The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8206 Security Council Seventy-third year 8206th meeting Friday, 16 March 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Esono Mbengono Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Tenya Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mr. Miller Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-07334 (E) *1807334* S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 2/10 18-07334 The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Brussels. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Recalling the Security Council's latest note 507 on its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and to focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: We have been constantly, around the clock, in touch with the Secretary-General, my colleagues in the field and all those with influence because, as the Security Council knows, many events, some of which are very worrisome, have taken place in the past few days. On 7 March, I briefed the Council in consultations on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). At that time, I said that there had not been any sustained ceasefire or adequate humanitarian access at that stage. On 12 March, the Secretary-General himself orally reported to the Council on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and United Nations efforts to create such conditions by using his own good offices or those of his own team, including ourselves (see S/PV.8201). The Secretary-General also underscored that it was incumbent on all the parties and on all those with influence in the Council, in the Astana process and in the broader International Syria Support Group to act on the resolution throughout Syria without delay. Allow me to update the Council on where we stand on the matter since then — that is, since the Secretary- General gave a very comprehensive report — on the very day after the sad anniversary of the beginning of the conflict. We are entering the eighth year. In everything that we are doing in the horrific conflict, our compass — and I know the Council feels the same — has been, is and should be the Syrian people, wherever they are, who are telling us that they are fed up with the conflict and the way in which civilians are being affected in the cross-fighting. That is our compass. So whatever we do these days and whatever we suggest, including our current facilitation role, is constantly framed by the urgent needs of ordinary civilians — women, children and men. Since the briefing by the Secretary-General, in the past few days further meetings have taken place between the Russian Federation and Jaysh Al-Islam on the outskirts of Douma, which is the northernmost of the three opposition-controlled enclaves in eastern Ghouta. The result of that engagement is a tenuous and fragile ceasefire between the Government, the Russian military and the Jaysh Al-Islam forces, which has now largely continued to hold for the sixth day. We hope that it will continue to do so, notwithstanding the engagement between Government forces and Jaysh Al-Islam in other areas outside Douma, such as the village of Reihan. In other words, the talks, the discussions and the ceasefire have been effected and implemented with Jaysh Al-Islam in Douma but not beyond. However, that is only one part of eastern Ghouta. For example, the ceasefire is not being replicated in the rest of eastern Ghouta or elsewhere, and it is extremely fragile. While I speak, I understand that at this very moment there are some delicate meetings taking place regarding the follow-up to the arrangement regarding Douma. Let us therefore hope that the ceasefire holds because that would be at least one good piece of news among very bad news. The United Nations has been practicably offering its good offices but efforts to facilitate meaningful contacts between the Russian Federation and Faylaq Al-Rahman or Ahrar Al-Sham have not yet produced results. They are dominant forces in the two other enclaves in eastern Ghouta — in Harasta and around Kafr Batna, Ayn Tarma, Arbin, Zamalka and Jobar, respectively. In those two other areas, we have not seen any ceasefire to speak of. Rather we have seen Government forces and their allies pursue a concerted escalation against those two enclaves with rapid ground offensives, accompanied by shelling and airstrikes. Reports of a public market in Kafr Batna having been 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 3/10 hit are just coming in. Of course, we need to verify them, since they are new reports. Again, regrettably, there are numerous civilian casualties. We have also seen continuous shelling coming from those areas of eastern Ghouta inside civilian areas of Damascus again. We are also hearing from people inside eastern Ghouta, asking the United Nations, the Council and Member States with influence to pressure the armed opposition groups to let civilians leave and to pressure all parties for a ceasefire and protection for those who do not want to leave but want to stay. The bottom line of all this is that too many civilians are suffering and too many have died in that area. Let me first say that it need not be that way. Negotiations in Douma in the past few days show that there is a way to create the conditions to advance the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As we have done so far, the United Nations therefore stands ready to offer its good offices to all parties to facilitate further engagement of that kind so as to make a concrete contribution to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) in all areas of eastern Ghouta. The United Nations is not ready to facilitate ultimatums from either side. It stands ready to facilitate discussion, a ceasefire and evacuations. Meanwhile, violence has escalated across many other parts of Syria, where there is no ceasefire to speak of. In Afrin, the Turkish Government forces and their armed allies continue to gain ground rapidly. We have also received reports of shelling in besieged Fo'ah and Kafraya — two villages which, for a long time, have been held by the opposition. There have also been air strikes in Idlib and a new armed-opposition offensive in Hama. Clashes and air strikes have also occurred in Dar'a, southern Syria. If now is the time for de-escalation, the Security Council had better convince me that de-escalation is indeed taking place. What we see on the map looks like the opposite — escalation. Let me re-emphasize that resolution 2401 (2018) cannot be applied piecemeal. It is not an à la carte menu. It applies to all non-Security- Council-listed terrorist groups across Syria. Let me also reiterate the words of the Secretary-General who stated that even efforts to combat terrorist groups identified by the Council do not supersede obligations under international law. I am sure that members of the Council will have the opportunity to hear a briefing from Mr. Mark Lowcock. Meanwhile, since I have the opportunity to brief the Council today, let me provide some information about the humanitarian situation. On 13 March, the United Nations observed the evacuation of 147 civilians, including 10 critical medical cases — the majority of them women and children from Douma who sought shelter in rural Damascus. Based on the outcome of discussions and meetings between the Russian military and Jaysh al-Islam, facilitated by the United Nations, on 15 March, United Nations colleagues also delivered a convoy of food assistance to Douma for 26,100 people in need. Additional medical cases were also evacuated. Let us be honest and admit that positive efforts are generally welcome and long overdue, but remain limited. Civilians require much more, including medical and health-care supplies, the restoration of water, commercial access and freedom of movement. Members of the Council must have seen the report in which Mr. Peter Maurer, who had been meeting with some of the people in eastern Ghouta, stated they were simply asking for water. They just needed water. Humanitarian colleagues who entered those areas spoke of having seen hunger, dire want, poverty, haggard faces and despair all around. Even for experienced people, such as my own humanitarian colleagues, it is an unsustainable situation in which people are on the brink of collapse a few kilometres — 20 minutes' drive — from Damascus. Let me be clear, that is only in Douma — an area which has seen a few days of ceasefire and positive movement on humanitarian access. Can we imagine the situation elsewhere? In other words, in the other two enclaves of eastern Ghouta further south, we have seen no ceasefire to speak of and to borrow the words of the Secretary-General, people are still living in hell on Earth. Scores of people have been killed and the injured left unattended because health workers could not reach them due to the relentless air strikes. We have heard fresh allegations about the use of incendiary weapons in various urban areas and the targeting of medical facilities since 12 March, as well as new and disturbing allegations of chlorine use in those areas. As the Secretary-General has stated, we cannot independently verify those allegations but we also cannot and should not ignore them. We have also received reports of thousands of people displaced, some moving further into eastern Ghouta and many others exiting en masse in large groups, as a result of the advances of the Syrian Government in Hama, Noria and in Saqba. S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 4/10 18-07334 Evacuations not observed by the United Nations are also reported to have taken place, including from Misraba and other areas. The United Nations was not present to observe those evacuations and is unable to know the precise number of them. We urge parties that all evacuations must take place in accordance with the highest protection standards under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, they must be protected against attacks and have access to the essentials to survive. They must be safe and voluntarily enter a place of their of choosing. The United Nations stands ready to provide assistance to people in need — those who choose to stay and those who want to leave. We are also extremely concerned about the plight of civilians throughout Syria. They include the displaced, as well as almost 3 million in besieged and hard-to-reach areas and those caught up in escalations in Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Dar'a. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands that all parties immediately lift the sieges of populated areas. To date, that has not occurred. According to my colleagues, the situation in Afrin is particularly worrying. We have received reports of tens of thousands of people displaced within Afrin and to nearby Tell Rifaat and surrounding villages, Nubul and Zahra, and other areas of Aleppo governorate. The United Nations has also received reports of civilian casualties and restrictions on movement for many of the large numbers of civilians seeking to leave the city. I urge all parties to ensure that civilians seeking to leave Afrin be given safe passage. Since 6 March, it has been reported that people in Afrin city have suffered from severe water shortages as its source of water has been damaged by the fighting. Allow me to add a point of particular importance that was revealed in a recent report. The safety of Syrian women in particular is threatened when they are evacuated following the lifting of a siege or end of a battle. Threats include widespread sexual and gender-based violence, which has been widely documented and mentioned by women's groups. The protection and needs of women must be at the forefront of our response. With regard to a separate humanitarian issue, on 14 March my technical team participated in the first meeting of the Working Group on detainees and missing persons that took place in Astana. We pressed the Astana guarantors at that meeting and before to make progress on the crucial issue, which to us, is one of the main reasons we attend meetings in Astana. It is an issue that has been at the forefront of our concerns. We have offered to host a standing secretariat so that information on detainees can be distributed in all meetings of the Working Group. Thus far, the guarantors have simply agreed to consider our proposal about a standing secretariat in Geneva to monitor the issue of detainees, but no final decision has been taken. We will intensify our contact with them and the parties in order to accelerate work on that important — frankly, crucial — humanitarian issue. We should remind ourselves that the issue of detainees and missing persons was first raised in Astana a year ago and, sadly, no concrete progress has been made so far. We owe it to the Syrian families on all sides who have long been awaiting word on the fate of their relatives. Although the logic of war clearly still prevails and resolution 2401 (2018) is not being implemented as it should be, as the Secretary-General stated, we absolutely refuse to give up hope of seeing Syria rising from the ashes. The Syrian people deserve to be helped. The Syrian people are proud. They love their country. We need to help them to go back to having a normal country. There too, it is with the people of Syria in mind and their legitimate aspirations for the long-term shape of their country that we continue our political efforts — in spite of what we see on the ground — for a sustainable settlement of the conflict. And there too, the voices of women across Syria conveying their wish to play a meaningful role — just as with our own civil society — in the next stage of the political process must be heard. Therefore, my team and I have continued to consult, in the context of the political side, widely and intensively on the formation of the constitutional committee in Geneva in an effort to advance the full and complete implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) within the framework of the United Nations-facilitated political process in Geneva. To this end, we seek to leverage the momentum produced by the Sochi final declaration, which emphasizes the fact that we should have a constitutional committee in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations. We take note, therefore, of the statement issued — today, I believe — by the Astana guarantors in their own ministerial meeting, in which they reaffirmed that "the results of the Sochi Congress, especially to form the constitutional committee and to facilitate the 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 5/10 beginning of its work in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria as soon as possible." However, I have to be frank. I must report that at this stage — more than two weeks beyond one month since the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi — we have not yet received the complete inputs on the pool of candidates for a constitutional committee developed in Sochi, from the three guarantors. It is my intention, in close consultations with all concerned, to look carefully at this pool when we receive it, and at others as required and consistent with resolution 2254 (2015), to facilitate the establishment of the constitutional committee. I must also report, once again, that there is still some serious homework to be done regarding the Syrian Government's readiness to engage on implementing the Sochi final declaration and moving forward with a constitutional committee in Geneva. I have impressed that on the relevant guarantors repeatedly in recent weeks, just as I continue to make clear the readiness of the United Nations to engage the Government of Syria on this matter. We need them to be part of it. We need to have the comprehensive participation of all Syrian parties. In the meantime, we have been proactive in offering creative suggestions as to how to expedite the formation of that constitutional committee. We continue to assess various options on how to advance discussions on all four baskets of the political process in Geneva. In particular, it is clear that there must be more and serious talks with the Government, the opposition and all Syrian and international stakeholders on what is required in order to establish a secure, calm, neutral environment, as per resolution 2254 (2015), in which a constitutional process and United Nations-supervised presidential and parliamentary elections, pursuant to a new constitution, could viably take place. We remained determined to engage all parties. As I said in my most recent briefing, a month ago (see S/PV.8181), conflict is increasingly spilling over Syria's borders, or at least risks doing so. This month we have further incidents of potential and real international confrontation within Syria that we cannot independently verify, but which concern us. That is precisely we need urgent action on the political front. Syrians need to see some positive movement on the political process. On Monday I will be attending a meeting of European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers here in Brussels. On Tuesday, I should be back in Geneva. I will attend the meeting at the invitation of High Representative Mogherini, in the context of the preparatory efforts of the EU and the United Nations for their joint ministerial conference in Brussels at the end of April. I hope that the Conference will provide a significant opportunity to bolster international support for the Syrian people though humanitarian commitments. I also hope that the gathering of a significant number of Foreign Ministers will also provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the collective efforts of the international community towards a sustainable peace through the United Nations-led peace process in Geneva, within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015) and other relevant resolutions. In conclusion, I urge caution. We must recognize that we are witnessing developments of the utmost gravity on the ground. These events demand action, and the world is worried and watching. I remain concerned that concrete matters that we have been trying to advance — resolution 2401 (2018), detainees and a constitutional committee — need to move faster and with more meaningful impact than has so far proven possible. And de-escalation must replace what we are watching at the moment — a clear tendency towards escalation. I will continue, creatively and determinedly, to seek to facilitate the overall political process. As the Secretary-General said on Monday, the ultimate goal is to help the Syrians and to "see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian people able to freely decide their future and choose their political leadership." (S/PV.8201, p. 5) The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Tenya (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting and Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We are grateful for his tireless and important efforts. We agree that the continuation of the conflict and the regrettable humanitarian situation in Syria undermines the prospects of making political S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 6/10 18-07334 progress. The unpunished lack of compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and Security Council resolutions erode the needed trust for sustainable peacebuilding. While we express our deep sympathy and solidarity with the victims, we would like at the same time to indicate our concern over the impact of the Syrian conflict on regional stability, the Council's credibility and the functioning of an rules-based international system. More specifically, the international community is awaiting an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria, full access to the needed humanitarian assistance, the attainment of a political agreement that could bring about sustainable peace in Syria, and accountability for the heinous crimes committed, including the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more excuses and no more delays. The humanitarian ceasefire, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), must be implemented immediately in eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Afrin, Raqqa, Rukban and throughout Syria. All parties should commit to resolving the conflict peacefully, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). That will require the constructive participation of the Syrian Government and the opposition groups in establishing a constitutional committee, as agreed in Sochi. We believe that a new constitution must be drafted to lay the political and institutional groundwork for sustainable peace in Syria. The Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict must rise to the occasion in confronting the gravity of the situation, prevent its further deterioration and escalation, and fulfil their obligations and responsibilities. The Astana guarantors must also meet expectations in terms of the special responsibility entailed by their influence and involvement on the ground. Yesterday's meeting in Astana and the meeting to be held in Istanbul in early April must yield concrete outcomes, including in the matter of those detained and missing. As a member of the Council, Peru believes that its own responsibility vis-à-vis the tragic humanitarian situation in Syria entails requiring all parties involved in the conflict, especially those with greater ability to influence events on the ground, to comply with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru places priority on the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, and stresses the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council concerning this and all other conflicts and humanitarian crises, wherever they might arise. In conclusion, we convey our support for Mr. De Mistura's work to encourage dialogue among the Syrian opposition groups that have expressed their willingness to comply with the ceasefire and expel terrorists from eastern Ghouta and other parties to the Syrian conflict. Mr. Esono Mbengono (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the initiative of convening this meeting owing to the gravity of the situation on the ground. We also thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his informative briefing. As we continue to seek a solution to the tragic humanitarian situation throughout the country, it is also important to continue pursuing political efforts. We all believe that there is no military solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must continue to support and encourage the intra-Syrian negotiations and impress upon all parties that it is only by sitting around the negotiating table and engaging in frank, direct and inclusive dialogue that a solution can be reached that addresses everyone's concerns. In such a process, we must ensure that the sovereignty and unity of Syria are respected. We support the United Nations in its mission as a mediator in finding a political solution to the Syrian issue, pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015). It is imperative to relaunch negotiations in Geneva and all other peace initiatives, including those in Astana and Sochi, which must lead to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. The final outcome must ensure the well-being of the Syrian people. Consolidating a political process in Syria will be difficult without eradicating terrorism. The international community must also demonstrate its unfaltering unity by joining forces and following the same criteria to combat the various terrorist organizations operating in Syria. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy De Mistura for his update. The humanitarian situation in Syria remains dire. We echo the United Nations call on all parties to facilitate a ceasefire and unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country, pursuant to resolution 2401 (2018). It is also vital to take the measures necessary to protect civilians 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 7/10 and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required under international law and human rights standards. As members of the Security Council are aware, the guarantor States of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities adopted a joint statement on the settlement of the conflict and its future direction at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 16 March in Astana. Kazakhstan remains committed to bringing peace to Syria. The situation is not simple, but nevertheless we cannot give up. Kazakhstan has taken the following positions. First, we do not believe in a military solution, for that would only aggravate an already difficult situation. We need serious compromises from every side. Any conflict — even the most serious — ends with negotiations, and we must strive to achieve the goal of bringing peace to Syria. We know of many fine examples in which conflicting parties in many other countries have come together despite difficult negotiations so as to find common prosperity for their peoples. Secondly, Kazakhstan calls on the Syrian Government and opposition parties to immediately begin substantive talks on the entire spectrum of issues. Astana does not anticipate any political or international miracles, yet sees great promise in a collective and pragmatic approach. Kazakhstan, for its part, is deeply committed to ending the intense suffering, which has lasted for eight long years. We all know that today Syria is undergoing a significant challenge that must not lead to a deadlock, but offer new opportunities to pave the way to a peaceful and lasting political settlement to the crisis. We hope that the forthcoming ninth round of talks, to be held in Astana in May, will offer an opportunity to end the war. In that regard, we will urge the guarantors and Syrian parties to overcome their differences through dialogue and reach a final agreement covering every aspect of the issue. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte D'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing on the latest developments in the political process and the situation in the country, and for his work to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. The Ivorian delegation remains concerned about the upsurge in fighting, which with every passing day further distances us from finding a peaceful settlement through political negotiations. Despite the efforts of the international community to establish a ceasefire, we continue to witness indiscriminate attacks and bombardments in eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria, thereby resulting in a large number of casualties among civilians and the destruction of important infrastructure. My country therefore calls once again for an immediate cessation of hostilities and urges the international community to work together towards the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). That resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, calls for establishing a humanitarian cessation of hostilities of at least 30 days so as to allow for the safe, lasting and unhindered access of humanitarian convoys to deliver essential supplies to the people of eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria. Should it be implemented, such a temporary cessation of hostilities could not only alleviate the suffering of millions of people living in distress and hopelessness, but also allow for the resumption of political talks among Syrian parties in a peaceful environment. In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the Astana meeting will lead to a lasting ceasefire, improve the humanitarian situation and establish the conditions for advancing the political process. My country welcomes all initiatives aimed at reviving the inter-Syrian dialogue and encourages Mr. De Mistura to continue undertaking, within the framework of the Geneva process, the steps needed to set up the committee responsible for drafting Syria's new constitution, as agreed at the meeting in Sochi in the Russian Federation. In conclusion, my delegation urges the Syrian parties to give priority to dialogue, which is the only way to advance the political process with a view to a definitive end to the crisis, in accordance with the road map laid out by resolution 2254 (2015). That is Côte d'Ivoire's profound conviction and it is in the interests of the Syrian people. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational States of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the briefing given by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties. As on previous occasions, my delegation wishes to express its support for the various meetings held in S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 8/10 18-07334 different contexts and at different levels, which have allowed for the creation of de-escalation zones, the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access. At the same time, we remain converned over the urgent need to advance in a political process that will help to resolve the conflict in Syria so that the people can return to peace. That is why we again highlight the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January. It focused on strengthening the political process led by the United Nations within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015), particularly through the drafting of a new constitution by a constitutional committee, which we believe should be representative and neutral. We underscore in particular that the mandate, terms of reference, powers, rules of procedure and selection criteria for the composition of the committee must be agreed in the United Nations-supported talks held in Geneva. In that regard, we firmly believe that the principles agreed at the Sochi Congress will lead to a strong commitment on the part of the parties to respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, in the context of its right to choose its own political, economic and social systems, without pressure or foreign interference. We are certain that the political process will resume as a result of those dialogues. However, and despite the advances in the political arena, we remain concerned over the critical situation of the Syrian people. In that regard, we welcome the holding of the Astana meeting and its outcome, and we hope that those political agreements will be reflected on the ground. We also express our greatest hopes for the success of the summit to be held shortly among high-level representatives of Turkey, Iran and Russia. We hope that it will serve to reaffirm the Astana agreements and de-escalation zones with a view to reducing violence and addressing the needs of families of detained, kidnapped and disappeared persons. Once again, the Council has the challenge of remaining united and calling on the parties involved to join forces and maintain the impetus of the Astana talks and the political process in Sochi, among others, the outcomes of which, we reiterate, must strengthen the political process in Geneva. We hope that those forums for dialogue will promote points of convergence and consensus in order to reduce violence and allow the humanitarian access that is so necessary, not only for the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons, but also to achieve sustainable peace in Syria. To that end, it is crucial for the parties to demonstrate their willingness to seek a settlement to the conflict, which has persisted for more than 8 years. We again call on all parties involved to effectively implement resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the entire Syrian territory in order to achieve unrestricted humanitarian access and permit the necessary urgent medical evacuations. We reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria, and believe that the Syrian people must be able to freely decide their future and political leadership within the framework of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and concerted political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, which will enable a peaceful solution for all parties involved. The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I wish to again remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable to Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Mr. Ja'afari (Syria) (spoke in Arabic): On 12 March (see S/PV.8201), I informed the members of the Security Council of a number of measures undertaken by the Syrian Government to alleviate the suffering of Syrians throughout my country caused by armed terrorist groups. Today, I assure those present once again that the Government of Syria is indeed most keen to save the lives of its citizens and continues to take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security. In line with those efforts, the Government of Syria opened the new secure corridor in Hamouriyah village, which was liberated from terrorists yesterday in eastern Ghouta. Its aim is to assist the evacuation of civilians who are being used as human shields by terrorist groups. Just yesterday, Thursday, 15 March, more than 40,000 civilians exited eastern Ghouta through the new additional corridor. They went to the Syrian Government, which coordinated with the Syrian Red Crescent, to facilitate their safe transportation to temporary shelters that are equipped with all the necessary resources. They were not transferred to camps, or tents. The Syrian Army, in coordination with 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 9/10 the Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria, has opened a total of three corridors in Hamouriyah, Jisreen and Wafideen. Yesterday, the Government of Syria also allowed the entry of a joint assistance convoy of the Red Crescent, the Red Cross and the United Nations, made up of 25 trucks carrying 340 tons of various medical and nutritional supplies. The Syrian Government will continue to allow the passage of such convoys, security conditions permitting. In return for all those efforts undertaken by the Government of Syria to protect its citizens, the armed terrorist groups — upon direct instructions from the Governments of the States supporting them — continue to use civilians as human shields in eastern Ghouta and prevent them from using the corridors as they target them with bullets and missiles. It is quite strange that the Government of Syria is shouldering the huge responsibility of implementing resolution 2401 (2018) and responding to the needs of civilians exiting the inferno of terror in the eastern Ghouta, while the United Nations agencies working in Damascus, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Governments of other countries that are lamenting the destiny of our civilian population have done nothing materially or morally to alleviate the suffering of tens of thousands of people who have escaped from terrorism. One hundred thousand civilians were displaced in Afrin and around 100,000 fled eastern Ghouta —— a total of almost 200,000 civilians — yet no one has provided them with help. Some States members of the Security Council are abusing the work of the Council in launching campaigns to defame and spread misinformation about the Government of Syria, especially with respect to the unofficial Arria Formula meeting that the Council held on 12 March. However, I recall that the United Nations is an Organization of Governments and not a theatre for the display of power, and that giving the opportunity to terrorist groups, including the so called White Helmets affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front, to use the platform of the Security Council represents a gross violation of Security Council resolutions, especially those on combating terrorism. The biggest scandal is that one of the United Nations agencies working in Damascus has asked for the transfer of 76 White Helmets out of eastern Ghouta. It does not care about the tens of thousands of civilians but it cares about 76 White Helmet terrorists. If the Security Council really wants to know about what is happening in Syria, it should ask some of our people who are still living in the city of Raqqa to talk before the Council about the scandals perpetrated against civilians by the outlaw coalition, and its extreme respect for international law after it completely destroyed their city. The coalition has committed the most terrible massacres against civilians, provided protection to 4,000 terrorists affiliated with Da'esh, and facilitated their exit from the city of Raqqa in order to use them somewhere else in Syria. The city of Raqqa is to us what Dresden is to Germany. The Security Council should also ask to hear from some of our people in Afrin, who could tell its members about the ideal implementation of the provisions of international humanitarian law and resolution 2401 (2018) by the invading Turkish forces that have perpetrated terrible massacres against civilians and displaced tens of thousands of them. The Council should also ask some foreign terrorist fighters who have returned to their countries to explain in an open meeting of the Security Council how the Governments of their countries were actually involved in their recruitment, training and financing and how they provided them with arms and sent them to Syria to commit massacres against the Syrian people. The problem is, however, that these fighters have been recycled, renamed and rebranded as the moderate opposition in Syria. The Security Council should also ask some of our people who have left eastern Ghouta over the past few days to talk about the terrorist practices of Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham, the three groups that have been called the moderate Syrian opposition by the United States, France, Britain and their agents in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and to talk in particular about how those groups kill anyone who tries to get out. They have seized all forms of humanitarian and medical assistance and sold it at very high prices. The Council should also ask some of our people from Fo'ah and Kafraya to talk about their years of suffering in the ongoing oppressive siege there, which has been conducted by Al-Nusra Front with direct assistance from Turkey and Qatar. However, it seems that those defenders of humanity have no ears and tongues to listen about the suffering of those civilians and talk about it. If Western countries in the Security Council were one part in a thousand as sincere as the Russian Federation in their assertions that they really care about the Syrian people and respect the provisions S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 10/10 18-07334 of the international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions, particularly those pertaining to combating terrorism, then terrorism would not have emerged in Syria and in other countries. No civilian would have suffered in eastern Ghouta or in eastern Aleppo or in the old city of Homs, Raqqa or any other Syrian city. Those Western countries have invested in terrorism to bring down Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Now, they have also invested in terrorism in Syria and that investment has failed. It is as if these countries were saying that, given a choice between supporting the demons of terrorism, on one the hand, and the Syrian State, on the other, they, the sponsors of terrorism, would choose the demons. In conclusion, the Government of my country reiterates its principled position that the solution to the Syrian crisis is a political one, based on an intra-Syrian dialogue led by Syria without any foreign interference or preconditions. I have spent hours and hours in negotiations with Mr. De Mistura on those very words in resolution 2254 (2015). I remind Council members that the success of the political track and the tangible enhancement of the humanitarian situation will depend primarily on creating an environment conducive to international and regional commitment to seriously fighting terrorism in Syria and freeing the process from politicization. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.
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A sharp divide has emerged within the Democratic foreign policy community as Israel enters the third week of its bombing campaign in Gaza. While most politicians have held to the Biden administration line — namely, that a decisive response is necessary to eliminate Hamas and prevent further atrocities against Israelis — a growing number of staffers in the State Department and Congress have questioned what they view as blanket support for human rights violations in Gaza. Josh Paul stepped into the center of this debate last week when he resigned from the State Department in protest of the administration's policy. "I cannot work in support of a set of major policy decisions, including rushing more arms to one side of the conflict, that I believe to be shortsighted, destructive, unjust, and contradictory to the very values that we publicly espouse," Paul, who was a director in the office overseeing U.S. weapons sales, wrote in a widely shared LinkedIn post. In subsequent statements, Paul claimed that senior officials have consistently ignored internal concerns about Israel's use of American weapons in alleged human rights violations. His comments suggest that the White House has fallen short in implementing its own arms transfer policy, which said the State Department should block weapons sales if it is "more likely than not" that they will be used to commit atrocities. A spokesperson for the State Department denied Paul's allegations and said the U.S. complies "with all applicable statutory requirements and regulatory requirements in our provision of military assistance to Israel, as we do to every other country in the world." RS spoke with Paul about why he resigned and how political pressures can override concerns that American weapons will be used to carry out atrocities abroad. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity. RS: What response have you gotten from your former colleagues about your decision to resign? Do you expect more of them to express their concerns internally as well within the State Department? Paul: I've had an astonishing response from former colleagues, well beyond what I expected. I thought that barely anyone would actually want to communicate with me after I resigned because of the sensitivity of debates about Israel. But on the contrary, I've heard from so many — both within the State Department and across the U.S. government — sharing their own experiences of wanting to talk out about this issue and not being able to. It's been very moving and eye-opening. I think there are more people now talking out about this within the system. I don't know that anyone else is going to take the step that I took in resigning, but I respect that everyone has their own personal circumstances.RS: In your op-ed for the Washington Post, you wrote that "Israeli requests for ammunition started arriving immediately, including for a variety of weapons that have no applicability to the current conflict." Can you expand on that? Paul: I'll expand on it in a limited form, because these remain, in some cases, pre-decisional, and I do want to give the process time to work through these issues. But I will say that there are two things here. First of all, the sorts of things that Israel was requesting had applicability not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. There are videos out there now on Instagram, for example, of Israeli officials handing out M4 firearms to settlers. I think that is very concerning. It should be concerning to us because there is a track record of settler violence against Palestinian civilians. I also think that [Israel sees this as] an opportunity. There has been more significant pushback against the blind provision of military equipment to Israel in the last few years than we've seen in decades, and this is a moment in which that pushback has been sidelined. Therefore it is — frankly, in at least the way they see it — in Israel's interest to get what it can now because who knows how long this moment of opportunity, to put it quite cynically, is open for. RS: Do you oppose all U.S. arms transfers to Israel at this time? Paul: No, not at all. My opposition is to lethal arms transfers. That means items that kill people. I have no problem whatsoever with defensive items such as Iron Dome. I don't think civilians should have to live under rocket fire, and I absolutely support the provision of defensive equipment like that. Even when it comes to the lethal, I'm not saying that Israel does not have a right to defend itself and does not have a right to go after the Hamas terrorists who attacked it so brutally on October 7. Of course it does. The question is how many Palestinian civilians have to die in that process? And how does this actually lead us to real security for Israel? RS: Have State Department officials flagged specific Israeli units for human rights violations and have those flags ever led to a change in policy? Paul: What you're talking about here is Leahy vetting. Under U.S. law, any military unit that receives U.S. military grants assistance must be vetted to ensure that it has not committed gross violations of human rights. In the context of Israel, which receives more than half of all U.S. military grant assistance in the base budget, there is a special process unlike that followed by other countries. For most countries, we vet the units that are receiving the systems before they receive the assistance. In the context of Israel, we provide the assistance, and then if certain allegations come to light of potential gross violations of human rights, we investigate those and decide if such things have actually happened. There have been a number of units and individuals that have been flagged through the process that have very credible allegations of gross violations of human rights against them — allegations that are supported by significant and senior bureaus within the Department — but the process has never been able to come to a conclusion that such gross violations of human rights have occurred. There's always been a political pressure and a policy pressure to not come to that conclusion. RS: What does that look like in practice? Paul: First, a violation is flagged. Typically, it's something we see in the press, or an NGO will reach out to say, "Hey, are you aware of XYZ?" And there is a process where the bureaus with equities come together to review those allegations to determine if they are credible. If they are credible, the next step is actually to reach out to the government of Israel and see what they have to say about it, which in itself is a problem. But then once Israel comes back, there is further discussion of whether this was a gross violation of human rights. It's at that point, typically, that the process grinds to a halt, whether it is from the leadership of a bureau involved in the process or sort of a higher level guidance that, "Hey, this isn't gonna go anywhere. Let's move on to the next thing." RS: Have other states gotten arms sales approved due to political pressure despite credible allegations of human rights violations? Paul: Yes, absolutely, particularly under the previous administration, but prior to that under the Obama administration too. If you look at sales that are publicly known to other countries with dubious human rights records in the region, you will see that there have been instances in which there are clear concerns about human rights, for example, in the context of the conflict in Yemen, where despite knowledge of those concerns, sales have gone forward. There is a difference, however, and this is quite technical, but it comes back to this question of 'grant military assistance.' If a country is buying from the U.S. with its own money, Leahy does not apply, and that is a problem in itself. The law that says you cannot provide military equipment to units involved in gross violations of human rights does not apply if that country is spending its own money. RS: You've mentioned the Biden administration's new Conventional Arms Transfer policy, which says the US shall not transfer weapons to countries more likely than not to use them in workarounds. Is it your view that the Biden administration has held to this policy in all cases besides Israel? Paul: Now, remember, a policy is a policy. It is not legally binding. The way the Conventional Arms Transfer policy is written, by and large, is as a framework for policymakers to make decisions rather than a directive or a checklist. But the CAT policy has always guided decisions on transfers under the Biden administration. Even before it was writ, we followed the spirit of it. And so I would say this is a unique instance. RS: So you wouldn't say that arms transfers to other countries accused of human rights abuses fell afoul of that, especially ones in the Middle East? Paul: I think we have to look at a case by case basis about what you're talking about, a lot of these sales are public. In each of those, there has been consideration of what the item is and what unit is receiving it, and those are the discussions that have played out over the course of months and years. That is what is lacking here. However, while they have all been made in accordance with the CAT policy, that doesn't mean I agree with the outcomes or the decisions, including some sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. RS: During your time with the State Department, did you or your colleagues at any point succeed in stopping an arms sale completely due to human rights concerns? Paul: Yes. In fact, the first step that the administration took upon taking office was to suspend two arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. RS: And those never went through in the end? Paul: Those have not yet gone through. They are suspended. RS: Are there any cases besides that one that you can recall? Paul: Yes, there are certainly other arms transfers to other countries that either have been under policy discussion and debate, including with Congress, for years, or which just did not go anywhere. To point you to a very public example of the constructive role Congress can play here, it's well known that Congress has played a critical role in delaying potential arms transfers to Turkey. RS: What is your advice to your former colleagues and government people that are working on this issue on how they should make the case that you're making and how they should seek to affect policy?Paul: The Civil Service does provide some unique and really important protections in terms of the ability to push back against policy internally. You cannot be fired for disagreeing with a policy decision. You can only be fired for real malfeasance, which is right, and that gives them the ability to take a stand and to push back on things where they believe that there are mistakes being made or where there are policies being pursued that are unhelpful both to American national security and to human rights. So I would encourage them, to the extent they can feel comfortable, to take advantage of those protections and to keep fighting the good fight.
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US military aid to Ukraine is back, and not a moment too soon. After months of suspended arms deliveries, Ukrainian defenses have buckled and news from the front lines is grim. The lurching, grinding advance of Russian forces, particularly the recent withdrawal of Ukraine's defenders from Avdiivka, tells us much about the true state of the full-scale invasion now in its third year. Most international attention has understandably focused on the state of US aid in Congress, and its wider implications for European security, and rightly so. Even with US aid back in the pipeline, the retreat from Avdiivka and broader Ukrainian struggles on the battlefield are an apt prism into a longer view of Russia's imperial tenacity, Ukraine's desperate and obstinate capacity for survival, and the Kremlin's challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Between October of last year and March, according to recent estimates, Russian forces lost some 17,000 troops and nearly 700 combat vehicles in its offensive against Avdiivka—a staggering casualty rate for a city that, on its own, represents a marginal prize for the Russian war effort. However, like Bakhmut or Severodonetsk before it, single-minded Russian attacks en masse towards questionable territorial objectives have, even after achieving breakthroughs, done little to appreciably impact the direction of the war. In some cases, they have even heralded Ukrainian counteroffensives. In such engagements, Ukrainian forces made industrious use of Russian-ruined, treacherous urban terrain to hold and attrite much larger Russian attacking formations. Estimates of upwards of nearly 400,000 Russian combat losses since the invasion was launched in 2022 should be seen in this context. Yet Avdiivka's fall is invariably associated, and is symbolically coterminous, with US failures to provide long-promised military aid and wider concerns about Western political fecklessness in the face of evident Russian imperial aggression. Although it is uncertain to what extent Avdiivka's defenses were tenable, given inherent Russian advantages in material superiority and mass from the start, there is widespread agreement in the analytical community that troop and, particularly, ammunition shortages sharply hindered the city's defenses.[1] Because of relatively modest gains from Ukraine's 2023 summer counteroffensive and the subsequent assessments of operational stalemate, alarm has set in across the Euro-Atlantic as the mythological powers of seemingly infinite Russian mass seem to have materialized. Increasingly, analysts had been taking fears of Russian victory in Ukraine seriously.An Empire Called ForeverAt its low points, the heroic, ferocious stand of a few in Avdiivka against the inexorable advance of Russian mass might seem to describe the war in Ukraine as a whole. The restoration of US arms flows notwithstanding, the prospects of Russian victory in Ukraine had appeared to be a more urgent consideration, which stoked understandable concerns in frontline European states over the possibility of an eventual direct conflict with Russia. Just this year so far, Romanian, Danish, and German political and military leaders have issued warnings about the potential of open war with Russia should Ukraine fall.[2] France, most significantly, has adopted a more forward-leaning policy in support of Ukraine's defense. It has even refused to rule out the potential deployment of troops,[3] which according to some sources are already on the ground in limited capacities.[4] However, besieged and wounded though it has been, Ukraine's agency and capacity for survival in recent months has been underrated. When given the basic means of self-defense, Ukraine has proven over and over again to be more than equal to the task. With US arms now again en route, the world will likely be reminded of this fact.At the same time, Russia's destructive tenacity in pursuit of demonstrably imperial aims has been evident to Ukraine, and other wary neighbors, for some time. Russia can seem an empire forever called to external expansion and dominion, and today has made its regime legitimacy inseparable from aggressive militarism and severe historical revisionism. Even a year ago, we could see Russia's willingness to accept otherwise unfathomable losses, endure extended material privation, and risk domestic political instability in pursuit of victory in Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian national resilience and superior battlefield leadership, alongside a hodgepodge of secondhand Western and Soviet weaponry, was often enough to best Russian forces in the field. However, it has not been enough on its own to dislodge Russia's imperial agenda, particularly as western arms have petered out. As such, a more complete Ukrainian victory demands a more aggressive and urgent Western policy of defensive aid. While certain high-value Western systems were eventually green-lit—such as F-16s, key long-range strike platforms, and cluster munitions—they came after much consternation and delay, typically in limited quantities, and often lagged battlefield conditions. Ukraine has never been able to enjoy decisive advantage in any one military capability, and no superiority of mass in any domain. Over the past year, Russia has leaned into its quantitative edge as a decisive (if cumbersome) tool, while implementing some key battlefield lessons,[6] to gain momentum.Putin's prosecution of its war on Ukraine demonstrates that imperialism is not merely a feature of Russian strategic thinking, but perhaps its central feature. It should give Western defense analysts and policymakers pause that Russia has been both willing and able to absorb such horrendous losses in such a gruesome enterprise. These losses have been made more palatable to the elite, certainly, by the systematic and deliberate exploitation of ethnic minority, indigenous, and marginalized populations in the imperial periphery.[7] Any assumptions that Russian political or material exhaustion will be sufficient to compel the abandonment of the war are implausible in the near-term, except perhaps in the face of overwhelming and immovable Ukrainian military might. Just as Ukraine's capacity for survival should not be underrated, neither should analysts ignore Russia's willingness to broadly prosecute a war of national mobilization, its evident capacity for regeneration, and perhaps even the perceived political advantages to the Kremlin of a totalitarian war footing.A Warrior RepublicAlthough it may not always be recognized in Western capitals, Ukrainians have no doubt that they are fighting an existential war in the most literal sense: for the preservation of their state, their national identity, and their very lives. As highlighted in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Vancouver Declaration last summer, by recent Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe statements,[8] and further among several Euro-Atlantic national parliaments, the Russian pattern of atrocities in Ukraine is deliberate and recognizably genocidal in its character.[9] Any cursory review of Russian state news media reveals a casual embrace of Ukrainian cultural and physical extermination as an operational necessity. Even outside of growing scholarly consensus and international recognition, that reality is a salient organizing principle in Ukrainian society.[10] Ukrainians are under no illusions about the enemy they face and the existential consequences of defeat. However, while Russian victory may have seemed a possibility, especially in the wake of the Avdiivka withdrawal, neither is it necessarily an obvious outcome—despite Russia's increasingly totalitarian war footing and the fatalist lurch in Western media and policy discourse. For one, most conceptions of Ukrainian victory tend to be tied to the full restoration of Ukrainian internationally recognized territory. However, territorial gain is not a sufficient indicator for the achievement of either Ukrainian or Russian political aims. For Ukraine, the preservation of an independent and recognizably Ukrainian nation-state with the integral features of its territorial boundaries would be a legitimate victory. By contrast, Russian victory depends on the decapitation of Ukrainian political leadership and the wholesale subjugation of the Ukrainian nation-state. For at least the foreseeable future, even absent US military aid, the first scenario remains far more likely than the second one. At the same time, the months-long suspension of US military aid lends clues about the strategic calculus for Ukraine and the wider region, where outright defeat in the near- to medium-term is but one (low) possibility. Other potentially higher propensity scenarios are entirely conceivable and may even be already playing out—and in some cases pose other types of risks.For one, the US strategic detour did not appear to contribute to a collapse in European support for Ukraine, but rather served as a galvanizing force for a more muscular approach to Ukraine. France's more hawkish turn is only one expression of this shift. The European Union's recently announced 50-billion-euro package for Ukraine, as well as additional pledges for financial and military aid, highlight a converging appreciation for the stakes among many European leaders. And although Ukraine had come to rely primarily on the United States for its pipeline of munitions stocks, their abrupt interruption led to a diversification approach, as Washington was no longer seen as entirely reliable. While it is a positive dynamic to see Europe playing a more proactive role in Ukrainian and continental security, broader European remilitarization amid US disengagement could threaten the postwar success of arresting ruinous cycles of intra-European warfare. More muscular European rhetoric and actions during suspended US arms deliveries also revived quiet speculation that European states, acting independently or in some kind of secondary coalition outside of NATO or the EU, could be forced to intervene directly to prevent Russian victory and Ukrainian defeat. While this possibility is typically muted in public, it is a scenario that has been taken seriously within some Western analytical circles.[11] It is widely believed that Poland alone, for example, likely has the military and material capacity to successfully intervene and decisively turn the tide of the conflict; other potential Central/Eastern European and possibly Nordic members of such a coalition are not difficult to conceive. Such an intervention, however successful, would widen the war and likely lead to a fundamental crisis within NATO. Yet, if Russia is seen as likely to test NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause, as is increasingly believed, a preemptive military action to rescue Ukraine from capitulation may be a preferable option for several frontline European states. There are also risks to more complete abandonment of Ukraine. Alone, Ukraine would further its transformation as a warrior republic, where the maintenance of war in the desperate enterprise of survival is the prevailing principle under which all other ideals are subsumed. This Ukraine would be unconstrained by the niceties of Western guardrails and caveats delivered out of concern for escalation and would take the war to Russia in an uncompromising fashion, with a ferocity could make some of its liberal international supporters wince. The debate over Ukrainian raids against Russian oil refineries, an entirely legitimate military target, is a relatively low-stakes example of this phenomenon playing out recently.[12] It should be noted that Ukraine continues to act with relative restraint, including its attacks within Russian borders, reflecting deference to US and European admonitions to limit the scope of war. However, if Western support dawdles and dwindles, and the specter of successful Russian genocide looms, incentives for restraint deplete. Left isolated, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of where Kyiv does not seriously entertain nuclear rearmament, given the large nuclear arsenal it surrendered in exchange for Western security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. While ample ink has been spilled over the failure of those guarantees and the harm it has done to nuclear nonproliferation as a principle or concept, in no country is this betrayal more evident and immediate than in Ukraine. Russia's invasion itself seems to have crystallized the decision of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament as a potential error, given the eminent failure of the Bucharest Memorandum and the privileged position that nuclear powers enjoy. Meanwhile, western-provided arms deliveries are variously sourced, with some even arriving in poor or unusable condition, and tend to follow cycles of Western deliberation and delay. In addition, both the arms and instructions for their use are burdened with caveats, illustrating powerful fears over Russian nuclear blackmail. Even with robust US and European aid, it would be understandable for Kyiv to consider the deterrent effect of an independent nuclear strike capability as significantly more valuable than the warm regards of Western diplomats.[13]Crumbling EdificesAnticipating Russian victory, under even current conditions, underplays Ukrainian strategic agency as well as significant other downstream risks. Meanwhile, although the threat posed by a total Russian victory is widely discussed, the potential risks of broad Russian advances without Ukrainian collapse have not been adequately considered. For example, it is conceivable that Ukraine, desperate in its war for survival, triggers a wave of nuclear proliferation in Europe as the nominally protective fabric of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture lies in tatters. In this scenario, US influence and the power it derives from the alliance systems it created could be severely compromised, undermining already narrowing options for responding to contingencies elsewhere around the globe, including in the Indo-Pacific. In the immediate term, the demands of the moment are plain enough. Ukraine must see robust and unified support from both the United States and Europe to stave off Russian advances and create the conditions for military victory—and with urgency. Russian forces must face not only extended losses in manpower and resources, but such losses without hope of victory. For Russia, Ukraine must symbolize not imperial tenacity, but hubris, incapacity, and strategic impotence. Ukraine, and this war, should be associated in the Russian mind with total military and political defeat. In practical terms, the resumption of US aid is a welcome and necessary development, but insufficient. The shape of that aid should be more purposeful and emphasize the ability for Ukraine to not merely attrite Russian forces, but to make rapid advances in the near to medium term. This will require more comfort with Ukrainian raids in Russia, the provision of long-range precision strike in volume, and certain escalation dynamics inherent in such an approach.Looking at the medium term, while Ukraine's territorial contours in a ceasefire should be at the Ukrainians' sole discretion, the overriding determinant of victory is the permanent preservation of Ukrainian independence and fundamental territorial integrity to a maximally practicable degree. The dread that might accompany any hint of a ceasefire proposal will come not from the ceasefire itself, but because of fear of a return to a status quo ante that assumes, in the absence of all evidence, that Russia would negotiate in good faith. More fundamentally, a viable European security depends on an inclusive and enforceable architecture that dispenses with the notion that Russia is a legitimate security stakeholder and banishes the gray zones where Russia has most actively and successfully meddled. And the only way to do that is full Ukrainian inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture—the EU and NATO, respectively, or their equivalents.In the longer term, Russia must be dealt with plainly, based on its pattern of action, and not its deliberate misrepresentation and weaponization of international obligations and norms. Certain facts must be confronted and hardwired into Western approaches towards Moscow, which neither shares our values nor a common conception of peace. First, that for all its existence, Russia has always been an empire—one with varying periods of expansion and decline. The Russian imperium has been either a ruler or menace to its neighbors, and a reliable spoiler to dreams of a sustainable European peace. As with an aggressive Soviet Union, only hard constraints on Russian imperial ambitions can check these tendencies and coax some baseline of cooperation. Similarly, a more radical reimagining of Russia is in order: not as a partner or a political equal, but as a revanchist and unreconstructed empire without hope for peacefulness, much less democracy, until its imperial moorings are severed. This requires, at minimum, a Russia policy that proactively checks external aggression and interrogates its internal coloniality.For now, Western analysts and policymakers should look to the war in Ukraine not only as a function of Russian aggression, but a Ukrainian war for survival that transcends Western conceptions or expectations around escalation dynamics or political polarization. For Ukraine, this war could be its last war if Russia is victorious, and the end of its civilization. If it succeeds, however, Ukraine could be the cornerstone of a new age of Euro-Atlantic security and stability and a premier military power in the Black Sea region in its own right. But with or without Western aid, if anything has been made clear over the past two years, Ukraine and its people will not fade quietly.Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the US Helsinki Commission. He is also an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. These views are his own.[1] Samya Kullab, "Analysis: A Key Withdrawal Shows Ukraine Doesn't Have Enough Artillery to Fight Russia," Associated Press, February 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-avdiivka-war-063ab1bd47a500ad4a815b12f3d1386d.[2] Sergey Goryashko, "We Need to Be Ready for War with Putin, Romania's Top General Says," Politico, February 1, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/we-need-to-be-ready-for-war-with-putin-says-romanias-top-general/; "Danish Defence Minister Warns Russia Could Attack NATO in 3–5 Years—Media," Reuters, February 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-defence-minister-warns-russia-could-attack-nato-3-5-years-media-2024-02-09/; and Nicolas Camut, "Putin Could Attack NATO in '5 to 8 Years,' German Defense Minister Warns," Politico, January 19, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-germany-boris-pistorius-nato/.[3] Sylvie Corbet, "Macron Again Declines to Rule Out Western Troops in Ukraine, but Says They're Not Needed Now," Associated Press, March 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-ukraine-troops-caa788d2455dafb06dd87f79c4afe06f.[4]Elise Vincent and Philippe Ricard, "Ukraine's Western allies already have a military presence in the country," Le Monde, March 1, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/01/ukraine-s-western-allies-already-have-a-military-presence-in-the-country_6575440_4.html[5] Michael Hikari Cecire, "Ukraine as Russian Imperial Action: Challenges and Policy Options," Royal United Services Institute, March 9, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russian-imperial-action-challenges-and-policy-options.[6] Mick Ryan, "Russia's Adaptation Advantage," Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage.[7] Mariya Vyushkova and Evgeny Sherkhonov, "Russia's Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine," Inner Asia, May 2, 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/inas/25/1/article-p126_11.xml#FN000009; and Laura Solanko, "Where Do Russia's Mobilized Soldiers Come From? Evidence from Bank Deposits," BOFIT Policy Brief, February 21, 2024, https://publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/53281.[8] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and 'russification' of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE, April 27, 2023,https://pace.coe.int/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-of-ukrainian-children-shows-evidence-of-genocide-says-pace?__cf_chl_tk=nsD2fTQl_qXokDkIipfYF4Y7yd1HqcxNvt6SWP474.c-1713537611-0.0.1.1-1855[9] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vancouver Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirtieth Annual Session, July 4, 2024, https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2023-vancouver/declaration-29/4744-vancouver-declaration-eng/file.[10] Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, and Volodymyr Venher, "Understanding Russia's Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide," Journal of International Criminal Justice 21, no. 2 (June 13, 2024): 233–264, https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/21/2/233/7197410; and Kristina Hook, "Many Ukrainians See Putin's Invasion as a Continuation of Stalin's Genocide," November 25, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/many-ukrainians-see-putins-invasion-as-a-continuation-of-stalins-genocide/.[11] Patrick Wintour, "Nato Members May Send Troops to Ukraine, Warns Former Alliance Chief," The Guardian, June 7, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/07/nato-members-may-send-troops-to-ukraine-warns-former-alliance-chief.[12] Christopher Miller, Ben Hall, Felicia Schwartz, and Myles McCormick, "US Urged Ukraine to Halt Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries," Financial Times, March 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c.[13] Josh Rogin, "Ukrainians Want to Know If NATO Still Wants Them," Washington Post, February 23, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/ukraine-munich-nato-membership/.
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US military aid to Ukraine is back, and not a moment too soon. After months of suspended arms deliveries, Ukrainian defenses have buckled and news from the front lines is grim. The lurching, grinding advance of Russian forces, particularly the recent withdrawal of Ukraine's defenders from Avdiivka, tells us much about the true state of the full-scale invasion now in its third year. Most international attention has understandably focused on the state of US aid in Congress, and its wider implications for European security, and rightly so. Even with US aid back in the pipeline, the retreat from Avdiivka and broader Ukrainian struggles on the battlefield are an apt prism into a longer view of Russia's imperial tenacity, Ukraine's desperate and obstinate capacity for survival, and the Kremlin's challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Between October of last year and March, according to recent estimates, Russian forces lost some 17,000 troops and nearly 700 combat vehicles in its offensive against Avdiivka—a staggering casualty rate for a city that, on its own, represents a marginal prize for the Russian war effort. However, like Bakhmut or Severodonetsk before it, single-minded Russian attacks en masse towards questionable territorial objectives have, even after achieving breakthroughs, done little to appreciably impact the direction of the war. In some cases, they have even heralded Ukrainian counteroffensives. In such engagements, Ukrainian forces made industrious use of Russian-ruined, treacherous urban terrain to hold and attrite much larger Russian attacking formations. Estimates of upwards of nearly 400,000 Russian combat losses since the invasion was launched in 2022 should be seen in this context. Yet Avdiivka's fall is invariably associated, and is symbolically coterminous, with US failures to provide long-promised military aid and wider concerns about Western political fecklessness in the face of evident Russian imperial aggression. Although it is uncertain to what extent Avdiivka's defenses were tenable, given inherent Russian advantages in material superiority and mass from the start, there is widespread agreement in the analytical community that troop and, particularly, ammunition shortages sharply hindered the city's defenses.[1] Because of relatively modest gains from Ukraine's 2023 summer counteroffensive and the subsequent assessments of operational stalemate, alarm has set in across the Euro-Atlantic as the mythological powers of seemingly infinite Russian mass seem to have materialized. Increasingly, analysts had been taking fears of Russian victory in Ukraine seriously.An Empire Called ForeverAt its low points, the heroic, ferocious stand of a few in Avdiivka against the inexorable advance of Russian mass might seem to describe the war in Ukraine as a whole. The restoration of US arms flows notwithstanding, the prospects of Russian victory in Ukraine had appeared to be a more urgent consideration, which stoked understandable concerns in frontline European states over the possibility of an eventual direct conflict with Russia. Just this year so far, Romanian, Danish, and German political and military leaders have issued warnings about the potential of open war with Russia should Ukraine fall.[2] France, most significantly, has adopted a more forward-leaning policy in support of Ukraine's defense. It has even refused to rule out the potential deployment of troops,[3] which according to some sources are already on the ground in limited capacities.[4] However, besieged and wounded though it has been, Ukraine's agency and capacity for survival in recent months has been underrated. When given the basic means of self-defense, Ukraine has proven over and over again to be more than equal to the task. With US arms now again en route, the world will likely be reminded of this fact.At the same time, Russia's destructive tenacity in pursuit of demonstrably imperial aims has been evident to Ukraine, and other wary neighbors, for some time. Russia can seem an empire forever called to external expansion and dominion, and today has made its regime legitimacy inseparable from aggressive militarism and severe historical revisionism. Even a year ago, we could see Russia's willingness to accept otherwise unfathomable losses, endure extended material privation, and risk domestic political instability in pursuit of victory in Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian national resilience and superior battlefield leadership, alongside a hodgepodge of secondhand Western and Soviet weaponry, was often enough to best Russian forces in the field. However, it has not been enough on its own to dislodge Russia's imperial agenda, particularly as western arms have petered out. As such, a more complete Ukrainian victory demands a more aggressive and urgent Western policy of defensive aid. While certain high-value Western systems were eventually green-lit—such as F-16s, key long-range strike platforms, and cluster munitions—they came after much consternation and delay, typically in limited quantities, and often lagged battlefield conditions. Ukraine has never been able to enjoy decisive advantage in any one military capability, and no superiority of mass in any domain. Over the past year, Russia has leaned into its quantitative edge as a decisive (if cumbersome) tool, while implementing some key battlefield lessons,[6] to gain momentum.Putin's prosecution of its war on Ukraine demonstrates that imperialism is not merely a feature of Russian strategic thinking, but perhaps its central feature. It should give Western defense analysts and policymakers pause that Russia has been both willing and able to absorb such horrendous losses in such a gruesome enterprise. These losses have been made more palatable to the elite, certainly, by the systematic and deliberate exploitation of ethnic minority, indigenous, and marginalized populations in the imperial periphery.[7] Any assumptions that Russian political or material exhaustion will be sufficient to compel the abandonment of the war are implausible in the near-term, except perhaps in the face of overwhelming and immovable Ukrainian military might. Just as Ukraine's capacity for survival should not be underrated, neither should analysts ignore Russia's willingness to broadly prosecute a war of national mobilization, its evident capacity for regeneration, and perhaps even the perceived political advantages to the Kremlin of a totalitarian war footing.A Warrior RepublicAlthough it may not always be recognized in Western capitals, Ukrainians have no doubt that they are fighting an existential war in the most literal sense: for the preservation of their state, their national identity, and their very lives. As highlighted in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Vancouver Declaration last summer, by recent Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe statements,[8] and further among several Euro-Atlantic national parliaments, the Russian pattern of atrocities in Ukraine is deliberate and recognizably genocidal in its character.[9] Any cursory review of Russian state news media reveals a casual embrace of Ukrainian cultural and physical extermination as an operational necessity. Even outside of growing scholarly consensus and international recognition, that reality is a salient organizing principle in Ukrainian society.[10] Ukrainians are under no illusions about the enemy they face and the existential consequences of defeat. However, while Russian victory may have seemed a possibility, especially in the wake of the Avdiivka withdrawal, neither is it necessarily an obvious outcome—despite Russia's increasingly totalitarian war footing and the fatalist lurch in Western media and policy discourse. For one, most conceptions of Ukrainian victory tend to be tied to the full restoration of Ukrainian internationally recognized territory. However, territorial gain is not a sufficient indicator for the achievement of either Ukrainian or Russian political aims. For Ukraine, the preservation of an independent and recognizably Ukrainian nation-state with the integral features of its territorial boundaries would be a legitimate victory. By contrast, Russian victory depends on the decapitation of Ukrainian political leadership and the wholesale subjugation of the Ukrainian nation-state. For at least the foreseeable future, even absent US military aid, the first scenario remains far more likely than the second one. At the same time, the months-long suspension of US military aid lends clues about the strategic calculus for Ukraine and the wider region, where outright defeat in the near- to medium-term is but one (low) possibility. Other potentially higher propensity scenarios are entirely conceivable and may even be already playing out—and in some cases pose other types of risks.For one, the US strategic detour did not appear to contribute to a collapse in European support for Ukraine, but rather served as a galvanizing force for a more muscular approach to Ukraine. France's more hawkish turn is only one expression of this shift. The European Union's recently announced 50-billion-euro package for Ukraine, as well as additional pledges for financial and military aid, highlight a converging appreciation for the stakes among many European leaders. And although Ukraine had come to rely primarily on the United States for its pipeline of munitions stocks, their abrupt interruption led to a diversification approach, as Washington was no longer seen as entirely reliable. While it is a positive dynamic to see Europe playing a more proactive role in Ukrainian and continental security, broader European remilitarization amid US disengagement could threaten the postwar success of arresting ruinous cycles of intra-European warfare. More muscular European rhetoric and actions during suspended US arms deliveries also revived quiet speculation that European states, acting independently or in some kind of secondary coalition outside of NATO or the EU, could be forced to intervene directly to prevent Russian victory and Ukrainian defeat. While this possibility is typically muted in public, it is a scenario that has been taken seriously within some Western analytical circles.[11] It is widely believed that Poland alone, for example, likely has the military and material capacity to successfully intervene and decisively turn the tide of the conflict; other potential Central/Eastern European and possibly Nordic members of such a coalition are not difficult to conceive. Such an intervention, however successful, would widen the war and likely lead to a fundamental crisis within NATO. Yet, if Russia is seen as likely to test NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause, as is increasingly believed, a preemptive military action to rescue Ukraine from capitulation may be a preferable option for several frontline European states. There are also risks to more complete abandonment of Ukraine. Alone, Ukraine would further its transformation as a warrior republic, where the maintenance of war in the desperate enterprise of survival is the prevailing principle under which all other ideals are subsumed. This Ukraine would be unconstrained by the niceties of Western guardrails and caveats delivered out of concern for escalation and would take the war to Russia in an uncompromising fashion, with a ferocity could make some of its liberal international supporters wince. The debate over Ukrainian raids against Russian oil refineries, an entirely legitimate military target, is a relatively low-stakes example of this phenomenon playing out recently.[12] It should be noted that Ukraine continues to act with relative restraint, including its attacks within Russian borders, reflecting deference to US and European admonitions to limit the scope of war. However, if Western support dawdles and dwindles, and the specter of successful Russian genocide looms, incentives for restraint deplete. Left isolated, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of where Kyiv does not seriously entertain nuclear rearmament, given the large nuclear arsenal it surrendered in exchange for Western security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. While ample ink has been spilled over the failure of those guarantees and the harm it has done to nuclear nonproliferation as a principle or concept, in no country is this betrayal more evident and immediate than in Ukraine. Russia's invasion itself seems to have crystallized the decision of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament as a potential error, given the eminent failure of the Bucharest Memorandum and the privileged position that nuclear powers enjoy. Meanwhile, western-provided arms deliveries are variously sourced, with some even arriving in poor or unusable condition, and tend to follow cycles of Western deliberation and delay. In addition, both the arms and instructions for their use are burdened with caveats, illustrating powerful fears over Russian nuclear blackmail. Even with robust US and European aid, it would be understandable for Kyiv to consider the deterrent effect of an independent nuclear strike capability as significantly more valuable than the warm regards of Western diplomats.[13]Crumbling EdificesAnticipating Russian victory, under even current conditions, underplays Ukrainian strategic agency as well as significant other downstream risks. Meanwhile, although the threat posed by a total Russian victory is widely discussed, the potential risks of broad Russian advances without Ukrainian collapse have not been adequately considered. For example, it is conceivable that Ukraine, desperate in its war for survival, triggers a wave of nuclear proliferation in Europe as the nominally protective fabric of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture lies in tatters. In this scenario, US influence and the power it derives from the alliance systems it created could be severely compromised, undermining already narrowing options for responding to contingencies elsewhere around the globe, including in the Indo-Pacific. In the immediate term, the demands of the moment are plain enough. Ukraine must see robust and unified support from both the United States and Europe to stave off Russian advances and create the conditions for military victory—and with urgency. Russian forces must face not only extended losses in manpower and resources, but such losses without hope of victory. For Russia, Ukraine must symbolize not imperial tenacity, but hubris, incapacity, and strategic impotence. Ukraine, and this war, should be associated in the Russian mind with total military and political defeat. In practical terms, the resumption of US aid is a welcome and necessary development, but insufficient. The shape of that aid should be more purposeful and emphasize the ability for Ukraine to not merely attrite Russian forces, but to make rapid advances in the near to medium term. This will require more comfort with Ukrainian raids in Russia, the provision of long-range precision strike in volume, and certain escalation dynamics inherent in such an approach.Looking at the medium term, while Ukraine's territorial contours in a ceasefire should be at the Ukrainians' sole discretion, the overriding determinant of victory is the permanent preservation of Ukrainian independence and fundamental territorial integrity to a maximally practicable degree. The dread that might accompany any hint of a ceasefire proposal will come not from the ceasefire itself, but because of fear of a return to a status quo ante that assumes, in the absence of all evidence, that Russia would negotiate in good faith. More fundamentally, a viable European security depends on an inclusive and enforceable architecture that dispenses with the notion that Russia is a legitimate security stakeholder and banishes the gray zones where Russia has most actively and successfully meddled. And the only way to do that is full Ukrainian inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture—the EU and NATO, respectively, or their equivalents.In the longer term, Russia must be dealt with plainly, based on its pattern of action, and not its deliberate misrepresentation and weaponization of international obligations and norms. Certain facts must be confronted and hardwired into Western approaches towards Moscow, which neither shares our values nor a common conception of peace. First, that for all its existence, Russia has always been an empire—one with varying periods of expansion and decline. The Russian imperium has been either a ruler or menace to its neighbors, and a reliable spoiler to dreams of a sustainable European peace. As with an aggressive Soviet Union, only hard constraints on Russian imperial ambitions can check these tendencies and coax some baseline of cooperation. Similarly, a more radical reimagining of Russia is in order: not as a partner or a political equal, but as a revanchist and unreconstructed empire without hope for peacefulness, much less democracy, until its imperial moorings are severed. This requires, at minimum, a Russia policy that proactively checks external aggression and interrogates its internal coloniality.For now, Western analysts and policymakers should look to the war in Ukraine not only as a function of Russian aggression, but a Ukrainian war for survival that transcends Western conceptions or expectations around escalation dynamics or political polarization. For Ukraine, this war could be its last war if Russia is victorious, and the end of its civilization. If it succeeds, however, Ukraine could be the cornerstone of a new age of Euro-Atlantic security and stability and a premier military power in the Black Sea region in its own right. But with or without Western aid, if anything has been made clear over the past two years, Ukraine and its people will not fade quietly.Michael Hikari Cecire is a senior policy advisor at the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the US Helsinki Commission. He is also an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. These views are his own.[1] Samya Kullab, "Analysis: A Key Withdrawal Shows Ukraine Doesn't Have Enough Artillery to Fight Russia," Associated Press, February 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-avdiivka-war-063ab1bd47a500ad4a815b12f3d1386d.[2] Sergey Goryashko, "We Need to Be Ready for War with Putin, Romania's Top General Says," Politico, February 1, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/we-need-to-be-ready-for-war-with-putin-says-romanias-top-general/; "Danish Defence Minister Warns Russia Could Attack NATO in 3–5 Years—Media," Reuters, February 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-defence-minister-warns-russia-could-attack-nato-3-5-years-media-2024-02-09/; and Nicolas Camut, "Putin Could Attack NATO in '5 to 8 Years,' German Defense Minister Warns," Politico, January 19, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-germany-boris-pistorius-nato/.[3] Sylvie Corbet, "Macron Again Declines to Rule Out Western Troops in Ukraine, but Says They're Not Needed Now," Associated Press, March 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-ukraine-troops-caa788d2455dafb06dd87f79c4afe06f.[4]Elise Vincent and Philippe Ricard, "Ukraine's Western allies already have a military presence in the country," Le Monde, March 1, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/01/ukraine-s-western-allies-already-have-a-military-presence-in-the-country_6575440_4.html[5] Michael Hikari Cecire, "Ukraine as Russian Imperial Action: Challenges and Policy Options," Royal United Services Institute, March 9, 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russian-imperial-action-challenges-and-policy-options.[6] Mick Ryan, "Russia's Adaptation Advantage," Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage.[7] Mariya Vyushkova and Evgeny Sherkhonov, "Russia's Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine," Inner Asia, May 2, 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/inas/25/1/article-p126_11.xml#FN000009; and Laura Solanko, "Where Do Russia's Mobilized Soldiers Come From? Evidence from Bank Deposits," BOFIT Policy Brief, February 21, 2024, https://publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/53281.[8] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and 'russification' of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE, April 27, 2023,https://pace.coe.int/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-of-ukrainian-children-shows-evidence-of-genocide-says-pace?__cf_chl_tk=nsD2fTQl_qXokDkIipfYF4Y7yd1HqcxNvt6SWP474.c-1713537611-0.0.1.1-1855[9] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vancouver Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirtieth Annual Session, July 4, 2024, https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2023-vancouver/declaration-29/4744-vancouver-declaration-eng/file.[10] Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, and Volodymyr Venher, "Understanding Russia's Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide," Journal of International Criminal Justice 21, no. 2 (June 13, 2024): 233–264, https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/21/2/233/7197410; and Kristina Hook, "Many Ukrainians See Putin's Invasion as a Continuation of Stalin's Genocide," November 25, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/many-ukrainians-see-putins-invasion-as-a-continuation-of-stalins-genocide/.[11] Patrick Wintour, "Nato Members May Send Troops to Ukraine, Warns Former Alliance Chief," The Guardian, June 7, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/07/nato-members-may-send-troops-to-ukraine-warns-former-alliance-chief.[12] Christopher Miller, Ben Hall, Felicia Schwartz, and Myles McCormick, "US Urged Ukraine to Halt Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries," Financial Times, March 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c.[13] Josh Rogin, "Ukrainians Want to Know If NATO Still Wants Them," Washington Post, February 23, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/ukraine-munich-nato-membership/.
Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) ; United Nations S/PV.8188 Security Council Seventy-third year 8188th meeting Saturday, 24 February 2018, noon New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Hickey United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05017 (E) *1805017* S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 2/14 18-05017 The meeting was called to order at 2.10 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/146, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. I now give the floor to members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Sweden and Kuwait earlier this week put forward a draft resolution to respond to the desperate calls of the United Nations and the humanitarian community in Syria for a cessation of hostilities for an initial period of 30 days, in order to allow for much-needed humanitarian relief. We have been working intensely with all Council members to operationalize the concrete requests of the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above, all the civilian population on the ground. We have done our utmost to accommodate Council members' concerns. It is now time for the Council to unanimously shoulder its responsibility and show that meaningful action is possible. The key components in our draft resolution are a nationwide cessation of hostilities for at least 30 days, weekly United Nations humanitarian aid convoys to all areas in need, and immediate emergency medical evacuations. The United Nations convoys and evacuation teams are ready to go. The draft resolution also calls for the immediate lifting of sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. It reiterates its demand, reminding in particular the Syrian authorities that all parties have an obligation to act in accordance with international law to protect civilians and hospitals and other medical facilities. The draft makes an exception for military operations directed against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups designated by the Security Council. This in no way relieves the parties to the conflict in Syria from upholding their obligations under international law at all times, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. The draft resolution is not a comprehensive peace deal on Syria; its aim is purely humanitarian. There are already ceasefire agreements in force for the areas where fighting has escalated the most. They need to be complied with. There are existing monitoring mechanisms that can be utilized. The role of the Council is to push the parties to the conflict to comply with the proposed cessation of hostilities in order to urgently enable needed alleviation of suffering for the people of Syria. If the draft resolution is adopted today, it can de-escalate violence, save lives, alleviate suffering and break the deadlock on humanitarian access and sieges. Since the first call for a cessation of hostilities, the situation has gotten dramatically worse, particularly in eastern Ghouta, as we have heard from the Secretary- General and from Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. After seven years of war, the situation for innocent civilians in Syria has never been worse. But we have an opportunity to turn things around today to avert the disaster unfolding before our eyes. The draft resolution before the Council represents a resolute and very urgent attempt for the Council to take decisive and meaningful action. Today, we count on each and every member to do the right thing. The President (spoke in Arabic): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America The President (spoke in Arabic): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2401 (2018). 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 3/14 I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Kuwait. I associate myself with the statement just made by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on our behalf. The unanimous adoption today of resolution 2401 (2018), following lengthy and intensive negotiations, demonstrates that the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, are keen to ensure unanimity on this important humanitarian resolution. The resolution renews hope in the Security Council's ability to be unified and speak in one voice, sending a clear and explicit message that it rejects any violations of the Charter of the United Nations. I wish to thank all Member States that voted in favour of the resolution, which includes key and specific demands in response to the appeals of the international community, the most important of which are as follows. First, it demands that all parties cease fire without delay throughout Syria for a minimum of 30 days. Secondly, it allows the United Nations and its partners to immediately undertake medical evacuations safely and unconditionally. Thirdly, it requires all parties to ensure the unimpeded and safe access of all humanitarian and medical workers. Fourthly, it calls on all parties to lift the siege of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta. We are totally convinced that, while the resolution may not end the humanitarian suffering in Syria at once, it is a positive message that the Council today is solidary and united to end this humanitarian suffering and hostilities right away. The biggest task now is to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the resolution in order to save civilian lives in Syria and deliver their humanitarian needs immediately. The Security Council still has a great deal to do so as to end this tragic crisis in Syria, which is about to complete its seventh year. The resolution that we have adopted today is only an interim solution, as a political solution in Syria is the only way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the crisis and meet the aspirations of the brotherly Syrian people, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). The State of Kuwait stresses the importance of reaching an agreement among Council members to prevent any attempt to obstruct a draft resolution aimed at stopping flagrant violations of human rights. Kuwait supports the code of conduct proposed by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, whereby Council members would pledge not to obstruct draft resolutions that address crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also support the Mexican-French initiative calling on restraint in the use of the veto in the event of serious violations of human rights, based on our commitments to abide by the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, international humanitarian law and the outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. We call for engagement on general humanitarian issues, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the evacuation of the sick and injured, and humanitarian truce, as procedural issues. In order to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and the great suffering of humankind, the veto must not be used in such instances. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the other members of the Council that wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I want to thank the penholders, Sweden and Kuwait, for their work, their sacrifice and their time in the negotiations. As we look at the negotiations, I think it is also important that we bring the Council some of the voices of the Syrian people in eastern Ghouta, who have suffered so much while waiting for the Security Council to act. A doctor treating patients in a makeshift hospital described the conditions she is facing: "We are mental and emotional wrecks. There is nothing more we can do. We are bled dry." In a haunting video, the doctor walks into a room with a crying mother as she says, "I am waiting for my son to die. At least he will be free of pain. I was just making bread for him when the roof fell in. He is going straight to heaven. At least in heaven there is food." Another message we received yesterday which I think was relayed to Council members in the closed consultations, but which I think it is important to repeat again — was an emergency call from a doctor in eastern Ghouta, who said: "We have a horrible situation here. We are being targeted with all kinds of weapons, non-stop. We lack everything: water, food, medical supplies, S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 4/14 18-05017 shelter. This is a disaster. Everyone is just waiting to die." Today, the Security Council finally took a step towards addressing these devastating levels of human suffering in Syria. The United States wants nothing more than to see the ceasefire in resolution 2401 (2018) implemented immediately across the country. It is critical that the Al-Assad regime and its allies comply with our demand to stop the assault on eastern Ghouta and immediately allow food and medicine to reach everyone who needs it. All of us on the Council must do our part to press the Al-Assad regime as hard as we can to comply. But we are late to respond to this crisis — very late. On Wednesday, the Secretary-General made an emotional plea for an immediate ceasefire in Syria to allow the very basic necessities to get to the people. Kuwait and Sweden had a version of the resolution ready to go for a vote, but Russia called for a delay. On Thursday, in an effort to stall, Russia called for an open meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. At that meeting (S/PV.8186), 14 members of the Council were ready to impose a ceasefire, but Russia obstructed the vote again. And then yesterday, the Council sat around for hours, ready to vote, only to have Russia delay it again. Every minute the Council waited on Russia, the human suffering grew. Getting to a vote became a moral responsibility for everyone, but not for Russia, not for Syria, and not for Iran. I have to ask: why? At least 19 health facilities have been bombed since Sunday. As they dragged out the negotiations, the bombs from Al-Assad's fighter jets continued to fall. In the three days it took us to adopt the resolution, how many mothers lost their kids to the bombing and the shelling? How many more images did we need to see of fathers holding their dead children? All for nothing, because here we are voting for a ceasefire that could have saved lives days ago. And after all of this time, hardly anything has changed in the resolution except a few words and some commas. The Syrian people should not have to die waiting for Russia to organize its instructions from Moscow or to discuss them with the Syrians. Why did the Council allow this? There is no good reason we should not have done this Wednesday, or Thursday, or Friday. We may not know the faces that we are talking about. We may not know their names, or these people, but they know us. And we all failed them this week. I guess there is unity in that. Today, Russia has belatedly decided to join the international consensus and accept the need to call for a ceasefire, but only after trying every possible way to avoid it. The resolution marks a moment of Council unity that we must seize and maintain beyond the 30-day timeframe. We hope that the resolution will be a turning point, where Russia will join us in pushing for a political settlement to this conflict and take action to re-establish real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Progress starts by adhering to the ceasefire with no excuses. After so many years of defying the Council's demands, the Al-Assad regime must change course. None of us should be so naïve as to accept that the Al-Assad regime can continue indiscriminately bombing schools, hospitals and homes under the fake excuse of "counter-terrorism". Al-Assad's bombing must stop. The ceasefire must be given a chance to work. We look to the Al-Assad regime's backers, especially Russia and Iran, to address what the Secretary-General rightly called a "hell on Earth". All eyes will now be on the Syrian regime, Iran and Russia. Our goal with this resolution is clear. The Al-Assad regime needs to stop its military activities around eastern Ghouta, and for once allow humanitarian access to all of those who need it. We are deeply skeptical that the regime will comply, but we supported the resolution because we must demand nothing less. We owe that to the innocent people of Syria begging for help. In the days to come, our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution will be tested. All of us must rise to the challenge of maintaining this ceasefire, just as we came together today. All of us must do everything we can to make the demands of the resolution a reality. That is the only way to restore the credibility of the Council. The Syrian people have been waiting long enough. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Following lengthy consultations, during which the overwhelming majority of delegations demonstrated a sincere focus on seeking joint solutions — for which we thank them — the Security Council has unanimously adopted the humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), on Syria. I wish to particularly thank the penholders, the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Sweden, for their tireless efforts 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 5/14 and resolve to reach a compromise up until the very last moment. Russia supports the resolution because it encourages the Syrian parties to work as quickly as possible to bring a halt to the hostilities, comply with previous agreed-on decisions in that regard, engage in negotiations on a general de-escalation and establish extended humanitarian pauses throughout the country. The reason it took us so long to reach agreement on the resolution was because we did not support the directives it included for an immediate cessation of hostilities for a relatively long period, and the reason for that was simply because it was unachievable in that form. A ceasefire would not have happened if we had adopted the directives without any concrete agreement between the warring parties, and any approach so removed from reality would definitely not help to address the pressing humanitarian problems in Syria. It will be crucial to ensure that the Security Council's demands are reinforced by concrete agreements on the ground. It would be naive to think that any of these complicated issues can be resolved overnight. We trust that all the external stakeholders with influence will work to bring that about. We can see that some foreign sponsors of the illegal armed groups have either fallen very short in that regard or have been deliberately flouting their obligations. Russia is working with all the parties to the conflict and doing everything possible to normalize the situation and actively assist the humanitarian efforts. Iran and Turkey, our partners in the Astana process, have taken on a major part of the work, and we are preparing for an important meeting in the Astana format next month. In the southern de-escalation zone a fairly decent level of cooperation has been established with Jordan and the United States, although we have been seeing tension rising in some areas owing to activity by armed groups. The resolution clearly states that it does not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Jabhat Al-Nusra, other Al-Qaida-affiliated organizations and various groups that the Security Council has recognized as terrorists. That struggle that will continue. We call on international stakeholders to coordinate closely on this issue, including with the Syrian authorities, and in strict compliance with international law and with respect for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The goal of combating terrorism must not become a pretext for solving this or that geopolitical issue of dubious legitimacy, which is exactly what the United States is doing in Syria. Instead of being drowned in rhetoric about Russia — and by the way, next time I am going to count the number of times Ambassador Haley mentions my country — what we are insisting on is a prompt end to the occupation-style efforts of the so-called coalition, which, among other things, would have a definite humanitarian impact, enabling the Syrian Government to address the issue of restoring normal life in all the areas that have been liberated from terrorists, including in the north and the east of the country. Closing the coalition's Al-Tanf military base would solve the problem of the internally displaced persons in the Rukban camp. In that connection, we would also like to point out that every effort should be made to deliver aid via the most direct routes, as provided for in the humanitarian resolutions on Syria. It is important that today's resolution calls for speeding up the immediate deployment of humanitarian mine-clearing operations throughout Syria. It also reiterates the demand that all parties demilitarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian infrastructure and refrain from establishing military positions in residential areas, something that the illegal armed groups have frequently been guilty of. The conflict's flashpoints are more clearly identified, and are not limited to eastern Ghouta and Idlib, and that includes Raqqa, which the coalition has laid waste. It also expresses indignation at the militias' shelling of Damascus, in which our Embassy has been hit several times. We know that the humanitarian situation in Syria is dire and in urgent need of effective measures, but we can see perfectly well that the propagandistic picture being painted of eastern Ghouta is identical to the loud campaign in late 2016 during the counter-terrorist operation to liberate eastern Aleppo. We must engage not just with eastern Ghouta, but with Raqqa, Rukban, Foah, Kefraya and Yarmouk. Every area of Syria should get help. The resolution emphasizes the importance of supporting the restoration of stability in the areas that civilians are returning to, which in our view sends an unambiguous message to those capitals that continue to make restoration assistance conditional on a specific transitional direction in the political process. It stipulates that the humanitarian priorities for Syria in 2018 are not limited to Under-Secretary-General Lowcock's five requests. The agenda is far broader. We S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 6/14 18-05017 hope in particular that the specialized United Nations agencies and their partners will be sensitive to requests from the Syrian authorities. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep concern about the public statements by certain United States officials threatening aggression against Syria, a sovereign country. This is a warning that we will not countenance any arbitrary interpretation of the resolution that has just been adopted. We demand an end to this irresponsible and hateful rhetoric. Rather, there should be joint efforts to settle the conflict in Syria on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that a cessation of hostilities be established without delay throughout Syria, in order to enable humanitarian personnel to evacuate the wounded and to gain access to the population. The negotiations were arduous. However, despite their differences in approach, the members of the Security Council managed to prevail in the name of the humanitarian imperative. The resolution is vital in the true meaning of that word, since halting the shelling and evacuating the wounded are matters of life and death for thousands of Syrian people, especially in eastern Ghouta, which has been under siege by the Damascus regime for days. I would like to thank the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden — which introduced the resolution, with our support — for their efforts, perseverance and outstanding work in arriving at a robust text. As by President Macron and the Secretary-General forcefully recalled last Wednesday, it is imperative and urgent to end the shelling of eastern Ghouta, Idlib and the whole of Syrian territory immediately. That was the thrust of yesterday's joint call by President Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel to President Putin during their demanding and close conversation on the issue. It is also the reason for our vote today. The resolution is the outcome of our concerted efforts, as well as a belated response to the violence unleashed against civilians in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere. Let us make no mistake: a cessation of hostilities for an initial 30 days to enable humanitarian access to meet vital urgent needs is only the very first step. It is the minimal response to the repeated demands of both the United Nations and humanitarian actors, which have been conveyed for months by Council members, in particular by France. It is now up to the regime's supporters to ensure full compliance with the cessation of hostilities without delay and to respond to all requests for access to humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations in accordance with the text we have just adopted. We specifically call on the guarantors of the Astana process to assume their responsibilities and effectively ensure that the Syrian regime immediately cease its hostilities and ensure respect for the basic principles and rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law. It is urgent that humanitarian assistance reach without delay the people who need it. Every minute counts because every minute can lead to the loss of lives. Nothing would be worse than to see this resolution remain a dead letter. That is why France will be extremely vigilant on all those points over the coming hours and days. We all know that a return to stability in Syria is the only way to put a definitive end to the humanitarian crisis, for which a political solution is required. More than ever, therefore, we must redouble our efforts to establish a neutral environment that will enable a credible political process and elections to be held in Syria, as part of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). France is ready to continue working tirelessly with its partners to that end. As we said yesterday in this forum, the elements for a regional and potentially major international confrontation have coalesced today. That is a risk that must be taken very seriously. We must therefore come together, as we have done today, to put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe under way, prevent a spillover of the conflict and seek an inclusive political solution in Syria. These are three indissociable priorities, and our generation will be judged on whether or not we are able to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. This text is a potentially important step, but it is obviously not the end of the road. Let us be frank: the hardest part has yet to be done. Therefore, on behalf of France, I would like to launch a two-pronged appeal. The first is a call for the resolution to be fully and immediately implemented. We are all aware that pitfalls and obstacles abound. This is a reflection of the extent to which resolute and coordinated engagement by all members of the Security Council is crucial to ensuring that the provisions we have just adopted are implemented on the ground without delay. To put it even more clearly: if we do not put all our resources 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 7/14 and energy behind the full implementation of this resolution, we know that it will not work. Above all, that applies to Russia and the Astana guarantors. The second call is to use this truce as leverage to put an end to the spiral of violence in the Syrian tragedy and create positive momentum towards an inclusive political settlement in Syria. That must be our common ambition. There is a glimmer of hope today in that regard. Let us seize this fragile moment to begin to reverse the course of events, despite the magnitude of the difficulties ahead. As the Council knows, France is fully committed to that goal. Mr. Hickey (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, we applaud your work, Mr. President, together with Sweden, as co-penholders. But this is not a moment for self-congratulation. It has taken us far too long to agree this resolution. While we have been arguing over commas, Al-Assad's planes have been killing more civilians in their homes and in their hospitals, imposing unbearable suffering. Despite the amount of time we have spent in this Chamber over many years discussing the devastating humanitarian crisis, we have still not been able to achieve the peace and security that the Syrian people so desperately need. As the conflict enters its eighth year, the situation in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in the country is far worse than we ever thought imaginable. The barbarity and depravity of the Al-Assad regime shows no limits. We must never lose sight of the fact that the pictures we see and the stories we hear from this comfortable Chamber are the agonizing reality for hundreds of thousands of civilians — for men, women and children who are being forced to eke out an existence underground to avoid being killed by a regime that commits daily atrocities against its own people. I have heard some say that the information about the situation in eastern Ghouta is propaganda. A doctor in eastern Ghouta, having heard such comments, said this morning: "Amid the chaos and the bombs, it is the not being believed that almost hurts the most. We are dying here every day. And when people say that they do not believe us, that is pain upon pain." This is not propaganda. It is a living hell for hundreds of thousands of residents of eastern Ghouta. As we have repeated many times, the intentional and systematic targeting of civilians and civilian objects not only violates international humanitarian law, it is a war crime. The United Kingdom will be unrelenting in our campaign to ensure accountability. By having voted in favour of the resolution today, we are standing up and saying that we will not stand by and let this happen. In the face of escalating violence, devastation and suffering, we must all now take practical steps to improve the situation for those living and dying in a hell of one man's making. The resolution demonstrates our resolve to put a stop to the brutal violence. It demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay. That means right now, immediately. The role and responsibility of the Council does not end with the adoption of this resolution, quite the opposite. All States Members of the United Nations, but particularly Council members, must now take responsibility for ensuring that the resolution is implemented in full, without delay. The resolution calls for the Council to review its implementation within 15 days, but we must all be active in supporting and monitoring implementation from the moment we step out of the Chamber. If we see any of the parties violating the terms of the resolution, we must bring it back to the Council immediately. Those with any influence over the Syrian regime — Russia, Iran — have a particular responsibility to ensure that the ceasefire is respected in full and without delay, that all sieges are ended and that humanitarian aid is delivered. This is the absolute minimum that the people of Syria deserve. As much as we welcome the adoption of this resolution today, it is only a small step. Just as one aid convoy in three months to a besieged area cannot even begin to address the humanitarian crisis, one resolution alone cannot solve the situation in Syria. We must do everything in our collective power to ensure that this resolution is effective in delivering for those whom we have failed to date. We must all send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime: abandon your attempt to pursue a military strategy, stop fighting and engage seriously in United Nations-led political talks in Geneva. In conclusion, let me reiterate the words of my Foreign Secretary. The entire world is looking at the Al-Assad regime, Russia and Iran. They hold the keys not only to the end of this obscene conflict, but to the safety, humanitarian aid and basic medical treatment S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 8/14 18-05017 that is being denied to millions of people right now in Syria. For the mother giving birth underground in eastern Ghouta, for the child unable to learn as schools are closed for yet another day, for the doctor battling air strikes to treat patients in Idlib — all of us sitting here today owe it to the people of Syria to work together with renewed and unyielding energy to achieve a political solution that will bring peace to the Syrian people. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): The recent escalation of conflict in the affected areas of Syria has caught the attention of the international community. We acutely feel the suffering of the Syrian people as if it were inflicted upon us. China condemns all acts of violence that target civilians and civilian property and destroy innocent lives. China welcomes the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which is the result of Council members' patient consultation and hard work to find consensus. The resolution includes positive elements such as calling for respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; demanding a cessation of hostilities by all parties; easing the humanitarian situation in Syria; supporting mine action throughout Syria; and continuing to combat terrorism. As an active party to the consultation process, China made unflagging efforts and played a constructive role in facilitating consensus-building in the Council. China appreciates that, thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties concerned, the Council arrived at a solution that reflects the broadest possible consensus among Council members. I would like in particular to thank Kuwait and Sweden, as co-penholders of the resolution, for their tireless efforts. By speaking with one voice on the humanitarian situation in Syria, the Security Council is helping to alleviate the situation as a whole, helping to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, contributing to counter-terrorism efforts in the country and serving the overarching objective of arriving at a political settlement of the Syrian issue. Going forward, the international community should work together to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so that it can play a positive role in improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. The only way to fundamentally improve the humanitarian situation in Syria and to lift the people of Syria out of their suffering is to find a political settlement. The international community should support the Syrian parties in seeking a swift solution that is acceptable to all parties in the context of a United Nations mediation through a Syrian-owned and -led political process in order to end the suffering of the Syrian people as soon as possible. China is keen for the Council to remain united and forge consensus on the Syrian issue. The Council must push the Syrian parties to consolidate the momentum towards a ceasefire, strengthen cooperation on combating terrorist groups, advance the process towards a political settlement and play a constructive role in maintaining peace and security in Syria and across the region. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): The delegation of Kazakhstan voted in favour of resolution 2401 (2018), on the cessation of hostilities in Syria. I express my gratitude to the co-penholders — Sweden and Kuwait — for their determined efforts to find common ground among the Security Council members. I also thank the members of the Council for their constructive approach towards the resolution, which has many significant provisions. The position of Kazakhstan is very consistent — that stability in the Middle East can be achieved by reducing violence for peaceful means and avoiding the emergence of new tensions. In the past few days, Heads of State and Government from around the world have called on the Syrian Government to observe human rights and on both sides to exercise restraint. Simultaneously, external incitement that fuels tension should stop immediately so that it does not endanger regional security. We see a Security Council united today in demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay. We now expect all countries that exercise influence on the ground and conduct military campaigns against international terrorist groups in Syria to interact and find common ground for fighting terrorism jointly, while taking practical steps to implement the resolution. Kazakhstan calls on all forces that support an early settlement of the Syrian conflict, including the Government of Syria and the armed opposition, to fully comply with the ceasefire regime and the resolution. All the parties must ensure safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance to reach the affected areas, as well as the evacuation of people in need of medical assistance. The Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan hopes that his colleagues — the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor States of the Astana process — will take additional constructive steps to strictly implement the 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 9/14 ceasefire agreements and support the de-escalation zones in Syria, at the meeting scheduled to take place in the capital of Kazakhstan in mid-March or earlier, if need be. These were difficult, but successful, deliberations. We should all work collectively to find a peaceful solution. The unity shown today in the Security Council should continue, since we have yet a lot to accomplish in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): On Wednesday, during the high-level debate on the Charter of the United Nations, I quoted one of the founding fathers of the United Nations, Ambassador Stettinius (see S/PV.8185). He said that the members of the Security Council had the obligation to agree so that the Council may be able to act and act effectively. Today we finally managed to agree to end the atrocious violence in eastern Ghouta; to end attacks against hospitals; and to end the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes the unanimous adoption of this crucial resolution — resolution 2401 (2018). Let me thank the co-penholders in particular — Kuwait and Sweden — for their tireless efforts and skilled diplomatic work. We pay tribute to them. Today we have a resolution, now we need to see action on the ground. All United Nations States Members have an obligation to make sure that the words of the resolution are implemented without delay. The Syrian authorities in particular have a specific responsibility towards their own people. The resolution means that all parties must cease hostilities without delay. All parties must engage immediately for a sustainable and durable humanitarian pause of at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and to enable medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international law. The implementation of the resolution means the cessation of hostilities, the delivery of humanitarian aid and urgent medical evacuations. It is a first step in the right direction, but much more is needed — a political solution, accountability and the return of refugees. The Council should remain seized of the matter and closely monitor the implementation of the resolution, starting today. The Council should reconvene without delay if the situation demands it. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): We highly commend the work of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders on the humanitarian resolution for Syria — resolution 2401 (2018) — who did their best to accommodate the concerns of all Security Council members. On Wednesday I stressed that it is the Council's responsibility to not fail in stopping the ongoing human tragedy in Syria, and in eastern Ghouta in particular (see S/PV.8185). Today we have managed to reach compromise and adopt the resolution by consensus. I would like to thank all my colleagues for their very constructive attitude. However, the innocent people of Syria have waited far too long for that. Now, all of the parties, especially those with influence on the ground, must make every effort to implement it. In that context, we reiterate our call on all sides to comply with international humanitarian law, cease all hostilities against civilians and allow for free humanitarian access. In conclusion, it is not only our legal obligation to act now, but also our moral duty. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), I take the floor on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose Government closely followed the whole process leading up to its successful conclusion with the unanimous adoption of this humanitarian resolution. At the outset, I pay a well-deserved tribute to the penholders, Kuwait and Sweden, for all their efforts, patience and dedication to the goal of drafting a resolution that was ultimately deserving of a favourable vote. We commend the unanimous support of the elected members for the penholders throughout the duration of that process. In Spanish, it is often said that "it is never too late if the outcome is good". This positive outcome is the result of the contributions of all members of the Council, to which we extend our gratitude and commend for the fruitful end. What lies ahead now is the effective implementation of the provisions of the resolution with a view to achieving the objective the Security Council has set out to achieve, namely, an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, unhindered and sustainable delivery S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 10/14 18-05017 of humanitarian aid, services and medical evacuations of all severely injured and ill persons. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea energetically calls on all parties, the United Nations and those involved in the devastating conflict to do everything possible towards the noble end of saving human lives and alleviating the suffering that has been endured far too long by the people. The adoption of the resolution partially spares all members of the Security Council from embarrassment. We will save ourselves completely from that shame if the ceasefire takes effect in the next few hours and if humanitarian aid and medical care begin to reach the affected persons over the upcoming days. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Seven years have elapsed since the beginning of this war, and the suffering of the Syrian people continues to worsen. The numerous human lives lost in recent weeks add to the more than 500,000 lost since the beginning of the conflict. We believe that while military tactics prevail over a political solution, there can be no lasting peace, and consequently it will be civilians, especially women and children, who will continue to be subjected to unnecessary suffering. For that reason, we commend the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), and hope that its timely and effective implementation will help to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation underscores and commends the arduous work undertaken by the penholders. The delegations of Sweden and Kuwait have demonstrated strong leadership and resolve up to the very last moment to reach an agreement. Similarly, we wish to acknowledge the effort and commitment shown by the Russian Federation and the parties involved, as well as all members of the Security Council during the negotiation process. In recent days, my delegation has expressed its position on the matter at hand, and today we do so once again. Consensus and unity within the Security Council are pivotal if we are to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria, which is why we commend the consensus reached today. We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the situation and that the only way forward is through inclusive political dialogue. We thefaffirm our support for the Geneva process and the achievements made in Astana, of which the agreements must be upheld by all parties. Moreover, we have high expectations that the various forums of dialogue, such as the Sochi dialogue, can contribute to the achievement of a final and lasting peace. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We voted in favour because we believe that the resolution can make a positive difference on the ground in the alleviation of the continued tragedy of the Syrians. Having discussed the severe humanitarian crisis in Syria almost weekly, it was clear that what was required from the Council was concrete and collective action that would contribute to alleviating the intolerable suffering of Syrians in all areas of the country. We are pleased that the Council has acted and sent the right message to bring about a cessation of hostilities that will allow the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to have safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to deliver the much-needed humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need. I wish to express our sincere appreciation to the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, which effectively and efficiently led the process of negotiations. We all know that it was not an easy task, but they did excellent work in accommodating the concerns of all delegations with a high sense of responsibility and patience. We also thank all delegations for their flexibility during the negotiation process. We hope that the positive spirit that led the Council to adopt the resolution will prevail, not only in ensuring its effective implementation, but also in laying the bases for greater mutual understanding among all those with enormous influence over developments in Syria, whether in the humanitarian or political and security domains. We know, given the realities, that this is a tall order. One matter needs to be stressed on this occasion. The security situation in Syria is perhaps more complicated today than it has ever been over the past few years. We should not overlook the fact that the source of the humanitarian tragedy that we see today is the result of the difficult political and security situation in the country. We trust that all those, including those whom Ambassador Delattre referred to, will continue to play a role in contributing to the creation of the basis for progress in the peace process. That is extremely critical for ensuring that the humanitarian tragedy is Syria is brought to an end. We can only hope that what the Council has achieved today will lay the basis for averting an even greater humanitarian tragedy in Syria. 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 11/14 Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We wish to thank you, Mr. President, and your team, as well as the Permanent Representative of Sweden and his team, for the tireless efforts made to achieve this important consensus, and we also thank the members of the Council for their flexibility. This commitment will allow for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Syria and the urgent and necessary provision of humanitarian assistance. We underscore the need to maintain unity within the Council in terms of its responsibilities to protect the civilian population, in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru, a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted, will closely monitor its urgent implementation and compliance therewith by all parties involved. We wish to express our sorrow concerning and solidarity with the victims of the conflict in Syria, and our support and admiration for the United Nations humanitarian workers and those of other agencies deployed on the ground. We hope that the important step that we have taken today will help to achieve a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire, as a sponsor of resolution 2401 (2017), which we have just adopted and which is purely humanitarian in nature, commends its initiators, namely, your country, Mr. President, and Sweden. It welcomes the adoption of the resolution, which demands the cessation without delay of hostilities. This demand on the part of the Council must be upheld by all actors on every battlefield in Syria. Côte d'Ivoire also welcomes the efforts undertaken by all parties to arrive at a consensus within the Council. It thanks in particular the Russian Federation for its spirit of compromise. The contribution made by all parties to the adoption of the resolution is aimed at saving the Syrian people from the horrific war plaguing that country, which is imperilling the lives of thousands of human beings, specifically civilians, including women and children. Côte d'Ivoire remains convinced that only a definitive end to the Syrian conflict through negotiations can enable all Syrians to restore peace, achieve reconciliation and rebuild their country, with a view to relaunching its economic and social development. We hope that the 30-day truce demanded by the Council will be the beginning of a process that will bring peace to Syria on the basis of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of all negotiations held in Astana, Sochi and Geneva concerning the country. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): Over the past two days, 10 of the thousands of missiles that have fallen on the Syrian capital landed on the headquarters of the Red Crescent in Damascus, the main headquarters of the Syrian Red Crescent, in the Abu Ramani neighbourhood of Damascus. Those missiles were launched by the moderate armed groups in Al-Ghouta. Thousands of people died, including Dr. Hassan, a professor at the Technological Health Institute in Damascus. A French colleague and friend, Thierry Mariani, said: (spoke in French) "Like hundreds of others over the past five years, Dr. Hassan Haj Hassan was killed by shells fired from Ghouta on Damascus by these moderate rebels. Those dead and are not entitled to media compassion; they are on the wrong side of history. When will there be balanced coverage?" (spoke in Arabic) This French citizen accurately described the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the launching by terrorists of missiles against Damascus. He had visited Aleppo in 2017, and as he was leaving Free Syrian Army gangs fired rockets at the airport. Luckily he was not hurt, but since then the Aleppo airport has been closed because it is unsafe. Also. the head of the Syrian Red Crescent in Idlib, Dr. Muhammad Al-Waty, was kidnapped by moderate armed groups. My colleague the Permanent Representative of France said that we must observe a truce, and I agree with him. However, I think that we also need to implement the 29 other Security Council resolutions on the situation in Syria, of which 13 relate to the fight against terrorism. We need not only a month-long cessation of hostilities; we also need to see the implementation of the 29 other resolutions that the Council has adopted. My colleague the British Ambassador told us horrific stories that he heard from other people. Perhaps S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 12/14 18-05017 he has not heard about what the British forces have done in Iraq, Palestine and Libya. The British Government went to the Malvinas and fought Argentina for an island that it does not own and that is situated tens of thousands of kilometres away from the United Kingdom. However, I say to my British colleague that his Government — and I am not using the term "regime", because I respect international law — is preventing us from countering terrorism in our own territories. We are not going thousands of kilometres away, we have not been fighting in other countries. It is in our own territories that we are combating terrorism — terrorism that is supported by the Government of the United Kingdom. During the meeting on Thursday (see S/PV.8186), I explained the reality of what is happening in Syria — the suffering of civilians as a result of the actions of armed terrorist groups. I assure members once again that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has taken all the de-escalation initiatives seriously and has observed them so as to protect the lives of its citizens and to stop those who have been trading in their pain and blood. In that regard, I note that the Syrian Government has complied with the Astana agreement on establishing de-escalation zones and stipulated a number of commitments, including compelling the signatory armed groups to sever any ties they have with terrorist organizations, especially the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusra Front and all other affiliated groups. At the same time, the Astana agreement gave the Syrian Government the right to respond in case of any violations by those armed groups. It was not at all surprising to us that those terrorist armed groups would not comply with any of those initiatives, but would use them as an opportunity to reorganize their forces and their terrorist fighters, acquire more arms, military equipment, human and logistical support and perpetuate their crimes against the Syrian people. They are receiving instructions from certain States members of the Council, as well as regional actors that are practicing State terrorism to ensure the obstruction and failure of those initiatives and agreements. Since the signing of the agreement on the establishment of de-escalation zones, these armed groups have systematically violated it. In responding to the violations, the Syrian Government has exercised extreme self-restraint to protect the lives of civilians and salvage the agreement that terrorist armed groups and the countries that sponsor them have been trying to obstruct since the moment of signing it. However, these violations have become repeated and serious and have affected the lives of 8 million civilians living in the capital, Damascus, and its suburbs. Attacks have been waged by launching rockets and missiles and using car bombs, with Syrian military sites being targeted. All this has led to an unbearable situation that we cannot condone. As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism. We are also receiving repeated appeals from Syrian citizens for protection — their families, their children, their schools — from the acts of these terrorist armed groups In the light of these violations and terrorist acts, the Syrian Government has had to take the necessary steps to protect its citizens. We exercised our legitimate right to defend them. At the same time, we have taken all the steps necessary to ensure the safety of the civilians who have been taken hostage by these groups and used as human shields inside eastern Ghouta. In cooperation with our Russian friends, we also ensured the safe passage of civilians out of danger from 4 to 14 February. We have provided shelter and food and necessary medical care. The Government has paid for all that assistance. We have called upon armed groups to lay down their weapons and stop their terrorism from residential places and neighbourhoods, and instead engage in national reconciliation initiatives. Of course, the appeals of 8 million Syrians do not reach the Secretariat or the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, although they receive appeals from their proxies — terrorist armed groups and White Helmet terrorists, the new legitimate representative of the Al-Nusra Front. It seems that these countries decided today to replace the black flags of ISIL and Al-Qaida with white flags in Iraq and the White Helmets in Syria. We are therefore done with using the black colour; we are using the white colour now, white flags in Iraq and White Helmets in Syria. According to General Assembly resolution 46/182, which we all negotiated and reached consensus on, the basic principle that governs the delivery of humanitarian aid is respect for the sovereignty of the country concerned as well as coordinating with it fully in any activity in which the United Nations is engaged on the territory of the country in question. However, such principles lose all value when they are 24/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8188 18-05017 13/14 subject to the political whims and double standards of the Secretariat and some more influential countries, particularly when it comes to implementing them in Syria. How else can we explain that some countries submit draft resolutions on the situation in Syria and negotiate them for many weeks with all actors, but excluding the country concerned? This is what I asked the day before yesterday. How do we explain that the Resident Coordinator in Damascus sends a note to the Syrian Foreign Ministry on 14 February stressing that the aid convoys reached 2.3 million Syrians in the so-called besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017, while the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs presented completely false figures yesterday to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and to give Western countries in the Security Council justification for targeting the Syrian Government and its partners? The Resident Coordinator said that aid had reached 2.3 million Syrians. But just two days ago, Mr. Lowcock said that aid had reached only 20,000 people. Along with some members of the Council, we have said repeatedly over the past seven years that to end the suffering of civilians in Syria we do not need non-consensual draft resolutions, nor do we need to adopt new resolutions or hold regular or emergency meetings. We do not need to deplete United Nations resources to prepare periodic reports that rely on unreliable sources. We do not need to establish a committee here and a body there. We need to implement the 29 — now 30 — Security Council resolutions that have been adopted; it is quite a coincidence that by adopting resolution 2401 (2018) today we have reached 30 resolutions. These resolutions should be implemented. The Governments of some countries should stop spending billions of dollars to support and finance armed terrorist groups and provide them with arms. The latest we have heard is that the United States of America has allocated $4 billion to ublically fund the terrorists in Syria. Those countries must stop opening their borders and airports to facilitate the flow of terrorist fighters to Syria. They must allow the Syrian people to shape its future and restore its security and stability without any foreign interference. You said, Mr. President, that the Council rejects anything that violates the purposes and principles of the Charter. Yes, this is very precise. You called also for the implementation of today's resolution in all parts of Syria, which is how we interpret this resolution in Damascus. Resolution 2401 (2018) must be implemented in all parts of Syria, including Afrin, United States-occupied areas and the Golan. In addition, let me make it clear that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France and their enablers in the region should stop holding meetings in Washington, D.C., Paris and London, establishing groups, bodies or forums and devising what they refer to as strategic plans reminiscent of colonial times. Following a meeting in Washington, D.C., they announced that they had drafted a plan to divide Syria within a year — I am just recounting what they said. The strategic plans contained in the document adopted in Washington, D.C., are aimed at dividing Syria, changing its political system by force, spreading terrorism and maintaining an illegitimate military presence in our territories. I say to my colleague the Permanent Representative of the United States, who threatened us here at the Council a while ago and no one has responded to her, that none of the plans will succeed; they will backfire sooner or later. According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, my country has the right to defend itself with all of the legal tools available. A United States occupying military presence exists in our territories, and we have the right to resist it. The representative of the United States has threatened us. We, in turn, give her a warning from this Chamber because, according to Article 51 of the Charter, we have the right to defend ourselves. We again stress that double standards will continue to mar international efforts to counter terrorism as long as there is a partial approach to addressing the threat of armed groups in Syria. Some members of the Council claim that they are concerned about an area controlled by terrorist armed groups in eastern Ghouta. The size of that area is 50 square kilometres. They continue to ignore three illegally occupied Syrian territories covering 50,000 square kilometres. They focus on 50 square kilometres and ignore an area of 50,000 square kilometres, of American, Turkish and Israeli occupation. That simple comparison reflects the political hypocrisy of some Member States, and the inaction of the Security Council and of other bodies of the United Nations, as the Organization succumbs to the political and financial polarization that has become the main feature of its working methods. S/PV.8188 The situation in the Middle East 24/02/2018 14/14 18-05017 In conclusion, we will continue, with the support our allies, to counter terrorism regardless of where it exists in Syria — I repeat, regardless of where it exists in Syria. We are exercising our sovereign right of self-defence and a constitutional right in our territory and within our national borders. We do not send forces to conquer areas thousands of kilometres away, as the so-called illegitimate international coalition does in my country, Syria, today. We do not follow the example of French forces in Mali, the Niger and other African countries, or of the United States and United Kingdom in Afghanistan, Libya today and Iraq previously. We defend ourselves and counter terrorism within our borders. We did not go to Mali, the Niger or the Malvinas. We need serious commitment from Governments that issue instructions to armed terrorist groups. The groups should be given orders to immediately stop targeting civilians and perpetrating terrorist acts — I repeat immediately and without delay, as the resolution stipulates. I stress that the Syrian Government will reserve the right to respond as it deems appropriate if such groups target civilians in any part of Syria with even a single missile. I take it that we all understand that paragraph 1 of resolution 2401 (2018) also applies to the aggression of Turkish forces in Afrin and the repeated acts of aggression by the international coalition against my country's sovereignty and territories. Of course, resolution 2401 (2018) applies also to the continuous violations by Israeli occupation forces against Syria's sovereignty, by supporting terrorist factions in the occupied Syrian Golan. That is how we interpret the resolution just adopted by the Council. The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.
TANİN'DEKİ YAZILARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE BABANZÂDE İSMAİL HAKKI'NIN MEŞRUTİYET DÜŞÜNCESİÖZETBabanzâde İsmail Hakkı Bey; etkili bir aydın, politikacı, gazeteci ve yazar olarak II. Meşrutiyet döneminin önemli isimlerinden biri olmuştur. Kökü 16. yüzyıla uzanan, Süleymaniye şehrinin kurucusu ünlü Kürt aşireti Baban ailesine mensuptur. İslamcılık düşüncesinin güçlü temsilcilerinden Babanzâde Ahmed Naim'in kardeşidir. Hukuk Mektebi'ni bitirdikten sonra Mülkiye ve Mühendis Mektepleri'nde hocalık; İkdam, Tanin, Şura-yı Ümmet gibi gazetelerde köşe yazarlığı yapmıştır. Hukukla ilgili eserlerinin yanı sıra Bismarc biyografisi ve Dreyfus Meselesini anlattığı kitapları da bulunmaktadır.Meclis-i Mebusan'da Bağdat (1908) ve Divaniye (1912) mebusu olarak yer almış, İbrahim Hakkı Paşa Kabinesi'nde Maarif Vekilliği (1911) siyasi kariyerinin en üst noktası olmuştur. 26 Aralık 1913'te, henüz 37 yaşında iken ders verdiği sırada vefat etmiştir.Meşrutiyet düşüncesini resmetmeye çalıştığım bu tezde onu tanımlayabilecek temel kavramlar; itidal, tedrici tekâmül, meşruiyet,parlamenter sisteme bağlılık, teamül , uzlaşma kültürüdür.Babanzâde, Meşrutiyet'i demokrasi ile eşanlamlı bir yönetim olarak gördüğü için yazılarını, demokrasiyi oluşturan temel unsurları (çoğunluk, çoğulculuk, yasama, yürütme, yargı, güçler ayrılığı, basın özgürlüğü, hukukun üstünlüğü vb.) esas alarak sınıflandırdım.Nitekim 1909 Ağustos'unda yayınlanan Şeyhülislamlık Beyannamesi'ni değerlendirdiği yazılarında; hâkimiyet-i milliye, iktidarın denetlenmesi, güçler ayrılığı, müsavat kavramlarını vurguladığı görülmektedir.Yaşanan olaylara sosyolojik izahlar getirmesi, akademik kimliğinin yazılarına akseden önemli bir parçasıdır. Etki-tepki kanunu, değişimin kaçınılmazlığı, parça-bütün ilişkisi, evrimci yaklaşım, bazı sorunların ancak toplumsal olgunlaşma ile çözülebileceği, yeniliklerin somut ihtiyaçlardan başlaması gerektiği bunlardan birkaçıdır. İttihad ve Terakki Partisi'nin güçlü olduğu dönemde, siyasi rakiplerinin kürsü dokunulmazlığı ve emeklilik haklarını savunması demokrasiye olan bağlılığındaki samimiyeti gösterir.Sultan Reşad'ın cülus yıldönümlerinde kaleme aldığı yazılar, Meclis'te hanedanın damatlarının -onurlarının korunabilmesi için- ödeneklerinin artırılması teklifini desteklemesi onun saltanata karşı olduğu iddiasını çürütmektedir. Ancak sistem içerisinde padişaha biçtiği rol de oldukça sınırlıdır: Milletin birliğini ve ülkenin bütünlüğünü temsil eden, siyasi yetkileri azaltılmış sembolik bir makam.Ona göre; halk Meşrutiyet yönetimiyle beraber iktidara ortak olmuştur. Ancak sınırsız bir özgürlük elde etmemiştir. Hakkını kurallar içerisinde aramalıdır. Rüşvet, tembellik, düzensizlik gibi toplumsal hastalıkların tedavisi için siyasi ve medeni terbiyenin yükselmesi gereklidir.Çoğulculuk kavramına çok erken sayılabilecek bir dönemde vurgu yapması onun demokrasi çıtasının yüksekliğini göstermektedir. Ona göre azınlıkta kalan siyasi hareketler ancak sağlam ve tutarlı fikirlerle hayatta kalabilirler.Karmaşık seçim sisteminde en iyi sonucu alabilmek için İttihad ve Terakki'nin hem seçmenlerine hem adaylarına hem de parti yöneticilerine tavsiyelerde bulunur. Bu tavsiyeler günümüzde dahi yerleşmemiş olan parti içi demokrasi anlayışı açısından oldukça önemlidir.Dini inançların seçim malzemesi yapılmasına karşı çıkar. Siyasi cinayetlere şiddetle karşıdır. Partisinin seçim başarısını açıklarken güçlü bir analizci olduğu görülmektedir.Basının halkın sesi olduğuna dair iyimserliği siyasi rekabetin labirentlerinde kaybolur. Bu alandaki düzensizliğin önlenmesi için bir Matbuat Cemiyeti kurulmasını ve bir Matbuat Nizamnamesi hazırlanmasını önemsemiştir. Yabancı basının iç politikada taraf olmasına karşı çıkar.Osmanlı Devleti'nin azınlıkları Türkleştirmeye çalıştığı ithamını bir iftira olarak görür. Ancak herkesi ortak vatan ve ortak vatandaşlık çatısı altında bir araya getirecek Osmanlıcılık politikasının da gerekli olduğunu savunur. Eşitlik talep eden azınlıkların eski ayrıcalıklarının devam etmesini istemelerini ise bir çelişki olarak görür. Kültürel amaçla kurulan Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti'ne (1908) üye olması ve bu Cemiyet'in gazetesinde yazı yazması, azınlıkları Türkleştirmenin yanlış olacağını savunması kendisinin Türkleşmiş Kürt olduğu iddiasını çürütür; Osmanlıcılık idealine samimiyetle bağlı Kürt kökenli bir aydın olduğunu gösterir.Arnavutluk'un Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayrılış süreci tam bir travma etkisi doğurur. Çünkü bu ayrılış "ümmet" anlayışına vurulan ilk darbedir. Arap siyasi hareketlerine, bu süreçte yaşananları bir ibret olarak hatırlatır.Devleti oluşturan unsurlardan başta yasamayı (Meclis) öne çıkarırken daha sonra yürütmeyi ilk sıraya geçirmiştir. Bir hükümet kurulurken padişah-sadrazam-Meclis arasında güvenoyu alınmasını sağlayacak bir işbirliğini gerekli görür. Bugünkü tabirle teknokrat bir koalisyon hükümeti kurulmasına, yürütmeyi zayıflatacağı için karşı çıkar.Örfi İdarenin hatalarının üstünü örtme çabası ve muhalefetin sesini daha gür duyurabileceği açık alan mitinglerine karşı çıkması onun demokrasi anlayışında tespit edebildiğimiz nadir kırılmalardır. Halaskarân Zabitan tehdidi karşısındaki dik duruşu ise takdire şayandır.Ona göre, yasama organının diğer parçası olan Ayan Meclisi'nin varlığı -aristokratik bir geçmişe dayanmadığı için- sadece bir sebeple anlamlıdır: Kanunların hazırlanması sürecinde ihtiyaç duyulan teenniyi sağlaması. Buna rağmen zaten Meclis'in feshinde onay hakkına sahip olan Ayan Meclisi'nin bir de hükümeti düşürebilecek istizah (gensoru), kendi üyelerini seçme gibi haklara sahip olursa sistemdeki tek güç olacağı uyarısını yapar. Meclis müzakerelerinin uzamaması için yaptığı teklifler tam bir uzman görüşüdür. Muhalefet milletvekillerinin iktidarın istediği kanunları engellemek için başvurduğu obstrüksiyon (engelleme) yöntemlerini demokrasi dışı uygulamalar olarak tanımlar.Ocak 1912'de Meclis'in ilk feshinin ardından aynı yıl Ahmet Muhtar Paşa Kabinesi döneminde yeniden feshedilmesi çabasına şiddetle karşı çıkar. Bu amaçla dile getirilen Meclis'in ömrüne dair fikirleri ustaca çürütür.Güçler dengesi bağlamında Meclis'in istizah hakkına karşılık hükümetin cevabın ertelenmesi hakkının hangi dengede olması gerektiğini izah eder. İstizah, güven oylaması ile sonuçlanan bir yöntem olarak kullanıldığı için iktidarın denetlenmesinde daha hafif bir yöntem olarak sual yöntemini teklif eder. Meclis'in adem-i itimad oyuna karşılık Hükümet'in Meclis'i feshetme hakkını düzenleyen 35. maddenin değiştirilmesi meselesi, güçler dengesi başlığının en önemli konusudur. Anayasa'da yapılan 1909 tadilatıyla bu denge İttihad ve Terakki tarafından Meclis lehine bozulmuştur. 1912'de dengenin yeniden kurulması için yapılan teklifin de İttihadçılardan gelmesi muhalifler tarafından şiddetle eleştirilmiştir.Babanzâde, yargı alanında reform ihtiyacını kabul etmektedir. Ancak bunun da tedrici bir şekilde olması gerektiğini savunur. Mahkemelerin tekliği esas olmasına rağmen bir süre daha memurların yargılanması için idari mahkemelerin varlığını sürdürmesi gereklidir. Gezici sulh mahkemelerinin kurulması adi suçların çözümünü hızlandıracaktır. Hâkimlerin ilmi yeterliliklerini artırmak için hukuk mekteplerinin sayısı artırılmalı, gayret eksikliğini gidermek için görevde yükselme şartlarını belirleyen objektif kriterler getirilmelidir.Ordu ve adliye mensubu memurların politikadan uzak durması şarttır. Ancak bu sayede saygınlıklarını koruyabilirler. Küçük düzeydeki memurların halkı bilgilendirmek amacıyla politikayla ilgilenmesi yanlış olmaz, aksi takdirde siyasi güç kısa zamanda yerel zorbaların eline geçer. Memurların sendikal haklara sahip olmaması fikri ise bugün geçerliliğini yitirmiştir.BABANZÂDE İSMAİL HAKKI'S CONSTİTUTİONALİZM İDEA İN THE VİEW OF HİS WRİTİNGS İN TANİNBabanzâde İsmail Hakkı Bey: He is one of the important names of II. Constitutionalizm as an effective intellectual, politician, journalist and an auther.He is a member of Baban Family which is a famous Kurdish tribe in 16. Cc. The founder of Suleymaniye city. He is the brother of Babanzâde Ahmet Naim who is the most powerful represantative of Pan-İslam. After graduation from law school,he worked at Mülkiye and Engineering Schools and wrote articles to İkdam, Tanin, Şura-yı Ümmet newspapers. In addition to his Works about law, he wrote Bismarc biography and the book which he told about Dreyfus matter.He worked as a representative of Bağdat and Divaniye in Grand National Assembly (Mebusan Meclisi). He worked as an Education Minister with İbrahim Hakkı's Goverment. This position was his top career. While he was teaching ,26 th December 1913 at 37 years old he died.When I want to describe his constitutionalism with this thesis, I can say these terms: moderate, improving step by step, legitimacy, devotion on the system of parliament, customs, culture of reconcile.As Babanzâde has seen constitutinalism and democracy the same, I classified his writings as the basic items: majority, pluralism, legislation, propulsion, judgement the diversity of powers, the freedom of press and dominiant of law.In his writings which criticized Şeyhülislam Declaration in 1909 August, it is seen that he focused on soverignity, inspecting the power goverment, the diversity of power and equality.His sociological way of describing the events is important part of his career. Effect and cause, inevitable change, the relation of part and whole, evolutionist approach, the thing that some problems can only be solved by the maturity of the society and the necessity that the innovation must started by the concrete need are some of them.When İttihad and Terakki Party was powerful, his defensing the rivals seat untouchable position of its and the rights of being retired shows his dependancy on democracy.In Sultan Reşat's ascending the throne anniversary writings his supporting increasing the subsidy of sons in law on the behalf of protecting their honour in the assembly refutes the idea of opposition against the throne. But the role of the Sultan is very limited in his system it is a symbolic stage which represents the unity of the nation and the unity of whole country.According to him the people participated in the political power with constitutinaolism. However,they couldn't get endless freedom. They have to look for their right according to the rules and law. The social disorders like bribery, laziness, untidiness can be solved by increasing the level of political and civilized understanding of society.His focusing the concept of pluralism at early period shows his improving the idea of democracy for him weak political movements can only stay alive by strong and coherent ideas.He has some suggestions both to the candidates and voters of İttihad and Terakki in order to be succesful on the complicated voting system. These suggestions are very important for the today's changeable party and democracy understanding.He is opposed to misusing of religious beliefs. He is strongly object to political murders. While he is describing his party's voting success, he is seen to be a strong analisist.The optimism of the press about being the voice of the nation disappears in the labyrinth of political competition. He gave importance to the foundation of press and to the event of preparing a press declaration in order to prevent the disorders in this field. He opposes to foreign press's side in inside policy.The minorities of Ottoman Empire sees the accusation of making them Turkish as a slander. On the other hand,he thinks that the Ottoman policy which will make all the natives and non-natives United is a most that the minorities who demands equality and also demanding their old privilages is seen as a contradiction by him. The event of being a member of the Kurdish Teavün and Terakki Association founded with the aim of culture (1908) and writing many articles in this association's newspaper and defending that it would be wrong to make Kurdish people Turkish refutes that he is a Kurdish. It shows that he is a Kurdish-rooted, intellectual person who is strongly devoted himself to Ottoman idealism.The period in which Albania seperated from Ottoman Empaire reveals a real travma. Because this parting is a real blow for the Muslim Community. He sees it as a sample for the Arabic political movements.He gives importance to legislation but then he finds carrying a law more important than legislation. He thinks a cooperation providing with winning a vote of confidence among Sultan-Grand Vizier and Assembly is necessary. He objects to today's technocrat coalition goverment, because of its dangerous effects on carrying out the law.His effors to conceal the faults of cencorship and his objections to opposition party's demonstrations are his defects of his democracy understanding. However,his standing upwright against the threat of Halaskarân is worth to appreciating.In his opinion, existing Ayan Assembly another part of legislation is only meaningful -because of not depending on the aristocratic past- while laws being pirepared the needed calmness is because provided. Neverthless he warns that if Ayan Assembly has the right to select its own members and to give interpellation in Parliment, it will be the unique power.His suggestions not to last the parliment discussions are totally expert ideas. He identifies the methods which the opposition party's members applied for preventing the power's laws are out of democracy.He is strongly against to the efforts of repealing during Ahmet Muhtar Paşa Kabinet period again after the first repealing of parliment in January 1912. He eliminates the ideas of the life-span of the Assembly.He explains the necessary balance between assembly's interpellation right and goverments delaying right to answer. As interpellation is a method used for voting for trust he proposes as a light method "questioning method" to inspect the goverment.The problem which is about the changing of the 35. Matter the right of repealing the goverment is the most important subject of the power balance. The change in 1909 constitution ,this balance was ruined against the Parliment by İttihad and Terakki. In 1912 the proposal by İttihad and Terakki to rebuild this balance was strongly criticized by the opponents.Babanzâde accepts the need for a change in judgement. But he defends that is should be step by step. Although the courts are the only way to judge, managerial courts must exist to judge the officers for a while. Founding portable peace courts will make the solution the vulgar crimes faster. The number of law schools should be more in order to develop the judge's careers and there should be some objective criteria to improve on their careers and to prevent the effort deficiency.It is a condition for army and judge staff to be away from the policy. Providing that they can protect their esteem. Low-level officers' dealing with the policy is not wrong, otherwise political-power can be subsituted with local tyrants. The officer's union rights have disappeared today.
The firming of the economic recovery is putting the policy spotlight back on the longer term challenge of faster, more inclusive Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Modest investment rates despite attractive returns and low savings rates despite favorable demographics are important impediments. A virtuous cycle of faster capital accumulation, job creation (especially for the youth), and technological advancement needs to be stimulated. There are no quick fixes that can produce the desired stimulus. The quest for inclusive growth calls for a different, bolder approach. Integration of the advanced and less-developed economies and more effective integration with the global economy, using factory Southern Africa as a platform, hold considerable potential. South Africa's medium-term growth prospects point to a strengthening recovery. GDP growth is projected to be 3.5 percent in 2011, 4.1 percent in 2012 and 4.4 percent in 2013. The long term potential growth rate under the current policy environment is estimated at 3.5 percent. In light of South Africa's low national savings, the reemergence of high current account deficits, financed mostly through volatile portfolio flows, will reemerge as the biggest cause for macroeconomic concern over the medium term. With considerable strengthening of the economic recovery and GDP projected to reach its potential by 2014, the focus shifts back to the longer term challenge of raising GDP growth to 6-7 percent and making it much more inclusive to tackle the extremely high unemployment. This first issue is anchored in the national aspirations of faster and more inclusive growth, with special emphasis on the issues of savings and investment.
Tom Cyberbezpieczeństwo wyzwaniem XXI wieku jest opracowaniem, które wpisuje się w kontekst rozważań poświęconych wielorakim aspektom bezpieczeństwa w cyberprzestrzeni. Autorzy, którzy zostali zaproszeni do realizacji tego projektu, prezentują różne spojrzenia na tę problematykę. Pomysłodawcą pierwszego rozdziału – Główni aktorzy cyberprzestrzeni i ich działalność jest Tomasz Hoffman. Autor, piszący z perspektywy prawno-politologicznej, posiłkujący się dorobkiem nauk o bezpieczeństwie, koncentruje się na ukazaniu potencjalnych aktorów cyberprzestrzeni, ich działalności, a w tym również zachowań niezgodnych z prawem. Cyberbezpieczeństwo, zdaniem Hoffmana, jest nową dziedziną bezpieczeństwa narodowego, z którą nieodłącznie wiążą się takie wyzwania, jak cyberprzestępczość oraz cyberterroryzm. Drugi rozdział – Cyberbezpieczeństwo jako wyzwanie dla współczesnego państwa i społeczeństwa – wyszedł spod pióra Marka Górki. Badacz dokonał przeglądu aktualnego stanu bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego w kontekście rozprzestrzeniania się zagrożeń pochodzących z cyberprzestrzeni, tworzonych przez organizacje państwowe oraz niepaństwowe. Górka stoi na stanowisku, że cyberprzestrzeń stała się podstawową cechą świata i stworzyła nową rzeczywistość dla prawie wszystkich krajów, co sprawia, że problemy z cyberprzestępczością oraz cyberbezpieczeństwem mają istotne, globalne znaczenie zarówno w wymiarze politycznym, jak i gospodarczym. Z przemyśleniami Górki koresponduje tekst Bogusława Węglińskiego – Cyberterroryści w cyfrowych czasach – profesjonalizacja i digitalizacja współczesnych organizacji terrorystycznych. Autor poddał analizie ewoluujące wraz z rozwojem technologii instrumentarium wykorzystywane przez grupy terrorystyczne, zwracając uwagę na Internet, który otworzył przed nimi nowe możliwości oddziaływania, a w tym także w sferze kreowania przekazu medialnego. W tekście zawarte są również dociekania dotyczące możliwości użycia przez terrorystów dronów. Nadmieńmy, że także czwarty rozdział Ataki cyberfizyczne a system bezpieczeństwa narodowego, którego autorem jest Bogusław Olszewski, wpisuje się w nurt wcześniejszych dociekań. W tej części tomu poruszone zostały sprawy związane z niepożądanym oddziaływaniem systemów cyberfizycznych na bezpieczeństwo otoczenia międzynarodowego. Zdaniem Olszewskiego, ich hybrydowy (cyfrowo-materialny) charakter sprawia, że wpływają nie tylko na logiczną warstwę cyberprzestrzeni, ale także na dziedzinę fizyczną. Umożliwiają m.in. destabilizację porządku wewnętrznego państwa, co w konsekwencji może prowadzić do destrukcyjnych zmian w szerszym, międzynarodowym kontekście. Stanowią zatem wielowymiarowe zagrożenie dla szeroko pojętego systemu bezpieczeństwa globalnego W rozdziale piątym, Marcin Adamczyk przedłożył tekst Cyberszpiegostwo w relacjach chińsko-amerykańskich w kontekście potencjalnej zmiany światowego hegemona. Opracowanie poświęcone jest działaniom Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w cyberprzestrzeni, ukierunkowanych na nielegalne pozyskanie amerykańskich technologii wojskowych i cywilnych. Zdaniem autora, Państwo Środka jest aktualnie jedynym krajem, który obecnie mógłby rzucić wyzwanie dominacji Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dążenie do uzyskania statusu państwa hegemonicznego wymaga zatem od Pekinu zbudowania odpowiedniej koalicji wspierającej Chiny na arenie międzynarodowej, ale również zmniejszenia dystansu ekonomicznego, jaki dzieli to państwo od Waszyngtonu. Autorem kolejnego rozdziału jest Kamil Baraniuk, którzy przygotował tekst Zarys przemian instytucjonalnych rosyjskiego wywiadu radioelektronicznego. Baraniuk podkreśla, że współczesny wysoki stopień zinformatyzowania społeczeństw i powszechności korzystania z technologii informatycznych sprawia, iż dane o charakterze sygnałowym i elektromagnetycznym stanowią bardzo istotne źródło informacji dla wyspecjalizowanych instytucji, zajmujących się ich gromadzeniem oraz przetwarzaniem. W tym kontekście zarysowuje genezę i przekształcenia instytucjonalne wywiadu radioelektronicznego Federacji Rosyjskiej, a co za tym idzie wojskowe i cywilne instytucje zajmujące się tego rodzaju działalnością na przestrzeni ostatnich kilkudziesięciu lat, przy uwzględnieniu ich zadań, a także zmian personalnych w ich kierownictwie. Rozdział siódmy napisany został przez dwie autorki z Ukrainy. Tetiana W. Nagachevskaya i Lyudmila Frliksowa przygotowały rozważania zatytułowane Napriamky formuwannia miżnarodnoji konkurentospromożnosti IT-sektoru Ukrajiny. Zawierają one analizę stanu i osobliwości kształtowania się międzynarodowej konkurencyjności sektora IT na Ukrainie. Nagachevskaya i Frliksowa zaprezentowały pozycję ukraińskiego sektora IT rozpatrywaną w kontekście Networked Readiness Index, który mierzy skłonność do wykorzystywania przez kraje możliwości oferowanych przez technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne. Ponadto, ukazały przewagę konkurencyjną i wady ukraińskich firm IT na rynkach międzynarodowych oraz kierunki wzrostu międzynarodowej konkurencyjności sektora informatycznego Ukrainy. Kolejne dwa rozdziały dotykają problematyki religijnej w cyberprzestrzeni. Autorem dociekań – Religijne i parareligijne grupy destrukcyjne: wyzwania cyberprzestrzeni – jest Wojciech Gajewski, który zwraca uwagę na sprawę penetrowania wirtualnej przestrzeni przez destrukcyjne grupy religijne. Jego zdaniem, stanowią one wzrastające zagrożenie nie tylko dla jej indywidualnych użytkowników, ale także zbiorowości społecznych. Religioznawca jest zwolennikiem podejmowania szeroko zakrojonych działań badawczych, edukacyjnych, a także prawnych, które wpłyną na ograniczenie negatywnych następstw ich aktywności w cyberprzestrzeni. Z kolei, Lucjan Klimsza przedłożył tekst Filozoficzne aspekty działania Internetu w kontekście zadań misyjnych Kościoła. Autor, który jest duchownym ewangelickim, zwraca uwagę na możliwości, jakie otwiera przed współczesnym chrześcijaństwem dostęp do przestrzeni cyfrowej. Klimsza wyraźnie zaznacza, że obecny Kościół musi być wspólnotą multimedialną, jednakże nie wirtualną, która jest oddalona od człowieka i jego realnej egzystencji. Autor, Internet postrzega zatem jako metamedium umożliwiające przekazywanie treści religijnych, które może być pomocne m.in. w spotkaniu i relacjach człowieka z człowiekiem oraz Boga z człowiekiem. Dziesiąty rozdziały Cyberbezpieczeństwo jako konstrukt w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej, będący rozważaniami o nachyleniu politologicznym, napisał Przemysław Mikiewicz. Tekst jest refleksją nad obecnością kategorii cyberbezpieczeństwa w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej, którą autor zawęził do opiniotwórczego oddziaływania centralnych instytucji państwowych oraz partii politycznych. Autor wskazuje, że pojęcie cyberbezpieczeństwa jest obecne w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej w różnym stopniu w dokumentach rządowych i w programach partii politycznych. Zdaniem Mikiewicza, występuje zasadnicza asymetria pomiędzy oboma typami dokumentów: dokumenty urzędowe poświęcają uwagę cyberbezpieczeństwu w znacznym stopniu, podczas gdy w dokumentach partyjnych kwestia ta jest jedynie wzmiankowana. Tak więc, cyberbezpieczeństwo jawi się jako rodzaj konstruktu, za pomocą którego kreowany jest obraz świata pełnego nienamacalnych niebezpieczeństw, do zwalczania których nieodzowne wydaje się publikowanie dokumentów pod postacią kolejnych doktryn i strategii walki z zagrożeniami w cyberprzrestrzeni. W nurt rozważań politologicznych wpisują się także dwa kolejne teksty. Autorem pierwszego jest Grzegorz Tokarz, którego dociekania zostały zatytułowane Internet jako instrument nawoływania do przemocy – przykład organizacji "Krew i Honor" Polska. Tekst przybliża działalność polskiej sekcji neonazistowskiej organizacji "Krew i Honor", a w tym zawartość jej strony internetowej, która jest istotnym narzędziem w propagowaniu idei tego środowiska, jak również źródłem informacji o osobach oraz instytucji uznawanych za zdrajców "białej rasy". Drugi tekst, który zarazem kończy niniejszy tom przygotował Mariusz Kozerski. W rozdziale Dawne afery polityczne ze współczesnej perspektywy: przykład sprawy Barschela/Pffeifera analizowana jest rola, jaką media odgrywają w nagłaśnianiu afer politycznych. Autor poddał oglądowi wydarzenia, które rozegrały się w latach 80 XX wieku, w północnoniemieckim landzie Szlezwik-Holsztyn, a w których ważną rolę odegrał opiniotwórczy tygodnik "Der Spiegel". Dodajmy, że Kozerski podejmuje się również próby odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jaki sposób afera kilońska mogłaby przebiegać współcześnie, w kontekście potencjału informacyjnego/opiniotwórczego, którym charakteryzuje się globalna sieć komputerowa. ; "Cybersecurity as the challenge of the XXI century" is a collection of considerations dedicated to various aspects of security in cyberspace. Authors, who have been invited to this project, present different views on this subject. An author of the first chapter, "The main actors of cyberspace and their activities", is Tomasz Hoffman. Writing from a legal and political perspective, including the achievements of security sciences, he tries to present potential actors of cyberspace, and their activities, including behaviors against the law. Cybersecurity, according to Hoffman, is a new element of national security and is related to challenges, such as cybercrime and cyberterrorism. The second chapter, "Cybersecurity as a challenge for modern countries and societies", has been written by Marek Górka. The researcher has reviewed the current situation of the cybersecurity in the context of the spread of dangers in cyberspace, created by government and non-government organizations. Górka states that cyberspace has become a basic feature of the world and has created a new reality for almost all countries, what caused that the problems with cybercrime and cybersecurity became significant in both, the political and the economic aspect. A text, which corresponds to the Górka's thoughts, is the text "Cyberterrorists in digital times - professionalization and digitalization of modern terrorist organizations" by Bogusław Węgliński. The author has analyzed the instruments used by terrorist groups. The instruments which have been evolving along with the development of technology. The most important of them is the Internet, which has opened new opportunities for terrorists, including digital communicating. The text also includes aspects of the usage of drones by terrorists. The fourth chapter, "Cyber-physical attacks and the national security system", by Bogusław Olszewski, is also related to the previously mentioned issues. This part of the book deals with matters of the undesirable impact of cyber-physical systems on the safety of the international environment. According to Olszewski, their hybrid (digital-material) character causes that they affect not only the logical aspect of cyberspace but also the physical one. They enable destabilization of the internal structure of countries, what can lead to destructive changes in the wider, international context. They are a multifaceted danger to the broadly understood system of the global security. In the fifth chapter, Marcin Adamczyk has presented a text titled "Cyberspying in Chinese-American relations, in the context of the potential change of the world hegemon". The study is dedicated to the activities of the People's Republic of China in cyberspace, taken to acquire American military and civil technologies. The author claims that China is currently the only country that could challenge the global domination of the United States. However, to obtain the status of the hegemonic state, Beijing would need to build a solid coalition, supporting China on the international arena, but also reduce the economic distance between Beijing and Washington. An author of the next chapter is Kamil Baraniuk, who has prepared a text titled "Outline of the institutional changes in the Russian radio-electronic intelligence". Baraniuk emphasizes that the high level of computerization of societies and the common use of information technologies makes the signal and electromagnetic data a very important source of information for specialized institutions dealing with information collection and processing. In this context the author outlines the genesis and the institutional transformation of the Russian radio-electronic intelligence, as well as the military and civil institutions dealing with this kind of activities over the last decades, analyzing their tasks and personnel changes in their management. The seventh chapter has been written by two authors from Ukraine. Tetiana W. Nagachevskaya and Lyudmila Frliksowa prepared a text "Napryamky formuvannya mizhnarodnoyi konkurentospromozhnosti IT-sector Ukrayiny". This text contains an analysis of the current situation and peculiarities in the shaping of the international competitiveness of the IT sector in Ukraine. Nagachevskaya and Frliksowa have presented the position of the Ukrainian IT sector, considered in the context of the Networked Readiness Index, which measures the tendency of different countries to use the opportunities offered by informational and communicational technology. In addition, they have shown competitive advantages and disadvantages of Ukrainian IT companies on international markets, and directions of growth of the international competitiveness of the IT sector in Ukraine. Next two chapters have been related to religious issues in cyberspace. "Religious and pseudoreligious destructive groups: the challenges of cyberspace" has been written by Wojciech Gajewski, who pays attention to the matter of penetrating of the virtual space by various destructive religious groups. In his opinion, they become increasing dangers not only for individual users of the cyberspace but also for entire social groups. The religious scholar is a supporter of extensive research, educational and even legal activities, that suppose to reduce the negative consequences of the sectarian activity in cyberspace. Next author, Lucjan Klimsza, has presented a text "Philosophical aspects of the Internet in the context of missionary tasks of the Church". Klimsza, who is a Protestant pastor, pays attention to the possibilities that the access to the digital space opens to contemporary Christianity. He clearly states that the current Church must be a multimedia, but not a virtual community, distant from a man and his real existence. The author sees the Internet as a meta-medium enabling the transmission of religious content, which may be helpful in cognition and relationship between man and God, as well as between man and man. Tenth chapter, "Cybersecurity as a construct in the Polish public space", has been written by Przemysław Mikiewicz from a political perspective. The text is a reflection of the presence of the cybersecurity in Polish public space, which has been specified by the author as the opinion-making influence of the central government institutions and political parties. The author indicates that the concept of the cybersecurity is present in the Polish public space in government documents and programs of political parties. According to Mikiewicz, there is a fundamental asymmetry between these two types: government documents pay a lot of attention to cybersecurity, programs of political parties, however, only mention about the issue. Finally, cybersecurity appears as a kind of a construct used to create an image of the modern world, full of immaterial dangers, which might be eliminated only by publication of new doctrines and strategies, created to combat dangers in cyberspace. The political aspect of the cybersecurity issue is present also in the next two texts. An author of the first one is Grzegorz Tokarz, whose section has been titled "The Internet as an instrument to incite violence - an example of Poland". The text introduces activities of the Polish section of this neo- Nazi organization, including the content of its website, which is an important tool, used to promote the ideas of this environment, as well as a source of information about people and institutions considered to be the traitors of the "white race". The second text, which also ends this book, has been prepared by Mariusz Kozerski. In this chapter, titled "Former political scandals from a modern perspective: an example of the Barschel/Pffeifer case", the analyzed issue is the role played by media to publicize political scandals. The author has reviewed incidents that took place in the 1980s, in the German land of Schleswig-Holstein. A significant role in those happenings was played by "Der Spiegel", an opinion-forming weekly magazine. Let's add that Kozerski also tries to answer the question of how that, socalled "Kiel scandal" could look like if it happened today, in the context of the contemporary informational/opinion-forming potential, which characterizes the global computer network.
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Text finalised on December 15th, 2024. This Nota Internacional is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team. Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, with contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Jordi Bacaria, Pol Bargués, Javier Borràs, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Daniel Castilla, Carmen Claudín, Patrizia Cogo, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Patrícia Garcia-Duran, Víctor García, Seán Golden, Rafael Grasa, Josep M. Lloveras, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Oscar Mateos, Pol Morillas, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Laia Tarragona and Alexandra Vidal. 2025 begins with more questions than answers. The world has already voted and now it is time to see what policies await us. What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?In 2025 there will be talk of ceasefires, but not of peace. The diplomatic offensive will gain ground in Ukraine, while the fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition. These movements will test an international system incapable of resolving the structural causes of conflicts.The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, the shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policies, both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025.2025 will be a year of post-election hangover. The world has now cast its vote, and it has done so in many cases from a place of anger, discontent or fear. Over 1.6 billion people went to the polls in 2024 and in general they did so to punish the parties in power. The list of defeated rulers is a long one: US Democrats, UK Conservatives, "Macronism" in France, the Portuguese left. Even those who weathered the storm have been weakened, as shown by the election debacle of Shigeru Ishiba's ruling party in Japan, or the coalitions necessary in the India of Narendra Modi or the South Africa of Cyril Ramaphosa.The election super-cycle of 2024 has left democracy a little more bruised. The countries experiencing a net decline in democratic performance far outnumber those managing to move forward. According to The Global State of Democracy 2024 report, four out of nine states are worse off than before in terms of democracy and only around one in four have seen an improvement in quality. 2025 is the year of Donald Trump's return to the White House and of a new institutional journey in the European Union (EU) underpinned by unprecedentedly weak parliamentary support. The West's democratic volatility is colliding with the geopolitical hyperactivity of the Global South and the virulence of armed conflict hotspots. Which is why 2025 begins with more questions than answers. With the polls closed and the votes counted, what policies await us ? What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?
Even if the United States today is a retreating power and power has spread to new actors (both public and private) who have been challenging Washington's hegemony for some time now, Donald Trump's return to the presidency means the world must readjust. Global geopolitical equilibriums and the various conflicts raging – particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East – as well as the fight against climate change or the levels of unpredictability of a shifting international order could all hinge on the new White House incumbent. The fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition, which reinforces the idea that 2025 will be a year of need for diplomatic processes that accompany the geopolitical rebalancing that may come in the coming months.We also live in a world still weighed down by the impact of COVID-19. Five years after the coronavirus pandemic, many countries continue to grapple with the debt they took on to combat the economic and social damage of that global health crisis. The pandemic left us a world deeper in debt, one that is more digitalised and individualistic, where the discordant voices among the major global powers have been gaining ground; where climate, economic and geopolitical goals are becoming increasingly divergent. It is a world in which not only policies clash, but discourses too. The old social and cultural fault lines have become more evident: from culture wars to the struggle for control over information and algorithmically inflated bubbles on social media. The elections in the United States, Pakistan, India, Romania, Moldova or Georgia are a clear illustration of the destabilising power of "alternative" narratives.
The US election hangover, then, will not be the type to be cured with rest and a broth. Trump himself will see to ramping up the political posturing as he makes his return to the Oval Office starting January 20th. Yet, above the rhetorical noise, it is hard to distinguish what answers will be put in place, to what extent we are entering a year that will further reinforce the barriers and withdrawal that have turned society inwards and fragmented global hyperconnectivity; or if, on the other hand, we shall see the emergence of a still tentative determination to imagine alternative policies that provide answers to the real causes of discontent and try to reconstruct increasingly fragile consensuses. 1-EGO-POLITICS AND INDIVIDUALISM2025 is the year of posturing and personalism. We shall see the emergence not just of new leaderships, but also of new political actors. The magnate Elon Musk's entry into the campaign and Donald Trump's new administration personify this shift in the exercise of power. The world's richest individual, clutching the loudest megaphone in a digitalised society, is stepping into the White House to act as the president's right-hand man. Musk is a "global power", the holder of a political agenda and private interests that many democratic governments do not know how to negotiate. In this shift in power (both public and private) the cryptocurrency industry accounted for nearly half of all the money big corporations paid into political action committees (PACs) in 2024, according to a report by the progressive NGO Public Citizen. The last political cycle – from 2020 to 2024 – was characterised by "election denialism": a losing candidate or party disputed the outcome of one in five elections. In 2025, this denialism has reached the Oval Office. The myth of the triumphant narcissist has been bolstered by the ballot box. It is the triumph of ego over charisma. Some call it "ego-politics".Ever more voices are challenging the status quo of democracies in crisis. Anti-politics is taking root in the face of mainstream parties that are drifting ever further away from their traditional voters. Trump himself believes he is the leader of a "movement" (Make America Great Again, or MAGA) that transcends the reality of the Republican Party. These new anti-establishment figures have gradually gained ground, allies and prophets. From the illiberal media phenomenon of the Argentinian president Javier Milei – who will face his first big test in the parliamentary elections of October – to Călin Georgescu, the far-right candidate for the presidency of Romania who carved a niche for himself against all odds, without the support of a party behind him and thanks to an anti-establishment campaign targeting young people on TikTok. He is the latest example of a 2024 that has also seen the arrival in the European Parliament of the Spanish social media personality Alvise Pérez and his Se Acabó la Fiesta ("The Party's Over") platform, garnering over 800,000 votes, or the Cypriot youtuber Fidias Panayiotou, among whose achievements to date number having spent a week in a coffin and having managed to hug 100 celebrities, Elon Musk included. All this also has an impact on a Europe of weak leaderships and fractured parliaments, with the Franco-German engine of European integration feebler than ever. Indeed, the hyper-presidentialism of Emmanuel Macron, who also embraced the idea of the En Marche movement to dismantle the Fifth Republic's system of traditional parties, will have to navigate 2025 as a lame duck, with no possibility of calling legislative elections again until June. Germany, meanwhile, will go to the polls in February with an ailing economic model, rampant social discontent and doubts about the guarantees of clarity and political strength that might be delivered by elections that have the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) lying second in the polls. In 2025, we shall also see an escalation of the political drama in the Philippines between the country's two most powerful political clans, brought on by the toxic relationship between the president, Fernando "Bongbong" Marcos, and his vice president, Sara Duterte, and which includes death threats and corruption accusations. The return to politics of the former president, Rodrigo Duterte, nicknamed the "Asian Trump", who in November registered his candidacy for the mayoralty of Davao, and the midterm elections in May will deepen the domestic tension and division in the archipelago. In South Korea, meanwhile, 2024 is ending with signs of resistance. President Yoon Suk Yeol, also considered an outsider who triumphed in what was dubbed the incel election of 2022, faced popular protests and action by the country's main trade unions after declaring martial law in response to political deadlock. The Korean Parliament has voted to initiate an impeachment process to remove Yoon Suk Yeol and, if it goes ahead, the country will hold elections before springThe year also starts with individualism on the rise. We live in a more emotional and less institutional world. If fear and anger have become what drive people when it comes to voting, this growing sense of despair is worryingly high among young people. In the 2024 European elections there was a decline in turnout among the under-25s. Only 36% of voters from this age group cast their ballot, a 6% decrease in turnout from the 2019 elections. Among the young people who failed to vote, 28% said the main reason was a lack of interest in politics (a greater percentage than the 20% among the adult population as a whole); 14% cited distrust in politics, and 10% felt their vote would not change anything. In addition, according to the Global Solidarity Report, Gen Z feel less like global citizens than previous generations, reversing a trend lasting several decades. This is true for both rich and poorer countries. The report also notes the perceived failure of the international institutions to deliver tangible positive impacts (such as reducing carbon emissions or conflict-related deaths). Disenchantment fuses with a profound crisis of solidarity. People from wealthy countries are "significantly less likely to support solidarity statements than those in less wealthy countries", and this indifference is especially evident in relation to supporting whether international bodies should have the right to enforce possible solutions.
2-TRUCE WITHOUT PEACE A year of global geopolitical turmoil ended with the surprise collapse of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria; but also, with a three-way meeting between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Emmanuel Macron in Paris, against the backdrop of the reopening of Notre Dame. The rhythms of diplomacy and the quickening pace of war are out of step on international political agendas. And Russia, the common thread running through recent events in Syria and Ukraine, is quick to issue a reminder that any diplomatic moves must also go through Moscow. Given this backdrop, in 2025 we may speak of ceasefires, but not of peace. For starters, the electoral announcements of a Trump intent on putting an end to the war in Ukraine "in 24 hours" prompted an escalation of hostilities on the ground with various actions: the appearance on the scene of North Korean soldiers in support of the Russian troops; authorisation for Ukraine to use US ATACMS missiles for attacks on Russian soil; and the temporary closure of some Western embassies in Kyiv for security reasons. Speculation about possible negotiations has increased the risk of a tactical escalation to reinforce positions before starting to discuss ceasefires and concessions. While the diplomatic offensive may gain traction in 2025, it remains to be seen what the plan is, who will sit at the table and what real readiness the sides will have to strike an agreement. Ukraine is torn between war fatigue and the need for military support and security guarantees that the Trump administration may not deliver. Although, given the prospect of a capricious Trump, nor can we rule out the possible consequences for Vladimir Putin of failing to accept a negotiation put forward by the new US administration. Trump is determined to make his mark from the very start of his presidency, and that might also mean, in a fit of pique, maintaining the military commitment to reinforcing the Ukrainian army. It is also an essential battle for Europe, which must strive to avoid being left out of negotiations on the immediate future of a state destined to be a member of the EU and where the continent's security is currently at stake. The EU will have Poland's Donald Tusk in charge of the 27 member states' rotating presidency as of January, with the former Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, making her debut as the head of European diplomacy. She is currently feeling the vertigo of Trump snatching the reins of a hasty peace while the member states have proved incapable of reaching an agreement on the various scenarios that might emerge in the immediate future. In any case, the Middle East has already illustrated the frailty and limited credit of this strategy of a cessation of hostilities without sufficient capacity or consensus to seek lasting solutions. The ceasefire agreed in the war that Israel is waging against Hezbollah in Lebanon is more of a timeout in the fighting than a first step towards the resolution of the conflict. The bombings and attacks after the ceasefire are an indication of the fragility, if not emptiness, of a plan that neither side believes in. Meanwhile, the war in Gaza, where over 44,000 people have died, has entered its second year of devastation, transformed into the backdrop of this fight to reshape regional influence, but with a Donald Trump intent on pushing a ceasefire agreement and freeing hostages even before he takes office on January 20th.The year begins with a change of goals in the region, but with no peace. While the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made it clear that his priority now was to focus on Iran, the regional escalation unexpectedly hastened the end of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, with Iran debilitated economically and strategically, and Hezbollah decimated by Israel's attacks, the Syrian president was bereft of the external support that had propped up his decaying dictatorship. The civil war festering since the Arab revolts of 2011 has entered a new stage, which also changes the balance of power in the Middle East. We are entering a period of profound geopolitical rearrangement because for years Syria had been a proxy battleground for the United States' relations with Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia.We are therefore faced with scenarios that have been thrown wide open, where any negotiation proposal put forward will be more a strategic move than a prior step to addressing the root causes of the conflicts. And yet these diplomatic moves – individual and personalist initiatives primarily – will once again put to the test an international system plagued by ineffectiveness when it comes to delivering broad global consensus or serving as a platform to resolve disputes. 3- PROTECTIONISM AND AUSTERITYDonald Trump's return to the US presidency steps up the challenge to the international order. If in his first term he decided to pull the United States out of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate agreement, now he is preceded by the announcement of a trade war in the making. The existing geo-economic fragmentation – in 2023 nearly 3,000 trade restricting measures were put in place, almost triple the number in 2019, according to the IMF – will now have to contend with an escalation of the spiral of protectionism should the new US administration keep its promise to raise tariffs to 60% on Chinese imports; 25% on goods coming from Canada and Mexico, if they fail to take drastic measures against fentanyl or the arrival of migrants at the US border; and between 10% and 20% on the rest of its partners. In 2025, the World Trade Organization (WTO) marks 30 years since its creation and it will do so with the threat of a trade war on the horizon, a reflection of the state of institutional crisis that is paralysing the arbiter of international trade.As a result, countries are looking to strengthen their positions through various alliances. The world is increasingly plurilateral. India is expanding its free trade agreements with the United Kingdom and in Latin America; in 2025 the EU must finally tackle a lengthy obstacle course to ratify the long negotiated deal with Mercosur. Trumpism, what's more, reinforces this transactional approach: it fuels the possibility of more unpredictable partnerships and the need to adapt. Among those that have begun to reconsider goals and partners is the EU. The European countries will foreseeably make more purchases of liquefied natural gas and defence products from the United States to appease Trump. Despite US pressure and the profile of the new European Commission appearing to presage a harder line from Brussels on China in the economic sphere, nor can we rule out seeing fresh tension among the EU partners over the degree of flexibility of its de-risking strategy. A US withdrawal from the global commitments to fight climate change, for example, would intensify the need for alliances between Brussels and Beijing in this field. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the emergence of European countries more accommodating of this geopolitical dependence on China may expose a new fault line between member states.
Given this uncertainty, recipes for fiscal discipline are also making a comeback. Brazil ended the year announcing cuts in public spending to the value of nearly $12bn; Argentina's Javier Milei boasts of implementing "the world's toughest austerity policy"; Mexico's minister of finance and public credit, Rogelio Ramírez de la O, has vowed to reduce the fiscal deficit in 2025 by pursuing austerity in the public administration and cutting spending in Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos). In the United Kingdom, the prime minister, Labour's Keir Starmer, has embraced the "harsh light of fiscal reality" in the budget and plans to raise some £40bn by increasing taxes and cutting spending in order to address the fiscal deficit.The EU is also preparing to tackle US protectionism in the awareness of its own weakness, with the Franco-German axis failing and its economic model in question. Paris and Berlin are both in a moment of introspection, and the siren calls of austerity are once again ringing through some European capitals. In France, parliamentary division is impeding an agreement to avert a possible debt crisis, while in Germany it will be the next government – the one that emerges from the early elections of 23 February – that must address the stagnation of the economy and its lack of competitiveness.Even though inflation is set to slip out of the picture somewhat in 2025, the effects of what Trump calls "Maganomics" remain to be seen. In the United States, the introduction of tariffs and the potential decline in the workforce in the wake of "mass deportations", coupled with tax cuts, could increase inflation in the country and limit the Federal Reserve's capacity to continue lowering interest rates. While Republican control of both houses in Congress and their majority in the Supreme Court may facilitate the adoption of these measures, actually carrying out the deportations appears to be much more difficult in view of the legal and logistical challenges it poses.Meanwhile, despite the savings generated by a possible pared-back public administration and the income from tariffs, the independent organisation Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Trump's measures could increase the deficit significantly and place the debt on a path towards topping 140% of GDP in 10 years, from 99% at present. This means investors will be more demanding when it comes to buying US debt in the face of the risk of a fiscal crisis. It will also be crucial to see whether the attempts to undermine the independent regulatory agencies or the independence of the central bank are successful.The IMF's global growth forecast for 2025 is 3.2%, much the same as the estimate for 2024, but below the pre-pandemic trend. This figure, however, masks significant differences between regions, where the strength of the United States and certain emerging economies in Asia stands in contrast to the weakness of Europe and China, as well as the rapid pace of the change taking place globally from consumption of goods to consumption of services. In Asia, all eyes will be on the ailing Chinese economy, weighed down by its real estate sector, and how its leaders respond to the new restrictions on trade, investment and technology from the United States. At the close of 2024, the main Asian economies were going against the austerity measures expected in Europe and America. Both China and Japan have announced economic stimulus packages, although the desire to cut the 2025 budget on the part of the opposition in Seoul has triggered political chaos domestically. In the circumstances, we can expect an increase in economic insecurity and an escalation of the fragmentation of the global economy, where we can already see like-minded nations moving closer together. Some key countries in the "reglobalisation" trend, like Vietnam or Mexico, which had acted as intermediaries by attracting Chinese imports and investments and increasing their exports to the United States, will see their model suffer in the face of pressure from the new US administration. The drop in interest rates worldwide, meanwhile, will allow some low-income countries renewed access to the financial markets, although around 15% of them are in debt distress and another 40% run the risk of going the same way.
4-GLOBAL DISMANTLING OF INSTITUTIONS The brazenness of this world without rules is only increasing. The undermining of international commitments and security frameworks and growing impunity have been a constant feature of this yearly exercise on the part of CIDOB. In 2025, the crisis of multilateral cooperation may even reach a peak if personalism takes the lead and does even further damage to the consensual spaces of conflict resolution, i.e. the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the WTO. We live in a world that is already less cooperative and more defensive, but now the debate over the funding of this post-1945 institutional architecture may help to compound the structural weakness of multilateralism. The United States currently owes the United Nations $995m for the core budget and a further $862m for peacekeeping operations. Donald Trump's return could lead to an even greater loss of funding for the organisation and prevent it from functioning properly. It remains to be seen whether, despite the geopolitical rivalry, there are areas where agreement among powers is still possible. We remain in a world marked by inequality, heightened by the scars of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2020, the gap between the more and the least developed countries has been growing steadily. In 2023, 51% of the countries with a low human development index (HDI) had not recovered their pre-COVID-19 value, compared to 100% of those with a high HDI. Given these circumstances, it will be crucial to see the outcome of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will take place in Seville in 2025.
In addition, 2024 ended with a bid from Brazil to seek an agreement in the G20 to levy the world's wealthiest people with an annual tax of 2% on the total net worth of the super-rich, those with capital in excess of $1bn. But for the time being Lula de Silva's proposal has gone no further than the debate stage. And while the United States is by far the country among the most industrialised nations where a much greater proportion of the wealth and national income ends up in the hands of the richest 1%, the arrival of the Donald Trump-Elon Musk entente in power in Washington will make it harder still to approve such a tax.
Likewise, in October 2024 Israel passed laws barring the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in the country and curtailing its activity in Gaza and the occupied territories of the West Bank by stopping contact between Israeli government actors and the agency. The legislation will come into force at the end of January 2025, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Although most countries that paused their UNRWA funding have resumed contributions, the United States withdrew $230m. The mobilisation of the international community to ensure the survival of UNRWA once the Israeli law takes effect will be crucial to demonstrate the resilience of humanitarian action; alternatively, it may compound the collapse of another United Nations pillar. Similarly, the dismantling of the institutions and rules of democracy has impacted spaces for protest in civil society, whether in the United States itself, in Georgia or in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, political violence scourged Mexico, where as many as 30 candidates are thought to have been murdered in the runup to the presidential elections of 2024, and demonstrations were banned in Mozambique. The year 2024 was a tumultuous one globally, marked by violence in multiple regions: from the ongoing battle against al-Shabaab in East Africa and the escalating regional conflict in the Middle East to over 60,000 deaths in the war in Sudan to date. Global conflict levels have doubled since 2020, with a 22% increase in the last year alone. The space for peace is shrinking. In 2025, the EU will end various training or peacebuilding missions in Mali, the Central Africa Republic or Kosovo, while the number of United Nations peacekeeping missions will also decrease in Africa. Similarly, if it is not renewed, the extended mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will end on August 31st. Some 10,000 blue helmets from 50 nations are deployed in the south of the country and they came under Israeli attack during the incursion against Hezbollah. All these moves reflect both the broad changes underway in the international security system and the crisis of legitimacy UN peacekeeping operations are suffering. Even so, the eighth peacekeeping Ministerial on the future of these operations and the five-year review of the international peacebuilding architecture will take place in May 2025, at a time when the organisation is trying to restore some of its relevance in countries gripped by violence like Haiti or Myanmar.While political violence grows, international justice is faltering. Take the division in the international community caused by the ICC's arrest warrants against the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, even among European countries that recognise the court. France refused to abide by the ruling, on the grounds of the supposed immunity of non-signatories of the Rome Statute, while Italy called it "unfeasible". The response stands in stark contrast to the resolve of the European countries regarding the arrest warrants issued against Vladimir Putin or the leader of the military junta in Myanmar, Min Aung Hliang. The situation will not improve with Trump in the White House. While US opposition to the ICC has traditionally been bipartisan, the hard-line stance towards the court of the first Trump administration went much further than rhetorical censure, resulting in sanctions against the court itself and its officials, which the Biden administration subsequently lifted. Which countries will best navigate this gradual dismantling of the international order? In 2025, we shall continue to see a highly mobilised Global South geopolitically, engaged in the reinforcement of an alternative institutionalisation, which is expanding and securing a voice and place for itself in the world, albeit with no consensus on a new reformed and revisionist order. In this framework, Brazil is preparing to preside another two strategic international forums in 2025: BRICS+ and COP30. As for Africa, the continent has become a laboratory for a multi-aligned world, with the arrival of actors such as India, the Gulf states or Turkey, which now compete with and complement more established powers like Russia and China. In late 2024, Chad and Senegal demanded the end of military cooperation with France, including the closure of military bases, in a bid to assert their sovereignty. South Africa, meanwhile, will host the G20, the first time an African nation will stage this summit on its soil, following the inclusion of the African Union (AU) into the group. It will mark the end of a four-year cycle in which the summit has been held in Global South countries. And in Asia there is the perception of some pacification processes underway: from the easing of tension on the border between China and India, with the withdrawal of troops in the Himalayas, to the return of trilateral summits among South Korea, Japan and China after a five-year hiatus. The region is withdrawing into itself in the face of the uncertainty that 2025 holds. 5- TECHNOLOGY CLASH AND (DE)REGULATORY PRESSURE The tech competition between the United States and China is set to gather further pace in 2025. The final weeks of Joe Biden's presidency have helped to cement the prospect of a clash between Beijing and Washington, which will mark the new political cycle. On December 2nd, 2024, the introduction of a third round of controls on exports to China, with the collaboration of US allies such as Japan and South Korea, further reduced the possibility of obtaining various types of equipment and software for making semiconductors. China, meanwhile, retaliated with a ban on exports of gallium, germanium and antimony, key components in the production of semiconductors, and tighter control over graphite, which is essential for lithium batteries. Apart from this bipolar confrontation, in 2025 we shall see how tech protectionism gains currency worldwide. Global South countries have begun to impose tariffs on the Chinese tech industry, albeit for different reasons. While countries such as Mexico and Turkey use tariffs to try to force new Chinese investment in their territories – particularly in the field of electric vehicles (EVs) – others, like South Africa, are doing it to protect local manufacturers. Canada too announced a 100% duty on imports of Chinese EVs, following the example of the EU and the United States, despite having no EV maker of its own to protect.Given the circumstances, for Xi Jinping 2025 will be a year to reassess the strategy that has enabled China to gain leadership of five of 13 emerging tech areas, according to Bloomberg: drones, solar panels, lithium batteries, graphene refining and high-speed rail. However, a decade on from the start of the Made in China 2025 plan – its road map towards self-sufficiency – development and innovation in the semiconductor sector in China has slowed, owing to its inability to secure more advanced chips, the machinery to produce them or more cutting-edge software. Will the chip war escalate with Trump's return to power? During the campaign, the president-elect accused Taiwan of "stealing the chip business" from the United States. Yet in 2025 the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (SMC) will start large-scale production of integrated circuits at its factory in the United States. The investment in Arizona by Taiwan's biggest chip maker was announced by the first Trump administration, so it is not hard to imagine another round of investment in the future on the part of the new Republican administration to reinforce supply chain security. In addition, Elon Musk's influence in the White House also promises greater symbiosis between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. Tech competition and the rise in conflicts across the world have restored Big Tech's appetite for public contracts in the defence field, which means that with Trump's return its leaders are hoping to gather the fruits of their investments in the presidential campaign. Just two days after the elections of November 2024, Amazon and two leading AI companies, Anthropic and Palantir, signed a partnership agreement to develop and supply the US intelligence and defence services with new AI applications and models. It seems likely, then, that the consensus reached in April 2024 between Biden and Xi Jinping to "develop AI technology in the military field in a prudent and responsible manner" will be rendered obsolete under the new Trump administration.But hyper-technology extends beyond the military field, as it cuts across ever more sectors of the administration in ever more countries. The entry into force of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in Europe, for example, will be accompanied by new technological surveillance measures, from the deployment of drones and AI systems at the border in states such as Greece to the adaption of the Eurodac system – the EU database that registers asylum seekers – to gather migrants' biometric data. This will only consolidate a model of surveillance and discrimination against this group. It also remains to be seen what impact the new political majorities in the United States and the EU will have on tech governance. Following a flurry of regulation creation and legal action in the courts against the monopolistic power of the major tech firms, in 2025 we shall see a slowdown – if not a reduction – of new measures against Big Tech. The EU's new political priorities, moreover, will put the emphasis in tech on security over competition, and we shall see the emergence of an internal debate on current regulation; over whether it can be implemented effectively or whether it has been too ambitious. It is a shift that contrasts with the regulatory trend, particularly regarding the use of AI, developing in the rest of the world, from South Korea to Latin America. Lastly, the United Nations proclaimed 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology (IYQ). Quantum computing is a branch of IT that will enable the development of more powerful computers that can run more complex algorithms, helping to make giant leaps in scientific research, healthcare, climate science, the energy sector or finance. Microsoft and another tech firm, Atom Computing, have announced they will begin marketing their first quantum computer in 2025. And Google has also unveiled Willow, a quantum chip that can perform a task in five minutes that it would take one of today's fastest supercomputers quadrillions of years to complete. This new generation of supercomputers harnesses our knowledge of quantum mechanics – the branch of physics that studies atomic and subatomic particles – to overcome the limitations of traditional IT, allowing a host of simultaneous operations. 6-A "THIRD NUCLEAR AGE"?While algorithmic complexity gathers pace, debates about nuclear safety take us back to the past, from a new rise of atomic energy to the constant recourse to the nuclear threat as a means of intimidation. With an increasingly weak global security architecture, the international arms race is hotting up without guardrails. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), both the number and type of nuclear weapons under development increased over the last year, as nuclear deterrence once again gains traction in the strategies of the nine states that store or have detonated nuclear devices. That is why the risk of an accident or miscalculation will still be very present in 2025, both in Ukraine and in Iran.Indeed, coinciding with 1,000 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and an escalation of fighting on the ground, Vladimir Putin approved changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The revised text states that an attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be treated as a joint assault on Russia. In order to drive home its message, the Kremlin threatened to use Russia's Oreshnik hypersonic missile on Ukraine, capable of carrying six nuclear warheads and travelling ten times faster than the speed of sound. Against this backdrop, the deployment of North Korean soldiers to support Russia on the Ukrainian front in late 2024 also means the involvement of another nuclear power in the conflict and raises fresh questions about what Pyongyang will receive in return. Commenting on the subject, the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, said Russia was supporting the development of the weapons and nuclear capabilities of Kim Jong-Un's regime. As a result, the threat of a potential upsetting of the balance in the Korean Peninsula and Trump's return to power have further fuelled the nuclear debate in Seoul and Tokyo, which had already been reignited by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There could also be changes in the United States' nuclear policy. Project 2025, the ultraconservative blueprint that means to guide the Trump administration, champions the resumption of nuclear testing in the Nevada desert, even though detonating an underground nuclear bomb would violate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States signed in 1996. The nuclear arms industry already surged under the first Trump administration. This time, however, experts believe that if the programme is implemented, it would be the most dramatic build-up of nuclear weapons since the start of the first Reagan administration four decades ago.At the same time, the two European nuclear states – France and the United Kingdom – are also in a process of nuclear modernisation. The British government has been immersed in an expansion of its arsenal of nuclear warheads since 2021 and, as a member of the AUKUS trilateral agreement along with the United States and Australia, in 2025 it will train hundreds of Australian officials in the management of nuclear reactors in order to prepare Canberra for its future acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. France, too, is developing its own design for a "latest generation" sub. In addition, 2025 will be a decisive year for Iran's nuclear programme. The deadline is approaching for the world's powers to start the mechanism to reinstate all the sanctions lifted in the deal that put a brake on Iran's nuclear expansion, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). So far, Tehran has already warned that if the sanctions return, Iran will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The threat only adds to the risk of an escalation of hostilities in the Middle East and the possibility of Israel considering an attack on nuclear facilities in Iran. Similarly, the nuclear debate has been revived in Europe, following a global trend. Nuclear energy production is expected to break world records in 2025, as more countries invest in reactors to drive the shift towards a global economy looking to move beyond coal and diversify its energy sources. The EU, which is at a critical juncture as it tries to satisfy the demand for energy while boosting economic growth, is also witnessing fresh impetus in the nuclear debate. Around a quarter of the EU's energy is nuclear, and over half is produced in France. In all, there are more than 150 reactors in operation on EU soil. Last April, 11 EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) signed a declaration that urged regulators to "fully unlock" the potential of nuclear energy and "enable financing conditions" to support the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors. Italy is mulling whether to cease to be the only G7 member without nuclear energy plants and lift the ban on the deployment of "new nuclear reactor technologies". A possible return of the Christian Democrat CDU to the German chancellery, following the elections in February, could reopen the debate on the decision taken by Angela Merkel in 2023 to close the last nuclear reactor operating in the country.Lastly, Taiwan, despite a strong aversion to nuclear in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in its neighbourhood, is also immersed in a process of reflection on nuclear energy, in a year in which the last operating plant is to close. Indeed, the need to meet the growing demand for semiconductors thanks to the AI boom, mentioned in the previous section, has put a huge strain on the country's energy consumption. The Taiwanese government is not the only one in this situation. Microsoft is helping to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, which closed in 2019, while Google (owned by Alphabet) and Amazon are investing in next-generation nuclear technology.7- CLIMATE EMERGENCIES WITH NO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP2024 will be hottest year on record. It will also be the first in which the average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, marking a further escalation of the climate crisis and the failure of attempts to keep the global temperature below that threshold. To June 2024 alone, extreme climate phenomena had already caused economic damage to a value of more than $41bn and impacted millions of people across the planet. And yet the global mitigation struggle is faced with a growing absence of political leadership. This was evident in the debates and outcomes of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November, where every political effort was devoted to just one battle: finance. Even so, the pledge on the part of the wealthiest countries to provide $300bn a year by 2035 is considered insufficient to cover the needs of the poorest countries and ensure climate justice. The cost of mitigation and adaptation for developing countries is estimated at between $5tn and $6.8tn to 2030. The pessimism, moreover, is borne out by the facts: while in 2009 the developed countries made the pledge to devote $100bn a year to climate finance, they failed to meet that goal until 2022. In Baku, in the wake of Donald Trump's victory and the shadow of a political agenda that has relegated the climate to the back seat in the face of inflation or energy prices, the Global North chose not to fight the mitigation battle. If at COP28 in Dubai it was said for the first time that the world should embark on a transition beyond fossil fuels, at COP29 it was not even mentioned. The year 2025 will be one to measure commitments, both on finance and taking action. The signatories to the Paris Agreement (2015) must present their national action plans to demonstrate they are honouring the agreed mitigation commitments. The scheduled delivery date for this new round of national contributions is February, but it is looking like many countries will be late and that their level ambition will not match up to what the science and the climate emergency require. In addition, the United States – the world's second biggest greenhouse gas emitter after China – could deal a fresh blow to the global fight against climate change if Donald Trump again decides to withdraw his country from the Paris Agreement, in a repeat of his first term. He would find it harder, however, to leave the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the treaty that underpins the agreement and the multilateral talks on the climate. But this is not the only question mark over the United States' "green transition". Trump's pick of Chris Wright, an oil executive from Liberty Energy and a climate crisis denier, to lead the Energy Department may again put fossil fuels before green energy goals.The new European Commission must also decide what role it wants to play on the global climate stage. The new political majorities will make it difficult for the EU to act with one voice on climate matters, as demonstrated recently in the European Parliament with the controversial decision to postpone and dilute the European deforestation law. Thus in 2025 we will see growing tension in the EU to lower environmental regulations and standards.While global progress in the mitigation battle slows and US leadership on climate matters fades, China is expanding its ambition and its influence. In 2025, hopes are pinned on China's energy transition and its new role as voluntary financial contributor to the agreement sealed in Baku. According to the experts, China's coal and CO2 emissions could peak in 2025 – five years ahead of its target. The climate progress China is making will have a clear impact not only on the planet, but also on the Asian giant's economic and energy interests. Part of China's economic transition since the pandemic has been directed at incentivising the development and introduction of renewables, making it the sector that most contributed to the country's economic growth in 2023. But, at the same time, it also has geopolitical implications: the more its consumption of renewable energy grows, the less dependent it is on hydrocarbons imports from third countries, including Russia. According to the vice president, Ding Xuexiang, China has devoted $24.5bn to global climate finance since 2016. With greater pressure from Brussels for China to increase its contributions, we may see the Asian country trying to burnish its image through greater climate activism in 2025. Still, the major players in renewables are the countries of the Global South. According to a study published by the think tank RMI, nations of the South are adopting these technologies at a much quicker pace and on a much greater scale than in the North. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that new solar and wind energy facilities in these countries have grown by 60% in 2024, with Brazil, Morocco and Vietnam at the head of the pack, reporting a greater adoption rate of these energies than part of Europe and the United States. The staging of COP30 in 2025 in Brazil, one of the most ambitious countries in terms of climate commitments, raises even greater hopes and expectations of a new global impetus in the battle against climate change, one that takes account of the needs and demands of the Global South. While the adaptation discourse, a longstanding demand of these countries, is expected to begin to gain traction on the international and local agenda, the change of narrative could hide new challenges. For one, the need to think about a world beyond the 1.5°C temperature increase. And for another, the risk of compounding inequalities between communities and countries with greater adaptation capacity, since poverty is directly linked to a country's resilience to climate risks and its capacity to recover from them. This places developing countries in a situation of considerable risk, and the adaptation gap is getting wider.8- GENDER: THE END OF CONSENSUS In 2025, polarisation around gender consensus will increase. As conservative agendas gain political ground, the international agreements that for decades have enabled gender equality to advance are under challenge again. On the one hand, 2025 will be a year of celebration of two international milestones for women's rights: the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Celebrating the two agreements, adopted at a time marked by optimism and the successes of transnational feminist movements, will be an invitation to reflect on lost consensuses, present challenges and the lack of political will to secure their full adoption and implementation. On the other hand, the Generation Equality forum, launched in 2021 to mark 20 years since Resolution 1325 with the aim of consolidating progress on women's and girls' rights in five years, will have to account for its unfulfilled commitments. According to the Population Matters association, one in three countries has made no progress on gender matters since 2015, and the situation of women has worsened in 18 countries, particularly Afghanistan and Venezuela. The difficulty in achieving new consensuses, leaderships and political will is apparent in the bid to adopt new international plans to protect the rights of women and girls. According to WILPF figures, 30% of the National Action Plans (NAPs) for domestic implementation of the WPS agenda expired more than two years ago, and the national strategies of 32 countries or regional organisations will end between 2024 and 2025, raising a question mark about their updating and renewal in an international context marked by tension and disputes, the rise of the far right and polarisation around gender. Two agreements to promote gender equality will end in 2025 and must be renegotiated: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Equality Strategy and the EU's Gender Action Plan III (GAP III). In the latter case, it is hard to envisage a European Commission as committed to gender equality as it was during Ursula von der Leyen's first term. During that time, the German marked several gender equality milestones, like the Directive on combatting violence against women or EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The first steps of her second term, however, have offered a glimpse of the difficulties she will encounter to continue down that path. While in her presentation of the political guidelines for the new commission, von der Leyen declared her commitment to gender equality and the LGBTIQ collective, the team of commissioners proposed by the member states has already challenged her desire for parity in the commission she leads. Just 11 of the 27 commissioners are women – including the president herself and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Estonia's Kaja Kallas. In addition, and as the name of the post indicates, the figure of commissioner for crisis management and equality – a competence first introduced in 2019 – will also be responsible for the management and prevention of crises now, diluting the emphasis on gender parity. Similarly, with a European Parliament that has shifted right and with a greater number of EU governments led by far right and antifeminist groups, it will be difficult to make headway on progressive measures. Against this backdrop, Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States augurs another severe setback for gender equality, particularly in the field of sexual and reproductive health rights. The arrival in power of Republican candidates is always accompanied by the restoration of the Mexico City policy (also known as the global gag rule), which places severe international restrictions on sexual and reproductive health rights. It is a policy that bars NGOs in the health sector from offering legal and safe abortion services or even actively promoting the reform of laws against voluntary termination of pregnancy in their own countries if they receive US funding – even if they do so with their own funds. Yet this restriction is not limited to the field of development assistance. Among other measures included in Project 2025, there is the elimination of language for gender equality, sexual orientation and gender identity, or the protection of sexual and reproductive health rights in future United Nations resolutions, but also in domestic policy and regulations of the United States.In 2017, countries such as Sweden and Canada – at the time the only ones to have adopted a feminist foreign policy – were quick to fill the void left by the change of US priorities, with the introduction of international projects like SheDecides, which sought to channel international political support to safeguard women's "bodily autonomy" throughout the world. Since 2022, however, with Sweden ditching the feminist flag in foreign policy and other countries such as Canada, France or Germany focusing on their upcoming elections and the domestic political instability they must face in 2025, it is hard to imagine alternative leaderships and funding. Europe is experiencing its own regression. But the reversals in political consensus at the highest level do not stop there. Following the US elections, harassment and misogynist texts have been sweeping social media with messages such as "your body, my choice", which has registered an increase of up to 4,600% on X (formerly known as Twitter). Cyberviolence against women is on the rise. According to a 2023 study, around 98% of deep fakes are pornographic and target women. These scandals have multiplied with AI, opening a debate on the regulation and possible criminalisation of such cases. 9- MIGRANT DEPORTATIONS AND RIGHTSAs 2024 comes to an end, thousands of Syrian refugees are returning home. After 14 years of civil war, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has raised hopes in a country facing the world's largest forced displacement crisis, according to the United Nations, with over 7.2 million internally displaced people – more than two-thirds of the population – and 6.2 million refugees, mainly living in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Yet despite the uncertainty of the political moment and that fact that fighting is still taking place on the ground, some EU countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland or Belgium) are rushing to suspend the asylum applications of Syrian refugees as others, like Greece and Austria, are taking measures to expel them. The Austrian government has even launched a deportation programme that is reassessing the situation of some 40,000 Syrians who had been granted refugee status in the country over the last five years. All these moves further aggravate the debate among European partners over the concept of "safe third country" so criticised by social organisations. 2025 will be a year of deportations, in terms of discourse and in practice. Immigration has been the cornerstone of Donald Trump's political career, and in his second presidential campaign he vowed to carry out the biggest deportation in history. How will it be done? It remains to be seen if we will see staged deportations or what the real impact might be on the US labour market of a policy that, according to multiple studies, is not a zero sum game in favour of US-born workers. Irregular migrants work in different occupations to those born in the United States; they create demand for goods and services; and they contribute to the country's long-term fiscal health. There are also doubts about the economic sustainability of this type of policy, particularly in view of the prospect of a growth in flows and the dramatic increase in the number of deportations in the United States already since the pandemic (some 300,000 people a year). Yet Trump's victory saw the value of firms engaged in the deportation of migrants and monitoring or supervising the border, as well as the management of detention centres, rocket on the stock market. The deportation business is booming.And deportation is not only an instrument of the Global North. Iran is considering mass deportations of Afghans; the Turkish deportation system has been bolstered by hundreds of millions of euros from the EU; and Tunisia too is conducting illegal "collective expulsions" of immigrants with funds from the EU. Egypt, meanwhile, for months has been carrying out mass arrests and forced returns of Sudanese refugees. On a European level, in 2025 the EU member states must present their national plans to implement the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. The rules are scheduled to enter into force in 2026, but Spain has asked for the use of new tools for border control and the distribution of migrants to be brought forward to next summer. The pact, however, has already been challenged by some member states, which are calling for it to be replaced by a model that allows migrants to be transferred to detention centres located outside the EU in countries that are deemd to be safe. Italy's decision last August to open centres of this type in Albania, though it ended in a resounding legal defeat for Georgia Meloni's government, offered a clear foretaste of the growing tension between policy and the rule of law. In these circumstances, moreover, in 2025 judges may become more acutely aware of the lack of tools to safeguard the rights to asylum and refugee status in a global environment that has been dismantling international protection for years. The war in Gaza – which in its first year caused the forced displacement of 85% of the population – illustrates the calamitous failure of international law, both in the humanitarian field and regarding asylum. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policy both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025. That is why the staging of deportations has become a symbolic deterrent. The criminalisation of migrants – who feel targeted – and the social burden narrative that certain governments exploit with an agenda of public cuts, are setting the tone in an international system increasingly obsessed with border protection and lacking the interest (or tools) to ensure safe and regular migration. 10- MILITARISATION OF INSECURITYIn this world of fragile institutions, the cracks through which organised crime can seep and expand are growing. Organised crime networks are multimillion dollar, transnational businesses that construct hierarchies and strategic alliances. As the international order fragments, mob geopolitics is evolving with new actors and a change of methodology: rather than compete, organised crime groups are cooperating more and more, sharing global supply chains for the trafficking of drugs and people, environmental crimes, counterfeit medicine or illegal mining – which in some countries, like Peru or Colombia, are as profitable as drug-trafficking, if not more so. Global networks that stretch from China to the United States and from Colombia to Australia, thanks to "narco submarines", account for the diversification of businesses and locations, but they also explain their capacity to penetrate the structures of power and undermine the rule of law, because they exist in a context of increasing corruption of states and their legal and security systems. In Ecuador, for example, a hotspot of drug-trafficking on a global scale, the government has declared war on 22 criminal organisations and speaks of an "internal armed conflict". Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, today is a city in the grip of rival criminal groups locked in turf wars, which have led to the various armed gangs seizing control of neighbourhoods, police stations and even temporarily blocking the airport. The latest escalation of violence has left nearly 4,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced people inside the country, according to the UN Human Rights Office. Meanwhile, the geopolitical crisis of fentanyl, where the epicentre is Mexico as a well-established producer of this synthetic drug since the COVID-19 pandemic, has developed into a bilateral problem of the first order with the United States and Canada and a threat to Central America. In Europe too, port cities like Marseille, Rotterdam or Antwerp are major points of drug entry and seizure. Organised crime is currently the biggest threat facing the Swedish government, with 195 shootings and 72 bombings that have claimed 30 lives this last year alone. Globalisation means this new hyperconnected reality has even reached the islands of the Pacific, which now occupy a prominent place on the international strategic chessboard thanks to a proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security commitments. It has also transformed the region's criminal landscape, with the presence of Asian triads and crime syndicates, the cartels of Central and South America, and criminal gangs from Australia and New Zealand.According to the Global Organised Crime Index, at least 83% of the world's population lives in countries with high levels of crime, when in 2021 it was 79%. If organised crime is one of the winners in this new fragmented order, the rise in violence has also brought the imposition of policies of securitisation. In Latin America, for instance, the clear choice to militarise security – seeking national solutions (containing the violence) to what is a transnational challenge – has favoured "firm hand" responses.
The world is rearming. With the rise in conflicts, like the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, so revenues from sales of arms and military services have grown. According to the SIPRI, 2025 will the biggest year for military spending in a long time. Given these circumstances, the pressure on NATO countries to increase their defence spending will ramp up again with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, but also on account of the unpredictability of the international environment. Over the coming months, NATO must negotiate various internal fractures: for one, the demand to raise defence spending to 3.5% of GDP; for another, the differences among allies over the strategies used against Russia. Countries such as Poland and the Baltic nations are calling for a more aggressive stance against Moscow, while other members, such as Hungary or Turkey, are looking to maintain a more neutral approach. This could hinder the formulation of a unified strategy in the face of threats from Russia and future geopolitical scenarios in Ukraine. In addition, during his campaign Trump questioned the commitment to mutual defence enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. If the new US administration adopts a more isolationist stance, the European allies might doubt US reliability as a pillar of their security. There is also growing concern in the EU over the security of essential components and undersea cable infrastructures, which are critical to connectivity and the global economy, particularly in the wake of several episodes of suspected sabotage like those seen in the Baltic Sea in the last few months. Lastly, China's growing militarisation of its maritime periphery is also triggering fresh security fears in Asia. Beijing is promoting – ever more zealously – a Sinocentric view of the Indo-Pacific region. This is raising fears that 2025 will see an increase in the aggressiveness of China's strategy to turn East Asia into its exclusive sphere of influence.Against this backdrop, the quickening pace of geopolitics raises multiple questions both for analysts and for international relations actors themselves. The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Given this prospect, the multi-alignment efforts that many countries across the world are trying to make, with security at heart, are becoming increasingly complex as confrontation escalates among the major global powers .
CIDOB calendar 2025: 80 dates to mark in the diary January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama and Somalia, which were elected in 2024, will join the council as non-permanent members, replacing Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique and Switzerland. Meanwhile Algeria, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and South Korea, which were elected in 2023, will start their second year as members.January 1 – Poland takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The government of Donald Tusk will focus council activity on moving forward with the accession processes of the countries aspiring to join the EU, comprehensive support for Ukraine and strengthening transatlantic ties with the United States. The latter priority must accommodate an uncomfortable truth for Brussels: the return of Donald Trump to the White House.January 1 – Bulgaria and Romania become full members of the Schengen area. In November 2024, Austria lifted its veto on the full integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen area. The two countries, members of the EU since 2007, were admitted to the borderless travel zone in March 2024, but checks on people were only lifted at ports and airports. Now the same will apply to land border checks, and the common visa policy will be in operation at the EU's external borders.January 1 – Finland takes up the yearly rotating chairmanship of the OSCE. The organisation responsible for maintaining security, peace and democracy in a hemisphere comprising 57 countries across Europe, Asia and North America has been through some low times since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which, despite the condemnation, remains a member. The 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting will take place in Finland between November and December 2025. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who was barred from the council meeting in 2022, did however attend in 2023 and 2024.January 1 – Handover between the African Union's ATMIS and AUSSOM missions in Somalia. The AU will remain involved in the efforts to bring peace to Somalia and stabilise the country – stricken by the al-Qaeda allegiant organisation al-Shabaab – with a new mission, the third consecutive operation since 2007. However, AUSSOM will come up against escalating tension between the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia, after Addis Ababa struck a deal on naval access to the Gulf of Aden with the secessionist Republic of Somaliland.January 1 – 30th anniversary of the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO enters its third decade of activity in an international context marked by growing opposition to globalisation, the rise of protectionism worldwide, and Donald Trump's electoral promise to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese goods and 10-20% on other imports.January 7 – John Mahama is sworn in as president in Ghana. In the English-speaking West African country, which has one of the most robust democratic systems on the continent, John Mahama, former president of the Republic for the first time in 2012-2017 and candidate of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, will return to power. Mahama will take over from the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) president Nana Akufo-Addo, who defeated him in 2016 and 2020. January 15 – Daniel Chapo takes office as president of Mozambique. The fifth straight president from the leftist FRELIMO party since national independence in 1975 was declared the winner of the elections of October 9, 2024. His opponents claimed fraud and called for popular protests. The crackdown left over 30 dead, including children. While rich in natural resources, Mozambique remains mired in underdevelopment and faces jihadist threats and serious climate risks.January 20 – Donald Trump takes office as president of the United States. The Republican starts a second non-consecutive term after roundly defeating the Democrat Kamala Harris in the election of November 5, 2024, with promises to deport undocumented immigrants, cut taxes and levy new trade tariffs. Trump returns to the White House with a more radical nationalist rhetoric than the one that marked his first term between 2017 and 2021.January 20-24 – Annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (Davos forum). The influential group of thinkers each year convenes figures from politics, business, academia and civil society to a select and extremely high-profile international gathering in the Swiss town of Davos. In 2025, it will put three major global challenges up for discussion: geopolitical shocks, stimulating growth to improve living standards and stewarding a just and inclusive energy transition.January 26 – Presidential elections in Belarus. Unlike in 2020, the dictator Alexander Lukashenko will not even have to pretend there is a competition at the ballot boxes because the country's election commission will only allow token candidates to stand, and none from the gagged opposition. The longest-serving president in Europe – in power since 1994 – and staunch ally of Vladimir Putin is sure to win a seventh presidential term.January 31 – End of the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali. A regional instrument of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali was launched in 2015 to assist the government in the fight against organised crime. Its continuation remains in doubt after the EUTM training mission, geared towards the fight against jihadism, was not renewed in 2024 and following the anti-French turn taken by the military junta in Bamako. Its twin operation in Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger, also ended in 2024. On September 19, the EUTM in the Central African Republic will likewise come to a end.February 9 – General elections in Ecuador. The centrist Daniel Noboa won the snap presidential election in 2023, called by his predecessor, the liberal conservative Guillermo Lasso, to avoid impeachment by the country's congress. Noboa will seek re-election, this time for a normal constitutional period of four years, in a climate overshadowed by the brutal wave of criminal violence afflicting Ecuador. His chief rival once again will be Luisa González, a protege of leftist former President Rafael Correa.February 10 and 11 – Artificial Intelligence Action Summit, France. The French government is staging one of many international AI-related events in 2025. Unlike the rest, this action summit will gather heads of state and government and leaders of international organisations, as well as company CEOs, experts, academics, artists and NGOs. Following on from the summits of 2023 in Bletchley, in the United Kingdom, and 2024 in Seoul, the Paris meeting will look at how AI can benefit public policy.February 11-13 – 13th World Governments Summit, Dubai. The WGS is a Dubai-based organisation that each year gathers leaders from government, academia and the private sector to debate technological innovation, global challenges and future trends in pursuit of good governance. The theme of the 2025 edition is "Shaping future governments".February 14-16 – 61st Munich Security Conference. Held every year since 1963, the MSC is recognised as the most important independent forum for the exchange of opinions on international security. In 2025, over 450 policymakers and high-level officials will discuss, among other topics, the EU's role in security and defence, the security implications of climate change and new visions of the global order.February 15 and 16 – 38th African Union Summit, Addis Ababa. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government will hold an ordinary session in which Mauritania will hand over the one-year chairpersonship, and the successor to the Chadian Moussa Faki as chairperson of the African Union Commission will be elected. The Pan-African organisation has been running the NEPAD development programme since 2001 and in 2015 it adopted its Agenda 2063 to hasten the continent's transformation. Six member states – Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan – are currently suspended following their respective military coups.February 23 – Federal elections in Germany. Six days after Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired his finance minister Christian Lindner, of the liberal party FDP, from the government over budget differences, on November 12, 2024, the Social Democrat came to an agreement with the Christian Democrat opposition to bring forward by seven months elections due in September. The SPD and The Greens, the only remaining partner following the collapse of the "traffic light" coalition, go into the vote languishing in the polls, with the CDU/CSU and the far-right AfD in the lead.March 1 – Yamandú Orsi takes office as president of Uruguay. The candidate from the leftist opposition Broad Front beat the conservative Álvaro Delgado, from the ruling National Party, in the runoff presidential election of November 24, 2024. The successor to the outgoing president, Luis Lacalle, has a five-year term. Broad Front's return, after holding power for the first time between 2005 and 2020, will precede the celebration of the bicentenary of Uruguay's Declaration of Independence on August 25.March 1 - End of the mandate of the new Transitional Government in Syria. This was the date announced on December 10, 2024, two days after the fall of the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad in the lightning offensive launched on November 27 against Damascus by a coalition of rebel groups, by the new Prime Minister, Muhammad al-Bashir. The day before, he was appointed to the post by the main rebel wing, the Islamist guerrilla group HTS (Hayat Tahrir al Sham) of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani and the Syrian Salvation Government, which Bashir himself had been leading.March 3-6 – 19th edition of the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. A fresh yearly edition of the world's leading mobile communication technologies event, where device manufacturers, service providers, wireless carriers, engineers and scientists unveil the latest developments in the sector. The 2025 MWC, the theme of which is "Converge. Connect. Create", will focus on topics including the next phase of 5G, IoT devices and generative AI.First quarter – Sixth European Political Community Summit, Albania. The EPC came about in 2022 at the initiative of Emmanuel Macron. It is a biennial gathering of the leaders of 44 European countries that seeks to provide a platform to discuss strategic matters in a non-structured framework of dialogue among the 27 EU member states and a further 17 states from the continent that are candidates for accession or are associated with the EU.First quarter – Election of the president of Armenia by the National Assembly. The term of Vahagn Khachaturyan will come to a close no later than April 9. This is the date the tenure of the previous holder of the post, Armen Sarkissian, was due to end. Sarkissian resigned in 2022. A parliamentary republic, Armenia remains in Russia's orbit, a situation that is proving increasingly problematic for the authorities in Yerevan given Moscow's lack of action towards the country's military defence in the face of attacks by Azerbaijan. One of these attacks in 2023 forced the surrender of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.First quarter – First European Union-United Kingdom Summit. The Labour government of Keir Starmer champions a new era of bilateral relations between London and Brussels. Following Brexit in 2020, the United Kingdom's economic exchange with the 27 EU members takes place under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which provides a limited area of free trade in goods and services. The British prime minister is pursuing "constructive" ties with the EU that cover complex issues such as immigration, although he rules out a return to the free of movement of workers, the customs union and, in short, the single market.April 13-October 13 – Universal exhibition, Osaka. The Japanese city is organising a world's fair for the third time, after 1970 and 1990. The theme of Expo 2025 is "Designing future society for our lives".May 6 – 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. Beijing and Brussels will celebrate half a century of diplomatic relations at a time defined by tensions over China's overcapacity, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles, and China's role in the war in Ukraine.May 9 – 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. In 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, made a proposal to place France and Germany's coal and steel production under a single authority. This was the genesis of a web of supranational integration institutions (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) that decades later would result in what today is the European Union.May 12 – General elections in the Philippines. The deterioration of the relationship between the Marcos and Duterte families, who lead the current ruling coalition, could trigger a competition between the two main governing parties in an election where more than 18,000 positions in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and provincial and local governments across the archipelago are up for renewal.May 19-23 – 29th World Gas Conference, Beijing. The growing importance of natural gas as an alternative fuel to petroleum products in the transition to carbon neutrality, its status as a raw material in the production of grey hydrogen and the greater demand for gas as a result of the war in Ukraine gives the triennial WGC gathering particular importance. The International Gas Union (IGU) has been staging the event since 1931. In China, production, imports and consumption of gas are increasing constantly.May 26 – End of Luis Almagro's tenure as OAS secretary general. Uruguay's Luis Almagro was elected head of the OAS in 2015, and in 2020 he secured re-election for a second and final five-year term. The candidates to succeed him are the Paraguayan foreign minister, Rubén Ramírez, and his counterpart from Suriname, Albert Ramdin. The vote will take place at the General Assembly, which in June will hold its 55th regular session in Antigua and Barbuda.May – Presidential elections in Poland. The Civic Platform (PO), a pro-European and liberal conservative party, returned to power in Poland in 2023 led by Donald Tusk. It is hoping to win this direct ballot and bid farewell to an uncomfortable cohabitation with the head of state elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2020, Andrzej Duda, from the right-wing party Law and Justice (PiS). The Polish system of government is a mixed one, where the president wields important powers.May – Pope's visit to Turkey. The Vatican is planning this papal visit, of a marked ecumenical nature, to commemorate 1,700 years since the First Council of Nicaea, whose doctrinal legacy is accepted by all the Christian churches. Pope Francis already made an apostolic visit to Turkey in 2014.June 9-13 – Third UN Ocean Conference, Nice. Three years after the second edition in Lisbon, the UN will stage a new thematic conference in the city on the French Riviera to support Sustainable Development Goal 14: "Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources". June 8, the day before the inauguration of the UNOC, marks World Oceans Day.June 14 – End of the EULEX Kosovo mission mandate. Since 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission to be launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EU support for the Kosovar institutions on rule of law matters is one of the three pillars of the international commitment to peace, security and stability in Kosovo, the others being UNMIK, the UN interim administration mission, and KFOR, the NATO force. June 20 – World Refugee Day. According to the UN's specialist agency UNHCR, in 2024 there were 117 million forcibly displaced people in the world, of whom 43.4 million could be considered refugees; 40% of them were under 18. A total of 69% of refugees and other people in need of international protection live in countries bordering their countries of origin, and only 25% are hosted by high-income countries.June 21-29 – London Climate Action Week. LCAW, founded in 2009 by the think tank E3G and the Mayor of London, is an annual major get-together where individuals, communities and organisations swap ideas and propose collaborations to support decarbonisation and climate resilience. Also taking place within it is the Cites Climate Action Summit (CCAS), organised by the Smart Cities Network.June 24-25 – NATO Summit in The Hague. The North Atlantic Council will meet at heads of state and government level with the number of member states increased to 32 and with the Netherlands' Mark Rutte as the organisation's new secretary general. NATO is expected to make significant decisions regarding Ukraine and Russia, with a question mark over what new US president Donald Trump's strategic focus will be.June 25 – 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The event is being preceded by flaring tension on the Korean Peninsula, which is seeing out 2024 on a state of alert thanks to an escalation of hawkish action on the part of North Korea (fresh missile launches into the sea, the blowing up of road and rail links to the border with South Korea, the sending of troops to support Russia in the war in Ukraine) and, in response, joint manoeuvres by the armed forces of the United States, Japan and South Korea.June 30-July 3 – Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, Seville. The discussions of the high representatives of the nations attending this conference sponsored by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) will focus on the policies and resources required to fulfil the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs globally. FfD4 Seville will assess the progress made in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the Doha Declaration (2008) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015).June – 51st G7 summit, Kananaskis. Canada in 2025 will lead the annual gathering of the seven big powers from the Global North, plus the European Union. For the Canadian government, some of the priorities to be addressed are the inclusive economy, climate action and managing emerging technologies. Kananaskis, in the Rocky Mountains of Alberta province, west of Calgary, already played host to the G7 in 2002.July 1 – Denmark takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The rotating council presidency "trio" standing between January 1, 2025, and June 30, 2026, will be completed by Poland (as the outgoing holder) and Cyprus (as the incoming holder in 2026).July 1 – Bulgaria to adopt the euro. Bulgaria is looking to become the 21st eurozone country on this date, once the five convergence criteria on inflation, deficit, debt, interest rates and monetary stability are met, the latter through participation in the ERM II exchange rate mechanism. The initially planned date of January 1, 2025, had to be put back after the European Central Bank told Sofia inflation was still too high.July 27 – Elections for the House of Councillors in Japan.The elections to renew half of the upper house of Japan's legislative power could reaffirm the current weakness of the leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party, headed by the unpopular Ishiba Shigeru. Following the snap general elections of 2024, Japan faces a historic political anomaly: a minority government, which brings uncertainty to the otherwise stable Japanese politics.August 1 – 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The signing of this declaration in the Finnish capital by the 35 states participating in the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the precursor to the OSCE) marked a milestone in establishing a model of co-existence among blocs and neutral countries in the detente years, during the first phase of the cold war. The successor to this instrument was the Paris Charter of 1990.August 6 – Bicentenary of the independence of Bolivia. The Andean country is gearing up for the commemoration in a climate of serious political upheaval, with outbreaks of violence and hints of civil strife, at the heart of the ruling party Movement for Socialism (MAS), where there is an escalating feud between the current president of the republic, Luis Arce, and his predecessor in the post, Evo Morales. With their respective factions behind them, both are seeking to lead the MAS candidacy in the presidential elections of August 17. Arce's current five-year term ends in November.August – General elections in Gabon. In August 2023, General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema ousted the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in a bloodless military coup. He immediately proceeded to proclaim himself president for a transitional period with a process to adopt a new constitution that, on paper, should end in August 2025. The transition charter does not expressly bar Oligui Nguema from standing in future presidential elections. The presumption is that the general will run for the presidency, in which case he is likely to win.September 8 – Legislative elections in Norway. The ballot will be a test of the performance of the coalition government comprising the Labour Party of Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and the centrists, which won power in 2021. During the term now nearing its end, the Nordic country has seen its strategic value soar as a hydrocarbons provider to European allies looking to reduce their dependence on Russia. In late 2024, the polls were worrying for the Labour Party, the most popular choice in every election since 1927, as they were trailing the Conservatives and even the right-wing Progress Party.September 15 – 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Signed after the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action represents the most ambitious commitment to gender equality to date, identifying 12 critical areas for action to end inequality. Its commemoration will coincide with the rise of anti-gender movements and the challenges posed by setbacks and ongoing backlash in gender equality in recent years.September 27 – Federal elections in Australia. This is the date on or before which the ballot to elect new members of the Australian House of Representatives must be held. The ruling Labor Party of Anthony Albanese, the prime minister since 2022 with a majority in parliament, will be up against the conservative Liberal-National coalition, headed by the Liberal's Peter Dutton.September – 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly gathering that brings together all the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and how they see the world. The regular session will begin on September 9 and the high-level general debate will start on September 23.September – End of the first phase of the conclusion of United States military operations in Iraq. That is the timeline put forward by the Department of Defense to move to the "second phase" of the "transition plan" that began in September 2024 for the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) the military operation to combat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since 2014. The United States ended combat operations in Iraq in 2021 but left behind a contingent of soldiers on logistics and training missions.September – Artemis II mission to the Moon. Barring technical difficulties causing further delays, NASA will carry out the second launch – the first crewed mission – of the Artemis space programme around this time. The plan is for the Orion spacecraft, propelled by the SLS rocket, to leave the Earth's orbit, perform a flyby of the Moon and return to Earth in ten days. If all goes well, the following mission, Artemis III, also crewed by four astronauts, will mark the first time humans have set foot on the Moon since the lunar landing by Apollo 17 in 1972.October 6 – World Habitat Day. The UN General Assembly established this day of global observance in 1985. Previously, in 1977, the UN had created its Human Settlements Programme to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities. UN-Habitat held its third international conference (Habitat III) in Quito in 2016 and the next edition (Habitat IV) is scheduled for 2036. Looking ahead to World Habitat Day 2025, the agency is calling for reflection on how to tackle the sustainability crises affecting urban areas.October 17-19 – Annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group, Washington. Preceded by the "spring meetings", the main international organisations providing credit assistance to states will bring together their boards of governors and their advisory bodies, the Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial Committee, in Washington, the corporate headquarters of both bodies. Bulgaria's Kristalina Georgieva has been in charge of the IMF since 2019 and the Indian-born American Ajay Banga has been the president of the World Bank since 2023.October 20 – Federal elections in Canada. The Liberal Party prime minister, Justin Trudeau, faces elections to the House of Commons with personal popularity ratings in free fall after a period in power stretching back to 2015. The centre-left leaning Liberals have run a minority government since 2019 and, after three straight victories, they are seeing how Pierre Poilievre's Conservatives have a commanding lead over them in the polls. Once hugely popular, a string of controversies and missteps have caused the progressive Trudeau's star to fade.October 26 – Legislative elections in Argentina. The South American country will elect a third of its senators (24) and half of the national deputies (127). A new feature in these elections will be that voters will mark their preferences on a single ballot paper. As a prior step, the "simultaneous and mandatory open primaries" (known by the Spanish acronym PASO), called for August 3, will be crucial. The government of President Javier Milei, however, wants to abolish them. In the 2023 legislative elections, Milei's La Libertad Avanza ("Liberty Advances") coalition debuted with 35 deputies, 23 fewer than the Peronist Unión por la Patria ("Union for the Homeland").October 31 – 25th anniversary of UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security. United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000 to reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.October – Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The French-speaking country that carries most economic weight in sub-Saharan Africa goes into these elections in a climate of relative calm, compared to the violent upheavals of 1999-2011. The president, Alassane Ouattara, was elected in 2010, re-elected in 2015 and secured a third term in 2020, amid huge opposition protest. In late 2024, it was not known whether Ouattara, in a fresh – and dangerous – self-serving interpretation of the country's constitution, would stand for a fourth time. The controversial former president and opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo had confirmed he would run.October – Legislative elections in the Czech Republic. ANO, the populist right-wing party of Andrej Babiš, was dislodged from the government in 2021 by a five-member liberal conservative coalition headed by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Petr Fiala. The polls are predicting a resounding victory for Babiš, though falling short of an absolute majority. The businessmen turned politician under the shadow of corruption is tipped to secure a return as prime minister with a nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric that is hostile to military assistance for Ukraine.October – Presidential elections in Cameroon. Paul Biya, now in his nineties and the president of the republic since 1982 (he is the fourth longest serving head of state in the world, behind Equatorial Guinea's Obiang, the King of Sweden and the Sultan of Brunei) will run for the post for the eighth straight time. A 2008 amendment to the country's constitution abolished the limit on the number of seven-year terms a president can serve. The conservative and Francophile ruling party the RDPC, has closed ranks behind the elderly and ailing Biya, a de facto dictator at the head of an authoritarian regime that tolerates pluralism but not true electoral competition.October – General elections in Tanzania. Marked by increased political violence against the opposition during the 2024 local elections, these elections will test current President Samia Suluhu Hassan's commitment to democratic reforms or, instead, it will evidence a return of the African country to authoritarianism.October or November – 47th ASEAN Summit, Malaysia. This dynamic bloc of ten Southeast Asian countries, which operates its own free trade area and another, the RCEP, with its regional partners, holds summits twice a year, the autumn summit being the most important on account of the profusion of parallel meetings it hosts. Also taking place at the 2025 edition, then, is the 20th East Asia Summit, the 28th ASEAN+3 Summit and bilateral summits with China (28th edition), Japan (28th), South Korea (26th), India (22nd), the United States (13th) and Australia (5th), as well as one with the UN (15th).November 6 – 50th anniversary of the start of the Green March. The Moroccan occupation of parts of the Sahara through the march of 360,000 volunteers on foot, along with the Sahrawi people's refusal to abandon their right to self-determination, initiated the still-unresolved Western Sahara conflict. In recent years, Spain and France have shifted their stance from supporting a referendum in the territory to expressing interest in Rabat's autonomy plan as a solution.November 10-21 – 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference, Belém. Brazil will host three parallel meetings (COP30, CMP20 and CMA7) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as scientific alerts and extreme climate events mount up on account of global warming. In tune with the general sensation of emergency and to demonstrate its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the government of Lula da Silva has chosen as venue for the event the capital of a state, Pará, that takes in the heart of the Amazon rainforest.November 16 – General elections in Chile. In Chile, the sitting president is not eligible to run for an immediate second term, which means that Gabriel Boric, who was elected in 2021 (and whose record in office has led to low approval ratings), will make way for another candidate from Alianza de Gobierno ("Government Alliance") the centre-left coalition in power and successor to Apruebo Dignidad ("Approve Dignity"). A year before the elections, neither the left nor the opposition centre-right or right had clearly defined figures to champion the various sectors.November 27 and 28 – 20th G20 summit, Johannesburg. The South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, the target of criticism at home on account of a relentless decline in electoral support and rifts within his party, the ANC, has pinned considerable hopes on the outcome of the 20th meeting of the most renowned and influential world leaders forum, which will be held in an African country for the first time. November 30 – General elections in Honduras. The vote will decide the successor to the president, Xiomara Castro, from the left-wing Libre (Liberty and Refoundation) party. Under the country's constitution, Castro is not eligible to seek a second term after the one that began on January 27, 2022. November – Second World Summit on Social Development, Qatar. A second summit, following the one held in Copenhagen in 1995, devoted to just and sustainable social development across the globe. WSSD2, convened by the UN General Assembly, will analyse shortcomings in the application of the Copenhagen Declaration and – say the organisers – should reinvigorate the programme of action for fulfilling the 2030 Agenda. Other directly related instruments are the FfD4, which is to take place in Seville in the summer, and the Summit of the Future, held in New York 2024.November – 32nd APEC summit, Gyeongju. The South Korean coastal city will play host to the heads of state and government of the world's biggest regional economic cooperation and trade group (ahead of the EU/EEA, the RCEP, the TPP and ASEAN), comprising 21 Pacific basin countries including China, the United States, Russia and Japan, as well as 12 of the 25 biggest economies by GDP. The APEC has not managed to form a free trade zone, but its leaders' summits have a deeply political and diplomatic aspect.December 1 – Centenary of the Locarno Treaties. The signing in 1925 of seven international agreements negotiated among Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia following a conference held in the Swiss city laid the foundations of a new order of peace, security and inviolability of the borders of Europe in the wake of the First World War. What was often referred to as "the spirit of Locarno" allowed Weimar Germany's entry into the League of Nations, but the advent of Nazism dashed those hopes.First week of December – 10th Summit of the Americas, Punta Cana. Since 1994, the Summit of the Americas has provided the format for the institutionalised political gatherings of the heads of the continent's 35 sovereign states, two of which are not included in the OAS. It takes place roughly once every three years. In 2022, President Biden did not invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela to the summit in Los Angeles as he considered their regimes were dictatorships, a decision that sparked controversy among the other Latin American delegations. The Dominican government is focusing on making the 2025 gathering an "inclusive" event and is looking to avoid controversy.December 14 – 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The accords signed at the U.S. military base in Dayton brought an end to the Bosnian War, with tragic episodes such as the Srebrenica genocide. In a peace negotiation that overlooked gender issues, Dayton condemned Bosnian women to be survivors of war and victims of peace by failing to address sexual violence as a weapon of war, leaving wounds that remain unhealed. Pending – Ninth CELAC summit and fourth CELAC-EU summit, Colombia. As holder of the presidency pro tempore, the South American country will be in charge of the annual gathering of the heads of state and government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where 33 sovereign nations of the continent discuss their integration without the presence of the United States or Canada. The bi-regional CELAC-EU summit will seek a common agenda on cooperation and investment, providing a more multilateral context to the association or free trade agreements between the EU and several of America's countries and subregional blocs.Pending – 17th BRICS summit, Brazil. The intergovernmental association formed in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China is expanding rapidly, and in 2025 it will stage its 17th summit in the first of those founding countries. The leaders of the nine member states will attend, as well as those of associated countries and the candidates to join, gathered as BRICS+. The drivers of the forum frame their activities in the contest with the Western powers to achieve a multipolar world order that includes the Global South.Pending – 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China. The founding superpower will once again orchestrate the annual gathering of leaders from the SCO, which – alongside the Belt and Road Initiative – is the chief instrument of the People's Republic of China to extend its geopolitical and geo-economic influence in Eurasia on the intergovernmental plane, hand in hand with Russia, its strategic partner. The Heads of State Council of the ten member states will be joined by the leaders of observer and associate countries, under the SCO+ format. Pending – Sixth Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit, New Delhi. India for the first time will host a leaders' summit of the Quad, the discussion forum in which the Asian power engages with the United States, Japan and Australia on both diplomatic and security matters of interest, with an eye on China. The Quad dialogue takes place in conjunction with the Malabar joint air and naval military exercise conducted every year in waters of the Indian or Pacific Oceans.Pending – 34th Arab League summit, Baghdad. Iraq will host the annual meeting of Arab League leaders. Apart from the armed and territorial conflicts tearing several of its members apart (Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia), the organisation is proving incapable of having a positive influence on ending the wars Israel has been waging against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon since 2023. In addition, its stance on Iran is far from unanimous.Pending – 17th summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization, Baku. Azerbaijan, one of the countries gaining most strategic advantage from the war in Ukraine, will host the gathering of presidents of this organisation of ten Eurasian governments that includes Turkey, Iran and the whole of Central Asia, but not Russia or China. The oil-exporting Transcaucasian country already staged COP29 in 2024 and in 2025 it will also be the venue for a summit of the Organization of Turkic States.Pending – Bulgaria to join the OECD. In 2022, the OECD began talks for the entry of six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania. In 2024, they were joined by Thailand and Indonesia. Of them all, the country to have made most progress towards joining the club of developed market-based economies committed to democracy appears to be Bulgaria, which is hoping to become the 39th member state at the end of 2025.Pending – Norway to ban the sale of new petrol and diesel cars. The government in Oslo has set out to ensure that as of 2025 all new cars will have zero carbon emissions, i.e. they will be electric or they will run on hydrogen. The ban by Norway – a major hydrocarbons producer – is a decade ahead of the goal mapped out by the EU. As for overall climate neutrality, it aims to achieve it by 2030, 20 years before the EU. Norway generates much more energy than it consumes and is committed to clean energies like green hydrogenAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donorsDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/313/en
This publication targets private sector stakeholders who want to reduce a company s risk and vulnerability to corruption. It aims to provide guidance and recommendations for integrating ethics programs into corporate governance mechanisms to safeguard against corruption. Anti-corruption attitudes have changed significantly over the past two decades. Corruption is no longer regarded as a subject to be avoided and is now widely condemned for its damaging effect on countries, industries, governments, and the livelihoods of individual citizens. More importantly, the view of the private sector in the corruption equation is changing. Companies are no longer viewed only as facilitators of corruption - they are increasingly recognized as victims and a valuable source of working solutions, and anti-corruption efforts seen as integral to good corporate governance, Predictable, competitive, and fair economic environments free of corruption are central to sustainable business, economic growth and national development. It has been an easier task to raise this awareness than to reduce the corrosive effects of corruption, especially its worst manifestation of state capture. And though the challenge defies simple solutions, significant progress is being made. Today we have in place numerous international conventions and global collective action initiatives that set higher standards of transparency and accountability in corporate and public governance. More importantly, such standards are buttressed by a growing convergence of ethical values that set the tone for 'doing the right thing' in both the public and private sectors.
This report seeks to inform the development of a framework for addressing governance reform in fragile and conflict affected environments through are view of international experiences. The report analyzes the experience both of countries that sustained a transition to peace and those that fell back into conflict. Pertinent lessons will be drawn selectively from a range of fragile and conflict affected countries, including Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. No specific typologies have been adopted or formed in order to assess these lessons, because typologies can be limiting and experiences can be better assessed based on the specificity of each country's context. The first section of the report sets out broadly accepted definitions of key terms such as governance, state building, and fragility. The second section reviews experiences with diverse governance dimensions and explores the objectives, opportunities, and constraints associated with each.
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Reducing carbon emissions entails a fundamental shift in energy production and consumption. It requires significantly more mineral products, such as copper and lithium, to manufacture low-carbon and mobility products. However, accessing the critical raw materials (CRMs) and related cleantech products needed to keep global warming under the 1.5°C threshold is increasingly challenging.[1] Mineral and cleantech supply chains have become highly geopolitical, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.[2] Green or cleantech value chains comprise raw materials sourcing such as lithium and cobalt; component manufacturing such as solar cells, turbine blades and battery cells; integrating components into clean technologies; and recycling and circular economy. At the moment, the EU is largely dependent on China for its CRMs supply, with the latter being responsible for 100 per cent of the EU's supply of heavy rare earth elements, 71 per cent of gallium, 40 per cent of natural graphite and 62 per cent of vanadium, among others.[3] Thus, a stronger collaboration with Africa on CRMs could be mutually beneficial by helping the EU with alternative supplies while supporting African industrialisation. With its significant endowments of CRMs, the African continent has become a hotbed of ongoing geopolitical contestations on economic diplomacy. Traditional partners such as the United States, Europe, and China, as well as new actors from the Gulf (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), Turkey and India,[4] are all seeking access to these prized resources. At the same time, many African governments see the renewed global demand for CRMs as a starting point to boost their national and regional CRMs processing capabilities. The expectation is that local processing will help drive innovation and productivity, thereby meeting age-old aspirations of industrialisation in Africa.[5] Despite several attempts since the decolonisation period (1950s–1970s), Africa is the least industrialised region globally while having almost 20 per cent of the global population and land area.[6] The continent's contribution to economic output is about 3 per cent of global GDP and 2 per cent of world manufacturing value added.[7] Africa largely remains a primary raw materials exporter to the world, including key Asian economies such as China, where most of its CRMs are further processed into value-added products such as precursor cells and batteries for electric vehicles (EVs).[8] The African continent accounts for about 30 per cent of the world's mineral reserves and 12 per cent and 8 per cent of the world's oil and natural gas reserves.[9] In addition, Africa also has 40 per cent of the world's gold, about 90 per cent of chromium and platinum, and the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds, platinum and uranium. Sub-Saharan Africa alone is reported to have over 30 per cent of the volume of critical minerals needed for the green energy transition.[10] African countries want to leverage these resources to address their energy and industrialisation needs, creating much needed jobs, productivity enhancements and structural change. They want to avoid the risk of the centuries-long extractivist practices, whereby African raw materials have been mined and exported by foreign companies with little local value addition, and with little regard for environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards.The added value of strengthening EU-Africa's ties on cleantech supply Africa provides unique advantages to help increase and diversify the EU's CRMs supply while the EU supports the continent's development and industrialisation efforts. On the one hand, the continent is uniquely placed at the centre of the world, with many potential African CRM supply countries having two to three weeks shipping times to Europe. The EU sources 63 per cent of its aluminium from Guinea, 35 per cent of its tantalum from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 41 per cent of its manganese from South Africa.[11] Many African countries are highly likely to continue with measures such as raw ore export bans to assert more beneficiation and in-country value addition. Against this backdrop, there is an opportunity to further increase and deepen ties with Africa as a friend-shoring partner of choice. This could be done by European private sector companies with funding and support from European financial institutions to set up mining ventures and processing facilities in the continent. While Europe's financial and technical support for initiatives such as the Lobito Corridor railway project[12] is welcome, the commitments of the EU and its member states to funding mining and processing ventures in Africa are still insufficient. Helping build a railway line is a good entry point for the EU, but it does not necessarily make Brussels a preferred partner of choice as compared to other geopolitical actors. The EU can do more beyond infrastructure and logistics. Beijing, through State-funded initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative involving the Chinese private sector, is investing in both mining ventures and value addition, as well as railways and other logistical infrastructure.[13] European leaders must bear in mind that for Africa, true added value in its relations with Europe or any other geopolitical partner means moving away from simply exporting primary commodities to using them for local production and manufacturing of components such as solar cells, turbine blades, battery cells and semiconductors to be sold on the continent, leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as well exports to other markets.Africa's development priorities: Electricity provision and financing Industrialisation and integration of Africa into global green value chains cannot happen without electricity. In order words, there cannot be proper cleantech supply chains in Africa if the fundamental prerequisite of the electricity needed for mining and processing into value-added products like EVs is not available. Without electricity provision to drive industry, Africa will only still end up exporting the raw mineral ores to China, Europe and other places that have the factor endowments such as cheaper electricity to turn them into useful products. The foremost priority for many African countries is getting the needed investments to upgrade the existing and to build new energy systems. The continent faces pervasive energy deficits and industrialisation challenges despite its abundant energy and mineral resources. Without increasing the production of energy from multiple sources, economic growth will stall, and so will the associated trickle-down to the micro-levels that are needed to reduce poverty and inequality. To that extent, the EU can and should assist African countries in attracting the necessary investments to develop context-specific energy pathways leveraging renewable energy – solar, wind, hydrogen and natural gas, among others. The deployment of high renewable energy shares is constrained by the "transition speed, cost and technology mix" for individual African countries.[14] Also, legacy resources like natural gas and hydropower are needed to balance the grid from the intermittencies associated with renewable sources like solar and wind, especially for industries like steel and aluminium production that require non-stop operations. Much like Africa, EU policymakers, especially with the aftershocks of the Russian-Ukraine war, recognise that multiple sources of energy supply are needed to meet trilemma goals of security of supply, affordability and sustainability.[15] It is within this context that the EU has included natural gas and nuclear energy in its taxonomy under the Complementary Delegated Act (CDA)[16] which is a key component of the Union's sustainable finance agenda. On the back of this, the EU must support African countries, especially those with significant endowments, to use natural gas for domestic power generation to meet household energy demand and industrial needs. The CDA provides a means for EU financial institutions to continue financing natural gas to power projects, albeit with stricter environmental requirements.[17] To attract investment, new projects must introduce measures such as carbon capture and storage to reduce their carbon intensity – that is, the CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour (kWh) of electricity produced. Furthermore, the EU could also advocate rechannelling the unused International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) into financing climate action in Africa, emphasising the development of the continent's nascent green value chains. Climate finance flows to Africa were a mere 30 billion US dollars in 2020, just 11 per cent of the annual target and only 3 per cent of global climate finance.[18] To close this financing gap, the EU could lobby other advanced economies to rechannel approximately 73 billion US dollars of unused SDRs[19] to low- and middle-income countries, several of whom are in Africa, for climate action. These funds could be provided to regional multilateral development banks such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) to finance climate action, including green value chain projects on the continent. They would serve as catalytic financing for new renewable energy and cleantech investments on the continent, enabling domestic innovation and productivity gains. EU member states such as France and Spain as well as institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are already in such discussions at the global level, but efforts could be doubled to ensure that rechannelling of SDRs becomes a reality by 2025. The longer this is delayed, the more difficult it becomes for African countries to integrate into global cleantech value chains due to domestic and external debt vulnerabilities. Also, the EU Commission and European financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) could help African countries with technical assistance in designing and launching new financing instruments such as green bonds and other ESG instruments. For example, sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs), a financing tool used at the sovereign level by Chile[20] and other countries, have key performance criteria that have to be met (such as gender criteria). It is worth noting, however, that this ESG funding still adds to African countries' existing debt burdens.[21]Engaging across regional and bilateral levels In engaging with African partners – be them national governments, regional institutions and local actors – the EU should refrain from a one-size-fits-all policy prescription to embrace a nuanced and multifaceted approach. Brussels, for example, should work with regional economic blocs such as the African Union, Southern African Development Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and others – to promote greater regional cooperation across CRMs value chains beyond the rhetoric. This should emphasise joint regional research and innovation, policy and market alignment, and regional processing infrastructure. African governments, policymakers and civil society are increasingly advocating for more regional value chains/corridor development approaches to cleantech value chains on the continent. For example, the DRC, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe could use their mineral resources and proximity to create a battery manufacturing opportunity, such as making the precursor cells needed for EVs. Local actors, including civil society, also advocate for more ESG considerations in projects, further driven by higher EU ESG standards.Looking ahead Developing clean industrial capacities with real added value would benefit Africa by addressing the many interconnected "nexus" challenges of energy access, poverty and limited industrial development capacities. Cleantech and industrial capacities using renewable energy such as solar and geothermal would drive the expansion of renewable energy infrastructure, providing access to affordable and reliable electricity for many on the continent. Africa could move up the value chain by developing industries that locally process CRMs and make component parts for domestic and export markets, creating a more diversified and resilient continental economy. From the EU's perspective, this would also mean less vulnerability or dependence on China for cleantech supply chains for Europe.Theophilus 'Theo' Acheampong is a visiting fellow with the Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. This commentary was prepared within the framework of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author's alone.[1] United Nations website: Net Zero Coalition, https://www.un.org/en/node/134483.[2] Melanie Müller, "The 'New Geopolitics' of Mineral Supply Chains: A Window of Opportunity for African Countries", in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2023), p. 177-203, https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2023.2226108.[3] Council of the EU website: An EU Critical Raw Materials Act for the Future of EU Supply Chains, https://europa.eu/!WgTCVv.[4] Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Čok, "Beyond Competition: How Europe Can Harness the UAE's Energy Ambitions in Africa", in ECFR Policy Briefs, June 2024, https://ecfr.eu/?p=123736.[5] African Union, 10 Things Africa Must Do to Accelerate Industrialization and Economic Diversification in Africa, 14 November 2022, https://au.int/en/node/42375.[6] Theophilus Acheampong and Prince Asare Vitenu-Sackey, "Industrialisation in Africa: Leading Countries and Reasons for Their Success", in APRI Short Analyses, 10 October 2024, https://afripoli.org/industrialisation-in-africa-leading-countries-and-r....[7] UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Factsheet: Africa. Highlights from the International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2023, December 2023, https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/unido-publications/2023-12/doc....[8] Theophilus Acheampong, "From Mines to Markets: How Africa and Europe Can Become Green Industry Partners of Choice", in ECFR Policy Briefs, April 2024, https://ecfr.eu/?p=121258.[9] UN Environment Programme (UNEP) website: Our Work in Africa, https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa.[10] Wenjie Chen, Athene Laws and Nico Valckx, "Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa's Critical Mineral Wealth", in IMF Country Focus, 29 April 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/04/29/cf-harnessing-sub-sahara....[11] Council of the EU website: An EU Critical Raw Materials Act, cit.[12] European Commission DG for International Partnerships, Connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and Angola to Global Markets through the Lobito Corridor, 24 October 2023, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/node/2801_en.[13] Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority, Confronting the China Challenge in Africa: The Lobito Corridor, 17 April 2024, https://www.lobitocorridor.org/post/confronting-the-china-challenge-in-a....[14] Yacob Mulugetta et al., "Africa Needs Context-Relevant Evidence to Shape Its Clean Energy Future", in Nature Energy, Vol. 7, No. 11 (November 2022), p. 1015-1022 at p. 1015, DOI 10.1038/s41560-022-01152-0.[15] Yana Popkostova, "Europe's Energy Crisis Conundrum. Origins, Impacts and Way Forward", in EUISS Briefs, No. 2/2022 (January 2022), p. 2, https://www.iss.europa.eu/node/2689.[16] European Commission DG Finance website: EU Taxonomy: Complementary Climate Delegated Act to Accelerate Decarbonisation, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/node/849_en.[17] For example, gas power plants would be categorised as green if "direct GHG emissions of the activity are lower than 270g CO2e/kWh of the output energy, or annual direct GHG emissions of the activity do not exceed an average of 550kg CO2e/kW of the facility's capacity over 20 years". See European Commission, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022 Amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 as Regards Economic Activities in Certain Energy Sectors and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as Regards Specific Public Disclosures for those Economic Activities, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/1214/oj. See also EU Platform on Sustainable Finance, Response to the Complementary Delegated Act, 21 January 2022, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/220121-sustainable-fin....[18] Akinwumi Adesina, "Mobilising Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth in Africa", in NewAfrican, 30 May 2023, https://newafricanmagazine.com/29682.[19] Stephen Paduano, "SDR Rechanneling and ECB Rules. Why Rechanneling SDRs to Multilateral Development Banks Is Not Always and Everywhere Monetary Financing", in FDL Policy Notes, No. 7 (May 2023), https://findevlab.org/?p=30845.[20] Environmental Finance: Environmental Finance's Bond Awards 2023: Sustainability-linked Bond of the Year: Republic of Chile, https://www.environmental-finance.com/content/awards/environmental-finan....[21] Carlos Lopes, "The African Debt Dilemma: Unpacking the Three Unfavourable Factors", in ODI Expert Comments, 10 June 2024, https://odi.org/en/insights/the-african-debt-dilemma-unpacking-the-three....
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As Israel intensifies its bombing of Lebanon and the spectre of a generalised conflict that may involve Iran and the United States hovers ominously over the region, Western governments seem passive viewers of a decade-long drama for which they actually bear great responsibility. Israel claims to defend itself against enemies determined to destroy it, from Hamas in Palestine to Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are undoubtedly implacable enemies. However, it is equally true that over the decades Israel has barely missed an opportunity to foment the radicalism of its adversaries, marginalising the more pragmatic voices, and that the United States and Europe have not put up any barriers.The peace process that never was In February 1994, a man named Baruch Goldstein fired on a group of Muslim worshippers gathered in prayer at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians and wounding 125.[1] Goldstein was a naturalised American-Israeli linked to the most extreme fringes of Zionism, which pushed for the annexation of Palestinian land occupied by Israel after the June 1967 six-day war – East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – and the forced removal of its inhabitants.[2] The massacre revealed how controversial the peace process initiated in Oslo was.[3] The opposition front spanned extremists like Goldstein but also the centre-right Likud party, whose leader Benjamin Netanyahu was and would forever remain opposed to a Palestinian state. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a main architect of Oslo, by an orthodox extremist in 1995 further consolidated Israel's internal fractures.[4] The last glimmers of hope were extinguished with the electoral victory in early 2001 of the new Likud leader Ariel Sharon, who had gone the extra mile to sabotage the new peace negotiations at Camp David and Taba.[5] Hamas, which had always denounced Oslo as a deception, launched a campaign of kamikaze attacks that resulted in the Second Intifada.The delegitimisation of the Palestinian cause The uprising increased the credibility of Hamas as a genuine anti-occupation resistance force, in contrast to a Palestinian Authority (the embryonic state formed in Oslo) that was weak, corrupt and compromised with Israel. But for the Palestinian cause the Second Intifada was a disaster. Hamas's terrorist tactics contributed to the delegitimisation of Palestinian claims in the eyes of the United States and Europe. This perception was reinforced as the Islamist group – ousted from the West Bank after winning parliamentary elections in 2006 but in control of Gaza since 2007 – progressively tightened ties with Iran and its anti-American axis of resistance.[6] This is the context in which the right to self-defence invoked by Israel has become all-encompassing. The presence of Hamas in Gaza has justified the almost total subordination of the Strip to Israel, which controls its air and sea space, land entrances with the exception of the border with Egypt, and its energy, water and food supply.[7] It has also provided cover to Israel's continuous military operations in Gaza, which according to the United Nations caused the death of more than 6,400 Palestinians (many of them civilians), compared to about three hundred Israelis killed, between 2008 and September 2023.[8] Self-defence was also invoked when in August 2006 Israel once again invaded Lebanon in the attempt to destroy Hezbollah. Over 1,100 people died in the campaign, of which about 250 were militiamen.[9] Finally, self-defence underpinned Israel's vehement opposition to any form of diplomatic engagement with Iran by the West, including on the nuclear front.Western defence of Israel's right to defence The United States and Europe have largely accepted the Israeli narrative of being just defending itself. Thanks to the formidable influence of the pro-Israel lobby (a mix of Zionists of all political hues, evangelicals and neo-conservatives), no US politician can fail to declare full and unconditional support for Israel if they hope to pursue a political career of high profile, lest they suffer from the accusation of being anti-Semites.[10] Most EU states have followed unquestioningly, with Germany going as far as to make Israel's security – in this overextended interpretation – a Staatsräson, or raison d'état. In so doing, the Europeans (Germans included) gave up on more than twenty years of sensible, autonomous diplomacy initiated with the Venice Declaration, which for the first time upheld the dual right of Israel to live in security and of the Palestinians to self-determination.[11] Protected by the US veto in the UN Security Council and rewarded with diplomatic support, arms supplies (especially from the United States and Germany), partnership agreements with both the United States and the EU in every field (from defence to research), Israel has acted with impunity.[12] The West has considered Israel an ally even though it has not aligned itself with the sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine,[13] continued to trade in advanced technology with China,[14] and relentlessly worked against the stated goals of two US administrations (Obama and Biden) and all of the EU such as the nuclear deal with Iran[15] and the two-state solution in Palestine. This dynamic was repeated on a large scale after Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, in which close to 1,200 people were assassinated and 250 taken hostage. The United States and Europe have loudly invoked Israel's sacrosanct right to keep its population safe. But they are at a loss to explain how this right fits with the devastation inflicted on the two million people living in Gaza, where Israeli shelling has killed more than forty thousand – 16,500 of them children –, displaced 90 per cent of the population (nearly two-thirds of houses are damaged or destroyed), while journalists, relief staff and aid workers have reportedly been deliberately targeted.[16] Equally importantly, Israel and its supporters in Washington, Berlin and elsewhere have failed to explain why Israel's security justifies the continued expansion into East Jerusalem[17] and the West Bank,[18] the expropriation of homes, the theft of land, the decades-long systematic oppression of millions of human beings that the International Court of Justice has declared illegal in all respects.[19]Israel from the river to the sea Since the 1994 Hebron massacre, Israeli expansion into Palestinian lands has never stopped. Israeli domestic politics has become radicalised, to the point that today no party with any following favours negotiations with the Palestinians. On the contrary, the Knesset, Israel's parliament, has recently passed a resolution calling a Palestinian state "west of Jordan" an "existential danger".[20] Israel's existence has now been made conditional on the continuous repression of the Palestinians. Extremist parties that explicitly advocate ethnic cleansing all but drive policy towards Palestine.[21] Itamar Ben-Gvir, an open admirer of the mass murderer of Hebron, is a minister in the Netanyahu government. Another extremist minister, Bezalel Smotrich, is responsible for the 'security' of the West Bank. Unsurprisingly, violence in the West Bank has increased exponentially since 7 October: over 690 Palestinians have been killed, 159 of them children.[22] Ultimately, when it comes to the defence of Israel, what is at stake is not so much the security of the state on the 1967 borders (those generally accepted internationally), but a profoundly racist, ethno-supremacist expansionist project into East Jerusalem and the West Bank (and perhaps Gaza again). Netanyahu has embraced this project not only for ideology but also for practical advantages, as the coalition with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich has protected him from a number of trials for electoral fraud and more.[23] It is the interplay of extremist and personal ideological interests that explains the Netanyahu government's strategy: no ceasefire in Gaza, even at the cost of the remaining hostages' lives; and the opening of the northern front against Hezbollah, an action supported by the military leadership (which would have wanted a hostage deal first, though) and which could be extended to Iran. Only war can wash away the shame of 7 October (and keep the trials at bay), as shown by recent polls showing Netanyahu again leading his political opponents.[24] And only war allows Israel to continue expanding eastwards, until it controls all the land between the river and the sea.Western complicities The United States and EU governments have established that their main goals are a ceasefire in Gaza, the liberation of the hostages and the prevention of regional escalation. They have also long supported the creation of a Palestinian state and claimed that Israeli settlement activities are an impediment to peace. As Israel has not just ignored their interests but undermined them, their expected policy course would be one of combining pressure on Israel's foes with pressure on Israel itself. One would expect the United States and Europe to insist on a ceasefire in Gaza as the most pressing priority. The world's main superpower and its wealthy allies could back that with the halting of weapons transfers to Israel as well as diplomatic condemnation of its conduct in all Palestinian lands and Lebanon, where civilians are dying in the hundreds in the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah and the whole population has been terrorised by Israeli intelligence using booby traps in the form of pagers and walkie-talkies. The United States and Europe should also insist on re-opening the Gaza Strip to journalists, on the protection of medical facilities and aid workers, and on the resumption of humanitarian aid on a massive scale. Most importantly, one would expect US and European policymakers to delegitimise the racist, ethno-supremacist vision that is increasingly dominant in Israeli discourse on the Palestinians. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich should be sanctioned, and all government and civil society organisations active in supporting and expanding Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank targeted with visa freezes, financial sanctions and other restrictions. The United States and Europe will do nothing of the above, and instead will allow Israel to continue working against their stated objectives. Having long internalised the narrative of Israel's all-encompassing right to self-defence, they can only hope that Hezbollah and Iran will exercise more self-restraint than Israel, to avoid the risk – at least for the United States – of being drawn into a war they have not sought.Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] For basic information on the Hebron massacre, see Institute for Palestine Studies, Hebron Massacre, 1994, 6 November 2023, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1652605.[2] Goldstein was a supporter of the Kach party (for more information, see Israel Democracy Institute website: Kach, https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/parties/kach).[3] An explainer of the Oslo Accord can be found here: Institute for Middle East Understanding, Explainer: The Oslo Accords, 1 September 2023, https://imeu.org/article/explainer-the-oslo-accords.[4] Roger Cohen, "The Incitement in Israel that Killed Yitzhak Rabin", in The New York Times, 4 December 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/opinion/incitement-movie.html.[5] Richard Kreitner, "September 28, 2000: Ariel Sharon Visits the Temple Mount, Sparking the Second Intifada", in The Nation, 28 September 2015, https://www.thenation.com/?p=188385.[6] Edward Wastnidge and Simon Mabon, "The Resistance Axis and Regional Order in the Middle East: Nomos, Space, and Normative Alternatives", in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 21 February 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2179975.[7] Amnesty International, Israel's Occupation: 50 Years of Dispossession, 7 June 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/?p=68668.[8] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) oPt website: Data on Casualties, https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.[9] Human Rights Watch, Why They Died. Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War, September 2007, https://www.hrw.org/node/255321.[10] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy", in HKS Faculty Research Working Papers, No. RWP06-011 (March 2006), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/node/178821; see also the authors' book by the same name published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 2007.[11] European Community, Venice Declaration, 13 June 1980, https://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.[12] On the United States' use of its veto power in the Security Council, see Hope O'Dell, "How the US Has Used Its Power in the UN to Support Israel for Decades", in Bluemarble, last updated 22 February 2024, https://globalaffairs.org/node/39261; on Western weapons supplies to Israel, see David Gritten, "Gaza War: Where Does Israel Get Its Weapons?", in BBC News, 3 September 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68737412; on US-Israel relations, see US Department of State, U.S. Relations with Israel. Factsheet, 30 January 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-israel-2; on EU-Israel relations, see European Commission DG Near website: Israel, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/node/3424_en.[13] Merav Amir, "The Israeli Reaction to the War in Ukraine", in IWMpost, No. 129 (Spring/Summer 2022), p. 18, https://www.iwm.at/node/4054.[14] Bill Figueroa, "The China-Israel Trade Deal", in Centre for Geopolitics Commentaries, 25 October 2022, https://www.cfg.polis.cam.ac.uk/news/china-israel-trade-deal.[15] Shira Rubin, "Israel Opposed the Iran Nuclear Deal, But Former Israeli Officials Increasingly Say U.S. Pullout Was a Mistake", in The Washington Post, 9 December 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-iran-nuclear-deal-sanctions/2021/12/08/ece28168-56c0-11ec-8396-5552bef55c3c_story.html.[16] AJLabs, "Israel-Gaza War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker", in Al Jazeera, accessed on 24 September 2024, https://aje.io/pnauxp; on the number of displaced persons, see UN Population Fund, Occupied Palestinian Territory, last updated on 3 September 2024, https://www.unfpa.org/occupied-palestinian-territory; on material damage, see UN Satellite Centre, UNOSAT Gaza Strip 8th Comprehensive Damage Assessment, July 2024, https://unosat.org/products/3904; on journalists killed in Gaza, see International Federation of Journalists, War in Gaza: Israel Must Be Helf Accountable, https://www.ifj.org/war-in-gaza; on relief staff, see Medical Aid for Palestinians, 500 Healthcare Workers Killed during Israel's Military Assault on Gaza, 26 June 2024, https://www.map.org.uk/news/archive/post/1598; on aid workers, see Human Rights Watch, Gaza: Israelis Attacking Known Aid Worker Locations, 14 May 2024, https://www.hrw.org/node/388036.[17] Jason Burke, "Revealed: Israel Has Sped Up Settlement-Building in East Jerusalem since Gaza War Began", in The Guardian, 17 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/qbb7t.[18] Alison Killing et al., "How Extremist Settlers in the West Bank Became the Law", in Financial Times, 18 September 2024, https://ig.ft.com/west-bank.[19] International Court of Justice, Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176.[20] Jacob Magid, "Knesset Votes Overwhelmingly against Palestinian Statehood, Days before PM's US Trip", in The Times of Israel, 18 July 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-overwhelmingly-against-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip.[21] Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, "The Unpunished: How Extremists Took Over Israel", in The New York Times, 16 May 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/magazine/israel-west-bank-settler-violence-impunity.html.[22] AJLabs, "Israel-Gaza War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker", cit.[23] Yonette Joshep and Patrick Kingsley, "Netanyahu Will Return with Corruption Charges Unresolved. Here's Where the Case Stands", in The New York Times, updated on 26 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-charges-israel.html.[24] James Shotter, "Benjamin Netanyahu's Polls Rebound after Aggressive Israeli Operations", in Financial Times, 24 September 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/3ae49fb5-a1c6-4e8a-ad08-1179d766550f.
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"A politically motivated cultural war" waged through "hate speech, aggression and abuse" via social media:[1] it was thus that Thomas Bach, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), described the swathe of disinformation and misinformation that spread following Algerian boxer Imane Khelif's victory by withdrawal against Italian Angela Carini at the Paris 2024 Olympic Games.[2] No longer than a week before, in his speech at the Opening Ceremony, Bach had invited to celebrate the "Olympic spirit of living life in peace, as the one and only humankind, united in all our diversity".[3] With two major wars raging on in Ukraine and in Palestine, and amidst increased political polarisation on both sides of the Atlantic, including in host country France, Bach's hopes sounded highly optimistic to say the least. Not only is such a global mega-event impossible to be truly shielded away from the social, political, economic and cultural cleavages that traverse our world; at a more mundane level, it clearly provides an easy target for propaganda ops that try to influence in a malicious way the public debate on polarising issues – this time, LGBTIQ rights.In the Kremlin's shadow Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia's participation in the 2024 Paris Games was long debated.[4] Finally, the IOC decided to allow limited participation of Russian athletes as individual neutral entrants whose eligibility had to be vetted by an ad-hoc committee. In the end, only 15 Russian participants accepted the invitation to Paris 2024,[5] with some Russian federations such as judo denouncing the entry requirements as "humiliating" and therefore dropping out altogether.[6] While the Russian Olympic Committee did not formally announce a boycott of the Games, the event has been diminished and ridiculed by Russian government spokespeople and media and is not being broadcast in the country (the first time since the Los Angeles 1984 Games).[7] Furthermore, plans for organising an alternative event, the World Friendship Games, are underway, although postponed to 2025.[8] In parallel, evidence accrued that a number of Russia-affiliated actors were launching disinformation campaigns targeting the event, also using AI tools. According to a Microsoft Threat Intelligence report, deceptive and fake videos (including one featuring a fake Tom Cruise's narrator's voice) were produced denigrating the organisers and fomenting public fears about expected violence during the Games.[9] Just a few days before the opening ceremony, France's Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin announced that a number of Russian individuals had been arrested on suspicion of plotting destabilisation acts against the Games.[10] Once the Games started, the focus of Russian attacks shifted to the issue of 'traditional values' and gender. The opening ceremony, which featured the scene of a grand pagan feast that some found reminiscent of Leonardo da Vinci's Last Supper, was described by Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova as "an LGBT mockery of a sacred Christian story".[11] Going further, President of the International Boxing Association (IBA) Umar Kremlev scathingly portrayed the Ceremony as "pure sodomy" via Instagram, asking for Bach's resignation and announcing that the upcoming World Friendship Games – of which he is the chairman of the Supervisory Board – will instead be imbued with "true human values" such as "family values".[12] Homophobic and sexist tones crept very quickly in the row over the opening ceremony, with artistic director Thomas Jolly and DJ Barbara Butch being targeted by death, torture and rape threats.[13] The controversy on gender and LGBTIQ rights was soon to be refocused from the opening ceremony to the sporting ground, once unfounded claims started to appear in social media that "transgender" athlete Imane Khelif was due to compete in Paris in the name of "woke ideology".[14] IBA followed on quickly by releasing a communiqué that stated that two women participants – Lin Yu-ting and Khelif herself – had not met the "necessary eligibility criteria" in a "separate and recognized test, whereby the specifics remain confidential" at the 2023 IBA World Championship.[15] Interestingly enough, back in March 2023, Kremlev himself had provided some highly sensitive details about the testing conducted at the World Championship to Russian news agency TASS.[16] According to the IBA, the IOC's decision to let Lin and Khelif compete in Paris would "raise serious questions about both competitive fairness and athletes' safety".[17] The IOC pointed out that the two athletes had competed in women's boxing for many years (including at the Tokyo 2020 Olympics), that they complied with all eligibility and entry requirements and that the IBA 2023 decision had been "sudden and arbitrary".[18] The Pandora's box of the cultural – better, anti-gender and LGBTIQ rights – war, however, had now been opened.The patriarchal populist discourse on women's bodies "A male punching a female". "A person who transitioned". "A good male boxer". "An Algerian transgender". These are just some of the unfounded and degrading allegations that highly prominent figures – most of them belonging or close to the populist far right – raised against Imane Khelif. The heated discussion around Khelif's body and identity showcases some of the defining tropes of what Rebecca Sanders and Laura Dudley Jenkins have called transnational patriarchal populism: "a virulent and increasingly dominant variant of contemporary right-wing populism that uses blatantly sexist and regressive tropes to mobilise mass support and undermine women's and LGBTQ equality, as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights".[19] Transgender participation in sport has become a preferred target within this narrative, as it allows far right populists to attack LGBTIQ rights while supposedly 'defending' women's rights. Notably, this approach (as many other tropes of the anti-LGBTIQ narrative) is also shared by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who scathingly dismissed transgender athletes as "the end to female sports" in 2021.[20] What we know for sure, however, is that Imane Khelif is not a transgender person: she was born and grew up as a woman – and a woman boxer – in a country where same-sex relations are criminalised, and gender transition de facto too.[21] As long as the governing authority of the Olympic Games (that is, the IOC, not the IBA) confirms her eligibility to participate in the event, any speculations of whatever kind (testosterone levels, DNA and so on) about her body or identity are not just unfounded, but inappropriate, if not abusive. This is especially concerning when such speculations are made publicly by government officials (as happened in Italy) or experts from the scientific community, without having access to solid evidence and disrespecting the right to privacy and confidentiality regarding personal health information. This is not to say that issues of fairness, safety and eligibility criteria in women's sport should be simply ignored, sure. These are serious matters that should be raised and addressed, however, in the appropriate international fora and in the awareness that there are no easy, clear-cut or conclusive answers in light of the complexity of being human – both from a biological and cultural point of view.[22] Should there be concerns about specific instances or decisions, appeals should be made through the appropriate channels made available by sports organisations and law, not via social media or tv broadcasting. While the safety of athletes should be a priority, much more controversial is the widespread tendency to frame the debate in terms of 'protection' of women's sport.[23] As Jean Williams pointed out, "The protectionist logic has been used for over 170 years to keep women out of sport".[24] Historically, this logic has been used to exclude or limit women's participation in sport. Without going back to Pierre de Coubertin's notorious opposition to women's sports competitions as such, one should simply recall that women's boxing became an Olympic discipline only in 2012, exactly due to this kind of logic. More generally, the abusive comments on Imane Khelif, her appearance and 'biology' are a case in point of the tendency of far-right populists to regulate women's bodies and behaviour. To make just one example, JD Vance's "childless cat ladies" remarks, compounded with his radical anti-abortion stances (basically, he accepts no exception to the prohibition of abortion), shed an alarming light on what some far-right populists think women should be and look like.[25]Olympic signs of hope And yet, however disturbing the row on Imane Khelif's victory has been, positive signs in the direction of comprehension and solidarity have manifested as well. Algerian authorities and media stood firmly by her,[26] as did the IOC. Fact-checking articles in the media helped draw a neat line between facts and speculations or outright falsities. As Khelif went on to fight against Hungarian Luca Anna Hamori in the round-of-8 bout, a passionate crowd of supporters cheered her in Paris;[27] Khelif is now certain to secure a medal in the Paris Games. It is just a pity that, amidst this hateful 'war on gender' waged by the populist far right and actively fed by Putin's cronies, the performance of Afghani runner Kimia Yousofi in the 100m-heat went almost completely unnoticed. At the end of her run, Yousofi – who fled from Afghanistan in 2021 – showed a handwritten piece of paper stating: "Eduction. Sport. Our rights", calling attention to the dire situation in her native country,[28] where the Taliban have banned all sports for girls and women: for once, a genuine and potent message for change delivered in the Olympic arena.Leo Goretti is Head of the Italian Foreign Policy Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Editor of The International Spectator.[1] "'We Will Not Take Part in a Culture War': Bach Defends Khelif's Right to Fight at Olympics – Video", in The Guardian, 3 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/xv75xg.[2] In the round-of-16 bout of the women's 66 kg event.[3] International Olympic Committee (IOC), IOC President's Speech – Olympic Games Paris 2024 Opening Ceremony, 26 July 2024, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-president-s-speech-olympic-games-paris-2024-opening-ceremony.[4] Leo Goretti, "The Olympics of Discontent: Paris 2024 and Russia's War against Ukraine", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|64 (December 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17905.[5] IOC, Individual Neutral Athletes at the Olympic Games Paris 2024, updated 20 July 2024, https://olympics.com/ioc/paris-2024-individual-neutral-athletes.[6] "Russia Opts Not to Send Any Judokas to Paris Olympics", in Reuters, 29 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/sports/olympics/russia-opts-not-send-any-judokas-paris-olympics-2024-06-28.[7] Jim Heintz, "Russian Media Throw Shade at Paris Olympics, which TV Won't Show", in AP News, 27 July 2024, https://apnews.com/article/835aabe6cca7cb288dbee07c2f6a2ebd.[8] "International Friendship Association Proposes to Postpone 2024 World Friendship Games", in TASS, 30 July 2024, https://tass.com/sports/1823241.[9] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, "How Russia Is Trying to Disrupt the 2024 Paris Olympic Games", in Security Insider, 6 June 2024, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/intelligence-reports/how-russia-is-trying-to-disrupt-the-2024-paris-olympic-games.[10] Daniel Boffey, "Russian Chef Arrested in Paris over Alleged 'Large Scale' Olympic Games Plot", in The Guardian, 24 July 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/xv547g.[11] John Leicester, "Paris' Olympics Opening Was Wacky and Wonderful — And Upset Bishops. Here's Why", in AP News, 28 July 2024, https://apnews.com/article/49f9885ff2b95b9b7ccc51ca195e84e1.[12] @umarkremlev, "The 2024 Games…", X post, 31 July 2024, https://x.com/umarkremlev/status/1818633618371076546; umar_kremlev, https://www.instagram.com/reel/C-IJbLdMkkR. Kremlev had been elected President of IBA in 2020, pledging to bring the organisation out of the financial and reputational ills that had led to its suspension by the IOC in 2019; to this end, in 2021, he announced a major sponsorship with Russian energy giant Gazprom. In 2023, the IOC found that the concerns about the governance, financial transparency and integrity of IBA had not been addressed, and therefore withdrew the Olympic recognition of IBA.[13] Jon Henley, "French Prosecutors Open Inquiry into Death Threats to Opening Ceremony Artistic Director", in The Guardian, 2 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/xv6qdk.[14] @matteosalvinimi, "Pugile trans…", X post, 30 July 2024, https://x.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1818317332164248025.[15] IBA, Statement Made by the International Boxing Association Regarding Athletes Disqualifications in World Boxing Championships 2023, 31 July 2024, https://www.iba.sport/?p=52414.[16] Jonathan Crane, "Paris 2024: What's Behind Boxing's Olympic Outcry?", in Deutsche Welle, 3 August 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/a-69849580. See also "IBA Expels Athletes Who Tried to Pass Themselves Off as Women from World Championships" (in Russian), in TASS, 25 March 2023, https://tass.ru/sport/17370249.[17] IBA, Statement Made by the International Boxing Association, cit.[18] IOC, Joint Paris 2024 Boxing Unit/IOC Statement, 1 August 2024, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/joint-paris-2024-boxing-unit-ioc-statement.[19] Rebecca Sanders and Laura Dudley Jenkins, "Patriarchal Populism: The Conservative Political Action Coalition (CPAC) and the Transnational Politics of Authoritarian Anti-Feminism", in The International Spectator, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2023), p. 1-19 at p. 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2225660.[20] "Female Sports May Become Extinct with Male Transgender Athletes' Arrival, Says Putin", in TASS, 23 December 2021, https://tass.com/sports/1380231. On these issues see also Leo Goretti and Sofia Mariconti, "Let's Learn Judo with Putin. Sport, Power and Masculinity in 21st-Century Russia", in IAI Papers, No. 23|03 (January 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16482.[21] Emma Guinness, "Inside the Tough Childhood of Olympic Boxer Imane Khelif as She Faces Groundless Accusations of Being Male", in Independent, 3 August 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/b2590229.html. On homosexuality in Algeria see Human Rights Watch, Algeria: Mass Convictions for Homosexuality, 15 October 2020, https://www.hrw.org/node/376698; on gender transition Cairo 52 Legal Research Institute website: Algeria, https://cairo52.com/?p=3652.[22] Alessia Tuselli, "Il corpo di Imane Khelif ci insegna che non siamo pronti", in Ultimo Uomo, 3 August 2024, https://www.ultimouomo.com/imane-khelif-carini-boxe-parigi24-corpo-donna.[23] This was a recurrent argument that was made, amidst reiterated attacks by Kremlev against Bach and the IOC as well as references to Sodom and Gomorrah, at a conference held by IBA on 5 August to supposedly clarify their stance on the case: see "Chaos at Imane Khelif Press Conference as Boxing Chiefs Double Down on Banned Fighters", in The Telegraph, 5 August 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/olympics/2024/08/05/imane-khelif-iba-explain-olympics-gender-row-boxer-live.[24]@JeanMWilliams, "Please stop saying…", X post, 1 August 2024, https://x.com/JeanMWilliams/status/1819065343089725712.[25] Camilla Cavendish, "'Childless Cat Ladies' Fight a Tide of Pronatalism", in Financial Times, 3 August 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/52bd814a-6571-4571-94a1-0db4df01c9ac. JD Vance described Imane Khelif in X as "a grown man pummeling a woman": @JDvance, "This is where Kamala Harris…", X post, 1 August 2024, https://x.com/JDVance/status/1819085100363272282.[26] Ashraf Hamed Atta, "Algerian Boxer Khelif Eyes Gold amid Gender Row", in Reuters, 3 August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/sports/olympics/boxing-algerian-khelif-eyes-gold-amid-gender-row-2024-08-03.[27] Alanis Thames and Megan Janetsky, "Olympic Fans Cheer on Imane Khelif during Win after She Faced Days of Online Abuse", in AP News, 3 August 2024, https://apnews.com/article/d4ed497911efceb6393fd4fc30c0d0ed.[28] Jack Snape, "Afghanistan 100m Runner Kimia Yousofi Sends Olympic Message to the Taliban", in The Guardian, 2 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/p/xv6qf5.
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Many countries with scheduled elections this year face a difficult choice in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic: how to balance public health considerations with holding a free and fair election. Learn more from NDI Senior Associate and Director of Electoral Programs Pat Merloe and Program Director Julia Brothers as they talk about democratic back-sliding during this crisis, electoral integrity, and ways civil society organizations can still make a difference. Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play Pat Merlow: In the public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of governments, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information. Julia Brothers: Hello, this is Julia Brothers. I'm the Program Director for Elections at the National Democratic Institute. Welcome to Dem Works. JB: Around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is sewing insecurity among the public, which can be exploited by authoritarians to consolidate power in sideline democratic institutions. It also poses severe technical, political, and social threats to elections themselves. In many countries, the effects of the virus may strain citizen relationships with government and elected [inaudible] officials, intensify political tensions and the potentials for violence, disenfranchise voters and increase conditions for democratic backsliding. Today I'm joined by Pat Merlow, senior associate and director of electoral programs at NDI. Welcome to the podcast, Pat. Thank you for being here. Pat Merlow: Hi, Julia. JB: So the COVID-19 crisis is causing enormous challenges for every country, including those with scheduled elections this year. What are the biggest concerns deciding whether to hold or postpone elections? PM: Elections must be held in ways that safeguard public health and in ways that ensure genuine opportunities for the electorate to vote. Universal and equal suffrage, which is in every modern constitution, means inclusion, not exclusion. So we have to also hold elections in ways where the political parties and the candidates have a fair chance to compete for votes without a playing field that's being manipulated or intentionally or unintentionally tilted in one party's favor. So striking a proper democratic balance of public safety and credible election processes is different and really difficult in every country. Depends a lot on the level of economic and technological development in the country on the nature of social cohesion versus divisions in the country and political polarization. So in many countries where NDI works, the concern is whether authoritarians will rush through elections with undue public health risks in order to gain an electoral advantage or to postpone elections under conditions that advantage their attempts to gain and maintain more power. A second troubling circumstance in countries that are unstable or prone to various kinds of violence, where constrains of the public health crisis can be used by malign actors to flood the population with this information... I mean we're hearing this term infodemic; also hate speech and other means to scapegoat religious or ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people or women in order to gain political advantage. That's not all the countries where NDI works, but even those are neither authoritarian nor fragile states, the COVID-19 crisis is still posing gigantic challenges both on the public health and to electoral integrity. JB: Right. I mean these factors present themselves as challenges to electoral integrity, not just where there might be bad faith actors that are trying to utilize this crisis to consolidate power, but also just in addressing basic issues related to how to make sure that you're maximizing participation during a public health crisis. What are some of the factors that these countries would need to think about in terms of actually implementing elections either during a public health crisis or immediately after. PM: There really are a number of factors that have to be considered. So the first thing that comes to everybody's mind of course is what do you do? Can people actually go to polling places or should they be under some sort of the shelter in place lockdown-like circumstances. That doesn't just affect whether to vote. That really has to do with whether you can register to vote safely or not. In countries where there are not a high level of electronic engagement where the digital divide falls really widely across broad swipes of the population, gathering those people into places to register to vote or to vote is really the only means of doing it. So the question of a postponement becomes really an operative question. Then we're concerned with what are the conditions for the postponement and how does that interrelate with the declarations of states of emergency, whether they're being done properly with the kinds of constraints on limitations on powers or whether they're being done in ways that usurp power. JB: Yeah. I think one of the major concerns, especially thinking about citizens being able to participate in the process, is that during a pandemic, if voters are concerned about going out to vote, chances are that that's not going to be an equal distribution among the population, where there are a vulnerable populations that will be more impacted. You'll see disproportionate levels of low turnout among certain communities like senior citizens or persons with disabilities or women who disproportionately have the burden of childcare and are in a situation where you don't have options for even temporary childcare because of social distancing regulations. Well, this seems like a good place to take a short break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institution's practices and skills necessary for democracy success. Welcome back. JB: So we talked a bit about the postponements that we're seeing around the world in terms of electoral timelines. Are election observers relevant during electoral delays, especially if there's restrictions on movement in the population if they're under some form of shelter in place or lockdown. PM: Yeah. So Julie, you mentioned that NDI works in more than 70 countries and in fact, working with nonpartisan citizen groups and coalitions and various organizations is one of the hallmarks of NDI's work over more than 35 years now and certainly the 25 years where I've been involved. There's a network of citizen election observers, there are nine of them in various regions of the world and they're amalgamated in more than 250 organizations from 90 countries. Those organizations have been sharing best practices and ideas about what can be done. So let me just quickly mention a couple of them. There are four areas where they have been able to focus. One are ways to assist; that is, to assist public health agencies and the electoral authorities to bring about safe elections and fair elections. The second is ways to address authoritarian opportunism and how states of emergency and various conditions are being used by those who would usurp the citizens of power. The third are ways to address disinformation, hate speech and attempts at hyperpolarization that influence and create unfair conditions for elections. The fourth way is to address, as you mentioned earlier, examples of where a health crisis can lead to disenfranchisement or further tilt the playing field so that it's an unfair circumstance. JB: Yeah, I mean you mentioned especially tracking the authoritarian leaders who are potentially taking advantage of the health crisis to grab power and subvert democracy and in some unstable countries, this can threaten heightened instability. What can election servers be doing to address that or what are they currently doing to address that? PM: The most important thing is citizen election observers in all kinds of countries have been time tested and over the series of elections cycles two, three, even four in many countries, they've built national networks and they've established themselves as trusted voices. In a public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of government, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information from the health authorities, accurate information from the electoral authorities about what to do, where to do things and so on. Also, they have networks that can collect information; even during lockdowns. You and I were in a conversation with one of the partner organizations with whom we work in Sri Lanka just last week. The head of that organization is working on a civil society task force. That task force is considering how to gain access to women's shelters, to older people's homes, to places where there's foster children's care, drug treatment centers, and so on because these are vulnerable populations that are being hit hard by the crisis. One of the things that he pointed out in our conversation is that the government is taking advantage of the postponement of the election for electoral advantage by handing out dry goods to citizens and even medical supplies through the political party rather than as an impartial governmental service to the people. So the question that he posed was, even during lockdown, is there a way that our network of over 1,000 people could begin to document this and report it so that we can lift up to the public the nature of this problem that's coming about and see if we can't get some accountability and get them to cut back. So even during a lockdown, it's possible for the citizen observer groups to do things that are extraordinarily relevant. JB: Yeah, I mean it seems like there are certainly opportunities for electoral observers to be monitoring the kinds of things that they would normally be looking at in a pre-election period when their elections are delayed... Issues related to is the government still helping to create conditions for a credible and competitive process in the midst of a public health emergency. Are conditions being put in place to ensure that marginalized populations are not sidelined from the process. But it also kind of expands it a little bit too in that there are these potentially other issues that that groups may consider looking at. Like you mentioned, how health resources are being distributed and what kinds of policy changes are being made and how were those being made? What's the decision-making process around things like delaying the elections, around emergency voting procedures? Are they inclusive? Are all the parties being brought in to them? Is civil society be brought into these discussions and taking a look at some of these new conditions that observers may otherwise not necessarily be monitoring in a pre-election period. I think the other issue here is there are constraints here in terms of potentially being able to deploy a bunch observers out into the field to collect information if you're in a lockdown situation. So it's been interesting talking with groups to see how they're thinking creatively about how they can collect some of this information remotely. What kind of data exists that you can collect whether it's open data sources from the government looking at budgets, looking at how budgets are changing and how resources are moving. You mentioned looking at disinformation, being able to monitor social media and seeing what data could be collected from that. It's been interesting to see how citizen election observers around the world are getting creative and still doing their jobs while being sometimes trapped at home. PM: Absolutely. You mentioned the disinformation... One of the things that we've been seeing is that in Russia for example, they have been making use of the COVID crisis to begin to track people even more carefully to introduce facial recognition technologies and cameras. The term that's been throwing around is cybergulags being created there. With China's facial recognition technologies and the way that's been used to suppress the weaker minorities, China has been introducing that working with governments and other places in the world to try to get that into voter registration so that you have biometric voter registration data that includes facial recognition technology. So in this era, getting access to government decision making, getting access even to the health data and disaggregated by gender, by vulnerable groups and so on is part of the work that election observers normally do. Demanding open electoral data can lead easily to the same kinds of advocacy around open health data. One of the other things I thought that you've touched on that's interesting is the states of emergencies and the relationships between that and postponement. There's more than 45 countries at this point that have postponed elections at the national and sub-national level. Not all of them are problematic by any means, but in a lot of countries, there have been extended states of emergency without any end date. The postponements have no end date on them. One of the things that election observers can do is to join with... And many of them are human rights organizations and bringing about the rules that have been established in the international arena for limiting the duration of states of emergencies, that the measures that are taken have to be proportionate to the nature of the threat to the nation to bring those issues up and do advocacy around them and to help those of us in the international arena be aware of where these problems are in various countries. JB: With that, I think we'll take a quick break. We'll be back after this quick message. One of the things that Secretary Albright has said is that it's absolutely essential for young people to understand that they must participate and that they are the energy behind democracy. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our Dem Works podcast. It is available on iTunes and SoundCloud. So before the break, we were talking about the role that citizen election monitors are playing in the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on electoral integrity. Are there other considerations that citizen election groups should be thinking about in the need for electoral integrity in their countries? I'm thinking especially related to how groups can make sure that their observers are safe while also being able to collect information and an advocate for critical processes and good governance. PM: That's really a critical question, Julia. A good example that comes to mind is in Mali, which has had very few reported cases of COVID-19, there was a parliamentary election just two weeks ago. The government, for national security reasons, has had to postpone those elections for almost two years and they were really in a phase of saying we need to push it ahead. In fact, there had not been a reported COVID-19 death until just a few hours before the election date. So it went forward and the citizen observers with which NDI has been working in that country in the weeks leading up to that advocated that the polling stations had to have masks for the staff; had to have gloves; had to have hand sanitizers or hand washing stations because hand sanitizer is hard to get in a lot of places in Mali. They made sure that their observers had those materials themselves. I think 1,500 observers went out to polling stations across the country. In their own headquarters and gathering data, there was social distancing that took place and they did a lot of checking in with their observers about how they were doing, how they were feeling over the course of the day. So one thing that the citizen observers can do is to join with organizations that are health advocates for those places where either voter registration is about to take place or voting is about to take place to ensure that the conditions minimize the risk. We just saw this over this past weekend in the elections that were held in South Korea. Whether or not you might think that the election should go forward, there was a country where there's a lot of public confidence in what the government has been doing and in the integrity of the election authorities and voter turnout was not terribly affected by this. So there is something that can be done immediately and as you have mentioned, there are numerous things that can be looked at by citizen observers without ever really leaving their homes or their headquarters. One of those, as you mentioned, is disinformation. Our partners in Georgia, for example, have uncovered a link between Russian propaganda, which has gone up around disinformation around COVID-19 and linking it to destabilizing public trust in Georgia's government. There's a really interesting report that they came out with just last week on that front. So how does COVID-19 and elections interface is something that can be explored in a number of dimensions. JB: We've talked mostly about the work of nonpartisan civil society organizations and their own countries that are confronting this challenge. Is there a role for international election observers on terms of electoral oversight during a public crisis, especially knowing that they will have some of the same if not even more constraints than citizen election monitors? PM: It's a very difficult role at the moment for international election observers. We've been in touch with our colleagues at the African Union and the European Union, at the United Nations and Organization of American States and so on. Many of them have been bringing teams home from countries. Some of them have been postponing or canceling sending teams out. At the same time, there are a number of things that international observers can do. As you mentioned, you can look at things from a distance. You can review the legal framework, which is part of what every international election observation and citizen observers do. You can compare what has been done over the past few cycles of elections, where recommendations have been made, whether those recommendations were acted upon or whether you find the same problem repeating in the next report and prioritize the issues that you might look to and even be able to inform diplomats and others about things that they should be raising with government. You can look at disinformation and other information disorder, hate speech and so on, from afar. Certainly you can tune in with what the critical people inside a country who are working on these issues have been doing. You can conduct some long distance interviews with key people in the citizen groups and in the election authorities and the political leaders to learn their opinions about what the state of play is in the country and their concerns going forward. But when it comes time to put people on the ground, we have to look at travel restrictions. We have to look at countries where foreigners have been seen as people who bring in COVID-19 and there's been violence against them; so security of observers is important. And the numbers of people who may go or where they may be deployed depending upon hotspots in the country and so on. So this is something that over the course of this year will be a challenge. And the next thing will be a challenge for international election observers is that as so many elections are being postponed, they're being postponed probably towards the end of this year or the beginning of next year, which already has many scheduled elections. So there may be an overwhelming demand for which the supply of financial and human resources runs short. JB: It does seem like at this point, especially knowing that international election observers in a lot of the places just can't deploy right now, one of the roles to play here is really trying to raise the voices of the citizen groups on the ground that are able to actually do some on the ground observation. Also keeping in mind, especially for the places we're concerned about authoritarian overreach, thinking about how we can use some of these international mechanisms to push back on democratic backsliding and mitigate tensions in places where it could potentially be a bit more unstable with the current situation. PM: You're right. That's the contribution that the international community can do, too... To really amplify the voices of the citizenry and to augment their efforts to bring about respect for civil and political rights. When you have a network of thousands of citizens who have taken the time and the effort to go out of their homes, into the street, to look at what the nature of the threats of violence or vote buying or intimidation to document how these things of disproportionally driven women or restricted women's political and electoral participation, would they have taken the time to go into polling stations, sometimes under threat or coercion? These people have become a solid core of citizen empowerment in so many countries around the world, and each of those citizens, of course, is using WhatsApp and other ways of talking and they're influencers within a country. They can gather information, they can give accurate information out, but as they report up through their networks, if there's good collaboration between the reputable citizen groups and the credible international election observers and the international community more broadly, we can use that cooperation that we've been working on over the years to try to bring attention, even when it's hard to shine a light directly on problems in countries that are being affected by this crisis and facing political challenges and stress. JB: Well, thank you again, Pat, for joining us. I think this has been a particularly relevant discussion. I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other Dem Works podcasts, please visit our website@www.ndi.org PM: Thank you, Julia and thank you to the listeners.
