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Ronald Dworkin famously argued that fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written calls for a fusion of constitutional law and moral philosophy. Barber and Fleming take up that call, arguing for a philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation

These papers were delivered at the conference, Constitutional Change in the 1990s organised by the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly's Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development from 4-6 October 1992 in Darwin. The editors have made only minor alterations, not affecting - we believe - the substance of the original papers. We have corrected typographical errors, deleted repetitions and rhetorical excursions appropriate to a conference paper but not to a proceedings, and attempted to obtain as much consistency of style and styling as possible. Most papers were written by the speakers and distributed at the conference. A few have been edited from typescripts. All papers have been shown to contributors before and after the final editing and final versions approved by them. Obviously these papers reflect a wide range of opinions and positions. Content and conclusions are not those of either the Sessional Committee, the North Australia Research Unit or the editors. Naturally, however, we are grateful to the authors for writing these papers, for the Sessional Committee for initiating the conference, the sponsors and supporters of the conference I and the Working Committee who planned the conference and the Conference Secretariat who ran the conference. In particular we would like to thank Graham Nicholson, Peter Jull, Yoga Harichandran, Nicole White and the staff of the Legislative Assembly who provided logistical support to the conference. Thanks are also due to Janet Sincock for the final wordprocessing and to Ann Webb for coordinating production.

One of the hallmarks of the present era is the discourse surrounding Human Rights and the need for the law to recognise them. Various national and supranational human rights instruments have been developed and implemented in order to transition society away from atrocity and callousness toward a more just and inclusive future. In some countries this is done by means of an overarching constitution, while in others international conventions or ordinary legislation hold sway. Contract law plays a pivotal role in this context. According to many, this is done through the much-debated 'civilising mission' of the contract, a notion which itself constitutes the canon of the Western liberal principle of 'civilised economy'. The movement away from the belief in the absolute freedom of contract, which reached its zenith in the nineteenth century, to the principles of fairness and justice that underpin contract law today, is often deemed to be a testament to this civilising influence. Delving into the interplay between human rights policies, constitutional law, and contract law from both theoretical and practical perspectives, this first volume of a two-book collection offers a totally new reappraisal of the subject by gathering a collection of essays written by contract law scholars from Europe, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Instead of providing the reader with a sterile compilation of positivistic norms and policies on the impact of fundamental rights and constitutional law issues on contract law's development, the authors build on their personal experience to analyse specific topics related to contracting that include a constitutional dimension. The book fills an important void in comparative law scholarship and in so doing represents the starting point for further debate on the subject.

How does the selection of judges influence the work they do in important constitutional courts? Does mixed judicial selection, which allows more players to choose judges, result in a court that is more independent and one that can check powerful executives and legislators? Existing literature on constitutional courts tends to focus on how judicial behaviour is motivated by judges' political preferences. Lydia Brashear Tiede argues for a new approach, showing that, under mixed selection, institutions choose different types of judges who represent different approaches to constitutional adjudication and thus have different propensities for striking down laws. Using empirical evidence from the constitutional courts of Chile and Colombia, this book develops a framework for understanding the factors, external and internal to courts, which lead individual judges, as well as the courts in which they work, to veto a law.

Given his range of interests, a tribute to Francis Jacobs could appropriately address just about any area of contemporary legal concern. But Francis Jacobs is one whose writings on and off the bench have, for an American, been especially illuminating, due to his unique capacity to translate fundamental issues of European constitutional law into terms that we can grasp. And so, notwithstanding the quantity of writing on the recent constitutional adventure of the European Union ("EU") that has already accumulated, I add yet one more set of reflections on this theme in Francis Jacobs' honor, this time on the possible lessons of that adventure for others.

Examining the constitutional foundations of European contract law, this book provides a thorough assessment of the extent of the European Union's competence to regulate contracts and offers a comprehensive comparative study of the contract law framework in the United States.

Constitutional law as a fundamental legal branch within one state always had prevailing national characteristics. National constitutional provisions were result of a multiple historical, political, economic and other significant forces which have been realized within one state. On the basis of the principle of national sovereignty, states were solely responsible for realization of social, economic and political reality on their territory as well as for the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are inalienable part of the constitutional law regulation. All revealed horrors of the World War II pointed out to the conclusion that contemporary states can not and must not be solely responsible for protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Instead, international community as a unit must assure legal mechanisms which can ensure realization of particular minimum human rights standards across the globe. One of such contemporary mechanism is the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with Protocols which is the most important international agreement devoted to the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Signed in Rome 1950, the Convention has developed from "just one more" international agreement related to the human rights protection to the one of the most important legal source of the human rights law in contemporary time. Impacts of the Convention on national legal orders of the Council of Europe member states are unprecedented and the Convention is commonly attributed as the Constitution for Europe or as the top of the European constitutional architecture. Such position of the Convention is based upon the procedural provisions of the Convention where supranational and independent European Court of Human Rights on the grounds of the autonomous interpretation of the Convention and individual application pursuant to the Art. 34 of the Convention secures realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are guaranteed by the Convention. On the other side, contracting states (member states of the Council of Europe) pursuant to the provision of the Art. 46 of the Convention must undertake all actions in order to fully and properly execute all final judgements of the European Court. Such organization of contemporary European (regional) human rights framework has significant impacts within constitutional law. Human rights and fundamental freedoms which are protected by the Convention's provisions are in the same time substantially and grammatically similar (convergent) with human rights and fundamental freedoms which are guaranteed within national constitutional provisions of the contracting states. This fact points out to the conclusion that within the Council of Europe member states exist national but also supranational legal framework for the human rights protection. This supranational legal framework is positioned on the European Court which accepted in its practice evolutive interpretation of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. By determination of the European Court that violation of particular provision of the Convention has occurred in particular case and by full execution of the final judgement of the European Court, constitutional law of respondent state assumes one particular and rather extensive context. On the other hand, the European Court by exercising its function becomes that institutional link that connects national constitutional orders of the contracting states on one qualitatively higher (supranational) level which gives inputs for evolution of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. Given the fact that protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms is an inherent part of contemporary constitutional law regulation and that the European Court and the Convention are substantially devoted to the protection and realization of that same human rights and fundamental freedoms which are also protected on national constitutional level, this dissertation will assess can contemporary constitutional law be constructed trans-nationally on the basis of judicial activism of the European Court and evolutive interpretation of the Convention. In other words, this dissertation will assess can contemporary constitutional law be de-nationalized on the basis of activism of one supra-national court. From the methodological perspective, this task will be fulfilled by analysis regarding legislative and judicial adjustments which have been undertaken in the process of execution of final judgements of the Court in particular cases. Respective legislative and judicial adjustments after the European Court's judgement indicate that national legal orders are changing and are becoming more and more similar pursuant to the judicial activism of the European Court in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are an inherent part of contemporary constitutional law regulation. And if we aggregate all impacts of the European Court's activism in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on national legal orders of contracting states maybe we can theoretically construct one new concept in the contemporary constitutional law, i.e. the particular constitutional law. ; Ustavno pravo kot temeljna pravna veja znotraj ene države je imelo vedno prevladujoče nacionalne značilnosti. Nacionalne ustavne določbe so bile rezultat večkratnih zgodovinskih, političnih, gospodarskih in drugih pomembnih sil, ki so se uresničile znotraj ene države. Na podlagi načela nacionalne suverenosti so bile države izključno odgovorne za uresničevanje družbene, gospodarske in politične realnosti na svojem ozemlju ter za uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so neodtujljivi del ustavnopravne ureditve. Vse razkrite grozote Druge svetovne vojne so pokazale da sodobne države ne morejo in ne smejo biti izključno odgovorne za varovanje in uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Namesto tega mora mednarodna skupnost kot enota zagotoviti pravne mehanizme, ki lahko zagotovijo uresničevanje določenih minimalnih standardov človekovih pravic po vsem svetu. Eden od takih sodobnih mehanizmov je (Evropska) Konvencija o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin s protokoli, ki je najpomembnejši mednarodni sporazum, namenjen varstvu in uresničevanju človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Konvencija je bila podpisana v Rimu leta 1950 in iz "samo še enega" mednarodnega sporazuma o varstvu človekovih pravic izhaja iz enega najpomembnejših pravnih virov prava človekovih pravic v sodobnem času. Vplivi Konvencije na nacionalne pravne rede držav članic Sveta Evrope so brez primere in Konvencija je običajno pripisana kot Ustava za Evropo ali pak vrh evropske ustavne arhitekture. Takšno stališče Konvencija temelji na postopkovnih določbah Konvencije, v katerih je nadnacionalno in neodvisno Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice na podlagi avtonomne razlage Konvencije in individualne vloge v skladu s čl. 34 Konvencije zagotavlja uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki jih zagotavlja Konvencija. Na drugi strani pa so države pogodbenice (države članice Sveta Evrope) v skladu z določbo čl. 46 Konvencije morajo sprejeti vse ukrepe, da bi v celoti in pravilno izvedli vse pravnomočne sodbe Evropskega sodišča. Takšna organizacija sodobnega evropskega (regionalnega) okvira človekovih pravic ima pomemben vpliv v okviru ustavnega prava. Človekove pravice in temeljne svoboščine, ki jih varujejo določbe Konvencije, so hkrati bistveno in slovnično podobne (usklajene) s človekovimi pravicami in temeljnimi svoboščinami, ki so zagotovljene z nacionalnimi ustavnimi določbami držav pogodbenic. To dejstvo kaže na ugotovitev, da v državah članicah Sveta Evrope obstajajo nacionalni, pa tudi nadnacionalni pravni okvir za varstvo človekovih pravic. Ta nadnacionalni pravni okvir je postavljen na Evropsko sodišče, ki je v svoji praksi sprejelo evolutivno interpretacijo sodobnih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Z odločitvijo Evropskega sodišča, da je v določeni zadevi prišlo do kršitve posamezne določbe Konvencije in s popolno izvršitvijo pravnomočne sodbe Evropskega sodišča, ustavno pravo tožene države prevzame določen in precej obsežen kontekst. Po drugi strani pa Evropsko sodišče s svojo funkcijo postane institucionalna povezava, ki povezuje nacionalne ustavne ureditve držav pogodbenic na eni kvalitativno višji (nadnacionalni) ravni, ki daje vložke za razvoj sodobnih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Glede na to, da je varovanje in uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin neločljiv del sodobne ustavnopravne ureditve in da sta Evropsko sodišče in Konvencija bistveno namenjeni varovanju in uresničevanju istih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so prav tako zaščitene na nacionalni ustavni ravni bo ta disertacija ocenila, ali je sodobno ustavno pravo mogoče oblikovati transnacionalno na podlagi sodnega aktivizma Evropskega sodišča in evolutivne razlage Konvencije. Z drugimi besedami, ta disertacija bo ocenila, ali je mogoče sodobno ustavno pravo de-nacionalizirati na podlagi aktivizma enega nadnacionalnega sodišča. Z metodološkega vidika bo ta naloga izpolnjena z analizo zakonodajnih in sodnih prilagoditev, ki so bile izvedene v postopku izvrševanja pravnomočnih sodb Sodišča v posameznih primerih. Ustrezne zakonodajne in sodne prilagoditve po sodbi Evropskega sodišča kažejo, da se nacionalni pravni redi spreminjajo in postajajo vse bolj podobni v skladu s sodnim aktivizmom Evropskega sodišča v okviru varstva človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so neločljiv del sodobno ustavnopravno ureditev. In če združimo vse vplive aktivizma Evropskega sodišča v linijo zaščite človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin v nacionalnih pravnih redih pogodbenih držav, lahko teoretično zgradimo nov koncept v sodobnem ustavnem pravu, to je partikularno ustavno pravo.