Suchergebnisse

Under its Health in Africa Initiative, IFC intended to conduct a country assessment of the private health sector in Mali, working in close collaboration with the World Bank and the Government of Mali.The Core objective of the Mali Country Assessment Report was to work closely with the Government of Mali and Development partners to develop recommendations for a reform program to strengthen the existing policy framework for the public-private interface in the health sector and to improve the delivery of health related goods and services for all Malians.As part of this, the purpose of the book wa

This book has the potential to contribute to a reversing of this trend, whereby activities in not only the health sector but also in other sectors relevant to nutrition will gain increased support and prominence in national development planning. South Asia has by far the largest number of malnourished women and children, and no other region of the world has higher rates of malnutrition. Malnutrition in childhood is the biggest contributor to child mortality; a third of child deaths have malnutrition as an underlying cause. For the surviving children, malnutrition has lifelong implications because it severely reduces a child's ability to learn and to grow to his or her full potential. Malnutrition thus leads to less productive adults and weaker national economic performance. Therefore, the impact of malnutrition on a society's productivity and well being and a nation's long-term development is hard to underestimate. For the South Asia region of the World Bank, malnutrition is a key development priority, and in the coming years, the Bank intends to enhance dramatically its response to this challenge. As a first step, a series of country assessments such as this one are being carried out. These assessments will be used to reinforce the dialogue with governments and other development partners to scale up an evidence-based response against malnutrition. To succeed, we will need to address the problem comprehensively, which will require engaging several sectors. This assessment of malnutrition in Afghanistan lays out the scale, scope, and causes of the problem. The assessment also indicates key elements of a potential response.

In the past decade, Latin America and the Caribbean has achieved impressive social and economic successes. For the first time in history, more people are in the middle class than in poverty. Inequality, although still high, declined markedly. Growth, jobs and effective social programs have transformed the lives of millions. In a striking departure from the crisis-prone Latin America of the past, the region has shown it is better prepared to weather the brunt of the global economic slowdown. Now, the region faces the challenge of maintaining and expanding its hard won gains in an adverse context of low growth. This is caused in part by a decrease in commodity prices and reduced economic activity in major commercial partners such as China. In such a scenario, achieving development results - and learning from them - becomes more important. This publication showcases stories about people and how their lives have been improved through better health and education, youth employment, disaster recovery and preparedness, infrastructure, and more.

Backed by sound economic policies and until the global crisis, a buoyant global economy, many developing countries made significant movement toward achieving the 2015millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly those for poverty reduction, gender parity in education, and reliable access to safe water. But even before the global economic crisis, progress in achieving some MDGs, especially those on child and maternal mortality, primary school completion, hunger, and sanitation, was lagging. The global food, fuel and economic crises have set back progress to the MDGs. An estimated 64 million more people are living on less than $1.25/day than there would have been without the crisis. The challenges ahead are achieving the MDGs requires a vibrant global economy, powered by strong, sustainable, multi-polar growth, underpinned by sound policies and reform at the country level; improving access for the poor to health, education, affordable food, trade, finance, and basic infrastructure is key to accelerating progress to the MDGs; developing countries need to continue to strengthen resilience to global volatility in order to protect gains and sustain progress toward the MDGs; the international community must renew its commitment to reach the 'bottom billion', particularly those in fragile and conflict-affected countries; and global support for a comprehensive development agenda including through the G20 process is critical. In the wake of recent global crises, and with the 2015 deadline approaching, business as usual is not enough to meet the MDGs.

Health is a direct source of human welfare and also an instrument for raising income levels. The authors discuss a number of mechanisms through which health can affect income, focusing on worker productivity, children's education, savings and investment, and demographic structure. As well as the impact of current illness, health may have large effects on prospective life spans and life cycle behavior. Studies suggest there may be a large effect of health and nutrition in uteri, and in the first few years of life, on physical and cognitive development and economic success as an adult. Macroeconomic evidence for an effect on growth is mixed, with evidence of a large effect in some studies. However, there is a possibility that gains from health may be outweighed by the effect of increased survival on population growth, until a fertility transition occurs. The low cost of some health interventions that have large-scale effects on population health makes health investments a promising policy tool for growth in developing countries. In addition, higher priority could be given to tackling widespread 'neglected' diseases that is, diseases with low mortality burdens that are not priorities from a pure health perspective, but that do have substantial effects on productivity.

Several developing economies have recently introduced conditional cash transfer programs, which provide money to poor families contingent on certain behavior, usually investments in human capital, such as sending children to school or bringing them to health centers. The approach is both an alternative to more traditional social assistance programs and a demand-side complement to the supply of health and education services. Unlike most development initiatives, conditional cash transfer programs have been subject to rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness using experimental or quasi-experimental methods. Evaluation results for programs launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey reveal successes in addressing many of the failures in delivering social assistance, such as weak poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and limited welfare impacts. There is clear evidence of success from the first generation of programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health care, and raising household consumption. Many questions remain unanswered, however, including the potential of conditional cash transfer programs to function well under different conditions, to address a broader range of challenges among poor and vulnerable populations, and to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

The Ukrainian people are entering the third year of their fight for their existence as a state and people. Every day, soldiers and civilians—children, women, and the elderly—are killed, homes are destroyed, and jobs are lost. The uncertainty of wartime forces individuals, families, communities, and the authorities to shorten their planning horizons and be ready to adapt at a moment's notice. Under such circumstances, any effort to develop long-term strategies focused on postwar development immediately raises questions of feasibility. However, no society can live by only looking at the challenges of the moment. The future is also important for collective survival. Today's demographic crisis is a challenge that short- and long-term government strategy planning must account for.Since Ukraine gained its independence in the 1990s, its demographic situation has demanded the government's attention. Authorities worked to improve its policies and achieved some success between 2006 and 2015. Unfortunately, these positive outcomes were adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and demolished by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. In recent months, the Ministry of Social Policy prepared a plan to respond to the demographic challenges brought on by the war. This document, the Demographic Development Strategy, underwent a series of public discussions and was developed in cooperation with government officials, Ukrainian scholars, and specialists from several international organizations. The strategy was finalized in January 2024 and now waits for governmental approval. About the Demographic Development Strategy The new strategy envisages two basic scenarios for Ukraine's development. The inertia scenario assumes that demographic processes will evolve naturally, without government intrusion. It predicts that the population of Ukraine within its 1991 borders may decrease to 28.9 million people by January 2041, and to 25.2 million by January 2051. The guided scenario assumes the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy and predicts the achievement of decent living standards for Ukrainians returning from abroad. Under this scenario, the demographic decline would be mitigated, with estimates of a population of 33.9 million by January 1941, and 31.6 million by January 2051. The goal of the strategy is to ensure that the population maintains its long-term reproduction capacity despite all war-related conditions. It is intended to improve Ukraine's sociodemographic characteristics as defined in the policy's five strategic goals: Chart 1. Goals of the Demographic Development Strategy of Ukraine (2024–2040)Image CreditThe strategy proposes using tested—both in Ukraine and worldwide—policy instruments to avoid the inertia scenario. These include policies intended to improve the birth rate; reduce premature mortality and excessive migration; address population displacement; accommodate an aging population; and address other challenges confronting the nation. Increasing Ukraine's Birth Rate The primary issue that the strategy addresses is Ukraine's population size, an issue greatly exacerbated by Russia's aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory. The war both sharply reduced Ukraine's already low birth rate, and sharply raised mortality across all age groups and occupations. Several million displaced Ukrainians moved toward the western part of Ukraine, and over six million others, mainly children and women, were forced to leave the country. In addition to the refugees, large-scale labor migration abroad between 2022 and 2023 threatens to turn into permanent emigration over time. The illegal annexation of Crimea and some southeastern Ukrainian regions between 2014 and 2022 has affected the demographic situation as well.[1] As a result, according to our calculations, Ukraine's population has radically decreased, moving from 48.5 million inhabitants in December 2001, to 42.0 million in January 2022, and then to 36.3 in August 2023 (of which, only around 31.5 million reside in the government-controlled territories).[2]Since Ukraine has not conducted a census since 2001, analysts must use both conventional and unconventional sources (as explained in the endnote 2). But making forecasts about the population size in the future is even more difficult. First, there is a lack of information on the population of the temporarily occupied territories and areas near the front. Second, military development scenarios vary greatly, which directly impact any demographic assessment. Third, the decisions that displaced and migrated Ukrainians make about whether and when to return are difficult to predict. Any demographic strategy must take all this into account in planning for the country's development. Even in peacetime, Ukraine's fertility rates have been below the level required for population replacement (2.2) since the mid-1960s. In 2021, the total fertility rate was 1.2. Put another way, the number of children born that year was half the number of people who reached the age of 60. After the start of Russian aggression in 2022, the fertility rate fell below 1.0.Even if the war were to end tomorrow, Ukraine would face an extreme challenge in improving its birth rate. There are five major reasons for such a low birth rate. First, there was a change in social values, towards self-realization and individualism. This translated into a shift from the number of children born to the quality of their care and upbringing, as well as a modification in the forms of marriage and the age at which people became parents.Second, economic factors played a negative role. According to 2021 statistical data, the poverty rate in Ukraine was 20.6 percent in the general population. For families with children, however, it was higher, measuring 22.4 percent for families with children; 27.6 percent for families with children under three years old; and 53.6 percent for large families. With the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion, these numbers became even worse. Third, there are structural obstacles to combining work with raising families for women in Ukraine. There is a significant difference in employment levels for women between 25 and 44 years old in 2021: the employment rate was 71.1 percent for women without children and only 51.5 percent for women with children between three and five years old. During the war, the shelling and large-scale destruction decreased the opportunities for children to attend school, which significantly worsened employment opportunities for women. Fourth, public health in Ukraine has deteriorated considerably in recent years, including declining trends in reproductive health. Additionally, Ukrainian women live under stress and depression caused by constant fear for their lives and the lives of their children and relatives. Finally, the fifth factor is the separation of families. Many men have been drafted into the armed forces, while many women have migrated abroad.Together, these factors have a synergistic effect, forcing most Ukrainian families to postpone childbearing in anticipation of a more favorable period. A significant number of these postponed births may never materialize. In the past, the Ukrainian government tried to increase the birth rate by increasing maternity benefits for women until their children reach the age of three. The government increased these benefits tenfold in 2005, and then threefold in 2008. These increases succeeded in increasing the birth rate: in 2005, there were 426,100 children born, compared to 512,500 newborns in 2009. However, the effect of financial incentives on the fertility rate was rather short-lived and mainly influenced families with low levels of education and income. A much more lasting positive result was achieved through the reduction of poverty for families with children, the creation of a legal and policy environment friendly to such families, and an increase in the economic self-sufficiency of families.Reducing Premature Mortality The second most important cause of the demographic crisis is high premature mortality for people under 65, an issue especially affecting men. Even before the major invasion and the COVID-19 pandemic, by 2020, the average life expectancy in Ukraine was 71.3 years, the lowest rate in Europe.The new strategy identifies the main factors contributing to the excessive mortality in Ukraine as a low level of hygiene culture, the prevalence of dangerous working conditions, unhealthy lifestyle, late response to health issues, widespread vaccination hesitancy, and faults in the public health care system. Lack of access to medical and recreational services are especially acute for residents in small towns and villages.The gender gap in mortality is typically high for all post-Soviet countries. According to 2020 official statistics, the gender gap in life expectancy was 9.8 years: 76.2 years for women and 66.4 years for men. Male mortality in Ukraine was higher than female mortality in all age groups, but especially—more than three times—in the 25–34 cohort. After retirement, this gap decreases. This difference stems from variations in lifestyle for women and men, and the exposure of men to more dangerous employment conditions. Russia's full-scale aggression has significantly increased mortality rates for Ukrainians. This is especially noticeable among soldiers who are risking death in battles and captivity. At the same time, the general population also risks death on a daily basis from rocket and drone attacks, limited access to medical care in the temporarily occupied territories,[3] and extreme stress that can lead to the emergence of new and exacerbation of old chronic diseases. Even though there are currently no reliable data on human losses among Ukrainian military personnel and civilians, the toll has tragically reduced the population. The cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is undoubtedly the first step to reducing mortality. However, the experience of other postwar countries shows that even the end of armed conflict does not immediately return mortality to prewar levels.Addressing Migration Out-migration of Ukraine's population has long exceeded in-migration since the dissolution of the USSR. For economic reasons, Ukrainians have been leaving for Russia, then for Poland. On the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants abroad was estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million people. Over the last decade, Ukrainians consistently were among the top nationalities receiving first-time EU residence permits. For example, 873,700 Ukrainian citizens received EU residence permits in 2021, 30 percent of all those issued.Russia's military aggression has resulted in the largest outward flow of migration from Ukrainian territory since WWII. Millions of people moved away from frontline areas to either relatively safe regions of Ukraine or to other countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, by the end of 2023, over six million Ukrainians fled abroad. Of these, 1.2 million were either deported to or (less often) voluntarily left for the Russian Federation.[4] According to Eurostat, by the end of October 2023, 63.2 percent of the 4.3 million Ukrainians who were in the EU/European Free Trade Zone (excluding Hungary) were women, 33.2 percent were under the age of 18, and 6.1 percent were 60 or older.[5] Since one-third of forced migrants abroad are children and adolescents, their non-return may cause irreparable demographic loss for Ukraine. The situation is potentially made worse if some Ukrainian families decide to reunite outside Ukraine after the war ends. As a recent study demonstrates, many migrants may not return home.[6] Female migrants who have found good jobs and housing outside of their country may bring their husbands to join them once martial law and travel restrictions are lifted in Ukraine. Additionally, growing divorce rates between partners separated by war reduce the incentive of Ukrainian women to return home after the war.The same study shows that the reasons for Ukrainians' reluctance to return home include uncertainty about security in Ukraine (for 47 percent of those polled), lack of workplace or place to live (31 percent), insufficient access to basic services (22 percent), and lack of acceptable quality of education for children (15 percent). Abroad, Ukrainian migrants value stable employment (21 percent), school and preschool institutions (11 percent), and a sense of integration (11 percent).[7]The new strategy includes policies to attract Ukrainians living abroad so they return to their homeland. These policies would apply to migrants who left because of war and those who moved before the war. Should conditions require it, the strategy also includes migration policies to attract immigrants from other countries.(Re)distributing Postwar PopulationThe military conflict has greatly influenced population distribution in Ukraine's regions. The first cohort of internally displaced people (IDP) appeared in Ukraine in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea and instigation of separatist conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk. These attacks caused approximately 1.5 million Ukrainians to leave their homes for safer regions in the country. In December 2023, the number of IDPs reached 4.9 million. These numbers include about 739,000 families with children that were forced to leave their homes for regions of Ukraine away from the front lines. Despite efforts from the government and local communities, IDPs lack housing, acceptable work and income, and access to timely health and social assistance. The constant stress and uncertainty about their future cause larger declines in fertility and increases in mortality among IDPs compared to the general population.At the same time, the massive population movements within Ukraine can be a source of labor resources for the regions where IDPs settle in. The demographic strategy envisages the formation of a new resettlement system to influence and support the reconstruction of different regions of Ukraine. The most likely scenario for postwar development envisions the formation of five territorial clusters. The central cluster includes relatively safe regions of central Ukraine that already shelter the largest number of IDPs. This cluster is likely to become the country's new industrial center after the war. Due to its closeness to the EU, the western cluster will need a larger workforce. This region will develop quickly through economic ties with the European countries and will provide a strategic location for military industry. However, western Ukraine has long been underdeveloped relative to other major population centers. It will take time and investment for this region to accommodate a large population influx. The northeastern territories will remain the area of the most "insecure habitation" due to its proximity to Russia. Economic development in these regions will require special policies and interventions from both the central and local governments. The southern cluster's prospects are currently the least clear. This area will probably have to develop under conditions of both constant threat from Russian and the benefits from sea-born trade.Ukraine's large urban environments—like those in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Lviv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia—will constitute a separate cluster. Big cities will likely provide the most accessible services and job opportunities to their residents. Rational population (re)settlement in postwar Ukraine must plan for housing (including temporary housing during reconstruction), infrastructure, reindustrialization, and job creation. These plans must also include social infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and other public buildings in each of the clusters.Adapting to an Aging SocietyUkraine has one of the 30 oldest populations in the world: almost 18 percent of its population is older than 65. Over the next several decades it will age even more. According to projections, the over-65 proportion will reach 21 percent by January 2041, and it will reach 23 percent of the general population by January 2051. This means that Ukraine must adapt and address issues related to the lives of older people.The demographic strategy plans to promote and accommodate the increased longevity of the Ukrainian population. The quality of life of older Ukrainians will depend on general factors like the social and economic outcomes of the war and specific factors like pensions; accessibility of social support and health services, especially in rural areas; and opportunities for employment and participation in society. Improving the quality of life of the elderly is an essential component for improving Ukraine's post-war prospects. Creating a Supportive Environment for Demographic ImprovementImproving a nation's demographic trends both requires and drives progress in other social sectors. For example, demography determines a nation's social and economic prospects, while governmental policies impact long-term demographic processes. The new Demographic Development Strategy, based on surveys and research, proposes to help develop an environment which supports population growth. Such an environment—in both war and postwar periods—has four major components: basic security, proper housing, a balanced labor market, and supportive living conditions.In the framework of this strategy, basic security for Ukraine's population means achieving physical security (advanced air defense system, accessible bomb shelters, and de-mining) and emotional security (social trust and trust in the authorities, supportive information flows, de-polarization). The solution to the housing problem means reconstruction and construction of a mix of private and public housing, using the best models from Ukraine and around the world. The labor market will require the elimination of imbalances that impede the ability of public and private enterprises to resume their operations and efficiently employ human resources. Finally, supportive living conditions mean the provision of basic services, including access to clean water, electricity, heat, communications systems, and public transportation.ConclusionSince the war continues with no end in sight, preventing the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy, the authorities must use short-term approaches for wartime problems. However, these short-term solutions should take into consideration the goals and requirements of the demographic strategy, starting with building public understanding and support for its objectives. These strategic objectives will need to be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted, should the war bring new losses to the Ukrainian nation. That way, Ukraine will be ready to rebuild when the war ends.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.Endnotes[1] For more on this, see Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[2] It is very difficult to determine a reliable count of the country's population, since there were no census conducted in the recent years. This document uses the estimate of the population during the war was made by researchers from the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. They used the following sources: the State Statistics Service (on population before the full-scale war); mobile operators (the number and location of their clients); the Ministry of Justice (registered deaths and births); the Ministry of Health (the number of newborns and children registered with the medical authorities); the Ministry of Social Policy (the number and location of IDPs); the International Organization for Migration (recent surveys); the UNHCR (the number, demographic characteristics, and regions of origin of Ukrainian forced external migrants abroad); the Pension Fund of Ukraine (the number and gender/age composition of retired people); and the Ministry of Education and Science (the number, location, and gender/age composition of students in educational institutions of different levels).[3] According to the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine, during the battles, 189 medical facilities were destroyed and another 1,427 severely damaged in the temporarily occupied territory. [4] "UNHCR Warns Worsening Conditions and Challenges Facing Vulnerable Ukrainian Refugees in Europe," press release, UN Refugee Agency, November 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-warns-worsening-conditions-and-challenges-facing-vulnerable-ukrainian. [5] See Eurostat's constantly updated database at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum/asylum/database?node_code=migr_asytp. [6] According to the Center for Economic Strategy, in the spring of 2023, only 63 percent of respondents planned to return to Ukraine. About 14 percent of those migrated people did not plan to return, and 23 percent were undecided. It is safe to estimate that the number of Ukrainians who will remain abroad will range from 1.3 million to 3.3 million, depending on further developments in the situation. See Гліб Вишлінський, Дарія Михайлишина, Максим Самойлюк та Марія Томіліна, Біженці з України: хто вони, скільки їх та як їх повернути?, Центр економічної стратегії, ("Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There and How to Return Them?" March 21, 2023), https://ces.org.ua/who-are-ukrainian-refugee-research/. [7] For example, see «Передумови повернення в Україну для участі у відбудові українських жінок, які знайшли тимчасовий прихисток за кордоном» (Ukrainian Women's Congress, "Study 'Prerequisites for Returning to Ukraine to Participate in the Reconstruction of Ukrainian Women Who Found Temporary Shelter Abroad,'" December 3, 2023), https://womenua.today/news/doslidzhennya-peredumovy-povernennya-v-ukrai-nu-dlya-uchasti-i-vidbudovi-ukrai-nskyh-zhinok-yaki-znay-shly-tymchasovyy-pryhystok-za-kordonom-povnyj-zvit/.

The Ukrainian people are entering the third year of their fight for their existence as a state and people. Every day, soldiers and civilians—children, women, and the elderly—are killed, homes are destroyed, and jobs are lost. The uncertainty of wartime forces individuals, families, communities, and the authorities to shorten their planning horizons and be ready to adapt at a moment's notice. Under such circumstances, any effort to develop long-term strategies focused on postwar development immediately raises questions of feasibility. However, no society can live by only looking at the challenges of the moment. The future is also important for collective survival. Today's demographic crisis is a challenge that short- and long-term government strategy planning must account for.Since Ukraine gained its independence in the 1990s, its demographic situation has demanded the government's attention. Authorities worked to improve its policies and achieved some success between 2006 and 2015. Unfortunately, these positive outcomes were adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and demolished by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. In recent months, the Ministry of Social Policy prepared a plan to respond to the demographic challenges brought on by the war. This document, the Demographic Development Strategy, underwent a series of public discussions and was developed in cooperation with government officials, Ukrainian scholars, and specialists from several international organizations. The strategy was finalized in January 2024 and now waits for governmental approval. About the Demographic Development Strategy The new strategy envisages two basic scenarios for Ukraine's development. The inertia scenario assumes that demographic processes will evolve naturally, without government intrusion. It predicts that the population of Ukraine within its 1991 borders may decrease to 28.9 million people by January 2041, and to 25.2 million by January 2051. The guided scenario assumes the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy and predicts the achievement of decent living standards for Ukrainians returning from abroad. Under this scenario, the demographic decline would be mitigated, with estimates of a population of 33.9 million by January 1941, and 31.6 million by January 2051. The goal of the strategy is to ensure that the population maintains its long-term reproduction capacity despite all war-related conditions. It is intended to improve Ukraine's sociodemographic characteristics as defined in the policy's five strategic goals: Chart 1. Goals of the Demographic Development Strategy of Ukraine (2024–2040)Image CreditThe strategy proposes using tested—both in Ukraine and worldwide—policy instruments to avoid the inertia scenario. These include policies intended to improve the birth rate; reduce premature mortality and excessive migration; address population displacement; accommodate an aging population; and address other challenges confronting the nation. Increasing Ukraine's Birth Rate The primary issue that the strategy addresses is Ukraine's population size, an issue greatly exacerbated by Russia's aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory. The war both sharply reduced Ukraine's already low birth rate, and sharply raised mortality across all age groups and occupations. Several million displaced Ukrainians moved toward the western part of Ukraine, and over six million others, mainly children and women, were forced to leave the country. In addition to the refugees, large-scale labor migration abroad between 2022 and 2023 threatens to turn into permanent emigration over time. The illegal annexation of Crimea and some southeastern Ukrainian regions between 2014 and 2022 has affected the demographic situation as well.[1] As a result, according to our calculations, Ukraine's population has radically decreased, moving from 48.5 million inhabitants in December 2001, to 42.0 million in January 2022, and then to 36.3 in August 2023 (of which, only around 31.5 million reside in the government-controlled territories).[2]Since Ukraine has not conducted a census since 2001, analysts must use both conventional and unconventional sources (as explained in the endnote 2). But making forecasts about the population size in the future is even more difficult. First, there is a lack of information on the population of the temporarily occupied territories and areas near the front. Second, military development scenarios vary greatly, which directly impact any demographic assessment. Third, the decisions that displaced and migrated Ukrainians make about whether and when to return are difficult to predict. Any demographic strategy must take all this into account in planning for the country's development. Even in peacetime, Ukraine's fertility rates have been below the level required for population replacement (2.2) since the mid-1960s. In 2021, the total fertility rate was 1.2. Put another way, the number of children born that year was half the number of people who reached the age of 60. After the start of Russian aggression in 2022, the fertility rate fell below 1.0.Even if the war were to end tomorrow, Ukraine would face an extreme challenge in improving its birth rate. There are five major reasons for such a low birth rate. First, there was a change in social values, towards self-realization and individualism. This translated into a shift from the number of children born to the quality of their care and upbringing, as well as a modification in the forms of marriage and the age at which people became parents.Second, economic factors played a negative role. According to 2021 statistical data, the poverty rate in Ukraine was 20.6 percent in the general population. For families with children, however, it was higher, measuring 22.4 percent for families with children; 27.6 percent for families with children under three years old; and 53.6 percent for large families. With the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion, these numbers became even worse. Third, there are structural obstacles to combining work with raising families for women in Ukraine. There is a significant difference in employment levels for women between 25 and 44 years old in 2021: the employment rate was 71.1 percent for women without children and only 51.5 percent for women with children between three and five years old. During the war, the shelling and large-scale destruction decreased the opportunities for children to attend school, which significantly worsened employment opportunities for women. Fourth, public health in Ukraine has deteriorated considerably in recent years, including declining trends in reproductive health. Additionally, Ukrainian women live under stress and depression caused by constant fear for their lives and the lives of their children and relatives. Finally, the fifth factor is the separation of families. Many men have been drafted into the armed forces, while many women have migrated abroad.Together, these factors have a synergistic effect, forcing most Ukrainian families to postpone childbearing in anticipation of a more favorable period. A significant number of these postponed births may never materialize. In the past, the Ukrainian government tried to increase the birth rate by increasing maternity benefits for women until their children reach the age of three. The government increased these benefits tenfold in 2005, and then threefold in 2008. These increases succeeded in increasing the birth rate: in 2005, there were 426,100 children born, compared to 512,500 newborns in 2009. However, the effect of financial incentives on the fertility rate was rather short-lived and mainly influenced families with low levels of education and income. A much more lasting positive result was achieved through the reduction of poverty for families with children, the creation of a legal and policy environment friendly to such families, and an increase in the economic self-sufficiency of families.Reducing Premature Mortality The second most important cause of the demographic crisis is high premature mortality for people under 65, an issue especially affecting men. Even before the major invasion and the COVID-19 pandemic, by 2020, the average life expectancy in Ukraine was 71.3 years, the lowest rate in Europe.The new strategy identifies the main factors contributing to the excessive mortality in Ukraine as a low level of hygiene culture, the prevalence of dangerous working conditions, unhealthy lifestyle, late response to health issues, widespread vaccination hesitancy, and faults in the public health care system. Lack of access to medical and recreational services are especially acute for residents in small towns and villages.The gender gap in mortality is typically high for all post-Soviet countries. According to 2020 official statistics, the gender gap in life expectancy was 9.8 years: 76.2 years for women and 66.4 years for men. Male mortality in Ukraine was higher than female mortality in all age groups, but especially—more than three times—in the 25–34 cohort. After retirement, this gap decreases. This difference stems from variations in lifestyle for women and men, and the exposure of men to more dangerous employment conditions. Russia's full-scale aggression has significantly increased mortality rates for Ukrainians. This is especially noticeable among soldiers who are risking death in battles and captivity. At the same time, the general population also risks death on a daily basis from rocket and drone attacks, limited access to medical care in the temporarily occupied territories,[3] and extreme stress that can lead to the emergence of new and exacerbation of old chronic diseases. Even though there are currently no reliable data on human losses among Ukrainian military personnel and civilians, the toll has tragically reduced the population. The cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is undoubtedly the first step to reducing mortality. However, the experience of other postwar countries shows that even the end of armed conflict does not immediately return mortality to prewar levels.Addressing Migration Out-migration of Ukraine's population has long exceeded in-migration since the dissolution of the USSR. For economic reasons, Ukrainians have been leaving for Russia, then for Poland. On the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants abroad was estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million people. Over the last decade, Ukrainians consistently were among the top nationalities receiving first-time EU residence permits. For example, 873,700 Ukrainian citizens received EU residence permits in 2021, 30 percent of all those issued.Russia's military aggression has resulted in the largest outward flow of migration from Ukrainian territory since WWII. Millions of people moved away from frontline areas to either relatively safe regions of Ukraine or to other countries. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, by the end of 2023, over six million Ukrainians fled abroad. Of these, 1.2 million were either deported to or (less often) voluntarily left for the Russian Federation.[4] According to Eurostat, by the end of October 2023, 63.2 percent of the 4.3 million Ukrainians who were in the EU/European Free Trade Zone (excluding Hungary) were women, 33.2 percent were under the age of 18, and 6.1 percent were 60 or older.[5] Since one-third of forced migrants abroad are children and adolescents, their non-return may cause irreparable demographic loss for Ukraine. The situation is potentially made worse if some Ukrainian families decide to reunite outside Ukraine after the war ends. As a recent study demonstrates, many migrants may not return home.[6] Female migrants who have found good jobs and housing outside of their country may bring their husbands to join them once martial law and travel restrictions are lifted in Ukraine. Additionally, growing divorce rates between partners separated by war reduce the incentive of Ukrainian women to return home after the war.The same study shows that the reasons for Ukrainians' reluctance to return home include uncertainty about security in Ukraine (for 47 percent of those polled), lack of workplace or place to live (31 percent), insufficient access to basic services (22 percent), and lack of acceptable quality of education for children (15 percent). Abroad, Ukrainian migrants value stable employment (21 percent), school and preschool institutions (11 percent), and a sense of integration (11 percent).[7]The new strategy includes policies to attract Ukrainians living abroad so they return to their homeland. These policies would apply to migrants who left because of war and those who moved before the war. Should conditions require it, the strategy also includes migration policies to attract immigrants from other countries.(Re)distributing Postwar PopulationThe military conflict has greatly influenced population distribution in Ukraine's regions. The first cohort of internally displaced people (IDP) appeared in Ukraine in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea and instigation of separatist conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk. These attacks caused approximately 1.5 million Ukrainians to leave their homes for safer regions in the country. In December 2023, the number of IDPs reached 4.9 million. These numbers include about 739,000 families with children that were forced to leave their homes for regions of Ukraine away from the front lines. Despite efforts from the government and local communities, IDPs lack housing, acceptable work and income, and access to timely health and social assistance. The constant stress and uncertainty about their future cause larger declines in fertility and increases in mortality among IDPs compared to the general population.At the same time, the massive population movements within Ukraine can be a source of labor resources for the regions where IDPs settle in. The demographic strategy envisages the formation of a new resettlement system to influence and support the reconstruction of different regions of Ukraine. The most likely scenario for postwar development envisions the formation of five territorial clusters. The central cluster includes relatively safe regions of central Ukraine that already shelter the largest number of IDPs. This cluster is likely to become the country's new industrial center after the war. Due to its closeness to the EU, the western cluster will need a larger workforce. This region will develop quickly through economic ties with the European countries and will provide a strategic location for military industry. However, western Ukraine has long been underdeveloped relative to other major population centers. It will take time and investment for this region to accommodate a large population influx. The northeastern territories will remain the area of the most "insecure habitation" due to its proximity to Russia. Economic development in these regions will require special policies and interventions from both the central and local governments. The southern cluster's prospects are currently the least clear. This area will probably have to develop under conditions of both constant threat from Russian and the benefits from sea-born trade.Ukraine's large urban environments—like those in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Lviv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia—will constitute a separate cluster. Big cities will likely provide the most accessible services and job opportunities to their residents. Rational population (re)settlement in postwar Ukraine must plan for housing (including temporary housing during reconstruction), infrastructure, reindustrialization, and job creation. These plans must also include social infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and other public buildings in each of the clusters.Adapting to an Aging SocietyUkraine has one of the 30 oldest populations in the world: almost 18 percent of its population is older than 65. Over the next several decades it will age even more. According to projections, the over-65 proportion will reach 21 percent by January 2041, and it will reach 23 percent of the general population by January 2051. This means that Ukraine must adapt and address issues related to the lives of older people.The demographic strategy plans to promote and accommodate the increased longevity of the Ukrainian population. The quality of life of older Ukrainians will depend on general factors like the social and economic outcomes of the war and specific factors like pensions; accessibility of social support and health services, especially in rural areas; and opportunities for employment and participation in society. Improving the quality of life of the elderly is an essential component for improving Ukraine's post-war prospects. Creating a Supportive Environment for Demographic ImprovementImproving a nation's demographic trends both requires and drives progress in other social sectors. For example, demography determines a nation's social and economic prospects, while governmental policies impact long-term demographic processes. The new Demographic Development Strategy, based on surveys and research, proposes to help develop an environment which supports population growth. Such an environment—in both war and postwar periods—has four major components: basic security, proper housing, a balanced labor market, and supportive living conditions.In the framework of this strategy, basic security for Ukraine's population means achieving physical security (advanced air defense system, accessible bomb shelters, and de-mining) and emotional security (social trust and trust in the authorities, supportive information flows, de-polarization). The solution to the housing problem means reconstruction and construction of a mix of private and public housing, using the best models from Ukraine and around the world. The labor market will require the elimination of imbalances that impede the ability of public and private enterprises to resume their operations and efficiently employ human resources. Finally, supportive living conditions mean the provision of basic services, including access to clean water, electricity, heat, communications systems, and public transportation.ConclusionSince the war continues with no end in sight, preventing the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy, the authorities must use short-term approaches for wartime problems. However, these short-term solutions should take into consideration the goals and requirements of the demographic strategy, starting with building public understanding and support for its objectives. These strategic objectives will need to be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted, should the war bring new losses to the Ukrainian nation. That way, Ukraine will be ready to rebuild when the war ends.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.Endnotes[1] For more on this, see Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[2] It is very difficult to determine a reliable count of the country's population, since there were no census conducted in the recent years. This document uses the estimate of the population during the war was made by researchers from the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. They used the following sources: the State Statistics Service (on population before the full-scale war); mobile operators (the number and location of their clients); the Ministry of Justice (registered deaths and births); the Ministry of Health (the number of newborns and children registered with the medical authorities); the Ministry of Social Policy (the number and location of IDPs); the International Organization for Migration (recent surveys); the UNHCR (the number, demographic characteristics, and regions of origin of Ukrainian forced external migrants abroad); the Pension Fund of Ukraine (the number and gender/age composition of retired people); and the Ministry of Education and Science (the number, location, and gender/age composition of students in educational institutions of different levels).[3] According to the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine, during the battles, 189 medical facilities were destroyed and another 1,427 severely damaged in the temporarily occupied territory. [4] "UNHCR Warns Worsening Conditions and Challenges Facing Vulnerable Ukrainian Refugees in Europe," press release, UN Refugee Agency, November 15, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-warns-worsening-conditions-and-challenges-facing-vulnerable-ukrainian. [5] See Eurostat's constantly updated database at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum/asylum/database?node_code=migr_asytp. [6] According to the Center for Economic Strategy, in the spring of 2023, only 63 percent of respondents planned to return to Ukraine. About 14 percent of those migrated people did not plan to return, and 23 percent were undecided. It is safe to estimate that the number of Ukrainians who will remain abroad will range from 1.3 million to 3.3 million, depending on further developments in the situation. See Гліб Вишлінський, Дарія Михайлишина, Максим Самойлюк та Марія Томіліна, Біженці з України: хто вони, скільки їх та як їх повернути?, Центр економічної стратегії, ("Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There and How to Return Them?" March 21, 2023), https://ces.org.ua/who-are-ukrainian-refugee-research/. [7] For example, see «Передумови повернення в Україну для участі у відбудові українських жінок, які знайшли тимчасовий прихисток за кордоном» (Ukrainian Women's Congress, "Study 'Prerequisites for Returning to Ukraine to Participate in the Reconstruction of Ukrainian Women Who Found Temporary Shelter Abroad,'" December 3, 2023), https://womenua.today/news/doslidzhennya-peredumovy-povernennya-v-ukrai-nu-dlya-uchasti-i-vidbudovi-ukrai-nskyh-zhinok-yaki-znay-shly-tymchasovyy-pryhystok-za-kordonom-povnyj-zvit/.

Viet Nam has undergone a major socio-economic transformation over the past quarter century, rising from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle income country. Today it continues to develop rapidly, becoming more integrated with the global economy and undergoing significant regulatory and structural changes. Viet Nam has also made remarkable progress on gender equality, but important gender differences still remain. On the positive side Viet Nam has had considerable progress in addressing gender disparities in education, employment and health. The gender gap in earnings is lower in Viet Nam than in many other East Asian countries. Indeed by a number of measures, women's outcomes have improved significantly. However, upon deeper examination of the data, a number of challenges still remain. The report is organized into five chapters. The current chapter has provided a background to the report and the process through which it has been prepared. The next three chapters will deal with the substantive issues, focusing primarily on gender but addressing ethnicity and other forms of social inequality where relevant. Chapter two will provide an analysis of the situation and trends in gender equality in relation to the multiple dimensions of poverty, some of which are included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Chapter three will provide an in-depth gender analysis of livelihoods and employment, bearing in mind the likely impact of the recent crisis as well as the challenges of transition to middle income status. Chapter four will pick up on the issue of women's political participation in leadership positions and in the wider society. The final chapter will synthesize the key findings of the report and prioritize key recommendations.

Debarun Bhattacharjya (" Formulating Asymmetric Decision Problems as Decision Circuits " and " From Reliability Block Diagrams to Fault Tree Circuits ") is a research staff member in the Risk Analytics team within the broader Business Analytics and Math Sciences division at IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. He received his Ph.D. in management science and engineering at Stanford University. His primary research interests lie in decision and risk analysis, and probabilistic models and decision theory in artificial intelligence. Specifically, he has pursued research in probabilistic graphical models (influence diagrams and Bayesian networks), value of information, sensitivity analysis, and utility theory. His applied work has been in domains such as sales, energy, business services, and public policy. He has coauthored more than 10 publications in highly refereed journals and conference proceedings, as well as two patents. He was nominated by IBM management for the Young Researcher Connection at the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Practice Conference in 2010. Email: debarunb@us.ibm.com . May Cheung (" Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters ") is an undergraduate senior in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University at Buffalo. Her research interests are in decision analysis, optimization, and simulation with respect to complex, high-impact decisions. Email: mgcheung@buffalo.edu . Léa A. Deleris (" From Reliability Block Diagrams to Fault Tree Circuits ") is a research staff member and manager at IBM Dublin Research Laboratory, where she oversees the Risk Collaboratory, a three-year research project funded in part by the Irish Industrial Development Agency around risk management, from stochastic optimization to the communication of risk information to decision makers. Prior to joining the Dublin lab, she was a research staff member with the Risk Analytics Group, Business Application and Mathematical Science Department, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York. Her primary interests have been in the fields of decision theory and risk analysis. Her work is currently focused on leveraging natural language processing techniques to facilitate the construction of risk models, distributed elicitation of expert opinions, and value of information problems. She holds a Ph.D. in management science and engineering from Stanford University. Email: lea.deleris@ie.ibm.com . Philippe Delquié (" Risk Measures from Risk-Reducing Experiments ") is an associate professor of decision sciences at the George Washington University, and holds a Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Delquié's teaching and research are in decision, risk, and multicriteria analysis. His research is at the nexus of behavioral and normative theories of decision, addressing issues in preference elicitation, value of information, nonexpected utility models of choice, and risk measures. Prior to joining the George Washington University, he held academic appointments at INSEAD, the University of Texas at Austin, and École Normale Supérieure, France, and visiting appointments at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. He is on the editorial board of Decision Analysis and has completed a term as an associate editor. Email: delquie@gwu.edu . Lorraine Dodd (" Regulating Autonomous Agents Facing Conflicting Objectives: A Command and Control Example ") is a highly respected international contributor to command and leadership studies within military and UK governmental command, control, intelligence and information analysis, and research. She has an honours degree in pure mathematics and an M.Sc. in operational research and management science from the University of Warwick majoring in catastrophe theory and nonlinearity. Her main interest is in sense-making, decision making, and risk taking under conditions of uncertainty, confusion, volatility, ambiguity, and contention, as applied to the study of institutions, organizations, society, people, and governance. She uses analogy with brain functions and coherent cellular functions to develop mathematical models of complex decision behavior. Her most recent studies include an application of a multiagency, multiperspective approaches to collaborative decision making and planning, and development of an "open-eyes/open-mind" framework to provide support to leaders when dealing with complex crises and "black swans." She has developed an understanding of the nonlinear, slow and fast dynamics of behavior, in particular, of means of organizing for agility in complex and uncertain environments. Email: l.dodd@cranfield.ac.uk . Rachele Foschi (" Interactions Between Ageing and Risk Properties in the Analysis of Burn-in Problems ") has an M.Sc. and a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Rome La Sapienza, where she also worked as a tutor for the courses of calculus and probability. Currently, she is an assistant professor in the Economics and Institutional Change Research Area at IMT (Institutions, Markets, Technologies) Advanced Studies, in Lucca, Italy. Her research interests include stochastic dependence, reliability, stochastic orders, point processes, and mathematical models in economics. Random sets and graphs, linguistics, and behavioral models are of broader interest to her. Email: rachele.foschi@imtlucca.it . Simon French (" Expert Judgment, Meta-analysis, and Participatory Risk Analysis ") recently joined the Department of Statistics at the University of Warwick to become the director of the Risk Initiative and Statistical Consultancy Unit. Prior to joining the University of Warwick, he was a professor of information and decision sciences at Manchester Business School. Simon's research career began in Bayesian statistics, and he was one of the first to apply hierarchical modeling, particularly in the domain of protein crystallography. Nowadays he is better known for his work on decision making, which began with his early work on decision theory. Over the years, his work has generally become more applied: looking at ways of supporting real decision makers facing major strategic and risk issues. In collaboration with psychologists, he has sought to support real decision makers and stakeholders in complex decisions in ways that are mindful of their human characteristics. He has a particular interest in societal decision making, particularly with respect to major risks. He has worked on public risk communication and engagement and the wider areas of stakeholder involvement and deliberative democracy. Simon has worked across the public and private sectors, often in contexts that relate to the environment, energy, food safety, and the nuclear industry. In all of his work, the emphasis is on multidisciplinary and participatory approaches to solving real problems. Email: simon.french@warwick.ac.uk . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors: Games and Decisions in Reliability and Risk ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently the editor-in-chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Email: lrkeller@uci.edu . Miguel A. Lejeune (" Game Theoretical Approach for Reliable Enhanced Indexation ") is an assistant professor of decision sciences at the George Washington University (GWU) and holds a Ph.D. degree from Rutgers University. Prior to joining GWU, he was a visiting assistant professor in operations research at Carnegie Mellon University. His areas of expertise/research interests include stochastic programming, financial risk, and large-scale optimization. He is the recipient of a Young Investigator/CAREER Research Grant (2009) from the Army Research Office. He also received the IBM Smarter Planet Faculty Innovation Award (December 2011) and the Royal Belgian Sciences Academy Award for his master's thesis. Email: mlejeune@gwu.edu . Jason R. W. Merrick (" From the Editors: Games and Decisions in Reliability and Risk ") is a professor in the Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. He has a D.Sc. in operations research from the George Washington University. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and simulation. His research is primarily in the area of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics. He has worked on projects ranging from assessing maritime oil transportation and ferry system safety, the environmental health of watersheds, and optimal replacement policies for rail tracks and machine tools, and he has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the United States Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, British Petroleum, and Booz Allen Hamilton, among others. He has also performed training for Infineon Technologies, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, and Capital One Services. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. He is the information officer for the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS. Email: jrmerric@vcu.edu . Gilberto Montibeller (" Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of Malicious Agents ") is a tenured lecturer in decision sciences in the Department of Management at the London School of Economics (LSE). With a first degree in electrical engineering (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil, 1993), he started his career as an executive at British and American Tobacco. Moving back to academia, he was awarded a master's degree (UFSC, 1996) and a Ph.D. in production engineering (UFSC/University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom, 2000). He then continued his studies as a postdoctoral research fellow in management science at the University of Strathclyde (2002–2003). He is an area editor of the Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, and he is on the editorial board of Decision Analysis and the EURO Journal on Decision Processes. His main research interest is on supporting strategic-level decision making, both in terms of decision analytic methodologies and of decision processes. He has been funded by the AXA Research Fund, United Kingdom's EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council), and Brazil's CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior). His research has been published in journals such as the European Journal of Operational Research, Decision Support Systems, and OMEGA—The International Journal of Management Science. One of his papers, on the evaluation of strategic options and scenario planning, was awarded the Wiley Prize in Applied Decision Analysis by the International Society of Multi-Criteria Decision Making. He has had visiting positions at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Austria) and the University of Warwick (United Kingdom), and is a visiting associate professor of production engineering at the University of São Paulo (Brazil). He also has extensive experience in applying decision analysis in practice; over the past 17 years he has provided consulting to both private and public organizations in Europe and South America. He is a regular speaker at the LSE Executive Education courses. Email: g.montibeller@lse.ac.uk . M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell (" Games, Risks, and Analytics: Several Illustrative Cases Involving National Security and Management Situations ") specializes in engineering risk analysis with application to complex systems (space, medical, etc.). Her research has focused on explicit inclusion of human and organizational factors in the analysis of systems' failure risks. Her recent work is on the use of game theory in risk analysis with applications that have included counterterrorism and nuclear counterproliferation problems. She is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, the French Académie des Technologies, and of several boards, including Aerospace, Draper Laboratory, and In-Q-Tel. Dr. Paté-Cornell was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from December 2001 to 2008. She holds an engineering degree (applied mathematics and computer science) from the Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble (France), an M.S. in operations research and a Ph.D. in engineering-economic systems, both from Stanford University. Email: mep@stanford.edu . Jesus Rios (" Adversarial Risk Analysis: The Somali Pirates Case ") is a research staff member at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. He has a Ph.D. in computer sciences and mathematical modeling from the University Rey Juan Carlos. Before joining IBM, he worked in several universities as a researcher, including the University of Manchester, the University of Luxembourg, Aalborg University, and Concordia University. He participated in the 2007 SAMSI program on Risk Analysis, Extreme Events, and Decision Theory, and led work in the area of adversarial risk analysis. He has also worked as a consultant for clients in the transportation, distribution, energy, defense, and telecommunication sectors. His main research interests are in the areas of risk and decision analysis and its applications. Email: jriosal@us.ibm.com . David Rios Insua (" Adversarial Risk Analysis: The Somali Pirates Case ") is a professor of statistics and operations research at Rey Juan Carlos University and a member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Sciences. He has written 15 monographs and more than 90 refereed papers in his areas of interest, which include decision analysis, negotiation analysis, risk analysis, and Bayesian statistics, and their applications. He is scientific advisor of AISoy Robotics. He is on the editorial board of Decision Analysis. Email: david.rios@urjc.es . Fabrizio Ruggeri (" From the Editors: Games and Decisions in Reliability and Risk ") is the director of research at IMATI CNR (Institute of Applied Mathematics and Information Technology at the Italian National Research Council) in Milano, Italy. He received a B.Sc. in mathematics from the University of Milano, an M.Sc. in statistics from Carnegie Mellon University, and a Ph.D. in statistics from Duke University. After a start as a researcher at Alfa Romeo and then a computer consultant, he has been working at CNR since 1987. His interests are mostly in Bayesian and industrial statistics, especially in robustness, decision analysis, reliability, and stochastic processes; recently, he got involved in biostatistics and biology as well. Dr. Ruggeri is an adjunct faculty member at the Polytechnic Institute (New York University), a faculty member in the Ph.D. program in mathematics and statistics at the University of Pavia, a foreign faculty member in the Ph.D. program in statistics at the University of Valparaiso, and a member of the advisory board of the Ph.D. program in mathematical engineering at Polytechnic of Milano. An ASA Fellow and an ISI elected member, Dr. Ruggeri is the current ISBA (International Society for Bayesian Analysis) president and former ENBIS (European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics) president. He is the editor-in-chief of Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry and the Encyclopedia of Statistics in Quality and Reliability, and he is also the Chair of the Bayesian Inference in Stochastic Processes workshops and codirector of the Applied Bayesian Statistics summer school. Email: fabrizio@mi.imati.cnr.it . Juan Carlos Sevillano (" Adversarial Risk Analysis: The Somali Pirates Case ") is a part-time lecturer at the Department of Statistics and Operations Research II (Decision Methods) at the School of Economics of Complutense University. He holds a B.Sc. in mathematics from Complutense University and an M.Sc. in decision systems engineering from Rey Juan Carlos University. Email: sevimjc@ccee.ucm.es . Ross D. Shachter (" Formulating Asymmetric Decision Problems as Decision Circuits ") is an associate professor in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University, where his teaching includes probability, decision analysis, and influence diagrams. He has been at Stanford since earning his Ph.D. in operations research from the University of California, Berkeley in 1982, except for two years visiting the Duke University Center for Health Policy Research and Education. His main research focus has been on the communication and analysis of the relationships among uncertain quantities in the graphical representations called Bayesian belief networks and influence diagrams, and in the 1980s he developed the DAVID influence diagram processing system for the Macintosh. His research in medical decision analysis has included the analysis of vaccination strategies and cancer screening and follow-up. At Duke he helped to develop an influence diagram-based approach for medical technology assessment. He has served on the Decision Analysis Society (DAS) of INFORMS Council, chaired its student paper competition, organized the DAS cluster in Nashville, and was honored with its Best Publication Award. For INFORMS, he organized the 1992 Doctoral Colloquium and has been an associate editor in decision analysis for Management Science and Operations Research. He has also served as Program Chair and General Chair for the Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence Conference. At Stanford he served from 1990 until 2011 as a resident fellow in an undergraduate dormitory, and he was active in planning the university's new student orientation activities and alcohol policy. Email: shachter@stanford.edu . Jim Q. Smith (" Regulating Autonomous Agents Facing Conflicting Objectives: A Command and Control Example ") has been a full professor of statistics at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom for 18 years, receiving a Ph.D. from Warwick University in 1977, and has more than 100 refereed publications in the area of Bayesian decision theory and related fields. He has particular interests in customizing probabilistic models in dynamic, high-dimensional problems to the practical needs of a decision maker, often using novel graphical approaches. As well as teaching decision analysis to more than 3,000 top math students in the United Kingdom and supervising 23 Ph.D. students in his areas of expertise, he has been chairman of the Risk Initiative and Statistical Consultancy Unit at Warwick for 10 years, engaging vigorously in the university's interaction with industry and commerce. His book Bayesian Decision Analysis: Principles and Practice was published by Cambridge University Press in 2010. Email: j.q.smith@warwick.ac.uk . Refik Soyer (" From the Editors: Games and Decisions in Reliability and Risk ") is a professor of decision sciences and of statistics and the chair of the Department of Decision Sciences at the George Washington University (GWU). He also serves as the director of the Institute for Integrating Statistics in Decision Sciences at GWU. He received his D.Sc. in University of Sussex, England, and B.A. in Economics from Boğaziçi University, Turkey. His areas of interest are Bayesian statistics and decision analysis, stochastic modeling, statistical aspects of reliability analysis, and time-series analysis. He has published more than 90 articles. His work has appeared in journals such as Journal of the American Statistical Association; Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Ser. B.; Technometrics; Biometrics; Journal of Econometrics; Statistical Science; International Statistical Review; and Management Science. He has also coedited a volume titled Mathematical Reliability: An Expository Perspective. Soyer is an elected member of the International Statistical Institute, a fellow of the Turkish Statistical Association, and a fellow of the American Statistical Association. He was vice president of the International Association for Statistical Computing. He served on the editorial board of the Journal of the American Statistical Association and is currently an associate editor of the Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry. Email: soyer@gwu.edu . Fabio Spizzichino (" Interactions Between Ageing and Risk Properties in the Analysis of Burn-in Problems ") is a full professor of probability theory at the Department of Mathematics, the Sapienza University of Rome. He teaches courses on introductory probability, advanced probability, and stochastic processes. In the past, he has also taught courses on basic mathematical statistics, Bayesian statistics, decision theory, and reliability theory. His primary research interests are related to probability theory and its applications. A partial list of scientific activities includes dependence models, stochastic ageing for lifetimes, and (semi-)copulas; first-passage times and optimal stopping times for Markov chains and discrete state-space processes; order statistics property for counting processes in continuous or discrete time, in one or more dimensions; sufficiency concepts in Bayesian statistics and stochastic filtering; and reliability of coherent systems and networks. He also has a strong interest in the connections among the above-mentioned topics and in their applications in different fields. At the present time, he is particularly interested in the relations among dependence, ageing, and utility functions. Email: fabio.spizzichino@uniroma1.it . Sumitra Sri Bhashyam (" Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of Malicious Agents ") is a Ph.D. candidate in the Management Science Group at the London School of Economics (LSE). Her Ph.D. thesis is supervised by Dr. Gilberto Montibeller and cosupervised by Dr. David Lane. Her research interests include decision analysis, multicriteria decision analysis, preference modeling, and preference change. Before coming to study in the United Kingdom, Sri Bhashyam studied mathematics, physics, and computer sciences in France for two years, after which she moved to the United Kingdom to complete a B.A.Hons in marketing communications and then an M.Sc. in operational research from the LSE. She worked as a project manager at Xerox and, subsequently, as a consultant for an SME (small and medium enterprise) to help them set up their quality management system. Alongside the Ph.D., and participating in other research and consultancy projects, she has been a graduate teaching assistant for undergraduate, master, and executive students at the LSE. The courses she teaches include topics such as normative and descriptive decision theory, prescriptive decision analysis, simulation modeling and analysis. Email: s.sribhashyam@lse.ac.uk . Jun Zhuang (" Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters ") has been an assistant professor of industrial and systems engineering at the University at Buffalo, the State University of New York (SUNY-Buffalo), since he obtained his Ph.D. in industrial engineering in 2008 from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Dr. Zhuang's long-term research goal is to integrate operations research and game theory to better mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from both natural and man-made hazards. Other areas of interest include healthcare, sports, transportation, supply chain management, and sustainability. Dr. Zhuang's research has been supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) through the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) through the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Dr. Zhuang is a fellow of the 2011 U.S. Air Force Summer Faculty Fellowship Program (AF SFFP), sponsored by the AFOSR. Dr. Zhuang is also a fellow of the 2009–2010 Next Generation of Hazards and Disasters Researchers Program, sponsored by the NSF. Dr. Zhuang is on the editorial board of Decision Analysis and is the coeditor of Decision Analysis Today. Email: jzhuang@buffalo.edu .

Ali Abbas (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. He received an M.S. in electrical engineering (1998), an M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research (2001), a Ph.D. in management science and engineering (2003), and a Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He worked as a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford and worked in Schlumberger Oilfield Services from 1991 to 1997, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He has also worked on several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and cotaught several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group in Menlo Park, California. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). He is also an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research and coeditor of the DA column in education for Decision Analysis Today. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . Matthew D. Bailey (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an assistant professor of business analytics and operations in the School of Management at Bucknell University, and he is an adjunct research investigator with Geisinger Health System. He received his Ph.D. in industrial and operations engineering from the University of Michigan. His primary research interest is in sequential decision making under uncertainty with applications to health-care operations and medical decision making. He is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) and the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE). Address: School of Management, Bucknell University, 308 Taylor Hall, Lewisburg, PA 17837; e-mail: matt.bailey@bucknell.edu . Anthony M. Barrett (" Cost Effectiveness of On-Site Chlorine Generation for Chlorine Truck Attack Prevention ") is a risk analyst at ABS Consulting in Arlington, Virginia. He holds a Ph.D. in engineering and public policy from Carnegie Mellon University, and he also was a postdoctoral research associate at the Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California. His research interests include risk analysis, risk management, and public policies in a wide variety of areas, including terrorism, hazardous materials, energy and the environment, and natural hazards. Address: ABS Consulting, 1525 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 625, Arlington, VA 22209; e-mail: abarrett@absconsulting.com . Manel Baucells (" From the Editors… ") is a full professor at the Department of Economics and Business of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. He was an associate professor and head of the Managerial Decision Sciences Department at IESE Business School. He earned his Ph.D. in management from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and holds a degree in mechanical engineering from Polytechnic University of Catalonia (UPC). His research and consulting activities cover multiple areas of decision making including group decisions, consumer decisions, uncertainty, complexity, and psychology. He acts as associate editor for the top journals Management Science, Operations Research, and Decision Analysis. He has received various prizes and grants for his research. In 2001, he won the student paper competition of the Decision Analysis Society. He is the only IESE professor having won both the Excellence Research Award and the Excellence Teaching Award. He has been visiting professor at Duke University, UCLA, London Business School, and Erasmus University. Address: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; e-mail: manel.baucells@upf.edu . J. Eric Bickel (" Scoring Rules and Decision Analysis Education ") is an assistant professor in both the Operations Research/Industrial Engineering Group (Department of Mechanical Engineering) and the Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. In addition, Professor Bickel is a fellow in both the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy and the Center for Petroleum Asset Risk Management. He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford University and a B.S. in mechanical engineering with a minor in economics from New Mexico State University. His research interests include the theory and practice of decision analysis and its application in the energy and climate-change arenas. His research has addressed the modeling of probabilistic dependence, value of information, scoring rules, calibration, risk preference, education, decision making in sports, and climate engineering as a response to climate change. Prior to joining the University of Texas at Austin, Professor Bickel was an assistant professor at Texas A&M University and a senior engagement manager for Strategic Decisions Group. He has consulted around the world in a range of industries, including oil and gas, electricity generation/transmission/delivery, energy trading and marketing, commodity and specialty chemicals, life sciences, financial services, and metals and mining. Address: Graduate Program in Operations Research, The University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, C2200, Austin, TX 78712-0292; e-mail: ebickel@mail.utexas.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" From the Editors… ") holds a joint appointment as a professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the Department of Engineering Physics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she has directed the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis (formerly the Center for Human Performance in Complex Systems) since 1995. She has more than 20 years of experience in risk analysis for the nuclear power, chemical, petrochemical, and aerospace industries. Before returning to academia, she spent seven years as a consultant at Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. While there, her clients included the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and a number of nuclear utilities, and she prepared testimony for Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings on the safety of the Indian Point nuclear power plants. Dr. Bier's current research focuses on applications of risk analysis and related methods to problems of security and critical infrastructure protection, under support from the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Bier received the Women's Achievement Award from the American Nuclear Society in 1993, and was elected a Fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis in 1996, from which she received the Distinguished Achievement Award in 2007. She has written a number of papers and book chapters related to uncertainty analysis and decision making under uncertainty, and is the author of two scholarly review articles on risk communication. She served as the engineering editor for Risk Analysis from 1997 through 2001, and has served as a councilor of both the Society for Risk Analysis and the Decision Analysis Society, for which she is currently vice president and president elect. Dr. Bier has also served as a member of both the Radiation Advisory Committee and the Homeland Security Advisory Committee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Science Advisory Board. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1513 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: bier@engr.wisc.edu . Samuel E. Bodily (" Darden's Luckiest Student: Lessons from a High-Stakes Risk Experiment ") is the John Tyler Professor of Business Administration at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business and has published textbooks and more than 40 articles in journals ranging from Harvard Business Review to Management Science. His publications relate to decision and risk analysis, forecasting, strategy modeling, revenue management, and eStrategy. He has edited special issues of Interfaces on decision and risk analysis and strategy modeling and analysis. Professor Bodily has published well over 100 cases, including a couple of the 10 best-selling cases at Darden. He received the Distinguished Casewriter Wachovia Award from Darden in 2005 and three other best case or research Wachovia awards. He is faculty leader for an executive program on Strategic Thinking and Action. He is the course head of, and teaches in, a highly valued first-year MBA course in decision analysis, has a successful second-year elective on Management Decision Models, and has taught eStrategy and Strategy. He is a past winner of the Decision Sciences International Instructional Award and has served as chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. He has taught numerous executive education programs for Darden and private companies, has consulted widely for business and government entities, and has served as an expert witness. Professor Bodily was on the faculties of MIT Sloan School of Management and Boston University and has been a visiting professor at INSEAD Singapore, Stanford University, and the University of Washington. He has a Ph.D. degree and an S.M. degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.S. degree in physics from Brigham Young University. Address: Darden School of Business, 100 Darden Boulevard, Charlottesville, VA 22903; e-mail: bodilys@virginia.edu . David Budescu (" From the Editors… ") is the Anne Anastasi Professor of Psychometrics and Quantitative Psychology at Fordham University. He held positions at the University of Illinois and the University of Haifa, and visiting positions at Carnegie Mellon University, University of Gotheborg, the Kellog School at Northwestern University, the Hebrew University, and the Israel Institute of Technology (Technion). His research is in the areas of human judgment, individual and group decision making under uncertainty and with incomplete and vague information, and statistics for the behavioral and social sciences. He is or was on the editorial boards of Applied Psychological Measurement; Decision Analysis; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Journal of Mathematical Psychology; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition (2000–2003); Multivariate Behavioral Research; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1992–2002); and Psychological Methods (1996–2000). He is past president of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (2000–2001), fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, and an elected member of the Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychologists. Address: Department of Psychology, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, NY 10458; e-mail: budescu@fordham.edu . John C. Butler (" From the Editors… ") is a clinical associate professor of finance and the academic director of the Energy Management and Innovation Center in the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, and the secretary/treasurer of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. Butler received his Ph.D. in management science and information systems from the University of Texas in 1998. His research interests involve the use of decision science models to support decision making, with a particular emphasis on decision and risk analysis models with multiple performance criteria. Butler has consulted with a number of organizations regarding the application of decision analysis tools to a variety of practical problems. Most of his consulting projects involve use of Visual Basic for Applications and Excel to implement complex decision science models in a user-friendly format. Address: Center for Energy Management and Innovation, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1178; e-mail: john.butler2@mccombs.utexas.edu . Philippe Delquié (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor of decision sciences at the George Washington University and holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Delquié's teaching and research are in decision, risk, and multicriteria analysis. His work focuses on the interplay of behavioral and normative theories of choice, with the aim of improving managerial decision making and risk taking. His research addresses issues in preference assessment, value of information, nonexpected utility models of choice under risk, and risk measures. Prior to joining the George Washington University, he held academic appointments at INSEAD, the University of Texas at Austin, and École Normale Supérieure, France, and visiting appointments at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. Address: Department of Decision Sciences, George Washington University, Funger Hall, Suite 415, Washington, DC 20052; e-mail: delquie@gwu.edu . Zeynep Erkin (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Industrial Engineering at the University of Pittsburgh. She received her M.S. and B.S. degrees in industrial engineering from the University of Pittsburgh and Middle East Technical University, Turkey, in 2008 and 2006, respectively. Her research interests include maintenance optimization and medical decision making. Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: zee2@pitt.edu . Peter I. Frazier (" Paradoxes in Learning and the Marginal Value of Information ") is an assistant professor in the School of Operations Research and Information Engineering at Cornell University. He received a Ph.D. in operations research and financial engineering from Princeton University in 2009. His research interest is in the optimal acquisition of information, with applications in simulation, medicine, operations management, neuroscience, and information retrieval. He teaches courses in simulation and statistics. Address: School of Operations Research and Information Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853; e-mail: pf98@cornell.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors… ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple-attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Lisa M. Maillart (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an associate professor in the Industrial Engineering Department at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh, she served on the faculty of the Department of Operations in the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. She received her M.S. and B.S. in industrial and systems engineering from Virginia Tech, and her Ph.D. in industrial and operations engineering from the University of Michigan. Her primary research interest is in sequential decision making under uncertainty, with applications in medical decision making and maintenance optimization. She is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), the Society of Medical Decision Making (SMDM), and the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE). Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: maillart@pitt.edu . Jason R. W. Merrick (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor in the Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. He has a D.Sc. in operations research from the George Washington University. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and simulation. His research is primarily in the area of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics. He has worked on projects ranging from assessing maritime oil transportation and ferry system safety, the environmental health of watersheds, and optimal replacement policies for rail tracks and machine tools, and he has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the United States Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, British Petroleum, and Booz Allen Hamilton, among others. He has also performed training for Infineon Technologies, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, and Capital One Services. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. He is the information officer for the Decision Analysis Society. Address: Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284; e-mail: jrmerric@vcu.edu . Phillip E. Pfeifer (" Darden's Luckiest Student: Lessons from a High-Stakes Risk Experiment ") is the Richard S. Reynolds Professor of Business at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business, where he teaches courses in decision analysis and direct marketing. A graduate of Lehigh University and the Georgia Institute of Technology, his teaching has won student awards and has been recognized in Business Week's Guide to the Best Business Schools. He is an active researcher in the areas of decision making and direct marketing, and he currently serves on the editorial review board of the Journal of Interactive Marketing, which named him their best reviewer of 2008. In 2004 he was recognized as the Darden School's faculty leader in terms of external case sales, and in 2006 he coauthored a managerial book, Marketing Metrics: 50+ Metrics Every Executive Should Master, published by Wharton School Publishing, which was named best marketing book of the year by Strategy + Business. Address: Darden School of Business; 100 Darden Boulevard; Charlottesville, VA 22903; e-mail: pfeiferp@virginia.edu . Warren B. Powell (" Paradoxes in Learning and the Marginal Value of Information ") is a professor in the Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1981. He is the director of CASTLE Laboratory (Princeton University), which specializes in the development of stochastic optimization models and algorithms with applications in transportation and logistics, energy, health, and finance. The author or coauthor of more than 160 refereed publications, he is an INFORMS Fellow, and the author of Approximate Dynamic Programming: Solving the Curses of Dimensionality, published by John Wiley and Sons. His primary research interests are in approximate dynamic programming for high-dimensional applications and optimal learning (the efficient collection of information), and their application in energy systems analysis and transportation. He is a recipient of the Wagner prize and has twice been a finalist in the Edelman competition. He has also served in a variety of editorial and administrative positions for INFORMS, including INFORMS Board of Directors, area editor for Operations Research, president of the Transportation Science Section, and numerous prize and administrative committees. Address: Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: powell@princeton.edu . Mark S. Roberts (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach "), M.D., M.P.P., is professor and chair of health policy and management, and he holds secondary appointments in medicine, industrial engineering, and clinical and translational science. A practicing general internist, he has conducted research in decision analysis and the mathematical modeling of disease for more than 25 years, and he has expertise in cost effectiveness analysis, mathematical optimization and simulation, and the measurement and inclusion of patient preferences into decision problems. He has used decision analysis to examine clinical, costs, policy and allocation questions in liver transplantation, vaccination strategies, operative interventions, and the use of many medications. His recent research has concentrated in the use of mathematical methods from operations research and management science, including Markov decision processes, discrete-event simulation, and integer programming, to problems in health care. Address: Department of Health Policy and Management, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public Health, 130 De Soto Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: robertsm@upmc.edu . Ahti Salo (" From the Editors… ") is a professor of systems analysis at the Systems Analysis Laboratory of Aalto University. His research interests include topics in portfolio decision analysis, multicriteria decision making, risk management, efficiency analysis, and technology foresight. He is currently president of the Finnish Operations Research Society (FORS) and represents Europe and the Middle East in the INFORMS International Activities Committee. Professor Salo has been responsible for the methodological design and implementation of numerous high-impact decision and policy processes, including FinnSight 2015, the national foresight exercise of the Academy of Finland and the National Funding Agency for Technology and Innovations (Tekes). Address: Aalto University, Systems Analysis Laboratory, P.O. Box 11100, 00076 Aalto, Finland; e-mail: ahti.salo@tkk.fi . Andrew J. Schaefer (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an associate professor of industrial engineering and Wellington C. Carl Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh. He has courtesy appointments in bioengineering, medicine, and clinical and translational science. He received his Ph.D. in industrial and systems engineering from Georgia Tech in 2000. His research interests include the application of stochastic optimization methods to health-care problems, as well as stochastic optimization techniques, in particular, stochastic integer programming. He is interested in patient-oriented decision making in contexts such as end-stage liver disease, HIV/AIDS, sepsis, and diabetes. He also models health-care systems, including operating rooms and intensive-care units. He is an associate editor for INFORMS Journal on Computing and IIE Transactions. Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: Schaefer@pitt.edu . George Wu (" From the Editors… ") has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business since September 1997. His degrees include A.B. (applied mathematics, 1985), S.M. (applied mathematics, 1987), and Ph.D. (decision sciences, 1991), all from Harvard University. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, Professor Wu was on the faculty at Harvard Business School. Wu worked as a decision analyst at Procter & Gamble prior to starting graduate school. His research interests include descriptive and prescriptive aspects of decision making, in particular, decision making involving risk, cognitive biases in bargaining and negotiation, and managerial and organizational decision making. Professor Wu is a coordinating editor for Theory and Decision, an advisory editor for Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, on the editorial boards of Decision Analysis and Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, and a former department editor of Management Science. Address: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; e-mail: wu@chicagobooth.edu .

Las epidemias siempre han acompañado al hombre, las cuales presentaron sus propios patrones de distribución espacial, ocasionando millones de fallecimientos. Unas de las más antigüas la tuberculosis (750 a.c.) en América; y la Plaga Antonina la cual se expandió en el imperio romano (165-166 D.C.). En el nuevo mundo durante la conquista se originaron epidemias de tifoidea, viruela y sarampión entre otras que devastaron a la población nativa.
En el siglo XX, se expandió la epidemia más devastadora que fue la fiebre española (1918 – 1919) que cobró de 40 a 50 millones de vidas; también se originaron otras como la gripe asiática (1957), gripe de Honk Kong (1968-1970), VIH/Sida (1981- ), SARS (2002-2003), gripe H1N1/gripe porcina y MERS (2012- 2016).
A 100 años después de la fiebre española se originó sorpresivamente la pandemia de COVID-19, en Wuhan, China y en tres meses se expandió prácticamente en todas las regiones del mundo, incidiendo en los cambios de los mapas epidemiológicos a nivel local, regional y global, al día 22 de mayo del 2021 se registraron 166.292.312 casos y 3.446.451 defunciones acumulados, gracias al desarrollo de las ciencias, las tecnologías y el papel de la toma de decisiones, a un año ya se cuenta con vacunas, para el 22 de mayo del 2021 se tienen 1.630.588.299 de dosis de vacunas administradas a nivel mundial.
El comportamiento espacio temporal de la pandemia de COVID-19, se está presentando en forma diferenciada en el territorio y en la población. Comparar los países no es lo adecuado porque cada uno de ellos tiene sus propias características sociales, económicas, culturales, ambientales y políticas que explican la expansión de la pandemia y sus consecuencias, pero es importante conocer lo que está pasando en el mundo, como se va expandiendo la pandemia, las diferentes políticas y estrategias que se implementaron, aquellas que tienen éxitos y aquellas que inciden en las primeras, segundas y terceras olas.
La COVID–19 ha afectado principalmente áreas urbanas, con alta concentración y densidad de población, teniendo consecuencias ambientales, sociales, económicas, culturales y políticas, agudizándose problemas en los sistemas de salud, en el desempleo, en la movilidad, la violencia, el abasto alimentario, entre otros. También se abren nuevos campos de oportunidad y desafíos en el potencial para la salud: Geotecnologías, telemedicina, inteligencia artificial, ciber-salud, entre otros, que justifican el publicar y dar a conocer las situaciones de la salud púbica en diversos espacios geográficos.
En este contexto es que este dossier temático de Revista Persona y Sociedad contempla 11 trabajos seleccionados sobre la pandemia de COVID-19 y la salud pública en los contextos territoriales de Argentina, Chile y México. Ante estos eventos extraordinarios que estamos viviendo es importante conocer el estado actual y futuro, los retos y oportunidades, a partir de los cuales en esta revista se consideran cuatro campos temáticos que articulan los artículos: la primera el estado actual de la pandemia, los aspectos sociales como la vulnerabilidad y las desigualdades ante la COVID-19; la tercera el papel de la gestión y gobernanza, planteamiento de escenarios y efectos de la pandemia; y la cuarta las geotecnlogías y métodos de análisis espacial.
Este dossier temático de Revista Persona y Sociedad es una invitación a pensar en la pandemia de COVID-19 desde el punto de vista territorial, el comportamiento espacial durante el año 2020, los escenarios post pandemia, las desigualdades y vulnerabilidad ante la COVID-19; las escalas de análisis espacial son diversas, desde nacionales, estatales, zonas metropolitanas y a niveles locales.
Abre este número el trabajo de Marcela Santana en el que se aborda la Covid-19 en México, el análisis del comportamiento espacio – temporal a partir de los Condicionantes Socioespaciales de la Salud, del mes de febrero al mes de octubre de 2020. La autora consideró los condicionantes geográficos, epidemiológicos, sociales y demográficos. Los procedimientos y técnicas empleados para la evolución de los casos y defunciones son cuadros históricos, gráficos y cartográficos; para la distribución espacial se emplearon los mapas temáticos de contagios y defunciones, así como cartografía de tasas de mortalidad y morbilidad. La autora señala que se presenta una marcada diferenciación espacial de la incidencia de los casos y contagios en áreas densamente pobladas, como las principales zonas metropolitanas (de acuerdo con el tamaño de población), las ciudades fronterizas del norte y las ciudades costeras, que son los principales epicentros de la pandemia, principalmente por el incremento de la movilidad. Una de las conclusiones de la autora es que, en México para octubre del año 2020, el condicionante que tuvo un papel importante en el inicio del aumento de la curva epidémica fue la toma de decisiones por parte de la población en general en el incremento de la movilidad y el no considerar las medidas sanitarias. Hechos que se evidencian en la realización de aglomeraciones de diversa índole: turísticas, religiosas, sociales, comerciales, políticas, deportivas, etc.
Los cinco trabajos siguientes siguen el hilo conductor de la temática de las desigualdades territoriales y vulnerabilidad, inicia Manuel Fuenzalida y María Paz Trebilcock, con la investigación de un diagnóstico cuantitativo de las desigualdades existentes en morbi y mortalidad asociada a COVID-19 al interior de las tres principales Áreas Metropolitanas de Chile, siendo estas las de Valparaíso (AMV), Santiago (AMS) y Concepción (AMC). El análisis de distribución espacial fue valorado como desigualdad en términos de brecha, entre quienes están en mejor posición versus peor situación. La metodología que los autores emplearon contempla el Análisis Exploratorio de Datos Espaciales uni y bi variado, la construcción de un Índice de Determinantes Sociales de la Salud (IDSS) y la valoración de las relaciones de morbi-mortalidad por COVID-19 con el IDSS. Los autores señalan que el patrón territorial de la valoración de las relaciones morbi-mortalidad por COVID-19 y los Determinantes Sociales de la Salud son diferentes para cada área metropolitana analizada. COVID-19, tiende a generar un mayor impacto en morbilidad y mortalidad en el Área Metropolitana de Santiago. El Área Metropolitana de Concepción muestra mayoritariamente impactos fuertes en morbilidad y mínimo en mortalidad. El Área Metropolitana de Valparaíso exhibe mayormente impactos controlado y mínimo para morbi-mortalidad.
En el trabajo de Salvador Villerías, aborda el análisis espacial de vulnerabilidad por COVID-19 en el estado de Guerrero, México, examina la variabilidad espacial de la vulnerabilidad socioeconómica y concentración urbana de la población del estado de Guerrero con relación al COVID-19. Parte de los conceptos de análisis espacial y Geografía de la salud, vulnerabilidad social y COVID-19. El autor señala que ante la concentración de la población por la actividades socioeconómicas que prevalecen en el territorio guerrerense, los lugares con mayor riesgo de contagio son: Acapulco, Chilpancingo, Iguala, Zihuatanejo, Taxco, además de considerar que la entidad guerrerense, el 42% de la población vive en la zona rural y es donde existen menor riesgo de contagio por el COVID-19, porque tiene menor movilidad la población y hay mayor dispersión de la población, no así en los cuatro centros urbanos antes mencionados. El autor concluye que es importante reflexionar sobre los beneficios de la concentración de la población y los servicios que en estos lugares se concentran, pero también los beneficios de una mayor dispersión de la población, como hoy se vive ante la pandemia y que en el futuro se debe de considerar una mayor dispersión de los servicios en general.
En la investigación de María Xochitl Mejía, Luis Miguel Espinosa y Miguel Angel Balderas, determinan y relacionan la degradación de suelos, fertilidad y sustentabilidad, ante la deficiencia en la producción agrícola y como consecuencia la seguridad alimentaria a nivel nacional e internacional, desde el inicio de su trabajo advierten que en la actualidad el bajo rendimiento de los suelos ha limitado la producción de alimento, asociado a la presente pandemia del COVID – 19 y que ha frenado la economía a nivel nacional e internacional. Los autores se enfocan en determinar y relacionar la degradación de suelos, fertilidad y sustentabilidad, ante la deficiencia en la producción agrícola y como consecuencia la inseguridad alimentaria a nivel nacional e internacional, a través del estudio de la edafología, geomorfología, morfoedafogénesis, geografía humana y geografía de la salud. Muestran distintos puntos de vista que se han generado en torno a este tema, para ello analizaron las condiciones edáficas de los suelos y la producción agrícola, mediante datos de fertilidad, de producción y venta de alimentos de hace veinte años a la actualidad, a través del comparativo de una línea de tiempo de COVID-19. Los resultados mostraron la sustentabilidad en la zona de estudio, la intervención antrópica y el escenario ante la actual pandemia de COVID–19. Se obtuvo la alteración del espacio natural de la zona de estudio, a manos de las actividades antropogénicas. Los autores concluyeron que, a través del análisis de fertilidad efectuados, fue posible determinar la alteración natural y antrópica en la zona de estudio, misma que ha limitado los servicios ambientales y como consecuencia la producción agrícola y que la sustentabilidad de los suelos se observa limitada, ya que los suelos han perdido de forma considerable la fertilidad.
Eska Solano, Jonathan Hernández y Daniel Hernández abordan la evaluación de requerimientos de accesibilidad universal desde una perspectiva urbano-territorial en la post-pandemia, a partir de una comparación jerárquica de los requerimientos de accesibilidad identificados por personas con discapacidad (PcD) en el territorio urbano-arquitectónico de México, dichos resultados fueron contrastados por grupos de expertos en la materia. La autora evaluó los resultados a través de un modelo matemático-fenoménico, el cual posibilitó la realización de un análisis de juicios y percepción, identificando así los comportamientos prospectivos en cuanto a las prioridades identificadas. Como resultados de esta investigación son las guías y recomendaciones basadas en un enfoque participativo, las cuales perfilan hacia la generación de un territorio urbano arquitectónico inclusivo, que considera las demandas de accesibilidad a través de la participación de los sectores consultados y responda a las condiciones que demandan la nueva normalidad. Una de las conclusiones de los autores concluye que las prioridades para una persona con discapacidad visual, no coinciden necesariamente con una persona con discapacidad motora o mental, y que la generalización de las necesidades de las PcD da lugar a acciones de apoyo poco útiles o pertinentes, dado que no alcanza a cubrir las necesidades de todas la PcD, e incluso no cubren la de ningún grupo de PcD, al no ser producto de un diseño centrado en el usuario.
En esta línea similar, pero para el caso de la educación, Agustín Olmos Cruz y Carlos Reyes Torres, abordan el coronavirus y la educación básica en México. Un aspecto de vulnerabilidad y marginación desde una visión geográfico-cultural, con el propósito de identificar espacialmente la infraestructura digital que apoya al Sistema Educativo Mexicano, para continuar con la impartición de clases a distancia y evitar ausentismo, pues es importante disponer de servicios y recursos tecnológicos que permitan generar condiciones de confort y seguridad, requerimientos necesarios para el aprendizaje.
La metodología empleada incluye la combinación del método geográfico, etnográfico y fenomenológico, que ayudó a identificar y ordenar la información recabada y ver qué relación guarda con la población que recibe educación en el nivel básico.
En el eje temático de la gestión, la gobernanza, el planteamiento de escenarios y efectos de la pandemia se incluyen tres trabajos, el de María Elina Gudiño contextualiza América Latina en el marco de la gestión y gobernanza territorial plantea problemas como el lento crecimiento económico, las desigualdades sociales y la degradación ambiental, la autora plantea posibles escenarios frente al cambio climático y la pandemia COVID-19 y destaca la importancia del uso de las Tecnologías de Información Geográfica (TIG), para la propuesta de acciones que permitan disminuir el margen de error en la toma de decisiones. La autora propone generar un desarrollo innovativo en la gestión sustentada en la coordinación multinivel y la gobernanza territorial. Ante esta "nueva normalidad" plantea 2 escenarios alternativos hacia el futuro: el escenario 1 en el que todo sigue igual, aumento de la inseguridad y la vulnerabilidad ante amenazas naturales y sanitarias; el escenario 2 en el que se producen cambios estructurales que llevan a aumentar la seguridad y la disminución de la vulnerabilidad ante amenazas naturales y sanitarias. Concluye la autora que se necesitan cambios estructurales para aumentar la seguridad y disminuir la vulnerabilidad ante amenazas como el COVID-19.
En esta línea similar Francisco Monroy, Milagros Campos y Cuauhtli Flores plantean nuevos escenarios económicos para el Estado de México, ante la presencia del COVID-19. La investigación se centró en delinear el efecto negativo de la crisis generada por la pandemia (COVID-19) en la caída de la actividad económica, a partir de análisis espacial para conocer los territorios de las afirmaciones presentadas por el Banco de México, en las que plantea, que existen sectores de actividades económicas con una mayor y/o menor propensión a la caída del valor generado por la presencia de esta pandemia para los próximos meses, los sectores que son considerados con un alto impacto negativo en el estado son actividades no esenciales. Para la realización del pronóstico se utilizó la técnica llamada econometría por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios(MCO). Los autores proponen una serie de estrategias para reducir el impacto de estos subsectores a corto plazo, para incentivar e incrementar la actividad económica ante la nueva normalidad, en las zonas más afectadas de las actividades que tienen una mayor relevancia. Una de las conclusiones de los autores es que la presencia del COVID-19, en el Estado de México se encuentra marcada por una tendencia alta en los municipios donde la riqueza de la mayor parte de las actividades económicas, generan riqueza, fuentes de trabajo, producción y distribución de productos.
En la investigación de Yered Canchola, David Velázquez, Acatl Reyes, Carlos Velázquez y Adriana Trejo, son analizados los principales impactos que se presentaron por la pandemia de COVID-19 en el sector turístico de las principales ciudades costeras del Estado de Quintana Roo, que son Cancún, Chetumal y Playa de Carmen, desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, partiendo por las condiciones previas de la pandemia y las afectaciones en las diversas ramas económicas al año 2020. Se hace un análisis estadístico-cartográfico en cuatro fases metodológicas: la primera la delimitación de las zonas de estudio; la segunda la medición y cuantificación de la vulnerabilidad y exposición ante el COVID-19, así como la estimación del nivel de resiliencia ante esta pandemia; en la tercera fase se identificaron y se cartografiaron los peligros y riesgos asociados al COVID-19, en las tres ciudades costeras; y en la cuarta fase metodológica se presentaron los impactos por el COVID-19 con un enfoque direccionado al turismo. Una de las conclusiones de los autores es que el impacto de la COVID-19 tiene orígenes de aparición y propagación en los centros turísticos de Quintana Roo, por los flujos del turismo internacional que acuden a esta región y que ha llegado al largo del año 2020.
Dos trabajos muestran el gran potencial de las geotecnologías y los métodos de análisis espacial y la importancia para la salud pública. los autores: Giovanna Santana Castañeda, Noel Bonfilio Pineda Jaimes y Rebeca Serrano Barquín desarrollaron el análisis de conglomerados espacio temporales de la neumonía en población vulnerable del estado de México, para identificar las zonas que requieren mayor atención, mediante el uso de técnicas socio-epidemiológicas y geoespaciales, a nivel municipal en el Estado de México. Se explican los métodos de conglomerados, Método de K-medias, Modelo de probabilidad de Poisson, así como la distribución espacial de la mortalidad en el grupo J. En los resultados se muestra la cartografía de mortalidad, por grupos de edad más vulnerables y por sexo, así como de los conglomerados espaciales, y cartografía del Riesgo relativo de contraer influenza, gripe y neumonía, 2018. Loa autores concluyen que el empleo de estos métodos de análisis permitieron tener mayor detalle en la exploración del espacio geográfico brindando la posibilidad de analizar el territorio con una mayor desagregación espacial y de esa manera detectar tendencias en lugares con exceso de casos, para dirigir recursos en investigación en salud con el objetivo de reducir la carga de morbilidad y mortalidad de la población y que esto nos lleve a alcanzar ambientes saludables para mejorar la calidad de salud de la población.
Los autores Miguel Ernesto González Castañeda, Igor Martín Ramos Herrera, Antonio Reyna Sevilla y Juan de Dios Robles Pastrana, nos guían en el mundo de las geotecnologías, se documentan la justificación conceptual del uso de las herramientas geográficas en el análisis de situación de salud; así como las experiencias tenidas en la aplicación de éstas en el seno de una Sala de Situación ante el COVID-19 en Guadalajara, México. El objetivo que se persigue es compartir las actividades prioritarias de análisis de situación de la pandemia, su evolución y tendencias espacio temporales en la población jaliscience con el fin de apoyar a la toma de decisiones al interior de la propia universidad, así como para las autoridades e instituciones de salud estatales. A través del método de salas de situación en salud desarrollada por la Organización Pan-americana de la Salud (PAHO por sus siglas en inglés) que se trata de un espacio físico o virtual donde se realiza un "diagnóstico situacional de salud" que favorece la toma de decisión en la búsqueda de una nueva realidad e identificar los municipios y regiones prioritarias. Los resultados se muestran en diversos reportes científico-técnicos y mapas. En específico el Reporte Geo epidemiológico, que comprende a la fecha un total de 30 Reportes de análisis de las condiciones en Jalisco y la Región Occidente de México desde distintas perspectivas, así como 11 reportes especiales; la generación de mapas de distribución en diferentes escalas (regional, estatal y sub regional), entre otros; así como el uso intensivo de los buscadores, sistemas de cálculo y los SIG. Se agregan, además, datos procesados en diferentes plataformas en forma de gráficos, visualizaciones y expresiones cartográficas, con el fin de contextualizar los hechos más relevantes. Aportes importantes para la toma de decisiones, la generación de conocimientos para las sugerencias en el tratamiento de la pandemia, para incidir en la reducción de las cadenas de contagio.
Finalmente, nuestros agradecimientos y reconocimientos al equipo editorial de la Revista de Persona y Sociedad por brindarnos la oportunidad de publicar la situación de la pandemia de COVID-19 y la situación de la salud en diversos espacios geográficos; a los autores de los artículos por sus valiosas contribuciones; así como a los evaluadores de los artículos que con sus sugerencias han hecho posible el enriquecimiento y fortalecimiento de dichos documentos.

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected young leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in two blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation and the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and second, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as artificial intelligence, including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by administrations, businesses, and citizens because of their promises of enormous opportunities, the potential solution to global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. These technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. AI is increasingly considered as a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, the swift progress is also filled with risks, including challenges to fundamental rights, which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological issues. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are still many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in those areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, security instability and growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report aimed at establishing a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas – such as the digital economy or the protection of human rights in cyberspace – where the international community should collaborate and cooperate with regards to the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, among others, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22).The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the ambition to avoid the fragmentation of the internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of artificial intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – but also uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems (keeping a whole life-cycle approach, from design to deployment and use), and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of "courage", which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in dthe development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU also adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council. These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own regulation – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to elements such as human rights – and even implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability.However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiple global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the velocity of technological change and development, it is difficult to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, in the regulation of technologies, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted regulations do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer countries to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues which are managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This lack of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies by different actors. As such, there is a lack of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and fundamental freedoms protection for every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicization and securitization of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the European Union and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and dominate the standard setting of these technologies in order to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary over the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.The lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. And, while paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent hyperactivity in digital advances shows the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multistakeholder approach, for example in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact, as well as a top-down multilateral approach that still gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multistakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow – which implies the subordination of multistakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialized conversation with a small pool of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be fit for purpose for non-Western realities.Besides more representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must also see their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In sum, democratic and participatory elements must be incorporated into the governance of technology on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. One of the main concerns and challenges of the current efforts is the need to ensure policy coordination, the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community and, as such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts. However, while regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract. Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. The unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be key to ensuring that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. In parallel, regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns, to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Secondly, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. Furthermore, these spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards – based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches – for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Thirdly, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technological advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity, and ensure that it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multistakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in three blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation, second, it identifies the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and finally, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by public administrations, businesses, and citizens because they bear the promise of enormous opportunities, the potential to help solve global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. In fact, these technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. Indeed, AI is increasingly considered a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery, and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, this swift progress is filled with risks which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological areas. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report to establish a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas where the international community should collaborate and cooperate regarding the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22). The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the intention to avoid the fragmentation of the Internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of Artificial Intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – although uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of 'courage', which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adoption. Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own frameworks – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to human rights – and implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability. However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiplicity of global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the speed of technological change and development, it is challenging to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted frameworks do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer actors to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This absence of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding by different actors of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies. As such, there is a mismatch of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and the protection of the fundamental freedoms of every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity of substantive participation between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual-focused perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicisation and securitisation of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the EU and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and to dominate the standard setting of these technologies to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary of the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach a consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.In conclusion, the lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. Paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent digital advances show the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach – for example, in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact – and a top-down multilateral approach which gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow, implying the subordination of multi-stakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialised conversation with a limited number of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing regulatory processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be suitable for non-Western realities.Besides more a representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must have their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In conclusion, the governance of technology must incorporate democratic and participatory elements on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. Beyond ensuring policy coordination, two further concerns and challenges that arise from current efforts are the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community. As such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts.Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. While regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract.Moreover, the unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be essential to guarantee that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. Regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Additionally, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. These spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Furthermore, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technology advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity and ensure it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multi-stakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has been in power for ten years, is seeking a third term in office. His goal is to restore the country to the preeminent position it supposedly lost due to previous Muslim and British rulers.He is kicking off the 2024 election year with the inauguration of the Ayodhya temple intended to liberate Hindus from the alleged enslavement they endured for 1,200 years.His supremacist ideology aims to transform the Hindu majority into an electoral majority. By intertwining politics and religion, it turns Muslims and Christians into aliens worthy only of the status of second-class citizens. Rarely has Hindu nationalist pride been so deeply flattered in India as at the start of 2024. With general elections looming in the South Asian giant – a huge ballot set to stretch over the months of April and May to allow hundreds of millions of voters to go to the polls – Narendra Modi is running for a third five-year term. He aims to make the religious question the common thread running through his campaign. On January 22nd, 2024, before an audience of 8,000 devotees, the head of government of the world's most populous country (1.43 billion inhabitants) led the solemn consecration of the Hindu temple currently under construction in Ayodhya, a holy city located on the Ganges plain. Boycotted by the opposition, this surreal piece of stage management is one of the most significant political events in India's contemporary history since the country gained independence in 1947.This inauguration marks the fulfilment of the Hindu supremacist fantasy formulated almost a century ago by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the association of the nation's volunteers founded in September 1925 in the city of Nagpur, at the exact geographical centre of the Indian subcontinent. The apparatchik Modi, born in 1950, was indoctrinated in the organisation from the age of eight and made his career there, before winning election mandates from the 2000s onwards. As the central core of the Hindu nationalist constellation around which dozens of student, workers' and farmers' organisations, publishing houses and charities orbit, as well as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian People's Party – its political showcase –, the RSS considers the Ayodhya temple its ultimate Holy Grail. Narendra Modi made it happen. Ayodhya is becoming what Mecca is to Islam: the holiest place in Hinduism. The prime minister opened an international airport on December 31st, 2023, to draw millions of pilgrims from all over the world. In the eyes of the Indian people, the far-right leader is now either a timeless sage, detached from the material condition, or a fanatical guru.An authoritarian regime with theocratic overtonesNever had an Indian prime minister indulged in such a masquerade, but the West was unmoved. After receiving Narendra Modi in Paris with the greatest possible republican decorum for Bastille Day on July 14th, the French national holiday celebrating the homeland of human rights, Emmanuel Macron was the guest of honour of his Indian "friend" on January 26th, 2024, in Delhi. Initially, Joe Biden was to have been invited to the Republic Day military parade marking the anniversary of the Indian constitution. The US president reluctantly declined to attend in the wake of the recent attempted assassination of an American citizen of Indian origin in New York, an opponent of the Modi regime. Washington accuses the Indian secret service of being behind the attempt on his life.Yet India is well and truly in the process of exiting the democracy camp and sliding into an authoritarian regime with theocratic overtones, and not because prelates are taking the reins of the country – Hinduism has no clergy whatsoever – but because the policies pursued at the top of the state are driven solely by religious considerations, in defiance of the secularist thinking of India's founding fathers, Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in particular. The current government is at pains to consign them to the dustbin of history, as well as other figures who are less well known in Europe, such as Nehru's right-hand man Vallabhbhai Patel and Babasaheb Ambedkar, the principal drafter of the constitution enacted in 1950.Like Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Narendra Modi is striving to merge religion1, nation and leadership, flying in the face of India's secular constitution. Describing India as "the world's largest democracy" no longer makes much sense today. More or less free elections are still held at the national and state levels, there is still a multi-party system and political changeovers occur regularly. But the foundations of democracy and the rule of law that typically accompany that are being eaten away and undermined one after another. The judiciary has been brought to heel, all the way up to its highest level, the Supreme Court. India's election commission, which is supposed to guarantee the pluralism of universal suffrage, has been placed under executive control; as recently as December 2023, the reform of the procedure for appointing its members made them entirely dependent on the government. In ten years, 17,000 international NGOs have been expelled from the country; opponents and what remains of the independent press has been severely repressed, and history has been completely rewritten in school textbooks. Fear reigns everywhere.The latest figures released in 2023 show that the ruling party attracts more than two-thirds of private donations to politics, and in a very opaque way. It has an unrivalled strike force, both human and financial, which it deploys without limit, particularly on social media. The BJP has become a bulldozer against which opposition parties have virtually no resistance in the northern half of the subcontinent, with the notable exception of Punjab state in the west, and Bengal state in the east, the traditional stronghold of Indian communism. Only the southern half of India holds its own, with the BJP proving unable to make inroads in most of the Deccan states, from Kerala to Telangana, taking in Tamil Nadu.Three heavyweight institutions have taken note of India's worrying new situation, downgrading it on the scale of democracies. For the past three years, the Swedish V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg has classified India as an "electoral autocracy", a regime that looks like a democracy but which one by one scuttles all the checks and balances that could safegard the balance of power. The American NGO Freedom House counts it among "partially free" countries, while the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, an intergovernmental organisation based in Stockholm, places it among the "declining" democracies. In the World Press Freedom Index compiled and published by Reporters Without Borders, India has dropped to 161st place out of 180.Iniquitous laws, often inherited from British occupation, on the offence of sedition or religious conversion are used to silence any dissenting voice. Anyone who is not on Modi's side is automatically considered an enemy of the prime minister, an enemy of Hindus and an enemy of the nation. Renowned political analyst Pratap Bhanu Mehta said as much recently in an interview with The New York Times: Indian democracy is under "very worrying" assault and "a sense of fear" is spreading about "the direction it is taking".1Back on August 5th, 2020, for the laying of the foundation stone of the Ayodhya temple, Narendra Modi was transformed into a high priest, dressed from head to toe in a gold-coloured tunic and draped with a saffron stole, the orange fetish of Hindu nationalists. The date had not been chosen at random. Exactly one year earlier, his government had brutally placed Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in the Indian Union, under siege, blocking internet access, imprisoning local leaders, abolishing the regional executive and parliament and banning all foreign journalists. A year later, surrounded by priests and ascetics, the Hindu nationalist leader performed a Vedic liturgy, chanting endless mantras before unveiling the foundation stone of the future edifice.On many other occasions, Modi has shamelessly mixed politics and religion. On December 13th, 2021, the member of parliament for Varanasi (formerly Benares), the holy city with its famous funeral pyres where the most fervent believers dream of achieving moksha, the end of the cycles of reincarnation, inaugurated an architectural complex leading to the Ganges by immersing himself in the river, again dressed in saffron, his forehead crossed with the tripundra, three horizontal lines drawn in ashes that symbolise the god Shiva.More recently, on May 28th, 2023, India's strongman took religious symbolism a step further by unveiling the interior of the new parliament building in Delhi. Drawn to the theatre since early childhood, the septuagenarian leader indulged in a totally inappropriate show. He did not see fit to invite the president of the republic, Droupadi Murmu, even though, according to the constitution, parliament is the product of the people and the head of state, however symbolic the latter's role may be. Narendra Modi lay on his stomach in front of around 30 half-naked sadhus, contemplative recluses, before entering the new hemicycle with his face deep in contemplation, carrying a long golden sceptre against his chest, which he religiously placed next to the high chair of the speaker of the house. That day, for all to see, the temple of democracy was converted into a Hindu temple.The monarchical ceremony enabled Modi to appropriate the symbolism of a relic dating back to the Cholas, the Tamil dynasty whose Hindu empire (300 BC-1279) gloriously resisted the Muslim invasions that swept across the north of the subcontinent from the 7th century onwards. It was also used to stage a hoax. According to the prime minister's entourage, the sceptre in question was given to Nehru by the British on the day they left India. Vehemently contested by historians, this account was a means of legitimising an Indian right wing invested with an allegedly divine power. All the better to make people forget its past collaborationist activities with the British crown. In the three decades leading up to 1947, the Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu Grand Assembly), a forerunner of the BJP, had distinguished itself for its involvement in the workings of the occupying power's administration.An outrageous cult of personalityA century later, it is a question of concealing this fact and acquiring new virtue, at a time when the 21st century is shaping up to be "India's century", as Modi is convinced. This is why he worked so hard to ensure that his country took over the rotating presidency of the G20 from Indonesia in 2023, when it should have held it in 2022. It was a ploy designed to make Modi look like one of the world's leading politicians in the run up to the Indian general elections. The pomp with which the leaders of the 20 countries in this club were received at the Delhi summit last September was only matched by the propaganda deployed by the Indian authorities to capitalise on it.Accustomed to an astonishing cult of personality, Modi's face is everywhere: in railway stations and airports, on bags of food rations distributed to the most destitute, on Covid vaccination certificates, in the press to the point of overkill. One figure speaks volumes: his government spends the equivalent of €230,000 a day on buying advertising space in the media. Since the end of December, life-size cardboard cutouts of Narendra Modi have been set up in all railway stations and schools so that Indians, from the youngest to the oldest, can take selfies with him. It is an election stunt, financed with taxpayers' money. For the G20 summit itself, it was impossible take two steps on the capital's streets, or in any of India's major cities, without coming across a giant portrait of the prime minister bearing the logo of the world summit and the slogan chosen for the occasion: "One Earth, One Family, One Future". In other words, the future of the planet will not be played out without India.For the Hindu nationalist leader, the primary goal is to restore the country to the first-rate position it lost because of the Muslims and the British colonists of the East India Company. First-rate, because India invented not only yoga and Ayurvedic medicine, but also, and millennia ago, aviation, cosmetic surgery, in vitro fertilisation and the internet – at least according to several BJP leaders, who spout such nonsense with the utmost seriousness at scientific conferences. If Modi wants to free Indians from the slavery of which he claims they have been victims for 1,200 years, it is because he believes the time has come to heal what the writer Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul (in 1976) called the "wounded civilisation". According to the winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize for Literature, India's decline began in 1565, when the sultanates of the young Mughal Empire brought down Vijayanagar, capital of the last great Hindu empire, now an archaeological site known as Hampi, in Karnataka.This saga, seen as an unmitigated disaster by RSS militants, is analysed as the inescapable culmination of Hindu vanity by Salman Rushdie in his latest novel, Victory City (2023). A native of Bombay, the American-British writer spins a mythical tale of the rise, then decline and fall of Vijayanagar after it became a reactionary dictatorial regime, which the reader might take as an allusion to the current situation in India: "Many people are suffering from this new hard line but they are keeping quiet, because (the king) has created a squadron of henchmen who react harshly to the slightest sign of dissent. There is a hard core, a small group that rules, and most people of a certain age fear it and hate it. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of young people support it, saying that the new 'discipline' is necessary to safeguard their identity."The principles of secularism trampled underfootWhatever the historical interpretation, the erection of the monumental Hindu temple at Ayodhya is presented by the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the World Hindu Council, an association linked to the RSS and responsible for the work, as a victim-based interpretation of this distant past. It is intended, it says, to "save the world from Christians and Muslims".2 The consecration of the temple could have passed for a political act like any other had Narendra Modi been inclined, since he came to power ten years ago, to cut the ribbon on a new mosque here, on a new church there. Given India's religious diversity, doesn't the secularism enshrined in the preamble to the Indian constitution establish a secular model in which the state authorises the presence of all faiths in the public arena and ensures each individual can express their beliefs, whatever they may be?Modi, however, has done nothing of the sort. Accused of having allowed anti-Muslim pogroms of an exceptional barbarity to take place in 2002 in his native region of Gujarat, a state bordering Pakistan he had taken charge of a few months earlier (the United States banned him from the country for years over the violence), he has only one idea in mind: to establish the superiority of Hindus over the rest of the population. And to assimilate the Indian nation to Hinduism, seen not as a religion but as a millennia-old culture, a philosophy, a way of life and even, for the most radical, a race. His political family sums up this vision in the term "Hindutva", a concept coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. According to the ideologue to whose ideas the founders of the RSS subscribed, to deserve Indian nationality it is imperative to be Hindu. And a Hindu can only be someone who considers the territory3 of India not only as their homeland, but above all as their holy land.This view effectively relegates to the rank of second-class citizens all those who belong to a religion described as "foreign": Islam and Christianity, of course, as well as Zoroastrianism imported by the Persians, and Judaism, whose representatives are now very few in number in India. In contrast, the BJP regime, which has been in power since May 2014, is much more tolerant of religions closely or distantly linked to Hinduism, because of their indigenous character, like Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism. In this respect, the policy pursued by the autocrat Modi is populist, since in the name of a supposed homogeneity of the people, in this case the overwhelming Hindu majority, it fosters popular resentment against real and above all supposed foreigners, in order to promote a policy of exclusion by authoritarian means. Arbitrary arrests of Muslims and Christians, as well as the destruction of their homes and businesses, have become commonplace, generally under the eyes of an impassive police force.This policy, incidentally, confirms the disturbing affinities observed for nearly a century between the Hindu nationalism promoted by the RSS and Zionism, affinities that have been strengthened by the emergence of Islamist movements on a global scale. As the French researcher Christophe Jaffrelot has analysed in a number of recent publications, "majoritarianism", whether Hindu or Jewish, feeds on "ethno-nationalist ideologies that give priority to factors such as race, territory and nativism" and sees the individuals who make up the Muslim minority as "sub-citizens"3.It is no coincidence that Israel, a strategic partner for more than 30 years and a leading arms supplier, has grown considerably closer to India since Narendra Modi took office as prime minister and Benyamin Netanyahu has been in power in Israel. After the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023, the Indian leader drew parallels with the Mumbai attacks and hostage-taking perpetrated by Pakistani Islamists in November 2008. With just a few months to go before the Indian general elections, he has found a fresh opportunity to wave his Islamophobic red rag to rally Hindu voters around him.Emigration on the riseMaintaining the confusion between Islam and terrorism is a tried and tested practice for him. When he was elected Gujarat chief minister in 2002, he referred extensively to the September 11th, 2001, attacks in the United States, as well as the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December of the same year. In 2019, when he was up for re-election as prime minister at the end of his first term, he made security the central theme of his campaign in the wake of a terrorist attack on an Indian army convoy in Kashmir, ordering surgical airstrikes on Pakistan in retaliation. This operation won him re-election by a landslide, with a record absolute majority for the BJP: 303 seats out of a total of 543.If Modi can bring the religious question to the fore in 2024, it is because he holds all the power in his hands. In 2014, he masked his intentions to reach the top. With the Hindu nationalists behind him, he preferred to seduce the rest of the electorate, on the sound advice of his communication experts, by promising them "development", in the image of the Gujarat model that he prided himself on having put in place in his home region, after ensuring that he had the employers and a number of prominent billionaires in his pocket.The promise of better days ("achhe din"), of economic growth and its expected benefits, has nevertheless fizzled out. Over the last ten years, India's gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by more than 60%. But in the previous decade, when the Indian National Congress was in power, it grew by nearly 100%. Narendra Modi says he is in charge of "the fifth-largest economy in the world", except that on a per capita basis, the wealth produced is no better than that of Bangladesh or Zimbabwe. Since he took office, public debt has soared to exceed the value of GDP, unemployment has reached record levels (to the extent that the publication of official statistics has been banned), causing more and more young people to flee abroad in search of a good education.Hundreds of thousands of people desperate to find work are also leaving the country, as highlighted by the plane intercepted on French soil before Christmas 2023. The aircraft belonging to the Romanian charter company Legend Airlines, was taking educated Indians, many of them from Gujarat, to Nicaragua, from where they hoped to go to Mexico and then into the United States. In 2023, no fewer than 100,000 Indians attempted to enter the country illegally, compared with 64,000 in 2021 and 20,000 in 2019. Currently, 2 million Indians leave their country every year. And since Narendra Modi came to power, 1.4 million Indian citizens have renounced their nationality.The tragedy of migration comes on top of an unprecedented widening of the gap between rich and poor, with 1% of the Indian population owning three-quarters of the national wealth, while the poorest half owns just 3% of that same wealth. India ranks 132nd in the UN Human Development Index, and according to the World Bank, 30% of its inhabitants live on less than $1.90 a day. When the government renewed the basic food aid programme last year, aimed at families who were not getting enough to eat, it was forced to recognise that there were 800 million beneficiaries. More than one in every two Indians.An openly Islamophobic discourseOne thing is certain: the completion of the Ayodhya temple brings to a close a sequence of three decades of debates, crises and bloody riots between the Hindu majority on the one hand, who make up 80% of the population and who Narendra Modi's BJP needs to turn into a majority at the ballot box, and the Muslim minority on the other, which accounts for "only" 14% but represents 200 million people, the third-largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia and Pakistan. To appreciate the political stakes involved in this Ayodhya affair, one needs to know that the supreme holy city is the birthplace of Rama, the mythical ruler of antiquity who became a deity in the Middle Ages. Rama, whose epic Ramayana recounts the quest for his wife Sita kidnapped by the devil, is as important to Hindus as the trinity of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. In the highest echelons of the BJP, it is not uncommon to hear it said that Modi is "the new Rama". As if the prime minister were a living god relegating all the great national figures of the past to insignificance, first and foremost Nehru, whom Modi has vowed to beat in terms of longevity in power (almost 17 years).The commemoration of the return of the royal couple Rama and Sita to the city of Ayodhya, illuminated by millions of candles, gives rise every year to Diwali, the festival of lights considered in northern India to be the Hindu New Year. Diwali is another way of forgetting the era when India was ruled by Muslims, which it was in whole or in part until the 19th century. Ayodhya, an ancient town on the great plain of the Ganges, was chosen by the founder of the Mughal Empire, Zahīr ud-Dīn Muhammad, Babur, to build a mosque at the beginning of his reign. In the 18th century, the building began to cause controversy, with some Hindus claiming that before Babur's mosque a temple dedicated to Rama had stood on that very spot, an assertion that has never been confirmed by any archaeological excavation, or even by his birthplace.In the early 1990s, the leaders of the BJP organised a procession covering several thousand kilometres in the north of the country, from the west coast of Gujarat to Ayodhya, with the aim of rallying crowds around the idea of demolishing the mosque and building a grandiose Hindu temple in its place. The nationalist parade drew in 75,000 volunteers and sparked outbreaks of violence in many places, under the leadership of the party president at the time, Lal Krishna Advani. This unprecedented operation culminated on December 6th, 1992, in dozens of rampaging fanatics climbing the domes of the mosque to demolish it with pickaxes and hammers, triggering a period of riots that left 2,000 people dead, the vast majority of them Muslim, and thousands injured in various parts of India. Behind the scenes, a local BJP boss in his forties with a chubby face and black beard meticulously organised every detail of the procession. His name? Narendra Modi.ReferencesNaipaul, Vidiadhar Surajprasad. India: A Wounded Civilization, V.S. Naipaul, Paperback, 1976. Rushdie, Salman. Victory City, Random House, 2023. Notes:1- "India is transforming. But into what?", Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The New York Times, December 12th, 20232- According to Triloki Nath Pandey, a VHP leader, in an interview with the author in 2019.3- "From Savarkar to Golwalkar, why Hindutva admires Zionism", Christophe Jaffrelot, Kalrav Joshi, The Indian Express, December 7th, 2023 Guillaume Delacroix is co-author with Sophie Landrin of the essay "Dans la tête de Narendra Modi" (Actes Sud, in press)All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/300/en