Ansätze von Rawls, Habermas und Scanlon stellen den Versuch dar, entgegen der klassischen Alternative, entweder das Gute gänzlich unberücksichtigt zu lassen oder das Gerechte darin zu integrieren, das Gute mit dem Gerechten zu verschränken und doch die Vorrangstellung des Gerechten zu sichern, mithin die klasssich liberale Moralarchitektonik beizubehalten. Dass diese Vorhaben in bestimmten Hinsichten deren zentrale Ansprüche verfehlen, wird durch eine jeweils interne Kritik gezeigt. Ziel ist zu zeigen, dass der "Möglichkeitsraum" alternativer moralphilosophischer Positionen, der durch diese Autoren aufgemacht wird, in charakteristischer Weise eingeschränkt ist. ; The distinction between the good and the right as well as the priority of the right over the good are seen as unavoidable for Kantian ethics. Questions concerning modelling this distinction and this priority relation had a strong influence on many aspects of practical and political philosophy over the last decades. Simplistically, theories that claim a priority of the right (aka the just) over the good are often called "liberal". That is because "only" obligations that regulate interactions of persons are regarded as being capable of, and as requiring, a justification. Individuals' good life is seen as neither generally capable of nor requiring a justification. A liberal understanding of justice, it seems, depends strongly on the distinction between what each individual is responsible for and what society or - more narrowly - state institutions are responsible for. Occasionally justice is further restricted to that part of ethics which can be enforced by state institutions (and thus becomes the normative part of law). Theories that understand the right as a part of the good and deny the independent determination of contents or of reasons (or both) are not so easily subsumed under one concept, for they argue very diversely against the possibility of the distinction and/or the claimed priority and are to be found under quite different titles like Essentialism, Contextualism, Communitarianism etc. In political philosophy the interesting alternatives to liberalism are the republican theories that emphasise processes of collective formation of will and opinion. Current deliberative theories of justice that are derived in a Kantian spirit are liberal in that they espouse the distinction and priority thesis in one version or the other. But they are also republican in that they affirm the entanglement of the good and the just. In this work, I analyse three central approaches to the development of a deliberative theory of justice - the approaches of Rawls, Scanlon and Habermas -and I show that they cover considerable alternatives of such theories. Different models of the good/right distinction are distinguished, analyzed and attributed to these authors. The perhaps most prominent such model is the "complementarity model" in which justice draws the limits and the good shows the point (Rawls). The "integration model", on the other hand, models the relation by only integrating into justice those aspects of the good life that are universally justifyable (Habermas). The "open model" leaves the relationship open to a large extent (Scanlon): The good life cannot be conceptualised uniformly for the purpose of determining the content of justice; a theory of the good is neither possible nor necessary. The aim of this work is to show how the spectrum of possible deliberative theories looks like, to discuss its range and to identify its reductionisms that prevent them from being fully deliberative.

This paper considers the effects on the local labour market, for both women and men, of the relocation of Kiruna, a large town in the north of Sweden. Whilst the area of Kiruna has been dominated by mining activity for many years this has now become the source of both problems and opportunities for those in the labour market, if not the whole community, as they ready themselves for the relocation of their town - presently situated above a number of deep mine shafts - to a safer area. Mining, transport and engineering industries flourish in Kiruna, with the current labour market and the relocation of the town expected to generate growth and a regional expansion. But the labour market for mining has been dominated traditionally by men, with women found predominantly in the public sector. A question that rises is how much will change, and who might be winners and losers, when the town relocates? Equal opportunities in labour markets have long been a part of political and philosophical debates in a number of European countries, not least Sweden where achievements of political gender equality debates have earned it an international reputation as a world leader in gender equality (Regeringskansliet, 2007). Indeed, in Sweden equal opportunities in respect of gender have been promoted as a part of the school curriculum since 1970 (SCB, 2006; Regeringskansliet, 2007). Subsequent to this and other achievements during the 1970's, social democratic politicians and other campaigners have striven to keep equal opportunities at the forefront of social awareness. This remained the case throughout the 1980's and 1990's, and into the new millennium (SCB, 2006). In 2004, for example, strategies for the integration of gender equality in Government Offices in Sweden were implemented, followed by "new" gender equality policies, that also focused on equal opportunities, in 2006 (SCB, 2006). However, in 2007 a "new" liberal approach to gender equality emerged, its significance albeit somewhat unclear. It is this on which the study focuses: changes to gender equity and labour markets in Kiruna. In order to do this we draw on early results from an empirical investigation involving a subset of data comprising 1,732 questionnaires sent to men and women respondents in the Kiruna local authority area. Although limited, the evidence suggests that the current gender discourse in Kiruna, at least amongst those that participated in the empirical research, is that the attitudes of women and men in respect of gender are decidedly similar. The indication from the data is that work is prioritised over the family and home. Yet while securing an income is widely agreed to be a joint responsibility, the evidence also suggests that the expectation that women will contribute jointly is lower. Moreover, whilst a majority of the participants agree that responsibility for taking care of the home and family is mutual, there is nonetheless a desire for men to increase their contribution. Even so, this does not mean that the men are expected to reduce the amount of paid work they do. These somewhat contradictory findings might be expected - people after all may well say one thing and then do another - but the findings do indicate that ideas of gender equity are in the minds of our respondents, even if they appear to co-exist in ways that are perhaps far from complementary, suggesting the need for an exploration that sets their responses in context as they shift between discourses of gender equity and the experience of inequity in their daily lives.This is important because it has been shown that imbalanced gender distribution has and continues to exist in the labour market in Sweden. This is despite apparent opportunities, choices and legal rights, with many men and women in Sweden 'choosing' gender-segregated occupations and professions, raising questions about the degree of freedom in such choices even in a gender-friendly country that prides itself on equality of opportunity. Yet this appears to have predated the self-interest and competitiveness promoted by the "new" liberal equality-integration policies of the present neo-liberal coalition government concerning the freedom to choose between occupation, profession and parenthood. But what effect is this now having? In what ways have form(s) of gender discrimination persisted and are there new varieties, linked to neo-liberalism (Harvey 2005) at play? The current gender discourse allows women and men to make apparently free choices, with the prioritising of paid work over the home and family by both women and men indicating that parenthood is the least attractive option presently on offer. Indeed, the evidence suggests that denying oneself parental responsibilities - or maybe at least deferring - is becoming the norm. In order to do this parents are mutually dependent on one another and, in most cases, municipal day-care facilities provided through the offices of the local authorities. However, the present government is scrutinising the costs of this provision closely. It is issues such as these that the paper explores through a consideration of approaches to equal opportunity - a concept that is itself liberal in its promotion of equal opportunities to be unequal, in contrast to affirmative action and quotas - in changing contexts in Sweden as they impact on our case study of Kiruna ; Godkänd; 2008; 20081210 (allkin)

The epic of America -- What I am fighting for -- People of plenty -- The making of a counter culture -- The poverty of affluence -- The world is flat

In this searing indictment of current administration policy, Charles Tiefer, a distinguished scholar of national legal affairs and former solicitor of the House of Representatives, argues that President George W. Bush methodically manipulates the law to promote right-wing causes. The beneficiaries of these machinations range from frontline pro-weapon and anti-women's rights groups to major industries that profit from lax environmental standards and military intervention in resource-rich regions. Accessibly written, legally rigorous, and meticulously documented, Veering Right demonstrates how t

Die neue Regierung in Israel steht politisch so weit rechts wie keine andere vor ihr. Der Erfolg der rechtsradikalen Parteien und ihre Beteiligung an der Regierung sind Ergebnisse einer länger anhaltenden Transformation der politischen Landschaft Israels. Kennzeichnend für diese Entwicklung ist die Genese einer rechten Mehrheit, die mit einer Rechtsverschiebung des Mainstreams und der politischen Legitimierung des radikalsten Segments der israelischen Gesellschaft einhergeht. Der gemeinsame Nenner dieser Regierung ist ein antiliberaler Impetus, der auf eine Neuordnung des Staates hinausläuft. Die Regierung beabsichtigt, demokratische Mechanismen, ins­besondere das System von Checks and Balances, den Status des Obersten Gerichtshofs und den der Grundrechte, zu schwächen. Stattdessen sollen majoritäre Prinzipien gestärkt werden, die den Regierungsmehrheiten kaum mehr Schranken auferlegen. Dieser disruptive Ansatz bezieht sich auch auf den Konflikt mit den Palästinensern: Hier wird ein Sieg angestrebt. Die Integration des Westjordanlands in das Rechts­gebiet des Staates Israel soll unumkehrbar gemacht werden. (Autorenreferat)

The new government in Israel is politically further to the right than any other before it. The success of the radical right parties and their inclusion in the government are the results of a long-term transformation of Israel's political landscape. One characteristic of this development is the genesis of a right-wing majority, accompanied by a shift to the right of the mainstream, and the political legitimisation of the most radical segment of Israeli society. The common denominator of this government is its anti-liberal impetus, which amounts to a reorganisation of the state. The government intends to weaken democratic mechanisms, especially the system of checks and balances, the status of the Supreme Court, and that of fundamental rights. Instead, majoritarian principles are to be strengthened, placing few limits on government majorities. This disruptive approach also applies to the conflict with the Palestinians. Here, victory is sought: The integration of the West Bank into the legal territory of the state of Israel is to be made irreversible. (author's abstract)

Dass Länder wie Russland und China den Westen herausfordern, hat man in Amerika und Europa zähneknirschend zur Kenntnis genommen. Doch zumindest moralisch wähnt man sich gern auf der überlegenen Seite. Mit Recht? In jüngster Zeit mehren sich auch hier die Selbstzweifel. Und das hat viel mit einem US-Präsidenten zu tun, dessen Amtszeit vor genau 100 Jahren zu Ende ging. (IP)

Dossier: Pablo Martínez Gramulla and Mariana Rosetti (coord.), Public opinion and cultural practices at the turn of the century. This article deals with the Spanish press of the War of Independence, both afranked and patriot, and that of the three-year liberal period, i.e. the press of the first two constitutional periods, to analyse how public opinion initially restricted to that of the elites lawyer in the Luces century. he expanded to what his opponents called the plebe, thanks in particular to iconoclastic journalists such as Fernández Sardinó, editor of the Spanish Robespierre (1811-1812) at the time of the first Spanish Revolution, or Mejía, editor of El Zurriago (1821-1823), at the time of the second. ; International audience This article, based on the Spanish press of the Peninsular War (from the afrancesado side as well as the patriotic side), and from the Trienio Liberal —that is, the press from the first two constitutional periods— will attempt to analyze how public opinion, which was initially restricted to the educated elites during the Enlightenment, gradually opened up to what their adversaries called the "hoi polloi", thanks in part to iconoclastic journalists such as Fernández Sardinó, editor of the Robespierre español (1811-1812) during the first Spanish revolution, or Mejía, editor of El Zurriago (1821-1823), during the second one. ; Dossier: Pablo Martínez Gramulla and Mariana Rosetti (coord.), Public opinion and cultural practices at the turn of the century. This article deals with the Spanish press of the War of Independence, both afranked and patriot, and that of the three-year liberal period, i.e. the press of the first two constitutional periods, to analyse how public opinion initially restricted to that of the elites lawyer in the Luces century. he expanded to what his opponents called the plebe, thanks in particular to iconoclastic journalists such as Fernández Sardinó, editor of the Spanish Robespierre (1811-1812) at the time of the first Spanish Revolution, or Mejía, editor of El ...

Les réformes Hartz constituent un objet privilégié des études sur l'Allemagne. Germanistes, économistes, politistes ont examiné les principes et conséquences des lois Hartz. Mais l'opinion publique et les hommes politiques se sont aussi largement penchés sur ces réformes. Aux yeux de beaucoup, l'Allemagne a en effet engagé une série de transformations majeures de son Etat social et de son marché du travail au travers de ces mesures. L'économie outre-Rhin a semblé en effet s'éloigner du modèle corporatiste qui la caractérise depuis le XIXème siècle. Le modèle rhénan recule-t-il face au modèle libéral anglo-américain ?Dans ce qui suit, nous voulons nous pencher sur ces questions sous un angle spécifique. Nous voulons examiner ici l'attitude des démocrates-chrétiens dirigés par Angela Merkel face aux réformes Hartz. Ce que nous voulons comprendre, c'est l'attitude de la CDU/CSU en amont et durant le vote des ces lois – Hartz I, II, III et IV. Notre idée centrale consiste en effet à avancer qu'il y a eu collaboration entre la majorité dirigée par Gerhard Schröder et l'opposition démocrate-chrétienne. Les recherches sur l'opposition parlementaire reste de manière relativement négligée dans les études politistes. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai pour les partis démocrates-chrétiens. ; Les réformes Hartz constituent un objet privilégié des études sur l'Allemagne. Germanistes, économistes, politistes ont examiné les principes et conséquences des lois Hartz. Mais l'opinion publique et les hommes politiques se sont aussi largement penchés sur ces réformes. Aux yeux de beaucoup, l'Allemagne a en effet engagé une série de transformations majeures de son Etat social et de son marché du travail au travers de ces mesures. L'économie outre-Rhin a semblé en effet s'éloigner du modèle corporatiste qui la caractérise depuis le XIXème siècle. Le modèle rhénan recule-t-il face au modèle libéral anglo-américain ? Dans ce qui suit, nous voulons nous pencher sur ces questions sous un angle spécifique. Nous voulons examiner ici l'attitude ...