La presente tesis tiene por objetivo realizar una minuciosa investigación sobre las ventajas e inconvenientes de la dación en pago, equilibrando las dos partes del procedimiento de ejecución hipotecaria (acreedor y deudor hipotecario). En primer lugar, se ha hecho un análisis exhaustivo de todas aquellas normas legales, doctrina y jurisprudencia que regulan la protección de los deudores hipotecarios, así como la normativa que suspende los lanzamientos hasta el año 2020. En segundo lugar, se ha utilizado el tipo de preguntas y respuestas a fin de solventar todas aquellas cuestiones que en la vida cotidiana suelen ocurrir y se ha explicado el iter procesal que se sigue en un procedimiento de ejecución hipotecaria, señalando los motivos de oposición que el deudor podrá alegar en tal caso, así como la estructura que tiene tanto una demanda de ejecución hipotecaria como la oposición a la misma. En tercer lugar, se ha aludido a los sistemas de ordenación de la propiedad inmueble en otros países, haciendo especial hincapié al derecho inglés por las particularidades que ostenta en comparación con el derecho español y que resultan totalmente ilustrativas y de gran ejemplo para España al proteger a ambas partes y conseguir ayudas gubernamentales para solventar las situaciones de aquellas personas que en un momento dado de su vida no pueden hacer frente a la deuda que contrajeron. Por ello, el objetivo de la presente no es otro que la investigación dirigida a evitar la desgracia económica que han sufrido muchas familias con ocasión de la crisis inmobiliaria, realizando al efecto una serie de conclusiones y propuestas, ambas basadas en un estudio de investigación legal, doctrinal y jurisprudencial profundo. No hay que olvidar que todo tiene su origen en un préstamo hipotecario concedido por la entidad acreedora, (en España bancos o cajas de ahorro y en Inglaterra, además de bancos, entidades locales y building societies, sociedades industriales y económicas, sociedades de previsión social y fiduciarios, entre otros) que debió ser explicado de forma previa a la contratación, en concreto, debió informarse de los escenarios positivos y negativos que se podían producir en caso de incumplimiento, así como no incluir cláusulas declaradas absolutamente abusivas, tanto por el Tribunal Supremo como por el Tribunal de Unión Europea, entre otros. Dichas cláusulas son las relativas a la cláusula suelo, gastos hipotecarios o vencimiento anticipado, por nombrar algunas, en las que el Banco, en una posición dominante hizo que el consumidor se adhiriera a ellas, sin posibilidad de negociación. La nulidad de las mismas no implicará la nulidad del contrato por completo, sino que se tendrán por no puestas. Por ello, a la entidad bancaria se le exige un grado de diligencia superior que al hombre medio, muy cercana a la responsabilidad por riesgo del profesional dada su experiencia profesional en la actividad financiera. A consecuencia de ello, serán muchos los supuestos en los que la oposición a la ejecución hipotecaria acabará en éxito para la parte deudora, sin perjuicio de la suspensión acordada en estos procedimientos por los Tribunales a día de hoy. De ahí, que resulte más equitativo para un Estado de Derecho como el que vivimos que en caso de incumplimiento, la entidad acreedora solo pueda reclamar judicialmente el impago cuando el mismo represente un porcentaje de la totalidad y en ningún caso tres cuotas como indica en la actualidad la propia Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Interesa destacar propuestas tales como la unificación de normativa en transparencia bancaria a nivel europeo, debiendo ser facilitada por el Banco Central Europeo a fin de lograr que las medidas se apliquen por igual a todos los ciudadanos de la Unión, de modo eficiente y equitativo. Otra propuesta que sería de gran interés para la economía española y sobre todo para aquellos consumidores que soliciten préstamos hipotecarios en el futuro es la regulación de modelos escritos con las cláusulas contractuales adecuadas para evitar aquellas abusivas que imponen obligaciones y gastos al prestatario pero no a la parte prestamista. Otras propuestas de lege ferenda que se encuentra en la tesis aluden a la necesidad de que se produzca la inversión de la regla del artículo 140 de la Ley Hipotecaria, así como impedir que sea el Banco el que se adjudique la vivienda por un precio inferior al valor de tasación, debiendo cubrirse correctamente las lagunas que siguen patentes y que son gravemente perjudiciales para el ciudadano de a pie". This thesis aims to carry out a thorough investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of the dation in payment, balancing the two parts of the foreclosure procedure (creditor and mortgage debtor). Firstly, an exhaustive analysis has been made about all those legal norms, doctrine and jurisprudence that regulate the protection of mortgage debtors, as well as the regulations that suspend launches until the year 2020. Secondly, it has been used the type of questions and answers in order to solve all those issues that in the everyday life usually happen. In addition to that it has also been explained the procedure in a mortgage execution, pointing out the reasons that the debtor may argue in such a case, as well as the structure that has both a demand of mortgage execution and the opposition to it. Thirdly, reference has been made to real estate management systems in other countries, with special emphasis on English law because of the peculiarities it has in comparison with Spanish law, which are totally illustrative and a great example for Spain. That's because such a law protects both parties and gets government aid to solve the situations of those people who at a certain moment of their lives could not cope with the debt they incurred in. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is a research aimed at avoiding the economic misfortune suffered by many families during the real estate crisis. Moreover, within the thesis are proposed several concluding and different ideas and proposals, both based on a legal research study, with doctrinal and jurisprudential fundamentals. It should not be forgotten that everything has its origin in a mortgage loan granted by the creditor entity, (in Spain, Banks or local savings Banks (cajas), and in England, in addition to banks, local entities and building societies, industrial and economic societies, social welfare societies and fiduciaries, among others). That's why it should have been explained the risk prior to the hiring, in particular, it should have had to be informed of the positive and negative scenarios that could occur in case of non-compliance, as well as not include clauses declared absolutely abusive, both by the Court Supreme as by the European Union Court, among others. Those clauses are the so-called "interest rate floors", mortgage expenses or advanced maturity, to name a few, in which the Bank, in a dominant position, caused the consumer to adhere to them, without possibility of negotiation. The nullity of those clauses will not imply the contract nullity in full, but the consideration of "not set". Therefore, banks are required a higher degree of diligence than regular people, very close to the risk liability of the professional given their professional experience in financial activity. Hence, the aforementioned scenario is more equitable for the Spanish State that in case of default, in which the creditor can only claim the default if it represents a percentage of the total amount, and in no case three quotas as indicated in the Civil Procedure Law. It is important to highlight proposals such as rules unification in bank transparency at European level, which also must be provided by the European Central Bank in order to ensure that the measures are applied equally to all Union citizens, in an efficient and Equitable way. Another proposal that that would be very interesting to Spanish economy and especially for consumers who apply for mortgage loans in the future is the regulation of "written models" with the appropriate contractual clauses to avoid those abusive clauses because these clauses impose obligations and expenses on the borrower but not on the lender party. Other "lege ferenda" proposals explained in this thesis allude to the need of reversing the 140th Article of the Mortgage Law, as well as the need of preventing the Bank from self-adjudicating housing in a lower price than its appraised value. The ideas and proposals within this thesis could help to bridge the gap in matters that are seriously and negatively affecting ordinary citizens."
Проаналізовано причини та витоки кризової ситуації в Україні за період незалежності держави. Досліджено форми і способи вирішення імперських інтересів Росії. Висвітлено прорахунки і недоліки у реформуванні Збройних сил України та роль патріотизму у вирішенні бойових завдань силовими відомствами України. Ключові слова: Антитерористична операція; незаконні збройні формування; збройні сили; збройна агресія. DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN UKRAINE: SOME MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS This article analyzed the practice of contemporary armed conflicts, which can be considered as a composite manifold of a new generation of warfare – a hybrid war, namely the application of the international confrontation between the proportion of political-diplomatic, economic, informational, cybernetic, psychological means.It is noted that the aggression against Ukraine is carried out by starting a war of a new type. The enemy realizes its aggression not only in the military sense, but also in other spheres.The causes and origins of the crisis in Ukraine for the period of independence.Particular attention is paid to the placement the intercontinental ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear missiles and strategic bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the presence of one of the three largest missile production centers in the USSR on the territory of Ukraine in the early 90-ies of XX century. Also the path of our state to the signing of the Memorandum of security according which a US, Russian Federation (RF) and Great Britain guarantees to respect for the independence, sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.It noted a package of disputes between Ukraine and Russia concerning the ownership and location of the Crimean peninsula and placement of the Black Sea fleet there, what later has played the role of «Trojan horse» during annexation of Crimea.It is emphasized that economic instability in the state of corruption in all spheres of life have led to the fact that society simply require changes to better and open up new opportunities for the development of the country. This hope was destroyed by the suspension of the process of preparation for the signing of an agreement on Ukraine's EU association.Independence Square was the center of the peaceful resistance to this decision of the government. However, the final and most dramatic stage of the revolution of Dignity were the events in Kiev on February 18–20 2014, in which more than a hundred protestors were shot. Events on European Square sharpened contradictions between Kiev and south-eastern regions, in particular the Crimea and Donbas. The political leadership of Russia took advantage of the unstable socio-political situation in Ukraine and moved to the implementation of the imperial project «Russian world» and «Novorosii» that began with the annexation of the Crimea.It is noted that before the start of active phase in the process of organizing, planning and carrying out the Russian special services, military (special) operations were carried out a number of relevant preparatory activities.It is emphasized that the result of these complex preparatory activities, in fact, were the total control from the separatists' part over the infrastructure system in the selected areas of the state authorities and representatives of local law enforcement agencies, the creation of the regime of «assistance» in the area of the State border of Ukraine.Reviewed the sequence of events for the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russian army, the action of self-proclaimed government on the request to assist in the «peace and quiet» in the Crimea, which are subsequently recognized as military aggression by the Parliamentary assemble of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's.It is noted that the Russian president sent the proposal on the introduction of Russian troops in the Crimea to the Federation Council. Both chambers of the State Duma voted in favor of the introduction of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine and in Crimea in particular on 1 March 2014.It is noted that the information war against Ukraine began immediately after the proclamation of independence of Ukraine and acquired particularly aggressive form since the annexation of the Crimea. Actually, it was an attempt of disinformation not only the citizens of Ukraine, but also Russian citizens and the international community as a whole.We investigated the events in the south-eastern part of Ukraine. Their analysis in the marked period of time can attest that all seizures of administrative buildings, areas and objects were made for well-planned and pre-organized screenplay of FSB, GRU and General Staff of RF. It is noted that as a result of the events in the south-east of Ukraine in the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the capacity significantly underestimated the fighting capacity of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian army in particular. All attempts to raise havoc in the southern and central regions of Ukraine have been strangled. Due to the rise the amount of patriotic society the new leadership of the state has managed not only to bring to Donbass the Armed Forces and the National Guard of Ukraine, but also begin to restore constitutional order in the liberated territories.Serious attention is paid to the start of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) with the involvement of the Armed Forces (AF). The attack on the Volnovakha checkpoint which was under control of Armed Forces of Ukraine, the result is 18 Ukrainian military killed, is seen as the beginning of an understanding of the brutal war.Recorded errors and shortcomings in the reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.Analyzed in detail the operations in Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo. It was highlighted as a result of agreements with the Russian military column Ukrainian leadership was insidiously shot. Actions under Ilovaisk became the turning point of the war in the east of Ukraine. After the events in Ilovaisk the first time, in a time of independence of Ukraine, begin to radically reform the army.Events near the city Debaltsevo showed that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite the significant loss, able to lead active hostilities and to give a fitting rebuff not only to the illegal armed groups, but well-trained elite sub regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.As a result of fighting the Kremlin elite was forced to move to an open military aggression with greater involvement of the regular units of the Russian army.The heavy losses on both sides urged Ukrainian and Russian leaders to the conclusion of the Minsk ceasefire in the contact group Ukraine - Russia - OSCE with participation of representatives of terrorist organizations DNR and LNR.The attention is focused on the format of negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the conflict, more commonly known as the «Minsk agreement».As a consequence of events in the overall situation underlines the possibility of Ukraine to carry out six waves of mobilization and appeals for conscript military service, to resume military-technical support of its armed forces and other security agencies, to prove to the world community need the help of international partners in the allocation of funds to the trust funds, the transfer of non-lethal weapons, equips and humanitarian assistance.Attention is paid to the importance of volunteers in supply questions for the Armed Forces soldiers with the beginning of military operations in the zone of the ATO in the south-east of Ukraine.It is emphasized that due to human assistance saved a big amount of soldiers life during the war, national sense of patriotism and public danger, gaining strength and understanding.At the same time it noted continued deterioration of the situation along the line of differentiation in the area of ATO revitalization of illegal armed groups, particularly enemy's reconnaissance groups and snipers, the placement in close proximity to the state border and on the occupied territory of Ukraine group of forces totaling about 40 thousand soldiers of the regular the Armed Forces of RF.It is noted that the history of recent decades, and immediately the events in Ukraine testifies to the dangerous trend: domestic conflict that occurred in the country, it becomes a kind of «field of attraction» for foreign hostile forces.It is noted that the resolution of such conflicts, for that would not be approved by the «Customer», is possible only in the format of the temporary address. While there is no corresponding «solutions», the conflict will fester and continue to bleed.There is an obvious need for unity of the Ukrainian people for the sake of the national idea, a radical revision of Ukraine plans to protect and fundamental reform of its security sector, and above all, its armed forces.Key words: anti-terrorist operation; illegal armed groups; the armed forces; armed aggression.
The European Union is a space o f continuous negotiations and an arena hosting the clashes of diverse integration options and concepts represented by EU member states and institutions. Furthermore, the disintegration of the EU (which dates back to the Maastricht Treaty) is becoming more and more visible. It is reflected directly by the presence in the European debate concerning multi-speed Europe and the current actions taken by the Eurozone states aimed at escalating the integration among selected states. Poland is also taking part in the debate concerning the future o f the European Union. The author of this paper attempted to examine Poland's place in the political and economic space o f the European Union by referring to the theory of integration. The research objective o f the paper is to analyse the Polish integration policy between late 1989 and 2012 within the context o f the international and European integration theory. The advanced research reflection in this scope in relation to Poland as the selected and important EU member state fits into the debate on the relevance of the European Union uniting concepts. The author posed the following research hypotheses in the dissertation: 1 .Considering the current stage o f development of the European Union, the Polish integration policy does not firmly support strictly one international or European integration concept. The Polish integration policy does not have a cohesive and stable integration policy concept and it is largely dependent on the policy and objectives of the current government (this is not only typical o f Poland) and the integration level. 2.Poland is strongly fixed in western structures, which makes the integration policy a vital component of development. What is more, the outlook on the European Union continues to evolve in the Polish political and social space. Poland sees the European Union as the main point o f reference in many political, economic, and social areas. 3.The organisation of the European Union does not only see Poland affect the form of the integration process, but also sees member states and EU organisations affect the functioning of Poland. The influence of a given state on the form o f the European Union mostly depends on the state's strength and significance in the EU community. This premise sees the place o f a given state in the system conditioned by the current factors, for example the European Union expansion process. Therefore, the interests o f Poland do not always correspond to the interests of the European Union, and the other way around. This deepens the EU's intergovernmental dimension. 4.Member states constitute the most important element o f the European Union. It is a union of states and nations supported by community institutions. This structure covers the convergence o f its methods, theories, and areas. This makes it impossible to profile the structure only from the perspective of the specified international integration theory. 5.The current stage o f the European Union's development, its challenges, and its problems show that the integration process continues to evolve and its result is impossible to foresee. 6.The current economic crisis influences the perception and management o f the European Union. The expectations include the intensification of intergovemmentalism and the establishment of multi-speed Union. If Poland remains outside of the Eurozone, it will find itself on the periphery o f the integration process, which is rather far from its very centre. Based on these research findings, Polish politics with regard to and, later, as part o f the EU can be divided into several principal periods. Period 1: (1989-1997) a time of consolidating Polish independence and security. This time was associated with the choice of a principal direction of the Polish foreign policy after 1989, i.e. Western Europe and declaration of Poland's will to take part in the process of its integration, without having any concrete vision for further course of those processes. This approach was often marked by a claiming attitude, both among political elites (marked by high instability) and the society (a simplified attitude, no social debate or knowledge about integration processes). During that period, Polish politics with regard to the EU cannot be ascribed to any specific model, since that policy was in statu nascendi at the time and was targeted at the EU membership, an objective in its own right. Period 2: (1998-2004) a time of negotiating Poland's accession to the EU, and the candidate's becoming accustomed to the rules o f EU's workings. There was still no vision o f integration processes from the Polish perspective and related opinions were expressed in a very cautious way. The primary aim was membership in the EU, such that was available at a given moment. At the same time, we should stress an important moment in the process of changes: the breakthrough o f the years 1999/2000. The interest in issues related to Poland's integration with the EU grew more intense then. The Polish government began to address this issue not only from the local perspective (a balance o f benefits and losses), but also expressed opinions on the reformation of the EU as a whole. Poland came as a difficult candidate for an EU member state (Polish support for US activities in Iraq and Afghanistan). This "difficulty" also emerged in the government's seeking to secure Poland's financial interests in connection with the accession. It was a period of preparations for membership, marked by a high level o f uncertainty (no clear vision, conflicting views: strong Union or preservation of independence, Common Foreign and Security Policy or working with the USA). Period 3: (2005-2007) a process aimed at building a vision of "Europe of Solidary Nations" in the EU by the government o f K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński. Decisive, though not quite stable, support for international liberalism in the Polish integration policy. This manifested itself in reinforcing the Euro-realistic stance, both within Poland and abroad, by many considered, in fact, Eurosceptic. Period 4: (since 2008 to this day) a period of an integration vision being developed by D. Tusk's government, especially the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, R. Sikorski. It is a time of big changes and evolution in the Polish integration policy. An important issue at this time was a real sense of benefits coming from Poland's integration with the EU and the Polish government's pro-European attitude. The integration policy being developed shows a more flexible approach to the concept of independence (emergence o f collective independence) and thinking about the Polish foreign policy from the EU perspective. Additionally, we observed a return to constructing strategic partnership between Poland and Germany, rationalisation of partnership with the USA, Poland's active contribution to solving EU problems (e.g. the economic crisis), working towards a better "Eastern policy" as part of the EU. R. Sikorski was the first Polish Minister o f Foreign Affairs to have officially used the concept of federalism and vow his support for it in integration processes, mindful of Polish experiences and historical heritage in this respect. The Polish government expresses a firm objection to the idea of "multi-speed" Europe and builds an image o f Poland as an active member state (presidency at the EU Council), enjoying a good economic situation and having a society with an enthusiastic approach to the integration processes and strong Europe, and seeking to be as close to the "epicentre" o f countries behind this process.The analysis o f the integrative concepts presented in this paper shows that the different periods of the Polish integration policy (establishment and execution) saw and continue to see various levels in the majority of the international integration theory elements (of course, this is not just a Polish characteristic in the European Union, but rather a predominant trend in the Union's integration process). This has been and continues to be conditioned in large part by the foreign policy objectives of the given government, as well as by the current challenges and problems Poland is facing. In the case of the Polish integration policy, as in most other EU member states, we can observe an aggregation of interests, concepts and attitudes. This research project seeks to systematise them.
The articles that make up this issue cover a wide range of topics: the ecological impact of some productive practices, the constitution of the subjects of public policies by the policies themselves, the scope and limitations in the effectiveness of social participation according to the issues that motivate it, the levels in which it operates and the political system that frames it; the institutional organization of power and the negotiation and confrontation strategies to which the actors resort in certain contexts and moments.María Emilia Val's text on the process of restructuring Argentina's external debt in 2005 studies the sovereign debt negotiation strategy developed by the government of Néstor Kirchner, with an orientation that would continue until 2015, setting a novel precedent regarding the policy with which the states can promote debt restructuring processes in the current stage of financial globalization. It is particularly appropriate to return to that experience at a time when Argentina has been led to gigantic indebtedness for reckless and misguided government management - judging by the results, which are what counts in terms of political action - generating an economic, financial crisis. and social depth and dimensions unparalleled in the last seventy years. Val's article allows us to appreciate the subtlety of the Argentine strategy that, in a framework of explicit adversity with the creditor bloc, at the same time knew how to take advantage of internal or specific differences between different creditors, and between them and their political guarantors, to optimize the perspectives of success.One of the greatest liabilities of capitalism throughout its history is the environmental one. Two articles analyze two aspects of the issue. Soledad Nión Celio deals with the social construction of risk in the production of soybeans in Uruguay, based on the perception of different actors - an issue that fully touches Argentina. This item is taken as an example of the changes that agricultural production has experienced in recent decades. Martha Jhiannina Cárdenas Ruiz and María dos Dôres Saraiva de Loreto present the results of a qualitative study on informal mining in a region of Peru and its effects on the quality of life of the families involved in the activity.The text of Jimena Pesquero Bordón focuses on the role of the vice government in the politics of three Patagonian provinces in recent years. The work opens the way for the study of an issue that until now had been ignored by the "subnational" political analysis. The author emphasizes the strategic relevance that the figure of the Vice Governor usually plays in certain institutional situations and the counterpoint of political games that develop within the respective provinces around the Governor / Vice Governor relationship and the gravitation of that relationship in provincial policy and in its articulation with the federal political system. For its part, Catalina Luz Bressán's article is part of the contemporary theoretical reflection on the relationship between the scale of citizen participation and democracy. Criticisms of the effective modalities in which "transitions to democracy" developed in several countries of our region, in particular what these criticisms posed as a growing distance between formal political systems and the demands of broad sectors of citizenship, led to exalt the virtues of the local, the direct, possibly the immediate, to the detriment of representative democracy practices oriented in the best case towards issues and with approaches alien to the specific problems of citizens and to an effectively democratic participation, generating a vision of the local as an idealized area of participation and deepening of democracy. On the contrary, the author argues that democratic participation is not condemned to the limits of the small scale; maintains that democracy is strengthened the greater the scale of participation as it allows to achieve a citizen involvement of better quality and politicity. "Who nominates dominates" says the old apothegm; naming means identifying and also calling, questioning someone or something, constituting it as a subject or object. The state names through its policies and the tools it uses to achieve its objectives. María Florencia Marcos' article inquires about the production of rural development subjects based on the analysis of the Social Agricultural Program (PSA), a state policy that was developed in Argentina between 1993 and 2013.onstitutes the subject; more often the name, the word, does not change, but the identity mutation occurs as a result of substantive policies, particularly those aimed at empowering its recipients. This is the case of Conectar Igualdad, to which Victoria Matozo's article is dedicated. Conectar Igualdad was one of the best known and possibly successful programs designed and promoted by the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, later dismantled and concluded by the Cambiemos Alliance government. It was also a program surrounded by some controversies, referring to the role of ANSES in its implementation and financing, and how to classify the program within the rigidities of academic classifications: social policy? Educational policy? Technological democratization? - not to mention the deployment of denigrative adjectives and social prejudices that were directed against the program and its beneficiaries. Victoria Matozo's article gets into the discussion from a rights perspective, debating with some social questions, popularized by the media, about the recipients of the program and its scope in relation to the objectives of this policy. The massive student mobilizations that took place in Chile in the 1990s and in recent years highlighted, in the field of public education, the limitations of a firmly structured representative democratic system and the inevitability of the formulation of participation claims and greater democratization far beyond the local level. Braulio Carimán Linares focuses them using theoretical methodological approaches developed in the study of social movements and the analysis of public policies. The article also shows the challenges that student demands posed to successive Democratic Concertación government and the different responses with which they tried to agree with organizations, against the background of a power structure that, in the economic-financial field, maintained continuities with which he had supported the military regime that was installed in 1973. ; Los artículos que integran este número cubren un amplio arco de temas: el impacto ecológico de algunas prácticas productivas, la constitución de los sujetos de las políticas públicas por las propias políticas, los alcances y limitaciones en la eficacia de la participación social de acuerdo a los asuntos que la motivan, los niveles en los que se desenvuelve y el sistema político que la enmarca; la organización institucional del poder y las estrategias de negociación y confrontación a las que recurren los actores en determinados contextos y momentos. El texto de María Emilia Val sobre el proceso de reestructuración de la deuda externa argentina en 2005 estudia la estrategia de negociación de deuda soberana desarrollada por el gobierno de Néstor Kirchner, con una orientación que se continuaría hasta 2015 sentando un precedente novedoso respecto a la política con la que los estados pueden impulsar procesos de reestructuración de deuda en el actual estadio de la globalización financiera. Resulta particularmente oportuno regresar a esa experiencia en momentos en que Argentina ha sido conducida a un endeudamiento gigantesco por una gestión gubernamental imprudente y desacertada -a juzgar por los resultados, que son lo que cuenta en materia de acción política- generando una crisis económica, financiera y social de profundidad y dimensiones sin paralelo en los últimos setenta años. El artículo de Val permite apreciar la sutileza de la estrategia argentina que, en un marco de explícita adversariedad con el bloque acreedor, supo al mismo tiempo aprovechar diferencias internas o puntuales entre distintos acreedores, y entre estos y sus garantes políticos, para optimizar las perspectivas de éxito. Uno de los mayores pasivos del capitalismo a lo largo de su historia es el ambiental. Dos artículos analizan sendos aspectos de la cuestión. Soledad Nión Celio trata la construcción social del riesgo en la producción de soja en el Uruguay a partir de la percepción de diferentes actores -un asunto que toca de lleno a Argentina-. Este rubro es tomado como un ejemplo de los cambios que la producción agrícola ha experimentado en las últimas décadas. Martha Jhiannina Cárdenas Ruiz y María dos Dôres Saraiva de Loreto presentan los resultados de un estudio cualitativo sobre la minería informal en una región de Perú y sus efectos en la calidad de vida de las familias involucradas en la actividad. El texto de Jimena Pesquero Bordón enfoca el papel de la vicegobernatura en la política de tres provincias patagónicas en años recientes. El trabajo abre el camino para el estudio de un tema que hasta ahora había sido soslayado por el análisis político "subnacional". La autora destaca la relevancia estratégica que la figura del Vicegobernador suele desempeñar en determinadas coyunturas institucionales y el contrapunto de juegos políticos que se desenvuelven dentro de las respectivas provincias en torno a la relación Gobernador/Vicegobernador y a la gravitación de esa relación en la política provincial y en su articulación con el sistema político federal. Por su parte el artículo de Catalina Luz Bressán se inscribe en la reflexión teórica contemporánea sobre la relación entre escala de la participación ciudadana y democracia. Las críticas a las modalidades efectivas en que se desenvolvieron las "transiciones a la democracia" en varios países de nuestra región, en particular lo que esas críticas plantearon como un creciente distanciamiento entre los sistemas políticos formales y las demandas de sectores amplios de la ciudadanía, llevó a exaltar las virtudes de lo local, lo directo, eventualmente lo inmediato, en detrimento de las prácticas de la democracia representativa orientadas en el mejor caso hacia temas y con enfoques ajenos a las problemáticas concretas de los ciudadanos y a una participación efectivamente democrática, generando una visión de lo local como ámbito idealizado de participación y profundización de la democracia. Al contrario, la autora argumenta que la participación democrática no está condenada a los límites de la pequeña escala; sostiene que la democracia se fortalece cuanta mayor es la escala de participación en cuanto permite alcanzar un involucramiento ciudadano de mejor calidad y politicidad. "Quien nomina domina" reza el viejo apotegma; nombrar significa identificar y también llamar, interpelar a alguien o algo, constituirlo como sujeto u objeto. El estado nombra a través de sus políticas y de las herramientas de que se vale para alcanzar sus objeticos. El artículo de María Florencia Marcos indaga acerca de la producción de sujetos de desarrollo rural a partir del análisis del Programa Social Agropecuario (PSA), política estatal que se desarrolló en Argentina entre el 1993 y el 2013. El análisis del PSA explicita el modo en que el nombre constituye al sujeto; más a menudo el nombre, la palabra, no cambia, pero la mutación identitaria ocurre por efecto de políticas sustantivas, particularmente aquellas encaminadas al empoderamiento de sus destinatarios. Es el caso de Conectar Igualdad, a la que se dedica el artículo de Victoria Matozo. Conectar Igualdad fue uno de los programas más conocidos y posiblemente exitosos diseñados e impulsados por el gobierno de la presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, posteriormente desmantelado y concluido por el gobierno de la Alianza Cambiemos. Fue también un programa rodeado de algunas polémicas, referidas al papel de la ANSES en su implementación y financiamiento, y a cómo encasillar al programa dentro de las rigideces de las clasificaciones académicas: ¿política social? ¿política educativa? ¿democratización tecnológica? -para no mencionar el despliegue de adjetivaciones denigratorias y prejuicios sociales que se dirigieron contra el programa y sus beneficiarios-. El artículo de Victoria Matozo se mete en la discusión desde la perspectiva de derechos debatiendo con algunos cuestionamientos sociales, popularizados mediáticamente, sobre los destinatarios del programa y su alcance con relación a los objetivos de esta política. Las masivas movilizaciones estudiantiles que tuvieron lugar en Chile en la década de 1990 y en años recientes pusieron de relieve, en el terreno de la educación pública, las limitaciones de un sistema democrático representativo firmemente estructurado y la inevitabilidad de la formulación de reclamos de participación y mayor democratización mucho más allá del nivel local. Braulio Carimán Linares las enfoca recurriendo a abordajes teórico metodológicos desarrollados en el estudio de los movimientos sociales y el análisis de políticas públicas. El artículo permite ver asimismo los desafíos que las demandas estudiantiles plantearon a sucesivos gobierno de la Concertación Democrática y las diferentes respuestas con que estos intentaron acordar con las organizaciones, con el trasfondo de una estructura de poder que, en el terreno económico-financiero, mantenía continuidades con la que había servido de sustento al régimen militar que se instaló en 1973.
The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8206 Security Council Seventy-third year 8206th meeting Friday, 16 March 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Esono Mbengono Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Tenya Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mr. Miller Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-07334 (E) *1807334* S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 2/10 18-07334 The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Brussels. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Recalling the Security Council's latest note 507 on its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and to focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: We have been constantly, around the clock, in touch with the Secretary-General, my colleagues in the field and all those with influence because, as the Security Council knows, many events, some of which are very worrisome, have taken place in the past few days. On 7 March, I briefed the Council in consultations on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). At that time, I said that there had not been any sustained ceasefire or adequate humanitarian access at that stage. On 12 March, the Secretary-General himself orally reported to the Council on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and United Nations efforts to create such conditions by using his own good offices or those of his own team, including ourselves (see S/PV.8201). The Secretary-General also underscored that it was incumbent on all the parties and on all those with influence in the Council, in the Astana process and in the broader International Syria Support Group to act on the resolution throughout Syria without delay. Allow me to update the Council on where we stand on the matter since then — that is, since the Secretary- General gave a very comprehensive report — on the very day after the sad anniversary of the beginning of the conflict. We are entering the eighth year. In everything that we are doing in the horrific conflict, our compass — and I know the Council feels the same — has been, is and should be the Syrian people, wherever they are, who are telling us that they are fed up with the conflict and the way in which civilians are being affected in the cross-fighting. That is our compass. So whatever we do these days and whatever we suggest, including our current facilitation role, is constantly framed by the urgent needs of ordinary civilians — women, children and men. Since the briefing by the Secretary-General, in the past few days further meetings have taken place between the Russian Federation and Jaysh Al-Islam on the outskirts of Douma, which is the northernmost of the three opposition-controlled enclaves in eastern Ghouta. The result of that engagement is a tenuous and fragile ceasefire between the Government, the Russian military and the Jaysh Al-Islam forces, which has now largely continued to hold for the sixth day. We hope that it will continue to do so, notwithstanding the engagement between Government forces and Jaysh Al-Islam in other areas outside Douma, such as the village of Reihan. In other words, the talks, the discussions and the ceasefire have been effected and implemented with Jaysh Al-Islam in Douma but not beyond. However, that is only one part of eastern Ghouta. For example, the ceasefire is not being replicated in the rest of eastern Ghouta or elsewhere, and it is extremely fragile. While I speak, I understand that at this very moment there are some delicate meetings taking place regarding the follow-up to the arrangement regarding Douma. Let us therefore hope that the ceasefire holds because that would be at least one good piece of news among very bad news. The United Nations has been practicably offering its good offices but efforts to facilitate meaningful contacts between the Russian Federation and Faylaq Al-Rahman or Ahrar Al-Sham have not yet produced results. They are dominant forces in the two other enclaves in eastern Ghouta — in Harasta and around Kafr Batna, Ayn Tarma, Arbin, Zamalka and Jobar, respectively. In those two other areas, we have not seen any ceasefire to speak of. Rather we have seen Government forces and their allies pursue a concerted escalation against those two enclaves with rapid ground offensives, accompanied by shelling and airstrikes. Reports of a public market in Kafr Batna having been 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 3/10 hit are just coming in. Of course, we need to verify them, since they are new reports. Again, regrettably, there are numerous civilian casualties. We have also seen continuous shelling coming from those areas of eastern Ghouta inside civilian areas of Damascus again. We are also hearing from people inside eastern Ghouta, asking the United Nations, the Council and Member States with influence to pressure the armed opposition groups to let civilians leave and to pressure all parties for a ceasefire and protection for those who do not want to leave but want to stay. The bottom line of all this is that too many civilians are suffering and too many have died in that area. Let me first say that it need not be that way. Negotiations in Douma in the past few days show that there is a way to create the conditions to advance the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As we have done so far, the United Nations therefore stands ready to offer its good offices to all parties to facilitate further engagement of that kind so as to make a concrete contribution to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) in all areas of eastern Ghouta. The United Nations is not ready to facilitate ultimatums from either side. It stands ready to facilitate discussion, a ceasefire and evacuations. Meanwhile, violence has escalated across many other parts of Syria, where there is no ceasefire to speak of. In Afrin, the Turkish Government forces and their armed allies continue to gain ground rapidly. We have also received reports of shelling in besieged Fo'ah and Kafraya — two villages which, for a long time, have been held by the opposition. There have also been air strikes in Idlib and a new armed-opposition offensive in Hama. Clashes and air strikes have also occurred in Dar'a, southern Syria. If now is the time for de-escalation, the Security Council had better convince me that de-escalation is indeed taking place. What we see on the map looks like the opposite — escalation. Let me re-emphasize that resolution 2401 (2018) cannot be applied piecemeal. It is not an à la carte menu. It applies to all non-Security- Council-listed terrorist groups across Syria. Let me also reiterate the words of the Secretary-General who stated that even efforts to combat terrorist groups identified by the Council do not supersede obligations under international law. I am sure that members of the Council will have the opportunity to hear a briefing from Mr. Mark Lowcock. Meanwhile, since I have the opportunity to brief the Council today, let me provide some information about the humanitarian situation. On 13 March, the United Nations observed the evacuation of 147 civilians, including 10 critical medical cases — the majority of them women and children from Douma who sought shelter in rural Damascus. Based on the outcome of discussions and meetings between the Russian military and Jaysh al-Islam, facilitated by the United Nations, on 15 March, United Nations colleagues also delivered a convoy of food assistance to Douma for 26,100 people in need. Additional medical cases were also evacuated. Let us be honest and admit that positive efforts are generally welcome and long overdue, but remain limited. Civilians require much more, including medical and health-care supplies, the restoration of water, commercial access and freedom of movement. Members of the Council must have seen the report in which Mr. Peter Maurer, who had been meeting with some of the people in eastern Ghouta, stated they were simply asking for water. They just needed water. Humanitarian colleagues who entered those areas spoke of having seen hunger, dire want, poverty, haggard faces and despair all around. Even for experienced people, such as my own humanitarian colleagues, it is an unsustainable situation in which people are on the brink of collapse a few kilometres — 20 minutes' drive — from Damascus. Let me be clear, that is only in Douma — an area which has seen a few days of ceasefire and positive movement on humanitarian access. Can we imagine the situation elsewhere? In other words, in the other two enclaves of eastern Ghouta further south, we have seen no ceasefire to speak of and to borrow the words of the Secretary-General, people are still living in hell on Earth. Scores of people have been killed and the injured left unattended because health workers could not reach them due to the relentless air strikes. We have heard fresh allegations about the use of incendiary weapons in various urban areas and the targeting of medical facilities since 12 March, as well as new and disturbing allegations of chlorine use in those areas. As the Secretary-General has stated, we cannot independently verify those allegations but we also cannot and should not ignore them. We have also received reports of thousands of people displaced, some moving further into eastern Ghouta and many others exiting en masse in large groups, as a result of the advances of the Syrian Government in Hama, Noria and in Saqba. S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 4/10 18-07334 Evacuations not observed by the United Nations are also reported to have taken place, including from Misraba and other areas. The United Nations was not present to observe those evacuations and is unable to know the precise number of them. We urge parties that all evacuations must take place in accordance with the highest protection standards under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, they must be protected against attacks and have access to the essentials to survive. They must be safe and voluntarily enter a place of their of choosing. The United Nations stands ready to provide assistance to people in need — those who choose to stay and those who want to leave. We are also extremely concerned about the plight of civilians throughout Syria. They include the displaced, as well as almost 3 million in besieged and hard-to-reach areas and those caught up in escalations in Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Dar'a. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands that all parties immediately lift the sieges of populated areas. To date, that has not occurred. According to my colleagues, the situation in Afrin is particularly worrying. We have received reports of tens of thousands of people displaced within Afrin and to nearby Tell Rifaat and surrounding villages, Nubul and Zahra, and other areas of Aleppo governorate. The United Nations has also received reports of civilian casualties and restrictions on movement for many of the large numbers of civilians seeking to leave the city. I urge all parties to ensure that civilians seeking to leave Afrin be given safe passage. Since 6 March, it has been reported that people in Afrin city have suffered from severe water shortages as its source of water has been damaged by the fighting. Allow me to add a point of particular importance that was revealed in a recent report. The safety of Syrian women in particular is threatened when they are evacuated following the lifting of a siege or end of a battle. Threats include widespread sexual and gender-based violence, which has been widely documented and mentioned by women's groups. The protection and needs of women must be at the forefront of our response. With regard to a separate humanitarian issue, on 14 March my technical team participated in the first meeting of the Working Group on detainees and missing persons that took place in Astana. We pressed the Astana guarantors at that meeting and before to make progress on the crucial issue, which to us, is one of the main reasons we attend meetings in Astana. It is an issue that has been at the forefront of our concerns. We have offered to host a standing secretariat so that information on detainees can be distributed in all meetings of the Working Group. Thus far, the guarantors have simply agreed to consider our proposal about a standing secretariat in Geneva to monitor the issue of detainees, but no final decision has been taken. We will intensify our contact with them and the parties in order to accelerate work on that important — frankly, crucial — humanitarian issue. We should remind ourselves that the issue of detainees and missing persons was first raised in Astana a year ago and, sadly, no concrete progress has been made so far. We owe it to the Syrian families on all sides who have long been awaiting word on the fate of their relatives. Although the logic of war clearly still prevails and resolution 2401 (2018) is not being implemented as it should be, as the Secretary-General stated, we absolutely refuse to give up hope of seeing Syria rising from the ashes. The Syrian people deserve to be helped. The Syrian people are proud. They love their country. We need to help them to go back to having a normal country. There too, it is with the people of Syria in mind and their legitimate aspirations for the long-term shape of their country that we continue our political efforts — in spite of what we see on the ground — for a sustainable settlement of the conflict. And there too, the voices of women across Syria conveying their wish to play a meaningful role — just as with our own civil society — in the next stage of the political process must be heard. Therefore, my team and I have continued to consult, in the context of the political side, widely and intensively on the formation of the constitutional committee in Geneva in an effort to advance the full and complete implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) within the framework of the United Nations-facilitated political process in Geneva. To this end, we seek to leverage the momentum produced by the Sochi final declaration, which emphasizes the fact that we should have a constitutional committee in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations. We take note, therefore, of the statement issued — today, I believe — by the Astana guarantors in their own ministerial meeting, in which they reaffirmed that "the results of the Sochi Congress, especially to form the constitutional committee and to facilitate the 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 5/10 beginning of its work in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria as soon as possible." However, I have to be frank. I must report that at this stage — more than two weeks beyond one month since the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi — we have not yet received the complete inputs on the pool of candidates for a constitutional committee developed in Sochi, from the three guarantors. It is my intention, in close consultations with all concerned, to look carefully at this pool when we receive it, and at others as required and consistent with resolution 2254 (2015), to facilitate the establishment of the constitutional committee. I must also report, once again, that there is still some serious homework to be done regarding the Syrian Government's readiness to engage on implementing the Sochi final declaration and moving forward with a constitutional committee in Geneva. I have impressed that on the relevant guarantors repeatedly in recent weeks, just as I continue to make clear the readiness of the United Nations to engage the Government of Syria on this matter. We need them to be part of it. We need to have the comprehensive participation of all Syrian parties. In the meantime, we have been proactive in offering creative suggestions as to how to expedite the formation of that constitutional committee. We continue to assess various options on how to advance discussions on all four baskets of the political process in Geneva. In particular, it is clear that there must be more and serious talks with the Government, the opposition and all Syrian and international stakeholders on what is required in order to establish a secure, calm, neutral environment, as per resolution 2254 (2015), in which a constitutional process and United Nations-supervised presidential and parliamentary elections, pursuant to a new constitution, could viably take place. We remained determined to engage all parties. As I said in my most recent briefing, a month ago (see S/PV.8181), conflict is increasingly spilling over Syria's borders, or at least risks doing so. This month we have further incidents of potential and real international confrontation within Syria that we cannot independently verify, but which concern us. That is precisely we need urgent action on the political front. Syrians need to see some positive movement on the political process. On Monday I will be attending a meeting of European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers here in Brussels. On Tuesday, I should be back in Geneva. I will attend the meeting at the invitation of High Representative Mogherini, in the context of the preparatory efforts of the EU and the United Nations for their joint ministerial conference in Brussels at the end of April. I hope that the Conference will provide a significant opportunity to bolster international support for the Syrian people though humanitarian commitments. I also hope that the gathering of a significant number of Foreign Ministers will also provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the collective efforts of the international community towards a sustainable peace through the United Nations-led peace process in Geneva, within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015) and other relevant resolutions. In conclusion, I urge caution. We must recognize that we are witnessing developments of the utmost gravity on the ground. These events demand action, and the world is worried and watching. I remain concerned that concrete matters that we have been trying to advance — resolution 2401 (2018), detainees and a constitutional committee — need to move faster and with more meaningful impact than has so far proven possible. And de-escalation must replace what we are watching at the moment — a clear tendency towards escalation. I will continue, creatively and determinedly, to seek to facilitate the overall political process. As the Secretary-General said on Monday, the ultimate goal is to help the Syrians and to "see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian people able to freely decide their future and choose their political leadership." (S/PV.8201, p. 5) The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Tenya (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting and Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We are grateful for his tireless and important efforts. We agree that the continuation of the conflict and the regrettable humanitarian situation in Syria undermines the prospects of making political S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 6/10 18-07334 progress. The unpunished lack of compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and Security Council resolutions erode the needed trust for sustainable peacebuilding. While we express our deep sympathy and solidarity with the victims, we would like at the same time to indicate our concern over the impact of the Syrian conflict on regional stability, the Council's credibility and the functioning of an rules-based international system. More specifically, the international community is awaiting an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria, full access to the needed humanitarian assistance, the attainment of a political agreement that could bring about sustainable peace in Syria, and accountability for the heinous crimes committed, including the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more excuses and no more delays. The humanitarian ceasefire, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), must be implemented immediately in eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Afrin, Raqqa, Rukban and throughout Syria. All parties should commit to resolving the conflict peacefully, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). That will require the constructive participation of the Syrian Government and the opposition groups in establishing a constitutional committee, as agreed in Sochi. We believe that a new constitution must be drafted to lay the political and institutional groundwork for sustainable peace in Syria. The Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict must rise to the occasion in confronting the gravity of the situation, prevent its further deterioration and escalation, and fulfil their obligations and responsibilities. The Astana guarantors must also meet expectations in terms of the special responsibility entailed by their influence and involvement on the ground. Yesterday's meeting in Astana and the meeting to be held in Istanbul in early April must yield concrete outcomes, including in the matter of those detained and missing. As a member of the Council, Peru believes that its own responsibility vis-à-vis the tragic humanitarian situation in Syria entails requiring all parties involved in the conflict, especially those with greater ability to influence events on the ground, to comply with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru places priority on the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, and stresses the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council concerning this and all other conflicts and humanitarian crises, wherever they might arise. In conclusion, we convey our support for Mr. De Mistura's work to encourage dialogue among the Syrian opposition groups that have expressed their willingness to comply with the ceasefire and expel terrorists from eastern Ghouta and other parties to the Syrian conflict. Mr. Esono Mbengono (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the initiative of convening this meeting owing to the gravity of the situation on the ground. We also thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his informative briefing. As we continue to seek a solution to the tragic humanitarian situation throughout the country, it is also important to continue pursuing political efforts. We all believe that there is no military solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must continue to support and encourage the intra-Syrian negotiations and impress upon all parties that it is only by sitting around the negotiating table and engaging in frank, direct and inclusive dialogue that a solution can be reached that addresses everyone's concerns. In such a process, we must ensure that the sovereignty and unity of Syria are respected. We support the United Nations in its mission as a mediator in finding a political solution to the Syrian issue, pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015). It is imperative to relaunch negotiations in Geneva and all other peace initiatives, including those in Astana and Sochi, which must lead to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. The final outcome must ensure the well-being of the Syrian people. Consolidating a political process in Syria will be difficult without eradicating terrorism. The international community must also demonstrate its unfaltering unity by joining forces and following the same criteria to combat the various terrorist organizations operating in Syria. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy De Mistura for his update. The humanitarian situation in Syria remains dire. We echo the United Nations call on all parties to facilitate a ceasefire and unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country, pursuant to resolution 2401 (2018). It is also vital to take the measures necessary to protect civilians 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 7/10 and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required under international law and human rights standards. As members of the Security Council are aware, the guarantor States of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities adopted a joint statement on the settlement of the conflict and its future direction at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 16 March in Astana. Kazakhstan remains committed to bringing peace to Syria. The situation is not simple, but nevertheless we cannot give up. Kazakhstan has taken the following positions. First, we do not believe in a military solution, for that would only aggravate an already difficult situation. We need serious compromises from every side. Any conflict — even the most serious — ends with negotiations, and we must strive to achieve the goal of bringing peace to Syria. We know of many fine examples in which conflicting parties in many other countries have come together despite difficult negotiations so as to find common prosperity for their peoples. Secondly, Kazakhstan calls on the Syrian Government and opposition parties to immediately begin substantive talks on the entire spectrum of issues. Astana does not anticipate any political or international miracles, yet sees great promise in a collective and pragmatic approach. Kazakhstan, for its part, is deeply committed to ending the intense suffering, which has lasted for eight long years. We all know that today Syria is undergoing a significant challenge that must not lead to a deadlock, but offer new opportunities to pave the way to a peaceful and lasting political settlement to the crisis. We hope that the forthcoming ninth round of talks, to be held in Astana in May, will offer an opportunity to end the war. In that regard, we will urge the guarantors and Syrian parties to overcome their differences through dialogue and reach a final agreement covering every aspect of the issue. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte D'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing on the latest developments in the political process and the situation in the country, and for his work to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. The Ivorian delegation remains concerned about the upsurge in fighting, which with every passing day further distances us from finding a peaceful settlement through political negotiations. Despite the efforts of the international community to establish a ceasefire, we continue to witness indiscriminate attacks and bombardments in eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria, thereby resulting in a large number of casualties among civilians and the destruction of important infrastructure. My country therefore calls once again for an immediate cessation of hostilities and urges the international community to work together towards the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). That resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, calls for establishing a humanitarian cessation of hostilities of at least 30 days so as to allow for the safe, lasting and unhindered access of humanitarian convoys to deliver essential supplies to the people of eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria. Should it be implemented, such a temporary cessation of hostilities could not only alleviate the suffering of millions of people living in distress and hopelessness, but also allow for the resumption of political talks among Syrian parties in a peaceful environment. In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the Astana meeting will lead to a lasting ceasefire, improve the humanitarian situation and establish the conditions for advancing the political process. My country welcomes all initiatives aimed at reviving the inter-Syrian dialogue and encourages Mr. De Mistura to continue undertaking, within the framework of the Geneva process, the steps needed to set up the committee responsible for drafting Syria's new constitution, as agreed at the meeting in Sochi in the Russian Federation. In conclusion, my delegation urges the Syrian parties to give priority to dialogue, which is the only way to advance the political process with a view to a definitive end to the crisis, in accordance with the road map laid out by resolution 2254 (2015). That is Côte d'Ivoire's profound conviction and it is in the interests of the Syrian people. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational States of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the briefing given by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties. As on previous occasions, my delegation wishes to express its support for the various meetings held in S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 8/10 18-07334 different contexts and at different levels, which have allowed for the creation of de-escalation zones, the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access. At the same time, we remain converned over the urgent need to advance in a political process that will help to resolve the conflict in Syria so that the people can return to peace. That is why we again highlight the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January. It focused on strengthening the political process led by the United Nations within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015), particularly through the drafting of a new constitution by a constitutional committee, which we believe should be representative and neutral. We underscore in particular that the mandate, terms of reference, powers, rules of procedure and selection criteria for the composition of the committee must be agreed in the United Nations-supported talks held in Geneva. In that regard, we firmly believe that the principles agreed at the Sochi Congress will lead to a strong commitment on the part of the parties to respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, in the context of its right to choose its own political, economic and social systems, without pressure or foreign interference. We are certain that the political process will resume as a result of those dialogues. However, and despite the advances in the political arena, we remain concerned over the critical situation of the Syrian people. In that regard, we welcome the holding of the Astana meeting and its outcome, and we hope that those political agreements will be reflected on the ground. We also express our greatest hopes for the success of the summit to be held shortly among high-level representatives of Turkey, Iran and Russia. We hope that it will serve to reaffirm the Astana agreements and de-escalation zones with a view to reducing violence and addressing the needs of families of detained, kidnapped and disappeared persons. Once again, the Council has the challenge of remaining united and calling on the parties involved to join forces and maintain the impetus of the Astana talks and the political process in Sochi, among others, the outcomes of which, we reiterate, must strengthen the political process in Geneva. We hope that those forums for dialogue will promote points of convergence and consensus in order to reduce violence and allow the humanitarian access that is so necessary, not only for the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons, but also to achieve sustainable peace in Syria. To that end, it is crucial for the parties to demonstrate their willingness to seek a settlement to the conflict, which has persisted for more than 8 years. We again call on all parties involved to effectively implement resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the entire Syrian territory in order to achieve unrestricted humanitarian access and permit the necessary urgent medical evacuations. We reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria, and believe that the Syrian people must be able to freely decide their future and political leadership within the framework of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and concerted political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, which will enable a peaceful solution for all parties involved. The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I wish to again remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable to Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Mr. Ja'afari (Syria) (spoke in Arabic): On 12 March (see S/PV.8201), I informed the members of the Security Council of a number of measures undertaken by the Syrian Government to alleviate the suffering of Syrians throughout my country caused by armed terrorist groups. Today, I assure those present once again that the Government of Syria is indeed most keen to save the lives of its citizens and continues to take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security. In line with those efforts, the Government of Syria opened the new secure corridor in Hamouriyah village, which was liberated from terrorists yesterday in eastern Ghouta. Its aim is to assist the evacuation of civilians who are being used as human shields by terrorist groups. Just yesterday, Thursday, 15 March, more than 40,000 civilians exited eastern Ghouta through the new additional corridor. They went to the Syrian Government, which coordinated with the Syrian Red Crescent, to facilitate their safe transportation to temporary shelters that are equipped with all the necessary resources. They were not transferred to camps, or tents. The Syrian Army, in coordination with 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 9/10 the Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria, has opened a total of three corridors in Hamouriyah, Jisreen and Wafideen. Yesterday, the Government of Syria also allowed the entry of a joint assistance convoy of the Red Crescent, the Red Cross and the United Nations, made up of 25 trucks carrying 340 tons of various medical and nutritional supplies. The Syrian Government will continue to allow the passage of such convoys, security conditions permitting. In return for all those efforts undertaken by the Government of Syria to protect its citizens, the armed terrorist groups — upon direct instructions from the Governments of the States supporting them — continue to use civilians as human shields in eastern Ghouta and prevent them from using the corridors as they target them with bullets and missiles. It is quite strange that the Government of Syria is shouldering the huge responsibility of implementing resolution 2401 (2018) and responding to the needs of civilians exiting the inferno of terror in the eastern Ghouta, while the United Nations agencies working in Damascus, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Governments of other countries that are lamenting the destiny of our civilian population have done nothing materially or morally to alleviate the suffering of tens of thousands of people who have escaped from terrorism. One hundred thousand civilians were displaced in Afrin and around 100,000 fled eastern Ghouta —— a total of almost 200,000 civilians — yet no one has provided them with help. Some States members of the Security Council are abusing the work of the Council in launching campaigns to defame and spread misinformation about the Government of Syria, especially with respect to the unofficial Arria Formula meeting that the Council held on 12 March. However, I recall that the United Nations is an Organization of Governments and not a theatre for the display of power, and that giving the opportunity to terrorist groups, including the so called White Helmets affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front, to use the platform of the Security Council represents a gross violation of Security Council resolutions, especially those on combating terrorism. The biggest scandal is that one of the United Nations agencies working in Damascus has asked for the transfer of 76 White Helmets out of eastern Ghouta. It does not care about the tens of thousands of civilians but it cares about 76 White Helmet terrorists. If the Security Council really wants to know about what is happening in Syria, it should ask some of our people who are still living in the city of Raqqa to talk before the Council about the scandals perpetrated against civilians by the outlaw coalition, and its extreme respect for international law after it completely destroyed their city. The coalition has committed the most terrible massacres against civilians, provided protection to 4,000 terrorists affiliated with Da'esh, and facilitated their exit from the city of Raqqa in order to use them somewhere else in Syria. The city of Raqqa is to us what Dresden is to Germany. The Security Council should also ask to hear from some of our people in Afrin, who could tell its members about the ideal implementation of the provisions of international humanitarian law and resolution 2401 (2018) by the invading Turkish forces that have perpetrated terrible massacres against civilians and displaced tens of thousands of them. The Council should also ask some foreign terrorist fighters who have returned to their countries to explain in an open meeting of the Security Council how the Governments of their countries were actually involved in their recruitment, training and financing and how they provided them with arms and sent them to Syria to commit massacres against the Syrian people. The problem is, however, that these fighters have been recycled, renamed and rebranded as the moderate opposition in Syria. The Security Council should also ask some of our people who have left eastern Ghouta over the past few days to talk about the terrorist practices of Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham, the three groups that have been called the moderate Syrian opposition by the United States, France, Britain and their agents in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and to talk in particular about how those groups kill anyone who tries to get out. They have seized all forms of humanitarian and medical assistance and sold it at very high prices. The Council should also ask some of our people from Fo'ah and Kafraya to talk about their years of suffering in the ongoing oppressive siege there, which has been conducted by Al-Nusra Front with direct assistance from Turkey and Qatar. However, it seems that those defenders of humanity have no ears and tongues to listen about the suffering of those civilians and talk about it. If Western countries in the Security Council were one part in a thousand as sincere as the Russian Federation in their assertions that they really care about the Syrian people and respect the provisions S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 10/10 18-07334 of the international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions, particularly those pertaining to combating terrorism, then terrorism would not have emerged in Syria and in other countries. No civilian would have suffered in eastern Ghouta or in eastern Aleppo or in the old city of Homs, Raqqa or any other Syrian city. Those Western countries have invested in terrorism to bring down Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Now, they have also invested in terrorism in Syria and that investment has failed. It is as if these countries were saying that, given a choice between supporting the demons of terrorism, on one the hand, and the Syrian State, on the other, they, the sponsors of terrorism, would choose the demons. In conclusion, the Government of my country reiterates its principled position that the solution to the Syrian crisis is a political one, based on an intra-Syrian dialogue led by Syria without any foreign interference or preconditions. I have spent hours and hours in negotiations with Mr. De Mistura on those very words in resolution 2254 (2015). I remind Council members that the success of the political track and the tangible enhancement of the humanitarian situation will depend primarily on creating an environment conducive to international and regional commitment to seriously fighting terrorism in Syria and freeing the process from politicization. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.
Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) ; United Nations S/PV.8188 Security Council Seventy-third year 8188th meeting Saturday, 24 February 2018, noon New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Hickey United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05017 (E) *1805017* S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 2/14 18-05017 The meeting was called to order at 2.10 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/146, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. I now give the floor to members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Sweden and Kuwait earlier this week put forward a draft resolution to respond to the desperate calls of the United Nations and the humanitarian community in Syria for a cessation of hostilities for an initial period of 30 days, in order to allow for much-needed humanitarian relief. We have been working intensely with all Council members to operationalize the concrete requests of the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above, all the civilian population on the ground. We have done our utmost to accommodate Council members' concerns. It is now time for the Council to unanimously shoulder its responsibility and show that meaningful action is possible. The key components in our draft resolution are a nationwide cessation of hostilities for at least 30 days, weekly United Nations humanitarian aid convoys to all areas in need, and immediate emergency medical evacuations. The United Nations convoys and evacuation teams are ready to go. The draft resolution also calls for the immediate lifting of sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. It reiterates its demand, reminding in particular the Syrian authorities that all parties have an obligation to act in accordance with international law to protect civilians and hospitals and other medical facilities. The draft makes an exception for military operations directed against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups designated by the Security Council. This in no way relieves the parties to the conflict in Syria from upholding their obligations under international law at all times, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. The draft resolution is not a comprehensive peace deal on Syria; its aim is purely humanitarian. There are already ceasefire agreements in force for the areas where fighting has escalated the most. They need to be complied with. There are existing monitoring mechanisms that can be utilized. The role of the Council is to push the parties to the conflict to comply with the proposed cessation of hostilities in order to urgently enable needed alleviation of suffering for the people of Syria. If the draft resolution is adopted today, it can de-escalate violence, save lives, alleviate suffering and break the deadlock on humanitarian access and sieges. Since the first call for a cessation of hostilities, the situation has gotten dramatically worse, particularly in eastern Ghouta, as we have heard from the Secretary- General and from Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. After seven years of war, the situation for innocent civilians in Syria has never been worse. But we have an opportunity to turn things around today to avert the disaster unfolding before our eyes. The draft resolution before the Council represents a resolute and very urgent attempt for the Council to take decisive and meaningful action. Today, we count on each and every member to do the right thing. The President (spoke in Arabic): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America The President (spoke in Arabic): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2401 (2018). 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 3/14 I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Kuwait. I associate myself with the statement just made by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on our behalf. The unanimous adoption today of resolution 2401 (2018), following lengthy and intensive negotiations, demonstrates that the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, are keen to ensure unanimity on this important humanitarian resolution. The resolution renews hope in the Security Council's ability to be unified and speak in one voice, sending a clear and explicit message that it rejects any violations of the Charter of the United Nations. I wish to thank all Member States that voted in favour of the resolution, which includes key and specific demands in response to the appeals of the international community, the most important of which are as follows. First, it demands that all parties cease fire without delay throughout Syria for a minimum of 30 days. Secondly, it allows the United Nations and its partners to immediately undertake medical evacuations safely and unconditionally. Thirdly, it requires all parties to ensure the unimpeded and safe access of all humanitarian and medical workers. Fourthly, it calls on all parties to lift the siege of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. We are totally convinced that, while the resolution may not end the humanitarian suffering in Syria at once, it is a positive message that the Council today is solidary and united to end this humanitarian suffering and hostilities right away. The biggest task now is to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the resolution in order to save civilian lives in Syria and deliver their humanitarian needs immediately. The Security Council still has a great deal to do so as to end this tragic crisis in Syria, which is about to complete its seventh year. The resolution that we have adopted today is only an interim solution, as a political solution in Syria is the only way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the crisis and meet the aspirations of the brotherly Syrian people, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). The State of Kuwait stresses the importance of reaching an agreement among Council members to prevent any attempt to obstruct a draft resolution aimed at stopping flagrant violations of human rights. Kuwait supports the code of conduct proposed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, whereby Council members would pledge not to obstruct draft resolutions that address crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also support the Mexican-French initiative calling on restraint in the use of the veto in the event of serious violations of human rights, based on our commitments to abide by the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, international humanitarian law and the outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. We call for engagement on general humanitarian issues, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the evacuation of the sick and injured, and humanitarian truce, as procedural issues. In order to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and the great suffering of humankind, the veto must not be used in such instances. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the other members of the Council that wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I want to thank the penholders, Sweden and Kuwait, for their work, their sacrifice and their time in the negotiations. As we look at the negotiations, I think it is also important that we bring the Council some of the voices of the Syrian people in eastern Ghouta, who have suffered so much while waiting for the Security Council to act. A doctor treating patients in a makeshift hospital described the conditions she is facing: "We are mental and emotional wrecks. There is nothing more we can do. We are bled dry." In a haunting video, the doctor walks into a room with a crying mother as she says, "I am waiting for my son to die. At least he will be free of pain. I was just making bread for him when the roof fell in. He is going straight to heaven. At least in heaven there is food." Another message we received yesterday which I think was relayed to Council members in the closed consultations, but which I think it is important to repeat again — was an emergency call from a doctor in eastern Ghouta, who said: "We have a horrible situation here. We are being targeted with all kinds of weapons, non-stop. We lack everything: water, food, medical supplies, S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 4/14 18-05017 shelter. This is a disaster. Everyone is just waiting to die." Today, the Security Council finally took a step towards addressing these devastating levels of human suffering in Syria. The United States wants nothing more than to see the ceasefire in resolution 2401 (2018) implemented immediately across the country. It is critical that the Al-Assad regime and its allies comply with our demand to stop the assault on eastern Ghouta and immediately allow food and medicine to reach everyone who needs it. All of us on the Council must do our part to press the Al-Assad regime as hard as we can to comply. But we are late to respond to this crisis — very late. On Wednesday, the Secretary-General made an emotional plea for an immediate ceasefire in Syria to allow the very basic necessities to get to the people. Kuwait and Sweden had a version of the resolution ready to go for a vote, but Russia called for a delay. On Thursday, in an effort to stall, Russia called for an open meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. At that meeting (S/PV.8186), 14 members of the Council were ready to impose a ceasefire, but Russia obstructed the vote again. And then yesterday, the Council sat around for hours, ready to vote, only to have Russia delay it again. Every minute the Council waited on Russia, the human suffering grew. Getting to a vote became a moral responsibility for everyone, but not for Russia, not for Syria, and not for Iran. I have to ask: why? At least 19 health facilities have been bombed since Sunday. As they dragged out the negotiations, the bombs from Al-Assad's fighter jets continued to fall. In the three days it took us to adopt the resolution, how many mothers lost their kids to the bombing and the shelling? How many more images did we need to see of fathers holding their dead children? All for nothing, because here we are voting for a ceasefire that could have saved lives days ago. And after all of this time, hardly anything has changed in the resolution except a few words and some commas. The Syrian people should not have to die waiting for Russia to organize its instructions from Moscow or to discuss them with the Syrians. Why did the Council allow this? There is no good reason we should not have done this Wednesday, or Thursday, or Friday. We may not know the faces that we are talking about. We may not know their names, or these people, but they know us. And we all failed them this week. I guess there is unity in that. Today, Russia has belatedly decided to join the international consensus and accept the need to call for a ceasefire, but only after trying every possible way to avoid it. The resolution marks a moment of Council unity that we must seize and maintain beyond the 30-day timeframe. We hope that the resolution will be a turning point, where Russia will join us in pushing for a political settlement to this conflict and take action to re-establish real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Progress starts by adhering to the ceasefire with no excuses. After so many years of defying the Council's demands, the Al-Assad regime must change course. None of us should be so naïve as to accept that the Al-Assad regime can continue indiscriminately bombing schools, hospitals and homes under the fake excuse of "counter-terrorism". Al-Assad's bombing must stop. The ceasefire must be given a chance to work. We look to the Al-Assad regime's backers, especially Russia and Iran, to address what the Secretary-General rightly called a "hell on Earth". All eyes will now be on the Syrian regime, Iran and Russia. Our goal with this resolution is clear. The Al-Assad regime needs to stop its military activities around eastern Ghouta, and for once allow humanitarian access to all of those who need it. We are deeply skeptical that the regime will comply, but we supported the resolution because we must demand nothing less. We owe that to the innocent people of Syria begging for help. In the days to come, our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution will be tested. All of us must rise to the challenge of maintaining this ceasefire, just as we came together today. All of us must do everything we can to make the demands of the resolution a reality. That is the only way to restore the credibility of the Council. The Syrian people have been waiting long enough. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Following lengthy consultations, during which the overwhelming majority of delegations demonstrated a sincere focus on seeking joint solutions — for which we thank them — the Security Council has unanimously adopted the humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), on Syria. I wish to particularly thank the penholders, the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Sweden, for their tireless efforts 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 5/14 and resolve to reach a compromise up until the very last moment. Russia supports the resolution because it encourages the Syrian parties to work as quickly as possible to bring a halt to the hostilities, comply with previous agreed-on decisions in that regard, engage in negotiations on a general de-escalation and establish extended humanitarian pauses throughout the country. The reason it took us so long to reach agreement on the resolution was because we did not support the directives it included for an immediate cessation of hostilities for a relatively long period, and the reason for that was simply because it was unachievable in that form. A ceasefire would not have happened if we had adopted the directives without any concrete agreement between the warring parties, and any approach so removed from reality would definitely not help to address the pressing humanitarian problems in Syria. It will be crucial to ensure that the Security Council's demands are reinforced by concrete agreements on the ground. It would be naive to think that any of these complicated issues can be resolved overnight. We trust that all the external stakeholders with influence will work to bring that about. We can see that some foreign sponsors of the illegal armed groups have either fallen very short in that regard or have been deliberately flouting their obligations. Russia is working with all the parties to the conflict and doing everything possible to normalize the situation and actively assist the humanitarian efforts. Iran and Turkey, our partners in the Astana process, have taken on a major part of the work, and we are preparing for an important meeting in the Astana format next month. In the southern de-escalation zone a fairly decent level of cooperation has been established with Jordan and the United States, although we have been seeing tension rising in some areas owing to activity by armed groups. The resolution clearly states that it does not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Jabhat Al-Nusra, other Al-Qaida-affiliated organizations and various groups that the Security Council has recognized as terrorists. That struggle that will continue. We call on international stakeholders to coordinate closely on this issue, including with the Syrian authorities, and in strict compliance with international law and with respect for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The goal of combating terrorism must not become a pretext for solving this or that geopolitical issue of dubious legitimacy, which is exactly what the United States is doing in Syria. Instead of being drowned in rhetoric about Russia — and by the way, next time I am going to count the number of times Ambassador Haley mentions my country — what we are insisting on is a prompt end to the occupation-style efforts of the so-called coalition, which, among other things, would have a definite humanitarian impact, enabling the Syrian Government to address the issue of restoring normal life in all the areas that have been liberated from terrorists, including in the north and the east of the country. Closing the coalition's Al-Tanf military base would solve the problem of the internally displaced persons in the Rukban camp. In that connection, we would also like to point out that every effort should be made to deliver aid via the most direct routes, as provided for in the humanitarian resolutions on Syria. It is important that today's resolution calls for speeding up the immediate deployment of humanitarian mine-clearing operations throughout Syria. It also reiterates the demand that all parties demilitarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian infrastructure and refrain from establishing military positions in residential areas, something that the illegal armed groups have frequently been guilty of. The conflict's flashpoints are more clearly identified, and are not limited to eastern Ghouta and Idlib, and that includes Raqqa, which the coalition has laid waste. It also expresses indignation at the militias' shelling of Damascus, in which our Embassy has been hit several times. We know that the humanitarian situation in Syria is dire and in urgent need of effective measures, but we can see perfectly well that the propagandistic picture being painted of eastern Ghouta is identical to the loud campaign in late 2016 during the counter-terrorist operation to liberate eastern Aleppo. We must engage not just with eastern Ghouta, but with Raqqa, Rukban, Foah, Kefraya and Yarmouk. Every area of Syria should get help. The resolution emphasizes the importance of supporting the restoration of stability in the areas that civilians are returning to, which in our view sends an unambiguous message to those capitals that continue to make restoration assistance conditional on a specific transitional direction in the political process. It stipulates that the humanitarian priorities for Syria in 2018 are not limited to Under-Secretary-General Lowcock's five requests. The agenda is far broader. We S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 6/14 18-05017 hope in particular that the specialized United Nations agencies and their partners will be sensitive to requests from the Syrian authorities. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep concern about the public statements by certain United States officials threatening aggression against Syria, a sovereign country. This is a warning that we will not countenance any arbitrary interpretation of the resolution that has just been adopted. We demand an end to this irresponsible and hateful rhetoric. Rather, there should be joint efforts to settle the conflict in Syria on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that a cessation of hostilities be established without delay throughout Syria, in order to enable humanitarian personnel to evacuate the wounded and to gain access to the population. The negotiations were arduous. However, despite their differences in approach, the members of the Security Council managed to prevail in the name of the humanitarian imperative. The resolution is vital in the true meaning of that word, since halting the shelling and evacuating the wounded are matters of life and death for thousands of Syrian people, especially in eastern Ghouta, which has been under siege by the Damascus regime for days. I would like to thank the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden — which introduced the resolution, with our support — for their efforts, perseverance and outstanding work in arriving at a robust text. As by President Macron and the Secretary-General forcefully recalled last Wednesday, it is imperative and urgent to end the shelling of eastern Ghouta, Idlib and the whole of Syrian territory immediately. That was the thrust of yesterday's joint call by President Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel to President Putin during their demanding and close conversation on the issue. It is also the reason for our vote today. The resolution is the outcome of our concerted efforts, as well as a belated response to the violence unleashed against civilians in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere. Let us make no mistake: a cessation of hostilities for an initial 30 days to enable humanitarian access to meet vital urgent needs is only the very first step. It is the minimal response to the repeated demands of both the United Nations and humanitarian actors, which have been conveyed for months by Council members, in particular by France. It is now up to the regime's supporters to ensure full compliance with the cessation of hostilities without delay and to respond to all requests for access to humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations in accordance with the text we have just adopted. We specifically call on the guarantors of the Astana process to assume their responsibilities and effectively ensure that the Syrian regime immediately cease its hostilities and ensure respect for the basic principles and rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law. It is urgent that humanitarian assistance reach without delay the people who need it. Every minute counts because every minute can lead to the loss of lives. Nothing would be worse than to see this resolution remain a dead letter. That is why France will be extremely vigilant on all those points over the coming hours and days. We all know that a return to stability in Syria is the only way to put a definitive end to the humanitarian crisis, for which a political solution is required. More than ever, therefore, we must redouble our efforts to establish a neutral environment that will enable a credible political process and elections to be held in Syria, as part of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). France is ready to continue working tirelessly with its partners to that end. As we said yesterday in this forum, the elements for a regional and potentially major international confrontation have coalesced today. That is a risk that must be taken very seriously. We must therefore come together, as we have done today, to put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe under way, prevent a spillover of the conflict and seek an inclusive political solution in Syria. These are three indissociable priorities, and our generation will be judged on whether or not we are able to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. This text is a potentially important step, but it is obviously not the end of the road. Let us be frank: the hardest part has yet to be done. Therefore, on behalf of France, I would like to launch a two-pronged appeal. The first is a call for the resolution to be fully and immediately implemented. We are all aware that pitfalls and obstacles abound. This is a reflection of the extent to which resolute and coordinated engagement by all members of the Security Council is crucial to ensuring that the provisions we have just adopted are implemented on the ground without delay. To put it even more clearly: if we do not put all our resources 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 7/14 and energy behind the full implementation of this resolution, we know that it will not work. Above all, that applies to Russia and the Astana guarantors. The second call is to use this truce as leverage to put an end to the spiral of violence in the Syrian tragedy and create positive momentum towards an inclusive political settlement in Syria. That must be our common ambition. There is a glimmer of hope today in that regard. Let us seize this fragile moment to begin to reverse the course of events, despite the magnitude of the difficulties ahead. As the Council knows, France is fully committed to that goal. Mr. Hickey (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, we applaud your work, Mr. President, together with Sweden, as co-penholders. But this is not a moment for self-congratulation. It has taken us far too long to agree this resolution. While we have been arguing over commas, Al-Assad's planes have been killing more civilians in their homes and in their hospitals, imposing unbearable suffering. Despite the amount of time we have spent in this Chamber over many years discussing the devastating humanitarian crisis, we have still not been able to achieve the peace and security that the Syrian people so desperately need. As the conflict enters its eighth year, the situation in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in the country is far worse than we ever thought imaginable. The barbarity and depravity of the Al-Assad regime shows no limits. We must never lose sight of the fact that the pictures we see and the stories we hear from this comfortable Chamber are the agonizing reality for hundreds of thousands of civilians — for men, women and children who are being forced to eke out an existence underground to avoid being killed by a regime that commits daily atrocities against its own people. I have heard some say that the information about the situation in eastern Ghouta is propaganda. A doctor in eastern Ghouta, having heard such comments, said this morning: "Amid the chaos and the bombs, it is the not being believed that almost hurts the most. We are dying here every day. And when people say that they do not believe us, that is pain upon pain." This is not propaganda. It is a living hell for hundreds of thousands of residents of eastern Ghouta. As we have repeated many times, the intentional and systematic targeting of civilians and civilian objects not only violates international humanitarian law, it is a war crime. The United Kingdom will be unrelenting in our campaign to ensure accountability. By having voted in favour of the resolution today, we are standing up and saying that we will not stand by and let this happen. In the face of escalating violence, devastation and suffering, we must all now take practical steps to improve the situation for those living and dying in a hell of one man's making. The resolution demonstrates our resolve to put a stop to the brutal violence. It demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay. That means right now, immediately. The role and responsibility of the Council does not end with the adoption of this resolution, quite the opposite. All States Members of the United Nations, but particularly Council members, must now take responsibility for ensuring that the resolution is implemented in full, without delay. The resolution calls for the Council to review its implementation within 15 days, but we must all be active in supporting and monitoring implementation from the moment we step out of the Chamber. If we see any of the parties violating the terms of the resolution, we must bring it back to the Council immediately. Those with any influence over the Syrian regime — Russia, Iran — have a particular responsibility to ensure that the ceasefire is respected in full and without delay, that all sieges are ended and that humanitarian aid is delivered. This is the absolute minimum that the people of Syria deserve. As much as we welcome the adoption of this resolution today, it is only a small step. Just as one aid convoy in three months to a besieged area cannot even begin to address the humanitarian crisis, one resolution alone cannot solve the situation in Syria. We must do everything in our collective power to ensure that this resolution is effective in delivering for those whom we have failed to date. We must all send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime: abandon your attempt to pursue a military strategy, stop fighting and engage seriously in United Nations-led political talks in Geneva. In conclusion, let me reiterate the words of my Foreign Secretary. The entire world is looking at the Al-Assad regime, Russia and Iran. They hold the keys not only to the end of this obscene conflict, but to the safety, humanitarian aid and basic medical treatment S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 8/14 18-05017 that is being denied to millions of people right now in Syria. For the mother giving birth underground in eastern Ghouta, for the child unable to learn as schools are closed for yet another day, for the doctor battling air strikes to treat patients in Idlib — all of us sitting here today owe it to the people of Syria to work together with renewed and unyielding energy to achieve a political solution that will bring peace to the Syrian people. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): The recent escalation of conflict in the affected areas of Syria has caught the attention of the international community. We acutely feel the suffering of the Syrian people as if it were inflicted upon us. China condemns all acts of violence that target civilians and civilian property and destroy innocent lives. China welcomes the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which is the result of Council members' patient consultation and hard work to find consensus. The resolution includes positive elements such as calling for respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; demanding a cessation of hostilities by all parties; easing the humanitarian situation in Syria; supporting mine action throughout Syria; and continuing to combat terrorism. As an active party to the consultation process, China made unflagging efforts and played a constructive role in facilitating consensus-building in the Council. China appreciates that, thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties concerned, the Council arrived at a solution that reflects the broadest possible consensus among Council members. I would like in particular to thank Kuwait and Sweden, as co-penholders of the resolution, for their tireless efforts. By speaking with one voice on the humanitarian situation in Syria, the Security Council is helping to alleviate the situation as a whole, helping to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, contributing to counter-terrorism efforts in the country and serving the overarching objective of arriving at a political settlement of the Syrian issue. Going forward, the international community should work together to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so that it can play a positive role in improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. The only way to fundamentally improve the humanitarian situation in Syria and to lift the people of Syria out of their suffering is to find a political settlement. The international community should support the Syrian parties in seeking a swift solution that is acceptable to all parties in the context of a United Nations mediation through a Syrian-owned and -led political process in order to end the suffering of the Syrian people as soon as possible. China is keen for the Council to remain united and forge consensus on the Syrian issue. The Council must push the Syrian parties to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, strengthen cooperation on combating terrorist groups, advance the process towards a political settlement and play a constructive role in maintaining peace and security in Syria and across the region. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): The delegation of Kazakhstan voted in favour of resolution 2401 (2018), on the cessation of hostilities in Syria. I express my gratitude to the co-penholders — Sweden and Kuwait — for their determined efforts to find common ground among the Security Council members. I also thank the members of the Council for their constructive approach towards the resolution, which has many significant provisions. The position of Kazakhstan is very consistent — that stability in the Middle East can be achieved by reducing violence for peaceful means and avoiding the emergence of new tensions. In the past few days, Heads of State and Government from around the world have called on the Syrian Government to observe human rights and on both sides to exercise restraint. Simultaneously, external incitement that fuels tension should stop immediately so that it does not endanger regional security. We see a Security Council united today in demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay. We now expect all countries that exercise influence on the ground and conduct military campaigns against international terrorist groups in Syria to interact and find common ground for fighting terrorism jointly, while taking practical steps to implement the resolution. Kazakhstan calls on all forces that support an early settlement of the Syrian conflict, including the Government of Syria and the armed opposition, to fully comply with the ceasefire regime and the resolution. All the parties must ensure safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to reach the affected areas, as well as the evacuation of people in need of medical assistance. The Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan hopes that his colleagues — the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor States of the Astana process — will take additional constructive steps to strictly implement the 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 9/14 ceasefire agreements and support the de-escalation zones in Syria, at the meeting scheduled to take place in the capital of Kazakhstan in mid-March or earlier, if need be. These were difficult, but successful, deliberations. We should all work collectively to find a peaceful solution. The unity shown today in the Security Council should continue, since we have yet a lot to accomplish in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): On Wednesday, during the high-level debate on the Charter of the United Nations, I quoted one of the founding fathers of the United Nations, Ambassador Stettinius (see S/PV.8185). He said that the members of the Security Council had the obligation to agree so that the Council may be able to act and act effectively. Today we finally managed to agree to end the atrocious violence in eastern Ghouta; to end attacks against hospitals; and to end the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes the unanimous adoption of this crucial resolution — resolution 2401 (2018). Let me thank the co-penholders in particular — Kuwait and Sweden — for their tireless efforts and skilled diplomatic work. We pay tribute to them. Today we have a resolution, now we need to see action on the ground. All United Nations States Members have an obligation to make sure that the words of the resolution are implemented without delay. The Syrian authorities in particular have a specific responsibility towards their own people. The resolution means that all parties must cease hostilities without delay. All parties must engage immediately for a sustainable and durable humanitarian pause of at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and to enable medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international law. The implementation of the resolution means the cessation of hostilities, the delivery of humanitarian aid and urgent medical evacuations. It is a first step in the right direction, but much more is needed — a political solution, accountability and the return of refugees. The Council should remain seized of the matter and closely monitor the implementation of the resolution, starting today. The Council should reconvene without delay if the situation demands it. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): We highly commend the work of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders on the humanitarian resolution for Syria — resolution 2401 (2018) — who did their best to accommodate the concerns of all Security Council members. On Wednesday I stressed that it is the Council's responsibility to not fail in stopping the ongoing human tragedy in Syria, and in eastern Ghouta in particular (see S/PV.8185). Today we have managed to reach compromise and adopt the resolution by consensus. I would like to thank all my colleagues for their very constructive attitude. However, the innocent people of Syria have waited far too long for that. Now, all of the parties, especially those with influence on the ground, must make every effort to implement it. In that context, we reiterate our call on all sides to comply with international humanitarian law, cease all hostilities against civilians and allow for free humanitarian access. In conclusion, it is not only our legal obligation to act now, but also our moral duty. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), I take the floor on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose Government closely followed the whole process leading up to its successful conclusion with the unanimous adoption of this humanitarian resolution. At the outset, I pay a well-deserved tribute to the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, for all their efforts, patience and dedication to the goal of drafting a resolution that was ultimately deserving of a favourable vote. We commend the unanimous support of the elected members for the penholders throughout the duration of that process. In Spanish, it is often said that "it is never too late if the outcome is good". This positive outcome is the result of the contributions of all members of the Council, to which we extend our gratitude and commend for the fruitful end. What lies ahead now is the effective implementation of the provisions of the resolution with a view to achieving the objective the Security Council has set out to achieve, namely, an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, unhindered and sustainable delivery S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 10/14 18-05017 of humanitarian aid, services and medical evacuations of all severely injured and ill persons. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea energetically calls on all parties, the United Nations and those involved in the devastating conflict to do everything possible towards the noble end of saving human lives and alleviating the suffering that has been endured far too long by the people. The adoption of the resolution partially spares all members of the Security Council from embarrassment. We will save ourselves completely from that shame if the ceasefire takes effect in the next few hours and if humanitarian aid and medical care begin to reach the affected persons over the upcoming days. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Seven years have elapsed since the beginning of this war, and the suffering of the Syrian people continues to worsen. The numerous human lives lost in recent weeks add to the more than 500,000 lost since the beginning of the conflict. We believe that while military tactics prevail over a political solution, there can be no lasting peace, and consequently it will be civilians, especially women and children, who will continue to be subjected to unnecessary suffering. For that reason, we commend the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), and hope that its timely and effective implementation will help to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation underscores and commends the arduous work undertaken by the penholders. The delegations of Sweden and Kuwait have demonstrated strong leadership and resolve up to the very last moment to reach an agreement. Similarly, we wish to acknowledge the effort and commitment shown by the Russian Federation and the parties involved, as well as all members of the Security Council during the negotiation process. In recent days, my delegation has expressed its position on the matter at hand, and today we do so once again. Consensus and unity within the Security Council are pivotal if we are to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria, which is why we commend the consensus reached today. We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the situation and that the only way forward is through inclusive political dialogue. We thefaffirm our support for the Geneva process and the achievements made in Astana, of which the agreements must be upheld by all parties. Moreover, we have high expectations that the various forums of dialogue, such as the Sochi dialogue, can contribute to the achievement of a final and lasting peace. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We voted in favour because we believe that the resolution can make a positive difference on the ground in the alleviation of the continued tragedy of the Syrians. Having discussed the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria almost weekly, it was clear that what was required from the Council was concrete and collective action that would contribute to alleviating the intolerable suffering of Syrians in all areas of the country. We are pleased that the Council has acted and sent the right message to bring about a cessation of hostilities that will allow the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to have safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to deliver the much-needed humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need. I wish to express our sincere appreciation to the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, which effectively and efficiently led the process of negotiations. We all know that it was not an easy task, but they did excellent work in accommodating the concerns of all delegations with a high sense of responsibility and patience. We also thank all delegations for their flexibility during the negotiation process. We hope that the positive spirit that led the Council to adopt the resolution will prevail, not only in ensuring its effective implementation, but also in laying the bases for greater mutual understanding among all those with enormous influence over developments in Syria, whether in the humanitarian or political and security domains. We know, given the realities, that this is a tall order. One matter needs to be stressed on this occasion. The security situation in Syria is perhaps more complicated today than it has ever been over the past few years. We should not overlook the fact that the source of the humanitarian tragedy that we see today is the result of the difficult political and security situation in the country. We trust that all those, including those whom Ambassador Delattre referred to, will continue to play a role in contributing to the creation of the basis for progress in the peace process. That is extremely critical for ensuring that the humanitarian tragedy is Syria is brought to an end. We can only hope that what the Council has achieved today will lay the basis for averting an even greater humanitarian tragedy in Syria. 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 11/14 Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We wish to thank you, Mr. President, and your team, as well as the Permanent Representative of Sweden and his team, for the tireless efforts made to achieve this important consensus, and we also thank the members of the Council for their flexibility. This commitment will allow for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Syria and the urgent and necessary provision of humanitarian assistance. We underscore the need to maintain unity within the Council in terms of its responsibilities to protect the civilian population, in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru, a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted, will closely monitor its urgent implementation and compliance therewith by all parties involved. We wish to express our sorrow concerning and solidarity with the victims of the conflict in Syria, and our support and admiration for the United Nations humanitarian workers and those of other agencies deployed on the ground. We hope that the important step that we have taken today will help to achieve a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire, as a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted and which is purely humanitarian in nature, commends its initiators, namely, your country, Mr. President, and Sweden. It welcomes the adoption of the resolution, which demands the cessation without delay of hostilities. This demand on the part of the Council must be upheld by all actors on every battlefield in Syria. Côte d'Ivoire also welcomes the efforts undertaken by all parties to arrive at a consensus within the Council. It thanks in particular the Russian Federation for its spirit of compromise. The contribution made by all parties to the adoption of the resolution is aimed at saving the Syrian people from the horrific war plaguing that country, which is imperilling the lives of thousands of human beings, specifically civilians, including women and children. Côte d'Ivoire remains convinced that only a definitive end to the Syrian conflict through negotiations can enable all Syrians to restore peace, achieve reconciliation and rebuild their country, with a view to relaunching its economic and social development. We hope that the 30-day truce demanded by the Council will be the beginning of a process that will bring peace to Syria on the basis of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of all negotiations held in Astana, Sochi and Geneva concerning the country. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): Over the past two days, 10 of the thousands of missiles that have fallen on the Syrian capital landed on the headquarters of the Red Crescent in Damascus, the main headquarters of the Syrian Red Crescent, in the Abu Ramani neighbourhood of Damascus. Those missiles were launched by the moderate armed groups in Al-Ghouta. Thousands of people died, including Dr. Hassan, a professor at the Technological Health Institute in Damascus. A French colleague and friend, Thierry Mariani, said: (spoke in French) "Like hundreds of others over the past five years, Dr. Hassan Haj Hassan was killed by shells fired from Ghouta on Damascus by these moderate rebels. Those dead and are not entitled to media compassion; they are on the wrong side of history. When will there be balanced coverage?" (spoke in Arabic) This French citizen accurately described the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the launching by terrorists of missiles against Damascus. He had visited Aleppo in 2017, and as he was leaving Free Syrian Army gangs fired rockets at the airport. Luckily he was not hurt, but since then the Aleppo airport has been closed because it is unsafe. Also. the head of the Syrian Red Crescent in Idlib, Dr. Muhammad Al-Waty, was kidnapped by moderate armed groups. My colleague the Permanent Representative of France said that we must observe a truce, and I agree with him. However, I think that we also need to implement the 29 other Security Council resolutions on the situation in Syria, of which 13 relate to the fight against terrorism. We need not only a month-long cessation of hostilities; we also need to see the implementation of the 29 other resolutions that the Council has adopted. My colleague the British Ambassador told us horrific stories that he heard from other people. Perhaps S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 12/14 18-05017 he has not heard about what the British forces have done in Iraq, Palestine and Libya. The British Government went to the Malvinas and fought Argentina for an island that it does not own and that is situated tens of thousands of kilometres away from the United Kingdom. However, I say to my British colleague that his Government — and I am not using the term "regime", because I respect international law — is preventing us from countering terrorism in our own territories. We are not going thousands of kilometres away, we have not been fighting in other countries. It is in our own territories that we are combating terrorism — terrorism that is supported by the Government of the United Kingdom. During the meeting on Thursday (see S/PV.8186), I explained the reality of what is happening in Syria — the suffering of civilians as a result of the actions of armed terrorist groups. I assure members once again that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has taken all the de-escalation initiatives seriously and has observed them so as to protect the lives of its citizens and to stop those who have been trading in their pain and blood. In that regard, I note that the Syrian Government has complied with the Astana agreement on establishing de-escalation zones and stipulated a number of commitments, including compelling the signatory armed groups to sever any ties they have with terrorist organizations, especially the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusra Front and all other affiliated groups. At the same time, the Astana agreement gave the Syrian Government the right to respond in case of any violations by those armed groups. It was not at all surprising to us that those terrorist armed groups would not comply with any of those initiatives, but would use them as an opportunity to reorganize their forces and their terrorist fighters, acquire more arms, military equipment, human and logistical support and perpetuate their crimes against the Syrian people. They are receiving instructions from certain States members of the Council, as well as regional actors that are practicing State terrorism to ensure the obstruction and failure of those initiatives and agreements. Since the signing of the agreement on the establishment of de-escalation zones, these armed groups have systematically violated it. In responding to the violations, the Syrian Government has exercised extreme self-restraint to protect the lives of civilians and salvage the agreement that terrorist armed groups and the countries that sponsor them have been trying to obstruct since the moment of signing it. However, these violations have become repeated and serious and have affected the lives of 8 million civilians living in the capital, Damascus, and its suburbs. Attacks have been waged by launching rockets and missiles and using car bombs, with Syrian military sites being targeted. All this has led to an unbearable situation that we cannot condone. As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism. We are also receiving repeated appeals from Syrian citizens for protection — their families, their children, their schools — from the acts of these terrorist armed groups In the light of these violations and terrorist acts, the Syrian Government has had to take the necessary steps to protect its citizens. We exercised our legitimate right to defend them. At the same time, we have taken all the steps necessary to ensure the safety of the civilians who have been taken hostage by these groups and used as human shields inside eastern Ghouta. In cooperation with our Russian friends, we also ensured the safe passage of civilians out of danger from 4 to 14 February. We have provided shelter and food and necessary medical care. The Government has paid for all that assistance. We have called upon armed groups to lay down their weapons and stop their terrorism from residential places and neighbourhoods, and instead engage in national reconciliation initiatives. Of course, the appeals of 8 million Syrians do not reach the Secretariat or the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, although they receive appeals from their proxies — terrorist armed groups and White Helmet terrorists, the new legitimate representative of the Al-Nusra Front. It seems that these countries decided today to replace the black flags of ISIL and Al-Qaida with white flags in Iraq and the White Helmets in Syria. We are therefore done with using the black colour; we are using the white colour now, white flags in Iraq and White Helmets in Syria. According to General Assembly resolution 46/182, which we all negotiated and reached consensus on, the basic principle that governs the delivery of humanitarian aid is respect for the sovereignty of the country concerned as well as coordinating with it fully in any activity in which the United Nations is engaged on the territory of the country in question. However, such principles lose all value when they are 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 13/14 subject to the political whims and double standards of the Secretariat and some more influential countries, particularly when it comes to implementing them in Syria. How else can we explain that some countries submit draft resolutions on the situation in Syria and negotiate them for many weeks with all actors, but excluding the country concerned? This is what I asked the day before yesterday. How do we explain that the Resident Coordinator in Damascus sends a note to the Syrian Foreign Ministry on 14 February stressing that the aid convoys reached 2.3 million Syrians in the so-called besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017, while the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs presented completely false figures yesterday to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and to give Western countries in the Security Council justification for targeting the Syrian Government and its partners? The Resident Coordinator said that aid had reached 2.3 million Syrians. But just two days ago, Mr. Lowcock said that aid had reached only 20,000 people. Along with some members of the Council, we have said repeatedly over the past seven years that to end the suffering of civilians in Syria we do not need non-consensual draft resolutions, nor do we need to adopt new resolutions or hold regular or emergency meetings. We do not need to deplete United Nations resources to prepare periodic reports that rely on unreliable sources. We do not need to establish a committee here and a body there. We need to implement the 29 — now 30 — Security Council resolutions that have been adopted; it is quite a coincidence that by adopting resolution 2401 (2018) today we have reached 30 resolutions. These resolutions should be implemented. The Governments of some countries should stop spending billions of dollars to support and finance armed terrorist groups and provide them with arms. The latest we have heard is that the United States of America has allocated $4 billion to ublically fund the terrorists in Syria. Those countries must stop opening their borders and airports to facilitate the flow of terrorist fighters to Syria. They must allow the Syrian people to shape its future and restore its security and stability without any foreign interference. You said, Mr. President, that the Council rejects anything that violates the purposes and principles of the Charter. Yes, this is very precise. You called also for the implementation of today's resolution in all parts of Syria, which is how we interpret this resolution in Damascus. Resolution 2401 (2018) must be implemented in all parts of Syria, including Afrin, United States-occupied areas and the Golan. In addition, let me make it clear that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France and their enablers in the region should stop holding meetings in Washington, D.C., Paris and London, establishing groups, bodies or forums and devising what they refer to as strategic plans reminiscent of colonial times. Following a meeting in Washington, D.C., they announced that they had drafted a plan to divide Syria within a year — I am just recounting what they said. The strategic plans contained in the document adopted in Washington, D.C., are aimed at dividing Syria, changing its political system by force, spreading terrorism and maintaining an illegitimate military presence in our territories. I say to my colleague the Permanent Representative of the United States, who threatened us here at the Council a while ago and no one has responded to her, that none of the plans will succeed; they will backfire sooner or later. According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, my country has the right to defend itself with all of the legal tools available. A United States occupying military presence exists in our territories, and we have the right to resist it. The representative of the United States has threatened us. We, in turn, give her a warning from this Chamber because, according to Article 51 of the Charter, we have the right to defend ourselves. We again stress that double standards will continue to mar international efforts to counter terrorism as long as there is a partial approach to addressing the threat of armed groups in Syria. Some members of the Council claim that they are concerned about an area controlled by terrorist armed groups in eastern Ghouta. The size of that area is 50 square kilometres. They continue to ignore three illegally occupied Syrian territories covering 50,000 square kilometres. They focus on 50 square kilometres and ignore an area of 50,000 square kilometres, of American, Turkish and Israeli occupation. That simple comparison reflects the political hypocrisy of some Member States, and the inaction of the Security Council and of other bodies of the United Nations, as the Organization succumbs to the political and financial polarization that has become the main feature of its working methods. S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 14/14 18-05017 In conclusion, we will continue, with the support our allies, to counter terrorism regardless of where it exists in Syria — I repeat, regardless of where it exists in Syria. We are exercising our sovereign right of self-defence and a constitutional right in our territory and within our national borders. We do not send forces to conquer areas thousands of kilometres away, as the so-called illegitimate international coalition does in my country, Syria, today. We do not follow the example of French forces in Mali, the Niger and other African countries, or of the United States and United Kingdom in Afghanistan, Libya today and Iraq previously. We defend ourselves and counter terrorism within our borders. We did not go to Mali, the Niger or the Malvinas. We need serious commitment from Governments that issue instructions to armed terrorist groups. The groups should be given orders to immediately stop targeting civilians and perpetrating terrorist acts — I repeat immediately and without delay, as the resolution stipulates. I stress that the Syrian Government will reserve the right to respond as it deems appropriate if such groups target civilians in any part of Syria with even a single missile. I take it that we all understand that paragraph 1 of resolution 2401 (2018) also applies to the aggression of Turkish forces in Afrin and the repeated acts of aggression by the international coalition against my country's sovereignty and territories. Of course, resolution 2401 (2018) applies also to the continuous violations by Israeli occupation forces against Syria's sovereignty, by supporting terrorist factions in the occupied Syrian Golan. That is how we interpret the resolution just adopted by the Council. The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.
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Ethiopia's Tigray conflict—one of the world's deadliest conflicts—has been characterized by a particularly dire level of gender-based violence (GBV). Throughout the two-year war, experts estimate that GBV was committed against at least 40 to 50 percent of women and girls in the Tigray, Amhara, Afar, and Oromia regions of Ethiopia. These figures are an underestimation. Further, approximately 80 percent of cases reported rape, and over 90 percent of cases were perpetrated against underage girls. Both sides of the conflict, including members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the Eritrean Defense Force, the Tigrayan Forces, Tigrayan militias, the Amhara Regional Special Force, and the Fano militia, are implicated. Investigations of human rights abuses and war crimes conducted by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Office revealed that wartime sexual violence was a "deliberate strategy" to "terrorize, degrade and humiliate the victims and the ethnic minority group that they belong." Refugees and internally displaced women were particularly targeted by these acts of violence. While the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) formally ended the conflict, the rates of sexual violence are unchanged, and the needs of extensive numbers of victims continue to be unmet.The Tigray conflict is one of several cases of wartime sexual violence perpetrated against women throughout conflict zones in Africa. In Sudan, just months after violence ignited between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces, reports indicate the "brutal and widespread use of rape and... sexual violence" by the RSF, especially as a tool of the "targeted ethnic violence" unfolding in Darfur. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), instances of GBV are surging after conflict between the government and militant groups has resumed in an area where women and girls are already extremely vulnerable. Even when women report the perpetrators of sexual violence, it is highly doubtful that any justice or redress will be delivered in these situations. Like Ethiopia, cultures, and systems that marginalize women continue to enable GBV with impunity within DRC and Sudan. Therefore, it is important to note that while exacerbated by conflict, GBV is a particularly detestable symptom of a larger issue—the marginalization of women—and "should not be treated merely as a by-product of conflict." While the safety, redress, and rehabilitation of victims should be the foremost priority, attention must also be paid to the extensive systems of oppression against women that engender and allow these sorts of large-scale GBV campaigns that devastate women, girls, and entire communities.Accountability, Restoration, & the Role of the United StatesThe United States maintained its diplomatic relations with Ethiopia throughout the Tigray conflict while condemningthe atrocities committed by Ethiopian and Eritrean regional forces and participating as anobserver to negotiations in Pretoria between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front that led to the CoHA. The United States continues the dialogue with Ethiopia, which US diplomats portray partly as an effort to ensure that Ethiopia's transitional justice mechanisms—part of the CoHA—are authentically followed. However, the international community has expressed concern that the Ethiopian Government will only engage with accountability mechanisms to the point of "quasi-compliance" to "deflect international attention and circumvent international scrutiny" while not following through on efforts to bring justice to victims....Attention must also be paid to the extensive systems of oppression against women that engender and allow these sorts of large-scale GBV campaigns that devastate women, girls, and entire communities.Over a year since the CoHA, while the "silencing of guns" may ring true, the sexual violence committed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces has seen an appalling lack of accountability. Successful public pressure in May 2021 resulted in the release of a summary report of the violations of international humanitarian law by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Now that Ethiopia is making progress in disarmament efforts, the government must show true dedication to prosecuting perpetrators of wartime sexual violence. Although Ethiopia's Ministry of Defense launchedan investigative team that found 60 incidents of crimes of sexual violence and extrajudicial killings in September 2022, the military courts had only 25 convictions and two acquittals, and little progress has been made since the cessation of hostilities. Pressure by international funders and human rights organizations could catalyze the continuation of such investigations, especially when coupled with a UN and US commitment to ensure CoHA's justice mechanisms are properly and thoroughly implemented.Furthermore, action must be taken to help address the extensive need among women who have experienced conflict-related GBV. USAID has clarified that eliminating GBV is integral to its foreign policy. After the CoHA, USAID made it a priority to fund organizations in Ethiopia that provide protection and psychosocial support to women, such as counseling services and dignity kits, helping to increase the availability of these services. USAID's humanitarian response in Ethiopia has also worked to strengthen the capacity of human rights and civil society organizations in Ethiopia that address conflict-related GBV.However, USAID's difficulties have also highlighted the complexity of addressing the human rights abuses that continue to occur. Earlier this year, USAID temporarily suspended food aid in Ethiopia following massive diversion and theft of large aid deliveries, worsening the impacts of rising hunger and the displacement crisis in Ethiopia, which particularly impacts and further marginalizes women.Overall, measures that address and seek accountability for GBV must be accompanied by strengthening civil society and continually making efforts to ameliorate the position of women in society, especially in countries like Ethiopia, marked by significant gender inequality. Women leaders and women-led civil society organizations must be effectively supported, and in Ethiopia, their representation in post-conflict national dialogue efforts is imperative.Milkee Bekele is a Staff Intern with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship at the Wilson Center Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is currently a senior at Macalester College studying International Studies and Anthropology. Torianna Eckles is a Staff Intern (Director's Office) with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship at the Wilson Center Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is a senior at The George Washington University, double majoring in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Political Science.The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of the Wilson Center or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Wilson Center's Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.
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Ethiopia's Tigray conflict—one of the world's deadliest conflicts—has been characterized by a particularly dire level of gender-based violence (GBV). Throughout the two-year war, experts estimate that GBV was committed against at least 40 to 50 percent of women and girls in the Tigray, Amhara, Afar, and Oromia regions of Ethiopia. These figures are an underestimation. Further, approximately 80 percent of cases reported rape, and over 90 percent of cases were perpetrated against underage girls. Both sides of the conflict, including members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the Eritrean Defense Force, the Tigrayan Forces, Tigrayan militias, the Amhara Regional Special Force, and the Fano militia, are implicated. Investigations of human rights abuses and war crimes conducted by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Office revealed that wartime sexual violence was a "deliberate strategy" to "terrorize, degrade and humiliate the victims and the ethnic minority group that they belong." Refugees and internally displaced women were particularly targeted by these acts of violence. While the November 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) formally ended the conflict, the rates of sexual violence are unchanged, and the needs of extensive numbers of victims continue to be unmet.The Tigray conflict is one of several cases of wartime sexual violence perpetrated against women throughout conflict zones in Africa. In Sudan, just months after violence ignited between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces, reports indicate the "brutal and widespread use of rape and... sexual violence" by the RSF, especially as a tool of the "targeted ethnic violence" unfolding in Darfur. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), instances of GBV are surging after conflict between the government and militant groups has resumed in an area where women and girls are already extremely vulnerable. Even when women report the perpetrators of sexual violence, it is highly doubtful that any justice or redress will be delivered in these situations. Like Ethiopia, cultures, and systems that marginalize women continue to enable GBV with impunity within DRC and Sudan. Therefore, it is important to note that while exacerbated by conflict, GBV is a particularly detestable symptom of a larger issue—the marginalization of women—and "should not be treated merely as a by-product of conflict." While the safety, redress, and rehabilitation of victims should be the foremost priority, attention must also be paid to the extensive systems of oppression against women that engender and allow these sorts of large-scale GBV campaigns that devastate women, girls, and entire communities.Accountability, Restoration, & the Role of the United StatesThe United States maintained its diplomatic relations with Ethiopia throughout the Tigray conflict while condemningthe atrocities committed by Ethiopian and Eritrean regional forces and participating as anobserver to negotiations in Pretoria between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front that led to the CoHA. The United States continues the dialogue with Ethiopia, which US diplomats portray partly as an effort to ensure that Ethiopia's transitional justice mechanisms—part of the CoHA—are authentically followed. However, the international community has expressed concern that the Ethiopian Government will only engage with accountability mechanisms to the point of "quasi-compliance" to "deflect international attention and circumvent international scrutiny" while not following through on efforts to bring justice to victims....Attention must also be paid to the extensive systems of oppression against women that engender and allow these sorts of large-scale GBV campaigns that devastate women, girls, and entire communities.Over a year since the CoHA, while the "silencing of guns" may ring true, the sexual violence committed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces has seen an appalling lack of accountability. Successful public pressure in May 2021 resulted in the release of a summary report of the violations of international humanitarian law by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Now that Ethiopia is making progress in disarmament efforts, the government must show true dedication to prosecuting perpetrators of wartime sexual violence. Although Ethiopia's Ministry of Defense launchedan investigative team that found 60 incidents of crimes of sexual violence and extrajudicial killings in September 2022, the military courts had only 25 convictions and two acquittals, and little progress has been made since the cessation of hostilities. Pressure by international funders and human rights organizations could catalyze the continuation of such investigations, especially when coupled with a UN and US commitment to ensure CoHA's justice mechanisms are properly and thoroughly implemented.Furthermore, action must be taken to help address the extensive need among women who have experienced conflict-related GBV. USAID has clarified that eliminating GBV is integral to its foreign policy. After the CoHA, USAID made it a priority to fund organizations in Ethiopia that provide protection and psychosocial support to women, such as counseling services and dignity kits, helping to increase the availability of these services. USAID's humanitarian response in Ethiopia has also worked to strengthen the capacity of human rights and civil society organizations in Ethiopia that address conflict-related GBV.However, USAID's difficulties have also highlighted the complexity of addressing the human rights abuses that continue to occur. Earlier this year, USAID temporarily suspended food aid in Ethiopia following massive diversion and theft of large aid deliveries, worsening the impacts of rising hunger and the displacement crisis in Ethiopia, which particularly impacts and further marginalizes women.Overall, measures that address and seek accountability for GBV must be accompanied by strengthening civil society and continually making efforts to ameliorate the position of women in society, especially in countries like Ethiopia, marked by significant gender inequality. Women leaders and women-led civil society organizations must be effectively supported, and in Ethiopia, their representation in post-conflict national dialogue efforts is imperative.Milkee Bekele is a Staff Intern with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship at the Wilson Center Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is currently a senior at Macalester College studying International Studies and Anthropology. Torianna Eckles is a Staff Intern (Director's Office) with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship at the Wilson Center Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is a senior at The George Washington University, double majoring in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Political Science.The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of the Wilson Center or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Wilson Center's Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.
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Speaking at a campaign event on October 20, President Biden clearly linked Hamas's brutal surprise attack on Israel to the highly publicized normalization talks with Saudi Arabia, explaining, "One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel … they knew that I was about to sit down with the Saudis." While the talks have since paused, the incentives for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel still remain, assuming a wider war does not confound the present calculus.Saudi Arabia reportedly stands to benefit from U.S. nuclear assistance and a potential defense pact if the deal goes through, which would represent a galactic shift in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Normalization was already a prized goal for Israel, but it is now highly incentivized to isolate Hamas from the Arab world by normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia and building on the Abraham Accords. And President Biden may view a breakthrough as his legacy achievement in the Middle East, given that the Iran nuclear deal is hanging by a thread.As presently envisioned, the tripartite deal relies on the United States to grease the wheels for there to be any breakthrough in normalization talks. But it is some expensive grease. The United States and Saudi Arabia have spent a decade negotiating the limits of a nuclear power program to no avail, and Saudi leaders routinely threaten to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does. Acceding to Saudi demands on this issue would represent a stark break in U.S. nonproliferation policy, but the transfer of enrichment technology is highly unlikely. Instead, the United States' pursuit of influence over the program might result in concessions, allowing Riyadh access to enrichment capabilities without exerting control over them, unlike the situation with Iran. The measure of policy success should be the extent of knowledge and technology retained by Riyadh in the event of U.S. withdrawal.Saudi Arabia's Nuclear QuestSince its inception, the Saudi nuclear program has never been fully isolated from regional security dynamics. Saudi Arabia announced its nuclear ambitions in 2006 along with the heads of the other Gulf Cooperation Council members at a time when Washington was warming up to the idea of negotiating with Iran over its by-then halted military nuclear program. While the Saudis have played up the energy security angle, the initially quiet, and eventually explicit, message was that if Iran was allowed to maintain its nuclear program, then the Saudis must follow along in stride.The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have tried to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) since 2012. An NCA would provide assurances for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the key point of contentions has been over access to enrichment and reprocessing technology. If a state develops a latent nuclear capacity with ostensibly peaceful nuclear technology, the threat of proliferation can hang over all security interactions. Specifically, a state's possession of uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing technologies determines its latent capacity to produce the fissile material for the core of a nuclear weapon, which is the challenge presently posed by Iran.The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all eventually settled on requiring Saudi Arabia to forgo enrichment and reprocessing technology — also known as the "gold standard" which the UAE and Taiwan have adhered to — and to implement an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog. The exact conditions are uncertain, but reports suggest that building an enrichment plant with Saudi investment, either in the U.S. or, as suggested by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nuclear expert Mark Hibbs, a black-box centrifuge enrichment plant in Saudi Arabia but under complete U.S. control, is under discussion today.Regarding safeguards, Saudi Arabia is finally in negotiations with the IAEA to grant nuclear inspectors access to sites where nuclear material may be present. For almost two decades, the country maintained minimal safeguards for its growing nuclear program. While it was not an imperative for Saudi Arabia to negotiate an Additional Protocol with the IAEA until it was prepared to handle large quantities of nuclear material, addressing these concerns earlier would have alleviated proliferation fears. Not doing so raised more questions about Riyadh's intentions.The Slippery Slope and the Role of CongressSaudi Arabia views the Iran nuclear deal as the regional standard and argues that if Iran can maintain its enrichment program — even though the country suffers from crippling economic sanctions — then Riyadh should similarly be allowed access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. If the United States deviates from its long-standing nonproliferation policy and enables a path to Saudi enrichment, then the UAE will likely renegotiate the terms of its NCA, Turkey and Egypt may turn to Russia and China for enrichment plants, and the region may slide into a nuclear race.However, Congress has a significant oversight role to play. It should sound strange that Congress gets the ultimate say in whether there is a normalization deal between two countries on the other side of the world, but Riyadh's conditions of U.S. nuclear assistance will require congressional approval and a defense pact might require congressional approval. While any NCA would require congressional review, a defense pact, on the other hand, could come in many different forms.For example, a NATO-style Article 5 commitment that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all would require congressional ratification while a Bahrain-style Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) is an internationally binding agreement that does not require congressional ratification. The political lift and the role of Congress depends on the final shape of each condition. However, it is prudent to prepare for the scenario that U.S.-Saudi relations deteriorate; an imaginable scenario as U.S. lawmakers have called to withdraw troops over oil disputes as recently as last year, and presidential candidate Joe Biden said he would make them "pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are."In an October 24 readout from the White House, President Biden and Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman "affirmed the importance of working towards a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians as soon as the crisis subsides, building on the work that was already underway between Saudi Arabia and the United States over recent months." Normalization talks may resume at some point, but it is crucial for the U.S. inter-agency process and Congress to prioritize long-term nonproliferation threats over meeting Riyadh's immediate demands.
Overseeing the Australian election campaign one could conclude that it truly was a battle to the very end, in which there was an unruly sense of tension and anticipation in the air as 14 million citizens were called to cast their compulsory vote on 21st of August, for the 27th Prime Minister of Australia. The true encounter held between the two traditional front running parties that possessed two flawed leaders.The ALP (Australian Labor Party) the centre left party, who held power from 2007- 2010, faced a recent internal crisis not seen since 1991, a party room coup. The previous Prime Minister Kevin Rudd sworn in, in 2007 was over thrown on the 23rd of June 2010 due to months of dramatic losses in public support and key factions required to sustain his leadership. Key decisions made by the leader such as the controversial resource super profits tax, the global emissions trading scheme, endless broken promises and extravagant spending, all contributed enormously in the decline of voter's approval towards the leader.Consequently this descending dissatisfaction caused severe instability within the party itself and resulted in communication of an internal leadership ballot that would be held by the Labor party caucus, forcing a choice to be made of whether to continue behind Rudd's reign as leader, or choose Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard as their representative. Rudd was beaten by a landslide and overnight Gillard replaced him, becoming the first female Prime Minister of Australia. She held this temporary role into the elections for eight weeks and three days while also holding the position of actual contender, representing the Labor Party for the honourable title. After this replacement she commented on various occasions that she could not truly consider herself Prime Minister until she was voted so democratically by the people.The LPA (Liberal Party of Australia) is the self proclaimed centre right party; who demonstrated far more stability as a whole during the campaign although its leader Tony Abbott was highly questioned. Abbott, a previous Minister for Employment Services, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations & Minister for Health and Aging came to be leader of the Liberals in December of 2009. Voting took place between Malcolm Turnbull (ex Minister for Environment and Water Resource) and himself for the role, as the previous leader (ex Prime Minister John Howard) refused to go into another election. After Howard's departure and refusal to run for another election, Abbott won the previously mentioned internal elections by only one point and thus was chosen to lead the party into the 2010 elections.As the elections were called rather abruptly after the crumbling of the Labor Party, both parties were forced to present strong and structured strategies on their ideas for the growth and prosperity of the nation. The main issues on debate were climate change, economic management, taxation, population policy, asylum seekers, health, and the national broadband network.The Labor Party focused its agenda on "moving Australia forward" as their slogan stated by "talking to the Australian people in this campaign about how our nation can seize the opportunities of the future". Gillard and her team claimed this was possible through: a health reform, advancing the national health and hospital system; "a tax plan for our future" entailing the reinvestment of profits made in the commodities boom of non renewable resources; an enhanced superannuation plan; the creation of a national curriculum based on specific subjects and the building of "better regional cities".On the other hand, the coalition, apart from dictating their ideas on further productivity and positive changes for the country used scare tactics and the fact that Labour was unstable to their advantage. This worked to their benefit to a certain degree as many individuals were disappointed and confused with the decisions of the Labor Party. Leering closer to the election dates figures began to show that Gillard was mounting a strong campaign, and although coming in from behind she won many votes during the campaign. Labors transformation was working in its favour as it held a 42% approval rating as opposed to that of the Liberals a 38%. Gillard's personal approval rating was also many points higher than that of Abbotts, who has the lowest approval ratings since he became liberal leader. These percentages, when Gillard became contender, were entirely opposed as Labors change of leader was illustrated through a massive drop in support.On the 21st of August, voters headed to the polls but this was not even close to the end of this nail biting election. The results slowly began to illustrate that votes were tied as Labor possessed 73 seats and Liberal 72 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives. No party held a majority (more than 76 seats) of which is required to guarantee a win. Labor needed to gain two votes and Liberal three from the independents in order to assure victory. This began a long and tedious negotiation period between the parties and the independents in order to certify their loyalty to either party that lasted weeks. It was the first hung elections in decades for the nation, as no party had majority over the opposition.Although voting is compulsory statistics post election showed that almost a million Australians decided not to vote and of those who did, around 730,000 chose to vote informally thus their vote was cancelled. Many questioned whether or not Gillard had made an error in deciding to set elections only five weeks after becoming the official candidate. Such prompt campaigns were not usual in Australian politics. Four vital independent votes were needed to reach the House of Representatives seats required. After 17 days of "political deadlock" the votes were locked, 76 for Labor and 74 for Liberal. The result: Julia Gillard was officially sworn in as the first female Prime Minister of Australia on the 14th of September.Gillard proudly stated after her win, "I have big ambitions for this country". During her first 100 days as Prime Minister she has re launched the climate change debate and is currently on her first international trip, attending the Asia-Europe Meeting in Brussels which is the first of four conferences the Prime Minister will be attending in the coming weeks where we will see her abilities on the international scene as leader.*Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales.FACS - ORT
As our main guidelines in judging the probability of success in the formation of an economic union, we have used past trade patterns to indicate complementarities between the prospective partners, oil revenue projections to estimate the degree of future expansion of both demand and supply, and the principles of mutual self-interest and universal gain to argue for the likelihood of cooperation of all members. The essential participants in a Middle East Economic Community (MEEC), on these bases, would have to include most of the countries now producing food and other commodities in sufficient quantities for export to the partners, and enough of the major oil producers to provide the capital resources the community will need to accelerate its development during the next decade. At a minimum this would involve the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The arguments put forward to indicate the interest of the last two countries in unification apply also to the other oil producers considered here—Libya and the smaller Gulf states. The need in the Middle East for enhanced food-producing capabilities recommends inclusion of the Sudan, though the latter suffers from internal political problems that might limit its participation in an essentially Arab enterprise.We have not considered the possible participation of other neighboring states in a Middle East Economic Community—Cyprus, Iran, Turkey, or even, after a settlement with the Palestinians, Israel—in order not to further complicate the discussion. While none of these countries might be interested in full MEEC membership in the foreseeable future, each might find considerable advantage in some sort of a link, possibly like Turkey's current associate standing in the European Community. Possible Iranian interest would have the same basis as that of the Arab oil exporters, promising investment opportunities in non-oil countries and a larger market in the long-run for new Iranian industries. On the other hand, Turkey is more like Egypt or Lebanon. It has already seen a considerable jump in its exports to the major Arab countries, from about $71 million in 1972 to $168 million, close to an eighth of all its exports, in 1975.Although Iran's imports from the potential community members account for less than 1.5 percent of its total imports, 10 percent of the value of its non-petroleum exports are destined for these Arab States. Almost 16 percent of its food exports and over 11 percent of its manufactured exports constitute the major categories of Iran's exports to this market.Cyprus, whose economy has suffered serious setbacks after the 1974 crisis, has, paradoxically had an extremely healthy growth of exports to these Middle Eastern states. By 1975, the total value of Cypriot exports to these countries was nearly 270 percent of its 1973 export figures to the same market. The principal factor behind this remarkable expansion of trade was due to the civil strife in Lebanon which disrupted its exports of vegetable and food products to these countries. Cyprus immediately filled the gap left by the Lebanese civil war; it remains to be seen, however, how strong and permanent the Cypriot foothold is in this market, since the end of the disturbances in Lebanon.Turkey imports 10 percent of its total imports from these countries and exports nearly 12 percent of its total exports to them. There is, however, a great difference in the composition of imports and exports. Eighty-eight percent of Turkish exports to these countries are varied. In terms of its total exports to this market, Turkey exports 36 percent in food products, 39 percent in non-fuel crude materials, and 15 percent in basic manufactures.The truly unique set of economic circumstances taking shape in the Middle East offer the region a chance for rapid development that could even exceed that of post-war Japan or Stalinist Russia. Such massive capital inflows that the oil-producers are now and will continue to enjoy for several years have never previously been seen in such a short period by any people. The Arabs will add this ingredient to economic structures which have already undergone considerable modernization in the past two generations. Transportation networks, educational and public health systems, and administrative bureaucracies, among other infrastructure elements, throughout the area are fairly well developed, thanks in no small part to past oil-related revenues.These oil revenues will bring their recipients sufficient wealth to provide adequately for their descendants, economic union or not. But, the degree to which their descendants live by their own economic activities, provided for by today's investments, and the extent that oil benefits will fuel regional development depend upon whether, when, and how much economic integration occurs.Both oil and non-oil states could reap considerable benefits from an economic union, and given their mutual needs for each other, they all would enter serious negotiations from individual positions of strength. To no small extent, the success of an Arab union may be as much dependent on the progress of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. But, the advantages of integration to the core states of the Arab world, we maintain, are clear, and the degree to which these advantages can be realized depends upon how early in the upsurge of oil revenues economic union advances to an operative level. Some important early steps have been the Economic Unity Agreement and the establishment of the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, and the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation. Most of these proposals have not achieved their full potential, and more genuine commitment is needed.Stirrings of movement toward such commitment were seen at the June 1975 meeting of the Arab Economic Unity Council. Rather than issuing still another call for immediate integration with more rhetorical value than economic content, the participants pledged a five-year effort to coordinate the policies of their governments with the aim of initiating a Middle East Economic Community in 1981. Of course, progress remains to be seen, but considerable political realism appeared to be shown at the 1975 AEUC meeting, recognizing the need for a step-by-step approach to integration, not only over the first five years, but also in the twenty-year period beginning in 1981 that was seen as necessary for complete implementation of the economic community.The challenge to integrate facing the Arabs is not as drastic as the economic equivalent of life or death, but the way in which it is met is likely to determine whether they emerge from the next quarter century as the major world economic power that their numbers, history, and fortunate endowment of natural resources seem to make possible.
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Venezuela is approaching one of its most consequential elections. On 28 July, the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro will seek a third consecutive six-year term.[1] Even though he has struck an agreement with the opposition in which both parties commit to creating the conditions for a competitive election, known as the 'Barbados Agreement',[2] many observers doubt that Maduro would allow for a relatively free and fair contest, given that polls do not give him the slightest chance of winning.[3] But what will happen if he actually opts to go down the path of an evidently rigged vote? If the past is any indication, the answer is probably a lot of demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, alongside renewed international isolation that would undermine recent diplomatic openings in the region.[4]The 2018 election and its aftermath In the last presidential election of 2018, opposition groups considered the playing field tilted in Maduro's favour because the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was stacked with government loyalists. Most opposition candidates opted out of the race except for Henri Falcón. When Maduro claimed victory, Falcón brought the case to the Supreme Court.[5] The election was considered so illegitimate that the then opposition-controlled National Assembly used a constitutional quibble to appoint its head, Juan Guaidó, as interim president in early 2019. This marked a watershed moment, as it gave birth to, de facto, two parallel presidencies.[6] Rallying national and international outcry, most opposition forces mobilised their supporters to back the appointment of Guaidó. Over 500 protests were led or attended by different opposition movements in 2019 according to ACLED, a dataset that tracks political violence and protests in Venezuela and around the world. These demonstrations set out to repel Maduro's re-election and instead support Guaidó's claim to the interim presidency in 2019. Most of them were peaceful, but 13 per cent were violent or repressed by security forces and government-affiliated mobs known as colectivos. Part of the military also joined the rallies and tried to stage an uprising, but were quashed as well.[7] The government's crackdown on opposition-led and other spontaneous protests led to the death of at least 76 people, a record high in a single year since ACLED started covering the country in January 2018. The crackdown, coupled with growing international isolation and US and European sanctions,[8] contributed to further sinking the country's economy and fuelling the greatest mass exodus ever recorded in Latin America, with around one-fourth of the 28 million Venezuelans leaving the country.[9] Support for Guaidó progressively waned. Corruption accusations related to mishandling resources,[10] the crackdown of security forces faced by Guaidó's supporters and the eventual failure to overthrow the Maduro government left the public disillusioned. Demonstrations in his support fell from 76 in 2020 to 19 in 2021 and just 2 in 2022. The opposition eventually removed Guaidó from the post of interim president in December 2022.[11]The Venezuelan opposition 2.0 Since then, opposition forces have progressively rebuilt public trust and scored some electoral advances. After boycotting the 2020 legislative elections, some progress in a Norway-led negotiation between the government and opposition paved the way for a slight improvement in the playing field of the 2021 regional elections – including through a more balanced composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presence of EU observers. This led opposition parties to participate in the election, despite widespread irregularities and arbitrary candidate disqualifications. As a result, opposition candidates won four of the country's 23 governorships, including Barinas, a historic Chavista stronghold.[12] Through the 2021 process, opposition parties reckoned that the benefits of electoral participation outweighed the boycott. In October 2023, they signed a deal with the government, the abovementioned Barbados Agreement, committing to use the electoral route to solve the country's crisis. In parallel, the emergence of María Corina Machado as a political icon[13] has rekindled popular enthusiasm and expectation of change, including among Chavistas.[14] Her undisputed victory of the opposition primaries in late 2023, with over 93 per cent of the votes, turned her into a pivotal figure around which to rally. Under her leadership, Edmundo González – Machado's placeholder, since she was not allowed to run – has been recognised as the opposition unity candidate, hence forming a more cohesive front than in previous electoral cycles.[15] González could get 55 per cent of the votes, according to polls.[16]A summer of discontent? For its part, the government is not doing well, as far as public support is concerned. In 2023, ACLED recorded over 2,700 demonstrations in Venezuela. While these demonstrations related to a range of issues, they mostly revolved around discontent with the faltering provision of services, labour rights and access to justice. This is the highest number since it began covering the country, which hints at both the growing dissatisfaction with the government and the renewed citizen willingness to retake public spaces to express dissent. Despite slight economic improvements after the darkest times of 2018–2019, in fact, Venezuela's economy still faces enormous difficulties.[17] The government's superficial efforts to go after corruption, furthermore, seem to respond more to internal purges within Chavismo than an actual commitment to punish misconduct.[18] The evident improvements in the security realm – with gang-related violence events nosediving from 1,149 in 2020 to 476 in 2023 – also seem to owe more to the exodus of Venezuelans, including criminals,[19] than the security forces' recent raids in jails and kingpin hunts in marginalised neighbourhoods, as the government claims.[20] Against this backdrop, and regardless of Maduro's attempt to rebrand his public image, from authoritarian to 'friendlier' leader,[21] his public support remains very low, with around 15 per cent vote intention.[22]Looking beyond 28 July It is hard to predict the eruption of protests. The high toll of the 2019 repression and the disillusionment with the Guaidó initiative has alienated most Venezuelans from politics. Furthermore, the increase in demonstrations in 2023 seems to have been independent of the political opposition's efforts to recompose itself. Opposition parties or representatives spearheaded or participated in just a few dozen of the protests. Hence, it is unclear whether such social discontent can coalesce into mobilisation in favour of the opposition. Nonetheless, the renewed sentiment of hope and participation that a more united opposition front is creating under Machado's leadership,[23] coupled with widespread popular grievances and the subsequent quest for change by different societal sectors, are creating a scenario in which an evidently rigged election may trigger another wave of demonstrations, in addition to international outcry and isolation. Maduro can choose to allow the return of democracy in the country, even if that likely means losing the presidency. By retaining control of all the other government branches, he would still be in the position to negotiate with the current opposition the conditions for a smooth transition that does not translate into a witch hunt against him and his allies. However, he could also use this influence to hamper González's ability to run the presidency, pitting the judiciary and the legislature against it. Alternatively, he could opt to sway electoral authorities into disqualifying the opposition ticket or manipulating the results and, in doing so, reset the little economic and political progress made in the past couple of years and shepherd the country towards the abyss of authoritarianism, international isolation and socio-political turmoil. In this scenario, he would face the hardships related to having to face widespread mass protests, severed ties with regional governments – including more sympathising ones such as Colombia and Brazil – and the likely full-blown re-imposition of US and EU sanctions. Even though he has already sailed through similarly stormy waters once, the greater cohesiveness of the opposition, some cracks among the Chavista ranks, and the diplomatic and economic pressure that this path entails may hinder his ability to hold on to power for another term. Hopefully, these costs will weigh in his final decision.Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Rafael Ramírez, "An Election between Sanctions and Transition: Venezuela at a Crossroads", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|30 (June 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18622.[2] International Crisis Group, Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls, 20 October 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/21681.[3] Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, "How Venezuela's Leader Could Stay in Power, No Matter What Voters Want", in The New York Times, 25 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro-power.html.[4] Chase Harrison, "Map: Which Latin American Countries Have Restored Relations with Venezuela?", in AS/COA Articles, 21 June 2023, https://www.as-coa.org/node/103328.[5] "Venezuela: Maduro Rival Henri Falcon Demands New Election", in Al Jazeera, 30 May 2018, https://aje.io/ds3kr.[6] Jon Lee Anderson, "Our Man in Caracas", in The New Yorker, 3 June 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/venezuelas-two-presidents-collide.[7] Scott Smith and Christopher Torchia, "Clashes Rock Venezuela as Guaido, Maduro Vie for Power", in AP News, 1 May 2019, https://apnews.com/0153cace08c84c8fbf34f9c6a7bdd4dd.[8] Anna Ayuso et al., "A Critical Juncture: EU's Venezuela Policy Following the War in Ukraine", in JOINT Briefs, No. 27 (May 2023), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1689.[9] Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, "The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis", in CSIS Commentaries, 27 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/108349.[10] Angus Berwick and Mariela Nava, "'Missed His Moment': Opposition Corruption Scandal Undermines Venezuela's Guaido", in Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1Y72BB.[11] Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Removes Interim President Guaido", in Reuters, 31 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-removes-interim-president-guaido-2022-12-31.[12] Deisy Buitrago and Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Gains Hope from Win in Ruling Party Stronghold", in Reuters, 11 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-gains-hope-win-ruling-party-stronghold-2022-01-11.[13] Luz Mely Reyes, "María Corina Machado, la elección sentimental de la 'candidata-no candidata'", in El País, 13 June 2024, https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/maria-corina-machado-la-eleccion-sentimental-de-la-candidata-no-candidata.html.[14] Tony Frangie Mawad, "In Venezuela, Some Chavistas Are Quietly Drifting toward the Opposition", in Americas Quarterly, 10 June 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/?p=44891.[15] Andreina Itriago Acosta and Patricia Laya, "Maduro at Crossroads as Venezuela Opposition Joins Together", in Bloomberg, 22 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/maduro-is-at-crossroads-as-venezuela-s-opposition-joins-together.[16] In Venezuela, there is no run-off. Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición en Venezuela con 'una brecha muy grande' de votos", in Voz de América, 17 June 2024, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/7656509.html.[17] Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 22 December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/231759.[18] Alonso Moleiro, "Venezuela Doubles Down on Anti-Corruption Internal Purges", in El País, 7 April 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-04-07/venezuela-doubles-down-on-anti-corruption-internal-purges.html.[19] InSight Crime Venezuela Investigation Unit, Why Is Venezuela's Crime Rate Falling?, 28 May 2024, https://insightcrime.org/?p=276710.[20] "¿Qué tiene que ver la intervención de cárceles en Venezuela con las elecciones presidenciales de 2024?", in La Patilla, 17 November 2023, https://www.lapatilla.com/?p=5304787.[21] Patricia Laya and Andreina Itriago Acosta, "'Why Don't You Give Me Likes?': Maduro Wants to Ditch Despot Image", in Bloomberg, 13 June 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-venezuela-elections-maduro-rebrand.[22] Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición", cit.[23] Tony Frangie Mawad, "From West to East, Machado and González Re-politicized Caracas", in Caracas Chronicles, 8 July 2024, https://wp.me/p6PDXs-mhJ.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Venezuela is approaching one of its most consequential elections. On 28 July, the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro will seek a third consecutive six-year term.[1] Even though he has struck an agreement with the opposition in which both parties commit to creating the conditions for a competitive election, known as the 'Barbados Agreement',[2] many observers doubt that Maduro would allow for a relatively free and fair contest, given that polls do not give him the slightest chance of winning.[3] But what will happen if he actually opts to go down the path of an evidently rigged vote? If the past is any indication, the answer is probably a lot of demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, alongside renewed international isolation that would undermine recent diplomatic openings in the region.[4]The 2018 election and its aftermath In the last presidential election of 2018, opposition groups considered the playing field tilted in Maduro's favour because the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was stacked with government loyalists. Most opposition candidates opted out of the race except for Henri Falcón. When Maduro claimed victory, Falcón brought the case to the Supreme Court.[5] The election was considered so illegitimate that the then opposition-controlled National Assembly used a constitutional quibble to appoint its head, Juan Guaidó, as interim president in early 2019. This marked a watershed moment, as it gave birth to, de facto, two parallel presidencies.[6] Rallying national and international outcry, most opposition forces mobilised their supporters to back the appointment of Guaidó. Over 500 protests were led or attended by different opposition movements in 2019 according to ACLED, a dataset that tracks political violence and protests in Venezuela and around the world. These demonstrations set out to repel Maduro's re-election and instead support Guaidó's claim to the interim presidency in 2019. Most of them were peaceful, but 13 per cent were violent or repressed by security forces and government-affiliated mobs known as colectivos. Part of the military also joined the rallies and tried to stage an uprising, but were quashed as well.[7] The government's crackdown on opposition-led and other spontaneous protests led to the death of at least 76 people, a record high in a single year since ACLED started covering the country in January 2018. The crackdown, coupled with growing international isolation and US and European sanctions,[8] contributed to further sinking the country's economy and fuelling the greatest mass exodus ever recorded in Latin America, with around one-fourth of the 28 million Venezuelans leaving the country.[9] Support for Guaidó progressively waned. Corruption accusations related to mishandling resources,[10] the crackdown of security forces faced by Guaidó's supporters and the eventual failure to overthrow the Maduro government left the public disillusioned. Demonstrations in his support fell from 76 in 2020 to 19 in 2021 and just 2 in 2022. The opposition eventually removed Guaidó from the post of interim president in December 2022.[11]The Venezuelan opposition 2.0 Since then, opposition forces have progressively rebuilt public trust and scored some electoral advances. After boycotting the 2020 legislative elections, some progress in a Norway-led negotiation between the government and opposition paved the way for a slight improvement in the playing field of the 2021 regional elections – including through a more balanced composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presence of EU observers. This led opposition parties to participate in the election, despite widespread irregularities and arbitrary candidate disqualifications. As a result, opposition candidates won four of the country's 23 governorships, including Barinas, a historic Chavista stronghold.[12] Through the 2021 process, opposition parties reckoned that the benefits of electoral participation outweighed the boycott. In October 2023, they signed a deal with the government, the abovementioned Barbados Agreement, committing to use the electoral route to solve the country's crisis. In parallel, the emergence of María Corina Machado as a political icon[13] has rekindled popular enthusiasm and expectation of change, including among Chavistas.[14] Her undisputed victory of the opposition primaries in late 2023, with over 93 per cent of the votes, turned her into a pivotal figure around which to rally. Under her leadership, Edmundo González – Machado's placeholder, since she was not allowed to run – has been recognised as the opposition unity candidate, hence forming a more cohesive front than in previous electoral cycles.[15] González could get 55 per cent of the votes, according to polls.[16]A summer of discontent? For its part, the government is not doing well, as far as public support is concerned. In 2023, ACLED recorded over 2,700 demonstrations in Venezuela. While these demonstrations related to a range of issues, they mostly revolved around discontent with the faltering provision of services, labour rights and access to justice. This is the highest number since it began covering the country, which hints at both the growing dissatisfaction with the government and the renewed citizen willingness to retake public spaces to express dissent. Despite slight economic improvements after the darkest times of 2018–2019, in fact, Venezuela's economy still faces enormous difficulties.[17] The government's superficial efforts to go after corruption, furthermore, seem to respond more to internal purges within Chavismo than an actual commitment to punish misconduct.[18] The evident improvements in the security realm – with gang-related violence events nosediving from 1,149 in 2020 to 476 in 2023 – also seem to owe more to the exodus of Venezuelans, including criminals,[19] than the security forces' recent raids in jails and kingpin hunts in marginalised neighbourhoods, as the government claims.[20] Against this backdrop, and regardless of Maduro's attempt to rebrand his public image, from authoritarian to 'friendlier' leader,[21] his public support remains very low, with around 15 per cent vote intention.[22]Looking beyond 28 July It is hard to predict the eruption of protests. The high toll of the 2019 repression and the disillusionment with the Guaidó initiative has alienated most Venezuelans from politics. Furthermore, the increase in demonstrations in 2023 seems to have been independent of the political opposition's efforts to recompose itself. Opposition parties or representatives spearheaded or participated in just a few dozen of the protests. Hence, it is unclear whether such social discontent can coalesce into mobilisation in favour of the opposition. Nonetheless, the renewed sentiment of hope and participation that a more united opposition front is creating under Machado's leadership,[23] coupled with widespread popular grievances and the subsequent quest for change by different societal sectors, are creating a scenario in which an evidently rigged election may trigger another wave of demonstrations, in addition to international outcry and isolation. Maduro can choose to allow the return of democracy in the country, even if that likely means losing the presidency. By retaining control of all the other government branches, he would still be in the position to negotiate with the current opposition the conditions for a smooth transition that does not translate into a witch hunt against him and his allies. However, he could also use this influence to hamper González's ability to run the presidency, pitting the judiciary and the legislature against it. Alternatively, he could opt to sway electoral authorities into disqualifying the opposition ticket or manipulating the results and, in doing so, reset the little economic and political progress made in the past couple of years and shepherd the country towards the abyss of authoritarianism, international isolation and socio-political turmoil. In this scenario, he would face the hardships related to having to face widespread mass protests, severed ties with regional governments – including more sympathising ones such as Colombia and Brazil – and the likely full-blown re-imposition of US and EU sanctions. Even though he has already sailed through similarly stormy waters once, the greater cohesiveness of the opposition, some cracks among the Chavista ranks, and the diplomatic and economic pressure that this path entails may hinder his ability to hold on to power for another term. Hopefully, these costs will weigh in his final decision.Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Rafael Ramírez, "An Election between Sanctions and Transition: Venezuela at a Crossroads", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|30 (June 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18622.[2] International Crisis Group, Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls, 20 October 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/21681.[3] Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, "How Venezuela's Leader Could Stay in Power, No Matter What Voters Want", in The New York Times, 25 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro-power.html.[4] Chase Harrison, "Map: Which Latin American Countries Have Restored Relations with Venezuela?", in AS/COA Articles, 21 June 2023, https://www.as-coa.org/node/103328.[5] "Venezuela: Maduro Rival Henri Falcon Demands New Election", in Al Jazeera, 30 May 2018, https://aje.io/ds3kr.[6] Jon Lee Anderson, "Our Man in Caracas", in The New Yorker, 3 June 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/venezuelas-two-presidents-collide.[7] Scott Smith and Christopher Torchia, "Clashes Rock Venezuela as Guaido, Maduro Vie for Power", in AP News, 1 May 2019, https://apnews.com/0153cace08c84c8fbf34f9c6a7bdd4dd.[8] Anna Ayuso et al., "A Critical Juncture: EU's Venezuela Policy Following the War in Ukraine", in JOINT Briefs, No. 27 (May 2023), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1689.[9] Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, "The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis", in CSIS Commentaries, 27 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/108349.[10] Angus Berwick and Mariela Nava, "'Missed His Moment': Opposition Corruption Scandal Undermines Venezuela's Guaido", in Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1Y72BB.[11] Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Removes Interim President Guaido", in Reuters, 31 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-removes-interim-president-guaido-2022-12-31.[12] Deisy Buitrago and Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Gains Hope from Win in Ruling Party Stronghold", in Reuters, 11 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-gains-hope-win-ruling-party-stronghold-2022-01-11.[13] Luz Mely Reyes, "María Corina Machado, la elección sentimental de la 'candidata-no candidata'", in El País, 13 June 2024, https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/maria-corina-machado-la-eleccion-sentimental-de-la-candidata-no-candidata.html.[14] Tony Frangie Mawad, "In Venezuela, Some Chavistas Are Quietly Drifting toward the Opposition", in Americas Quarterly, 10 June 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/?p=44891.[15] Andreina Itriago Acosta and Patricia Laya, "Maduro at Crossroads as Venezuela Opposition Joins Together", in Bloomberg, 22 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/maduro-is-at-crossroads-as-venezuela-s-opposition-joins-together.[16] In Venezuela, there is no run-off. Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición en Venezuela con 'una brecha muy grande' de votos", in Voz de América, 17 June 2024, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/7656509.html.[17] Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 22 December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/231759.[18] Alonso Moleiro, "Venezuela Doubles Down on Anti-Corruption Internal Purges", in El País, 7 April 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-04-07/venezuela-doubles-down-on-anti-corruption-internal-purges.html.[19] InSight Crime Venezuela Investigation Unit, Why Is Venezuela's Crime Rate Falling?, 28 May 2024, https://insightcrime.org/?p=276710.[20] "¿Qué tiene que ver la intervención de cárceles en Venezuela con las elecciones presidenciales de 2024?", in La Patilla, 17 November 2023, https://www.lapatilla.com/?p=5304787.[21] Patricia Laya and Andreina Itriago Acosta, "'Why Don't You Give Me Likes?': Maduro Wants to Ditch Despot Image", in Bloomberg, 13 June 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-venezuela-elections-maduro-rebrand.[22] Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición", cit.[23] Tony Frangie Mawad, "From West to East, Machado and González Re-politicized Caracas", in Caracas Chronicles, 8 July 2024, https://wp.me/p6PDXs-mhJ.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Venezuela is approaching one of its most consequential elections. On 28 July, the incumbent President Nicolás Maduro will seek a third consecutive six-year term.[1] Even though he has struck an agreement with the opposition in which both parties commit to creating the conditions for a competitive election, known as the 'Barbados Agreement',[2] many observers doubt that Maduro would allow for a relatively free and fair contest, given that polls do not give him the slightest chance of winning.[3] But what will happen if he actually opts to go down the path of an evidently rigged vote? If the past is any indication, the answer is probably a lot of demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, alongside renewed international isolation that would undermine recent diplomatic openings in the region.[4]The 2018 election and its aftermath In the last presidential election of 2018, opposition groups considered the playing field tilted in Maduro's favour because the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was stacked with government loyalists. Most opposition candidates opted out of the race except for Henri Falcón. When Maduro claimed victory, Falcón brought the case to the Supreme Court.[5] The election was considered so illegitimate that the then opposition-controlled National Assembly used a constitutional quibble to appoint its head, Juan Guaidó, as interim president in early 2019. This marked a watershed moment, as it gave birth to, de facto, two parallel presidencies.[6] Rallying national and international outcry, most opposition forces mobilised their supporters to back the appointment of Guaidó. Over 500 protests were led or attended by different opposition movements in 2019 according to ACLED, a dataset that tracks political violence and protests in Venezuela and around the world. These demonstrations set out to repel Maduro's re-election and instead support Guaidó's claim to the interim presidency in 2019. Most of them were peaceful, but 13 per cent were violent or repressed by security forces and government-affiliated mobs known as colectivos. Part of the military also joined the rallies and tried to stage an uprising, but were quashed as well.[7] The government's crackdown on opposition-led and other spontaneous protests led to the death of at least 76 people, a record high in a single year since ACLED started covering the country in January 2018. The crackdown, coupled with growing international isolation and US and European sanctions,[8] contributed to further sinking the country's economy and fuelling the greatest mass exodus ever recorded in Latin America, with around one-fourth of the 28 million Venezuelans leaving the country.[9] Support for Guaidó progressively waned. Corruption accusations related to mishandling resources,[10] the crackdown of security forces faced by Guaidó's supporters and the eventual failure to overthrow the Maduro government left the public disillusioned. Demonstrations in his support fell from 76 in 2020 to 19 in 2021 and just 2 in 2022. The opposition eventually removed Guaidó from the post of interim president in December 2022.[11]The Venezuelan opposition 2.0 Since then, opposition forces have progressively rebuilt public trust and scored some electoral advances. After boycotting the 2020 legislative elections, some progress in a Norway-led negotiation between the government and opposition paved the way for a slight improvement in the playing field of the 2021 regional elections – including through a more balanced composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presence of EU observers. This led opposition parties to participate in the election, despite widespread irregularities and arbitrary candidate disqualifications. As a result, opposition candidates won four of the country's 23 governorships, including Barinas, a historic Chavista stronghold.[12] Through the 2021 process, opposition parties reckoned that the benefits of electoral participation outweighed the boycott. In October 2023, they signed a deal with the government, the abovementioned Barbados Agreement, committing to use the electoral route to solve the country's crisis. In parallel, the emergence of María Corina Machado as a political icon[13] has rekindled popular enthusiasm and expectation of change, including among Chavistas.[14] Her undisputed victory of the opposition primaries in late 2023, with over 93 per cent of the votes, turned her into a pivotal figure around which to rally. Under her leadership, Edmundo González – Machado's placeholder, since she was not allowed to run – has been recognised as the opposition unity candidate, hence forming a more cohesive front than in previous electoral cycles.[15] González could get 55 per cent of the votes, according to polls.[16]A summer of discontent? For its part, the government is not doing well, as far as public support is concerned. In 2023, ACLED recorded over 2,700 demonstrations in Venezuela. While these demonstrations related to a range of issues, they mostly revolved around discontent with the faltering provision of services, labour rights and access to justice. This is the highest number since it began covering the country, which hints at both the growing dissatisfaction with the government and the renewed citizen willingness to retake public spaces to express dissent. Despite slight economic improvements after the darkest times of 2018–2019, in fact, Venezuela's economy still faces enormous difficulties.[17] The government's superficial efforts to go after corruption, furthermore, seem to respond more to internal purges within Chavismo than an actual commitment to punish misconduct.[18] The evident improvements in the security realm – with gang-related violence events nosediving from 1,149 in 2020 to 476 in 2023 – also seem to owe more to the exodus of Venezuelans, including criminals,[19] than the security forces' recent raids in jails and kingpin hunts in marginalised neighbourhoods, as the government claims.[20] Against this backdrop, and regardless of Maduro's attempt to rebrand his public image, from authoritarian to 'friendlier' leader,[21] his public support remains very low, with around 15 per cent vote intention.[22]Looking beyond 28 July It is hard to predict the eruption of protests. The high toll of the 2019 repression and the disillusionment with the Guaidó initiative has alienated most Venezuelans from politics. Furthermore, the increase in demonstrations in 2023 seems to have been independent of the political opposition's efforts to recompose itself. Opposition parties or representatives spearheaded or participated in just a few dozen of the protests. Hence, it is unclear whether such social discontent can coalesce into mobilisation in favour of the opposition. Nonetheless, the renewed sentiment of hope and participation that a more united opposition front is creating under Machado's leadership,[23] coupled with widespread popular grievances and the subsequent quest for change by different societal sectors, are creating a scenario in which an evidently rigged election may trigger another wave of demonstrations, in addition to international outcry and isolation. Maduro can choose to allow the return of democracy in the country, even if that likely means losing the presidency. By retaining control of all the other government branches, he would still be in the position to negotiate with the current opposition the conditions for a smooth transition that does not translate into a witch hunt against him and his allies. However, he could also use this influence to hamper González's ability to run the presidency, pitting the judiciary and the legislature against it. Alternatively, he could opt to sway electoral authorities into disqualifying the opposition ticket or manipulating the results and, in doing so, reset the little economic and political progress made in the past couple of years and shepherd the country towards the abyss of authoritarianism, international isolation and socio-political turmoil. In this scenario, he would face the hardships related to having to face widespread mass protests, severed ties with regional governments – including more sympathising ones such as Colombia and Brazil – and the likely full-blown re-imposition of US and EU sanctions. Even though he has already sailed through similarly stormy waters once, the greater cohesiveness of the opposition, some cracks among the Chavista ranks, and the diplomatic and economic pressure that this path entails may hinder his ability to hold on to power for another term. Hopefully, these costs will weigh in his final decision.Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Rafael Ramírez, "An Election between Sanctions and Transition: Venezuela at a Crossroads", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|30 (June 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18622.[2] International Crisis Group, Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls, 20 October 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/21681.[3] Julie Turkewitz and Anatoly Kurmanaev, "How Venezuela's Leader Could Stay in Power, No Matter What Voters Want", in The New York Times, 25 June 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro-power.html.[4] Chase Harrison, "Map: Which Latin American Countries Have Restored Relations with Venezuela?", in AS/COA Articles, 21 June 2023, https://www.as-coa.org/node/103328.[5] "Venezuela: Maduro Rival Henri Falcon Demands New Election", in Al Jazeera, 30 May 2018, https://aje.io/ds3kr.[6] Jon Lee Anderson, "Our Man in Caracas", in The New Yorker, 3 June 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/venezuelas-two-presidents-collide.[7] Scott Smith and Christopher Torchia, "Clashes Rock Venezuela as Guaido, Maduro Vie for Power", in AP News, 1 May 2019, https://apnews.com/0153cace08c84c8fbf34f9c6a7bdd4dd.[8] Anna Ayuso et al., "A Critical Juncture: EU's Venezuela Policy Following the War in Ukraine", in JOINT Briefs, No. 27 (May 2023), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1689.[9] Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, "The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis", in CSIS Commentaries, 27 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/108349.[10] Angus Berwick and Mariela Nava, "'Missed His Moment': Opposition Corruption Scandal Undermines Venezuela's Guaido", in Reuters, 3 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1Y72BB.[11] Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Removes Interim President Guaido", in Reuters, 31 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-removes-interim-president-guaido-2022-12-31.[12] Deisy Buitrago and Mayela Armas, "Venezuela Opposition Gains Hope from Win in Ruling Party Stronghold", in Reuters, 11 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-gains-hope-win-ruling-party-stronghold-2022-01-11.[13] Luz Mely Reyes, "María Corina Machado, la elección sentimental de la 'candidata-no candidata'", in El País, 13 June 2024, https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/maria-corina-machado-la-eleccion-sentimental-de-la-candidata-no-candidata.html.[14] Tony Frangie Mawad, "In Venezuela, Some Chavistas Are Quietly Drifting toward the Opposition", in Americas Quarterly, 10 June 2024, https://americasquarterly.org/?p=44891.[15] Andreina Itriago Acosta and Patricia Laya, "Maduro at Crossroads as Venezuela Opposition Joins Together", in Bloomberg, 22 April 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/maduro-is-at-crossroads-as-venezuela-s-opposition-joins-together.[16] In Venezuela, there is no run-off. Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición en Venezuela con 'una brecha muy grande' de votos", in Voz de América, 17 June 2024, https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/7656509.html.[17] Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 22 December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/231759.[18] Alonso Moleiro, "Venezuela Doubles Down on Anti-Corruption Internal Purges", in El País, 7 April 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-04-07/venezuela-doubles-down-on-anti-corruption-internal-purges.html.[19] InSight Crime Venezuela Investigation Unit, Why Is Venezuela's Crime Rate Falling?, 28 May 2024, https://insightcrime.org/?p=276710.[20] "¿Qué tiene que ver la intervención de cárceles en Venezuela con las elecciones presidenciales de 2024?", in La Patilla, 17 November 2023, https://www.lapatilla.com/?p=5304787.[21] Patricia Laya and Andreina Itriago Acosta, "'Why Don't You Give Me Likes?': Maduro Wants to Ditch Despot Image", in Bloomberg, 13 June 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-venezuela-elections-maduro-rebrand.[22] Adriana Núñez Rabascall and Gustavo Ocando Alex, "Encuestas proyectan triunfo de la oposición", cit.[23] Tony Frangie Mawad, "From West to East, Machado and González Re-politicized Caracas", in Caracas Chronicles, 8 July 2024, https://wp.me/p6PDXs-mhJ.
