Suchergebnisse

Benutzerkommentar

Aus japanischer Sicht

"The main emphasis of this report is on the domestic scenery with respect to both comparing and explaining the individual missile defence policies of 16 democracies. These 16 case studies give answers to the following three research questions: 1. How the missile defence (MD) policy in each country has developed as a response to the proliferation problem in the context of the broader security and foreign policy; 2. how it is located in the overall domestic setting and 3. how the MD policy can be explained. What accounts for the variety of missile defence policies of the democracies? In a nutshell, it is neither their formal status as a democracy, nor their different quality as a democratic country within the spectrum of the stable, new, and deficient democracies in the cases of Turkey and even more so of Russia. The two traditional explanatory factors - the role of military alliances such as NATO and the geographical/ geopolitical position of the democracies examined - are secondary. In the final analysis it is the combination of the foreign policy orientations in connection with the particular domestic power constellations (in some cases strong economic and bureaucratic interests), the role of the US and the relevance of perceived threats that account for either a sceptical/critical or a supportive policy (threats defined mostly as missiles from non-democratic adversaries, but to a lesser extent as the US menacing the basic foreign policy orientations of other democracies). The research report finally lists several major problems ahead associated with missile defence systems. To mention two of them: In the case of basing radars or interceptors on Central European territory, Russia in particular would be affected. What if Moscow chooses to obstruct those kinds of missile defence plans, establishes stronger ties with Beijing, intensifies its arms trade in the rocket area with countries of concern, bypasses arms control agreements, continues to intensify its arms build-up and aims its nuclear tipped missiles at Polish strategic targets? In addition, ecological and social risks are probably associated with the interception of an atomic, biological or chemical warhead which falls on European territory. The report concludes with research perspectives. They focus on the conflict potential to be assessed in view of rising nations (economically and technologically) and in terms of their 'rising' rocket and space-faring capabilities. Here, Brazil, China, India, and Iran are the case in point. Finally, the research question is raised: What role is missile defence likely to play in the context of a ballistic missiles free zone? Would missile defence enhance or hamper such a zone?" (excerpt)

Donald Trump and Kamala Harris not only proved last night that they have no fleshed out foreign policy visions of their own, but that they feel most comfortable pantomiming like they do, using bafflingly cartoonish language about each other, playing so fast and loose with history, facts, and figures so as to make the entire debate over what to do in Ukraine and Gaza absolutely incoherent.So much for "America First."An "America First" answer to the question posed to Harris about what she would do about the more than 40,000 Palestinian deaths in Gaza — which the moderator pointed out Harris was "concerned" about nine months ago — would be to say that continuing to fund it directly would ultimately hurt America, put our troops in the region at risk, and doom our integrity as nation of laws and a beacon of moral clarity forever. At the very least, she could point out that Benjamin Netanyahu is a bad faith actor who represents his people but not the American people, and we cannot aid or assist him if he continues to flout the Geneva Conventions in a desperate bid to stay in power. Full stop.Instead she says: "What we know is that this war must end it and immediately, and the way it will end is we need a ceasefire deal, and we need the hostages out, and so we will continue to work around the clock on that, also understanding that we must chart a course for a two state solution, and in that solution, there must be security for the Israeli people and Israel, and an equal measure for the Palestinians. But the one thing I will assure you always, I will always give Israel the ability to defend itself, in particular, as it relates to as it relates to Iran, and any threat that Iran and its proxies pose to Israel."Trump for his part, decided to lay napalm down, but unlike the Trump of 2016 who emphasized that it was not in the best interest of the United States to be sucked into other countries' wars and conflicts, that we should not be the world's police, he chose to accuse Kamala of "hating Israel." When asked how he would negotiate with Netanyahu and Hamas to get the hostages out and to stop civilian suffering — a layup question for the man who loves "to talk" really — he said this:"(Harris) she hates Israel. She wouldn't even meet with Netanyahu when he went to Congress to make a very important speech. She refused to be there because she was at a sorority party of hers. She went to go to the sorority party. She hates Israel. If she's president, I believe that Israel will not exist within two years from now, and I've been pretty good at predictions, and I hope I'm wrong about that one. She hates Israel at the same time, in her own way, she hates the Arab population because the whole place is going to get blown up, Arabs, Jewish people, Israel will be gone. It would have never happened. Iran was broke under Donald Trump." Onto Ukraine. Trump had one of his brighter moments in an otherwise dim evening of missed opportunities (like saying nothing when Harris boasted endorsements from Iraq War architect Dick Cheney and daughter Liz) when he said he wanted to end the war in Ukraine and would do so by bringing Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin together in a room to resolve it in order to avoid more death and "World War III." He then repeated unexplained assertions about "millions" dead (without clarifying who, by whom, or where) and ticked off a few points in his usual jag about NATO members not paying enough into the system. But his grasp of why that war happened and how it would suddenly "end" began and ended with his concept that Biden was "weak," and that Harris is "weak." It was, frankly, weak.Harris, for her part, acted as though it was still 2022 and would be forever as long as the U.S. kept funding the war. Again, no real explanation as to why this was in anyone's best interest, even Ukraine's, to continue on this course, other than, you know, Russian domination of the rest of Europe."If Donald Trump were president, Putin would be sitting in Kyiv right now and understand what that would mean, because Putin's agenda is not just about Ukraine. Understand why the European allies and our NATO allies are thankful that you are no longer president, and that we understand the importance of the greatest military alliance the world has ever known, which is NATO, and what we have done to preserve the ability of Zelensky and the Ukrainians to fight for their independence. Otherwise, Putin would be sitting in Kyiv with his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland."On Afghanistan, oh my. It was a good idea to get out, agreed by both. But why? Doesn't matter. What matters is that according to Harris, Trump, "negotiated directly with a terrorist organization called the Taliban. The negotiation involved the Taliban getting 5000 terrorists, Taliban terrorists, released. And get this. No, get this. And the president at the time, invited the Taliban to Camp David, a place of storied significance for us as Americans, a place where we honor the importance of American diplomacy, where we invite and receive respected world leaders." She also pulled the "as of today, there is not one member of the United States military who is in active duty in a combat zone," which is a lie and everyone knows it. Just ask our troops getting droned in Iraq and Syria. And the U.S. Navy might have something to say about what they have been doing stationed in the Red Sea for the last 10 months.Instead of owning that his negotiations helped to end one of the biggest U.S. foreign policy failures of the last century, Trump boasted that he threatened to blow up the Taliban leader's house and that is how he got the Taliban to stop shooting our soldiers. He briefly mentioned the negotiations with the Taliban, and how it was right to get out of the war, but then went straight into blaming the Biden administration for the catastrophic withdrawal of August 2021. "And by the way, that's why Russia attacked Ukraine, because they saw how incompetent she and her boss are." China, where's China? The only mention of Asia in the debate last night was over Trump's proposed new tariffs and Harris avoiding the question as to why Biden never lifted the ones he imposed during Trump's presidency. Oh yeah, and Harris accusing Trump of saying nice things about Xi Jinping during COVID. The rest of the foreign policy discussion went like this: Harris: "It is well known he exchanged love letters with Kim Jong Un and it is absolutely well known that these dictators and autocrats are rooting for you to be president again because they're so clear, they can manipulate you with flattery and favors, and that is why so many military leaders who you have worked with have told me you are a disgrace."Trump: "(Hungary's president) Victor Orban said you need Trump back as president. They were afraid of him. China was afraid. And I don't like to use the word afraid, but I'm just quoting him. North Korea was afraid of him. Look at what's going on with North Korea. By the way, he said Russia was afraid of him. … He said the most respected, most feared person is Donald Trump. We had no problems when Trump was president."After this debate, the American voter, the American people, should be afraid. To be sure, they will be voting on a whole host of issues and opinions that likely have nothing to do with Gaza, Ukraine, NATO, or the whims of the world's strongmen. But to call any of this "America first" is pure gaslighting. On foreign policy, we come in dead last.

Three years after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, many Western countries are unwilling to formally recognize the hardline group as a legitimate government until it ends widely banned practices such as institutionalized oppression of women or extrajudicial detentions and killings of suspected political opponents. While the West justifiably remains fixated on human rights, the Taliban government remains intransigent and refuses to bend to the demands of the international forces it defeated in August 2021. Dangling the reward of formal recognition has failed as an effective incentive to modify Taliban behavior, especially as numerous regional countries are already engaging with Kabul. China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and several Central Asian republics are pursuing transactional, pragmatic policies towards the Taliban to revive the ancient "Silk Road" trade route which is part of China's "One Road, One Belt" mega-project, and would see Afghanistan become a major logistics point for regional exports, including oil. This approach does not consider the internal affairs of the Taliban significant. Even with non-Western support, a rapidly worsening water crisis poses a grave and imminent threat to Afghan lives. On-the-ground assessments persuasively argue that the Taliban's isolation is aggravating the underlying causes of the crisis, which has resulted in food insecurity, hunger, mental health issues and the spread of infectious diseases. Until now, external actors have shown indifference to the problem, but if ignored, the present situation will most likely lead to a broader humanitarian catastrophe. This crisis, a direct threat to Taliban governance, may offer the West greater leverage to address its concerns than previous aid-based policies. Climate crisisWhile Western-dominated international institutions focus on the Taliban's oppressive policies, there is comparatively little reported in mainstream media about the climate-related pressures facing an Afghan population of over 43 million. Rising temperatures and extreme weather events such as melting glaciers, flash floods, droughts, and earthquakes, have led to the destruction of vital water sources and facilities in Afghanistan. Nearly four out of every five Afghans now lack access to clean water, while only 27 percent of the rural population enjoy access to sanitation facilities. Afghanistan currently ranks fourth on the list of countries most at risk of a climate change crisis and eighth on the index of countries most vulnerable and least prepared to adapt to climate change.These pressures would challenge any government, let alone Afghanistan's current de facto rulers of madrassa-educated guerrilla fighters. They are hardly capable of assessing and managing highly complex geoclimatic factors that impact the economic viability of the entire South Asia region. Although not a unified body — with reports of schisms within the ranks of its leadership — some elements within the Taliban may be aware, if not fearful, of the near-term consequences of their inability to manage the crisis on their own. Efforts are underway to manage groundwater in the country with at least 300 projects in various provinces set to be implemented this year, according to Afghanistan's Ministry of Energy and Water. Rehabilitation has begun on six major water projects, including the Pashtun dam, Kamal Khan dam, Turi Bakhshabad dam, and Shah and Arous dam, and construction is set to start on 11 more check dams to store water and release it into springs and canals for irrigation. But these projects are hardly sufficient to meet the needs of the Afghan people, mostly concentrated in rural areas and living a bare, subsistence-level agrarian lifestyle. Sadly, it is not for lack of water within Afghanistan, as its high mountains and near-alpine conditions provide a surplus. Yet, distribution of that water is severely impaired by outmoded or non-existent delivery systems. Currently, Afghanistan annually uses only 30 percent of available water resources; 70 percent is wasted due to lack of infrastructure, water storage facilities, and inefficient distribution systems.Rivers run through itDespite an inability to get water to its own people, Afghanistan is a major source of water to Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. With major population and industrial growth and shrinking rivers, water is a vital concern for them. They understand the threat of water shortages to their economies and political and social stability.As a result, water disputes have been a significant cause of tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors. In May 2023, Afghan and Iranian forces clashed after Iran's president charged the Taliban government with restricting access to water from the Helmand River. The Taliban's construction of a 285-kilometer canal off the Amu Darya, the Qosh Tepa Canal, could draw off 12 to 15 percent of the water that now flows to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Water wars are not new and may soon come to Central Asia.An offer they can't refuseAs a country whose economic viability is dependent on agriculture, an adequate domestic supply of water, reliable irrigation and power are fundamental. The Taliban will need to understand that the sustainability of its grip on power will be in large part contingent upon its ability not just to rule, but also to govern and maintain good relations with its neighbors. Water is key to both. Failure to do so will likely result in a powerful backlash, including regional isolation and even an uprising by people who have nothing left to lose.This situation presents Western countries with leverage with the Taliban, to both reduce the suffering of the Afghan people and enhance their influence in the larger region which, according to most accounts, they have lost to China and Russia. The West can deploy both advanced water resource management technologies inside Afghanistan and regional diplomacy with its neighbors as tools to move forward on long-stalled objectives. The Taliban may be ideological, but it can also be pragmatic. To avert the risk of being left out of a new reality in Central Asia, the West must move toward decoupling politics from environmental and humanitarian issues. It must reach an entente of sorts whereby the Taliban would accept desperately needed assistance in exchange for a few "good faith" concessions on human rights issues in particular. These concessions would need to be made quietly and without fanfare, to allow the Taliban to save face.The Taliban will also need to attract and work with technocrats and with expertise in hydraulics engineering and water resource management, as well as negotiate partnerships with countries that are at the cutting edge of water management technology, such as the Netherlands, the U.S., Australia and Germany.If the Taliban's behavior is to be modified, those seeking modification need to use more carrots and fewer sticks. Some measure of pragmatism Humanitarian catastrophes routinely require good faith efforts by both local authorities and outside aid agencies, but the situation with the Taliban is anything but routine. The "facts on the ground" demonstrate that the conventional assumption — that humanitarian aid can be used to effect changes in local governance practices — have not worked with the Taliban. Part of this is ideological, and part of this is practical.While Western nations seek to tie assistance to reforms, other nations, such as China, famously "take no position on internal affairs" and view engagement as transactional in nature. In Afghanistan, that means trade and investment in return for aid. While this is unfortunate (and some would say immoral), it is clear that the West should be similarly pragmatic in exchange for minor reform. Water resources is one key area where this could bear fruit.

Former President Donald Trump's foreign policy is as murky as ever.He gave a rare long-form interview to journalist Eric Cortellessa for TIME's stark May magazine cover, simply titled, "If He Wins." Alongside the profile, TIME also released the full transcripts of two interviews that Cortellessa had with the former president. Cortellessa grilled Trump on a number of foreign policy topics, including the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine. As is often the case with Trump's views on international affairs, they raise more questions than answers, leaving uncertainty about what he would do if elected president in November.In general, Trump's foreign policy approach seems motivated by criticizing what he considers to be Joe Biden's failures while avoiding providing clear, discernible alternatives. On multiple occasions, Trump has claimed that neither Russia's invasion of Ukraine nor Hamas's incursion into Israel would have happened under his watch, claims he repeated during Tuesday's interview. Israel and the Middle East Trump's answers to what he would do about wars in the Middle East were largely noncommittal, with one notable exception. When asked in the first interview — which took place the day before Iran launched airstrikes at Israel — Trump said that he would "protect Israel" in the case of a war with Tehran. During a second conversation two weeks later, Trump seemed to endorse the idea that Iran's strikes on Israel in April were telegraphed with the intention of avoiding further escalation — and said that that was a "good thing" — but then affirmed his support for defending Israel. "So it would depend, obviously, but the answer is yes," Trump said. "If they attack Israel, yes, we would be there." Otherwise, Trump played up his loyalty to Israel during his presidential term, touting his withdrawal from the JCPOA, his moving of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and his recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel. But Trump also had harsh words for Benjamin Netanyahu. "I had a bad experience with Bibi. And it had to do with Soleimani, because as you probably know by now, he dropped out just before the attack," Trump said, referring to the January 2020 strike that killed Iranian military officer Qassem Soleimani, in which, Trump claims, the Israeli prime minister declined to participate at the last minute. "And I was not happy about that. That was something I never forgot. And it showed me something. I would say that what happened on—the October 7 should have never happened."He added that Netanyahu "rightfully has been criticized for what took place on October 7," without elaborating on exactly what he meant. Speaking about Israel's reaction to the Hamas attacks, Trump repeated an earlier criticism that Israel had mismanaged its PR approach to the war. "I don't think that the Israel Defense Fund or any other group should be sending out pictures every night of buildings falling down and being bombed with possibly people in those buildings every single night, which is what they do," Trump said, misnaming the Israel Defense Forces. While Trump has previously said that Israel should "get [the war] over with," he did not say what he would do to accomplish that goal. When pressed by Cortellesa over whether he would be willing to condition military aid to Israel to try to end the war, Trump deflected, instead listing the pro-Israeli policies implemented during his presidency. Trump also expressed skepticism over the possibility of a two-state solution, but did not suggest an alternative proposal. He did point to doubts from his former patron and late pro-Israel GOP mega-donor Sheldon Adelson as a reason for his pessimism."He loved Israel, and he wanted to protect Israel. And he felt that it was impossible to make a deal because of the level of hatred," Trump said. "I disagreed with it. But so far, he hasn't been wrong" The former president was similarly noncommittal about withdrawing troops from the region to focus on other theaters, only saying that the U.S. was "in a lot of places where we shouldn't be," and that "We have a lot of options" when it comes to military deployments. Ukraine, Russia, and NATO Trump has been painted by members of the media, his opponents, and even some supporters as a staunch opponent of aid to Ukraine. And while he earlier pledged to end the war in 24 hours, the former president has never articulated a clear strategy for doing so. He reportedly quietly blessed Speaker Mike Johnson's foreign aid package — which included roughly $60 billion in assistance for Kyiv — and since its passage has continued to praise the Speaker while generally staying quiet on the details of the legislation.In the TIME interview, Trump again provided very few details on his policy preferences. His primary gripe is that Europe has expected Washington to foot the bill while not providing sufficient aid itself."We're in for billions of dollars more than they're in in Ukraine. It shouldn't be that way. It should be the opposite way. Because they're much more greatly affected. We have an ocean in between us. They don't," he said.When pressed about whether he would support cutting off military aid for Kyiv, Trump said, "I wouldn't give unless Europe starts equalizing." He repeated similar talking points in response to a series of further questions trying to pin down his stance on Ukraine aid. Trump also said that he had not yet called for the release of detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich because he has "so many things I'm working on." He added that, if elected president, he would secure Gershkovich's release. "I get along very well with Putin, but the reporter should be released and he will be released," he said. "I don't know if he's going to be released under Biden." Other notable quotablesCortellessa also asked Trump about his stance on China/Taiwan, South Korea, and NATO. Asked whether the U.S. should defend Taiwan if China invades, Trump remained ambiguous. "I've been asked this question many times and I always refuse to answer it because I don't want to reveal my cards to a wonderful reporter like you," Trump said. "But no. China knows my answer very well. But they have to understand that things like that can't come easy. But I will say that I have never publicly stated although I want to, because I wouldn't want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any reporter."On South Korea, Trump seemed to threaten a withdrawal of U.S. forces if Seoul did not "treat us properly.""They've become a very wealthy country. We've essentially paid for much of their military, free of charge. And they agreed to pay billions of dollars," he said. "And now probably now that I'm gone, they're paying very little. I don't know if you know that they renegotiated the deal I made. And they're paying very little."The 45th president made a similar case for the NATO alliance, which he said he was not interested in re-negotiating. "I don't need to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. All I need to do is have them pay their bills. They don't pay their bills," Trump said, seemingly referring to a certain percentage of GDP NATO countries pledge to spend on defense. There are no NATO "bills." He added that his primary problem with the alliance was that he doubted that NATO countries would come to America's defense if attacked despite the fact that many NATO countries fought alongside the United States in Afghanistan. Trump gave a meandering interview which covered a lot of ground but ultimately didn't reveal much about what another term would look like, instead sticking to his common talking points — perhaps deliberately offering little detail to keep his options open if he returns to the Oval Office next year.

Many are seeing the current impasse over the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine as the ultimate manifestation of congressional dysfunction. Following several attempts, the Senate in February passed a $95 billion bill that includes most of the Biden administration's previous requests, minus border funding. That bill sits in limbo in the House, with Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), who, while signaling he wants a vote on it, has so far been unwilling to bring it to the floor. Last month House Democrats introduced an arcane "motion to discharge" petition, which could allow supporters to bring the bill to a vote if 218 members agree. While 191 have signed the petition, the odds of finding another 27 appear daunting, given the number of progressive Democrats who oppose military assistance for Israel, and opposition by Republicans to bypassing the Speaker.This situation — while distressing to the Ukrainians, and it seems, the foreign policy establishment — presents an opportunity to reestablish some measure of congressional control, if only in a limited area. Members of Congress wary of presidential overreach and endless military intervention can use this delay to push the administration to define its strategy for Ukraine more transparently. Such a definition is essential for Congress, and the voters they represent, to evaluate the total costs, in treasure and risk of escalation, of our current policy.A common task for government bureaucrats is drafting responses to congressional questions for the record sent to their agencies. These QFRs range from in-the-weeds clarifications of budgets to essentially rhetorical questions on why a particular senior administration official is clueless, and everything in between. The best QFRs can cause policymakers to question some of their assumptions. Since the Ukraine war began, the administration's statements have been opaque, often contradictory, and sometimes lacking in elementary logic. We are past the point where the American people deserve straight answers on where this war is going, what our real critical interests are, and how we can best achieve them.Before approving further military assistance for Ukraine, lawmakers should ask, preferably in hearings with administration officials, or at least in detailed letters, a number of overarching questions.The first should be: Can you define what constitutes victory in this war? Does it require Ukraine recapturing all its internationally recognized territory, as President Zelensky and others maintain? Or can victory be defined more simply as preventing the collapse of the current government? What do we mean by providing Ukraine aid "as long as it takes"? The Biden administration should provide actual analysis, based on U.S. national interests, and not simply Ukrainian government talking points.Second, if our definition of victory is the expulsion of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, how plausible is that from a military perspective? Can the Biden administration provide a historical example in which a numerically smaller force, without air superiority, successfully attacked a larger force entrenched in strong defensive positions hundreds of miles long, dislodged that force, and inflicted more casualties on the defender than it suffered itself while on the offensive?Next, there has been much speculation about the risks of nuclear escalation, and whether Russian statements are merely aggressive bluffing, with no likelihood such weapons would be used. During the Cold War, wasn't it U.S. doctrine to implicitly threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons, not just to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the US homeland or using nuclear weapons in Europe, but to deter a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact? If those threats were credible, why would Putin not consider using tactical nuclear weapons if he were facing a conventional defeat in which Ukraine threatened to retake Crimea and the Donbas, areas Russia now considers part of its territory?Fourth, a major talking point has been that a Russian defeat would deter China from attacking Taiwan, and represent a victory for the democratic world over an authoritarian axis. If this is a rationale to keep the war going, wouldn't China take us at our word, and decide that a Russian defeat is an unacceptable red line? Why wouldn't China begin providing munitions, artillery, tanks, and aircraft to Russia to prevent such an outcome?Fifth, in addition to Ukraine's shortage of ammunition and weapons, we increasingly hear about a manpower shortage, and an inability to replace casualties. Despite the battlefield situation, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men remain outside the country or are in Ukraine but making extraordinary efforts to avoid being drafted. Is this due to dissatisfaction with the current government, or a sense that while it was important to save the country in 2022, it's not worth continued fighting to retake Crimea and Donbas, or something else? Regardless of its cause, why should the American taxpayer be more committed to a Ukrainian victory than hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens themselves are?And finally, following Ukraine's unsuccessful counteroffensive last year, Russia is now undertaking limited attacks in several areas, using its superiority in artillery and airpower to wear down Ukrainian defenses. The Biden administration often states that its objective is to give Ukraine as strong a position on the battlefield as possible going into any negotiations. Is it possible that Ukraine is now in the best position militarily that it can reasonably hope for? Is it time for us to urge Ukraine to begin negotiations now, based on realities on the ground, rather than strive for maximum objectives, before it loses any more territory, and its bargaining position is further weakened?***Questions such as these would help start the dialogue on how our policy should evolve. The result may be a security assistance package much smaller than what the administration is proposing. There may be consensus to include, for example, artillery ammunition and shorter range air defense missiles to defend Ukraine's current positions, while excluding longer range munitions and aircraft. Those systems, by allowing strikes inside Russia, might encourage Ukraine to pursue unrealistic victory conditions, reducing the chances for diplomacy.For this approach to succeed, two elements are essential. First, members of Congress must make clear their sympathy for the Ukrainian people and their suffering. The point is not whether Ukraine is justified in seeking the return of its territory — it certainly is. The question is whether this goal is in any way realistic. Since the answer is likely "no," to continue throwing away lives as a performative gesture is immoral as well as pointless. Congress might consider a bill that separates out humanitarian assistance and voting for that now, since those funds are needed regardless of military policy.Second, this approach must be a bipartisan effort, with lawmakers on the left and right working together toward a common goal. So far certain Republicans have been in the lead on this issue, with Democrats lagging behind. More than a year has elapsed since the fiasco in late 2022, when the Congressional Progressive Caucus was forced to retract its already anodyne call for diplomacy. Progressives must overcome their fear of White House displeasure and attack from the Washington foreign policy establishment. People will take notice when similar questions are raised by members of both the Freedom Caucus and "the Squad." Members of Congress who favor endless military intervention have no problem with bipartisan cooperation, and those who think differently need to catch up.With the current effort in the House to act on the Senate's bill, the window is closing to ask tough questions. If Congress is to have any meaningful voice, these issues must be addressed as soon as possible.

If there is a "Chekhov's gun" in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, it consists of circa $300 billion worth of central bank assets sitting in the coffers of the U.S. and (more so) its close allies. Frozen at the outset of Moscow's invasion, the money represents both the object of the strongest sanctions taken so far against a state outside of a UN-authorized regime, and, at the same time, the possible target for even more dramatic further escalatory measures.The question at the moment is whether G7 states will make the crucial transition from "freezing" to "seizing" – i.e., liquidate the funds and then reallocate them to assist Ukraine. The issue has gathered urgency amidst flagging support in the U.S. and in Europe for continuing to expend funds on shoring up Ukraine's struggling defenses.At home in the U.S., the bipartisan REPO Act endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would empower the President to "confiscate ... Russian sovereign assets'' and to then deposit them into a "Ukraine Support Fund" that would aid in reconstruction, recovery, and the "welfare of the Ukrainian people." Those goals, if vague, are hardly objectionable. But using seized sovereign assets to promote them is, as a matter of law, untested and problematic. As a matter of economic statecraft, meanwhile, it is still more inadvisable, for several reasons. These include the significant risk of alienating allies, further discrediting U.S. "dollar power", boosting China's prestige and its own "yuanization" aims, and endangering U.S. assets abroad.Piercing the Veil of SovereigntyThe legal objections are quite simple to summarize. The norm of sovereign immunity is one of the most well-established customs in international law. In the eyes of many experts, it is precisely the firmness of this bedrock principle that has allowed exceptions, such as litigation for commercial disputes involving states, to become reliable.The rule is reflected in the law of countries around the world, including in the U.S.'s own Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. China, notably, has only as of this year finally implemented legislation for immunity that clearly separates commerce from matters of state, putting foreign businesses and investors on equal footing as litigants — which should be seen as a victory for U.S. interests in its market.Despite immunity's inarguable applicability to central banks, advocates of asset seizure have pointed to the custom of "countermeasures'' to justify their project. These are illegal acts taken by states injured by a previous wrong of another state, and intended only to induce the latter to cease its misbehavior. Usually, only a directly injured party (here, Ukraine) can take such actions, but emerging arguments for "collective countermeasures"would extend the field of retaliators for some core wrongs to include any state in the global community.Experts critical of asset seizure have pointed out, however, that doctrinal support is lacking. As Vanderbilt Law School's Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk rightly summarizes: "There is little or no state practice on countermeasures for reparations ... There is little practice of third-party countermeasures, little or no practice of countermeasures used to deny immunity, and no practice that provides clear support for denying central bank immunity as a countermeasure."Meanwhile, given that most of the funds currently lie in special accounts at the financial services company Euroclear, any repercussions would also be primarily borne not by Washington, but rather by its European allies. That fact has prompted considerable opposition to the initiative among European policymakers, despite their willingness to join earlier rounds of sanctions. After all, Europe's leaders are, in effect, being deputized to carry out a policy of financial warfare whose costs they will have to bear right along with that policy's targets.First of all, the precedent of a geopolitically-motivated confiscation could threaten the euro's hard-won status as the world's second reserve currency. The euro's attractiveness has been based on numerous ingredients, obviously including Europe's economic productivity, stability, and growth potential; however, its apparent security for asset-holders as compared with the more thoroughly weaponized U.S. financial system is also a key factor. And then there is, of course, European states' relatively far greater vulnerability than Washington in the case of any escalations of the broader NATO-Russia conflict.It is understandable why the EU has so far balked on agreement to a plan of outright confiscation of Russian funds. It has, instead, begun to implement a much more moderate approach of reallocating to Kyiv the sizable interest payments being generated by the frozen assets. However, the G7 is still due to discuss the proposal for seizure at its next meeting. The Biden administration, along with Canada and Japan, remain strong backers of this idea.A Financial Coalition of the Willing?Debates are intensifying. For example, when Swiss lawmakers discussed reparations involvement this month, the motions were adopted in the Senate by 21 votes to 19, with three abstentions. Some senators worried about "weakening" international law protections, which "exist to protect small states." Those misgivings are still more widely shared beyond Europe, of course, as large swathes of the Global South know precisely how vulnerable they can already be to Western sanctions. A dubious new practice of asset confiscation would make U.S. dollar power, already a subject of widespread discontent, even more unpalatable.If the G7 financial offensive provokes as much backlash as it seems poised to, could China stand to benefit? Certainly, Beijing is likely to reap diplomatic dividends from perceptions that Western financial warfare has become too extreme. Xi Jinping's Party center has emphasized portraying China as a law-abiding global power, especially by embracing UN institutions (where it, of course, exerts great influence at little cost). The contrast with a G7 maneuvering around the UN at every turn makes a potent impression in the Global South.A separate question is whether China's vision of a "de-dollarized" world could receive a boost from Western confiscation efforts. Certainly, Beijing has long sought to increase the yuan's share of global foreign currency reserves and cross-border usage, and has made some recent progress. The RMB would indeed become more attractive as dollar and euro accounts began to look ever more vulnerable to seizure.But it has a long way to go. Currently, the yuan is only the fifth global reserve currency, still narrowly trailing the yen and the pound. It is also limited by domestic economic issues and, especially China's strict capital controls and heavily managed exchange rates. As a recent article produced for a PRC Ministry of Education research project phrased it, given all of the current obstacles to international use of the RMB, even for Russia itself, "de-dollarization cannot be a complete renminbization."Still, intensified weaponization of Western currencies could indeed boost China's yuan efforts, and, more significantly, provide a major stimulus to plans for a BRICS basket reserve currency. The move would simultaneously improve Beijing's reputation as an apparently more responsible actor with respect to foreign assets, while also perversely incentivizing it to further experiment with its own nascent unilateral sanctions regime.A managed process of de-dollarization with cross-bloc participation could be a good thing, but a chaotic transition triggered by Western hubris, provoking similar ventures by great power rivals, would not be. Like the "coalition of the willing" that supported the illegal Iraq War in 2003, arguably helping to normalize behaviors like those of Russia today, the coalition now aligning for ever-escalating financial warfare may ultimately weaken international law protections for everyone, not only their intended targets. It is time to put a freeze on the transition to seizure.

Reports Monday that Israel has killed a major Hezbollah commander comes after what is described as the militants' first act of retaliation against Israel following the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh Al-Arouri in southern Beirut. This development threatens to jeopardize U.S.-led efforts to calm the situation on the Lebanese-Israeli front, after Hezbollah's leadership appeared to signal a conditional willingness to engage in such a processReuters reported on Monday that an Israeli strike on south Lebanon killed Wissam al-Tawil a senior commander in Hezbollah's elite Radwan force.Meanwhile, Hezbollah issued a statement Saturday saying it had launched a barrage of 62 rockets at an Israeli air surveillance base located at Mount Meron in Northern Israel. According to the statement the rocket attack struck the intended target in what it said was a preliminary response to the assassination of Al-Arouri, indicating that the score with Israel has yet to be settled over the killing of the Hamas official. The Israeli side meanwhile confirmed that 40 rockets were launched towards the base, without further elaborating as to whether the rockets had reached their target. But according to Israeli daily Haaretz on Sunday night, the Israelis are now saying the operation inflicted heavy damage on its military facility. The Israeli military meanwhile announced that it carried out a large-scale operation against Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon in response to the Shiite movement's operation. According to the Israeli army "significant assets" belonging to the movement were hit in the attacks. These developments come after Hezbollah's secretary general Hassan Nasrallah on Friday vowed retaliation for Al-Arouri's assassination, which marked the first Israeli military operation targeting the Lebanese capital since the 2006 war with Hezbollah.Despite the soaring tensions however the situation remains tenuous but contained, at least for now. "Hezbollah's operation is more than escalation and less than conflagration," explained retired Lebanese army general Elias Hanna in an interview with RS. "For its part Israel is relying on America for munitions and firepower," he added, stressing that Hezbollah was 10 times stronger than Hamas. "In case of full-blown war with Hezbollah, Israel would therefore need to rely even more on the U.S., which is against such a war," he stated.The latest round of escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli front has nevertheless sparked fears of a full-blown conflict. Addressing reporters in Beirut, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned of the risks of Lebanon becoming embroiled in a large-scale conflagration. "It is absolutely necessary to avoid Lebanon being dragged into a regional conflict," he underscored. Borrell's agenda in Beirut also included talks with the head of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc Mohammad Raad. This marked the first meeting between a senior Western official and a representative from the Shiite movement since the eruption of violence on the Lebanese-Israeli front on October 8. It comes as the Biden administration is intensifying its efforts to reach a land demarcation deal between Lebanon and Israel. Washington's push for launching talks over a potential deal stems from its fears of a full-blown war on the Lebanese-Israeli front.President Joe Biden's special advisor for energy and infrastructure Amos Hochstein is spearheading these efforts. Hochstein, who successfully mediated the maritime border deal reached between Lebanon and Israel in 2022, recently visited Israel to discuss the situation on the Lebanese-Israeli front and a possible land border agreement. Nasrallah did not rule out his party's readiness to engage in U.S.-sponsored talks over such a deal, emphasizing, however, that this cannot take place before a permanent ceasefire is reached in Gaza."Any talks, negotiation or dialogue will only take place or achieve a result after halting the aggression against Gaza," declared Nasrallah in his Friday address.Hezbollah's leader also appeared to lay down his conditions for a potential deal. They not only included Israel's withdrawal from what Lebanon says is occupied territories in the villages of the Shebaa farms and Ghajjar, but also an end to all Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty. "We stand before a historic opportunity to liberate every inch of Lebanese territory and to prevent the enemy from violating Lebanese sovereignty on land, in the air and at sea," he asserted.Nasrallah's statements echo what Hezbollah officials privately say about the movement not being opposed in principle to the idea of talks or negotiations over the border."Declaring that there will be no talks pertaining to this issue prior to a ceasefire in Gaza indicates that Hezbollah is open in principle to such talks," according to one Hezbollah official who spoke to RS on condition of anonymity. RS can also reveal that officials from the Shiite party have stated in closed-door meetings with European diplomats that the U.S.-brokered maritime deal between Lebanon and Israel could facilitate talks over a possible land agreement. Importantly, these statements suggest that Hezbollah remains ready to engage in U.S.-led mediation efforts despite the Biden administration's virtually unconditional support for Israel in the current conflict in Gaza.Hezbollah's conditional readiness to engage in such a process under U.S. auspices, and its continued reluctance to take action that would initiate all-out war, provide a strong impetus for the Biden administration to pressure Israel into agreeing to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, not least given Washington's stated goal of preventing a major flare-up on the Lebanese-Israeli front. Full-scale conflict on this front would undermine U.S. interests in Lebanon, which remains one of the region's most pivotal countries and the gateway of the West to the Middle East. Despite its close ties with Israel, Washington continues to wield significant influence in Lebanon. The Lebanese army, which is the country's most respected institution, is one of the world's largest recipients of American military aid. Army officers and soldiers also frequently travel to the United States as part of their training programs. Washington's success in brokering the maritime border deal further cemented its role as a critical player in Lebanon, particularly given that the country technically remains in a state of war with Israel. By failing to push for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, on the other hand, the U.S. runs a real risk of war on the Lebanese-Israeli front. This owes in no small part to a "real men go to Beirut '' mindset that appears to be prevalent amongst some members of the Israeli political and military elite. Just as U.S. neoconservatives adopted the slogan "real men go to Tehran" after the U.S. invaded Iraq and toppled the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, so do some of the more radical Israeli officials appear to be itching for war with Hezbollah. The Washington Post has also revealed that U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may resort to escalation on the Lebanese front for domestic political considerations. Regardless of how such a war would play out, it will be seen by many, particularly across the Arab world, as backed and enabled by Washington. However, contrary to the situation in 2006 when the Israelis last attacked the Lebanese capital, the world has returned to an era of great power competition with nations like China and Russia seeking to enhance their role in the Middle East. Both Beijing and Moscow are challenging U.S. influence in the region, with the former successfully mediating the resumption of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the latter intervening militarily on behalf of Syrian President Bashar Assad. China and Russia's refraining from adopting an anti-Hamas stance in the conflict in Gaza is another indicator of their intent to compete with the United States in the region. An all-out war on the Lebanese-Israeli front will only serve to undermine U.S. influence in Lebanon in ways that can only benefit China and Russia. Both countries would likely be tempted to expand their influence in Lebanon given its geopolitical importance. And it likely would add to the already formidable influence enjoyed by Iran, which backs Hezbollah, in Lebanon.