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The Modern Language Association (MLA) report "Foreign Languages and Higher Education: New Structures for a Changed World" (2007) recommended that the language disciplines decenter off literature and design programs that are more directly related to "real world" contexts. This recommendation has awoken renewed discussion about how best to promote and develop multilingualism and intercultural competence in the United States. In order to change undergraduate offerings, it would be necessary to change the focus of graduate programs. Changing the focus of graduate programs is a delicate and high stakes task, which can influence both the nature of intellectual production in the United States as well as impact the employability of thousands of new PhDs. Will the MLA 2007 report stimulate any lasting change? Will the number of jobs which deviate from the traditional literature, linguistics and second language acquisition fields merit redesign of graduate programs to train future professors to meet this demand? The MLA Foreign Language Job Information List contains a plethora of data that can provide answers for some of these questions. This article seeks to create insights into a significant subcategory of the Foreign Language profession by presenting an analysis of job announcements for Language for Specific Purposes (LSP). ; To cite the digital version, add its Reference URL (found by following the link in the header above the digital file). ; LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 15 Language for Specific Purposes Job Announcements from the Modern Language Association Job Lists: A Multiyear Analysis Mary K. Long University of Colorado at Boulder Abstract: The Modern Language Association (MLA) report "Foreign Languages and Higher Education: New Structures for a Changed World" (2007) recommended that the language disciplines decenter off literature and design programs that are more directly related to "real world" contexts. This recommendation has awoken renewed discussion about how best to promote and develop multilingualism and intercultural competence in the United States. In order to change undergraduate offerings, it would be necessary to change the focus of graduate programs. Changing the focus of graduate programs is a delicate and high stakes task, which can influence both the nature of intellectual production in the United States as well as impact the employability of thousands of new PhDs. Will the MLA 2007 report stimulate any lasting change? Will the number of jobs which deviate from the traditional literature, linguistics and second language acquisition fields merit redesign of graduate programs to train future professors to meet this demand? The MLA Foreign Language Job Information List contains a plethora of data that can provide answers for some of these questions. This article seeks to create insights into a significant subcategory of the Foreign Language profession by presenting an analysis of job announcements for Language for Specific Purposes (LSP). Keywords: jobs, job announcements, Languages for Specific Purposes (LSP), Modern Language Association (MLA), non-tenure track (NTT), tenured/tenure track (TTT) Introduction Since its release five years ago, the Modern Language Association (MLA) report "Foreign Languages and Higher Education: New Structures for a Changed World" (2007) has awoken renewed discussion in the profession about how best to promote and develop multilingualism and intercultural competence in the United States. The suggestion that the language disciplines should decenter off literature and design programs that are more directly related to "real world" contexts has caused both consternation and excitement as well as much discussion about what steps would be necessary to redesign both undergraduate and graduate programs in order to train future faculty to teach within the proposed new scenarios (e.g., Porter, 2009; Rifkin, 2012). Changing the focus of graduate programs is a delicate and high stakes task that can influence both the nature of intellectual production and international understanding in the United States as well as impact the employability of thousands of new PhDs. Thus, those in the profession are wise to move deliberately and to consider the multiple angles. From the point of view of preparing future professors, some very pragmatic issues of job market demand must be considered. For example, will the MLA 2007 report stimulate any lasting change? Are departments truly moving to transform their undergraduate offerings away from literature? If so, in what ways are they redefining their programs and who will teach these courses? What is the balance between tenured/tenure track (TTT) and non-tenure track (NTT) jobs LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 16 in these areas? Will there be steady demand for future faculty trained to meet the new scenarios? Are new research fields emerging? If so, what do they look like? Will the number of jobs that deviate from the traditional literature, linguistics and second language acquisition fields merit redesign of graduate programs to train future professors to meet this demand? Or, is it more a question of helping future professors to enhance the traditional fields of specialization with new pedagogical approaches and secondary content expertise? The MLA Foreign Language Job Information List contains a plethora of data that can provide answers for some of these questions and be used to gauge the direction of the Foreign Language professions. In fact, the MLA itself releases yearly summaries of many of the overarching themes, such as number of jobs overall, changes in demand between languages, and so forth, but the potential exists to provide much more detailed analysis, which will be useful—and even crucial—to shaping the future of Foreign Language education in the United States. Along those lines, this article seeks to create insights into a significant subcategory of the Foreign Language profession by presenting an analysis of MLA Job List announcements with a focus on Languages for Specific Purposes (LSP). Since the late 1940s, the LSP field has been meeting the 2007 MLA report's stated goals of increasing the number of "educated speakers who have deep translingual and transcultural compentence" as well as the ability to carry that competence beyond the classroom into the world (MLA, 2007, p. 3). The LSP field continues to represent a significant area of Foreign Language Education in the United States. The national survey "Evolution of Language for Specific Purposes programs in the United States: 1990–2011" conducted by Long and Uscinski (2012), shows that, since the early 1990s, overall offerings of LSP have remained stable at 62% while at the same time the sophistication and variety of offerings have become deeper and more focused in response to the nuanced needs within different multilingual settings. The LSP faculty profile created as part of this survey indicates a more or less even split between TTT faculty and NTT faculty. In addition, while 20% of faculty listed LSP as their primary field of academic preparation, a dramatic 80% indicated another field as their primary field of academic preparation. Of these, the majority listed Literature as their primary focus, with Linguistics and Cultural Studies running a distant second and third (Long & Uscinski, 2012, p. 183). In part, this mix of primary fields has a very pragmatic explanation since as new fields develop, there will necessarily be a large number of "ground breakers" who are willing and able to expand their research and pedagogical skills beyond their original areas of content expertise. But, in addition, and more importantly, this mix of expertise is by definition one of the advantages and challenges for any interdisciplinary field. Recent volumes focused on LSP (e.g., Gueldry, 2010a, Gueldry 2010b; Lafford, 2012; Pérez-Llantada & Watson, 2011) showcase the rich research potential of the LSP focus for a variety of fields and point to the advantages of interdisciplinary research for addressing many of the complex intercultural issues faced in today's "global setting." These publications also provide significant insights into the history, current state and future potential for the LSP field. One of the difficulties highlighted in this body of work is that interdisciplinary work often blocks the professional progress of faculty since tenure and promotion structures are more suited to single focus research fields. Against this backdrop of past practices, the following analysis of LSP job announcements will shed light on how the profession envisions the future of the LSP field as well as offer insight LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 17 into what provisions (if any) are being made in the design of new positions to support and promote the professional success of faculty who possess highly needed interdisciplinary expertise. Methodology The job announcements have been analyzed for two "snap shot" moments: the online MLA Foreign Language Job Information list September 2008–January 2009 and the online MLA Foreign Language Job Information list from September 2011–June 2012 (and, one chart shares additional data on Spanish for Business from September 2007–January 2008). It should be noted that in 2008–2009 there was an historic decline in job announcements that continued into 2009–2010. Since 2010–2011, there has been a "tentative climb upwards" (Lusin, 2012, p. 95). Because of the unique moment represented by the job market during these years, and because only two years of data are presented, there has been no analysis performed to determine if changes in raw numbers or percentages represent statistically significant changes overtime. Rather than attempting to track statistical changes, the goal of this current project has been to have a more clear understanding of the quantity and specific profiles of jobs in the LSP field both in relation to the overall job market, and within the LSP profession itself. The data was collected as follows: the search function included in the electronic posting of the job list was used to first search each language for the total number of jobs for all ranks and regions in each language (both expired and current listings). The categories offered on the MLA job list that were searched are: Arabic, Chinese, French, German and Scandinavian, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian and Slavic, Spanish, Other languages, Linguistics and ESL, Generalist, and Other. After establishing the total number of jobs for each language, several new searches were conducted per language using the keyword function to limit results. For the 2008–2009 list, the search was repeated for each language using the keyword 'business,' and this keyword brought up announcements that also contained other LSP terms such as 'professions,' 'translation,' 'medical,' etc. For the search of the 2011–2012 MLA list, a more expanded set of keywords was used. Each language was searched separately for the following keywords: business, translation, medicine, medical, professions, professional and specific/special purposes. To avoid double counting of announcements that included several of the search words and to eliminate "false positives" when the keywords were used in non-LSP contexts, once they were identified, the LSP announcements were read individually and hand-sorted. After extracting the number of LSP jobs in relation to the overall number of jobs for each language, further analysis was conducted on the specific nature of the LSP jobs, whether the LSP field was listed as primary or secondary, the split between TTT and NTT positions within these categories, and in the case of jobs that list LSP as a secondary field, what primary fields are most often combined with LSP. LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 18 Results Search terms. For the 2008–2009 search, even though additional search terms emerged through the key word 'business,' the majority of jobs were for 'language for business' with 'translation' coming in second. In 2011–2012, the highest results were for business, translation, professions, medical and specific/special purposes in descending order. 'Medicine' and 'professional' did not achieve any results in any language. This process revealed that when the keywords 'specific/special purposes' and 'professions' are used they are frequently followed by a parenthetical list of examples that duplicated other keywords (most often 'business' and 'translation') along with words not used in the search function. For example, for Spanish, other parenthetical examples included 'legal,' while for German, 'engineering' is a significant 'specific purpose.' 'Medical' only appeared in Spanish LSP job announcements, occasionally as a stand-alone term, but most often as one possible professional use. 'Translation,' on the other hand, was a stand-alone term that rivaled 'business' in Spanish, French, German, and Japanese. (In these cases, only non-literary translation positions were counted since there is a clear distinction in announcements between literary translation theory and applied professional translation.) Categories with LSP announcements. Categories that included jobs with an LSP focus in both 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 are Arabic, Chinese, French, German and Scandinavian, Japanese and Spanish. Categories that had no LSP jobs linked to the keywords in either sample are Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Slavic, Other languages, and Generalist. The Linguistics and ESL heading had no LSP jobs in the 2008–2009 list, but in the 2011–2012 had 10 LSP jobs out of 120 total (8.3%), 2 in ESL and 8 in Spanish. However, since the focus of this article is not on ESL and the Spanish linguistics/LSP jobs have also been counted in Spanish and will be analyzed there, the Linguistics and ESL category will not be analyzed further in this article. In each of the years, the category 'other' has a few interdisciplinary opportunities with a professional focus that breaks away from categorization by language. Overall numbers. Table 1 shows the total number of jobs compared to total LSP jobs and percentages for all languages from the 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 samples. Overall, the LSP job offerings fluctuate between 2 and 9% of all jobs, depending on specific language and year. LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 19 Table 1 Total jobs vs. total LSP jobs and percentages by language 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 Language 2008–2009 Total of all jobs in sample of MLA job list 2008–2009 Number of jobs with LSP element in sample 2008–2009 % of jobs with LSP element out of all jobs in sample 2011–2012 Total of all jobs in sample of MLA job list 2011–2012 Number of jobs with LSP element in sample 2011–2012 % of jobs with LSP element out of all jobs in sample Arabic 46 2 4.3% 46 1 2.1% Chinese 64 6 9.3% 79 4 5% French 150 6 4% 177 9 5% German and Scandinavian 90 4 4% 120 9 7.5% Italian - - - 59 0 0 Japanese ? 2 38 2 5% Portuguese - - - 39 0 0 Russian and Slavic - - - 34 0 0 Spanish 377 13 3% 365 29 7.9% Other languages - - - 64 0 0 Linguistics and ESL - - - 120 2 ESL and counted in Spanish 8 linguistics (5 required and 3 possible field) 8.3% Generalist - - - 34 0 0 Other ? 3 137 1 NA LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 20 Table 2 breaks down the total number of LSP jobs for both sample years into categories of LSP as a primary or secondary field of interest and also indicates whether the jobs are TTT or NTT. Table 2 Total number of LSP jobs compared to primary or secondary field and Tenured/Tenure Track (TTT) or Non-Tenure Track (NTT) by language for 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 Language 2008–2009 Total number LSP in sample 2008–2009 LSP as Primary field and TTT or NTT 2008–2009 LSP as secondary field and TTT or NTT 2011–2012 Total number LSP in sample 2011–2012 LSP as Primary field and TTT or NTT 2011–2012 LSP as secondary field and TTT or NTT Arabic 2 1 (NTT) 1 (TT) 1 0 1 (NTT) Chinese 6 2 (NTT) 4 (TTT) 4 1 (TT) 3 (2 TT/1 NTT) French 6 3 (2 TTT/1NTT) 3 (TTT) 9 2 (1 TT/1 NTT) 7 (3 TT/ 4 NTT) German and Scandinavian 4 4 (2TTT/2NTT) 0 9 1 (TT) 8 (4TT/3 NTT) Japanese 2 1 (NTT) 1 (TTT) 2 2 (1 TT/1 NTT) Spanish 13 6 (NTT) 7 (TTT) 29 13 (9 TT/ 4 NTT) 16 (11 TT/ 5 NTT) Other 3 1 (TT) Primarily business, PhD in applied linguistics or other fields of linguistics and MA in one of the World Languages) 2 post docs language open PhD field open; work on creating connection between the arts and the sciences and business 1 1 (TT) Director of a center for International Understanding Total 36 18 (5 TTT/13 NTT) 18 (16 TTT/2 post docs) 53 20 (14TTT/6NTT) 34 (21 TTT/ 13 NTT) LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 21 Table 3 transforms the raw numbers from Table 2 into percentages from the 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 samples of TTT LSP positions overall, and the split for jobs with LSP as the primary field or secondary field. In order to provide context, the percentages of TTT jobs by language for the overall profession from the 2011–2012 job list is also provided in this table. Table 3 2011–2012 percent of tenured/tenure track (TTT) for all jobs vs. 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 percent of TTT in LSP total and percentages of TTT with LSP as primary or secondary field Language 2011–2012 % TTT of total jobs in MLA sample 2008–2009 % TTT of total LSP in sample 2008–2009 % TTT LSP as primary within total LSP sample 2008–2009 % TTT LSP as secondary within total LSP sample 2011–2012 % TTT of total LSP sample 2011–2012 % TTT LSP as primary within total LSP sample 2011–2012 % TTT LSP as Secondary within total LSP sample Arabic 43% 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% Chinese 47.5% 66% 0% 66% 75 % 25% 50% French 47.9 % 83% 33% 50% 44% 11% 33% German and Scandinavian 38% 50% 50% 0% 55 % 11% 44% Japanese 48% 50% 0% 50% 50 % 50% 0% Spanish 53% 53% 0% 53% 68% 31% 37% Overall 49% 58% 50% 8% 64% 25% 39% The percentages of TTT positions for the overall profession by language range from 38% (in German) to 53% (in Spanish). For 2008–2009 the percentages of TTT positions out of the body of LSP jobs ranged between 50% and 83% while in 2011–2012 the percentages ranges from 0% to 75%. When the LSP jobs are analyzed for TTT positions with LSP as a primary field or as a secondary field, the TTT positions with LSP as a secondary field are slightly more than LSP as a primary field for both samples. From 2008–2009 to 2011–2012 there would seem to be a decrease in the overall number of TTT primary LSP positions, but these numbers are misleading, since in 2008–2009 only two languages (French and German) had TTT primary LSP positions, while in 2011–2012 all languages except for Arabic have at least one TTT primary LSP position. LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 22 Discussion of overall numbers. At first the overall percentages of LSP positions to total jobs may seem low, but it helps to contextualize them by briefly comparing with the percentages of other more traditional specializations within the language professions. So for example, from the 2011–2012 list, a search in late July for Spanish with keyword 'Mexico' reveals 18 out of 359 or 5% of jobs focused on this specialization, while the keywords 'Golden Age' yield 12 out of 359 or 3% of jobs, 'Modern Peninsular' appears in 16 out of 359 or 4.4%, 'Applied Linguistics' in 41 out of 359 or 11% of announcements, and 'Cultural Studies' tallies a dramatic 82 out of 359 or 22% of all jobs in Spanish. For French, the keywords '18th century' exist in only 5 out 175 or 2% of jobs, while '20th century' yields 12 out of 175 for 6%, 'Francophone' 54 out of 175 for 30%, 'Applied Linguistics' 11 out of 175 for 6%, and 'Cultural Studies' 57 out of 175 for 32%. In contrast, the 'Generalist' category defines 34 out of 359 or 9% of jobs for Spanish but for French only 6 out of 175 or 3%. One could continue to generate multiple different combinations of keywords. For the purposes of this article the point meant to be illustrated by this quick comparison of some literary and linguistic categories is to show that the percentages for job offerings requiring some LSP content, while not in the double digits, are as significant as many other smaller fields of specialization within the profession, and thus, LSP is a viable career enhancing area of expertise for those who have an interest or previous experience in an LSP area or who have access to LSP content and/or teaching experience through their graduate institution. In regards to the percentage of TTT positions, it appears that the ratio of TTT to NTT within the LSP profession is slightly better than in the overall job market. But, as stated earlier, no analysis has been done to determine statistical significance. What is clear, however, is that the ration of TTT to NTT for LSP is at least the same as for the overall market. However, the most important element in the analysis of TTT vs. NTT positions is the split between primary and secondary fields. In this case, the numbers do not seem to justify advising graduate students to focus exclusively on an LSP field. Rather, they should pursue LSP as a strong secondary field and be prepared in the case of primary LSP positions to expand on their LSP expertise further. This leads to the question of which primary fields are most often combined with a secondary interest in LSP in the job announcements. It is not possible to make overall generalizations about this, since the primary/secondary field combinations are quite specific to each language. So, in what follows, the results for each language will be presented and discussed individually. Arabic In 2008–2009, there were 2 LSP jobs out of a total of 46 announcements or 4.3% of jobs had an LSP element. One of these jobs was a tenure track position with a primary field listed as expertise in language, culture and civilization with business and comparative literature as desirable secondary fields. The other was a non-tenure track position with primarily a focus on Arabic for business and additional duties as administrator of the Arabic minor. In 2011–2012, the sample also revealed 46 jobs but just one (or 2.1%) had an LSP focus. This non-tenure track position offered a 3 year renewable contract but had a hefty list of requirements: LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 23 Required: Experience with the proficiency communicative approach; ability to teach at least one colloquial dialect in addition to Modern Standard and Classical Arabic at all levels, and content courses such as Newspaper/Media Arabic and Business Arabic; experience in curriculum development and supervision, along with full competency to teach language and content courses at all levels; completed doctoral degree by time of appointment. Chinese In the 2008–2009 sample, there were 6 LSP jobs out of a total of 64 for Chinese, which represented 9.3% of all jobs in this language. For the 2011–2012 sample, the percentage is lower at 5%, while the total number of jobs is higher at 79 only 4 positions mention LSP. In 2008–2009, there was one tenure track assistant level position and 3 tenured at the level of Associate or Full. All of these positions were at the City University of Hong Kong and listed cultural management communication as the primary field with business as a secondary area. The jobs that listed business as a primary field were both non-tenure track: one visiting professorship focused on policy and business and one non-tenure track full-time position, which also included administration of the minor. In 2011–2012, there were 3 TTT positions: two had a primary focus on LSP, one focused especially on "courses related to Chinese Business Language and Culture" the other specified that "research should focus on the knowledge and behavioral demands confronting nonnative speakers seeking professional level competencies in contemporary China, issues of cross-cultural communication between Americans and Chinese, and the development of pedagogical instruments for training in these areas." The other TTT position and the NTT position listed the interest in and ability to teach Chinese for business as a plus, while leaving the actual specialty open. French In the 2008–2009 sample, there were 6 LSP jobs out of a total of 150 for 4% and in 2011–2012, 9 out of 177 for 5%. The 2008–2009 positions were split equally between primary and secondary with a majority of the jobs (5) as TTT, and the only NTT was in the primary LSP category. The field combinations during this year were quite interesting with the primary fields being defined as "Business French and also Italian with a PhD in French from any field" and "open area able to teach Business French and Francophone cultural studies" for the TTT positions, and "French and Spanish able to interact with regional business" for the NTT position. When LSP was listed as a secondary field the primary fields were: 1) French literature and/or Francophone studies, in a program that had an Undergraduate major in Global studies, 2) 19th-and 20th-century literature or Francophone studies or linguistics, and 3) Post-1600 French studies and an "active participation in Language and Cultures for Professions and ability to create internships/study abroad." In 2011–2012 the French LSP positions were split 2/7 with a distribution of 1 TTT and 1 NTT in primary LSP and 3 TTT to 4 NTT in the category of secondary field. For the TTT primary LSP position, the description specified a Generalist, with preference being LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 24 given to specialists in Cultural Studies and Business French. The NTT position required a PhD or equivalent in French or related field but stated that the successful candidate: must be familiar with current business and economic issues in Francophone countries and the EU and be able to develop and maintain links to the Francophone business and cultural community in the Greater Atlanta area and also serve as academic advisor for students in the Language and Business concentrations and interest/experience with Study Abroad programs is a plus. For the jobs that specified interest in LSP as a secondary field, the specified primary fields were: 1) pre-20th-century French literature and culture and the LSP field was translation, 2) Linguistics and pedagogy, and 3) PhD in Spanish, French or Romance Languages, with preference for those who can teach both French and Spanish though candidates who can "teach only French will be considered." The NTT positions in the secondary LSP category listed language teaching, pedagogy and phonetics as primary interests and the LSP fields were translation and business. It is important to note that in the French announcements, when LSP capabilities are listed as secondary interest they are most often included in a list of possible secondary fields like phonetics, phonology and stylistics. Keywords 'business' and 'translation' predominate. It is also important to note the frequent combination of Francophone studies with LSP fields. German and Scandinavian In this category, all the LSP jobs were for German with 4 out of 90 or 4% from the 2008–2009 sample and 8 out of 120 or 6% for the 2011–2012 sample. In 2008–2009, all the jobs were for primary LSP field with 2 TTT and 2 NTT. The TTT positions listed the PhD field as open and emphasized the "ability to develop Professions Focus" for the first and phonetics and business for the second. For the NTT positions one had an open PhD field, and also asked for English in addition to German for Business, and the other NTT position, which was renewable, included the administrative task of directing the Business German PhD and required a PhD in Applied Linguistics with a focus on language and identity. In 2011–2012, the sample yielded one primary LSP job seeking a colleague with PhD in any area to contribute to a "new beginning in the German studies program." The primary interest was in "practical experiences" for the student such as "cultural studies (politics, society, business, media, film) literature and second language acquisition." The TTT LSP secondary jobs had primary fields of: 1) 19th- through 21st-century German Studies, the LSP fields of interest were film, professions (engineering and business) and language-across-the-curriculum, 2) German literature with an LSP field in translation, 3) German or German studies, and 4) German and German Cultural Studies. The NTT positions did not specify the PhD field and were primarily focused on general language teaching and some advising and administrative tasks. Of particular note in these announcements is the predominance of German studies or German Cultural studies over literature. LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 25 Japanese In the 2008–2009 list sample, there were two LSP jobs (the overall number of Japanese positions is unclear). They are: one NTT primary LSP position to administer the Japanese for business minor and one TTT secondary LSP position which called for the ability to teach all levels of language, civilization, history, business, contemporary culture and literature. In 2011–2012, there were 2 jobs out of 38 or 5%. Both were primary LSP positions. The TTT position was for the University of Hong Kong and stated, "Those specializing in literature, film, translation, linguistics, business culture, anthropology, and/or religion are especially encouraged to apply." The NTT position clarified that the candidate is expected to work with faculty to design and develop content-based/thematic-based courses and/or Japanese language for special purposes. Spanish The data for Spanish LSP is more extensive since the majority of LSP jobs are in this language. Also, the data is drawn from three sample moments since in addition to the 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 sample used for the other languages, data was also collected for Spanish from the September 2007–January 2008 portion of the MLA list, which can be seen in Table 4. Table 4 Breakout of data for Spanish job listings for 2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2011–2012 Spanish Total jobs 2007–2008 LSP jobs 2007–2008 Total jobs 2008–2009 (Sep–Jan 23) LSP jobs 2008–2009 Total jobs 2011–2012 LSP Totals 514 40 377 13 365 29 (5 specifically call for linguist) Primary LSP Focus 0 6 (NTT) 13 ( 9 TTT/ 4 NTT) Secondary LSP focus 40 7 (TTT) 16 (11 TTT/ 5 NTT) In the 2007–2008 sample (which was the year before the dramatic drop in job offerings), there were 40 LSP jobs out of a total of 514 Spanish positions, which equaled 9% of jobs. In the 2008–2009 sample, there were 13 LSP jobs out of 377 for 3% and in 2011–2012, 29 LSP jobs out of 365 for 7.9%. In 2007–2008, data was not collected for TTT vs. NTT positions, but all the LSP designations were listed as a preferred secondary field, 26 in the area of business, 15 for professional (non-literary) translation/interpretation, and 9 for medical. Typical announce-ments were "Assistant Professor of Spanish (Golden Age). . . . [S]trong preparation in LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 26 Golden Age literature. . . . [W]illingness to teach Business Spanish. . ." and "Tenure-track position. . . . [F]ield of specialization open, but generalist with Latin American studies preferred. Must be prepared to teach all levels of language (including business Spanish) as well as Hispanic Americana and Peninsular literatures and cultures." In the 2008–2009 list, though the overall numbers had dropped, the number of primary LSP positions had increased dramatically to 6, although all were NTT positions some requiring only a MA. The 7 secondary LSP positions were all TTT. The designated primary fields followed the standard areas of specializations of the Spanish profession with a predominance of literature positions and the announcements were characterized by the "laundry list" nature shown in the examples above. In the 2011–2012 sample, of the 29 positions 13 were for primary LSP positions and 9 of these were TTT. Of the 16 secondary LSP positions, 11 were TTT. There are some dramatic changes in the nature of the job announcements in this sample. For example, where as in previous job list samples 'business' was the primary word, and most often was a stand-alone term, this time none of the job announcements called only for 'business,' rather 'business' was always included in a list of options (e.g., medical, legal, interpretation, etc.) most often under the heading 'Spanish for the Professions.' 'Spanish for Health Professions' or 'Medical Spanish' seemed to gain ground, with 3 TTT positions (two primary LSP and 1 secondary LSP). Translation and interpreting studies showed a marked increase with 8 TTT positions of which 5 were primary LSP and 3 secondary LSP positions. Translation also appeared in 4 NTT secondary LSP positions. In addition, whereas earlier lists had predominantly shown literary fields combined with LSP, in this sample, applied linguistics showed significant gains with 4 jobs specifically designating a combination of applied linguistics and an LSP field (translation, interpretation, or medical) and 3 listing linguistics in general as one of the possible primary fields. Some of the announcements still combined seemingly disparate primary and secondary fields. For example "Contemporary Peninsular Literature with emphasis on theatres and /or poetry. . . . [E]xperience teaching Spanish for the Professions a plus" or "Preferred specialization Peninsular and Cultural studies; ability to contribute to Spanish for health professions (interest in interdisciplinary research/program development)." The mention of interdisciplinary research marks an opening up that is observable in many of the Spanish announcements. Yet, in spite of the mention of interdisciplinary research being a valued interest, in this sort of advertisement, there is really no clear vision of what that interdisciplinary research might look like. While it is true that this kind of open-endedness can be exhilarating and freeing for a creative professional, it can also be somewhat problematic at the time of tenure and promotion review. In contrast to this sort of announcement that has previously characterized LSP job descriptions, there were a number that had very specific and extensive LSP designations. Consider for example this announcement for an Assistant Professor in Spanish Applied Linguistics: The Department of Modern Languages and Literature at the University of [X] is seeking an innovator in Spanish applied linguistics or Latin American or Latina/o cultural studies research and pedagogy with interdisciplinary skills to engage the complex socio-cultural dimensions of health-related issues in South Texas. This position requires a willingness to develop a research plan and engage in cross-LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 27 disciplinary research in healthcare issues of particular importance to the region of South Texas, such as health literacy, diabetes, obesity, or health issues surrounding poverty, race, gender, class, immigration, or legality. The successful candidate will participate in teaching and mentoring in the Department's unique program in Medical Spanish for Heritage Learners, will collaborate with faculty from other departments in advancing research in healthcare, and will teach undergraduate and graduate courses in the area of specialization. A PhD in Spanish is required prior to start date in Fall, 2012. The successful candidate will have native or near native fluency in Spanish. The candidate must demonstrate potential for teaching excellence, research and publication, and grantsmanship. Or another from a criminal justice program "[X University] seeks an Assistant Professor of Spanish/Specialist in Translation and Interpreting (Foreign Languages), PhD in Spanish Translation, interpreting or related field." The specificity and focus of these job announcements mark a significant change in the envisioning of Spanish LSP fields and seem to create clear direction for the expected research agenda, which would allow the faculty member to develop a unified body of research and facilitate the path to tenure/promotion. One question that comes to mind when reading these more detailed job descriptions is how many candidates there might be for such jobs given the very specific qualifications (especially in the Applied linguistics ad for the medical field). Also, one is lead to ponder what the doctoral programs that are producing such specialists might look like. There are a few doctoral programs around the nation that are already preparing candidates for such positions and a description and analysis of these programs is material for another article. For our purposes here, these job announcements lead us to return to the questions posed at the beginning of the article. Conclusions Are departments truly moving to transform their undergraduate offerings away from literature? Are new research fields emerging? If so, what do they look like? What is the balance between TTT and non-tenure track NTT jobs in these areas? Will there be steady demand for future faculty trained to meet the new scenarios? Based on the information presented here, there does not seem to be a dramatic increase in the quantity of LSP positions, but rather a steady demand at a level that is similar to other less common research fields. However, there are indications that the LSP positions are becoming better defined as announcements move away from the "laundry-list" format to specific visions for new programs. Also, there is a slight increase in TTT primary LSP positions and these positions are also slowly becoming more focused on specific regional and/or discipline needs (i.e. health issues in South Texas, Francophone outreach in the Atlanta metropolitan area, translation and interpretation programs). The emergence of the phrase 'cultural studies' or 'specific area studies' (i.e., German, Francophone) in many of these LSP announcement and the large number of jobs in Spanish and French that come up with a keyword search for 'cultural studies' does suggest a shift away from literature. It seems that perhaps the cultural studies field might ultimately provide an umbrella for LSP programs that could afford LSP faculty a more LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 28 central institutional position. This data seems to echo Doyle's (2012) extensive and convincing argument in favor of a nomenclature change in the Language for Business field to Business Language studies. But, ultimately, will the number of jobs, which deviate from the traditional literature, linguistics and second language acquisition fields, merit redesign of graduate programs across the board to train future professors to meet this demand? Or, is it more a question of helping future professors enhance the traditional fields of specialization with new pedagogical approaches and secondary content expertise? In spite of the examples of very specific jobs given here, the number of these is still so low, that it would not seem feasible to suggest that all doctoral programs be transformed away from literature at this time, though certainly the PhD and Master's programs that have already developed these sorts of focus will become an ever more vital part of the foreign language education mission. What seems to be a more feasible approach for doctoral programs with a strong literature tradition is to begin a more gradual expansion into complementary areas. This can be accomplished by providing opportunities to doctoral candidates to develop secondary expertise in LSP content areas and to develop frameworks of practice that allow them to move between the theories of scholarly analysis to the practicalities of application to real world scenarios. The forum for such training can be graduate seminars and/or certificate programs through language resource centers. References Doyle, M. (2012). Business language studies in the United States: On nomenclature, context, theory and method [Special Issue]. The Modern Language Journal, 96, 105–121. Gueldry, M. (Ed.). (2010a). Consistent incorporation of professional terminologies into the world's languages: The linguistic engine of a global culture. Lewiston, ME: The Edwin Mellen Press. Gueldry, M. (Ed.). (2010b). How globalizing professions deal with national languages studies: Cultural conflict and cooperation. Lewiston, ME: The Edwin Mellen Press. Lafford, B. (Ed.). (2012). Languages for specific purposes in the United States [Special Issue]. The Modern Language Journal, 96. Long, M., & Uscinski, I. (2012). Evolution of languages for specific purposes programs in the United States: 1990–2011 [Special Issue]. The Modern Language Journal, 96, 173–189. Lusin, N. (2012). Trends in the foreign language Job Information List. ADFL Bulletin, 42, 195–197. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/bulletin/ Modern Language Association (MLA). (2007). Foreign languages and higher education: New structures for a changed world. Retrieved from http://www.mla.org/pdf/forlang_newspdf.pdf Modern Language Association (MLA). (2008). Foreign language Job Information List. September 2007–January 2008. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/jil/index.htm Modern Language Association (MLA). (2009). Foreign language Job Information List. September 2008–January 2009. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/jil/index.htm Modern Language Association (MLA). (2012). Foreign language Job Information List. LSP JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MLA JOB LISTS Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 29 September 2011–July 2012. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/jil/index.htm Pérez-Llantada, C., & Watson, M. (Eds.). (2011). Specialized languages in the global village: A Multi-perspective approach. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Porter, C. (2009). The MLA recommendations: Can we get there from here? ADFL Bulletin, 41(1), 16–23. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/bulletin/ Rifkin, B. (2012). "Learners' goals and curricular designs: The field's response to the 2007 MLA report on foreign language education" ADFL Bulletin, 42(1), 68–75. Retrieved from http://www.adfl.org/bulletin/
La memoria histórica se ha convertido en pocos años, realmente en el tiempo que llevamos recorrido del siglo XXI y del tercer milenio, en un concepto que ha trascendido de un uso privativo de los especialistas en la investigación histórica a una utilización generalizada por parte de la sociedad en general con un fuerte contenido simbólico y reivindicativo. Sin embargo, para el mundo académico este concepto no es tan nuevo, aunque se trate de una categoría histórica polémica en si misma que no ha tenido una notable expansión hasta los años 80 del pasado siglo XX. Historia y memoria son cosas bien distintas, pero con una relación dinámica creciente y la reflexión contemporánea sobre la memoria histórica es tan rica y compleja que se convierte en una de las discusiones más apasionantes de nuestros días, ya que trasciende del ámbito académico para ser objeto de un no menos intenso debate social al tratarse de uno de los fenómenos más relevantes de la democracia española. Aunque las definiciones que los principales expertos otorgan a la memoria histórica son múltiples y variadas, da la impresión de que el público en general, pese a su incorporación posterior al debate, ha sido más capaz de ponerse de acuerdo en torno al significado de este término compuesto de dos palabras yendo justamente al fondo de la cuestión: el intento de reivindicar a los vencidos en la guerra civil española, de recuperar su memoria reprimida y su honorabilidad, de reequilibrar un relato histórico tergiversado durante demasiado tiempo de dictadura, de búsqueda de una verdad difícil de recomponer y de hacer justicia con las víctimas, que no son sólo aquellos que murieron en los paredones, sino también los que sobrevivieron y sus descendientes, a quienes se ha transmitido un trauma generacional. Para ellos, las heridas siguen abiertas y supuran una memoria doliente, por lo que tienen derecho -y así se lo reconoce el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos- a ser escuchados para que tras la cura y la sutura de sus llagas pueda superarse una situación anacrónica que corre el peligro de cronificarse. Así pues, y pese a la manida argumentación heredada de la falsa mitología franquista que sigue anidando en buena parte del subconsciente colectivo, la memoria histórica no trata de abrir heridas, sino de curarlas y cerrarlas para pasar de una vez por todas la página más trágica y convulsa de la historia de España del siglo XX. Y, por supuesto, para tomar lecciones que eviten su repetición en el futuro. El presente trabajo se centra en la historia de un fenómeno más social que político, el de la recuperación de la memoria histórica, que ha generado un amplio debate en España, pese a que no es exclusivo de aquí. Un debate que se abrió 25 años después de la muerte en la cama del dictador Franco, coincidiendo con que la democracia española se encontraba plenamente asentada y con que una generación heredera del trauma original de la contienda civil, los nietos, decidió rebelarse reivindicando la memoria de sus abuelos. Se trata de un fenómeno reciente y creciente que, aunque con tímidos antecedentes en la transición, ha tenido importantes consecuencias políticas e institucionales y que sigue abierto en la actualidad, incluso con más fuerza y más proyección internacional. Pues bien, todo este proceso ha sido descrito y analizado para esta tesis fundamentalmente a través de la experiencia única en España del programa especializado de la radio pública andaluza titulado 'La Memoria' que surgió en 2006 y que ha concluido en 2015 su novena temporada en antena. Inevitablemente, al tratarse de un espacio que continúa emitiéndose, había que acotar el tiempo de estudio y análisis y se estableció para ello el periodo 2006-2009, coincidiendo con la integridad de las tres primeras temporadas de emisiones. El objetivo de esta investigación, por lo tanto, es aportar la radiografía temporal de tres años de un proceso socio-político vivo que se proyecta sobre nuestros días, tratando de mostrar los motivos por los que surge un movimiento generacional en un determinado momento del año 2000 y por los que, conforme crece y las condiciones políticas institucionales se hacen más permeables a sus planteamientos (en Andalucía más que en España), determina la adopción de políticas memorialistas, que alcanzan su punto crucial en ese periodo. Para ello se ofrece una visión retrospectiva de los antecedentes, se describe la realidad vivida en un importante momento procesal con sus claves y se actualiza el desarrollo evolutivo del proceso general de la memoria histórica en un intento de facilitar un mejor entendimiento de su proyección sobre el presente, entendido como 2015, año de entrega de la tesis. Hablamos de un periodo analizado primordial en el que se adoptaron políticas de memoria en España y en Andalucía que impulsaron de manera notable actuaciones en pos de la investigación histórica y del reconocimiento a las víctimas del franquismo que no se habían producido nunca antes ni en nuestro país ni en nuestra comunidad autónoma. Además, las tres temporadas de emisiones del programa se sitúan en el centro y en el eje temporal entre el inicio del proceso de recuperación de la memoria histórica -convencionalmente situado en otoño de 2000, con la primera exhumación de víctimas con criterios homologados a nivel internacional incluyendo la identificación de restos con ADN- y el momento actual de presentación de este trabajo también en otoño pero de 2015, cuando la realidad de este movimiento social reivindicativo adquiere una relevante proyección a nivel internacional con el espaldarazo tanto de las Naciones Unidas como de la jurisdicción universal, impulsada desde Argentina en la única causa abierta en el mundo para investigar los crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos durante la guerra civil y la dictadura franquista. El periodo 2006-2009 ha sido el más fructífero y productivo desde la perspectiva memorialista con la aprobación de la Ley de Memoria Histórica, con el primer y único intento -finalmente fallido- de la justicia por investigar al franquismo, con el desarrollo normativo de la ley marco forzado por la irrupción del juez Garzón, con una fuerte influencia de las asociaciones de la memoria histórica y con las subvenciones oficiales anuales estatales para proyectos diferenciados incluyendo las exhumaciones. Lógicamente, en consonancia con el título de esta tesis 'Memoria histórica, una experiencia desde Andalucía' ha sido nuestra comunidad autónoma la que en mayor medida ha sido objeto de análisis, tanto por lo ocurrido en su territorio antes y ahora, como por la procedencia de los testigos que dieron testimonio oral y/o escrito y por el origen de los expertos -principalmente historiadores- que expusieron sus investigaciones, casi siempre centradas en Andalucía. Además, no hay que perder de vista que Andalucía ha sido pionera en políticas de memoria y es de las pocas autonomías que sigue manteniéndolas pese a la crisis, con estructuras administrativas para su gestión ad hoc , antes el comisariado y actualmente una dirección general. Y que cuenta con un movimiento asociativo especialmente pujante. Dada la naturaleza mediática de la experiencia sobre la memoria histórica que se analiza en este trabajo, el propio programa radiofónico que es objeto de estudio para examinar el proceso memorialista se convierte también en fuente, ya que de lo tratado en él proviene la mayor parte de los contenidos que posteriormente se han ordenado, contextualizado, relacionado, agrupado, comparado e interpretado. Las diferentes temáticas abordadas en el programa han estado precedidas de un trabajo de documentación previo para elaborar los guiones con conocimiento de causa, lo que determinó la lectura de numerosas publicaciones que constituyen la mayor parte del material bibliográfico reseñado en el apartado correspondiente de la tesis. Pero además se ha recurrido a otros libros, a tesis doctorales y a publicaciones científicas online para reforzar el sustento argumental del trabajo, especialmente en lo referente al marco teórico sobre historia y memoria y al proceso evolutivo del proceso memorialista en España. [El acceso a la documentación bibliográfica actualizada se ve facilitado por la activa colaboración de autores y editoriales que, comprobando la creciente aceptación e influencia del programa, remiten sus novedades para que sean abordadas en las emisiones de diferentes formas: entrevistas, coloquios, reseñas, recomendaciones, etc.]. Los testimonios orales de los testigos de la época y de sus descendientes también han sido una fuente de memoria fundamental, especialmente de los primeros, para enriquecer el relato humanizándolo con la aportación que suponen para una más completa comprensión de la historia de la guerra civil y el franquismo y del proceso de recuperación de la memoria histórica. En el Apéndice Documental se enuncia la estadística completa, con breve ficha técnica, de los 211 entrevistados -sin contar la sección semanal del Noticiero- a lo largo de las tres primeras temporadas de emisiones: 51 testigos veteranos, 23 familiares, 17 dirigentes de asociaciones de la memoria, 55 historiadores, 16 políticos, 11 periodistas, 9 arqueólogos, 7 juristas, 5 religiosos y otras 17 profesiones en diversas materias. [Las entrevistas a los testigos de la época fueron, de hecho, un aspecto especialmente valorado por destacados historiadores cuando se produjo una movilización memorialista por Internet contra la posible desaparición del programa, del que se dijo que constituía una fuente de memoria oral para la investigación]. En las notas a pie de página pueden observarse también referencias a consultas obligadas de artículos, informaciones y reportajes de solventes medios de comunicación -especialmente prensa-, así como a programas de televisión y documentales, sin olvidar informes oficiales, debates parlamentarios, leyes, decretos y declaraciones institucionales, ya que la respuesta política a la demanda social memorialista es ampliamente tratada en el trabajo. [En el Apéndice Documental pueden observarse cuadros ilustrativos e información detallada y recopilada especialmente para este trabajo sobre iniciativas institucionales, balances de subvenciones y de medidas normativas, distribución de las ayudas oficiales, etc.]. En cuanto al esquema para desarrollar la tesis, hemos creído conveniente dividirla en dos grandes partes. La primera se refiere a la memoria histórica, analizando su marco teórico y el debate actual de los especialistas, la evolución del fenómeno socio-político en España y Andalucía, y su creciente tratamiento mediático hasta desembocar en el ejemplo de periodismo especializado del programa 'La Memoria'. Y la segunda se centra en exponer y estudiar la gran diversidad temática del programa seleccionando grandes apartados sectoriales de entre las 107 emisiones semanales (alrededor de 90 horas de contenido). Tras el marco introductorio obligado sobre las diferencias entre historia y Memoria para contextualizar las reflexiones teóricas de los especialistas españoles y extranjeros, y la fusión de ambos conceptos con referencia añadida a algunos debates de intelectuales sobre la memoria histórica en España, como el que sostuvieron en la revista Hispania Nova Santos Juliá y Francisco Espinosa, entramos de lleno en el proceso de recuperación de la memoria histórica, analizándolo como fenómeno social encuadrado plenamente en el siglo XXI e impulsado por una generación de los nietos de las víctimas tan crítica con el espíritu de la transición que bien podría decirse que, de alguna manera y mutatis mutandis , es precursora de la rebelión regeneracionista que se desató una década después con el 15M del año 2011. En ese sentido y después de rescatar algunos antecedentes internacionales de movimientos memorialistas similares y los precedentes ya en la naciente democracia española postfranquista de tímidas y esporádicas actuaciones de homenaje a las víctimas del franquismo y de exhumaciones de fosas comunes, nos adentramos en la trascendencia del hito histórico de la primera exhumación de restos mortales de fusilados en la fosa de Priaranza del Bierzo (León) en octubre de 2000 y la consiguiente constitución de las asociaciones para la recuperación de la memoria histórica, que suponen el tejido social proactivo de este movimiento social. Una de las aportaciones de este trabajo es el enunciado y la descripción de estas entidades, desglosado a nivel estatal y andaluz, desde que surgen y el modo con que se desarrollan con un inequívoco compromiso en torno a sus objetivos de reivindicación de la memoria y dignificación de las víctimas, que está por encima de sus diferencias tácticas y de su variada inspiración ideológica. Asimismo, hemos profundizado en la evolución de las políticas de memoria, anteriormente referidas, adoptadas en buena medida por la creciente presión social de este movimiento asociativo, a la que la Administración autonómica andaluza ha sido especialmente permeable y receptiva desde el principio. Dada la importancia del nuevo fenómeno socio-político memorialista, hemos considerado fundamental analizar la creciente cobertura que los diferentes medios de comunicación han dado al tema. Prensa, radio y televisión fueron llenando progresivamente sus páginas, sus informativos y sus telediarios de noticias, reportajes y entrevistas con actos de homenajes, investigaciones, testimonios orales, etc., dedicando una especial atención a las exhumaciones de fosas comunes. Y como consecuencia lógica de este creciente interés informativo para dar respuesta a una clara demanda social, surgió un periodismo especializado, uno de cuyos principales exponentes ha sido y es el programa de radio 'La Memoria' que en su primera emisión, a modo de declaración de intenciones que sigue plenamente vigente en la actualidad, proclamó que nacía "para facilitar que fluyan las informaciones y las opiniones, para ayudar a una mejor comprensión de nuestro pasado en torno a la guerra civil y el franquismo", con la conciencia de que se trataba de "una temática histórica polémica, con sensibilidades a flor de piel pese al largo tiempo transcurrido". [En el periodo 2006-2009, este programa fue reconocido con tres importantes galardones periodísticos: el Premio El Defensor de Granada al mejor trabajo periodístico en 2007 concedido por la Asociación de la Prensa de Granada, el Premio Andalucía de Periodismo 2008 en la modalidad de Radio otorgado por la Presidencia de la Junta de Andalucía y el Premio 28 de Febrero en 2009 concedido por el Consejo Asesor de RTVE dependiente del Parlamento de Andalucía por la serie de emisiones titulada 'Andaluces en los campos nazis']. La segunda parte de la tesis pasa revista a la diferente temática tratada en el contenido del centenar largo de programas en las primeras tres temporadas, dejando constancia del escaso grado de conocimiento social de sus variados aspectos, ya que la recuperación de la memoria histórica es un proceso en continua evolución sometido a estudios que hacen aflorar datos desconocidos conforme progresan las investigaciones. Así pues, esa parte del trabajo entra así de lleno en los contenidos del programa agrupados en capítulos temáticos de manera que su amplia diversidad expuesta y analizada ofrece un análisis multidisciplinar y una visión poliédrica de una realidad relativamente novedosa en España como la memoria histórica en un periodo previamente acotado. Probablemente sea la primera vez que se abordan y se analizan en la coctelera de un trabajo académico los diferentes elementos segmentados que confluyen en torno a una problemática tan actual como la memoria a fin de extraer una serie de conclusiones. Sin lugar a dudas, todo ello supone una oportunidad de recapitular sobre la evolución de un proceso social y político de nuestro tiempo presente. Hemos querido dar una importancia especial en el primer apartado del cuarto capítulo (4.1.) dedicado a la guerra civil y la postguerra en Andalucía -el más extenso- al detectar que la bibliografía preexistente sobre este tema desde una perspectiva global era realmente escasa. Sin pretender llenar ese hueco ni mucho menos, ya que no era ese nuestro objetivo, sí que hemos intentado, tras agrupar las aportaciones provinciales del contenido de las emisiones y de los libros consultados, ofrecer una aproximación general andaluza para una mejor comprensión de conjunto referida a la actual comunidad autónoma -antes región- ofreciendo balances provinciales y seleccionando hechos especialmente destacados de la historia de la guerra en cada provincia, pero interconectando datos, porcentajes y problemáticas diversas, y estableciendo comparaciones para facilitar un entendimiento más global de la contienda civil y la represión, algo que se echa de menos en las publicaciones existentes. Pese a que probablemente nunca conoceremos el balance exacto de la represión franquista en Andalucía -algo que lamentan y a lo que se resignan los historiadores-, hemos tratado de ofrecer una modesta visión aproximada de lo sucedido en guerra y postguerra sobre la base de dos experiencias radicalmente distintas: la durísima represión de los rebeldes en más de la mitad occidental del territorio que además fue instigada desde la cúpula de mando institucional y la menor violencia desatada de forma incontrolada en la retaguardia republicana en la zona oriental, con unas represalias franquistas tras la victoria importantes, pero sin llegar al extremo castigo occidental. Sirva como botón de muestra de la desproporción entre víctimas los datos de Huelva, donde los sublevados mataron a más de 6.019 republicanos por 101 asesinados de derechas por los izquierdistas (una relación de 60 a 1), con respecto a lo sucedido en Almería, única provincia andaluza cuyo territorio permaneció íntegramente bajo el poder republicano, la que menos muertos registró y la única donde la represión republicana superó ligeramente a la franquista: 471 y 375, respectivamente (algo más de 1 a 1). La mayoría de los trabajos de investigación sobre la guerra civil en Andalucía se circunscriben al ámbito provincial, pero se echa de menos una perspectiva global que establezca análisis de evolución general y cruces de datos y de situaciones que contribuyan a una mejor comprensión del tema. En cuanto a la política hay tres capítulos seguidos que profundizan no sólo en las claves que llevan a la aprobación de la Ley de Memoria Histórica, expuestas en corto por los portavoces de las tres principales fuerzas estatales, sino también desde la perspectiva de su aplicación, asimismo verbalizada por los alcaldes que entonces eran de las tres principales capitales andaluzas, casualmente diversificados en esas tres formaciones: PSOE, PP e IU. Y curiosamente llama la atención cómo pese a sus diferencias ideológicas los primeros ediles de Sevilla, Málaga y Córdoba (Alfredo Sánchez Monteseirín, Francisco de la Torre y Rosa Aguilar) coincidían sobre la simbología franquista en espacios públicos, primero, en negar la mayor sobre la existencia de problemas en su ciudad al respecto y, segundo, en afrontar el reto de su localización y retirada con timidez y una extremada delicadeza sin querer molestar a nadie. El resultado de tanta prudencia general es que, aunque es verdad que ya no quedan calles, plazas ni monumentos honrando a los principales gerifaltes del franquismo, sí que permanecen escudos preconstitucionales y espacios dedicados a personajes de segunda fila del franquismo, algo impensable en Alemania o Italia en relación con nazis o fascistas. También es preciso advertir que pese al reconocimiento de las políticas vanguardistas de la Administración andaluza, no hemos querido ser complacientes, sino que hemos analizado la gestión política memorialista con un espíritu crítico que pone de manifiesto las disfunciones detectadas, como el descontrol en las subvenciones y las ocurrencias sobre proyectos imposibles de algunos responsables, en la clásica línea del recurrente dicho suarista de "puedo prometer y prometo". Aunque, sin duda, esas son anécdotas si se comparan con el peor revés institucional que ha sufrido el movimiento memorialista, que no ha sido otro que el rechazo, el desprecio y la desactivación total de la ley marco de memoria por parte del Partido Popular, cuyo presidente la dejó sin dotación presupuestaria cuando llegó al Gobierno central, como había prometido años antes y como se barruntaba con el voto en contra del PP a la aprobación de la norma a finales de 2007. A caballo entre la política y la justicia, no podíamos obviar el histórico intento de la justicia española por enjuiciar los crímenes del franquismo sobre la base del derecho internacional que fue finalmente cortado en seco por el Tribunal Supremo argumentando la prevalencia de la Ley de Amnistía de 1977. Y decimos que entre la justicia y la política porque la irrupción en la escena memorialista del magistrado de la Audiencia Nacional Baltasar Garzón dejó en evidencia las carencias de la Ley de Memoria Histórica y obligó al Gobierno socialista a despertar de su letargo y adoptar las medidas de desarrollo normativo que guardaba en el cajón ante la impaciencia de los familiares y las asociaciones de víctimas. Las fosas comunes han sido otro tema destacado sobre el que se ha recogido con profusión la opinión y el criterio de destacados especialistas y dirigentes del movimiento asociativo memorialista. No en vano, su distribución geográfica recogida en los mapas de fosas realizados por toda España constituye la cartografía de represión y su existencia torpedea el relato imperante de transición en toda su línea de flotación. Muchos y variados son los argumentos expuestos y, sin duda, en el correspondiente apartado ad hoc hay respuestas a la pregunta sobre por qué Andalucía -sin duda la comunidad más masacrada por el franquismo con sus más de 50.000 víctimas mortales repartidas en más de 600 enterramientos colectivos en cunetas, campos y cementerios- no se ha distinguido por haber efectuado tantas excavaciones como otras CCAA y, sin embargo, ha protagonizado la mayor intervención en un conjunto de fosas como la espectacular realizada en el viejo cementerio de Málaga (2.480 esqueletos exhumados) y el mayor fiasco con la fosa imposible de Federico García Lorca. Como hemos visto en el índice, hay hasta 20 apartados distintos incluidos en el capítulo cuarto, que se constituye en el núcleo temático de la tesis, analizando en mayor o menor medida con espíritu científico y divulgativo y con un objetivo recopilatorio aspectos diferenciados que se ramifican desde el tronco común de la memoria histórica: los maestros republicanos y la escuela franquista, la mujer oprimida y reprimida, la homosexualidad perseguida, los maquis, los deportados en los campos nazis, el testimonio oral rehuyendo la autocrítica de Santiago Carrillo, la memoria selectiva de la Iglesia, la rebelión de los nietos, los niños robados, la 'ley de los nietos', la perspectiva exterior (Marruecos y Argentina) y la memoria musical, porque el arte y la cultura no estuvieron exentos de la instrumentalización y de la represión franquista. [Cierto es que faltan elementos que no fueron abordados en los años 2006-2009, pero que serían tratados en el programa en años posteriores, como el exilio, el estado de excepción de 1969 y el tardofranquismo, la masonería, la sexualidad reprimida, la justicia universal, el papel de la ONU, etc.]. En el apartado de conclusiones generales y parciales relacionadas con el análisis de la tesis, hemos considerado oportuno actualizar la proyección de los acontecimientos con posterioridad al año 2009, ya que desde entonces se han producido novedades en los ámbitos políticos, judiciales, de la investigación y de la evolución del movimiento memorialista que merecían ser considerados. Y de igual modo, hemos valorado el interés adicional en ofrecer una prospección de futuro sobre el tema. El Apéndice Documental, por su parte, no se limita a aportar la documentación adicional en la que se basa el trabajo a los efectos probatorio de la solvencia de la investigación, sino que también añade información especialmente recopilada para la tesis como la referida a quienes que han intervenido en el programa 'La Memoria' comentando su cualificación personal y profesional, así como los datos estadísticos sobre su audiencia en cuando a número de oyentes, las descargas de las emisiones por Internet y las visitas al blog, incluyendo su procedencia nacional e internacional y acerca de los contenidos más visitados. Todo ello, comentado y expuesto con cuadros y gráficos evolutivos para facilitar su comprensión. Finalmente, el apartado de fuentes y bibliografía completa el soporte de consultas realizadas para la elaboración de este trabajo de investigación académica, aunque también relaciona y cataloga gran parte de las publicaciones editoriales que se han producido en España durante los últimos años en torno a esta temática, que en gran medida se han realizado fuera del ámbito académico. En la bibliografía se citan dos libros publicados recientemente por el autor de la tesis. El primero es 'Testigos de la memoria' (Aconcagua, 2013), editado con el apoyo de la Dirección General de Memoria Democrática de la Junta de Andalucía con las transcripción de entrevistas efectuadas en el programa con interesantes testimonios orales de protagonistas de la guerra civil y del franquismo, y con reflexiones de veteranos historiadores. Y el segundo, titulado 'La Memoria de todos. Las heridas del pasado se curan con más verdad' (Fundación Alfonso Perales, 2014), en el que el autor firma con el catedrático de Historia Contemporánea de la Universidad de Jaén Salvador Cruz Artacho el capítulo 'Políticas de la Memoria y desarrollo normativo en España'. La publicación de esta segunda obra, escrita en su mayor parte por destacados historiadores de las universidades andaluzas y promovida desde una fundación de estudios ligada al PSOE de Andalucía, en la que se apuesta decididamente por la creación de una Comisión de la Verdad, viene a demostrar la mayor sensibilidad que existe en Andalucía entre los socialistas hacia la memoria histórica. Pero antes de poner fin a esta introducción, consideramos interesante detenernos a reflexionar en un aspecto fundamental del contenido de la tesis -parte del cual que se detalla en el capítulo referido a la falta de pruebas documentales-, porque contribuye a entender las dificultades con que tanto familiares como historiadores se enfrentan a la hora de investigar. En efecto, los registros civiles, los archivos y la censura judicial son tres aspectos de una misma estrategia que cierra el paso al conocimiento de la verdad sobre la represión franquista. Esta situación es una especie de círculo vicioso o viciado que muestra a España como un país seriamente hipotecado por su pasado dictatorial, sobre el que se proyecta la larga sombra del franquismo con la existencia de miles de desaparecidos física y documentalmente. Miles de víctimas no existen en los registros oficiales porque sus asesinos impidieron su inscripción. Muchos archivos de la represión han sido destruidos y muchos de los que quedan son de difícil acceso. Y si tras superar los obstáculos, se logra reconstruir una historia solvente sobre testimonios orales y pruebas documentales parciales, se corre el riesgo de una condena judicial ruinosa. Siendo ese un círculo suficientemente vicioso, no deja de ser parte de otro más grande que lo abarca y que comienza en la proyección sobre el presente de la educación de la escuela y de la enseñanza media de la dictadura que formó a la población española con más de 50 años de edad en la actualidad. Aquellos niños crecieron crecimosadoctrinados por el dogma de "Franco, caudillo de España por la gracia de Dios", una leyenda que corría de mano en mano en todas las monedas de curso legal, sacralizando al dictador con técnicas goebblelianas repetitivas hasta la saciedad y con la bendición de una Iglesia agradecida por sus privilegios. Los vencedores glorificados por todas partes y los vencidos eran unos rojos desalmados con cuernos y rabo, señalados o muertos. Nadie lo podía cuestionar. Posteriormente, los niños de la democracia han sido educados acerca de la guerra civil con arreglo a una interpretación basada en la equidistancia: en el reparto de responsabilidad entre los bandos, en que fue una guerra fratricida, en que todos hicieron barbaridades, etc. La equidistancia se convirtió en un parapeto, una especie de cortafuegos para evitar el avance de las investigaciones. En una especie de empate pactado a la defensiva, mientras el revisionismo pseudohistórico neofranquista vendía libros como rosquillas en los kioscos. Los libros de texto -por no hablar del reciente Diccionario Biográfico de la Real Academia de la Historia que dulcifica sin pudor la figura del dictador- no han incluido, ni antes ni ahora, los avances en la investigación histórica que desenmascaran el verdadero rostro criminal del franquismo y, para colmo, es bastante habitual que los profesores de Historia pasen de puntillas sobre guerra y dictadura o, sencillamente, finalicen el temario contemporáneo sin llegar a tocar el tema. Excepcionales son los casos de profesores comprometidos con la historia y la memoria que valoran como fundamental el conocimiento activo del pasado reciente y que organizan ciclos para sus alumnos con la presencia de testigos de la memoria, octogenarios o nonagenarios que a modo de donantes de memoria, aportan su relato vital en auténticas clases magistrales. La experiencia derivada de realizar el programa 'La Memoria', semana tras semana, nos ha llevado en este sentido a comprobar el gran desconocimiento general sobre nuestro pasado, incluso en sectores ilustrados de la población, lo que pone de manifiesto las enormes lagunas que subsisten en la enseñanza media española. Así pues, las generaciones que han llegado y que llegan a su etapa adulta carecen de una formación con una mínima solvencia sobre la guerra civil y el franquismo. Y si hablamos del ámbito universitario, sería hipócrita no reconocer que también ha vivido en democracia de espaldas a la memoria histórica. El número de tesis doctorales sobre esta temática en los diferentes departamentos teóricamente afectados ha sido bajísimo, aunque se ha notado un aumento conforme ha crecido la influencia del movimiento memorialista y tras la Ley de Memoria Histórica. De hecho, la mayoría de los estudios y de las publicaciones sobre la memoria histórica han sido realizados por investigadores –muchos de ellos profesores de instituto-, ajenos al ámbito académico, sin que por ello sus trabajos carezcan de rigor y de solvencia. Es más, con su tradicional desinterés -ahora felizmente superado-, las universidades han dejado el terreno de la investigación a muchos voluntariosos estudiosos locales a quienes justificadamente elogia Paul Preston en su obra magna 'El holocausto español' por haber desplegado un trabajo de campo impresionante para reconstruir el pasado sin que la memoria oral desaparezca y pese a remar a contracorriente en el proceloso mar de caos y desorden de los archivos españoles. Así pues, todo nos lleva a pensar que si alguien se propuso enseñar bien la historia española del siglo XX, ha fracasado estrepitosamente. A menos -y esto es más que probable- que haya habido una estrategia intencionada para evitar profundizar en nuestro pasado, en cuyo caso la ignorancia supina generalizada resultante habría sido un éxito gracias a la escasa y deficiente enseñanza impartida, a la falta de implicación universitaria y a la complejidad con que se han realizado las investigaciones. De este modo se ha configurado una sociedad bastante desconocedora de un pasado que cambió violenta y radicalmente el desarrollo del país, lo que facilita su manipulación mediática y política, con la vigencia de una mitología llena de lugares comunes como "reabrir heridas", "revancha", "rencor", etc. Todo ello genera desinterés e insensibilidad amén de falta de compromiso político, pese a las reiteradas advertencias de los más altos organismos internacionales sobre derechos humanos. En ese contexto, el programa 'La Memoria' ha podido contribuir modestamente desde la parcela mediática a trasladar a la ciudadanía una nueva visión de la realidad, la cara oculta de la verdad oficial. Probablemente se sepa más en España de los episodios bélicos y represivos del nazismo, del fascismo o del estalinismo, sin mencionar a la Segunda Guerra Mundial y a la conquista del Far West americano, que de lo que pasó en España durante la guerra civil y la posguerra. Por los comentarios de los oyentes, no han sido pocos los que a través de la radio pública andaluza se han enterado de episodios terribles y vergonzosos de la contienda como la Desbandá de Málaga, las matanzas en la plaza de toros de Badajoz, el bombardeo de Jaén anterior al de Guernica, los cañonazos de la Armada nazi contra Almería, la cacería de presos en la multitudinaria fuga del penal navarro del monte Ezkaba y un largo etcétera. Lo más habitual es que la gente tenga un ligero y parcial conocimiento de la historia de su provincia, pero no más allá. Pero también esta experiencia mediática ha permitido ofrecer un seguimiento bastante exhaustivo de la recuperación de la memoria histórica con sus avances sociales y políticos. Un proceso que, sin lugar a dudas, ha cambiado la visión "plácida" que se había transmitido sobre el franquismo mostrando su cara largamente ocultada al dar voz a las víctimas silenciadas, con el descubrimiento y la apertura de fosas comunes –inapelable prueba de cargo de la represión- y con el impulso de investigaciones que desmontan una historiografía franquista tan plagada de falsos mitos y leyendas. "La incomprensión del presente nace fatalmente de la ignorancia del pasado", advirtió el historiador francés Marc Bloch. El programa 'La Memoria' constituye una interesante experiencia andaluza sobre la memoria histórica desde la perspectiva de la divulgación mediática para atenuar el olvido y la ignorancia sobre el pasado y, paralelamente, para activar la memoria, el conocimiento de causa contrastado y, sobretodo, la empatía hacia las víctimas. Como acertadamente señalan la historiadora Josefina Cuesta y el psicólogo José María Ruiz-Vargas, sin la necesaria empatía será más difícil que la sociedad española supere su división y tome conciencia de la necesidad de aprobar esta asignatura pendiente con la democracia y los derechos humanos. En resumen y a modo de gran crónica abierta sobre un periodo apasionante, la presente tesis trata de describir, ordenar, contextualizar, comparar e interpretar –con aportaciones de testigos y expertos y con datos a veces inéditos- un proceso de recuperación de la memoria histórica que probablemente desemboque, tarde o temprano, no tanto en justicia para las víctimas dado el largo tiempo transcurrido, como en más verdad y más reparación, aunque sólo sea moral.
La presente Tesis Doctoral viene titulada como "Presencia de las Redes Sociales y Medios de Comunicación: representación y participación periodística en el nuevo contexto social". Se hace preciso advertir que esta investigación que elaboro pretende cumplir los requisitos necesarios para la obtención del título de Doctor bajo la modalidad de "Tesis por compendio de publicaciones" según viene determinado por el artículo 9 de la Normativa Reguladora del Régimen de Tesis Doctoral (acuerdo 9.1/CG 19-4-12) de la Universidad de Sevilla, publicada en el Boletín Oficial de la Universidad de Sevilla (BOUS) número 3, de 23 de mayo de 2012, y que se desarrolla en el Real Decreto 99/2011 de 28 de enero, por el que se regulan las enseñanzas oficiales de doctorado (BOE de 10 de febrero), donde sus artículos del 11 al 15 establecen el régimen relativo a la admisión a un programa de doctorado, realización, evaluación y defensa de la Tesis Doctoral. Según lo dispuesto por la Disposición Transitoria Primera del RD 99/2011 que habilita la aplicación de la nueva regulación del régimen de Tesis a los estudiantes de anteriores ordenaciones en lo relativo a tribunal, defensa y evaluación de la Tesis Doctoral, la Normativa Reguladora del Régimen de Tesis Doctoral (acuerdo 9.1/CG 19-4-12) de la Universidad de Sevilla indica en su artículo 1 que "queda por tanto así derogada la Normativa de régimen de tesis adoptada por Acuerdo 6.1/C.G. 30-9-08 que es sustituida por la presente Normativa". Esta advertencia es imprescindible para entender la estructura y forma de la materialización escrita de un largo proceso investigador. Es preciso apuntar que, según la Normativa antes indicada, se pueden presentar para su evaluación como Tesis Doctoral un conjunto de trabajos publicados por la doctoranda que "deberá estar relacionado con el proyecto de tesis doctoral en programas regulados por el RD 1393/2007 o anteriores, o con el plan de investigación que conste en el documento de actividades del doctorando en programas regulados por el RD 99/2011". Además, "el conjunto de trabajos deberá estar conformado por un mínimo de dos artículos publicados o aceptados o capítulos de libro o un libro, debiendo ser el doctorando preferentemente el primer autor […]". El compendio de la presente Tesis Doctoral está compuesto por dos libros que son los siguientes: § GARCÍA ESTÉVEZ, Noelia: Redes Sociales en Internet. Implicaciones y consecuencias de las plataformas 2.0 en la sociedad. Editorial Universitas, Madrid, 2012. ISBN: 978-84-7991-359-5. D.L.: M-7755-2012. § GARCÍA ESTÉVEZ, Noelia: Realidad Periodística, contexto social y era tecnológica. Equipo de Investigación de Análisis y Técnica de la Información, Sevilla, 2012. ISBN -13: 978-84-695-6109-6. ISBN -10: 84-695-6109-X. D.L.: SE-6872-2012. Comprobamos que la Tesis Doctoral aquí presentada por compendio de publicaciones cumple los requisitos de la Normativa. Así, el título que encabeza estas páginas fue el propuesto para el Proyecto de Tesis Doctoral presentado en su día y con la posterior aprobación de la Comisión de Doctorado del Departamento de Periodismo II de la Universidad de Sevilla, en el que se circunscribe esta Tesis. Por lo tanto, observamos una evidente relación entre el tema del Proyecto de Tesis Doctoral y las publicaciones aquí presentadas: las Redes Sociales, el Periodismo y la Sociedad. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la autoría de los trabajos presentados, en ambas publicaciones la única autora es la doctoranda, Noelia García Estévez, ciñéndose así a lo indicado en la Normativa que precisa que debe ser la primera autora, y que como puede apreciarse es la única. Siguiendo las indicaciones de la citada Normativa que regula la presentación de una Tesis Doctoral por compendio, a las publicaciones ya mencionadas se incluyen estas páginas en las que figuran los siguientes apartados: A. Una introducción en la que se desarrolla la justificación de la unidad temática de la Tesis. (Véase Capítulo 1). B. Los objetivos, las hipótesis y los principales aspectos del sistema metodológico que ha regido esta investigación. (Véase Capítulo 2). C. Un resumen global de los resultados, donde se enlazan y se contrastan los principales resultados obtenidos y plasmados de forma independiente en las publicaciones presentadas. (Véase Capítulo 4). D. Una discusión de estos resultados, en la que se contrasten estos resultados con las hipótesis planteadas y se reflexione de manera crítica sobre la calidad de la validez interna y externa de la investigación. (Véase Capítulo 5). E. Las conclusiones alcanzadas tras la investigación. (Véase Capítulo 6). F. Aunque la Normativa no lo exige, hemos creído conveniente añadir los apartados de "Publicaciones y sus canalizaciones" donde desarrollamos la optabilidad de editar nuestras investigaciones y las tangibilidades al efectuar las ediciones (véase Capítulo 3) y de "Bibliografía utilizada" en el cual hemos recopilado y clasificado todas las fuentes bibliográficas y hemerográficas que han sido utilizadas a lo largo de las dos publicaciones presentadas y de las siguientes páginas. (Véase Capítulo 7). La presente Tesis Doctoral, titulada "Presencia de las Redes Sociales y Medios de Comunicación: representación y participación periodística en el nuevo contexto social", tiene como objeto de estudio el análisis de la actividad periodística en el nuevo contexto social donde las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación han adquirido un papel crucial. Centraremos nuestra investigación en el ámbito de las Redes Sociales en Internet, pues se han erigido como un elemento fundamental cuyas implicaciones se extienden de manera transversal en todos los aspectos de la sociedad. Por lo tanto, nos enfrentamos al estudio del Periodismo en un momento en el que los avances tecnológicos y la comunicación basada en el paradigma 2.0 influyen, por un lado, en el propio quehacer periodístico, desde el punto de vista del profesional de la información, y, por otro, afecta de manera importante en el entorno social en el que encontramos un ciudadano, receptor de la información periodística, con nuevos hábitos y costumbres y con nuevas demandas y exigencias. Dice Klaus Krippendorff que "toda investigación científica está motivada por el deseo de conocer o entender mejor una porción del mundo real". Esa porción del mundo real a la que se refiere el citado autor y que de forma genérica se conoce como acotación del objeto de estudio es en esta investigación la interrelación entre las Redes Sociales, el Periodismo y la Sociedad. Más concretamente, el papel del Periodismo en un nuevo contexto social en el que impera una comunicación 2.0. Desde finales del pasado siglo y muy especialmente con el inicio del siglo XXI se inauguró una nueva etapa para la humanidad, marcada en gran medida por el imparable desarrollo de las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación. Es obvio que hoy día el ciudadano posee una gran capacidad para comunicarse y mantener relaciones profesionales y/o afectivas con otras personas situadas en cualquier parte del globo terráqueo, superando barreras no sólo geográficas, sino también sociales, culturales, políticas, etc. Además, la popularización y el abaratamiento paulatino de los dispositivos y terminales desde los que se pueden acceder a estas redes ha impulsado la generación de conexiones en el ciberespacio. Como dice Cebrián "la web 2.0 es una plataforma de redes sociales de información en sentido amplio y general concerniente a muchos campos del conocimiento y de la vida real, en sentido periodístico o de información de actualidad, veraz y de interés general de la sociedad, en sentido interpersonal, o de relaciones entre dos o más personas y grupos, y en sentido personal o de comunicación de cada individuo con su entorno inmediato a través de sus sistemas captores del exterior y de sus reacciones ante ellos". Con todo ello, nosotros abordamos una investigación de un fenómeno comunicacional que ha supuesto un profundo cambio en la estructura de los Medios de Comunicación y en los modos en que la sociedad recibe la información. El impacto de la web 2.0 ha supuesto una mutación del receptor pasivo de la comunicación a un creador y gestor de contenidos. Ha supuesto, además, la ruptura del paradigma tradicional de la comunicación consistente en la tríada emisor-canal-receptor, donde el mensaje ya no es unidireccional, sino que fluye de manera transversal hasta convertirse en una gran conversación global y multidireccional gracias a la accesibilidad, instantaneidad y viralidad de la red. La planificación y el trazado del proyecto de la investigación por realizar supusieron el inicio de esta investigación, pues se trata de una etapa crucial para el éxito del proceso investigador ya que sin una buena planificación difícilmente se podrán establecer unos objetivos concretos y los mecanismos necesarios para conseguiros. Esta etapa se divide en los siguientes pasos: Selección del tema: consiste en "la definición y posterior delimitación del campo de conocimientos sobre el que piensa trabajar". Identificación de un problema: se trata de detectar algún aspecto no conocido dentro de un área temática y que amerite de una indagación para su solución, también enunciado. Formulación del anteproyecto: se refiere a la realización de "un primer borrador o papel de trabajo que ha de contener las ideas básicas sobre la investigación que nos proponemos llevar a cabo". La elección del tema es la primera gran encrucijada a la que se enfrenta todo investigador en su andadura hacia la obtención del Título de Doctor. No obstante, antes del tema está el problema, pues tal y como apunta Jorge Felibertt "el problema es el punto de partida de toda investigación. Se origina cuando el investigador observa dudas sobre una realidad, o hecho o teorías, aparece a raíz de alguna dificultad, nace de una necesidad, con dificultades sin resolver. Una vez que se viene una idea sin resolver, se procede a enmarcar dicho problema en forma de un título de investigación, luego se plantea de forma específica el problema que se acaba de originar el cual estará contenido en el tema seleccionado". Ahora bien, está claro que el problema que el investigador detecte y que le incite a embarcarse en una investigación profunda como es una Tesis Doctoral estará enmarcado en las áreas de conocimiento y de interés del propio investigador. Esto es, una persona puede hallar diversos problemas que se presten a ser investigados, pero la elección del problema a investigar vendrá determinado en gran medida por las características y la propia naturaleza del investigador. Así, el tema, y su pertinente problema, es el primer interrogante que, una vez resuelto, iniciará un largo camino hasta su materialización en una Tesis Doctoral. No siempre es posible formular el problema de forma clara, precisa y manipulable. Éste es propio de la naturaleza misa de la investigación científica, de sus dificultades y complejidades. La capacidad de plantear problemas, dice Cohen y Nagel, "es una señal de posesión del genio científico" y es que los problemas no surgen de la nada, sino que son los investigadores con sus conocimientos y bases teóricas quienes los formulan. En nuestro caso, la elección del tema vino determinada, en primer lugar, por corresponderse a las predilecciones de la doctoranda y estar en sintonía con el Equipo de Investigación de Análisis y Técnica de la Información de la Universidad de Sevilla, al que pertenece la doctoranda desde 2009. Además, y siguiendo las recomendaciones de Umberto Eco, las fuentes a las que se debía recurrir eran, en general, accesibles y manejables. Por su parte, los directores de la Tesis y la propia investigadora han trabajado en la elaboración de un cuadro metodológico apto y efectivo para esta investigación y para la obtención de unos resultados. Recordemos que la realización de una Tesis Doctoral "constituye un trabajo original de investigación con el cual el aspirante ha de demostrar que es un estudioso capaz de hacer avanzar la disciplina a la que se dedica". Esa es la verdadera vocación de este trabajo, hacer avanzar las Ciencias del Periodismo e incluir en ellas investigaciones y teorías válidas sobre fenómenos actuales que repercuten en la sociedad en general y en el Periodismo en particular y que nos obligan a un replanteamiento constante de las bases teóricas de la ciencia. Las Redes Sociales en Internet han calado en la sociedad como en su día lo hiciera la televisión, el teléfono móvil o el propio Internet. Como ya lo dijera el sociólogo Marshall McLuhan en la década de los 60 del pasado siglo, la tecnología constituye una prolongación de nuestro cuerpo. Internet, que más que una tecnología es un efecto de la misma, ha creado el marco de la nueva sociedad, un entorno vital a medio camino entre lo virtual y lo real. El surgimiento de la web 2.0 o web social ha supuesto un antes y un después para el conjunto de la sociedad en, prácticamente, todas las esferas de la vida. Desde el plano más personal e íntimo, hasta el profesional o académico. Todo se ha visto impregnado de la presencia de Blogs, Wikis o Redes Sociales (como Facebook, Twitter…). La tecnología es omnipresente hoy día y media gran parte de la comunicación social. Este nuevo paradigma en el proceso de la comunicación subyace también en el entorno del Periodismo y los Medios de Comunicación. Por lo tanto, en esta investigación nos aproximamos al papel del Periodismo como un ente que ha de evolucionar y adaptarse al propio desarrollo tecnológico, por un lado, y a la nueva sociedad receptora del discurso mediático, por otro. Desde la ciencia poco se ha abordado aún un estudio profundo y amplio sobre el surgimiento, desarrollo y situación actual de las plataformas sociales y sus implicaciones en el Periodismo. Estamos convencidos de que, como bien apuntaba Castells, "la teoría y la investigación […] deben considerarse medios para comprender nuestro mundo y deben juzgarse por su precisión, rigor y pertinencia". De aquí deriva el interés de esta investigación la cual pretende analizar cómo funciona la actividad periodística en el marco de la sociedad actual desde la inclusión de la web 2.0 y las Redes Sociales. Aspirando a ofrecer un conocimiento válido y útil para hacer frente a las nuevas exigencias del profesional de la información de nuestro mundo. Asistimos a cambios profundos, más grandes de los que vivieron cualquiera de nuestros antepasados. Se trata, según palabras de Vázquez Medel, de un proceso de "trashumanización, en el que se están transformando radicalmente las claves que rigen la economía y el mundo empresarial, la política y las organizaciones sociales, las relaciones interculturales y el mundo del derecho, la evolución de la ciencia y la tecnología, y hasta la experiencia individual del mundo, de la vivencia de la espacialidad, la temporalidad, la corporeidad, la relacionalidad". En esta encrucijada ya no sirven las respuestas que hasta ahora eran válidas, ya se quedan obsoletas las fórmulas que parecían efectivas. Ahora, advierte Vázquez Medel, "se hace imprescindible buscar activa y creativamente nuevas soluciones". En última instancia, ése es precisamente nuestro objetivo: buscar respuestas a las nuevas preguntas surgidas en el ámbito del Periodismo tras una revolución tecnológica y cibernética masiva, en la que los usuarios ya no sólo consumen sino que también producen. Un espacio heterogéneo en cuanto a las características de sus miembros así como a la naturaleza de las relaciones que entre ellos se establecen. 1.3. Antecedentes e interés actual de la investigación. El Análisis de Redes Sociales (en adelante, ARS) y la Teoría de Redes se han configurado como una metodología clave en las modernas Ciencias Sociales, entre las que se incluyen la Sociología, la Antropología, la Psicología Social, la Economía, la Geografía, las Ciencias Políticas, la Cienciometría, los estudios de Comunicación, estudios Organizacionales y la Sociolingüística. También ha ganado un apoyo significativo en la Física y la Biología entre otras. En el ámbito de las Ciencias Sociales, una Red Social es una estructura, un grupo de personas relacionadas entre sí que puede representarse analíticamente en forma de uno o varios grafos, en los cuales los nodos representan a los agentes o individuos -también llamados actores- y los arcos -o lazos- representan las relaciones entre ellos. El ARS surge en la década de 1950 con una ingente cantidad de estudios desde diferentes disciplinas: en la sociometría Jacobo Moreno desarrolla la teoría matemática de los grafos; en la psicología social encontramos las teorías del equilibrio estructural de Harary y Cartwright; en la antropología destacan John Barnes, J. Clyde Mitchell y, especialmente, Elizabeth Bott; desde la sociología también se ha entendido el ARS como una variedad de la teoría general de la Sociología estructural con autores como Radcliffe-Brown y, sobre todo, Simmel. En el ámbito español suele considerarse pionero en la introducción del ARS el artículo "El concepto de red social" de Félix Requena Santos en la Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS). También ha sido fructífero el trabajo de Josep A. Rodríguez desde el Departamento de Sociología y Análisis de las Organizaciones de la Universidad de Barcelona y el Grupo de Análisis de Redes (NAGAR) y el de José Luis Molina desde el Departamento de Antropología Social y Cultural de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona y su grupo de investigación Egoredes. Sin embargo, hemos de advertir que nuestro objeto de estudio no es el concepto tradicional y sociológico de Red Social, sino que nosotros indagamos sobre las características, efectos, desarrollo y evolución de las Redes Sociales en Internet. En esta parcela, son mucho menos numerosos los estudios e investigaciones que actualmente encontramos, especialmente en el campo de las Ciencias del Periodismo. Si bien es cierto que desde el principio Internet, las Redes Sociales y el desarrollo tecnológico han despertado el interés de la Academia, la mayoría de los estudios que encontramos carecen aún de la profundidad y la amplitud necesarias. En efecto, nos hallamos ante un fenómeno coetáneo y de imparable evolución, lo cual no nos permite gozar de perspectiva histórica para su análisis. Sin embargo, es imprescindible la realización de investigaciones exploratorias que empiecen a teorizar y argumentar sobre los procesos de los que son testigos. En el ámbito internacional hallamos las aportaciones de autores como el propio Stanley Milgram y su teoría del mundo pequeño; Dan Gillmor y sus aportaciones sobre el Periodismo Ciudadano; Davenport y Prusak y sus estudios sobre la gestión del conocimiento; Fowler y Christakis y sus estudios sobre el poder las Redes Sociales; Godins y su concepto de ideavirus; Jeff Jarvis y el marketing de código abierto; Palfrey y Gassser y su descripción del nativo digital; Rheingol y sus observaciones sobre las comunidades virtuales y las multitudes inteligentes; Lévy y su idea de inteligencia colectiva; Prensky y su teoría de la inmigración digital… Dentro del habla castellana o española también encontramos una serie de autores que se han convertido en referencia dentro de la temática de Redes Sociales en Internet y sus diversas implicaciones sociales y profesionales. No podemos dejar de citar el trabajo y las contribuciones de autores como Manuel Castells y su teoría sobre la Sociedad de la Información y la Sociedad en Red; Enrique Dans y sus constantes reflexiones sobre tecnología y evolución; José Luis Orihuela y sus indagaciones en torno a la Cibercultura, Periodismo y Comunicación digital; Ugarte y su concepto de ciberturba en torno al papel de las Redes Sociales en la movilización social; Alfons Cornellá y su indagación sobre la gestión del conocimiento en red; Juan Varela, José Manuel Gómez y Méndez y Sandra Méndez Muros y su visión del Periodismo Ciudadano; Juan Freire; Mariano Cebrián; Jesús Miguel Flores Vivar; María Ángeles Cabrera González; Antonio Fumero; Adolfo Plasencia; Javier Celaya; Ramón Salaverría; Luis Rull… Diversos investigadores han optado también por esta temática en su andadura hacia la consecución del título de Doctor. Aparte de nuestro caso y de la presente Tesis Doctoral, debemos señalar la investigación llevada a cabo por Sonia Ruiz Blanco sobre la evolución del blog y el papel del receptor en generador y emisor de contenidos y la de César Viana Teixeira en torno a una concepción de las Redes Sociales como modelos de agencias ciudadanas de Comunicación. Desde el ámbito de la Comunicación también encontramos investigaciones de Tesis Doctoral que indagan acerca de los aspectos publicitarios y de marketing de estas herramientas, tal y como la de Fanny Yolanda Paladines Galarza, la de Pedro Álvaro Pereira Correia o la de Virginia Piazzo. Desde la organización y la gestión de empresas encontramos las Tesis Doctorales de Mª. del Carmen Alarcón del Amo o la de Silvia Rodríguez Donaire. Destacamos también las investigaciones de Pedro Román Graván, de Marco Vinicio Ferruzca Navarro o de Paloma López Sánchez, todas ellas insertadas en el campo educativo. Desde otras parcelas como las Matemáticas o la propia Informática también se han realizado interesantes trabajos de Tesis Doctorales, si bien las perspectivas aplicadas en estas investigaciones se alejan considerablemente de nuestra acotación del objeto de estudio, por lo que tienen menos pertinencia en nuestra investigación. Consideramos oportuna la realización de una investigación con rigor científico que sea capaz de analizar el papel de los Medios de Comunicación y de la propia profesión ante una evolución tecnológica evidente que ha conllevado nuevas fórmulas de comunicación social y ante una sociedad interconectada con nuevos hábitos y costumbres pero también con nuevas demandas y exigencias. Los orígenes de Internet se remontan a los años de la Guerra Fría y nace como un proyecto de investigación en redes de conmutación de paquetes, dentro del ámbito militar. A finales de los años sesenta el Departamento de Defensa Americano (DoD) llegó a la conclusión de que su sistema de comunicaciones basado en la comunicación telefónica (Red Telefónica Commutada, RTC) era demasiado vulnerable, puesto que establecía enlaces únicos y limitados entre importantes nodos o centrales, con el consiguiente riesgo de quedar aislado parte del país en caso de un ataque militar sobre esas arterias de comunicación. Como alternativa, el citado Departamento de Defensa, a través de su Agencia de Proyectos de Investigación Avanzados (Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA) decidió estimular las redes de ordenadores hasta llegar a una red experimental de cuatro nodos, que arrancó en diciembre de 1969, se denominó ARPAnet. La idea central de esta red era conseguir que la información llegara a su destino aunque parte de la red estuviera destruida. De esta manera nacen los cimientos de Internet. Hoy, su gran popularización y asimilación por parte de la ciudadanía nos lleva a reflexionar sobre la evolución de una herramienta que nació con fines militares y que en la actualidad tiene una clara orientación social. Como expresa Millán, Internet es el fruto caliente de la Guerra Fría pues "aquel producto de la guerra fría se ha convertido (valga el juego de palabras) en el medio más caliente de la actualidad". Al hablar de Internet en España hemos de tener en cuenta que su origen, evolución y situación actual tienen unas características definitorias concretas. Si bien es cierto que los inicios fueron más tardíos y lentos que en otras áreas geográficas, hemos de reconocer que en la actualidad existe un abultado número de usuarios con una gran actividad en los contextos digitales. Desde la aparición de Internet, el crecimiento de número de usuarios ha ido a un ritmo exponencial, alcanzando los 2.400 millones de usuarios en todo el mundo en 2012, según la empresa de servicios online Pingdom. En España, un total de 25 millones de personas se conectaron a Internet en diciembre de 2013, lo que supone un 9,5% más que en el mismo mes de 2011, según el informe elaborado por la consultora Barlovento con datos de la empresa de medición comScore. En octubre de 2012, Facebook llegó a los 1.000 millones de usuarios, con más de 600 millones de usuarios móviles. En Twitter existen ya más de 140 millones de usuarios activos, enviándose más de 340 de millones de tweets al día. Más de mil millones de usuarios únicos visitan YouTube cada mes, reproduciéndose más de 4.000 millones de horas de vídeo al mes. Cada vez más gente se conecta y por más tiempo. En 2012 ese tiempo aumentó un 21%, con respecto a 2011. Los usuarios invierten más tiempo en las Redes Sociales que en otros sitios de Internet. En EE.UU., por ejemplo, el 17% del tiempo en Internet están en la Red Social Facebook. En cuanto al tiempo dedicado por persona a las Redes Sociales: por género, son las mujeres con 8:37 horas al mes a través del ordenador y 9:43 horas a través de dispositivo móvil. En cuanto a franja de edad y género, quienes más tiempo pasan son los hombres de entre 18 a 24 años y las mujeres de entre 25 a 34 años que están 11 horas al mes. Sociales han irrumpido en nuestra sociedad y en nuestras formas de comunicación transformando el panorama actual. Como ya hemos dicho, el paradigma comunicacional ha variado, se ha visto alterado por estas plataformas 2.0 generando nuevas maneras de informar y ser informados. Por lo tanto, la principal innovación en esta investigación es que en ella se entremezclan tres elementos que en la práctica están inevitablemente vinculados: las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación en general y las Redes Sociales en particular; la sociedad interconectada y el ciudadano 2.0 "prosumidor"; y el Periodismo, los Medios de Comunicación y el periodista. La actual sociedad "viene marcada por la aparición de nuevos sectores laborales, la complejidad de los procesos y los productos alcanzados, la inmediatez, el progreso y la búsqueda constante de la eficacia, la globalización de los medios de comunicación, el pluralismo ideológico y la multifocalidad de la comunidad. Pero de todos estos hechos, sobresale el hecho de que las nuevas tecnologías giran en torno a todos los procesos de la información y de la comunicación". La realización de esta Tesis Doctoral se justifica por la necesidad de estudiar las características comunicacionales surgidas tras el fenómeno 2.0 y sus repercusiones en el ejercicio, estructura y recepción del Periodismo. Se ha indagado esta temática en primer lugar desde un punto de vista de la teoría, creando un importante corpus teórico sobre nuestro objeto de estudio. Además, se ha realizado un estudio de campo analizando aspectos concretos de nuestro objeto de estudio e intentando vislumbrar algunas dinámicas y tendencias en el Periodismo y la sociedad actual. Por lo tanto, se trata de una justificación doble: la primera consiste en hacer una aportación teórica, lo más completa posible, sobre las características de las Redes Sociales en Internet y el Periodismo y la sociedad bajo el paraguas de la comunicación 2.0; y la segunda es ofrecer un estudio detallado sobre las repercusiones y transformaciones reales que se están dando en el Periodismo y en el contexto social donde éste tiene lugar.
Hubo un tiempo que las fronteras de la intimidad estuvieron defendidas por el tiempo y por el espacio. No hace mucho eran, precisamente, el tiempo y la distancia los que mantenían indemne a la intimidad. La sociedad era otra. Los medios de transporte evolucionaron poco a poco. En los últimos años las comunicaciones dieron un salto hacia el futuro de manera asombrosa. Con los avances se despertó, la ambición del ser humano por el conocimiento y la información. Así pues, se reconoció masivamente el valor de la información. Como contrapartida, el derecho a la intimidad se vio afectado y comenzó su defensa. Se desató una lucha enfurecida entre el derecho a la intimidad y la libertad de información. De ahí, en 1890 en los Estados Unidos, Samuel Warren y Louis Brandeis, publican, en la Harvard Law Review, un artículo con el título Right to privacy en el cual defienden la protección de refracciones de la personalidad humana. Esta nueva dimensión merecedora de protección ante los peligros provocados por la masificación de la difusión de informaciones a través de la prensa escrita fue por los autores identificada como el Right to be let alone. La batalla del derecho a la intimidad continuó y continúa hasta hoy a medida que aparecen nuevas técnicas de procesamiento de datos, formas más rápidas, eficaces y económicas de almacenar y transportar el dato con la revolución tecnológica. Los campos de batalla se van reciclando. Hoy, con la sociedad de la información se ha producido una nueva imagen del hombre, definido por Frosini como un 'hombre artificial', para referirse a la dimensión psicológica de un hombre nuevo que vive en un mundo artificial, creado por el propio hombre y no por la naturaleza. Es innegable que esta revolución tecnológica tiene generado profundos cambios en la dinámica de la sociedad actual y en el comportamiento de las personas. Hoy, las nuevas tecnologías de la información y comunicación (en adelante TIC's) forman parte de la sociedad, es mucho más, son ella misma. Esta es la sociedad de la información, la sucesora de la sociedad industrial, con una cultura transnacional, globalizada y conectada en red. Todos estos cambios en la historia de la humanidad siempre exigen una respuesta por parte de los sistemas que los gobiernan. De la misma manera que el sistema jurídico en los que se sustentan debe ser dinámico para acompañar estas mudanzas y cumplir con su función social. Fue exactamente lo que Warren y Brandeis sugerían en el comienzo de su opúsculo cuando expresaban "(…) es un principio tan viejo como el 'common law' que el individuo debe gozar de total protección en su persona y en sus bienes, sin embargo, resulta necesario, de vez en cuando, redefinir con precisión la naturaleza y la extensión de esta protección. Los cambios políticos, sociales y económicos imponen el reconocimiento de nuevos derechos, y el 'common law', en su eterna juventud, evoluciona para dar cabida a las demandas de la sociedad". En la época en la que dichos autores publicaron su artículo, los medios tecnológicos de intrusión en la vida privada era la fotografía sin permiso y la distribución por la prensa. Después de más de un siglo, las denuncias de vulneración a la intimidad se realizan contra otras familias tecnológicas. El Tribunal Constitucional español (en adelante TC), dentro de su amplia jurisprudencia en esta materia, ha ido perfilando diferentes dimensiones dentro de ese derecho de difícil definición, que es la intimidad. Aquéllas que se han dibujado en función de las diferentes amenazas frente a las que se ha de articular la protección de este derecho, no definido constitucionalmente y de doble proyección. Lo ha hecho en todo caso desde una formulación amplia, no en vano el concepto de intimidad como señala la doctrina (más allá de esa referencia clásica al estudio de Warren y Brandeis), es esencialmente abierto, pues '¿Qué relación existe entre las inmisiones de ruidos evitables insoportables en el propio domicilio (STC 119/2001, de 24 de mayo) y las indagaciones o investigaciones sobre partes íntimas del cuerpo (STC 37/1989, de 15 de febrero)? Garantizar al individuo un ámbito reservado de su vida frente a la acción y el conocimiento de los demás es el objeto de este derecho que ahora tratamos. Éste ámbito se protege tanto respecto de los poderes públicos como de los particulares, y se encuentra vinculado de manera inmediata y directa con el respecto de su dignidad como persona, su personalidad, siendo necesario para mantener su calidad mínima de vida humana. Como señaló el TC en su sentencia 20/1992, de 14 de febrero, sin este derecho no sería realizable, ni concebible la existencia de la dignidad que a todos quiere asegurar la norma fundamental. La elección del tema de esta investigación deriva del hecho que la revolución tecnológica ha traído consecuencias importantísimas al mundo del derecho constitucional. Los avances de las últimas décadas han incidido considerablemente en el concepto del derecho a la intimidad, de la misma manera que el uso masivo de las redes sociales son unos de los motores de este cambio. Las fronteras entre lo público y lo privado son cada vez más porosas. Por consiguiente, han aparecido elementos nuevos que nos obligan a realizar nuevas valoraciones sobre las relaciones de las personas entre sí, de éstos con la naturaleza, y de su convivencia con las nuevas tecnologías de la información. Dentro de este contexto, de las tecnologías de información, internet es la gran estrella, razón por la cual, en esta investigación, daremos mayor énfasis a internet y redes sociales. La hipótesis que se traduce es que la incorporación de las nuevas tecnologías de la información (en adelante NTI) en la sociedad actual, ha abierto el debate sobre la necesidad de establecer normas que restrinjan su uso en beneficio de la protección de los derechos fundamentales, como la intimidad. El control electrónico al que nos vemos sometidos produce efectos negativos que inciden de lleno en nuestra vida familiar e intima, porque nos somete, a un 'juicio universal permanente'. La tecnología de la información ha revolucionado la sociedad y sigue provocando cambios. Cambios de hábitos, de necesidades, de prioridades y aun de evaluación de los derechos. Internet presupone una amenaza al derecho a la intimidad. La red no es solo un medio de comunicación, sino que también se configura como un nuevo medio de vigilancia, no solo por parte del Estado sino también por particulares curiosos. Los peligros de este uso masivo de internet, pide a gritos mecanismos de defensa que hagan eficaz la protección horizontal del derecho (Drittwirkung) y no solo frente a las agresiones del poder público. Los riesgos de vulneración del derecho a la intimidad son interminables. Mencionaremos algunos de ellos, por ejemplo, el actual problema con los motores de búsqueda como google, que eternizan la disponibilidad de informaciones en la red. Un verdadero 'atestado de muerte' del derecho al olvido digital. Los sistemas de vigilancia y seguimiento en lugares estratégicos como aeropuertos, centros comerciales, calles etc., enaltecidos sobre todo tras los últimos ataques terroristas en Paris, Bruselas y Niza. Estos dispositivos suministran una gran cantidad de información biográfica y geofísica, representan sin duda una repercusión negativa sobre la intimidad de las personas. Además, solo para tener una idea de este contexto, citamos otros sistemas tecnológicos de seguimiento y vigilancia existentes. Las tabletas y los teléfonos móviles con tecnología 3G y 4G están equipados con GPS (Global Positioning Systems) que permiten la situación exacta de los usuarios a través de satélites. En Estados Unidos, utilizan el sistema de "localización social" denominado Verizon Chaperone para saber dónde se encuentran las personas en cada momento. Junto a los GPS, las cajas negras en los vehículos, que muchos usuarios desconocen que la tienen, están dotados de una tecnología EDRS (Electronic Data Recorders) que recogen y gravan datos como la velocidad, el uso de cinturones, el estado de frenos, aceleración, etc. Una gran mayoría de ciudadanos no tienen conocimiento de otras tecnologías de vigilancia y rastreo como el sistema ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Reconigtion); de la identificación mediante radio frecuencia (RFID, Radio Frecuency Identification), etc. Igualmente, las transacciones que realizamos a través de internet pueden ser vigiladas, sin adentrar en el mundo del google earth, google street view, drones, etc. que invaden cualquier espacio. Como se nota la realidad es asustadora. La convergencia entre las diversas tecnologías de la información y comunicación, parece un fenómeno imparable. La actual realidad está provocando una dificultad creciente para delimitar los medios tradicionales dedicados a la transmisión pública de la información, y los dedicados a la comunicación privada; entre los 'tradicionales' medios audiovisuales y los medios de telecomunicación. Y el problema va más allá, en pleno auge de los reality show, el derecho a la intimidad también está siendo devaluado a través de su comercio, donde la falta de conciencia de las personas alcanza las esferas más intimas. Parece que los tiempos futuros serán aún más controlados, se pronostica una invasión creciente sobre esta parcela íntima del ser humano; "(…) el futuro no estará dominado por un 'Gran Hermano', sino por cientos de pequeños hermanos que constantemente irrumpirán y observarán nuestras vidas". Esto se traducirá "(…) en la captura sistemática de los eventos diarios de nuestras vidas; cada lugar al que viajemos, cada palabra que digamos, cada página que leamos". Junto a estos programas existen otros, que no se diferencian de los reality show, la única diferencia es que en lugar de comerciar su propia intimidad, lo hacen con la intimidad ajena. Los que no son devotos de estos fenómenos televisivos, sufren la imposición de ese tipo de información, sin poder hacer nada al respecto. Hasta los programas de noticias e informativos convencionales han entrado en la dinámica del 'consumo de la intimidad'. Con la excusa del derecho a la información y a la libertad de expresión se está poniendo en peligro el derecho a la intimidad. Es evidente la crisis de este derecho. En la sociedad de la información, la exposición de la vida íntima es cada vez más intensa y cotidiana. Se verifica una deformación progresiva de la noción de intimidad en muchas camadas sociales y no se notan reacciones proporcionales, sobre todo, la generación de los 'nativos digitales'. Vivimos en verdad una redefinición de los contornos del público y del privado. Los 'nativos digitales' crecen con la aceptación de la pérdida del anonimato y de la intimidad, que a nosotros nos parece tan esencial. Adoptan un concepto de dicho derecho completamente distinto de las generaciones anteriores. La gran mayoría de los ciudadanos no son conscientes de las enormes consecuencias, del trasfondo de sus 'actos informáticos cotidianos' y así, cualquier nuevo desarrollo se asume y celebra como un avance, obviando la reflexión crucial de si el derecho a la intimidad cabe en este mundo actual tal y como se ha entendido hasta ahora. No en vano, el directivo de Google, Eric Schmidt, afirma que internet juega en contra del individuo, asevera que "(…) los jóvenes quizás tengan que cambiar su nombre en el futuro para escapar de su antigua actividad online". Los grandes de internet no han dudado en sentenciar la muerte de la privacidad en el mundo online bajo la premisa de que, "(…) si no quieres que algo se sepa, mejor no hacerlo", porque "(…) nosotros tenemos idea de lo que eres, de lo que te importa y de quiénes son tus amigos"; o como afirma Zuckerberg, fundador de facebook, "(…) la Era de la privacidad ha acabado". ¿Están ellos correctos? Ante todos estos hechos, lo que no queda duda, es que, las NTI presentan un potencial sin precedentes para agredir la intimidad. Así, se denota que son interminables las hipótesis que involucran el tema en la misma proporción que las razones que justifican la presente investigación. Este escenario alarmante forma ya parte de nuestra realidad y multiplicará sus manifestaciones en el futuro, salvo que la sociedad arbitre mecanismos que maticen tal intromisión en la esfera individual invirtiendo la tendencia inaugurada por el nefasto principio, "(…) si no tengo nada que esconder, no tengo por qué preocuparme por el respeto de mi privacidad". En el mundo antiguo o pasado era fácil sustraerse de la curiosidad ajena, retirándose a un lugar apartado y no suministrando noticias personales, no existían medios de identificación inmediata, el reconocimiento o la noticia cierta sobre la persona se conseguía a través de medios de comunicación y difusión lentos. Hoy, la realidad es totalmente otra, los datos estadísticos comprueban que, a finales del 2012, en el mundo, alrededor de 2.500 millones de personas estaban en línea (incremento del 10% anual), 241 millones más que el año anterior. La media de acceso en Europa, según esos datos es de 63% y de Norte América 78%. En 2013 se estima que casi el 40% de la población mundial estaba conectada a internet. El porcentaje de personas que utilizan internet en los países desarrollados alcanzó a finales del 2012 el 73,4%. En términos absolutos, casi la mitad de los conectados a internet en el mundo son en Asia Pacífico, siendo 1.133 millones en 2012. En España, en general el acceso ronda el 70% en 2013 unos 19 millones de españoles "viven conectados" a internet y consultan el móvil unas 150 veces al día. El 53,8% de la población se conecta a diario, siendo el 86% de los jóvenes entre 16 a 24 años. Veinticinco millones de españoles acceden a internet, y las redes sociales forman parte de la vida del 64,1% de los usuarios (del 95% de los jóvenes entre 16 a 24 años). Por cuanto a los usos administrativos, el 45% de la ciudadanía interactuó con las Administraciones Públicas a través de internet. En términos comparativos relativos a 2012, los conectados a internet en España son el 67,2% (38.7% en 2006), con 17,5 millones de usuarios de Facebook, ocupando un lugar medio en la Unión Europea frente a países como Holanda (93%) o Noruega (96,9%). Para América Latina, los datos más recientes señalan que un 48% (32,1 % en 2009 y 14,4% en 2006) de la población de América Latina (sin Caribe) están ya conectados a internet. Los datos estadísticos demuestran la utilización masiva del internet en el mundo. Números estos generados a partir de la revolución tecnológica, se puede considerar internet el grande paradigma de esta revolución, sin duda un medio de comunicación de grande relevancia, sin embargo, generador de grandes controversias también. En este estudio se investigará este nuevo entorno que involucra el derecho a la intimidad y cuáles son los efectos que derivan de esta convivencia en dicho derecho. Es sin duda, un tema de innegable actualidad que exige una renovación constante, considerando el imparable desarrollo tecnológico. El estudio es arduo porque el dinamismo de la evolución tecnológica es sorprendente y ocurre en paralelo a la experiencia jurídica exigiendo una doble dedicación porque son distintas ciencias en confluencia, creando situaciones cuya resolución va más allá de sus propios muros, exigiendo del jurista estudios en mundos científicos foráneos. En este sentido, oportunas y estimulantes las palabras del autor ANTONI ROIG cuando asevera que "(…) el jurista debería acercarse sin complejos a esta propuesta multidisciplinar de estudio de las libertades informativas, si de verdad quiere complementar la protección jurídica de derechos fundamentales con el también apasionante mundo de la tecnología (…)". El derecho a la intimidad ya es un clásico en la doctrina constitucional en razón de las innumerables implicaciones que ofrece a lo largo de las evoluciones sociales, justamente por acompañar los cambios de perfil de la sociedad. Desde su primera formulación hace más de cien años, ha adquirido un nuevo y diverso significado tras la aparición de los ordenadores en el campo de la información, ya que este nuevo instrumento es como una prótesis de la inteligencia humana que con su capacidad de memorizar, procesar los datos y repartir informaciones se ha convertido en un 'informante electrónico', un 'cerebro artificial' capaz de controlar, cotejar y entrecruzar los datos recogidos. Es por esta razón que es reconocida en la doctrina la dificultad en la definición de este derecho, a pesar de las diversas tentativas, persiste el problema en delimitar los límites entre lo público y lo privado, entre la esfera privada y la íntima, entre la esfera íntima y la esfera del secreto, así es porque, estos límites son muy difusos y este derecho evoluciona con mucha rapidez, a tal punto, que hoy, se puede observar que raros son los conceptos jurídicos aún conectados a la esencia del ser humano. Las implicaciones de las TIC's en los derechos fundamentales son enormes. Varios son los derechos y principios constitucionales afectados genéricamente por el asombroso desarrollo de todas las nuevas tecnologías. En España, el derecho a la intimidad está expreso en el artículo 18.1 de la Constitución (en adelante CE) y, atendiendo al mandato contenido en el artículo 53.1 CE y, en consonancia con el artículo 81.1 CE, el desarrollo normativo para la protección del derecho a la Intimidad Personal y Familiar ha correspondido a la Ley Orgánica 1/1982 - de 5 de mayo - de Protección Civil del Derecho al Honor, a la Intimidad Personal y Familiar y a la Propia Imagen (en adelante LODHI). En los últimos tiempos, y debido a la necesidad de afrontar estos nuevos riesgos planteados por la tecnología informática, tanto la doctrina como los operadores jurídicos se han visto obligados a replantear el concepto de intimidad. No hay incertidumbre que todo este avance ha producido una mejora sustancial de nuestra democracia, pero también, no hay duda que aportó muchos problemas hasta ahora sin soluciones. Dicho fenómeno, lanza a cada día una multitud de interrogantes que el derecho, por la extrema dinámica casuística, no consigue acompañar y debe responder eficazmente a la sociedad. La metodología utilizada para esta investigación será la teórica doctrinaria y jurisprudencial. Cumple además aclarar que, la distinción entre información y comunicación vendría dada porque la 'información' pretende la libre difusión de datos de todo tipo, y tendencialmente es abierta; la 'comunicación' busca acercar a las personas y facilitar los contactos y la transmisión de todo tipo de mensajes y opiniones entre ellas, de modo que tendería más bien a un contexto más cerrado o privado. No obstante, se ha destacado acertadamente que el aspecto más interesante de las nuevas tecnologías es la convergencia entre la tecnología de las telecomunicaciones, la informática y la radiodifusión, de manera que "(…) en el futuro inmediato ya no tendrá sentido entender el teléfono como algo diferente de la televisión y esta como algo muy distinto de un periódico". Por tanto, cada vez es más difícil, y tiene menos sentido, distinguir entre la información y la comunicación, y ello aboga por una visión amplia y convergente de las nuevas tecnologías. Así subrayamos que, desde esta perspectiva, y a efectos de esta investigación, consideraremos las expresiones 'tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación' – TIC's, 'nuevas tecnologías'- NT y 'nuevas tecnologías de información'- NTI, sinónimos. Este impacto de las NTI sobre el derecho fundamental a la intimidad será el objeto de esta investigación. Así, enfocaremos el estudio en 5 Capítulos, todas ellos orientados por la doctrina, legislación y jurisprudencia, sobre todo del Tribunal Constitucional (en adelante TC) y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (en adelante TEDH). En el Capítulo Primero de la tesis, perseguiremos un conocimiento de forma profundizada de la configuración constitucional del derecho a la intimidad en España, empezando por un estudio de la evolución histórica de dicho derecho (sección I). En la sección II analizaremos el controvertido concepto de intimidad, las tendencias doctrinales y las principales interpretaciones sobre el tema del Tribunal Constitucional. Como el derecho a la intimidad está expreso en el artículo 18.1 CE, juntamente con el derecho al honor y el derecho a la imagen, analizaremos, consonante doctrina y jurisprudencia, si se trata de un único derecho – trifonte, o de tres derechos autónomos (sección II.1). Además cuando hablamos de intimidad percibimos que en la vida cotidiana y hasta mismo en algunas doctrinas se hacen uso de las expresiones "privacidad", "vida privada" e "intimidad" como sinónimos. Así, en la sección II.2 investigaremos si estas expresiones designan la misma realidad. Aún con respeto al análisis del tenor del artículo 18 CE, ahora con referencia a los apartados 2,3 y 4 - la inviolabilidad del domicilio, el secreto de las comunicaciones y la autodeterminación informativa respectivamente, examinaremos en la sección II.3, cual es la dinámica existente entre estos derechos y el derecho a la intimidad. Delineada las interpretaciones del artículo 18 de la CE, partiremos para el estudio exhaustivo de los sujetos titulares del derecho a la intimidad (sección III). Ya que la intimidad es un derecho que tiene un carácter individual, innato, abordaremos en la sección III.1 los rasgos de la titularidad de dicho derecho entre los personajes públicos y famosos. En la sección III.2 detallaremos el ejercicio del derecho por los menores de edad, ya que una afectación de su intimidad se presume ser mucho más grave que para cualquier otro sujeto pues afecta al libre desarrollo de su personalidad. En el contexto de la sección III.3 estudiaremos cómo es ejercido el derecho a la intimidad de una persona fallecida ya que los derechos de la personalidad se extinguen con la muerte. De igual forma se estudiará en las secciones III.4 y III.5 si la persona jurídica y extranjeros son sujetos titulares del derecho a la intimidad en España. Aunque el contenido del derecho a la intimidad sea reconocido en la doctrina especializada y en la jurisprudencia como flotante y flexible, porque, como dicho, este derecho acompaña la evolución de la sociedad, dedicaremos a la sección IV el estudio de los intentos doctrinales en delimitarlo. Entre los varios intentos, investigaremos la célebre doctrina alemana de la Sphärentheorie (la teoría alemana de los círculos concéntricos), la tesis maximalista de Fariñas Matoni, entre otros intentos. En el Capítulo Segundo de esta tesis trataremos de los límites del derecho a la intimidad. Dentro de este contexto, partimos del tenor del art. 10.1 CE, donde se extrae que la dignidad humana es el fundamento de la legitimación del orden político español en su conjunto. Este precepto constituye el principio rector supremo del ordenamiento jurídico, es decir, es el núcleo de todo el sistema de valores constitucionalmente establecido. Si así es, cuando hablamos de 'límites de los derechos fundamentales' debemos, por tanto, traer a un primer plano el tema de la dignidad humana. En efecto, empezaremos en la sección I con el estudio de la dignidad humana como fundamento de los límites de los derechos fundamentales. Analizaremos en esta sección las principales sentencias sobre el asunto. Vencido este tema, abordaremos en la sección II, la inexistencia de derechos absolutos y, consecuentemente el análisis de los límites de los derechos fundamentales. Analizaremos la tipología de límites presentados por variada doctrina. El importantísimo valor que tienen los derechos fundamentales en los sistemas democráticos, hace que su limitación se vea sometida al cumplimiento de ciertas condiciones y que se interpreten siempre de forma restrictiva. En este contexto llegaremos al estudio de 'los límites de los límites' (sección III), donde abordaremos la reserva de ley, el contenido esencial y las garantías normativas frente a las limitaciones. En este punto estudiaremos cómo las limitaciones de los derechos fundamentales deben estar habilitadas (art. 53.1 CE) y cual el tipo de ley exigido en cada circunstancia (art. 81.1 CE), también analizaremos qué debe ser entendido por contenido esencial (sección III.1). No obstante, hay situaciones que no resulta suficiente delimitar el objeto del derecho fundamental y fijar los límites que cabe imponer a éste. Puede suceder que sea necesario definir la intensidad en que estos límites deben ser aplicados, así urge investigar la aplicación del principio de la proporcionalidad como criterio orientador, cuyo estudio desarrollaremos en la sección III.2. Pasaremos a analizar en la sección IV, los límites del derecho a la intimidad propiamente dicho, cuyas restricciones pueden estar en la exacta frontera en que la dignidad y la conveniencia del individuo deben ceder ante las exigencias del bienestar general o de la equidad. Así como todos los derechos fundamentales dicho derecho también es susceptible de limitación, sea en su inevitable articulación con otros derechos fundamentales, como la libertad de información, o en el plan de protección de otros bienes jurídicos, como la seguridad pública, prevención y persecución de delitos. Como el derecho a la intimidad reconocido en el apartado primero del art. 18 de la CE tiene la peculiaridad de recibir una doble mención constitucional: en el art. 18.1 CE, en cuanto derecho substantivo, y en el art. 20.4, como límite de los derechos a una comunicación libre, en la sección V nos dedicaremos a estudiar los derechos a una comunicación libre desde la perspectiva constitucional. En la sección VI pasaremos al estudio de los frecuentes conflictos entre el derecho a la intimidad y la libertad de información y expresión, el juicio de la ponderación como medio de solución de estos conflictos, la posición preferente del derecho a la información y los requisitos de la relevancia y la veracidad de la información como criterio legitimador a la invasión de la intimidad (sección VI.1 y VI.2 respectivamente). Se hará también, un estudio de la Ley Orgánica 1/1982 de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen, considerando que dicha Ley Orgánica tipifica las intromisiones al derecho a la intimidad que se consideran legítimas e ilegítimas. Daremos énfasis al artículo 7, apartado 1 y 2 – que se refieren a la forma de obtención de una información; el apartado 3 – que se refiere a la divulgación de una información; y el 4 en el quebrantamiento de confianza (sección VI.3). Pues bien, como la intimidad antes de ser un fenómeno jurídico es un fenómeno social, como dicho, es inevitable que su concepto tenga un reconocido carácter flotante pues acompaña los cambios de la sociedad. Así siendo, en la actualidad, más una vez, a partir del desarrollo tecnológico, el derecho a la intimidad adquiere un nuevo perfil. Las nuevas tecnologías de la información, además de propiciar un irrefutable crecimiento económico sin precedentes en todo el planeta, han permitido la captación y mercantilización de datos personales y que la información circule a escala mundial con una rapidez inconcebible. Hoy, las personas, más que destinatarios de la información, corren el riesgo de convertirse en sus rehenes. Así es porque el acceso a las informaciones disponibles permite la creación de retratos que muestran los principales hábitos y prácticas de una persona (teoría del mosaico de Madrid Conesa), revelando facetas de las cuales el propio individuo muchas veces no es consciente y que pueden ser utilizados para diversos fines. Con esta realidad mundial, conservar el derecho a la intimidad intacto se está tornando muy difícil. Los satélites cada vez más modernos exhiben imágenes que eran inimaginables hasta hace poco tiempo. Dentro de todo este avanzado universo tecnológico, no sólo la prensa, empresas o los órganos públicos, sino que también cualquier persona puede invadir la intimidad ajena sin salir de casa. Algunos hablan de la 'industrialización de la indiscreción' como pauta del comportamiento del Estado, de los órganos de comunicación social y también de los particulares, cuya curiosidad acerca de la vida ajena se manifiesta asombrosa. La sociedad de la información está totalmente inmersa en las nuevas tecnologías, en un hábitat donde estamos en permanente contacto con el mundo, aunque creemos que en la mayoría de las veces el mayor riesgo se encuentra en el usuario que en la propia tecnología en sí. En efecto, cerramos este capítulo con la sección VII donde empezaremos a confrontar el tema del derecho a la intimidad en la Era de la sociedad de la información. Hoy en día, se dice, irónicamente, que gozamos de más intimidad que nuestros antepasados precisamente gracias al anonimato de la vida urbana y los medios tecnológicos. Sin embargo, consideramos que en etapas anteriores al desarrollo tecnológico, el respeto a la vida privada se centraba en el uso de los sentidos, tales como la vista o el oído. Se permanecía así dentro de los límites de relaciones naturales y los muros de una casa, la soledad de un lugar desierto, eran suficientes para asegurar la protección de la intimidad y para excluir el conocimiento o la difusión de las acciones y de las palabras de un individuo o de varias personas unidas entre sí por vínculos confidenciales. En el Capítulo Tercero de la tesis trataremos de las nuevas tecnologías de la información propiamente dichas. Plantearemos como las nuevas tecnologías de la información han supuesto, por una parte, grandes ventajas y por otra parte, perjuicios a los ciudadanos. Como estamos hablando de una nueva ciencia en confluencia con el derecho a la intimidad, urge estudiar algunas nociones básicas relativas a las NTI para entender el modo en el que se van a ver afectados los derechos y libertades constitucionalmente reconocidos (sección I). Fundamental comprender de qué se trata cuando hablamos de un mundo digital, de un mundo analógico o de una información digitalizada. Estos conceptos básicos y otros más desarrollaremos en la sección I.1. De igual importancia es la comprensión de las estructuras, los medios de transmisión y el ancho de banda que estudiaremos en la sección I.2 porque estos conceptos ayudan a entender cuál es el entorno fáctico de los problemas jurídicos. Como ya hicimos hincapié, el tema 'nuevas tecnologías de la información' involucra un universo extenso, así, daremos énfasis a internet, pues es el gran protagonista de las tecnologías de la información y, hoy, internet ha convertido en realidad el 'hogar global', en la medida en que cada domicilio de los usuarios de la red constituye la terminal de un sistema integrado universal. Así, buscaremos en la sección I.3 una necesaria aproximación técnica del 'mundo de internet', verificando conceptos, características y evolución, desde la web 1.0, web 2.0 hasta la web 3.0 (sección I.3.1), Todos estos nuevos sistemas socio-técnico-informáticos no solo han puesto de manifiesto el poder de la innovación informática y los beneficios que aportan, como también han revelado nuevas amenazas y desafíos en materia de protección a la intimidad. De ahí, trataremos en la sección II de este capítulo las medidas tecnológicas que están siendo reclamadas para la protección del derecho a la intimidad como la Privacy Enhancing Tecnologie (PET) y la Privacy by Design (PbD). El Capítulo Cuarto se intitula el derecho a la intimidad en internet y sus límites. Expondremos en la sección I, como cuestiones previas, la difícil tarea que representa la protección de la intimidad frente a esta dimensión global que alcanza una publicación en internet. Todos estos aspectos de la 'revolución llamada internet' será objeto en la sección II. Nadie es indiferente a estos avances tecnológicos de las últimas décadas ni a los cambios que, sobre todo, el internet ha desencadenado en distintos ámbitos de la vida personal y social. Las TIC's han propiciado profundos cambios en las pautas del proceso comunicativo. Se ha producido con el adviento internet una convergencia en los medios de comunicación, generando dificultades en la delimitación de las Tecnologías de Información y Comunicación a través de las que se ejerce en la libertad de información y expresión y las que son aptas para el ejercicio de una comunicación libre, este tema será objeto de estudios en la sección III. En la sección IV estudiaremos el derecho a la intimidad en internet. Analizaremos como este proceso ha producido un progresivo extrañamiento del hombre respecto a la naturaleza, paulatinamente sustituida por un ambiente artificial. Cómo el desarrollo de estas mismas tecnologías ha acarreado nuevos riesgos para los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos debido a la capacidad de las entidades y personas tanto públicas como privadas, de acumular informaciones personales en formato digital para finalidades muy diversas y no siempre perfectamente identificadas. La pérdida de control sobre estas informaciones puede incidir de manera directa en los derechos y libertades ya que esta capacidad de acumulación de grandes cantidades de datos personales hace posible su alteración, manipulación y transmisión a terceros de manera rápida, lo cual incide en la libertad de elección y decisión de los individuos ante la incertidumbre de si sus comunicaciones, actividades o elecciones serán registradas por entidades desconocidas y para finalidades que igualmente ignoran. Otra pregunta que se hace es que una vez revelada voluntariamente una información en un medio virtual, ¿abarcaría sustentar renuncia al derecho a la intimidad?; ¿dejando desamparado a su titular, víctima de su propio poder de decisión sobre lo que considera íntimo o no?, este análisis lo desarrollaremos en la sección V. Vivimos una nueva Era, en un hábitat donde la comunicación a través de la web y de los dispositivos móviles dio voz al diálogo interactivo. Hoy en día, en cualquier lugar, estamos en permanente contacto con el mundo e igualmente vigilados por el mundo. Internet y las redes sociales de internet, como Facebook, Tuenti, Linkedin, Instagram, etc. afectan de forma directa el derecho a la intimidad. Tan grande su afectación que, sin duda, está provocando un cambio en el concepto 'de lo íntimo'. No es difícil observar, por ejemplo, cuando estamos en un restaurante, a las personas que están a nuestro entorno con sus teléfonos, en total silencio, publicando fotografías de la comida que comen e informando en la red donde están y con quien. En internet, el peligro es invisible. Jamás, como en la sociedad de la información, las personas han estado tan expuestas a ojos extraños en su vida cotidiana. Internet está cada vez más presente en todos los espacios donde se desarrollan actividades humanas, difícil no encontrarla en todos los lugares. Internet permite no sólo nuevas, más fáciles y más sofisticadas formas de comunicación, sino también, y como contrapartida, la posibilidad técnica de que se produzcan más injerencias en las mismas. En efecto, daremos énfasis en el estudio de las redes sociales. Así iniciaremos su estudio en la sección VI intitulada las redes sociales como forma de limitación del derecho a la intimidad. Analizaremos los nuevos retos que enfrenta el derecho a la intimidad con las redes sociales que, como dicho, representan uno de los motores del cambio del concepto de intimidad (sección VI.1). Examinaremos los riesgos que plantean las redes sociales para el derecho a la intimidad (sección VI.1.1). Haremos un análisis normativo y un análisis de la evolución legislativa del derecho a la intimidad personal y familiar (art. 18 CE), haciendo especial hincapié en la protección de este derecho en internet y en los servicios asociados a ésta. Para contar con una visión global de la situación también se analizará el ámbito internacional, comunitario o europeo y el nacional (sección VI.1.2). El marco legal en materia de protección de datos en las redes sociales será objeto de estudios en la sección VI.1.3. Los menores de edad y los incapaces, colectivos especialmente vulnerables en las redes sociales, serán analizados en la sección VI.1.4 y, las medidas empleadas en las redes sociales para protección del derecho a la intimidad, serán estudiadas en la sección VI.1.5 respectivamente. También discutiremos otro supuesto de limitación al derecho a la intimidad, la seguridad pública. Analizaremos como el terrorismo, sobre todo después de los atentados de 11 de septiembre de 2001(en adelante 11-S) en Estados Unidos y los más recientes en Paris, en 13 de noviembre de 2015; en Bruselas, en 22 de marzo de 2016 y, en Niza, en 14 de julio de 2016, reabre la discusión sobre la necesidad de intensos métodos de seguridad (por ejemplo, las amplias medidas de seguridad como cámaras de vigilancia, presencia policial, y registros personales en aeropuertos, estaciones, control de telecomunicaciones, actividades privadas etc.) que puedan implicar un recorte en el derecho a la intimidad. El terrorismo ha desencadenado una exagerada colecta de informaciones personales, la intromisión en la intimidad de los ciudadanos también se consuma por medio de ciberespionaje operada por los sistemas de inteligencia. Hoy, las agencias de inteligencia interceptan comunicaciones realizadas por medio de teléfonos, internet, entre otros. Estos hechos se desprenden diariamente de las noticias en los periódicos, por ejemplo: 'El mundo' – EEUU 'espía' a través de los servidores de Apple, Google o Facebook: "El Gobierno de Barack Obama no sólo tiene información sensible de millones de llamadas telefónicas, también tiene acceso directo a los datos y a los servidores de poderosas empresas de Internet como Google, Facebook o Apple. Una presentación en PowerPoint de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional (NSA) a la que ha tenido acceso los diarios 'The Guardian' y 'The Washington Post' probaría el control de EEUU sobre el contenido de determinados e-mails, fotografías, vídeos conversaciones de chat o transferencia de archivos.(…)"; - "EEUU vigila de forma 'rutinaria' sitios de noticias, Twitter y redes sociales"; "Un ataque informático expone los correos de centenas de militares británicos"; "El gobierno de Obama espía desde abril las llamadas de millones de ciudadanos", "EE.UU. espió más de 60 millones de llamadas telefónicas en España". Así pues, en la sección VII analizaremos otros supuestos de limitación del derecho a la intimidad beneficiados por el avance de las nuevas tecnologías de la información. En este sentido, discutiremos cómo las nuevas demandas de seguridad pública de la sociedad de la información, con sus avanzados sistemas informáticos, tienen implicado en un recorte en el derecho a la intimidad de sus ciudadanos. Cómo el creciente temor al terrorismo tiene estimulado a la aparición de marcos normativos que restringen o eliminan el derecho a la intimidad (sección VII.1). Dentro de este contexto, la tecnología de la videovigilancia pública es uno de los métodos de seguridad pública cuyo uso indiscriminado tiene preocupado a juristas y activistas de organizaciones no gubernamentales de defensa de las libertades públicas en todo el mundo. En efecto, haremos un análisis de la Ley Orgánica 4/1997 sobre la utilización de videocámaras por las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad bajo el prisma del derecho a la intimidad. El Capítulo Quinto lleva el título 'hacia una redefinición del concepto del derecho a la intimidad con el impacto de las nuevas tecnologías de información', donde en la sección I abordaremos el tema la crisis del derecho a la intimidad con esta realidad social que se impone y la perspectiva del incremento futuro de la crisis con el perfil de los nativos digitales. Por ello, la sociedad de la información reclama nuevos derechos. Esta temática será desarrollada en la sección II. Como las TIC's no encuentran entrabes en el tiempo, hacen que los hechos practicados desde hace mucho tiempo, en momentos distantes, y ya olvidados, pueden, ser rescatados por los motores de búsquedas, causando nuevas formas de intromisiones, actuales, y mucho más ruinosas, más allá de aquellos causados en época pretérita. Dentro de este contexto, estudiaremos el derecho al olvido digital como una de las medidas jurídicas discutidas en la actualidad para preservar el derecho a la intimidad en el espacio virtual. Analizaremos una Sentencia de gran repercusión sobre el tema dictada por el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (en adelante TJUE) el día 13 de mayo de 2014 (sección II.1). En la sección II.2 abordaremos otro derecho que se presenta en la doctrina especializada como medida jurídica necesaria para garantía de la intimidad. Estamos hablando del derecho al anonimato que es consagrado legalmente en el ámbito de las comunicaciones telefónicas, pero muy discutido en la doctrina en el ámbito de internet como uno de los nuevos derechos fundamentales vinculados a la red. Para algunos autores se ha configurado como el derecho más importante de cuantos se reconocen a los internautas, como reacción frente a la monitorización de las huellas de navegación. Ante estas discusiones doctrinarias, analizaremos el derecho al olvido y el derecho al anonimato como posibles medidas jurídicas protectoras del derecho a la intimidad en el mundo virtual. Comprobada esta realidad, urge una consecuente redefinición del derecho a la intimidad con el impacto de las NTI, que trataremos en la sección III. De esta manera, ancorado en algunos entendimientos ya sedimentados en la doctrina constitucional y conclusiones formuladas en cada sección de este estudio, buscaremos descubrir algunas cuestiones. Entre ellas, destacamos la necesidad de reconceptualización del derecho a la intimidad y de las libertades comunicativas. Sin embargo, para una correcta conclusión a respecto del tema central, imperioso será analizar otras cuestiones como: ¿Está el derecho a la intimidad amenazado a extinción? ¿Los nativos digitales están creando pautas de comunicación en internet que pueden atingir al derecho a la intimidad de todos los demás? ¿Considerando el ejercicio de la propia voluntad en la definición de 'lo intimo', la intimidad hoy ha evolucionado tanto que tiene su ámbito reducido para todos? ¿La seguridad pública puede transformar el derecho a la intimidad en un derecho ficticio? ¿La reglamentación del derecho al olvido digital y del derecho al anonimato es suficiente para asegurar la intimidad en internet? Estos son algunos de los principales aspectos que se pretende desarrollar en este trabajo de investigación. Por fin, presentaremos algunas sugerencias, propuestas y recomendaciones dirigidas a los servicios de redes sociales y usuarios para la protección del derecho a la intimidad (anexo).
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Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.
1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.
3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.
In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.
A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.
Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.
CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
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Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
Not Available ; Strategies for Doubling Farmers' Income in Rainfed Regions of the Country Rainfed agriculture with nearly 53 per cent of the cultivated area contributes to 40 per cent of country's food production. Nearly 83% of the area under pulses, 85% of the area under coarse cereals, 70% of the area under oilseeds and 42% of the area under rice is rainfed. Rainfed regions are home to about 40% of the human and 60% of the livestock population and the performance of rainfed agriculture is critical to achieve and sustain higher growth in agriculture, enhance incomes and improve livelihoods. The productivity of several rainfed crops is around 1 t/ha and the adoption and diffusion of key rainfed technologies is still low resulting in large yield gaps between research stations and farmers' fields. Decline in the size of the holdings, continuous and unabated land degradation, widespread nutrient deficiencies, increasing climatic variability and climate change poses new challenges in the form of deficit rainfall, droughts and floods impacting the productivity and profitability. Besides, large livestock population inhabiting the rainfed regions require nutrient rich fodder and the demand and supply of fodder is widening. By 2025, the deficits will be to the tune of 65% in case of green fodder and 25% in case of dry fodder. The real incomes of the farmers are declining due to growing labour and input costs. In order to achieve doubling of farmers' income, besides meeting food and nutritional security of the growing population, enhancing the productivity of crops as well as an accelerated growth of livestock, fishery and horticulture sub-sectors will be required in rainfed areas. The short-term strategy would be deployment of location specific proven rainfed technologies depending on the resource endowments for bridging the yield gaps, cropping intensification in medium to high rainfall regions with appropriate water harvesting and efficient use, diversification of agriculture at farm level. Emphasis on strengthening of the farming system and enhancing income from livestock component, focus on market intelligence and dissemination of market information is key for enhancing income at farm. Upscaling of climate resilient integrated farming system modules with diversifying enterprises with high farm income is an essential strategy particularly for small and marginal farmers. The medium term strategy would be on high value crops and commodities including horticulture, protected cultivation of high value crops, value chain development for rainfed crops, capacity building of communities on market intelligence, skill up-gradation towards value addition, cost minimization by way of establishment of farmers producers groups, and risk minimization by way of providing access to water and insurance. For long-term sustainable agriculture, building Dr. K. Sammi Reddy soil organic carbon and promotion of application of organic manures and crop residues with reduced tillage to improve soil health is needed. These strategies have to be implemented in a system mode in association with all the relevant stakeholders so as to establish scalable and evidence based models for doubling of income for various rainfed agro-ecosystems in the country. The action plan need to be implemented in a mission mode pattern by DAC&FW and State line departments by converging with ongoing Central (PMKSY,PMPKVY, MGNREGA, RKVY, PMFBY, etc) and State (eg. Krishi Bhagya program of Karnataka, PantaSanjivani of Andhra Pradesh, PoCRA of Maharashtra, drought management program of Odisha, TSMIP of Telangana etc) programs. This may require adequate fund allocation and manpower. The focus should also be on capacity building/skill development of all relevant stakeholders at various levels. ICAR-CRIDA along with network partners through AICRPDA, AICRPAM, NICRA and SAUs would contribute for implementing the mission mode program through technical backstopping. K. Sammi Reddy Director (Acting), CRIDA CRIDA - Newsletter 2 Research Highlights New Research Initiatives Development of Microbial Consortia for Drought Tolerance in Rainfed Crops Plant beneficial microorganisms have great potential to enhance the drought tolerance and crop productivity. They exhibit variety of plant growth promoting characteristics, which help in modifying the physiological responses to water scarcity and enhances the survival and growth of crop plants. Combination of microbial cultures potentially aid in multiple functions, which are not possible otherwise. Since the constituent individual species perform different functions such as nitrogen fixation, phosphorus solubilization, drought tolerance etc. which gives additive benefit for crop growth and development. At ICARCRIDA, a project entitled 'Development of microbial consortia for drought tolerance in rainfed crops' has been initiated in collaboration with AICRP on Dryland Agriculture to evaluate microbial consortia already developed at CRIDA under different rainfed regions of the country and to identify potential isolates/ consortia of microorganisms if any for drought tolerance and plant growth promotion from native soils. This study would help in characterizing the location specific effective consortia that could be used to improve plant growth and yield under drought stress conditions. District Action Plans for Drought Proofing ICAR-CRIDA has been given the responsibility to develop district action plans for drought proofing for 24 selected districts in 3 states i.e Karnataka (16), Andhra Pradesh (4), Rajasthan (4). The plans being developed in association with participation of district level officials of different line departments including agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, irrigation, groundwater and rural development and KVKs and state agriculture universities. A common template has been prepared by ICAR-CRIDA and circulated to all districts to collect the relevant information on all sectors covering climate information, crops, animals, water resources availability and prioritisation basis to identify the crops/horticulture systems/ livestock systems to assess the vulnerability and the possible interventions in terms of water management, watershed activities and crop based interventions for inclusion in developmental programmes. Capacity building workshops were organised for 3 states separately on the template and review meetings are also completed for district level officials. Co-4 fodder in the farmer's field Farmers FIRST Project Farmers FIRST project on "Farmer Centric Natural Resource Development for Socio- Economic Empowerment in Rainfed areas of Southern Telangana Region" being implemented since October, 2016 in Pudur mandal of Vikarabad district of Telangana State in a cluster of four villages namely: Thirumalapur, Rakamcharla, Pudugurthy and Devanoniguda comprising 400 households. Based on PRA and baseline survey information, an action plan and technology package for the area has been implemented. The technology package modules comprised of soil and water conservation, crops and cropping systems, horticulture, livestock, farm mechanization and socio-economic studies. Development of model irrigation system, vegetable nursery raising at farmers level utilizing portrays with cocopeat; seed and shade nets, backyard poultry; mineral supplementation; crop residue management by making total mixed ration and use of chaff cutter; ram lamb technology; fodder technology var.CO- 4 series were some of interventions carried out in the villages in participatory mode. CRIDA - Newsletter 3 Unreaped Yield Potentials of Major Rainfed Crops A Decision Support System (DSS) has been developed which can be hosted online. The DSS accommodates 15 rainfed crops. For a selected crop and district, the DSS identifies model district having agro-climatic features similar to target district and provides potential yield achieved by model district. It further explores the scope for bridging the yield gap with adoption of HYVs and proper nutrient management. Some validation checks were incorporated for nutrient use. Testing is being done for hosting the application on CRIDA server. Yield efficiency of a district was assessed under rainfed conditions by building a composite index. The index was built by combining crop-wise efficiencies (20 crops) using area sown under a crop as weight. There were 60 districts which have potential for doubling of yield under rainfed production system. Scientific Activities Orientation Workshop on Drought Management An Orientation Workshop on "Drought Management in Odisha" at Watershed Mission Building, Bhubaneswar was organized on 7th July, 2017 by Department of Agriculture and Farmers' Empowerment, Govt. of Odisha, involving all line departments. The workshop was attended by Director, CRIDA and Scientist representatives from CRIDA, IIWM and OUA&T. The meeting was chaired by Smt. Sujata Kartikeyan, Commissioner cum Director, Odisha Watershed Development Mission. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Acting Director, ICAR-CRIDA in his opening remarks, appraised the delegates about short, medium and long-term action plans of Drought management to be taken up and role of various stakeholders in carrying out the MoU. Two presentations were made, first by Dr. P. Vijaya Kumar, ICARCRIDA on the detailed approach for drought management and the other by Dr. G. Kar of ICAR-IIWM on Mitigation Strategies. Deliberations were made on identification of blocks which are vulnerable to drought based on data available for selected parameters. Further, stress on inclusion of socio-economic parameters was laid, as Odisha is lagging behind in these aspects though it has better natural resources. A core group was formed to work out the methodology of prioritizing blocks for drought management. Smt. Sujata suggested for development of detailed technical programme for the selected blocks at the earliest to initiate the activities and also for monitoring and evaluation of the Programme by ICAR and SAU. Institute Advisory Committee (IAC) Meeting under Farmers FIRST Project Institute Advisory Committee (IAC) under Farmers FIRST Project was conducted on 26th July, 2017 at ICAR-CRIDA, under the chairmanship of Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICARCRIDA in the presence of Dr. Y.G. Prasad, Director, ICAR-ATARI (Zone-X), Smt. S.V. Bharati, ADA, Vikarabad Dist., Ms. Vijayanti, HO, Parigi division, Dr. G. Nirmala, PI and all Co-PIs of the Farmers FIRST Project. A brief presentation on activities of project was made by Dr. G. Nirmala, PI which included the progress of work done and action plans for the year 2017-18. Some suggestions made by official includes to sum up each parameter of survey of 400 households in 4 villages, establishment of fodder bank, seed bank and IFS module in each village. Orientation Workshop on Drought Management in Odisha Institute Advisory Committee (IAC) under Farmer FIRST Project Interface Meeting on Agriculture Contingencies An interface meeting was organised on 8th August, 2017 at ICARCRIDA, Hyderabad, to assess the prevailing crop condition due CRIDA - Newsletter 4 to deficient rains in Telangana state under the chairmanship of Sri Parthasarathi, Agriculture Prin. Secretary, Govt of Telangana which was attended by District Level Officials and representatives of various institutes in Hyderabad. The rainfall for Southwest monsoon 2017, was predicted to be normal for the entire state. Rainfall during June month observed to be very good with majority mandals receiving normal to large excess rainfall in the state. A total of 264 mandals out of 584 mandals in the state received large excess rainfall. Only 63 mandals received deficient (59 mandals) to large deficient (4 mandals) rains in the state. Contingency measures to be taken up under the present condition were discussed. An assessment of available water in major, medium and minor tanks was also discussed. District level officials were advised to be cautious and also requested to monitor the emerging pests for cotton and other crops and requested to issue timely advisories to farmers using electronic media. Interface Meeting Standing Technical Committee (STC) Meeting of National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA). The Standing Technical Committee (STC) meeting of National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA) was held on 8th September, 2017 at ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad under the Chairmanship of Dr.K. Sammi Reddy, Chairman, STC & Director, ICARCRIDA. Sri B.V.N. Rao, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare gave a brief on the importance of the pilot research projects being implemented by the various ICAR institutes sanctioned under NMSA. The committee reviewed these projects and suggested to develop Climate Resilient Farming System models. The committee advised to develop a withdrawal strategy for maintenance of assets created under the project and the outcome of the projects should indicate how the interventions of the project would contribute towards the vision of doubling of the farmers' income and reducing the risk due to extreme climate events. Hindi Fortnight Celebration The Hindi Fortnight was organized from 1-14 September, 2017. On this occasion Hindi Noting Drafting, Hindi-English technical, terminology, Hindi competitions and many others were organized. Winners were awarded with cash prizes on the concluding day by Director, CRIDA. Hindi Fortnight Celebration Dr.K.Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting) visited various experimental plots during Field IRC Field Institute Research Council (IRC) Meeting Field Institute Research Council (IRC) Meeting for 2017-18 was held on 21st September, 2017 at Gunegal Research Farm (GRF) and 27th September, 2017 at Hayathnagar Research Farm (HRF) under the chairmanship of Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting). The chairman IRC, Dr.K.Sammi Reddy, Project coordinators, Heads of Divisions/Sections and scientists visited various experiments and discussed thoroughly on various treatment effects. Various suggestions like displaying of the experimental and treatment boards at the experimental site, periodical Meeting in progress CRIDA - Newsletter 5 monitoring of soil moisture in CA related experiments, correlation of rainfall amount, rainy days and crop were made in Field IRC. Quinquennial Review Team (QRT) Meeting A two-day Quinquennial Review Team (QRT) meeting was organized at ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad during 20-21 December, 2017 under the Chairmanship of Dr. J.C. Katyal, Former VC, HAU, Hisar & Ex. DDG (Edn.), ICAR. The meeting was attended by Dr. V.M. Mayande, Former VC, PDKV, Akola; Dr. A. M. Shekh, Former VC, AAU Anand; Dr. V.S. Korikanthimath, Former Director, ICAR-CCARI, Goa; Dr. S.D.Gorantiwar, Head, (Dept. of IDE), MPKV, Rahuri and Dr. Rajender Parsad, Principal Scientist, ICAR-IASRI. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, in his welcome address briefed the members about historical background of the institute, organizational structure, achievements in brief. The QRT members appreciated the efforts of ICAR- CRIDA and recommended inter-divisional approach for carrying out research. An interaction session was also organized with the scientists of the institute. QRT meeting in progress Interaction session with scientists Technology Transfer Exposure Visit under Farmers FIRST Project An exposure visit was conducted for nearly 80 farmers from Devononiguda and Rakamcherla villages of Pudur cluster, Vikarabad district, Telangana state on 30th August, 2017 to expose the farmers to the horticulture exhibition which has been organized at Peoples plaza, Necklace road, Hyderabad by the State Department of Horticulture and Sericulture, Government of Telangana. During the visit the farmers were exposed to various horticultural technologies. A technical session was arranged on horticulture schemes of department and subsidies and prospects of organic farming in vegetable cultivation, and best management in vegetables particularly chillies which is grown by the farmers. The exposure visit provided farmers an opportunity to meet promoters of organic farming, medicinal and aromatic products, Bonsai practitioners etc. Farm Implements Distribution to Tribal Farmers In the month of October, 2017 two programmes were organized in Kothwalguda cluster of Adilabad district and another in Yellamma thanda cluster of Rangareddy district (27th October, 2017) to create awareness among tribal farmers and to distribute improved implements to the farmers, in the awareness programme organized in Rangareddy district. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting) emphasized the need of various improved implements and machinery and presented machines to the selected beneficiaries. CRIDA Farm machinery team under the guidance of Dr. I. Srinivas conducted demonstrations to farming community. Participation of Farmers in National Workshop Farmers from Pudur cluster under FFP project participated in 'A National Workshop on Doubling Farmers Income' from 22-23 December, 2017 at ICAR-NAARM. Feedback and suggestions on technology generation and dissemination for doubling farmers' income were provided to Telangana farmers during the meet. Dr. K.Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting) distributing power sprayers to farmers of Rangareddy Cluster Adilabad cluster village farmers display power sprayers received from CRIDA Participation of farmers in National Workshop Mera Gaon Mera Gaurav (MGMG) Activities Teams of Scientists from CRIDA have visited villages of Adilabad and Rangareddy districts in Telangana state under MGMG programme during July to December, 2017. During the period the following activities were undertaken in the programme: CRIDA - Newsletter 6 Districts Villages Activities Adilabad Seetagondi gram panchayat: Chinna Malkapur, Pedda Malkapur, Kothwalguda and Garkampet Demonstration and distribution of ten 5-hp pump sets and power sprayers to eligible beneficiaries, acquired under TSP plan Rangareddy Yellammathanda, Dadipalli thanda, Venkateswarthanda and Rangapur Distribution of power sprayers Nalgonda Kothathanda, Boringthanthanda, Lakma thanda Voice based Agro-advisries National Nutrition Week Celebration ICAR - KVK, Ranga Reddy district, CRIDA organized National Nutrition Week from 1 - 7 September, 2017 in the KVK adopted villages Narrepally and Gummadivelli. The theme of the event envisaged by the Govt. of India was "Better health and Improved diet in Infants and children". In Narrepally village, the programme was conducted on 6th September, 2017, where about 200 farm women, farmers and Anganwadi teachers attended the programme. Dr. V. Maruthi, Head KVK emphasized the traditional diets, their importance in nutrition to rural women. Smt. Shantisree, ICDS CDPO and chief guest presented a detailed picture of Nutritional programme for women nutritive value of synthetic diets nutritional disorders etc. In Gummadivelli, Kandukur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District the National Nutrition Week was celebrated on 7th September, 2017. Around 200 farm women attended the programme. Sri M.Babu Sarpanch, Sri Rameshwara Rao, District Training Officer, Zilla Parishad, Smt. Shobana CDPO, Kandukur mandal participated in the programme as Chief guests. Nutritional aspects of farm women and nutrition requirements were the topics of discussion during the programme. Field Day on Usage of Agricultural Implements ICAR-CRIDA KVK has conducted field day and an awareness programme on usage of agricultural Implements in field demonstrations on 18th September, 2017 at Gummadivelly village, Kandukur mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Dr. V. Maruthi, Head, KVK briefed the farmers on the need to adopt mechanization in all operations for cost reduction and yield enhancement with different implements and other technologies. Dr. B. Sanjeeva Reddy, Principal Scientist and OIC of farm Implements ICARCRIDA emphasized on CRIDA developed implements usage and availability. Er S. Vijayakumar, SMS (Agricultural Engineering), organized 30 field demonstrations in two villages with seedcum-fertilizer planter and the performance of demonstrated farmer fields with comparison to farmers' method and was found to be effective. About 67 farmers participated in the field day programme from two villages Gummadavelly and Kolanguda villages. The Farmers were educated on the improved production technologies through interactions and brochure prepared in local language. An exhibition was also arranged during this occasion to exhibit different agricultural implements developed from ICARCRIDA. Technology Week Technology week was organised at KVK-Ranga Reddy, ICARCRIDA, Hyderabad during 14-16 October, 2017. On the first day Dr.V.Maruthi, Head, KVK and Principal Scientist chaired the event and the Chief Guest of the day was Er.M.Mallikarjuna Swamy, State Technical Expert, State Level Nodal Agency, PMKSY and WDC, Telangana State, Guest of Honour was Dr.K.Dattatri, Principal Scientist, ICAR-ATARI, Hyderabad. Exhibitions were organized on farm machinery, livestock medicines, feed mixtures, bio-products, micro-irrigation, fodder cafeteria, books and literature on agriculture. National Women Farmers' Day National Women Farmers' Day (Mahila Kisan Divas) was organized by Krishi Vigyan Kendra, CRIDA on 15.10.2017 at Hayathnagar Research Farm with the participation of 250 women farmers from Ranga Reddy district. Dr. V. Maruthi, Head, KVK and Principal Scientist briefed the importance of the day and women's role in agriculture. Dr. K. Uma Maheswari, Head, PGRC, PJTSAU in her lecture discussed about the problems faced by women in farm activities. Dr. Sarah Kamala, Professor, AICRP (H.Sc.) discussed the issues related to drudgery reduction technologies for farm women, farm women's role and problems in agriculture. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA, Chief Guest of the programme addressed the women farmers by highlighting the KVK role in women empowerment, drudgery management and nutritional aspects. Dr. Y.G. Prasad, Director, ICAR-ATARI, Guest of Honour in his address sought the farmers to utilize the services of KVK by women farmers related to nutrition garden, drudgery equipment, trainings on farm and nonfarm activities. Live demonstrations, exhibits, technical sessions and farmer interactions with the experts were organized. National womens day celebration at CRIDA-KVK. CRIDA - Newsletter 7 National Agriculture Education Day ICAR-CRIDA celebrated National Agriculture Education Day on 3rd December, 2017 by organizing essay writing competitions for Class VIII & IX students and painting competitions for Class VI & VII students to mark the birth anniversary of first President of Independent India and Union Minister of Agriculture, Bharat Ratna (Late) Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Total 36 students from 12 different Kendriya Vidyalaya Schools located in Hyderabad and Secunderabad participated in the competitions. Dr. R.Nagarjuna Kumar, Scientist, briefed about the celebrations of Nation Agriculture Education Day. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA distributed prizes to the winners. In his address, he advised the students to choose agriculture science as a career option and also said that agriculture as a discipline which has huge opportunities and awareness of this has to be created through such science based programmes. oriented the farmers about soil testing facility, procedure of soil sample collection, analysis and usage of recommendations for higher crop yields. Sri. Pentaiah, Village Sarpanch thanked the CRIDA efforts in preparation and distribution of soil health cards and requested for similar cooperation and support in future. CRIDA scientists and extension functionaries from Agriculture department and Horticulture department interacted with the farmers. 140 Soil Health Cards were distributed with the crop related recommendations to the farmers of Rakamcharla, Tirumalapur and Devanoniguda villages of Pudur cluster under Farmers' First Project. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA explained the usage of Soil Health Cards and its National Agriculture Education Day Celebration World Soil Day Celebration at Rakamcharla Village KVK-CRIDA celebrated Agriculture Education Day on 3rd December, 2017 at KVK, Hayathnagar Research Farm. A batch of 164 school children from Ravindrabharathi School and St. Patrick School of 8th -10th standard actively participated. These school children were exposed to live field crops technologies, fodder cafeteria, farm mechanization, agricultural implements, livestock demonstrations etc. and also emphasized the importance of soil health status for agriculture crops and importance of soil by demonstration of soil testing in the laboratory. A debate competition on "Importance of organic Agriculture" was organized for students. Dr. V. Maruthi, Head, KVK and Principal Scientist and KVK staff interacted with children on various issues concerned to Agriculture education, followed by the distribution of appreciation certificates for the winners. World Soil Day Celebrations ICAR-CRIDA celebrate World Soil Day on 5th December, 2017 at Rakamcharla village, Pudur Mandal, Vikarabad district under the Chairmanship of Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICARCRIDA, Hyderabad. Around 200 farmers from the villages of Pudur cluster attended the Soil Health Card distribution program. Dr. G.Nirmala, Principal Scientist, Head, TOT welcomed the participants and explained the objectives of the programme. Shri Ram Mohan, Agricultural Officer from the Agriculture department World soil day celebration at CRIDA-KVK interpretation for effective nutrient management for sustainable crop yields. On this occasion farm literature on "Soil Health Cards", "Soil and Water Conservation measures" and "Nursery raising through portrays" were released by the dignitaries. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy along with CRIDA scientists reviewed the progress of Farmers FIRST project activities during the field visit. World Soil Day was celebrated by conducting programme in one of the KVK adopted villages: Nagireddipalli, Nawabpet Mandal on 5.12.2017. Honorable MLA Sh. K. Yadaiah, Chevella Assembly Constituency participated in the programme along with other local representatives, government officials, NGOs and 188 farmers and farm women. Expert lecture by Dr. K. Srinivas, Principal Scientist (Soil Science), ICAR-CRIDA was arranged on soil health, nutrient management and soil test based recommendations to the farmers. Dr. V. Maruthi, Head, KVK and Principal Scientist briefed the importance of world soil day to the farmers. Hon'ble MLA distributed few soil health cards to the farmers from 4 villages. Pledge on Soil Day was also taken. Video message was displayed. A total of 300 soil health cards were distributed. Exhibits on soil testing kit, bio-fertilizers and fodder were also arranged. CRIDA - Newsletter 8 News from AICRPs Farmers-Scientists Interaction Meeting AICRPDA Centre, Rakh Dhiansar organized Farmers-Scientists interaction meeting in AICRPDA-NICRA village Khaner, District Samba on 26th November, 2017. Dr K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA, Dr. G. Ravindra Chary Project Coordinator (AICRPDA), Dr. S. K. Dhyani, Principal Scientist, NRM Division ICAR, Dr. J. P. Sharma, Director of Research and other officials from SKUAST-Jammu, Scientists from AICRPDA centres, Rakh Dhiansar, Ballowal Saunkhri and farmers from the AICRPDA-NICRA villages Khaner and Dangervala participated in the meeting. Farmers appreciated the real-time contingency measures to cope-up with weather aberrations and farmers emphasized on farm mechanization in rainfed crops. Brainstorming Session on "Automation of Agromet Advisory Services" A meeting of scientists from IMD, AICRPAM and ICAR-CRIDA was organized on 3rd August, 2017 at ICAR-CRIDA. The meeting was chaired by Dr. K. J. Ramesh, Director General, IMD, in which Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA, Dr. P. Vijaya Kumar, PCAICRPAM and other scientists from IMD, AICRPAM Unit and Farmers-Scientists interaction in the AICRPDA-NICRA village AICRPAM Annual Working Group meeting National Innovations in Climate Resilient Agriculture (NICRA) Annual Action Plan and Review Workshop of NICRA-KVKs Annual action plan and review workshop of NICRA-KVK's of various ATARI Zones were conducted in July, 2017 to review the progress in 2017- 18 and to discuss and finalize the action plan for 2018-19. The meetings captured the salient achievements and success stories from technology demonstrations in NICRA adopted villages. Dr. JVNS Prasad, Co-PI, TDC-NICRA emphasized about the approaches for scaling up of the proven resilient practices in the NICRA villages which is to be adopted in the next phase of NICRA in various workshops. Various suggestions were given to make the NICRA-KVK's achievements visible to other farmers and stakeholders. NICRA-KVK's of the zone presented from three AICRPAM centers attended and discussed about the collaboration between AICRPAM and IMD in preparation and dissemination of Agromet advisories. AICRPAM Annual Working Group Meeting The Annual working group meeting of AICRP on Agrometeorology was held at Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agriculture Sciences & Technology (SKUAST) Jammu, Chatha during 27th-29th November, 2017 to evaluate the research progress made during Kharif 2016 and Rabi 2016-17. All the scientists from AICRPAM Unit and cooperating centers participated. The center-wise progress of AICRPAM was reviewed under each individual research theme. QRT member Dr. AM Shekh and other invited experts have provided their valuable suggestions. Training to IMD Scientist In a series of trainings to IMD scientists, Dr. (Mrs.) Lata Bishnoi was trained under AICRPAM, ICAR-CRIDA in Agrometeorology from 21-08-2017 to 8-09-2017. Brainstorming meeting on Automation of Agromet Advisory CRIDA - Newsletter 9 the consolidated achievements of the NICRA programme in the last 6 years and the action plan for the next year. Details of the Annual Action Plan and Review Workshop of NICRA-KVKs Sl.No Zones Place Date 1 Zone VIII Krishi Vigyan Kendra- Baramati (Pune) 3 July, 2017 2 Zone III ICAR-ATARI, Jodhpur 5 July, 2017 3 Zone V ICAR-ATARI, Kolkata 12 July, 2017 4 Zone VI College of Veterinary Sciences, Assam Agricultural University, Khanapara, Guwahati 10-11 July, 2017 5 Zone X ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad 13 July, 2017 6 Zone XI ICAR-ATARI, Bengaluru 29 July, 2017 Expert committee meeting in progress resilient agriculture, Up-scaling farm machinery custom hiring centres in India: A policy paper, "Roots of rainfed crops and Issues and remedies in rainfed farming" (in Hindi) were released by the Hon'ble DG, ICAR. Glimpses of Annual Action Plan cum Review Workshops Expert Committee to Review the Research Projects A two-day NICRA Expert Committee meeting was organized at NASC, New Delhi during 23rd-24th October, 2017.Dr. T. Mohapatra, Secretary, DARE and DG, ICAR in his address set the road map for next phase of NICRA with outputs that have impact at national level. Progress of 13 ongoing projects from Competitive Grants and two projects under Sponsored component were reviewed under the Chairmanship of Dr. K. Alagusundaram, DDG (NRM) and co-chaired by Dr. S Bhaskar, ADG (AAF & CC). Dr. K Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad presented the overview of progress under NICRA under CG and Sponsored components so far and the need for thorough monitoring of the progress by the expert committee. For each project a subcommittee of relevant members from NICRA Expert Committee was formed to mentor and monitor the progress of the projects. The committee deliberated on the identification of themes for inviting new proposals under Competitive Grants component for the next phase of NICRA. On this occasion, four publications from ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad viz., Farm innovations in climate ZMC visit at Kendrapara ZMC visit at Jharsaguda Zonal Monitoring Committee (ZMC) Visits Zonal monitoring committee's visits to various zones were organized to review the technical progress of different modules like NRM, crop production, livestock & fishery and institutional interventions in NICRA villages and for making appropriate suggestions for improvement. Details of ZMC visits during 2017-18 Sl. No Name of the ATARI Name of the KVK Date Name of the participating Member from CRIDA 1 Kolkata Kendrapara, Jharsuguda 31October - 1November, 2017 Dr. M. Osman 2 Barapani Ri-Bhoi and Imphal East 23-24 November, 2017 Dr. JVNS. Prasad 3 Hyderabad Nalgonda & Khammam 12-13 December, 2017 Dr. I. Srinivas, Dr. G. Pratibha 4 Patna Buxar, Jehanabad and Aurangabad 13-15 December, 2017 Dr. S.K. Bal, Dr. D.B.V. Ramana 5 Jodhpur Sirsa, Yamunangar 21-23 December, 2017 Dr. S.K. Yadav, Dr. K. Nagasree CRIDA - Newsletter 10 Important Visitors Visit of Dr. K. Alagusundaram DDG (NRM), ICAR Dr. K. Alagusundaram, Deputy Director General (NRM) has visited ICAR-CRIDA on 16th August, 2017 to review the research activities and oversee the completion of Climate Research Facilities (FATE, CTGC and SCADA) at Hayatnagar Research Farm (HRF). Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting) along with Project Coordinators, Heads of Divisions/Sections, other Scientists, staff of Administration and Finance have accompanied the DDG to HRF. The DDG (NRM) expressed his satisfaction Dr.K.A Lagusundaram, Deputy Director General (NRM) Interacting with Scientists about the progress made in installation of Climate Research Facilities. He visited the farm machinery workshop and gave valuable suggestions for improving the workshop facilities. Canadian Delegation Visit to ICAR-CRIDA Canadian delegation visited ICAR-CRIDA on 17th November, 2017. The team interacted with the Director and Scientists of the institute. The team got acquainted with the technologies developed by the institute displayed in Dryland Gallery and were exposed to various research facilities present at CRIDA. Visits Abroad Dr. D.B.V. Ramana participated in the International Conference on Recent Advances in Animal Nutrition (RAAN) held at School of Environmental and Rural Science, University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales, Australia from 25-27, October, 2017 under 2015 Norman E. Borlaug International Agricultural Science and Technology Fellowship Programme (Borlaug Fellowship) of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Dr. D.B.V. Ramana participated in the Recent Advances in Animal Nutrition (RAAN) conference Agricultural service, USA. The purpose of the visit was to get exposed to the recent advances in animal nutrition and had dialogue with mentor for possible future research linkages. Human Resource Development Training Programme on Efficient Watershed Management in Rainfed Agriculture A five day training programme on "Efficient Watershed Management in Rainfed Agriculture" sponserd by watershed development department, Govt. of Karnataka was organized at ICAR-CRIDA from 19-23 September, 2017. Twelve officials from the Karnataka agriculture departments participated in the programme. The training covered various aspects of soil and water conservation, water harvesting, farm machineries along Participants of the training programme Canadian delegation visit to ICAR-CRIDA CRIDA - Newsletter 11 with field visits and practical exposure to the water harvesting structures. Dr. K. Ravi Shankar, PS, TOT was the course director for the training course. Model Training Course on Participatory Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Agricultural Productivity in Rainfed areas Model Training Course on "Participatory Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Agricultural Productivity in Rainfed areas" sponsored by DOE was organised at CRIDA during October 4-11, 2017. Fifteen officials from eight different states viz., Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Goa, Punjab and Karnataka attended the model training course. The course covered focus on various technologies for sustainable NRM, horticulture systems in rainfed agriculture, enhancing productivity of crops and cropping systems through effective use of natural resources, farming systems approach, role of livestock and their management for enhancing productivity and income in drylands, gender mainstreaming, communication tools and techniques for sustainable NRM. Dr. K. Nagasree, Principal Scientist was the course director for the training programme. Participants of the training programme Training Programme on Farm Mechanization under CRP-Farm Mechanization and Precision Farming The programme was organized by the ICAR-CRIDA under CRP-Farm Mechanization and Precision Farming in association with KVK, RR District for TSP farmers on 27th October, 2017 at Yellamma Thanda village, Manchal Manda, Rangareddy District. The participants were addressed by Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), B. Venkteswar Rao, ADA, Alair Reddy District, Smt. G. Jayamma, MPP, Mr. Jagadeswar, village Sarpanch and ICARCRIDA Staff. The participants explained about the importance of farm mechanization in agriculture. Different farm machinery viz. manual weeder, six row multi crop CRIDA planter, bed planter cum herbicide applicator, bullock drawn weeder etc. were demonstrated. Around 200 farmers were trained from Yellamma Thanda village. The trainees were imparted skills in operation of different crop based agricultural implements. ICAR Short course on Tools on Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment of Rainfed Technologies and Development Programmes ICAR Sponsored Short course on "Tools on Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment of Rainfed Technologies and Development Programmes" was conducted for 10 days from 1-10 November, 2017 at ICAR-CRIDA. Dr. Y. G. Prasad, Director, ATARI (Zone-X) was the Guest of Honour for the inaugural session. Dr. Y. G. Prasad addressed the participants about the importance of Tools on Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment of Rainfed Technologies. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), ICAR-CRIDA highlighted significance of M&E for impact assessment of rainfed technologies in the context of doubling farmers' income. Dr. G. Nirmala, Principal Scientist and Course Director briefed the objectives of the short course. During the ten days of short course, the participants were familiarized with topics like concepts and principles of M&E, results-based management, theory of change, protocols for organic livestock interventions, impact assessment of KVK, IWDP and agricultural development programmes. Inaugural session of the short course Participants of the training programmes ICAR-Sponsored Training Program for ICAR Technical Staff ICAR-sponsored training program on 'Agrometeorological Data Collection, Analysis and Management' for ICAR technical staff was organized at ICAR-CRIDA during 11-23 December, 2017. All the trainees were exposed to various agro-climatic analysis techniques, and on hands on practicals. Besides these, they were exposed to national and international institutes where the Agrometeorological research is going on through field visits. CRIDA - Newsletter 12 Capacity Building Activities of Farmers Training on Crop Colonies and Soil Health Management in Horticulture Crops Department of Horticulture, Telangana and KVK-CRIDA organized the training programme on "Crop colonies and soil health management in horticulture crops for sustainable net returns" organized at Center of Excellence, Govt. of Telangana, Jeedimetla, Medchal on 8th September, 2017. About 150 practicing farmers from Ibrahimpatnam cluster attended the training. Sri. S. Parthasarathi, IAS, APC & Secretary to Govt.Agriculture & Cooperation, Government of Telangana, Sri L. Venkatram Reddy, Commissioner of Horticulture (FAC), Government of Telangana and department officials interacted with farmers and visited the fields. Importance of soil testing, procedures for soil sampling, soil test based fertilizer recommendations, vulnerability of small and marginal farmers in rain-fed/dryland areas, integrated farming with agri-horti-animal husbandry for sustainable net income, crop diversification, inter crops/mixed cropping, strip cropping, trap crops, boarder crops, sticky traps, pheromone traps, water traps etc were also demonstrated. Pest Management and Vegetable Cultivation in Nawabpet Mandal of Vikarabad Division (Kesavapalli and Thimmaredy palli villages). Dr. SM Vidya sekhar and Sh. G. Sri Krishna from KVK-CRIDA, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana, Sh. Nagabrahma Chari, CEO of Seed NGO and Village Sarpanch along with 67 farmers participated in the programme. The soil test based fertilizer recommendations were given to 200 farmers for crops like Rice, Cotton, Redgram, Maize, Vegetables and soil health management aspects were explained to farmers by Dr. S.M. Vidya Sekhar, KVK during the training programme. Around 200 soil health cards prepared by KVK were distributed to farmers of the two villages. Integrated Pest Management of Cotton and Redgram crops were covered and the farmers were given the demonstration of inputs of pheromone traps with lures for Pink bollworm, Helicoverpa, Spodoptera for Cotton and Redgram and bio-fertilizers, Trichoderma etc. Training Programme on Soil Health Management, IPM and Vegetable Cultivation An off-campus training programme in collaboration with SEED NGO under the sponsorship of NABARD was organized on 14th September, 2017 on Soil Health Management, Integrated Participants of the training programme Off-campus training on "Soil Health Management and IPM" Training on "Crop colonies and Soil health management" Training on Good Horticultural Practices in Tuber Crops KVK, ICAR-CRIDA conducted on-campus training on Good horticultural Practices in Tuber crops suitable for Ranga Reddy district farmers on 29th November, 2017 at KVK, CRIDA. About 42 vegetable growers and KVK staff attended the programme. Dr. D.Anitha Kumari, Scientist (Entomology) VRS, SKLTSHU explained about suitable major tuber crops viz. Colacasia, Sweet potato and Yam with reference to improved varieties, climate, soil characters, seed rate, spacing, planting methods, weeding, irrigation, fertilizers, pest, disease management, harvesting and yield. GHPs like Bio-fertilizers, Bio-control agents, plant derivatives, Raised bed cultivation, Use of Drip irrigation, Adaptation of Fertigation, Need based Micronutrient foliar sprays, trap crops, Boarder crops, sticky traps, pheromone traps, water traps etc. which will reduce the cost of cultivation were demonstrated. CRIDA - Newsletter 13 Forthcoming Events Sl. No. Title of the event Duration 1 26th Meeting of RAC at ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad January 11-12, 2018 2 International training on Strategies for Enhancement of Farmers Income in Dryland Agriculture" under the program Feed the Future - India Triangular Training (FTF-ITT) January 16-30, 2018 3 Republic Day January 26, 2018 4 XVI Working Group Meeting of AICRPDA at AICRPDA centre, Jagdalpur February 1-5, 2018 5 International Training programme on Rainwater Management for Climate Resilient Agriculture in Dryland under India-Africa Forum Summit-III February 15 - March 07, 2018 6 CRIDA Foundation Day April 12, 2018 7 IRC meeting April/May, 2018 8 World Environment Day June 5, 2018 For further details please visit the website : www.crida.in Participation in Seminars and Symposia Name of the scientist Workshops/seminars/meetings/symposia Duration Venue K. Sammi Reddy Chaired the Thematic Session-5 on Climate Resilient Agriculture in the 3rd World Congress on Disaster Management Nov 7, 2017 Visakhapatnam, AP Delivered a lecture in Summer School on "Recent Advances in Abiotic Stress Management in Climate Smart Agriculture" Sep 15, 2017 NIASM, Baramati, Maharashtra Attended World Bank aided Project meeting on Climate Resilient Agriculture (POCRA) and to give inputs regarding the effective dissemination Sep 22-23, 2017 World Trade Centre, Mumbai, Maharashtra Attended Interactive Seminar on the foresight – Agrimonde – Terre : 2050 The Indian Perspective Dec 7, 2017 NASC, New Delhi Attended International Groundwater Conference and delivered a keynote address Dec 11, 2017 New Delhi C.A.Ramarao Zonal Review and Progress Workshop for KVKs of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Maharashtra July 13, 2017 ICAR-ATARI, CRIDA, Hyderabad Workshop on 'Green Revolution in Eastern India: Constraints, opportunities and way forward' organized by IFPRI & TCI Oct 9-10, 2017 NASC, New Delhi 77th Annual Conference of the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics. Oct 12–14, 2017 CGPS, CAU, Umiam, Barapani Silver Jubilee Conference of Agricultural Economics Research Association on "Doubling farmers' income : Options & Strategies" Nov 7-9, 2017 ICAR-NAARM, Hyderabad Planning Workshop on Research Impact Assessment Nov 13, 2017 ICAR-NIAP, New Delhi C.A.Ramarao, V.Girija Veni International Seminar on 'Global climatic change : Implication for agriculture and water sectors' organized by VNMKV, Parbhani Dec 14 -16, 2017 WALMI, Aurangabad B.M.K.Raju ICAR, DAC and Dept. of Agriculture, Govt. of Telangana Interaction Meeting on 'Kharif 2017 Agriculture Scenario Assessment and Contingency Plan Preparation for Telangana' Aug 8, 2017. ICAR-CRIDA, Hyderabad R. Nagarjunakumar National conference on "Technological Challenges in Social, Environmental and Agricultural Reforms" Sep 9-10, 2017 ICAR-IIRR, Rajendra-nagar, Hyderabad International Conference on Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences Oct 23 -25, 2017 PJTSAU, Hyderabad Er. Ashish S Dhimate Workshop on "Advanced Farm Mechanization: Crop Sector" Sept 25-29, 2017 NIRDPR, Hyderabad CRIDA - Newsletter 14 Awards and Recognition AICRPDA-Ananthapuramu centre received "ICAR-Vasantrao Naik Award for Outstanding Research and Application in Dryland Farming Systems 2016" during ICAR Foundation Day and Award Ceremony on 16th July, 2017 at NASC, New Delhi. Dr. R.Nagarjuna Kumar, Scientist was awarded the best Ph.D. Thesis award and best paper award for the paper "Mobile Applications : Shaping the future of agricultural extension and advisory services" presented during the National conference on "Technological Challenges in Social, Environmental and Agricultural Reforms" organized at ICAR-IIRR, Hyderabad during 9-10, September, 2017. Ms B. Saraswati won 1st Prize in session on "Creativity and Innovation for excellence" and 3rd prize in session on "Effective Media Communication Skills" in training programme on "Enhancing Efficiency and Behavioral Skills for Stenographers Receiving Award at ICAR-IIRR, Hyderabad Grade III, PAs, PSs, & Sr. PPSs" of ICAR organized at ICARNAARM, Hyderabad during 25-31 October, 2017 Dr. Ravi Shankar received the Young Scientist Award-2017 from Indian Society of Extension Education, New Delhi at the ISEE National Seminar on "Doubling Farmers' Income and Farm Production through Skill Development and Technology Application" organized by the Department of Extension Education, Bihar Agricultural University, Sabour and Indian Society of Extension Education, New Delhi at Sabour, Bihar during 28-30 November, 2017. Mr. G. Venkatesh, Scientist (Senior Scale) awarded with the Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Science and Technology by the Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad on 15th July, 2017. Mr. AVM Subba Rao, Sr. Scientist was awarded Doctor of Philosophy on 12th December, 2017. Personnel Information Appointments/Promotions/Transfers/Joining Name and Designation Transferred/Joined/Promoted/Appointed Date w.e.f Dr. S.K. Bal, Principal Scientist (Agrometeorology) Transferred from ICAR - NIASM, Baramati, Pune 01.07. 2017 Dr. T. V. Prasad, Principal Scientist (Entomology) Transferred from ICAR-NBPGR, New Delhi 07.07.2017 Mr. Rajkumar Dhakar, Scientist (Agril. Physics) Joined back in ICAR-CRIDA after Ph.D. at ICAR-IARI, New Delhi. 01.08.2017 Shri. Ravi Dudpal, Scientist (Agril.Econ.) Transferred to ICAR-IISWC Research Centre, Bellari 28.09.2017 Ms. Sneha Verghese, Assistant Appointed in ICAR-CRIDA 07.12.2017 Shri. Putta Santosh Appointed in ICAR-CRIDA 06.09.2017 Promotions Dr. T. V. Prasad Sr. Scientist - Principal Scientist 17.06.2015 Shri. D. Sudheer STO - Assistant Chief Technical Officer 16.10.2015 Shri. Sri Krishna STO - Assistant Chief Technical Officer 28.12.2015 Receiving Young Scientist Award at Sabour, Bihar Name and Designation Transferred/Joined/Promoted/Appointed Date w.e.f Shri. I. R. Khandgond STO - Assistant Chief Technical Officer 16.10.2015 Smt. P. Laxmi Narasamma ACTO - Chief Technical Officer 01.07.2014 Shri. S. Srinivas Reddy ACTO - Chief Technical Officer 01.01.2014 Smt. Vidyadhari ACTO - Chief Technical Officer 01.07.2016 Smt. V. L. Savithri STO - Assistant Chief Technical Officer 01.07.2016 Shri. Manish Tomar Tech. Asst. - Sr. Technical Assistant 16.03.2017 Shri. Hemant Sahu Tech. Asst. - Sr. Technical Assistant 21.03.2017 Shri. P. Satish Tech. Asst. - Sr. Technical Assistant 02.03.2017 Shri. P. Ramakrishna Tech. Asst. - Sr. Technical Assistant 08.04.2016 CRIDA - Newsletter 15 Oath taking ceremony on Sadbhavana Diwas Independence Day Celebration The 71st Independence Day was celebrated on 15th August, 2017 with pride, patriotic zeal and gratitude towards the sacrifices of our freedom fighters. The Director hoisted the flag and addressed the staff of CRIDA. On this occasion Director distributed cash awards (CCS&CCRC) to the X class toppers of CRIDA staff children and motivated the staff with his message to work with dedication and boost institute's growth. Cultural and Welfare Activities Independence Day Celebration Name and Designation Transferred/Joined/Promoted/Appointed Date w.e.f Shri. Prem Kumar STO - Asst. Chief Technical Officer (Retired) 01.01.2011 Smt. D. Kalpana Assistant - Assistant Administrative Officer 30.12.2017 Shri. J. Mallesh & Shri. Ch. Balaiah Granted MACP from level 3 to level 4 28.07.2017 Smt. Avula Lalitha Granted MACP from level 2 to level 3 11.07.2014 Our hearty congratulations to all of them Sadbhavana Diwas "Sadbhavana Diwas" was observed on 18th August, 2017. Accordingly, a pledge taking ceremony was held on 18th August, 2017. Swachhta Hi Seva "Swachhta Hi Seva" was organized at ICAR-CRIDA during 14th September to 2nd October, 2017. The inaugural day started with oath by all the staff and various activities were carried out under "Swachhta Hi Seva". All the staff participated in the event for Retirements Name Designation Date of superannuation Mr. E. Ravindranath STO 31.11.2017 Shri. Bandari Sathaiah SSS 31.08.2017 Shri. Sama Sathi Reddy SSS 31.07.2017 Shri. P.Srinivasa Rao Assistant 31.07.2017 Our best wishes for happy and peaceful retired life to all of them Glimpses of Swachhta Hi Seva South Zone Sports Meet ICAR-CRIDA contingent participated in ICAR South Zone Sports Meet held at ICAR-Sugarcane Breeding Institute, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu from 9-13 October, 2017. Mr. Mukund, Technical Assistant secured 2nd place in 1500 meters cycle race. Vanamahostavam CRIDA Cultural and Recreation Club organized Vana Mahostavam at Hayathnagar Research Farm of the Institute on 28th October, 2017. All the CRIDA staff members actively participated in the cultural activities. The events generated great enthusiasm and unity among staff. Vigilance Awareness Week "Vigilance Awareness Week" was observed from 30th October to 4th November, 2017. Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting) in his address emphasized the importance of vigilance week and suggested all the staff to be vigilant in day to day office activities. As part of vigilance awareness week Shri. B. Viswanath, Deputy Chief Vigilance Officer, South Central Railway delivered the lecture on "My Vision : Corruption Free India" on 2nd November, 2017. cleanliness in office premises and residential quarters. Trees were planted in KVK adopted village, HRF, GRF, CRIDA main office and residential complex. Samagra Swachhata Diwas Sharamadann was celebrated in KVK adopted village. CRIDA - Newsletter BOOK-POST To _______________________________________ _______________________________________ _______________________________________ Published by : Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director (Acting), CRIDA Editorial Board Chairman : Dr. K. Sammi Reddy, Director(Acting), CRIDA Editors : Dr. (Mrs.) K. Nagasree, Pr. Scientist, TOT Dr. P. K. Pankaj, Senior Scientist, TOT Dr. R. Nagarjuna Kumar, Scientist, SDA Dr. Jagriti Rohit, Scientist, TOT Dr. Anshida Beevi CN, Scientist, TOT Hindi Translation : Dr. P.K. Pankaj, Senior Scientist, TOT Dr. S.R. Yadav, Asstt. Director (OL) Shri. G. Prabhakar, STO Photo credits : Mr. K. Surender Rao, CTO, TOT देश के वर्षा आधारित क्षेत्र में कृ ों षक आय को दगुनु ा करने की नीतियां भारत में वराषा आधारित कृ षि क्षेत्रफल लगभग 53 प्रतिशत है, जो कि देश के कु ल खाद्यान्न उत्पादन में लगभग 40 प्रतिशत का योगदान देता है। दलहन का लगभग 83 प्रतिशत, मोटे अनाज का लगभग 85 प्रतिशत, तिलहनो का लगभग 70 ं प्रतिशत एवं चावल का लगभग 42 प्रतिशत क्षेत्र वराषा आधारित कृ षि क्षेत्रफल के अंतर्गत आता है। वराषा आधारित क्षेत्रों में लगभग 40 प्र त्रों तिशत मानव एवं 60 प्रतिशत पशु निवास करते हैं। वराषा आधारित कृ षि में अधिक उत्पादन को निरंतर बनाए रखना तथा आय एवं जीविकोपार्जन को प्राप्त करना बड़ा ही जटिल कार्य है। कई वराषा आधारित फसलो की उत ं ्पादकता लगभग 1 टन प्रति हके ्टेयर है। हालांकि, किसानो में प्रमुख वर ं ाषा आधारित प्रौद्योगिकियो को अपनान ं े की प्रक्रिया एवं प्रसार अभी भी काफी धीमा है जिसके परिणामस्वरूप किसानो कं े खेतो एवं ं अनुसं धान कें द्रों क्रों े बीच के उत्पादन में काफी अंतर है। दिन-प्रतिदिन कृषको हं तु े घटता कृ षि क्षेत्रफल निरंतर एवं अक्ण्ण भू षु मि निम्नीकरण, पोषक तत्वों में काफी ्वों अंतर, बढ़ती जलवायु विविधता एवं जलवायु परिवर्तन ने वराषा की कमी, सूखा एवं बाढ़ के रूप में नई चुनौतियां पैदा की हैं, जो उत्पादकता एवं लाभ को प्रभावित करती हैं। इसके अलावा, वराषा आधारित क्षेत्रों में पशुओ त्रों की आबादी अध ं िक होने के कारण पोषकतायुक्त चारे की आवश्यकता होती है लेकिन चारे की मांग एवं आपूर्ति में अंतर बढ़ता ही जा रहा है। अनुमानत: वर्ष 2025 तक, हरे चारे की कमी 65 प्रतिशत एवं सूखे चारे की कमी 25 प्रतिशत तक होने की सं भावना है। मजदूरी एवं निवेश लागतो में वृ ं द्धि के कारण किसानो की वास् ं तविक आय घटती जा रही है। कृिष से आय को दगुना करन ु े के लिए, बढ़ती आबादी की खाद्य एवं पोषक सुरक्षा की मांग को पूरा करने के अलावा, फसलो की उत ं ्पादकता में वृद्धि के साथ-साथ वराषा आधारित क्षेत्रों कत्रों े उप क्षेत्रों में पशु-पालन, मछली पालन एवं बागवानी को त्रों बढ़ावा देने की आवश्यकता है। लघु अवधि की नीति के रूप में उत्पादन अंतर को कम करने के लिए स्थान विशेष के लिए तैयार की गई वराषा आधारित प्रौद्योगिकियों पर आधारित सं साधन सं पन्न प्रक्रिया अपनानी होगी। उपयुक्त जल सं ग्रहण एवं जल के बहतर उपयोग स े े अधिक वराषा वाले क्षेत्रों सत्रों े मध्यम वराषा वाले क्षेत्रों में फसल त्रों सघनता एवं कृ षि विविधता को फार्म स्तर पर पहुंचाने हेतु समन्वयन करना होगा। कृ षि आय बढ़ाने के लिए कृ षि प्रणाली की मजबूती पर ध्यान देना, पशुपालन से आय बढ़ाना, बाजार की मुख्य सूचना का ज्ञान एवं प्रसार करना प्रमुख हैं। विशेषकर छोटे एवं सीमांत किसानो को अध ं िक आय प्राप्त करने में सक्षम करने हेतु विभिन्न उद्यमो कं े साथ िमलकर जलवायु समुत्थान समेकित कृ षि प्रणाली का उन्नयन करना अत्यावश्यक है। ICAR-Central Research Institute for Dryland Agriculture Santoshnagar, Saidabad PO, Hyderabad - 500 059 Ph: 040-24530157/161/163 Fax: 040-24531802 E-mail: news.crida@icar.gov.in Website: www.crida.in बागवानी, अधिक मूल्य वाली फसलों की संरक्षित कृ षि, वराषा आधारित फसलों के लिए मूल्य श्रंृखला का विकास, बाजार ज्ञान पर समुदायो की ं क्षमता का निर्माण, मूल्य सं वर्धन की दिशा में कौशल विकास, किसान उत्पादक दलो की ं स्थापना करतेहुए लागत में कमी लाना एवं जल तथा फसल बीमा प्रदान करने से जोखिम में कमी लाना आदि को शामिल करके अधिक मूल्य वाली फसलो एवं उत ं ्पादो पर मध् ं यम अवधि की नीति अपनाई जानी चाहिए। लंबी अवधि की टिकाऊ कृ षि के लिए मृदा जैविक कार्बन का निर्माण तथा मृदा स्वास्थ्य सुधार के लिए जैविक खाद के प्रयोग को बढ़ावा देना एवं कम कर्षण सहित फसलावशेषो कं े प्रयोग की नितांत आवश्यकता है। इन नीतियो को सभी सं बं ध ं ित पणधारियो कं े सहयोग से प्रणाली के रूप में कार्यान्वित किया जाना चाहिए ताकि देश में विभिन्न वराषा आधारित कृ षि पारिस्थितिक प्रणालियो में कृ ष ं ि आय को दगुना करन ु े के लिए मांपने योग्य एवं प्रमाणयुक्त मॉडलो की ं स्थापना की जा सके। केंद्र स्तर पर (पीएमकेएसवाई, पीएमपीकेवीवाई, एमजीएनआरईजीए, आरकेवीवाई, पीएमएफबीवाई आदि) एवं राज्य स्तर पर (कर्नाटक की कृ षि भाग्या, आंध्र प्रदेश की पंटसं जीवनी, महाराष्ट्र का पीओसीआरए, ओडिशा का सूखा प्रबं धन कार्यक्रम, तेलंगाना का टीएसएमआईपी आदि) चलाए जा रह का े र्यक्रमो की समाभ ं िरूपता से डीएसी और एफडब्ल्यू एवं राज्य सरकार के सं बं धित विभागो द्ं वारा मिशन मोड पद्धति में कार्य योजना को कार्यान्वित करने की नितांत आवश्यकता है। भाकृ अनुपक्रीडा अपने नेटवर्क भागीदार के रूप में एक्रीपडा, एक्रीपाम, निक्रा एवं राज्य कृ षि विश्वविद्यालयो कं े साथ मिलकर तकनीकी सहयोग द्वारा मिशन मोड कार्यक्रम के कार्यान्वयन के लिए सहयोग देगा। इसके लिए पर्याप्त निधि आबं टन एवं श्रम शक्ति की आवश्यकता हो सकती है। विभिन्न स्तरो पर सभी सं बं ध ं ित पणधारियों केक्षमता निर्माण/कौशल विकास पर भी ध्यान देने की आवश्यकता है। के . सम्मी रेड्डी निदेशक (कार्यकारी), क्रीडा डॉ.के . सम्मी रेड्डी निदेशक की कलम से.
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ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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International Studies, vol. 49, no. 3-4, (September 2014), p. 207-231, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171453233 Stokke, Kristian. "The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices in Norway's Peace Engagement". Power, Conflict, Democracy Journal, vol. 2, no.1, (2010), p. 138-173, DOI: 10.22146/pcd.25724 Touval, Saadia. "Mediation and Foreign Policy". International Studies Review, vol.5, no. 4, (December 2003), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504009.x, p. 91–95. The Venezuelan Negotiation Process, Oslo, regjeringen.no (2023) [Date accessed 13.05.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/ Voz de América. "Diálogo: Opción que Guaidó y Maduro no descartan para salvar a Venezuela". Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570
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Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution
The United States holds dear our values of democracy, civil liberties, and the separation of the branches of our government. In fact, every member of our armed services has sworn an oath to defend the parchment that declares these institutions sacred, and it is the obligation of the United States Armed Forces to preserve and protect those democratic liberties which we hold dear. Given this, it is surprising to know that US Army doctrine idolizes a military dictator, who knowingly seized complete control of his home state following political unrest. Intriguingly, this same figure, who was revered by his soldiers and that same state he commandeered, struggled with marital and familial conflicts his entire life. These statements may be confusing, as there couldn't have possible been a military coup in the United States, let alone a leader of that coup who is still beloved by his statesmen today. Ironically, this individual is no other than Civil War hero Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. While the aforementioned facts are not popularly discussed in history, many Americans know and recognize Chamberlain and his contribution to the United States. He is remembered for his actions in battle which earned him the Medal of Honor later in life. Joshua L. Chamberlain is undoubtedly one of the most popularly researched and written figures in the American Civil War era. Moreover, there are a multitude of sources that further my research, answering the question of how Chamberlain was remembered during and after the war compared to evidence of the life he lived. Upon examination of several key books and articles that discuss the memory of Chamberlain, from during the war to the modern day, a baseline literature review can be made regarding the question as well as its answer. These selected works have all contributed to the field regarding Joshua Chamberlain and how he is remembered both in his own time and our modern age. ; Winner of the 2022 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the Senior Arts/Humanities category. ; Investigating Joshua L. Chamberlain; Distinctions Between the Memory and Reality of Maine's Famed Colonel Jacob Maker HI 430 A Professor Sodergren 12 December 2021 1 The United States holds dear our values of democracy, civil liberties, and the separation of the branches of our government. In fact, every member of our armed services has sworn an oath to defend the parchment that declares these institutions sacred, and it is the obligation of the United States Armed Forces to preserve and protect those democratic liberties which we hold dear. Given this, it is surprising to know that US Army doctrine idolizes a military dictator, who knowingly seized complete control of his home state following political unrest. Intriguingly, this same figure, who was revered by his soldiers and that same state he commandeered, struggled with marital and familial conflicts his entire life. These statements may be confusing, as there couldn't have possible been a military coup in the United States, let alone a leader of that coup who is still beloved by his statesmen today. Ironically, this individual is no other than Civil War hero Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. While the aforementioned facts are not popularly discussed in history, many Americans know and recognize Chamberlain and his contribution to the United States. He is remembered for his actions in battle which earned him the Medal of Honor later in life. Joshua L. Chamberlain is undoubtedly one of the most popularly researched and written figures in the American Civil War era. Moreover, there are a multitude of sources that further my research, answering the question of how Chamberlain was remembered during and after the war compared to evidence of the life he lived. Upon examination of several key books and articles that discuss the memory of Chamberlain, from during the war to the modern day, a baseline literature review can be made regarding the question as well as its answer. These selected works have all contributed to the field regarding Joshua Chamberlain and how he is remembered both in his own time and our modern age. Academic books such as Hands of Providence by Alice Rains Trulock, John Pullen's Twentieth Maine, and Conceived in Liberty by Mark Perry portray Chamberlain in a prolific 2 light. They all generally revere him, initiating their books with praise calling him "a great American hero and a genuinely good man," as well as "remarkable" and a "graceful gentleman".1 Not only do these historians hold these ideals, but the US Army and other agencies openly promote Chamberlain for his heroics without analyzing the reality of who he was holistically.2 Hands of Providence is one of the more prolific biographies describing Chamberlain and the 20th Maine. Trulock writes of his life before, during, and after his war service. She accurately illustrates how Chamberlain's colleagues at Bowdoin, as well as others in his life, regarded him early in the war.3 Comparatively, she notes statements from his soldiers about how they viewed him during the war, both in good and bad lights.4 Pullen does the same, but instead focuses mainly on the unit instead of its commander. This also allows for more in-depth analysis of how his men, and soldiers of the Confederacy, viewed Chamberlain.5 He also describes his work ethic, intelligence, and leadership characteristics regarding how they effected his colonelcy and command during the war. Conceived in Liberty differentiates from the other works because it primarily focuses on the two commanders at Little Round Top and their lives before, during, and after the war. This includes some of the more unsavory events that Trulock and Perry omit, particularly how Chamberlain's home life regarding his wife Fannie's disappointment in their marriage.6 The mentioning of this, as well as information about the abovementioned 1880 affair make this source stand apart from the others.7 1 Trulock, Hands of Providence, xvii; Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 3. 2 United States Department of Defense, "Medal of Honor Monday," https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/2086560/medal-of-honor-monday-army-maj-gen-joshua-chamberlain/ [accessed 3 November 2021]; Weart, "Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain," https://themilitaryleader.com/leadership-action-chamberlain/ [accessed 3 November 2021]. 3 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 11; Trulock, Hands of Providence, 57; Trulock, Hands of Providence, 105. 4 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 305. 5 Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 128. 6 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 4; Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 42; Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 333. 7 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 387-392. 3 Edward Longacre's The Soldier and the Man is an interesting contradictory source. Instead of constant praise for Chamberlain, Longacre credits him for both his good and poor actions during the war. He calls into question his ego and insecurities, selfish desires for greatness above all else, and indifference towards soldiers to include ordering their execution.8 Longacre writes this from a different perspective, that of truth regarding Chamberlain's life both good and bad. There have also been two articles that discuss Chamberlain and his leadership both written by military officers. The first is "Leadership as a Force Multiplier" by Lieutenant Colonel Fred Hillyard, and the second is "Blood and Fire", written by Major John Cuddy. Hillyard focuses on Chamberlain's leadership characteristics while deeming if he deserves the high pedestal he is placed upon, while Cuddy analyzes how different scholars understood Chamberlain and his leadership philosophy. They both state how Chamberlain has been designated as a symbol of leadership within the military and agree that he received all his knowledge from his commander, Colonel Ames, who was West Point educated.9 Furthermore, they consider Chamberlain in a favorable light by calling him a military genius.10 This differs from other sources in that it outright debates his poor attributes instead of assuming him to be an admirable figure. These articles exemplify the dichotomy of reality and fiction regarding how Chamberlain is remembered. This literature provides insight on the dichotomy of thought regarding Chamberlain, with the more mainstream historians, like Trulock, Pullen, and Perry picturing him as an idyllic, humble, and professional gentlemen who represented the best of Federal officers. This is countered by more modern writers, such as Longacre, Hillyard, and Cuddy, understanding that 8 Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 100; Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 118. 9 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 4. 10 Cuddy, "Blood and Fire", 2. 4 Chamberlain was by no means perfect, and his flaws should be investigated as much as his successes. Chamberlain's life and legacy is extremely important because it effects how we remember him and his actions during the Civil War. Popular history tells us of Chamberlain's battlefield heroics and of his gentlemanly manner both in and out of battle. Yet, what has not been compiled popularly is the reality of his life, and the memory associated with it. Growing up in Maine, learning about Chamberlain and his regiment was common, mainly as a high point in Maine's history. However, it is increasingly important to recognize who our leaders and heroes were in their lives and hold them accountable for both the good and bad things they did over the course of their lives. Throughout the research, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was viewed in high regard by both his adversaries and peers during the Civil War, as well as in his post-war politics, continuing into today's popular history. Yet, there are differing opinions that emerge over time regarding whether his political skills were as impressive as portrayed as well as how multiple personal issues plagued him and his ability to execute the offices bestowed upon him. *** Joshua Chamberlain came from a respected family in Brewer, Maine, outside of Bangor. In the Bangor area, and later Brunswick, Chamberlain and his relatives were regarded as model citizens who held dear to principles of toughness, work ethic, and democratic values.11 He was raised with these morals and sought after them in his personal and professional life. Concepts of honesty and integrity became trademarks of the family, with his parents expecting those attributes from the Chamberlain children.12 Educated in religion at the Bangor Seminary as well 11 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 57; Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 16. 12 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 57. 5 as traditionally at Bowdoin, he garnered a reputation as an astute academic who was a stickler for the rules and lived by a code of honor.13 Despite his found success in the classroom, Chamberlain had always fancied a military lifestyle, devoting one term of school at the Whiting Military Academy in 1843, as well as participating in several musters with the Maine Militia before entering service in the Civil War.14 Soon after his schooling, Chamberlain accepted a position as a professor at his alma mater, Bowdoin College. He influenced and instructed students on rhetoric and language prior to the war, even writing recommendations and using his political sway to help students gain commissions and enlistments.15 Eventually, his longing to serve coincided with the nation's necessity for leadership. Joshua Chamberlain's contributions to the preservation of the Union are undoubted, yet the perception of him by peers before and in the early years of the conflict indicate dissenting opinions from his popular reference as a revered leader by all. With the nation at war, Chamberlain's desire to serve increased daily as students graduated, or dropped their academics, and enlisted to serve the Union. In envy, Chamberlain utilized his familial and academic connections to pen a letter to the Governor of Maine, Israel Washburn. In this letter he states, "I have always been interested in military matters, and what I do not know in that line I know how to learn", pleading with the governor to allow a man with no military background or training a chance to command.16 Having claimed to be taking sabbatical in Europe, his colleagues detested his notion to leave Bowdoin and sent letters to the Governor urging him to not grant Chamberlain a commission declaring him to be "'no fighter, but only a mild-mannered common student'", "'nothing at all'", and "'good for nothing'".17 Evidently, despite he and his family's 13 Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 20, 25-26. 14 Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 18, 53. 15 Nespitt, Through Blood & Fire, 17. 16 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Nespitt, Through Blood & Fire, 9. 17 Colleagues at Bowdoin, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 11. 6 reputation throughout Maine, some harbored public doubts about his ability to lead men into battle, mainly because he was thought to be needed more in his role as a Professor at Bowdoin than in the army by some. Contrarily, there were others who supported Chamberlain's military ambitions full-heartedly. Brunswick's reputable physician, Dr. John D. Lincoln, wrote on Chamberlain's behalf, declaring him to be "'as capable of commanding… as any man out of… West Point" and that the enlisted men would surely "'rally around his standard as they would around a hero.'"18 It wasn't just family friends who supported Chamberlain, local newspapers deemed him "a capable and efficient officer" both fit for battle and the lieutenant colonelcy of the 20th Maine.19 The political sway of the his physician as well as the admirability of local press convinced Governor Washburn to grant Chamberlain's commission, yet opting instead to place West Point educated Adelbert Ames of Rockland as commander of the unit due to Chamberlain's lack of field experience and general military knowledge.20 Although there was noted dissent regarding his commission, his soldiers and fellow officers attest to his leadership attributes both under fire and while encamped. In accordance with what Dr. Lincoln wrote to Governor Washburn, he was commended by his troops as being "idolized" within the unit for his stature and leadership, unlike Ames who was viewed as tyrannical and cruel to his men.21 The men of the 20th Maine were driven towards Chamberlain's sympathetic, more egalitarian leadership style, as Ames gave his men no respect believing that military hierarchy should be placed above all else. The men of the unit rejected this, as in Maine 18 Lincoln, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 11-12. 19 "Letter from the State Capitol," Portland Daily Press. 20 Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 55. 21 Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 77. 7 they and their commander stood evenly on the social scale.22 Colonel Ames was detested for his constant drill and disrespect for his men, being proclaimed by his soldiers as a "'savage" whose "'men would surely shoot him'" when drawn into battle.23 Ames was blissfully unaware of these thoughts, but Chamberlain relished his public perception and continued to care deeply about his men and by extension his image. By default, the volunteers fell on Chamberlain for support and assurance, as they distrusted their Colonel. Chamberlain proved himself militarily at Fredericksburg, and most notably Gettysburg, as a great military officer and tactician. Although his actions are known and renowned, the perspective of him by others during battle is paramount to understanding how he was perceived. For example, over the course of the war Colonel Ames forced many of his regiment's officers to resign due to poor performance and lack of leadership, yet he referred to Chamberlain as his "'best officer'" who led from the front and modeled honor and bravery for his unit.24 Soldiers testified to an instance where his academic and military intelligence united to deceive the enemy by pretending to be a Confederate under the cover of darkness, fooling the enemy into believing the Union line was far away.25 They also pronounced his leadership as something that should be exemplified, as he refused to order his men into unnecessary danger and would not give them orders he would not execute himself.26 This praise was not solely from his soldiers, but other officers from around the army. The commanding general of the Fifth Corps, General Sykes, congratulated him after Gettysburg by saying that the actions of the 20th Maine, and Chamberlain's leadership thereof, were the most 22 Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 15. 23 Thomas Chamberlain, as quoted in Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 15. 24 Ames, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 105. 25 Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 57. 26 Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 80; Trulock, Hands of Providence, 151. 8 important to occur during the battle and that if Little Round Top was lost so was the Union cause.27 His direct superior, Colonel Rice, declared "'your gallantry was magnificent, and your coolness and skill saved us.'" indicating a consensus amongst all involved that Chamberlain's actions were valiant and noble placing him amongst the army's most superb officers.28 His subordinates and supervisors agreed that Chamberlain was an exceptional officer, which is something to note considering some officers, like General Thomas, were liked by their men and hated by their leaders. While it is not surprising that comrades of Chamberlain praised him, the reactions and testimonies of his enemies are important as well. Colonel William Oates was the commander of the opposing 15th Alabama at Little Round Top, and remarkably only had good things to say about Chamberlain. Oates stated that the decisiveness taken by the 20th Maine made them the hardest fighting unit he had ever seen, and that their "'gallant Colonel'" possessed exorbitant amounts of "'skill and… great bravery'" that saved the Union from defeat.29 Another anonymous soldier recollected on how, during Little Round Top, he had a clear line of sight on Chamberlain, yet felt a strong feeling not to fire upon him. He adhered to this feeling, and later expressed how glad he was that he hadn't killed him in a letter to Chamberlain.30 However, it was not only units involved in direct conflict against Chamberlain that respected him. During the surrender at Appomattox, Confederate Major General John B. Gordon stated that the officer from Maine was "'one of the knightliest soldiers of the Federal army'" because of the respect Chamberlain had bestowed upon the surrendering forces.31 Instead of 27 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 155. 28 Rice, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 155; Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 271. 29 Oates, as quoted in Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 128. 30 Pullen, Twentieth Maine, 122. 31 Gordon, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 305. 9 humiliating the men as they laid down their weapons, Chamberlain ensured that they were treated fairly, yet still making it known who the victor was. In postwar years, editions of the Confederate Veteran painted Chamberlain in a similar fashion. They tell of how brilliant he and his unit were in battle, over 35 years after the end of hostilities.32 The magazine makes it known how great of a leader Confederate soldiers believed he was. In fact, he is cited as representing the Federal Army in 1913 at a monument dedication in Chattanooga, Tennessee. This reconciliatory monument represented the peace between the states by inscribing the names of both Confederate and Federal war dead. Furthermore, Chamberlain attended as a "distinguished soldier" and gentlemen in the eyes of former Confederates.33 It is common for friendly forces to recognize the brilliance of successful military actions; yet surprising that enemy combatants also revered Chamberlain and his actions despite their catastrophic impact on the Confederate war effort. Chamberlain is remembered after the war for his accolades as a representative of Maine while pursuing political aspirations and maintaining public appearances, yet his support never faltered, and he remained generally well respected despite familial disputes and marital issues that troubled his private life. Politically savvy since his days as a professor, Chamberlain made the jump from wartime commander to state executive in a matter of years after the conclusion of hostilities. An indication of his popularity with the people of Maine, he was elected with the largest majority of any gubernatorial candidate in his first election. He ran on the promise to ratify the 14th and 15th amendments, all while ensuring the former Confederacy paid for their sins while earning their right of federal representation. 34 32 "About a Distinguished Southern Family," Confederate Veteran. 33 "Herbert Head of Peace Memorial", Confederate Veteran. 34 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 337. 10 Chamberlain desired "'suspension of certain privileges'" and "'certain rights'" for former Confederates, of which he believed had been relinquished by waging war. 35 He appealed to Congress, arguing that war is not a game, therefore the losers should be held accountable for their transgressions. He was known for a conservative streak compared to other Republicans, which itself angered those radicals in Maine politics. For example, he publicly argued against allowing suffrage to freedmen, claiming it to be too much of a change too quickly.36 He also supported Maine's conservative senator in voting against the impeachment of Andrew Jackson, an obvious minority opinion in fiercely liberal Republican politics. 37 He was never a practical politician, but his neglect of party viewpoints disgruntled leaders within Republican forums. This was different from other reconstruction leaders, as many focused-on reconciliation instead of punishment and often sided with the powerful postwar party. Although popular among the citizens of the state, he was unprepared for the life of a politician. In essence, he was not prepared for dissenting opinion, and outright disregard for his point of view at times, as he was at this point used to military reverence for the commanders orders. He fought with the legislature on several issues, mainly temperance and the legality of capital punishment in the state, but also found common ground and gained support from both parties.38 Previous legislations had proposed and supported temperance committees that oversaw laws regulating alcohol use and distribution. They established "special police", which Chamberlain declared an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of Mainers.39 He wrote to the legislature describing his dissatisfaction regarding this bill yet felt it his duty as executive to 35 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 338. 36 Longacre, The Soldier and the Man, 264. 37 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 338. 38 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 338. 39 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 338; Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 25. 11 sign it nevertheless due to its success in the legislature.40 He angered many within the state with his conduct regarding this issue, refusing to attend temperance meetings and denying them public forums. Chamberlain took his position as governor quite literally, as is evident by his signing of bills he disagreed with instead of vetoing them. He believed it was his, and the government of Maine's, responsibility to enact and therefore enforce law. By extension, he brought this same fervor to the capital punishment debate saying that laws should either change or be enforced. He is quoted saying, "'If we cannot make our practice conform to our law, [we must] make our law agree with our practice'".41 This debate had been raging far before Chamberlain was Governor, with his predecessors simply tabling execution authorizations as it was state law the Governor had to authorize each death with a signature. Furthermore, he used his executive power to commute sentences, but insisted on carrying out many of them considering it, again, his elected duty.42 He confided in his mother that "'many are bitter on me about capital punishment but it does not disturb me in the least'", continuing to describe that some had sent threatening letters in response to his ordering of the executions. 43 He responded calmly "'The poor fool for whomever thinks he can scare me… is mistaken… I do not have a particle of fear in me of anything that walks or flies,'" assuring his mother of his safety.44 His administration was not without success, as garnered support on several important issues. Chamberlain's exoneration of Civil War veterans with pardons received support from both parties, and the people as well.45 Furthermore, the establishment of the Maine's agriculture 40 Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 79; Smith, Fanny and Joshua, 197. 41 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 339. 42 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 339. 43 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 75. 44 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 75. 45 Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 71. 12 academy, the predecessor of the University of Maine, under his administration again excited the people and both political parties.46 This school created another avenue of education for Maine's youth, one not affiliated directly with the little ivy elite of Bowdoin, Bates, and Colby Colleges. Despite his immense popularity, and the fact that both parties supported him in a fifth term, Mainers typically regarded him as an ineffective politician.47 Today, he is not remembered for his political career or exploits, with historians and everyday people recognizing him for his war exploits. Unbeknownst to the public, while Chamberlain pursued political and public aspirations, his family was disintegrating. Not only did he and Fannie have marital issues, but his siblings all experienced turmoil that was directly and indirectly caused by the patriarch's endeavors. During the war, it was known that Fannie and Chamberlain were often at odds regarding their marriage and the direction of their lives. While she begrudgingly supported her husband's military endeavors, she was often distant during the war and hoped that when he returned to Maine he would settle down and make time for her.48 According to letters between the two, it appears that Fannie would often neglect to return letters to Chamberlain, saying he had sent seven letters by October of 1862 compared to receiving only two from his wife.49 This pattern continues throughout the war with Chamberlain asking "'Where are you… I do not hear from you all this long while?. It is more than a month that I have heard a word from you?'".50 Fannie and Chamberlain's marriage was strained by the distance and lack of communication during the war, yet his issues would also follow him into his post-war career. 46 Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 25. 47 Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 25. 48 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 333. 49 Nespitt, Through Blood & Fire, 23. 50 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Desjardin, Life in Letters, 184. 13 Fannie understood how tenaciously ambitious her husband was. He was a man of perception, and it came to no surprise to her that he accepted the Republican nomination and subsequent election as governor. Unlike her support during the war, Fannie made it clear she did not and would not encourage him in this undertaking, as she felt neglected as a wife.51 She felt so strongly about this, she refused to accompany her husband in Augusta, instead opting to stay in Brunswick. He missed her dearly and wanted to share his experience as governor with her pleading, "'we are getting rather lonesome without you…'" while encouraging her to accompany him saying "'we are having some quite pleasant times, only you are wanting to complete our happiness.'"52 Still, despite his proposed love and longing for his wife, their marriage continued to decline throughout his term to the point of abuse accusations and threats of divorce. Fannie, extremely unhappy with her marriage by 1868, released public statements alleging physical and mental abuse during their marriage. Chamberlain's response was chilling, saying "'if it were not you… I should make quick work of these calumniaters…'".53 Seeming more concerned with his public image than his marriage or the state of his wife, he says his enemies will "'ruin'" him when they catch hold of the allegations.54 Chamberlain scolded her like a child, warning her of the perils that faced widows in their society, as well as the unsought humiliation a separation would bring for himself and their families.55 These marital issues continued for the remainder of their lives, with Chamberlain confused on how or why his wife remained so disappointed in their union. They came to a mutual agreement, that they would remain married to preserve public respect for themselves and their family while living separately 51 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 334. 52 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 334; Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 59. 53 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Smith, Fanny and Joshua, 195. 54 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Smith, Fanny and Joshua, 195. 55 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 341. 14 for much of the remainder of their lives.56 These public statements were used as fodder by his enemies but amounted to make little difference as Chamberlain was subsequently reelected. Despite this, it is important to understand these accusations to therefore appreciate Chamberlain holistically, and acknowledge their absence in popular history. During the war, Joshua's brother Tom fought alongside Chamberlain in the 20th Maine while the remaining Chamberlains awaited the return of their soldiers. Sarah, their sister, continued life at home while John, being chronically ill, served alongside his brothers as a Chaplain. Upon returning home, John became increasingly sick. Despite the ailments of his brother, Chamberlain ran and was elected for governor whilst his wife spent considerable time caring for John.57 Tom, meanwhile, was lost after his wartime service. He lived and worked in New York for a time, yet never found anything worthwhile. Soon thereafter, John died and Governor Chamberlain left his Tom to fend for himself, stranding him both financially and emotionally as Tom had come to rely on the hospitality of John in Chamberlain's absence.58 Later in life he did the same, as Tom returned to Maine in 1889 after failed pursuits in Florida. Chamberlain, now retired, refused to help him as he had his own financial problems. Tom, neglected to attend any reunions of the 20th Maine, therefore allowing his brother to obtain the spotlight.59 Upon Tom's death, Chamberlain retained the same mindset regarding his siblings. Despite this, Tom never resented his brother, in fact encouraging and supporting him until the day of his death.60 Joshua Chamberlain made himself a priority throughout his life, doing so by routinely disregarding the needs of his loved ones in exchange for his own. This is 56 Perry, Conceived in Liberty, 339. 57 Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 78. 58 Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 82. 59 Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 86. 60 Loski, Chamberlains of Brewer, 88. 15 another unknown aspect of Chamberlain's life, and something that he and popular historians do not want the public to see, as it would taint his image as a saintly officer and leader. Omitted from almost every contemporary textbook or lesson regarding Joshua Chamberlain is the 1880 Maine Gubernatorial crisis, termed the 'Count-Out Crisis'. Essentially, elected Democrat Governor Alonzo Garcelon sought reelection in 1879 against two opponents, Daniel F. Davis of the Republican Party and Joseph L. Smith of the Greenbacks Party. With the vote split between three candidates, 49.6% of the votes went to Davis with the remainder split between Garcelon and Smith. The Maine Constitution declared that without over 50% of the votes, no winner could be announced, and the legislature must elect the governor.61 Facing a Republican majority in the legislature, Garcelon manipulated the votes by casting aside Republican votes as invalid, causing the Supreme Court of Maine to declare his actions unconstitutional and award the governorship to Davis. Garcelon refused to yield his office and began appointing Democrat and Greenback Representatives and Senators while declaring himself the rightful governor. All sides began to mobilize paramilitary forces, forcing then Commander of the Maine Militia, Joshua Chamberlain, to intervene.62 Called upon by leaders of the elected legislature, Chamberlain swiftly took control of the government by using civilian police to oust Garcelon's staff and council before alterations could be made to the legitimate election results.63 Controlling the state as a military dictator, Chamberlain now faced the daunting task of relinquishing power to one of the three factions, retaining it for himself, or allowing the courts to decide. He was urged from all sides, with many pleading him to retain the democratic institutions in place.64 Chamberlain confides his great 61 Desjardin, Life in Letters, 239; Foley, Ballot Battles, 164. 62 Foley, Ballot Battles, 165-167. 63 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 356. 64 Desjardin, Life in Letters, 242. 16 responsibility in Fannie saying "'There is… No Governor, no legislature… I have been obliged to assume the defense… of the state… I am determined that Maine shall not become a Southern American State'".65 He is interpreted as referencing his Confederate counterparts and the lawlessness he associated with their secession and subsequent reintegration into the Union, as well as nations literally situated on the South American continent that were notable monarchies and dictatorships. Chamberlain's outlook on his role in this matter is that of a noble hero, something that surely inflated his ego as well as gave him a needed break from what he deemed to be a morbidly boring life as a civilian. Committed to solving the issue in a non-partisan and equitable manner, Chamberlain managed to enrage almost everyone in Augusta during his occupation. He was offered appointments as senator by each side, to which he adamantly refused stating it was the sole responsibility of the courts to decide the outcome.66 He was discouraged that his own party had amounted military forces and bribed him, and that they and the Democratic camp called him a traitor and usurper who abused his office as Commander of the Militia by intervening.67 Both sides plotted against him, threatened to kill or kidnap him, yet he stayed true to his goal of "'keep[ing] the peace'" and allowing laws to be executed rightfully.68 A local paper describes the scene as dire, where all of the power of the state was vested into Chamberlain until matters could be resolved.69 It was also cautionary, asking citizens to stay calm and avoid the capital, as infantry from Gardiner had been given authority to fire upon civilians or police should they act malicious.70 In the end, he gracefully guided Maine through twelve days of political and social 65 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Goulka, Grand Old Maine of Maine, 138. 66 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 357. 67 Trulock, Hands of Providence, 357. 68 Joshua Chamberlain, as quoted in Trulock, Hands of Providence, 359. 69 "Chamberlain Holds the Helm," Daily Kennebec Journal. 70 "Chamberlain Holds the Helm," Daily Kennebec Journal. 17 unrest, ultimately allowing the court to empower the duly elected legislature to establish Davis as Governor. While Chamberlain fought to maintain his public image though marital and political disputes, today's scholars have begun to delve into his life and analyze his actions. Military writers, for example, annotate analysis his military exploits without necessarily focusing on other aspects of his life. By extension, these writers represent the popular memory of Chamberlain today. Military doctrine displays Chamberlain as the best and brightest military leader of the Civil War, yet writers like Hillyard, Cuddy, and Foley discuss his leadership style progression and whether he deserves the high pedestal he is placed in. Fred Hillyard points out in his paper that the Army uses Joshua Chamberlain as an example of leadership to be emulated, saying that the Army claims responsibility in developing leaders in his image through their education pipelines.71 Hillyard, in the 1980's, questions whether or not this selection is plausible, stating that the notion of military education is lost using Chamberlain as an example as he was schooled at a liberal arts college and volunteered for his commission without any prior military education.72 Hillyard also asserts that although the individual actions of Little Round Top are admirable, the tactics and leadership of the Civil War cannot be adequately translated to modern conflicts. He argues that "students may not relate to the muskets, bayonets, [and] bugle calls… when their thoughts are normally of sophisticated weapons systems… [and] the modern battlefield".73 Moreover, Hillyard continues to question the Army's position regarding Chamberlain, asking if his actions, although notable, were necessarily different from military actions of his time. 71 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 3. 72 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 3. 73 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 6. 18 Hillyard equates Chamberlain's war heroics to his personality, luck, and the fact that the pressure of the situation helped shape him into a military genius. Chamberlain's temperament and personal awareness were key to his success at Gettysburg, in that he was able to learn and adapt to the given situation.74 Hillyard also contributes Chamberlain's willingness to share in the suffering of his men as a motivator for them to follow his lead in battle.75 Unequivocally agreeing that his actions were great, he remains unconvinced that Chamberlain was a special instance of leadership. He determines that when people of character are placed in precarious situations, they usually will make consequential decisions.76 He concludes that Chamberlain is a great example of leadership, one that people can look to and learn from, but is not convinced he is the best example that the military should look toward. This exemplifies that, even in the 1980's, scholars viewpoints of him were changing as a holistic image of Chamberlain and his leadership attributes were being developed. In his paper, John Cuddy focuses on Chamberlain's leadership development over time, and how he became a symbol of leadership for the military and the public. Interestingly, Cuddy contradicts Hillyard by saying that his actions during battle were not a result of him being an exemplary human being, instead attributing his bravery to his personality, personal interactions with different role models, as well as his education and professorship at Bowdoin.77 These characteristics, Cuddy argues, projected him to success in leadership roles, and the evaluation of them and him can help others in the future. He also asserts that Chamberlain had an inert sense of entitlement for esteem and prestige citing his pleas to Senator Morrill regarding his permanent appointment to Major General following the war.78 Despite his ego, he was outwardly concerned 74 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 6. 75 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 8. 76 Hillyard, "Force Multiplier", 5. 77 Cuddy, "Blood and Fire", 4-5. 78 Cuddy, "Blood and Fire", 6. 19 for the welfare of his troops, yet also garnered the need for respect and order within his unit. He was sympathetic to his men but was also strict when called to do so. Cuddy attributes these and other personality traits to his success militarily and asks future students to analyze his self-need for adventure and validation as an example of poor leadership. Chamberlain's combination of humbleness regarding his troops and desire to prove himself made him daring yet conscious enough to lead gracefully in times of stress. Cuddy also determines that Chamberlain is an example of what good role models can do for leadership development, citing his boyhood idols as well as military leaders. Cuddy establishes that Chamberlain's upbringing was filled with military heroes, like his father and grandfather, of whom he always wanted to emulate.79 His childhood was filled with menial labor, hard lessons, and eventual academic prowess. Chamberlain was an advocate for hard work before the war and took these ideals with him into service. Never receiving formal military training, he yearned to prove himself in battle saying "'Soldiering in a time of peace is almost as much against my grain as being a peace man in time of war'" when asked prior to the war about militia service.80 His upbringing shaped his character, which Cuddy argues helped shape him into an effective military leader. Interestingly, we see Foley stray from the commonality of the other military writers, as he seems to agree with popular historians that Chamberlain was a "honorable" and "inspiring" man who answered his nation's call when needed.81 Foley neglects to mention his development as a leader, instead citing sources that clearly picture him as a leader born for greatness. He cites a plethora of Chamberlain's victories, both on and off the field of battle. These include early 79 Cuddy, "Blood and Fire", 15. 80 Chamberlain, as quoted in Cuddy, "Blood and Fire", 7. 81 Foley, "Citizen Warrior", 8. 20 military accomplishments, as well as earning the trust of his men.82 Foley concludes that Chamberlain was simply a military anomaly, crediting in part his successes to "'good genes'".83 He states that Chamberlain's intellectual prowess and desire for challenge fueled his military success, completely disregarding his development as a leader and person throughout his life.84 His lackluster analysis of Chamberlain's life and development is a discredit to leadership development of future military officers, as his paper clearly misinforms the reader by asserting that Chamberlain was a special instance of innate leadership capability. Chamberlain's preeminence is further celebrated today through monuments erected in his name and image. Intriguingly, these monuments were placed far after the Colonel's death in 1914. The first monument was raised on Veteran's Day, 1997, in Brewer near the Chamberlain home. 85 This monument is placed in a public park that is itself a replica of Little Round Top as well as an homage to the Underground Railroad. Named after Chamberlain, it serves to commemorate his battlefield heroics and those of the Hollyoke House that was an actual part of the railroad.86 It is interesting, noting Chamberlain's unfavorable opinions on voting rights for freedmen, that a memorial to him and his unit are placed at an extremely interesting and important historical site in terms of the Underground Railroad, of which Chamberlain was not involved. Yet, the contributions of the Holyoke Family are overshadowed by Joshua Chamberlain's legacy. It's date of completion, as well as location, are significant 82 Foley, "Citizen Warrior", 16. 83 Foley, "Citizen Warrior", 30. 84 Foley, "Citizen Warrior", 29. 85 Maine Civil War Monuments, "Brewer," https://www.maine.gov/civilwar/monuments/brewerchamberlainpark.html [accessed 3 November 2021]. 86 Maine Civil War Monuments, "Brewer," https://www.maine.gov/civilwar/monuments/brewerchamberlainpark.html [accessed 3 November 2021]. Chamberlain Park Statue, Brewer, Maine 21 Chamberlain Statue, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine Maine National Guard Headquarters, Augusta, Maine Chamberlain Post Office, Chamberlain, Maine because it shows that his popularity continued to grow despite his actions having taken place more than 130 years before the monument was placed. The revival of Chamberlain and his exploits in the 1990's can also be explained by he and his unit's stardom in later media. Additionally, Chamberlain retains a second monument in Brunswick on the campus of Bowdoin College. Dedicated in 2003, it is not surprising that the college wanted to commemorate its most notable alumni.87 Yet, this is significant given that the school and its faculty denied his initial requests to serve and slandered him to retain him as a professor. Again, it is notable that almost one hundred years after his death, Bowdoin utilizes the popularity and prestige of Chamberlain's name and likeness to honor him on their campus. Both monuments indicate that Chamberlain's popular memory is alive and thriving in Maine and will be for the foreseeable future. They also indicate that his remembrance has grown in recent years, as these monuments were dedicated in the last twenty-five years. In addition to monuments, his memory lives through his posthumous appointment as the namesake of the Maine National Guard Headquarters in Augusta, dedicated in 2018, as well as an eponymous village in my hometown established sometime in the late 19th century. His legacy is an integral part of Maine's military and political lineage as identified through his idolization by local and state organizations. 87 Maine Civil War Monuments, "Brunswick," https://www.maine.gov/civilwar/monuments/brunswickchamberlain.html [accessed 3 November 2021]. 22 It would be absurd to diminish Joshua Chamberlain's importance to the Civil War and the Battle of Gettysburg. His decisive military actions and the courage of his unit earn him the distinction as a great officer in the history of our military. The memory displayed by both the northern and southern soldiery indicates just this and exemplifies his gentlemanly traits that are often noted by popular historians and the public. Yet, these examples do not demonstrate the holistic view of who Chamberlain was during his time on earth, both during and after his service in the war. While he was respected for his gallantry in battle by almost all, historians have regularly neglected or diminished his shortcomings in life. Understanding the totality of historically significant people's life is important because we cannot afford to remember people in a single-faceted sense. When looking back on the past, the public deserve to know the good and the bad about the people they are supposed to admire. A one-dimensional viewpoint on any figure has no benefit except to paint a false reality, one that hides reality in exchange for a rose-colored fallacy. Instead, we should be yearning to investigate the lives of our heroes to learn from both their mistakes and accomplishments. In essence, there is more to learn from the mistakes of others than from their successes. Joshua Chamberlain has rightfully been admired for his heroics in battle, yet his private life seemed secluded, isolated, and rarely discussed. Yet, as of late, writers have begun to acknowledge that the hero of Little Round Top was indeed human, with his own demons that menaced him throughout his life. Accusations of abuse, familial abandonment, and general neglect of those he loved has begun to threaten Chamberlain's legacy. Given these flaws and misdeeds being exhumed, will his reputation, for which he fought vehemently to maintain, be tainted or amended in the coming years? Will the lessons taught in Maine schools feature his military feats, as well as his personal shortcomings? This is a question for historians, both 23 professional and amateur, to answer. We hold the keys to truth through research and analysis, and despite the man's noted contributions to our nation, we also owe a debt to future generations to lay out the entirety of Chamberlain's story, and let our children decide the fate of Maine's famed Colonel. 24 Annotated Bibliography Cunningham, S.A. "About a Distinguished Southern Family," Confederate Veteran, 1900. This edition of the Confederate Veteran discusses an encounter between a former Confederate and Gen. Chamberlain years after the war, discussing what happened on the Gettysburg battlefield. The disagreement the two had regarding it, as well as the adjectives used to describe Chamberlain, are interesting and are noted in the paper. "Chamberlain holds the Helm," Daily Kennebec Journal, January 12, 1880. This news article discusses the Maine gubernatorial crisis in 1880 from their point of view. The article talks about Chamberlain being essentially inserted as a military governor, and the fear in the community regarding this. It is used to support research done in other sources. Chamberlain, Joshua. The Passing of the Armies: An Account of the Final Campaign of the Army of the Potomac, Based Upon Personal Reminiscences of the Fifth Army Corps. Lincoln and London, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. Chamberlain's own autobiography is interesting because it was written out of necessity for money. It describes his own experiences of the war and why he believed certain instances occur. This is fascinating because others have differing accounts than he. I did not cite it in the paper, but it is listed in the bibliography. Cuddy, John F. "Training Through Blood and Fire: The Leadership Development of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain." Air Command and Staff College (2015): 2-37. Major Cuddy's essay focuses on Chamberlain's progression as a military leader throughout the war. He states that by modern standards he was a great strategist and soldier yet did not learn at an academy or college. Cuddy advocates for the experiential learning that affected Chamberlain, which he says made him into a great officer. It is used as support for the changing of thought regarding Chamberlain as of late. Desjardin, Thomas A, ed. Joshua L. Chamberlain: A life in Letters: The Previously unpublished letters of a great leader of the Civil War. Harrisburg, PA: National Civil War Museum, 2012. This collection of letters from Chamberlain depicts his personal feeling throughout the war, his gubernatorial years, when he was President of Bowdoin, and throughout his life with his family and colleagues. These primary sources were used when discussing his marital issues, as well as personal feelings during his post-war life. 25 Desjardin, Thomas A. Stand Firm Ye Boys from Maine: The 20th Maine and the Gettysburg Campaign. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. Desjardin's work focuses exclusively on the Battle of Gettysburg and the actions taken on Little Round Top by the 20th Maine. Most of this book regards the tactics of the battle, but throughout there are personal quotes from soldiers that will be useful, as well as the final two chapters that deal with the immediate memory of the 'Count-on Crisis' and how that affected the remainder of his life. I did not cite this in the paper, but did research it. Foley, Edward B. Ballot Battles; The History of Disputed Elections in the United States. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. This book has a chapter devoted to the Maine gubernatorial crisis, which was very hard to find research on. I used this source to provide context on the event and why it occurred, while highlighting the importance of Chamberlain's resulting actions. Foley, Chris M. "Citizen Warrior; Major General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain; A Study in Command." USMC Command and Staff College (2012): 8-32. Foley offers a Marine Corps investigation into Chamberlain, who he was as a person, and his leadership characteristics. Like the other officers' papers on Chamberlain, he agrees that the man was a military genius but tends to agree with Trulock and Pullen that Chamberlain's knowledge was an anomaly. Goulka, Jeremiah E, ed. The Grand Old Man of Maine: Selected Letters of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain 1865-1914. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Goulka's collection of letters fits well with the subject of memory because these letters go from during the war until his death. They discuss in depth his time as governor and the issues regarding his family. They are used to support the secondary source work regarding his life and the events that occurred during it. "Herbert Head of Peace Memorial" Confederate Veteran, 1913. The source is another Confederate viewpoint on the Colonel of the 20th Maine. This, like many, portrays him in a positive light. It is regarding a monument displaying peace between belligerents in Chattanooga, Tennessee. This primary source shows an example of how Confederates and Federal troops viewed him during his life. Hillyard, Fred. "Leadership as a Force Multiplier: The Joshua L. Chamberlain Example." US Army War College (1983): 1-29. This essay is written by an Army officer at the War College. LTC Hillyard discusses Colonel Chamberlain's leadership attributes and if he deserves the high stature he has and still is placed in within the Army. He focuses on how Chamberlain was not a trained soldier, but instead an avid learner who used his ability to absorb knowledge from other professional soldiers. Cuddy's piece on the same subject will support this, and Hillyard's 26 article will be used to further demonstrate Chamberlain's reverence amongst the modern military and changing ideals today. "Indignation in Maine" New York Tribune, December 20, 1879. The New York Tribune article discusses again the situation in 1880 in Maine, but from the outside viewpoint of New Yorkers. It is more of how outsiders view the situation instead of Mainers. "Letter from the State Capital" The Portland Daily Press, August 9, 1862. In my research, this is the first instance I could find discussing then Lt Col Chamberlain and his appointment to the newly designated 20th Maine. It states who the officers and NCOs will be within the unit. It describes Chamberlain in a good light, before he was even in combat, which is important to the research. Maine Civil War Monuments "Brewer." https://www.maine.gov/civilwar/monuments/brewerchamberlainpark.html [accessed 3 November 2021]. This is the State of Maine website that documents all the monuments within the state. It gives the relevant information regarding when the monument was placed and by whom. I also will include personal photographs of the site in the final Draft. Maine Civil War Monuments. "Brunswick." https://www.maine.gov/civilwar/monuments/brunswickchamberlain.html [accessed 3 November 2021]. This is like the prior source, simply a different monument. They serve the same purpose and this one will have a personal photograph as well. Nespitt, Mark, ed. Through Blood & Fire: Selected Civil War Papers of Major General Joshua Chamberlain. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996. This source will add to primary source collection off Chamberlain through letters but only includes works from 1862-1865. They will be used to express his personal feelings during the war regarding his service, his family, and hopefully any issues within his organization. It is used as supporting documents regarding how he was viewed in his time versus how he is remembered. New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center. "140th New York Infantry Regiment's Monument at Gettysburg." https://museum.dmna.ny.gov/unit-history/infantry-2/140th-infantry-regiment/monument-gettysburg [accessed 1 November 2021.] The site depicts the 140th New York Infantry's monument at Gettysburg, which is a statement itself about the men who fought with the unit. It stands as a simple memorial to those who died, including the regimental commander. 27 New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center. "44th New York Infantry Regiment's Monument." https://museum.dmna.ny.gov/unit-history/infantry/44th-infantry-regiment/monument-gettysburg [accessed 1 November 2021.] This huge castle is dedicated to the fighting men of the 44th New York, who were also alongside the 20th Maine at Little Round Top. It is a superfluous monument, given the fact their role in the battle was overlooked by the heroics of Chamberlain and his men. It has a lengthy inscription, unlike the 44th's, which describes what they did during the battle and how many perished. Both these sources will be used to show that some friendly soldiers harbored at least a little bit of jealousy and resentment for Chamberlain's popularity and recognition when they received little to none. Longacre, Edward G. Joshua Chamberlain: The Soldier and The Man. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1999. This book was one of the more helpful sources. It goes into who Chamberlain was as both a soldier and normal person, which my paper discovers through memory. This source helped me express to the reader who Chamberlain really was and how that relates to his popular portrayal. Also, it is one of the only sources that really questions Chamberlain and asks tough questions of his character and actions. Loski, Diana H. The Chamberlains of Brewer. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1998. Loski's book primarily confers how the entire Chamberlain family came to be, and their relevance throughout history. It not only discusses Joshua and Fanny, but also his brother Tom, his sister, other extended family, and of course his parents. I use it to discuss his familial life, mainly regarding how he abandoned them routinely. Norton, Oliver W. The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, Gettysburg, July 2, 1863. New York, NY: The Neale Publishing Company, 1913. Norton's piece, while older, gives a lot of valuable insight into the battle itself. While this is important to compare thinking from the past to present, there are other sources that do a better job. I do not cite it in the paper Perry, Mark. Conceived in Liberty: Joshua Chamberlain, William Oates, and the American Civil War. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books Limited, 1997. This is one of the more credible sources regarding Chamberlain and his memory, as it also discusses his adversary on Little Round Top and their parallels. Through this source, we can see how other officers and officials of the time viewed Chamberlain both during and after the war, and more importantly how his foes viewed him. Also, the book discusses some of his actions after the war, how it affected his personal life, and how others perceived him. This is a good source to use to refer to both how people thought about him but also the reality of his actions. Also, it is a beneficial source to see how adversaries thought of him, specifically William Oates who commanded the regiment that opposed him at Little Round Top. 28 Pullen, John J. The Twentieth Maine: A Volunteer Regiment in the Civil War. Philadelphia, PA: J.B Lippincott & Company, 1957. The book provides instances of how he is/was remembered. Mainly this source quotes Oates, Chamberlain's counterpart, but also Chamberlain's soldiers regarding their leader. Because the point of this paper is to focus on memory, this source will be helpful because it has a lot of points regarding how the people he commanded felt about Chamberlain. Smith, Diane Munroe, ed. Fanny and Joshua: The Enigmatic Lives of Frances Caroline Adams and Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1999. Like the Chamberlains of Brewer source, this book will give greater understanding of the relationship of Chamberlain and his wife. Comparing to other sources, I will see if in fact their relationship was strained and if so why. It is mainly letters between the two, accompanied by brief excerpts describing the times and circumstances of the letters. These sources will help determine if his stately appearance was a public rouse or if he was privately a different man. Trulock, Alice Rains. In the Hands of Providence: Joshua L. Chamberlain and the American Civil War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Trulock's work is one of the prolific biographies of Joshua Chamberlain but is claimed by writers like Cuddy and Longacre to be one sided and only include the more cheerful instances in his life. Most of the work puts Chamberlain in a good light by designating him as a marvelous leader who was fair and beloved by his troops. Strangely, she does mention some of his more unsavory actions after the war, as well as explaining his resistance in allowing freedmen to vote. I use this source a multitude of times because the author covers almost every instance of Chamberlain's life. United States Department of Defense. "Medal of Honor Monday." https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/2086560/medal-of-honor-monday-army-maj-gen-joshua-chamberlain/ [accessed 3 November 2021]. This DoD article discusses Chamberlain as an astute, gentlemanly officer who was a gallant recipient of the Medal of Honor. While this is true, it again is an example of popular memory regarding Chamberlain. He is viewed only through his singular actions, not by a collection of them. Weart, David. The Military Leader. "Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain- Leadership in Action," https://themilitaryleader.com/leadership-action-chamberlain/ [accessed 3 November 2021]. Weart's online article does the same as the DoD's. It describes Chamberlain in a single faceted manner and neglects all the instances that made him human like everyone else.
