Suchergebnisse

Für die Fleischproduktion in Deutschland müssen jedes Jahr 800 Millionen Lebewesen sterben. Dabei leben über 95% der Tiere in Massentierhaltung, auf engstem Raum, ohne Auslauf oder Beschäftigung, bis sie Jahre vor ihrer üblichen Lebenserwartung in den Schlachthöfen getötet werden (Fleisch kostet Leben: Leid und Tod in der Intensivtierhaltung, 2023). Die konventionelle Fleischproduktion, die die Massentierhaltung beinhaltet, birgt einige Probleme. Diese Art der Produktion des Fleisches schadet der Umwelt, der menschlichen Gesundheit und verschärft das Leid der Tiere.Seit geraumer Zeit werden aus diesem Grund Alternativen für die Fleischherstellung gesucht. Die Herstellung von Fleisch in einem Labor könnte dabei vielversprechend sein, die Aspekte Nachhaltigkeit und Verringerung von Tierleid zu vereinen und zu verbessern. Diese Seminararbeit widmet sich der Fragestellung, ob die Produktion und der Konsum von Laborfleisch zur Förderung der Nachhaltigkeit und des Tierwohles beitragen kann.Dabei wird zu Beginn die Problematik der herkömmlichen Fleischproduktion auf Umwelt und Tierwohl betrachtet. Es wird beschrieben, weshalb diese Form der Fleischherstellung kritisch zu betrachten ist und welche Folgen diese aufweist. Im nächsten Schritt wird auf Laborfleisch als alternative Produktionsmethode eingegangen. Es wird erklärt, was Laborfleisch ist, die Anfänge der Forschung werden beschrieben sowie das bisherige Herstellungsverfahren vorgestellt.Die Frage, ob Laborfleisch wirklich nachhaltiger ist, wird anhand von drei Aspekten näher betrachtet. Die Aspekte sind Reduzierung von Ressourcen, Energieeinsparung und Verringerung von Landnutzung. Auch die Tierwohlaspekte sind ein wichtiger Teil dieser Arbeit, weshalb auch hier mehrere Aspekte betrachtet werden. Es wird diskutiert, ob Laborfleisch tatsächlich zu weniger Tierleid führt, ob auf Antibiotika verzichtet werden kann und es wird auch das Töten von Tieren angesprochen.Kritisch betrachtet werden zudem die ethischen Dilemmata, die gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen, die Laborfleisch auf den Menschen haben könnte, sowie die Akzeptanz, die innerhalb der Gesellschaft zu diesem Thema herrscht. Abschließend wird ein Blick in die Zukunft gewagt, es werden Herausforderungen, die sich noch stellen könnten, eingebracht. Im Fazit wird die Fragestellung beantwortet inwiefern Laborfleisch zur Nachhaltigkeit und zum Tierwohl beitragen kann.Problematik der konventionellen Fleischproduktion für die UmweltAuch wenn in Deutschland seit einiger Zeit der Fleischkonsum sinkt, so steigt er doch weltweit seit Jahrzehnten immer weiter an. Finanziell geht es vielen Menschen besser als noch vor einigen Jahrzehnten, weshalb Fleisch schon längst nicht mehr als "Luxusgut" zählt. Die Produktion von Fleisch hat jedoch enorme Auswirkungen auf unsere Umwelt.Weltweit werden ungefähr 1,6 Milliarden Rinder, eine Milliarde Schweine und Schafe sowie 33 Milliarden Hühner gehalten. Um diese Tiere aufzuziehen und zu versorgen, benötigt man viel Fläche, außerdem viel Anbaufläche, um das Futter für diese Tiere anpflanzen zu können. Weltweit werden fünf Milliarden Hektar Fläche für landwirtschaftliche Zwecke genutzt. Vier Milliarden Hektar werden allein für die Tierhaltung und den Anbau des Futters verbraucht. Doch auch diese Fläche reicht längst nicht mehr aus. Die Fläche, die durch das Abholzen des Regenwaldes gewonnen wird, wird zum größten Teil für die Tierhaltung und als Anbaufläche genutzt.In Deutschland wird fast die Hälfte der Gesamtfläche landwirtschaftlich genutzt, aber auch diese Fläche reicht nicht aus, um unsere eigene Gesellschaft zu versorgen. Futtermittel, das auf einem Flächenanteil angebaut wird, das fast so groß wie Bayern ist, müssen wir noch importieren. Der größte Anteil der Fläche wird für den Anbau des Futtermittels benötigt. Soja als Futtermittel ist seit einigen Jahren sehr stark nachgefragt. Anstatt das Soja für den menschlichen Konsum zu verwenden, wird über 70 Prozent des angebauten Sojas für die Fütterung der Tiere in Tierhaltung verwendet. Auch der Regenwald wurde für den Anbau von Sojaflächen abgeholzt. Dadurch wird der Lebensraum von vielen Pflanzen und Tieren zerstört. Es kommt zu einem Aussterben vieler Arten und unsere Biodiversität wird zerstört (Der Appetit auf Fleisch und seine Folgen, 2022).Biodiversität ist die Vielfalt von Lebewesen, wie beispielsweise Tier- und Pflanzenarten. Laut eines UN-Berichtes aus dem Jahr 2019 sind wir gegenwärtig im sechsten Massenaussterben, das wir selbst verursachen. Ungefähr eine Million Pflanzen- und Tierarten sind derzeit vom Aussterben bedroht. Unser gesamtes Ökosystem ist davon bedroht. Ein funktionierendes Ökosystem ist sehr wichtig für jedes Leben auf der Erde. Nur durch dieses haben wir gute Luft, sauberes Wasser und nährstoffreiche Böden, um überhaupt Landwirtschaft betreiben zu können (Verlust der Biodiversität: Ursachen und folgenschwere Auswirkungen, 2020).14,5 Prozent der Treibhausgasemissionen werden durch die Tierhaltung verursacht. Die Hälfte davon entsteht bei der Produktion und dem Anbau des Futtermittels für die Tierhaltung. Pflanzliche Ernährung macht nur 29 Prozent der Treibhausgasemissionen von der gesamten Produktion an Lebensmitteln für den Menschen aus (Wilde 2022).Problematik der konventionellen Fleischproduktion für das TierwohlIm Jahr 2022 wurden pro Sekunde ungefähr 1.400 Tiere für den Fleischkonsum getötet. Zwar sind das fast 8 Prozent weniger als im Jahr zuvor, die Zahl jedoch bleibt schockierend. Auch schockierend ist, dass Fleischbetriebe eher noch größer werden müssen, um wirtschaftlich zu sein. Es müssen also noch mehr Tiere auf noch kleinerem Raum gehalten werden, um rentabel zu bleiben. Kleinere Betriebe können kaum noch wirtschaftlich betrieben werden. Massentierhaltung findet meist in großen Betrieben statt, die mehrere tausend Tiere auf engstem Raum halten. Die Tiere haben meist keine Möglichkeit, nach draußen zu gehen. Ziel ist es, mit möglichst geringen Kosten eine sehr große Menge an Fleisch, Eiern oder Milch herzustellen (Kubon 2022).Die meisten Tiere in der Tierhaltung werden ihr ganzes Leben lang gequält. Sie müssen in ihren eigenen Exkrementen und derjenigen der anderen Tiere stehen. Es ist eng in den Ställen, und somit kommt es auch zu häufigen Verletzungen untereinander. Es breiten sich Krankheiten aus, und es kann in den schlimmsten Fällen sogar zum Kannibalismus führen. Damit sich Krankheiten nicht so schnell oder gar nicht erst ausbreiten können, werden den Tieren verschiedene Antibiotika in ihr Futter gemischt. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf den Menschen. Es kann zu einer Antibiotikaresistenz führen (Kubon 2022). Die Tiere werden außerdem so gezüchtet, dass sie noch mehr Ertrag bringen, beispielsweise eine höhere Menge an Eiern, Milch oder eben Fleisch (Fleischkonsum in Deutschland: Trotz sinkender Zahlen leiden Tiere weiterhin, 2023).Teilweise werden die Tiere ohne jegliches Tageslicht gehalten, Schweine bekommen maximal 0,75 Quadratmeter Platz. Nachkommen der Tiere werden rasch von ihrer Mutter getrennt. Das Verstümmeln der Tiere steht in Massenbetrieben auf der Tagesordnung. Der Schwanz der Schweine wird ihnen oft in den ersten Tagen ihres Lebens abgeschnitten, dabei ist es für Schweine ein Organ, um mit ihren Artgenossen kommunizieren zu können. Bis 2021 war eine Kastration von Ferkeln ganz ohne Betäubung legal (Kubon 2022).Auch das Bio-Siegel bedeutet nicht zwangsläufig eine bessere Behandlung der Tiere. Diese müssen trotz allem mehr Eier oder mehr Milch produzieren, als sie es im Normalfall tun würden. Tierwohl und Wirtschaftlichkeit lassen sich nicht vereinbaren (Kubon 2022). Die normale Lebenserwartung wird von den Tieren nicht erreicht. Sie werden zuvor zum Schlachthaus gebracht, um anschließend vom Menschen verzehrt zu werden. Doch aufgrund von diversen Gründen können viele getötete Tiere nicht verzehrt werden. Sie wurden völlig ohne Nutzen getötet (Fleisch kostet Leben: Leid und Tod in der Intensivtierhaltung, 2023).Definition und die Anfänge von LaborfleischAls Laborfleisch wird im Labor industriell hergestelltes Fleisch bezeichnet. Es müssen also keine Tiere mehr gezüchtet, gehalten und geschlachtet werden. Genau das Teil des Tieres, welches gegessen werden soll, kann im Labor aus den Zellen des Tieres gezüchtet werden (Rempe 2023).In den 2000ern wollte der Gefäßspezialist Mark Post bereits das erste Laborfleisch herstellen. Allein für die Forschung, um ein Stück Rindfleisch herzustellen, brauchte er ungefähr eineinhalb Jahre. Außerdem brauchte es nochmals drei Monate, um dann die Frikadelle wirklich herzustellen. Leider war das Endergebnis noch zu teuer. 250.000 Euro hat die erste laborgezüchtete Frikadelle gekostet. Die Konsistenz soll einer normalen Rindfleischfrikadelle geähnelt haben, der Geschmack war etwas anders (Wildermuth, 2023).Mark Post hat daraufhin ein Start-Up gegründet, das weiterhin am Laborfleisch forschen sollte. 2015 kostete eine Frikadelle dann noch 70 Euro. Gegenwärtig konnte der Preis gesenkt werden und liegt bei 9 Euro pro Stück (In-vitro-Fleisch und Clean Meat: Gibt es Fleisch aus dem Labor, 2019). Im Lauf der Jahre wurden noch weitere Start-Ups, die sich mit Laborfleisch auseinandersetzen, gegründet. Das Produkt wird heute nicht mehr in Laboren hergestellt, sondern in großen Behältern in einer Art "Brauerei" (In-vitro-Fleisch und Clean Meat: Gibt es Fleisch aus dem Labor, 2019).Herstellung von LaborfleischUm Laborfleisch herstellen zu können, werden Stammzellen benötigt. Diese werden mithilfe einer Muskelbiopsie aus den Muskeln oder aus den Fettzellen des Tieres entnommen. Dies kann bei Rindern, Schweinen oder Hühnern entnommen werden. Die Tiere stehen dabei unter Narkose (Rempe, 2023).Damit aus diesen Stammzellen letztendlich Laborfleisch entstehen kann, benötigt es noch die Zugabe von einer Nährlösung, damit sich die Zellen vermehren können, und eine Substanz, die die Zellen zu einer dreidimensionalen Substanz wachsen lassen. Als Substanz wird meist Chinin oder Kollagen benutzt. Anschließend können die entnommenen Zellen sich dann in einem Behälter vermehren. Dieser Behälter ist ein Bioreaktor, in dem die Zellen alle notwendigen Nährstoffe bekommen, um dann die Muskelentwicklungsschritte durchlaufen zu können, um letztendlich zu einem Stück Fleisch kultiviert zu werden (Rempe 2023).Nachhaltigkeit von LaborfleischIn den folgenden Unterpunkten wird die Nachhaltigkeit von Laborfleisch kritisch untersucht.Reduzierung des RessourcenverbrauchsDie Herstellung von konventionellem Fleisch bedarf vieler Ressourcen. Sollte der Bedarf an Fleisch weiterhin anwachsen über die nächsten Jahre, dann wird die Erde die nötigen Ressourcen nicht mehr produzieren können. Am Beispiel des Rindfleisches, das vergleichsweise sehr viele Ressourcen benötigt, wird deutlich, wie umweltbelastend die Fleischproduktion ist. Ein Kilogramm benötigt ungefähr 9 Kilogramm Getreide, 15.400 Liter Wasser und bis zu 49 Quadratmeter Land. Für dieses eine Kilogramm Fleisch entstehen dabei circa 22 Kilogramm Treibhausgase. Im direkten Vergleich: Ein Kilogramm Laborfleisch würde nur ungefähr zweieinhalb Kilogramm Getreide für die Herstellung benötigen (Gerhard 2020).Schockierend ist auch, dass genug Nahrung erzeugt wird, um theoretisch jeden Menschen versorgen zu können. Durch die immer weiter ansteigende Fleischherstellung gehen aber Ressourcen, mit denen man Menschen weltweit ernähren könnte, verloren. Mit den dabei verlorenen Ressourcen könnten 3,5 Milliarden Menschen ernährt werden. Allerdings ist anzumerken, dass der Welthunger noch von anderen Faktoren abhängt. Ein Umstieg auf Laborfleisch würde das Problem des Hungers nicht lösen. Welthunger entsteht beispielsweise durch Faktoren wie Naturkatastrophen, Armut und auch durch mangelnde Produktionsmöglichkeit von Nahrung (Ferrari 2018).Verschiedene Studien zeigen aber auch, dass Laborfleisch genauso viel Treibhausgase ausstoßen und der Wasser- und Energieverbrauch sogar noch höher liegen könnte.EnergieeinsparungVerschiedene Studien ergaben unterschiedliche Ergebnisse. Während die einen von einer deutlichen Energieeinsparung von bis zu 45% sprechen, wird in anderen Studien davon ausgegangen, dass Laborfleisch eventuell sogar einen noch höheren Energiebedarf haben könnte. Der Bio-Reaktor sollte konstant 37 Grad aufweisen, weshalb dafür sehr viel Energie benötigt wird (Ferrari 2018). Da wir den Absprung von fossiler Energie noch nicht geschafft haben, schadet ein hoher Energieverbrauch weiterhin der Erde. Der Zellbiologe Kai Fiedler entgegnete in einem Interview folgendes:"Wie viel Energie und andere Ressourcen letztendlich wirklich benötigt werden für die Laborfleischherstellung, können wir erst ermitteln, wenn die Produkte in Massen produziert werden und auf den Markt kommen" (Gerhard 2020).Verringerung der LandnutzungEine Sache kann jedoch gesichert als Vorteil von Laborfleisch aufgelistet werden. Die Landnutzung würde definitiv verringert werden. Durch den Wegfall von Massentierhaltung, Weideflächen für die Tiere, aber vor allem durch die Senkung der Anbauflächen für das Futtermittel der Tiere würde eine geringere Landnutzung entstehen. Es könnte dementsprechend wieder mehr angepflanzt werden für die menschliche Ernährung. Und auch die ökologischen Auswirkungen auf das Land würde sich verbessern. Außerdem würde auch der Wasserverbrauch für die Herstellung sehr viel geringer ausfallen. Forscher*Innen nennen sogar sehr positive Zahlen: es soll bis zu 99% weniger Land benötigt werden und bis zu 90% weniger Wasserverbrauch (Ehrenfeld 2021).Weniger TierleidLaborfleisch soll Tierleid beenden. Doch wie tierfreundlich ist Laborfleisch wirklich? Es soll nur diesen einen Eingriff geben, der dazu noch unter örtlicher Betäubung oder Narkose vorgenommen wird, um die Stammzellen entnehmen zu können. Der Vorteil: Die Tiere müssen nicht mehr getötet werden, damit wir in den Genuss von Fleisch kommen. Es ist jedoch noch unklar, wie viele Schmerzen die Tiere bei einer Biopsie verspüren.Der Nachteil: Die Nährstoffe, die bislang verwendet werden, um den Stammzellen die notwendige Grundlage zu verschaffen, werden aus Kälberserum gewonnen. Dieses Kälberserum wird aus dem Blut von ungeborenen Kälbern gewonnen, weshalb es auch "fetales Kälberserum" genannt wird. Bei diesem Vorgang sterben jedoch das Muttertier und das ungeborene Kalb. Das Muttertier muss geschlachtet werden, um ihr den bis dahin noch lebenden Kälberfötus aus der Gebärmutter zu entnehmen. In einem nächsten Schritt wird dem Kalb dann das gesamte Blut entnommen. Bei diesem Prozess lebt das Kalb noch und bekommt keinerlei Betäubung. Aus diesem Grund kann das Kalb dabei Schmerzen empfinden. Pro Kalb kann etwa ein halber Liter Blut entnommen werden.Derzeit werden pflanzliche Alternativen getestet und einige scheinen sehr vielversprechend zu sein. Einige Unternehmen nutzen nur noch pflanzliche Alternativen, um einen Nährboden für das Laborfleisch zu schaffen. Aber auch, wenn das Kälberserum durch eine pflanzliche Alternative ersetzt wird, ist das Laborfleisch trotz alledem nicht vegan. Es bleibt die Biopsie, um die Stammzellen gewinnen zu können. Vorteilhaft ist, dass mit einer einzigen Biopsie mehrere Tonnen Fleisch hergestellt werden können. Es müssten weitaus weniger Tiere gehalten werden. Das bedeutet, dass die Haltung der Tiere verbessert werden könnte. Die klassische Massentierhaltung mit mehreren tausenden Tieren auf engstem Raum könnte abgeschafft werden. Dies würde dazu beitragen, das Tierleid zu verringern (Rempe 2023).Vermeidung von AntibiotikaeinsatzAntibiotika wird eingesetzt, um Krankheiten einzudämmen. Die Bakterien werden gehemmt und können sich nicht weiter im Körper vermehren. Bei Viren zeigt Antibiotika keine Wirkung. Aber Antibiotika kann auch schlechte Auswirkungen haben, wenn es falsch angewandt wird. Wird Antibiotika zu viel und zu früh eingesetzt, können sich Antibiotikaresistenzen entwickelt. Das bedeutet, dass die Antibiotika im Körper nicht mehr wirken, da sich der Körper bereits vorab an das Präparat gewöhnt hat.Infektionen, die normalerweise mit der Gabe eines Antibiotikums vollständig geheilt werden können, können nun einen schweren bis tödlichen Verlauf haben. In der Massentierhaltung wird Antibiotika meist ohne Notwendigkeit eingesetzt, um das Ausbrechen von Krankheiten zu vermeiden. Hier entstehen dann häufiger Resistenzen. Bricht eine Krankheit in diesen Anlagen aus, erkranken doch wieder vermehrt Tiere.In Deutschland wurden im Jahr 2021 insgesamt 601 Tonnen Antibiotika an Tiere vergeben. Schweine und Ferkel bekommen dabei am häufigsten Antibiotika verabreicht. Tiere, die krank sind, sollten behandelt werden. Problematisch ist nur, dass innerhalb der Massentierhaltung nie einzelne Tiere behandelt werden, sondern Antibiotika an alle Tiere vergeben werden, um das Ausbreiten von Krankheiten zu vermeiden (Kainz 2023).Das im Labor gezüchtete Fleisch benötigt kein oder viel weniger Antibiotika. Es werden nur einzelnen Zellen Antibiotika hinzugefügt, um Infektionen eindämmen zu können. Wenn das Laborfleisch steril hergestellt werden könnte, dann wäre dies eine Möglichkeit, gänzlich auf Antibiotika verzichten zu können (Clean Meat – Ist Laborfleisch die Zukunft, 2023).Bei der Produktion von Laborfleisch kann derzeit nicht ganz auf Antibiotika verzichtet werden, doch der Einsatz kann bis auf ein Minimum reduziert werden. In dieser Hinsicht wäre dies ein weiteres Argument, welches für das Laborfleisch spricht.Vermeidung von Tiertransporten und Töten der TiereIn Europa werden jährlich rund eine Milliarde Tiere in Tiertransporten durch Europa gefahren, um die Tiere zu einem Schlachthof zu bringen. Die Transportwege können teilweise mehrere hunderte Kilometer lang sein. Die Tiere werden dabei lebendig auf engstem Raum, ohne Trinkwasser oder ausreichend frischer Luft eingesperrt. Im Sommer leiden sie unter Hitze und im Winter unter Kälte. Es gibt zudem nicht ausreichend Platz, um sich hinzulegen, was wiederum zu Verletzungen führen kann. Einige Tiere sterben bereits auf dem Weg ins Schlachthaus. Es wird keine Rücksicht genommen, ob die Tiere schon vor dem Transport verletzt, trächtig oder krank sind.Die EU-Richtlinien für den Tiertransport sind häufig ungenau formuliert, weshalb die Tiere trotz Krankheit auf den Tiertransporter aufgeladen werden. Die maximale Transportdauer ist generell auf acht Stunden angelegt, diese kann jedoch unter bestimmten Umständen auch verlängert werden. Schweine dürfen bis zu 24 Stunden lang transportiert werden, wenn ein ständiger Zugang zu Trinkwasser gewährt wird. Dieser Vorgang kann beliebig oft wiederholt werden, wenn den Tieren nach dem Entladen 24 Stunden Ruhezeit gewährt wird mit Zugang zu Trinkwasser und Nahrung.Noch schockierender ist der Transport auf dem Meer. Tiere werden oft tage- oder wochenlang auf dem Meer auf einen anderen Kontinent transportiert. Dieser Transport gilt jedoch nicht als Transport, dabei leiden die Tiere hier häufig noch mehr. Über Wochen hinweg werden die Tiere auf engstem Raum, mit schlechter Luftzufuhr und in kotbedeckten Innenräumen zusammengepfercht gehalten. Nahrung, Wasser sowie medizinische Versorgung sind kaum vorhanden. Viele Tiere sterben bei dem langen Transportweg und werden daraufhin einfach im Meer entsorgt.Die Regelungen innerhalb der EU sind lückenhaft, verlassen die Tiertransporte jedoch die EU, dann gibt es keinerlei Möglichkeiten, die Einhaltung der Richtlinien zu überprüfen. Kontrollen innerhalb der EU finden zu wenig statt. Bei Kontrollen, die durchgeführt werden, zeigen sich schwere Verstöße gegen die Richtlinien, die wenig bis gar nicht sanktioniert werden (Tiertransporte – Zahlen, Fakten & aktuelle Regeln, 2022).In Deutschland wurden 2021 rund 760 Millionen Tiere in Schlachthöfen getötet. Nach dem Stress, den sie bereits beim Transport erleiden mussten, kommt im Schlachthof weiteres Leid auf die Tiere zu. Sie werden aus den Transportern getrieben und im Schlachthof betäubt. Dieses Betäuben fügt den Tieren schon Schmerzen zu. Teilweise wird fehlerhaft und unzureichend betäubt. Das bedeutet, dass die Tiere unter Umständen bei Bewusstsein sind, wenn sie getötet werden. Getötet wird, indem die Hauptschlagader durchtrennt wird (Schlachthof: So leiden und sterben Tiere in Schlachthöfen, 2022).Sollte Laborfleisch sich durchsetzen können und zukünftig auch für den Privatgebrauch zugänglich sein, dann würde der langwierige Transport, der immer mit Stress und Leid für die Tiere verbunden ist, wegfallen. Es würden insgesamt weniger Tiere gehalten und aufgezogen werden. Auch das Töten der Tiere in den Schlachthäusern würde wegfallen, da bei Laborfleisch keine Tiere mehr sterben müssten.Laborfleisch würde also insgesamt dazu beitragen, dass weniger Tiere leiden müssten. Antibiotika würde gar nicht mehr oder nur noch in kleinen Mengen verabreicht werden. Die grauenvolle Massentötung würde gänzlich entfallen. Es kann gesagt werden, dass Laborfleisch dazu beitragen würde, dass die Tiere vor Qualen geschützt werden würden.Doch laborgezüchtetes Fleisch bringt nicht nur Vorteile mit sich. Es gibt ethische Dilemmata, gesundheitliche Risiken können noch nicht abgeschätzt werden und auch innerhalb der Gesellschaft gibt es noch einige Bedenken. Diese Themen werden im nächsten Abschnitt betrachtet.Ethische ÜberlegungenDie Herstellung von Laborfleisch wird in der Öffentlichkeit kontrovers diskutiert. Ein Argument, das für das im Labor hergestellte Fleisch spricht, ist, dass die Entnahme von Zellen und Gewebe bei Tieren in etwa gleichzusetzen ist mit einer Blutspende durch den Menschen. Dieses Argument gilt jedoch nur, wenn die Lebewesen bei der Entnahme des fetalen Kälberserums nicht sterben oder leiden.Ein ethisches Dilemma sehen viele innerhalb der Gesellschaft darin, dass noch einige Tiere leiden oder sogar getötet werden müssen, um das Laborfleisch herzustellen, weshalb Laborfleisch für viele keine Option oder Verbesserung darstellt. Werden jedoch keine Tiere für die Herstellung gequält, dann sehen die meisten Personen keinen Grund mehr, das Laborfleisch nicht zu testen. Wenn sichergestellt wird, dass das Laborfleisch ein Stück Fleisch ohne tierischen Inhalt wird, dann würden auch einige Personen, die sich bisher vegetarisch oder vegan ernährt haben, sich von dem tierfreien Fleisch ernähren.Ein Nachteil des Laborfleisches besteht darin, dass die Bedeutung des Fleisches innerhalb unserer Gesellschaft noch weiter anwächst. Die Ernährung könnte noch einseitiger werden, da keine moralischen Vorbehalte mehr gegenüber dem Fleisch bestünden. Ein Ernährungsstil, der fleischbasiert ist, kann beispielsweise vermehrt zu Übergewicht, einem zu hohen Blutdruck oder auch zu Diabetes führen.Viele Personen stehen dem Laborfleisch sehr kritisch gegenüber. Fleisch im Labor zu züchten, das klingt für sehr viele Menschen unnatürlich oder auch ungesund. Vorurteile gibt es viele, weshalb sie das Laborfleisch meist nicht für geeignet halten. Die Angst vor neuen Technologien bringt bei einigen negative Emotionen hervor. Dabei besteht das Laborfleisch aus denselben Zellen wie das konventionell hergestellte Fleisch. Das Argument, dass Laborfleisch unnatürlich und ungesund ist, ist nicht rational begründet.Aber auch die Vorteile werden von einigen gesehen. Es gibt die Überzeugung, dass das Züchten von Fleisch im Labor einen moralischen Fortschritt mit sich bringt. Es könnte beinhalten, dass das Halten von Tieren auf kleinstem Raum oder auch das Töten als etwas sehr Negatives angesehen wird, das in Zukunft sehr kritisch betrachtet werden wird (Ferrari 2018).Gesundheitliche Auswirkungen von LaborfleischDie gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen, die der Konsum von Laborfleisch mit sich bringen könnte, sind noch unzureichend erforscht, weshalb bisher nur Annahmen getroffen werden können. Gesichert ist jedoch, dass das Laborfleisch keinerlei Antibiotikarückstände beinhaltet, wenn das Laborfleisch steril hergestellt wird. Antibiotikaresistenzen durch den Genuss von im Labor gezüchteten Fleisch könne also ausgeschlossen werden. Dies wird als sehr vorteilhaft für die Gesundheit angesehen.Da das gezüchtete Fleisch jedoch dieselben Eigenschaften wie das konventionelle Fleisch aufweist, ist davon auszugehen, dass es auch dieselben Risiken mit sich bringt. Ein übermäßiger Konsum des Laborfleisches könnte ebenfalls zu Übergewicht, Bluthochdruck und anderen gesundheitlichen Risiken, beitragen. Eine Möglichkeit, um das Laborfleisch gesünder zu machen, könnte die Zugabe von Nährstoffen oder eine Veränderung der Fettzusammensetzung sein.Da Laborfleisch bisher noch nicht oder nur wenig konsumiert wird, lassen sich noch keine validen Aussagen über die gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen treffen. Aussagen darüber werden sich erst Jahrzehnte nach der Zulassung treffen lassen (Clean Meat- Ist Laborfleisch die Zukunft?, 2023).Akzeptanz von Laborfleisch innerhalb der Gesellschaft und potentielle WiderständeDie Universität Osnabrück hat im Jahr 2021 eine Studie durchgeführt, wie hoch die Akzeptanz für das Laborfleisch in Deutschland ist. Es wurden 500 Frauen und Männer ab 18 Jahren befragt. Weniger als ein Drittel in Deutschland haben im Jahr 2021 von Laborfleisch gehört. Dennoch gaben 47% an, noch lieber ein laborgezüchtetes Fleisch als das konventionelle Fleisch zu konsumieren.Eine positive Einstellung gegenüber dem neuartigen Produkt beeinflusst auch die Akzeptanz. Eine höhere Akzeptanz und eine positivere Einstellung können auch durch den Einfluss von Peergroups erfolgen. Die Individuen fühlen sich dann mehr in die Gruppe integriert, wenn sie dieselben Ansichten teilen.Jedoch haben auch viele Personen noch Einwände und Sorgen gegenüber laborgezüchtetem Fleisch. Dies könnte ein Widerstand sein, mit dem das Laborfleisch zu kämpfen hat. Durch Aufklärung, beispielsweise durch Kampagnen, könnte jedoch eine positivere Einstellung hervorgebracht werden.Den Landwirten könnte eine Ernährung mit Laborfleisch missfallen, denn die regionale Viehwirtschaft könnte abgeschafft werden. Viele Landwirte würden ihre Arbeit verlieren. Ein weiterer Widerstand könnte sich bei der Zulassung ergeben. Da Laborfleisch ein neuartiges Produkt ist, muss es erst zugelassen werden. Dazu müssen einige Tests durchlaufen werden. Sollten diese Tests negativ ausfallen, dann wäre das Projekt "Laborfleisch" geplatzt.Herausforderungen und Blick in die ZukunftIm Jahr 2020 hat Singapur als erstes Land dem Laborfleisch die Zulassung gewährt. Seitdem ist es dort erhältlich. Mark Post, der Hersteller der ersten Laborfrikadelle, arbeitet seit 2013 mit Hochdruck an einem Laborfleisch, das auch für den Privatgebrauch funktionieren kann. Gentechnologien erschweren eine Zulassung innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Zudem dauert die Zulassung innerhalb der EU häufig doppelt so lang wie in anderen Staaten. Dadurch, dass Laborfleisch ein komplett neues Lebensmittel sein wird, müsste das Laborfleisch viele Tests bestreiten. Auch dies verzögert den Prozess. Diesen Herbst wurde die erste Zulassung innerhalb der EU für Laborfleisch beantragt. Den Antrag hat eine Firma aus Heidelberg gestellt. Dieser Antrag wird nun geprüft.Eine weitere Herausforderung wird es sein, die Gesellschaft von dem im Labor hergestellten Fleisch zu überzeugen. Um Tierleid zu beenden sowie die Umwelt zu schützen, müsste Fleisch aus dem Labor überwiegend beziehungsweise ausschließlich konsumiert und verkauft werden. Wenn Laborfleisch in großen Mengen auch für den Privatgebrauch hergestellt werden könnte, dann würden auch die Verkaufspreise sinken und für alle zugänglich gemacht werden.Des Weiteren sollte für die Herstellung des Laborfleisches noch eine pflanzliche Alternative für die Nährlösung gefunden werden, damit gar kein Tier für den Herstellungsprozess gequält und getötet werden muss. Eine weitere Möglichkeit wäre eine Technik, bei der die Kälber überleben können.FazitUm die Fragestellung dieser Seminararbeit beantworten zu können, wurden einige Aspekte des Laborfleisches kritisch betrachtet. Durch den weltweiten Anstieg des Fleischkonsums kam es zu schwerwiegenden Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt. Die konventionelle Tierhaltung bedarf einer riesigen Fläche für die Tierhaltung, aber vor allem für den Anbau des Futtermittels für die Tiere. Die Biodiversität wird durch die Flächennutzung und -ausweitung verringert. Dadurch wird auch die Landwirtschaft gefährdet, da die Böden nicht mehr genügend Nährstoffe für das Pflanzenwachstum aufweisen.Dies ist bereits der erste Vorteil, den die Laborfleischproduktion aufzuweisen hat. Die Landnutzung kann um bis zu 99% verringert werden. Und auch Ressourcen werden geschont. Es bedarf viel weniger Getreide, da kaum noch Tiere für die Fleischproduktion im Labor ernährt werden müssen. Studien zeigen, dass die Energienutzung jedoch nicht unbedingt geringer ausfallen würde, da die Reaktoren, in denen das Laborfleisch gezüchtet werden könnte, konstante 37 Grad haben müssten. Da wir die Energiewende noch nicht geschafft haben und somit die meiste Energie immer noch aus fossilen Brennstoffen gewonnen wird, trägt Laborfleisch in dieser Hinsicht nicht zu mehr Nachhaltigkeit bei.Für die herkömmliche Fleischproduktion sterben jede Sekunde rund 1.400 Tiere. Doch auch ihre meist kurze Lebensphase ist geprägt von Qualen. 95% der Tiere, die für den Fleischkonsum gezüchtet werden, leben in der Massentierhaltung. Dort leben sie auf engstem Raum ohne Beschäftigung. Meist müssen sie in ihren eigenen Exkrementen stehen. Verletzungen sowie Krankheiten sind an der Tagesordnung. Damit die Krankheiten sich nicht ausbreiten, wird ihnen Antibiotika in die Futtermittel gemischt. Dies kann zu Antibiotikaresistenzen beim Menschen führen. Ihre normale Lebenserwartung wird nicht einmal ansatzweise erreicht. Nach langem Transport, meist ohne Lüftung oder ausreichend Wasser und Nahrung, werden die Tiere in ein Schlachthaus gebracht. Nicht selten wird die Betäubung nicht richtig verabreicht und die Tiere erleiden starke Schmerzen während des Schlachtens.Einen gesicherten Vorteil, den das im Labor gezüchtete Fleisch vorzuweisen hat, ist, dass das Tierleid vermindert wird. In einem bisherigen Vorgang wurden bei der Gewinnung von Kälberserum, welches für die Stammzellgewinnung gebraucht wird, das Muttertier und das Kälbchen getötet. Die Forscher*Innen sind jedoch dabei, pflanzliche Alternativen zu testen, die sich bisher auch als sehr vielversprechend dargestellt haben. Auch die Option einer Biopsie, bei der das Tier nur betäubt wird, würde das Tierwohl fördern. Laborfleisch könnte gänzlich ohne Tierleid auskommen. Es würden keine Tiere mehr in Massentierhaltunganlagen gequält werden, es gäbe keine langen Transportwege mehr und auch die Tötung würde entfallen.Aussagen über die gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen auf den Menschen können nicht eindeutig getroffen werden. Wenn das Fleisch aus dem Labor vollständig steril hergestellt werden kann, dann würde der Einsatz von Antibiotika wegfallen. Dies wäre für den Menschen gesünder. Ansonsten hat Laborfleisch eine sehr ähnliche Zusammensetzung wie das konventionelle Fleisch. Dies bedeutet, dass es zu denselben Risiken wie beispielsweise Diabetes oder Bluthochdruck kommen kann. Gesünder könnte es lediglich durch die Zugabe von Nährstoffen oder Verringerung der Fettzusammensetzung werden.Ob das Laborfleisch sich durchsetzen kann und somit zu einer nachhaltigeren und tierleidfreien Welt beitragen kann, ist auch abhängig von der Gesellschaft. In Deutschland stehen die Menschen dem Laborfleisch relativ positiv gegenüber. Fast die Hälfte der Befragten in einer Studie der Universität Osnabrück gaben an, lieber Laborfleisch als das herkömmliche Fleisch essen zu wollen. Ob dies im Falle einer Zulassung auch so eintreten würde, bleibt offen.Ob die Herstellung und der Konsum von Laborfleisch wirklich dazu beitragen kann, dass Nachhaltigkeit und Tierwohl gefördert wird, wird sich zeigen, sobald die Produktion in großen Mengen ablaufen wird. Allerdings verspricht Laborfleisch viele positive Faktoren, die zur Nachhaltigkeit und zur Förderung von Tierwohl beitragen können. Das bestehende Tierleid könnte durch Laborfleisch fast vollständig beendet werden. In puncto Ressourcenverbrauch sowie Landnutzung verspricht das Laborfleisch auch, die nachhaltigere Variante zu sein.Insgesamt kann die Produktion und der Konsum des Laborfleisches das Potential haben, die Nachhaltigkeit sowie das Tierwohl zu fördern. Es müssten jedoch noch einige wichtige Schritte in Sachen Technologie und Konsumkultur gemacht werden, um diese Vorteile voll auszuschöpfen.LiteraturverzeichnisClean Meat - Ist Laborfleisch die Zukunft? (2023, 12. Mai). Verbraucherzentrale. https://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/wissen/lebensmittel/lebensmittelproduktion/clean-meat-ist-laborfleisch-die-zukunft-65071 (Abgerufen am 21. November 2023).Der Appetit auf Fleisch und seine Folgen. (2022, 13. Juli). WWF. https://www.wwf.de/themen-projekte/landwirtschaft/ernaehrung-konsum/fleisch/der-appetit-auf-fleisch-und-seine-folgen/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Ehrenfeld, F. (2021, 30. August). Fleisch aus dem Labor. SWR. https://www.swr.de/wissen/fleisch-aus-dem-labor-104.html (Abgerufen am 30. November 2023).Ferrari, A. (2018). Ethische und soziale Aspekte von In-vitro-Fleisch. TIERethik, 2018/1(Heft 16).Fleisch kostet Leben: Leid und Tod in der Intensivtierhaltung. (2022, 29. Juni). PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/fleisch/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Fleischkonsum in Deutschland: Trotz sinkender Zahlen leiden Tiere weiterhin. (2023, 30. Oktober). PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/fleischkonsum-deutschland/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Gerhard, S. (2020, 25. November). Wann wir endlich... Fleisch essen, für das kein Tier mehr leiden muss. Quarks. https://www.quarks.de/gesundheit/ernaehrung/wann-wir-endlich-fleisch-essen-fuer-das-kein-tier-mehr-leiden-muss/ (Abgerufen am 30. November 2023).In-vitro-Fleisch und Clean Meat: Gibt es Fleisch aus dem Labor? (2019, 13. Januar). PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/laborfleisch/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Kainz, L. (2023, 3. März). Antibiotika in der Massentierhaltung: So gefährlich ist ihr Einsatz. PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/antibiotika-massentierhaltung/ (Abgerufen am 21. November 2023).Kubon, I. (2022, 21. Oktober). Massentierhaltung: Schlecht für Tiere, Menschen und das Klima. PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/massentierhaltung/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Rempe, C. (2023, 11. August). Fleisch aus dem Labor. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung. https://www.bzfe.de/nachhaltiger-konsum/orientierung-beim-einkauf/fleisch-aus-dem-labor/ (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Schlachthof: So leiden und sterben Tiere in Schlachthöfen. (2022, 24. Mai). PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/schlachthof/ (Abgerufen am 21. November 2023)Tiertransporte – Zahlen, Fakten & aktuelle Regeln. (2022, 14. Juli). PETA. https://www.peta.de/themen/tiertransporte/ (Abgerufen am 21. November 2023).Verlust der Biodiversität: Ursachen und folgenschwere Auswirkungen. (2020, 16. Januar). Europäisches Parlament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/headlines/society/20200109STO69929/verlust-der-biodiversitat-ursachen-und-folgenschwere-auswirkungen (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Wildermuth, V. (2023, 9. August). Vom In-vitro-Burger zur Bulette für alle. deutschlandfunk. https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/laborfleisch-in-vitro-fleisch-kuenstliches-fleisch-100.html (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).Wilde, W. (2022, 30. Oktober). Faktencheck: Wie klimaschädlich ist Fleischkonsum wirklich? DW. https://www.dw.com/de/faktencheck-wie-sch%C3%A4dlich-f%C3%BCr-das-klima-ist-der-verzehr-von-fleisch-wirklich/a-63252828 (Abgerufen am 19. November 2023).

In September, the U.S. Commerce Department issued a rule that would result in a de facto ban on all Chinese autos in the United States. Invoking a looming danger to national security, Biden administration policy claims — without offering evidence or considering alternatives — that only complete exclusion of Chinese auto firms could keep Americans safe.This is only the latest indication that the U.S. political elite, seized with panic over the challenge China poses to American power and prosperity, is creeping toward cutting off the U.S. from Chinese advanced sectors across the board. Not only does this approach drive us further down the road to great power bloc formation, it is likely to seriously damage the long-term global competitiveness of U.S. firms as well.On this issue as with so many others connected to China, American leaders are identifying genuine problems that do require changes in U.S. laws, regulations, and even governing philosophy. But rather than the careful and pragmatic response that could turn Chinese competition into a force strengthening American business, revitalizing the global economy, and accelerating the global climate transition, the exclusionary U.S. response reinforces a world of a zero-sum competition in which all sides lose.The rule in question, "Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles" (15 CFR Part 791), was put forward by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, the same body executing the Biden administration's blockade on advanced semiconductors against China. It builds on a landmark executive order issued by Trump in 2019 by which the president arrogated to the executive branch the authority to ban any communications technology associated with a "foreign adversary." In this case, as with most Trump measures against China, the Biden administration chose to maintain the existing restrictions and steadily expand them.BIS's rule would prohibit the presence of Chinese-designed or -produced hardware and software in the external connectivity systems of vehicles. This may seem like a niche concern, but McKinsey expects 95 percent of cars sold globally to be connected by 2030, against 50 percent in 2020. Every automaker, regardless of where its headquarters is situated, is transitioning to a profit model based heavily on selling software in connected cars and exploiting the consumer data those connected cars make available. The transition to electric vehicles reinforces these trends because 97 percent are connected.Chinese automakers have been at the forefront of both these developments. In August, electric and hybrid vehicles accounted for 54 percent of sales in China — compared with 19 percent in the United States. In digital performance, Chinese companies are also eclipsing legacy automakers from the U.S., Japan, and elsewhere, their only real competition coming from U.S. startups like Tesla and Rivian. The Commerce Department rule thus strikes at the heart of Chinese companies' consumer appeal.It is also likely to close the last opening for Chinese companies to reach the American market. In 2023, Chinese EV exports to the United States represented only two percent of the total. In May, the Biden administration announced it would increase tariffs on Chinese electric vehicle exports from 27.5 percent to 100 percent, essentially closing the U.S. market to China-based producers. But that left open the possibility of Chinese factories setting up in third countries or even in the United States to sell into the U.S. market. México, with its well-established auto industry, low wages, and free trade to the American market via NAFTA's successor, the USMCA, would have been particularly attractive. BIS's rule effectively rules out that possibility.Significantly, the administration is justifying the rule on national security grounds. As Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said, "Cars today have cameras, microphones, GPS tracking, and other technologies connected to the internet. It doesn't take much imagination to understand how a foreign adversary with access to this information could pose a serious risk to both our national security and the privacy of U.S. citizens."The administration does not provide any evidence that the Chinese state has ever forced auto companies to use their technology to gather intelligence or to manipulate their hardware to introduce secret vulnerabilities. It does not consider whether the almost nonexistent U.S. protections on data privacy allow easier routes to gaining such information or whether the weak U.S. regulation of auto connectivity systems would allow foreign adversaries to hack into cars regardless of their national provenance. It does not weigh whether the Chinese government's intense interest in cultivating strong global auto brands might discourage behavior that would have a disastrous effect on their public image worldwide. The administration merely notes that Chinese laws notionally allow such abuses and, with a little imagination, we can think up all kinds of scary scenarios.Such reasoning reflects a sharp shift in policymakers' thinking in recent years. Previously, they found it easy to tolerate the risks involved with international connection and interdependence; now they evince absolute intolerance of any risk they can dream up, particularly if it can be imagined as involving nefarious intent on China's part. Not only does this shift lead U.S. leaders to underestimate other kinds of risk, it also causes them to neglect what may be a far more serious threat: large-scale great power conflict.After all, appealing to national security to ban Chinese vehicles without any evidence of malpractice signals clearly that Washington already considers China to be its enemy. Indeed, on Trump's last day in office in 2021, the Commerce Department listed China as one of the half dozen officially designated "foreign adversaries" of the United States for purposes of banning communications technology. The Biden administration made no move to reverse the designation.Chinese observers are getting the message loud and clear. As Li Haidong, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University put it: "In recent years, shoving normal economic activities under the heading of 'national security' to smear and suppress China has been a constant practice among U.S. politicians. They're also using it to manufacture an anti-China consensus among the public, laying a foundation for increasingly extreme policies against China." Each new exclusionary measure deepens disillusion on the Chinese side and further fragments the global economy, exacerbating the core zero-sum pressures that caused the collapse of U.S.–China relations in the first place.Encouraging globe-spanning conflict is not the only consequence. Excluding Chinese companies from the American market on national security grounds also precludes any path to restoring market access. Apparently the Biden administration did not entertain the possibility of creating safeguards that Chinese companies could in principle meet to address the genuine concerns about hacking and data security. That means that U.S. automakers will never have to confront the challenge of their more advanced Chinese competitors, which may undermine the long-term viability of the U.S. automotive industry itself.U.S. car companies, which refused to invest in electric vehicle production for decades, now say they need more time to make the transition. The same companies that spent hundreds of millions of dollars undermining government proposals to spur the EV transition complain that China's efforts to develop the new industry were unfair — though they are happy to take the similar subsidies and preferences that the U.S. government is now offering. The same companies that fell behind Chinese auto firms' digital innovation have discovered national security concerns that force them to support removing those firms from the American market.There are better ways to handle the challenge of Chinese competition, in part by studying China's response to an even more difficult competitive landscape in the late 20th century. As it integrated into the global economy, China faced corporations from the rich countries that dominated their sectors and left few openings to Chinese producers. Rather than excluding foreign businesses, Chinese leaders embraced their presence in the Chinese market to gain access to advanced technology and know-how, and to exert competitive pressure on Chinese businesses. However, Chinese leaders also modulated the otherwise overwhelming force of foreign competition, using the techniques of managed trade, industrial policy, and state-structured market competition to catch up before fully opening the domestic market.U.S. automakers are largely responsible for their own uncompetitive position, but the auto industry is essential to jobs and innovation in the American economy and cannot be sacrificed. Yet absolute protection from Chinese competition virtually guarantees that U.S. firms will fall further behind and will become increasingly irrelevant in global auto production. The fear of China's presence in American society is not only leading us into international conflict, it is simultaneously undermining the core sources of U.S. strength.

Neural circuits in the cerebral cortex consist of excitatory pyramidal cells and inhibitory interneurons. These two main classes of cortical neurons follow largely different genetic programs, yet they assemble into highly specialized circuits during development following a very precise choreography. Previous studies have shown that signals produced by pyramidal cells influence the migration of cortical interneurons, but the molecular nature of these factors has remained elusive. Here, we identified Neuregulin 3 (Nrg3) as a chemoattractive factor expressed by developing pyramidal cells that guides the allocation of cortical interneurons in the developing cortical plate. Gain- and loss-of-function approaches reveal that Nrg3 modulates the migration of interneurons into the cortical plate in a process that is dependent on the tyrosine kinase receptor ErbB4. Perturbation of Nrg3 signaling in conditional mutants leads to abnormal lamination of cortical interneurons. Nrg3 is therefore a critical mediator in the assembly of cortical inhibitory circuits. ; uterus, and 1 m g/ m L pCAG - Gfp or Nrg3 (kindly provided by C. Lai, Indiana Uni- versity, Bloomington, and subcloned into pCAGGS) plasmids were injected into the lateral ventricle of the telencephalon through the uterine wall. Square electric pulses of 45 V and 50 ms were passed through the uterus five times, spaced 950 ms, using a square pulse electroporator. The uterine horns were placed back in the abdominal cavity, which was then suture closed, and the female was allowed to recover. Explant Cultures For COS cell confrontation assays, COS7 cells were transfected with plasmids encoding Rfp alone, Rfp and Cxcl12 , Rfp and Nrg3 , Rfp and CRD-Nrg1 ,or Rfp and Ig-Nrg1 , and cell aggregates were prepared by diluting transfected cells with Matrigel in a 1:1 proportion. After jellification, COS cell aggregates were cut with a scalpel in small rectangular prisms of approximately 400 3 400 3 800 m m and confronted to MGE explants obtained from GFP-expressing trans- genic mice in 3D Matrigel pads. The cDNA used for expression of Cxcl12 was obtained from Invitrogen (clone number: 3483088; accession number: BC006640). Nrg3 was kindly provided by Cary Lai (Indiana University, Bloo- mington). The sequences used for expression of type I NRG1 ( Ig-Nrg1 ) and type III NRG1 ( CRD-Nrg1 ) correspond to the accession numbers AY648976 and AY648975, respectively. For Cxcl12 chemokine-blocking experiments, SU6656 (Sigma; 330161-87-0) was added to the medium at a final concentra- tion of 15 m M. Previous worked has shown that Src functions downstream of Cxcr4 activation ( Cabioglu et al., 2005 ). In Vitro Focal Electroporation Coronal slice cultures were obtained as described previously ( Anderson et al., 1997 ). A pCAGG-based dsRed plasmid was pressure injected focally into the MGE of coronal slice cultures by a Pneumatic PicoPump through a glass micropipette. Slices were then electroporated within a setup of two hor- izontally oriented platinum electrodes powered by a Electro-Square-Porator, as described before ( Flames et al., 2004 ). Time-Lapse Videomicroscopy Slices were transferred to the stage of an upright Leica DMLFSA or inverted Leica DMIRE2 microscope coupled to a confocal spectral scanning head (Leica; TCS SL) and viewed through 10–60 3 water immersion or 20 3 oil objec- tives. Slices were continuously superfused with warmed (32 C) artificial cere- brospinal fluid at a rate of 1 mL/min or maintained in supplemented Neurobasal medium. To block Cxcl12 function, SU6656 (Sigma; 330161-87-0) was added to the medium at a final concentration of 15 m M. Stripe Assay Purified CXCL12 protein was obtained from PeproTech (250-20A) and used at 1 ng/ m L. GST and EGF-Nrg3-GST were purified using standard protocols and used at 10 m g/mL. Alternating lanes, 50 m m wide, were laid down on a poly- lysine-coated plastic dish. Alexa 555-labeled anti-rabbit IgGs were added to the GST, EGF-Nrg3-GST, and CXCL12 protein solution for lane identification. The lanes were further coated with laminin. MGE explants were dissected out of GFP + brain slices, plated on top of the protein stripes, and incubated in methylcellulose-containing Neurobasal medium for 48 hr. FACS We dissected the sensorimotor cortex of E17.5 embryos and P4 pups following in utero electroporation at E14.5. Cortical tissue was dissociated as described previously ( Catapano et al., 2001 ). GFP + cells were purified using fluorescent activated cell sorting (FACSARIA III; BD Biosciences), and the re- sulting pellet was kept at 80 C. TaqMan Gene Expression Assays We isolated GFP + pyramidal cells by FACS at E17.5 and P4 after in utero elec- troporation at E14.5. mRNA was then extracted using the RNeasy Micro Kit (QIAGEN) according to the manufacturer's instructions. RNA quality was as- sessed using a bioanalyzer (Agilent Technologies) and then retro-transcribed into single-stranded cDNA. The RNA was sent to Unidad Geno ́ mica (Funda- cio ́ n Parque Cientı ́fico de Madrid) for quality control and retro-transcription. Relative gene expression levels from three independent samples were analyzed using custom designed TaqMan low-density array (TLDA) plates (Micro Fluidic Cards; Applied Biosystems). Each plate contained duplicates for all the genes shown in Table S1 . Data were collected and analyzed using the threshold cycle (Ct) relative quantification method. The housekeeping gene 18 RNA was included in the array for assessing RNA quality and sample normalization. Western Blot Cortical lysates were prepared from P30 control and Nestin-Cre;Nrg3 F/F and Nex-Cre;Nrg3 F/F mutants as described before ( Fazzari et al., 2010; Vullhorst et al., 2009 ) and blotted using mouse anti- b -Actin (1:4,000; Sigma) and rabbit anti-Nrg3 (1:500; Abcam). Signals were detected with a luminescent image analyzer (LAS-1000PLUS; Fujifilm) and quantified with Quantity One 1D Anal- ysis Software (Bio-Rad Laboratories). Image Analysis and Quantification Images were acquired using fluorescence microscopes (DM5000B, CTR5000, and DMIRB from Leica, or Apotome.2 from Zeiss) coupled to digital cameras (DC500 or DFC350FX, Leica; OrcaR2, Hamamatsu), or in an inverted Leica TCS SP8 confocal microscope. All images were analyzed with ImageJ (Fiji). For the quantification of migration in MGE explants, the distance migrated by the30furthestcellswasmeasured.Forthequantificationofshort-rangechemo- attraction, the colocalizing area between MGE and COS cells was measured. For the analysis of the interneuron angle of migration, we draw a grid of virtual radial lines (lines perpendicular to the ventricular zone and the pial surface) and oriented each cell in relation to the most adjacent ''radial line.'' Cells that deviated less than 25 from radial lines were considered as radially oriented; those that deviate more than 25 were designated as tangentially oriented. We systematically exclude from this analysis those cells located in the more lateral or medial regions of the cortex, so that the curvature of the slice in those regions would not interfere with our analysis ( Martini et al., 2009 ). For the quan- tification of cell migration in MGE explants, we measured the distance migrated by the30furthest cellsand normalized theaverage migrateddistance tothedis- tancebetweenMGEandCOSexplants.Forthequantificationofthecolocalizing area between migrating interneurons and COS cells in the short-distance confrontation assays, we quantified the colocalizing area using ImageJ (Fiji). Stripes were quantified by counting thenumber of neuronscontained in a virtual grid containing five black and five red lines. The same area was used for all explants. Sections from control and mutant mice were imaged during the same imaging session. Data acquisition was performed using the same laser power, photomultiplier gain, pinhole, and detection filter settings (1,024 3 1,024 resolution; 12 bits). Quantifications were done using ImageJ (Fiji). Layers were drawn following nuclear staining. For in situ hybridization, the area quanti- fied was divided in ten equal bins, and the percentage of cells in each bin was calculated. The bins were then matched to the appropriate layers. Statistical Analyses Statistical analysis was carried out in SPSS (SPSS, Inc.). The p values below 0.05 were considered statistically significant. Data are presented as mean and SEM throughout the manuscript ( Table S3 We thank I. Andrew, S. Bae, M.A. Casillas, M. Ferna ́ndez, and T. Gil for excel-lent technical assistance and laboratory support; A. Caler for excellent support with FACS experiments; G. Expo ́sito for support with imaging; L. Lim for help with quantitative methods; V. Borrell, R. Hevner, C. Lai, V. Pachnis, C. Redies,B. Rico, J.L.R. Rubenstein, and M. Tessier-Lavigne for plasmids and anti-bodies; and A. Barco, M.A. Nieto, and K. Nave for mouse strains. We are grateful to members of the Flames, O.M., and Rico laboratories for stimulating dis- cussions and ideas. This work was supported by grants from European Research Council (ERC-2011-AdG 293683) and the Spanish Government (CSD2007-00023 and SAF2011-28845) to O.M. O.M. is a Wellcome Trust Investigator. ; Sí

The 2024 European elections have significantly changed the political landscape, raising uncertainty about the future climate and energy ambitions of the EU and triggering shifts within national governments. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's Social Democratic Party (SPD) faced a historic defeat, registering its worst performance ever.[1] The SPD's coalition partners, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), also experienced notable losses. Meanwhile, in Italy, the right-wing coalition led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy (FdI) celebrated its electoral success but struggled to leverage it during subsequent European negotiations, exposing a degree of isolation on the international stage.
Given these developments, both Germany and Italy may have reasons to search for strengthened cooperation, not least in the energy sector. Indeed, while the two governments have different points of view on the energy transition, common needs for energy security and infrastructure development could create necessities for cooperation. For example, the two countries should cooperate in developing new natural gas and hydrogen routes in the Mediterranean that would facilitate flows from North Africa to Germany, passing through Italy.
An effective tool to do so is offered by the 2023 German-Italian Action Plan,[2] which established several bilateral forums between the two countries, such as meetings between ministerial officials responsible for economic affairs, security and defence, and climate and energy issues. These ministerial forums aim to develop a coordinated approach to these issues and exchange experiences and good practices between the two countries. However, the format of these forums should be expanded to more decision-makers, including officials from different ministries and regulatory agencies. Additionally, involving regional authorities could help develop solutions drawn from a wider array of expertise and that are tailor-made to regional contexts.Increasing bilateral coordination through inter-ministerial forums
The Action Plan may prove a starting point to expand bilateral cooperation. Indeed, in addition to pledging common commitments on a vast area of policies, such as new technologies, industrial policy, and international security, it also establishes regular meetings between the two countries.[3] Firstly, the Plan lays the foundation for an annual Ministerial Forum between the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) and the Italian Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy (MIMIT). It comprehends five thematic working groups, respectively on European legislation, industrial cooperation, digitalisation, economic security and 4.0 industry.[4]
However, while these sectors are closely related to energy issues, the Plan does not emphasise them. Indeed, bilateral consultations between the respective Energy Ministries established by the Plan are significantly less structured than the MIMIT-BMWK forum, with no thematic working groups put in place and no explicit indication as to how to explore synergies between economic and industrial aspects of the energy sector.[5]
Keeping these meetings – and these issues – so compartmentalised hampers effective collaboration, especially considering that energy competencies in Italy are already highly dispersed between different ministries.[6] The collision between the Ministry of Agriculture (MASAF) and the Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE) on the introduction of limitations on new solar panel installations on agricultural lands exemplifies how much competencies are interlinked in the Italian system.[7] While in Germany competencies are more centralized in the BMWK, this ministry was only established in 2021 as a consequence of the Greens entering the government coalition.[8] A new government – especially one more right-leaning – may split it into a less-prominent Climate ministry and an Economic Affairs one. Furthermore, although there is no significant overlapping of competencies, German authorities are familiar with interministerial tensions arising from issues within the governing coalition. Stark discussions between the Green-led BMWK and the FDP-led Ministry of Finance (BMF) on the 2025 budget and the resources allocated for financing the transition offer a notable example of the impossibility of dialoguing with only a single ministry to tackle energy issues.[9]Expanding the scope of bilateral forums to regional decision-makers and regulators
Problems of shared competencies are not exclusive to different ministries; vertical distribution between regional and central authorities could also lead to internal tensions that hamper the effectiveness of bilateral initiatives. Consequently, involving regional decision-makers in selected bilateral discussions could be beneficial to bring all necessary parties together and design coherent strategies.
This could be challenging but achievable in the Italian-German context. The countries share similarities in their vertical distribution of competences. In Italy, following the 2001 constitutional reform, regional and central governments have shared legislative competence on energy issues.[10] However, the distribution of competences remains unclear, especially in the renewable sector. The absence of an Italian unified framework law that clarifies approval procedures and defines the cases requiring environmental impact assessments and the authority responsible for performing them complicates matters. Until the publication of a unified framework that clarifies responsibilities, Italian regional authorities should be more involved in defining common projects that impact their territories.
Similarly, in Germany, Federal and Lander governments share energy competencies. While federal authorities play a primary role, Lander governments contribute to national energy policy design through the Bundesrat.[11] Furthermore, many federal laws are designed to be complemented by Landers' provisions to better reflect regional necessities. For example, the Buildings Energy Act, which includes a gas boiler ban, allows different Landers to implement it in various phases with deadlines extending up to 2028.[12] This makes Landers' officials well-suited to discuss the implications of wider projects, and their input can add local insights to bilateral meetings.
In particular, this would be the case for regions touched by the expansion of energy interconnections linking Italy and Germany, passing through Switzerland and Austria, along the "Scandinavia-Mediterranean" and "Rhine-Alps" lines. Bilateral meetings on energy infrastructure should also be extended beyond their current scope and, in fact, the Action Plan proposes an advisory working group to enhance coordination on sustainable infrastructure.[13]
However, this format should be broadened to also include regulatory agencies and transmission system operators (TSOs), facilitating the design and implementation of solutions for electricity and gas cross-border connections. Regulatory agencies would be critical additions to this forum, bringing valuable technical insights for strengthening networks and interconnections. Both Germany and Italy have a single national agency that oversees gas and electricity connections, making it easier to include them: the German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) and the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and the Environment (ARERA). On the other hand, while Italy's networks are essentially single-handedly managed by two respective TSOs – Snam for gas and Terna for electricity –, Germany's system is more heterogenous, with four electricity TSOs (Amprion, TenneT, 50Hertz, and TransnetBW) and sixteen regional gas TSOs. Their involvement could help operationalise political strategies, such as the 2024 Solidarity Agreement for natural gas exchange during shortages signed by Italy and Germany.[14] To maintain the effectiveness of this mechanism, constant dialogue between the two countries' TSOs would be essential.Looking ahead
There is a pressing need to expand bilateral cooperation between Germany and Italy to involve more key decision-makers from both countries. Periodic bilateral meetings should be modelled on the ones defined by the Action Plan but expanded into new modalities. First, to mitigate the unclear distribution of competence and to allow the essential participation of decision-makers, it is necessary to broaden the scope of bilateral ministerial forums. This could be done by establishing joint committees of officials from both countries' ministries, which could lay preparatory work for periodic bilateral Italian-German Interministerial Forums. These meetings may involve representatives with competencies on energy, climate, economic affairs, agriculture and infrastructure. A potential model could be the Italian Interministerial Committee for Ecological Transition (CITE), which represents a single entity for internal coordination and reunites MASE, MIMIT, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT), the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLPS) and MASAF. A similar format replicated in a bilateral perspective could evaluate initiatives covering every major aspect of the energy sector involving Italy and Germany. Due to difficulties in bringing together all the relevant stakeholders, these meetings could be held exclusively on special circumstances, such as in preparation for international climate negotiations or supply shocks, and could even be held online to facilitate logistical organisation.
Second, forums between regional and central governments should be developed to focus on identifying issues on the ground for specific projects and addressing region-bound problems for bilateral interconnections. Lastly, technical groups involving both countries' regulatory agencies and TSOs should be created to allow them to present their perspectives on bilateral initiatives, especially on facilitating the planning and development of transboundary infrastructure. These forums will foster smoother implementation and ensure greater acceptance of bilateral energy initiatives, ultimately contributing to stronger energy security and sustainability for both countries.Alessio Sangiorgio is Junior Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together policymakers and decisionmakers from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] Sabine Kinkartz, "Can Germany's Coalition Recover after EU Vote?", in Deutsche Welle, 10 June 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/a-69325438; "Germany: No Snap Election, Says Chancellor Scholz's Spokesman", in Le Monde, 10 June 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/06/10/germany-no-snap-election-says-chancellor-scholz-s-spokesman_6674377_4.html.[2] Germany and Italy, Piano di Azione italo-tedesco per la cooperazione strategica bilaterale e nell'Unione europea [Action Plan to strengthen cooperation at both bilateral and European level], 22 November 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/24362; Deutsch-italienischer Aktionsplan für strategische Zusammenarbeit auf bilateraler und EU-Ebene, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975228/2244468/dc5441c1b7497c5855a723c87ffbf3a8/2023-11-22-dtitaktionsplan-data.pdf.[3] Ibid.[4] Ibid.[5] Ibid.[6] Katiuscia Eroe (ed.), Scacco matto alle rinnovabili 2024, Legambiente, February 2024, https://www.legambiente.it/?p=20816.[7] Giorgio dell'Orefice and Celestina Dominelli, "Agrivoltaico, bollinato il decreto: salvi gli investimenti approvati in ambito Pnrr, i forestali passano al ministero dell'Agricoltura", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 May 2024, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/agrivoltaico-bollinato-decreto-salvi-investimenti-approvati-ambito-pnrr-forestali-passano-ministero-dell-agricoltura-AFvpb40D.[8] Kerstine Appunn, "The Design of Germany's New Govt: A Climate "Super Ministry" for the Greens", in Clean Energy Wire, 6 December 2021, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/node/9891.[9] Guy Chazan, "Olaf Scholz Unveils Budget after Tensions inside German Coalition", in Financial Times, 5 July 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/e72a10ed-d193-4914-8e28-e67689dadd0f; and Sabine Kinkartz, "Deutschlands Regierung: Showdown um den Haushalt", in Deutsche Welle, 3 July 2024, https://www.dw.com/de/a-69551468.[10] Maria Teresa Rizzo, La materia «energia» e la competenza legislativa Stato-Regioni, Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2013.[11] Ortwin Renn and Jonathan Paul Marshall, "Coal, Nuclear and Renewable Energy Policies in Germany: From the 1950s to the 'Energiewende'", in Energy Policy, Vol. 99 (December 2016), p. 224-232, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.05.004.[12] BMWK, The New Buildings Energy Act: Key Facts, January 2024, https://www.energiewechsel.de/KAENEF/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/faktenblatt-geg-gebaeudeenergiegesetz-en.html.[13] Germany and Italy, Piano di Azione italo-tedesco, cit.[14] BMWK, Federal Cabinet Approves Agreement on Solidarity Gas Deliveries between Germany, Italy and Switzerland, 13 March 2024, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2024/03/20240313federal-cabinet-approves-agreement-on-solidarity-gas-deliveries-between-germany-italy-and-switzerland.html; MASE, Gas: firmato a Berlino accordo di solidarietà tra Italia e Germania, 19 March 2024, https://www.mase.gov.it/node/18434.

IntroductionThe Report that the AIB has decided to publish starting from this year aims at presenting, even if synthetically, the main characteristics of an overview of Italian libraries, each time pointing out the questions, tendencies and some of the events that are of most interest to those who are interested in the development of the library service in our country.When it is proposed to describe a national picture of the situation of the libraries of the various types (public, university, state, scholastic, ecclesiastic, private, etc.) one finds oneself before the almost total absence of comparable and trustworthy organic information. Using the various sources available, it is possible to estimate with a certain approximation that the over 15,000 Italian libraries (in which approximately 20,000 people work) possess almost 200 million documents, that they acquire annually almost 7 million books, that their annual users are little less than 10 million and the loans made are around 65 million. It is believed that in the year 2001 the running costs exceeded 1000 billion lire, of which a little more than 10% were destined to the purchase of documents.LegislationThe year 2001 was rich in new details with regard to the sector of legislation for libraries. This was also due to the effect of the constitutional reforms and the new scenarios relative to the responsibilities and federalist arrangement of the State.Regulations of particular importance for libraries and indirectly linked to the overall institutional situation are those contained in the law of 28 December 2001, no. 448 (finance law 2002). This prescribes that the management of services aimed at the improvement of the public use and development of the artistic patrimony (and therefore also of the state libraries) can be entrusted to subjects other than those of the state. It also introduces an art. 113 bis in the sole text of the laws on the organization of local bodies (legislative decree 18 August 2000, no. 267), on the basis of which "local public services without industrial importance are managed through direct entrusting to: a) institutions; b) special businesses, including consortiums; c) joint-stock companies" and only as a residual solution (paragraph 2) "is economic management permitted when, due to the small dimensions or the characteristics of the service, it is not opportune to proceed to entrusting it to subjects as described in paragraph 1". Awaited on many sides as the chance to respond to a number of the age-old problems that have afflicted the sector of state public libraries for decades, the new organization regulations of the Ministry for cultural and artistic heritage, issued with the Presidential Decree of 29 December 2000, no. 441, actually only indicate, without solving, some fundamental questions that regard the sector, postponing their settlement, without any time limits, to subsequent second degree regulations.As regards the more strictly library themes of interest, the necessity to solve the problems of the legal deposit drove the AIB to revive the bill proposal, which had already been discussed and had arrived at the threshold of final approval in Parliament in the 13th legislature.During the year 2001, moreover, the European Parliament and the European Union Council finally approved the Directive 2001/29/CE, that aims at integrating the laws of the member countries regarding reproduction rights, rights of communication of works to the public and distribution rights, in reference to those works, on every kind of medium, including digital medium, subject to authors' rights. Art. 5 provides the faculty of member states to order exceptions and limitations to the above mentioned rights, to guarantee the right balance between authors' rights and other social interests. This article furthermore contains the "exceptions" that are to the advantage of libraries or of didactics and scientific research.Cooperation and consortiumsThe last two years have shown considerable progress in the field of cooperation activities, confirming also in Italy the current tendencies at international level. These developments generally - but with different nuances - regard various types of libraries and involve different sectors of activity, from those already established (such as cataloguing and purchases) to emerging activities, more directly linked with the diffusion of Internet (management and development of digital resources, etc.).Access to information and the development of electronic collections are surely the areas that are most involved in the new cooperation initiatives. The university sector is that which demonstrates most vitality in this area, but a certain recent enterprise of state and public libraries should be noted. The initiatives promoted by two large university computer consortiums should also be mentioned: the Cilea and Caspur.The CiBit project for digitalisation, archiving and networking, with a special research interface for Italian literature texts should be noted.In Italian universities, as in other developed countries, the idea of creating alternative models of academic electronic publishing is being increasingly encouraged: in this field mention must be made of the initiative of the University of Florence with the Firenze University Press project.On-line cataloguesThe catalogues of Italian libraries available through Internet number 420. For the year 2001 growth stabilized around 15% and mainly regarded the local body systems, the libraries of which cover municipal or provincial areas.The Italian university OPACs (On line Public Access Catalog) form approximately 40% of the total.National Library Service (SBN) and national projectsIn the last two years the SBN network has been established as the largest public network of libraries in Italy, both due to the number of libraries participating and to the considerable increase in the information in the catalogue: at the end of the year 2001 the libraries numbered approximately 1400, the size of the national collective catalogue was 5,500,000 titles (corresponding to approximately 12 million localizations, that is mentions of the presence of the works in the participating libraries). Daily hits, also as a result of the availability on Internet of the catalogue, are currently on average 160,000 on weekdays, with high points on some days of over 200,000 hits.Other cooperation projects are underway in the field of antique books and manuscripts.The Anagrafe delle biblioteche italiane (Registry of Italian libraries) data base, it too available for consultation on Internet, provides an instrument of general information on the patrimonies, services to the public and specializations of approximately 12,500 libraries.But it is "SBN on line" that has really marked a further step forward towards the improvement of the services: from a single access point, with identical modalities, users can consult catalogues of different institutions (libraries, archives, museums); they can compile a bibliography according to their own specific requirements by integrating information sources; they can also locate documents and ask for them on loan or in reproduced form.Formation, occupation and professionItaly also considers university formation as the basis for the initial preparation of librarians. In the nineties especially, the degree course in Preservation of Cultural Heritage was a source of considerable attraction among young people and in the year 2000/01 it ended up having over 23,000 students registered in the 17 universities offering the course as well as almost 3,000 registered in various related diploma courses (Operators of Cultural Heritage), for a total of 26,339 students. As a whole this is a small sector with respect to all university education (1.6% of the total of students, 2% of those enrolled, 0.6% of those graduated or having obtained diplomas), but a large group with respect to the degree or diploma "arts" group into which it is statistically inserted (16% of those registered, 23% of those enrolled and 7% of those graduated or having obtained diplomas).In the year 2000/01, the first year of the "3+2" university reform, among the 42 first level degree classes, that in Sciences of Cultural Heritage is at the 12th place as regards number of enrolled (9079) and is generally in the first place among the characteristic courses in the Arts Faculty (in the order Arts, Sciences and technologies of figurative arts, of music, entertainment and fashion, Philosophy, Historical Sciences). Sixty-six percent of the students in the degree courses in the archive-library field are female.As a whole the number of students registered is certainly greatly increased with the new courses (9079 enrolled in 2001/02 as against the 5920 of the previous year, +53%). The current offer is of 71 courses in 41 universities: among these, 9 (in a like number of universities) are specifically dedicated to the formation of librarians and archivists, while 33, 2 of which by distance-learning, have a general nature (18 with a specialization for librarians and archivists), and 29 regard other specific sectors (artistic, archaeological, musical, etc., heritage ). Overall, there are therefore at least 27 courses aimed at the formation of librarians, in 26 universities and with locations in 25 different cities.Those who graduated in Cultural Heritage have up to now obtained rapid and effective insertion into the world of work, initially above all with assistance initiatives or contract jobs but also with permanent employment, demonstrating among other things their capacity to temporarily or permanently exploit employment opportunities even in related fields (publishing, multimedia production, Web services, communications, etc.).Generally speaking, the offer of long-term employment in public administration is about 180 positions per year. The main employers are the local bodies, with 64%, followed by the Universities with 27%. Absent for years now is the Ministry for Cultural Heritage (except for two small competitions in 1998 and 1999); some offers come from the sector of research (institutions of the CNR and other bodies, for 7% in the three-year period under consideration), and exceptionally from other public bodies.From the point of view of geographic distribution, the vast majority of the jobs offered is in the North (72%, as against 11% in the Centre and 17% in the South and in the islands), and the percentage exceeds 80% for places in the local bodies: about half of the jobs offered by Italian local bodies are in the region of Lombardy; this is followed at a great distance by Emilia Romagna and then the Veneto region. In the universities, the distribution is a little less unbalanced, again with Lombardy in the first place but with a good offer also in regions of the Centre (Lazio) or of the South (Campania, Puglia).The offer of contract employment or with assistance positions is very active, both through competitions and screening for contract jobs in public administrations and through the search for assistants by service companies, mainly in the field of cataloguing, and of library structures: we can consider that through these forms of selection approximately 300 persons per year find temporary employment.The Italian Libraries Association and the Professional RegisterAn indicator of the dynamism of the profession is given also by the activity of the Italian Libraries Association (AIB) which, during the year 2000 extended to include all twenty Italian regions and considerably increased its number of members: 4407 members (+2% with respect to the previous year). This shows a much larger and clearer growth than that of employment in the sector, which therefore testifies to a greater group thrust, of "self-recognition" and identification, while a considerable number of occasional registrations remain: these are not renewed with any continuity.Since 1998, the AIB manages the Italian Professional Register of librarians, a private register that was established along the lines indicated by the European directives on the recognition of professional titles and by the bills on the unrecognised professions presented in the last legislatures but not yet approved. On 31 December 2001 the Register had 566 qualified librarians enrolled, 160 of which enrolled during the last year.The following persons co-operated to this work: Giovanni Solimine (Introduction); Luca Bellingeri, Gianni Lazzari (Law); Anna Maria Mandillo (Law, SBN and national projects); Gabriele Mazzitelli, Serafina Spinelli (Academic library systems); Tommaso Giordano (Cooperation and consortia); Antonella De Robbio (Italian OPACs); Vanni Bertini (Automation systems in Italy); Alberto Petrucciani (Training, employment and profession). ; Hanno collaborato alla redazione del Rapporto: Giovanni Solimine (Introduzione); Luca Bellingeri, Gianni Lazzari (Legislazione); Anna Maria Mandillo (Legislazione, SBN e progetti nazionali); Gabriele Mazzitelli, Serafina Spinelli (Sistemi bibliotecari di ateneo); Tommaso Giordano (Cooperazione e consorzi); Antonella De Robbio (OPAC italiani); Vanni Bertini (Sistemi di automazione in Italia); Alberto Petrucciani (Formazione, occupazione e professione).

ABSTRACT CHALIGAVA, Natia. E-Government Implementation in Public Administration of Georgia, MASTER Thesis, Ankara, 2018. The purpose of this research is the evaluation of e-Government process in Georgia and assessment of its contributions to public administration. Accordingly the first part of this thesis examines the subjects are as following: general structure of public administration in Georgia, historical development process of Georgia public administration system, the new legal order based on the admission of the Constitution, current political and administration structure. The second part of this study investigates conceptual dimensions of e-government implementation with a literature study on e-government model which is a unique part of information society. The third part of this study evaluates e-government implementations in the four countries which are the top ones according to the Electronic Government Development Index and the performance of e-government policies in Georgia public administration. In the last part of this thesis, by conducting a field study it was endeavored to evaluate current situation of e-government implementation process of e-government policies in Georgia public administration and to investigate the contributions this process makes to Georgia public administration. Regarding to the results of the field research it can be mentioned that e-government implementation make important contributions to Georgia public administration. Resting on the findings of both literature review and filed study, it was conducted that the general approach of Georgia towered the implementation of e-government can be evaluated successfully. Georgia government is determined to create an effective e-government with a healthy information infrastructure. In this framework, necessary public policies and regulations were formed for establishing this infrastructure. In conclusion it can be mentioned that Georgia government is enthusiastic and determined to transfer all public services to the electronic environment. ; TABLE OF CONTENTS ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL i DECLARATION ii YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI iii ETİK BEYAN iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v ABSTRACT vi ÖZET vii TABLE OF CONTENTS viii LIST OF TABLES xii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER: I GENERAL STUCTURE OF GEORGIA'S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 4 1.1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 4 1.1.1. Kingdoms at the Territory of Ancient Georgia 4 1.1.2. The First Administrative Division of Kingdom Kartli 5 1.1.3. Feudal Governance in Georgia 6 1.2. GEORGIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE GOVERNANCE OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE 7 1.3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA 9 1.3.1. The First Parliament of Independent Georgia Republic 10 1.3.2. The first Council of Ministers of Independent Georgia Republic 11 1.3.2.1. Georgian Language as an Official of Georgian Republic 11 1.3.3. Judicial System of Independent Georgia Republic 11 1.3.4. Administrative-Territorial Arrangement of Independent Georgia Republic 12 1.4. PUBLIC ADMINIATRATION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA 13 1.4.1. Civil Servant System of Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia 15 1.4.1.1. Division of Working Class and Peasantry Class 16 1.4.1.2. Division of Soviet Civil Employees 17 1.5. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF INDEPENDENT GEORGIA REPUBLIC (1991-2018) 18 1.5.1. Development of public Administration of Georgia Since 1991 19 1.5.1.1. The First Period- 1991-1997 20 1.5.1.2. Period from 1998 until 2003 21 1.5.1.3. The third Period from 2003- up to the Present Day 23 1.5.2. Implemented and Ongoing Reform of Georgia Public Administration 25 1.5.3. Constitution of Georgia 27 1.5.3.1. Amendment 2004, in Constitution of Georgia 29 1.5.3.2. Amendment 2009, within the Constitution of Georgia 29 1.5.3.3. Amendment 2017, within the Constitution of Georgia 30 1.5.4. Governance Structure of Georgia 31 1.5.4.1. The President of Georgia 32 1.5.4.2. The Parliament of Georgia 33 1.5.4.3. Judicial System of Georgia 35 1.5.4.4. Political Parties 37 1.6. THE GOVERNMETN OF GEORGIA 40 1.6.1. Abkhazian and Ajarian Autonomous Republics of Georgia 42 1.6.2. The Local Governance 44 1.6.2.1. The Law on Local Government and Self-Governance 45 1.6.3. Public Service of Georgia 46 1.6.3.1. State Service and Public Service 47 1.6.3.2. Legal Entities of Public Law (LEPL) 48 1.7. PUBLIC SERVANT 49 1.7.1. The State Servant 50 1.7.1.1. Classification of Officer's Positions 51 CHAPTER 2: E-GOVERNMENT- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 53 2.1. HISTORY OF E-GOVERNMENT EMERGENCE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 53 2.2. E-GOVERNMENT DEFINITIONS 55 2.3. TYPES OF E-GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION 58 2.3.1. Government to Citizen (G2C) 60 2.3.2. Government to Business (G2B) 61 2.3.3. Government to Government (G2G) 62 2.4. E-GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT MODELS 63 2.4.1. Gartner Group 4 Stage Development Model 63 2.4.2. Layne and Lee's 4 Stages Development Model 64 2.4.3. West's Four Stage Development Model 65 2.4.4. Hiller and Belanger's Five Stage Development Model 66 2.4.5. World Bank's Three Stage Development Model 67 2.4.6. UN's Five Stage Development Model 68 2.5. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF E-GOVERNMENT 69 2.5.1. Increasing Transparency and Accountability and Strengthening Anti-corruption 71 2.5.2. E-government Helps Improve Efficiency in Government 72 2.5.3. Increasing Citizen Participation and Building Trust 73 2.5.4. Reduced Costs of Government Operations 74 2.5.5. Technical Challenges 75 2.5.6. Organisational Challenges 75 2.5.7. Financial Challenges 76 CHAPTER 3: EXAMPLES OF TOP FOUR COUNTRIES ACROSS THE WORLD IMPLEMENTING E-GOVERNMENT AND E-GOVERNMENT IN GEORGIA 78 3.1. E-GOVERNMENT IN DENMARK 79 3.2. E-GOVERNMEN IN AUSTRALIA 82 3.3. E-GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA 85 3.4. E-GOVERNMENT IN UNITED KINGDOM 90 3.5. E-GOVERNMENT IN GEORGIA 93 3.5.1. Development of Information and Communication Technologies in Georgia 94 3.5.2. E-Government Infrastructure in Georgia 95 3.5.3. E-Government Projects in Georgia 98 3.5.4. Open Government Partnership Georgia 100 3.5.5. Legislative Background of E-government 101 3.5.5.1. The Law of Georgia on Electronic Signature and Electronic Document 102 3.5.5.2. The Law of Georgia on the Establishment of Data Exchange Agency Legal Entity of Public Law 103 3.5.5.3. The Law of Georgia on Information Security 103 3.5.5.4. The Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection 104 3.5.6. Organisational Management of E-Government 104 3.5.7. E-Government Services in Georgia 105 3.5.7.1. Electronic ID card 107 3.5.7.2. Digital Signature and Online Authentication 109 3.5.8. E-Government Projects 110 3.5.8.1. "Public Service Hall" (PSH) Project 110 3.5.8.1.1. "JUST drive" Project 113 3.5.8.1.2. "Voice of Customer" Project 113 3.5.8.2. "Citizens" Portal 113 3.5.8.3. "Community Centers" Project in Georgia 114 3.5.8.4. "Open Data" Portal 115 3.5.8.5. "E-Petition" Portal 117 3.5.8.6. "E-Procurement" Portal 118 3.5.8.7. "Revenue Services" Portal 119 3.5.8.8. E-Notary Project 121 3.5.8.9. E-Health (Currently under development) 123 3.5.9. Development Dynamics of Georgia within E-Government Implementation 124 CHAPTER 4: E-GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGIA: FIELD STUDY 128 4.1. THE PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 129 4.2. RESEARCH GROUP 130 4.2.1. Limitations of Study 132 4.3. RESEARCH METHOD 132 4.3.1. Data Collection Method 133 4.4. ANALYSIS 136 4.4.1. Assessment of Questionnaire 136 4.4.1.1. Results 137 4.4.1.1.1. Reliability Analysis 137 4.4.1.1.2. Review of the Findings 138 4.4.1.1.2.1. Reduction of Bureaucracy 138 4.4.1.1.2.2. Increase of Service Quality 139 4.4.1.1.2.3. 24/7 Service Nonstop Available Any Time and Usually Every Day 141 4.4.1.1.2.4. Simplified Access to the Information 142 4.4.1.1.2.5. Increased Efficiency in the Delivery of Public Service 142 4.4.1.1.2.6. Ensured Equality of Opportunity in Access to Public Service 143 4.4.1.1.2.7. Ensuring Transparency 144 4.4.1.1.2.8. More Convenient Communication among the Government Agencies 145 4.4.1.1.2.9. Decreased Bribery 146 4.4.1.1.2.10. Increase the Speed of Bureaucracy Procedures 147 4.4.2. Assessment of Interviews 148 4.4.2.1. Development Stages of E-government Implementation 149 4.4.2.2. Activities Accelerating the Implementation of E-Government Projects 150 4.4.2.3. The Benefit of E-Government Implementation 150 4.4.2.4. Changes would be liked to made into the current e-government projects 151 4.4.2.5. Obstacles in the E-Government Projects Implementation Process 152 4.4.2.6. E-Government Related Expectations of Institutions 153 CONCLUSION 155 REFERENCES 162 ; ÖZET CHALIGAVA, Natia. Gürcistan Kamu Yönetiminde E-Devlet Uygulamaları, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2018. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Gürcistan'daki e-Devlet sürecinin değerlendirilmesi ve e-Devlet uygulamalarının Gürcistan kamu yönetiminde ne tür katkılar sağladığını tespit edilmesidir. Bu amaçla da tezin ilk bölümünde Gürcistan'ın kamu yönetiminin genel yapısı; Gürcistan kamu yönetimi sisteminin tarihsel gelişim süreci, Anayasa'nın kabulü ile temeli oluşturulan yeni yasal düzen, Gürcistan'da şu an mevcut olan siyasal ve yönetsel yapı ele alınmış: ikinci bölümünde bilgi toplumunun vazgeçilmez öğesi ve bir çok ülkenin de devlet politikası olan e-Devlet modeli üzerine literatür çalışması yapılarak e-Devlet uygulamalarının kavramsal boyutu incelenmiş ve üçümcü bölümdeyse e-Devlet uygulamalarında en başarılı dört ülke öğrnek incelenmiş ve Gürcistan'da mevcut olan e-Devlet uygulamaları sırayla değerlendirilmiş, e-devlet politikalarının Gürcistan kamu yönetiminde uygulanma süreci genel hatlarıyla irdelenmiştir. Son bölümdeyse, Gürcistan Kamu Yönetiminde E-Devlet Uygulamaları üzerine yürütülen bir alan araştırmasıyla e-Devlet politikalarının Gürcistan kamu yönetiminde uygulanma sürecinin güncel durumu değerlendirilmeye çalişilmiş ve bu sürecin Gürcistan kamu yönetimine ne tür katkılar sağladığı araştırılmıştır. Yürütülen alan araştırması sonucunda elde edilen bulgulardan hareketle, e-devlet uygulamalarının Gürcistan kamu yönetimine olumlu yönde katkılar sağladığı söylenebilir. Tez kapsamında yapılan literatür çalışmaları ve alan araştırması sayesinde genel olarak Gürcistan'ın e-Devlet uygulamalarına ilişkin genel tutumunun pozitif olarak değerlendirilebileceği, Gürcistan'ın etkin bir e-Devletin, sağlıklı bir bilişim altyapısı ile yaşam bulabileceği tespitini kaide aldığı ve sağlıklı bir bilişim altyapısının hazırlanması için gerekli kamu politikalarını oluşturuğu, gerekli düzenlemeleri gerçekleştirdiği, Gürcistan hükümetinin kamu kurum ve kuruluşların sunduğu tüm hizmetlerin elektronik ortama taşınması konusunda istekli ve istikrarlı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Stickstoff, Spurenstoffe und Krankheitserreger können auch in geringen Mengen Schäden in Gewässern bzw. beim Menschen verursachen. In dieser Arbeit soll geklärt werden, inwieweit das naturnahe Abwasserreinigungsverfahren der technischen Feuchtgebiete zur Nachreinigung von Abwasser geeignet ist. Dafür wurden in Berlin sieben bewachsene Bodenfilter und Abwasserteiche im techni-schen Maßstab einer Kläranlage mit Nährstoffelimination nachgeschaltet. Ein Sandfilter, ein Sandfilter mit Lehm und ein Sandfilter mit Längsgräben wurden überstaut und auf diese Wei-se vertikal kontinuierlich beschickt. Bei den Teichen handelte es sich um einen flachen be-pflanzten Teich, einen Teich mit Pflanzenschwimmmatten, einen unbepflanzten Teich und einen am Ufer bepflanzten Graben. Mit Tracertests und Messungen zur Wasserdurchlässigkeit der Filter wurden die Aufenthaltszeiten exemplarisch bestimmt und das Durchlaufverhalten der einzelnen Anlagen charakterisiert. Der Zulauf und die Abläufe wurden über einen Zeitraum von sieben Jahren bei bestimmten Volumenströmen zwischen 25 und 200 mm/d regelmäßig auf Stickstoff, Phosphor und andere Abwasserstandardparameter hin analysiert. Die hygienisch-mikrobiologische Qualität wurde in 11 Messkampagnen bestimmt anhand der bakteriellen Indikatoren E. coli und Enterokokken sowie dreimal anhand des Virenindikators somatische Coliphagen. Das Puffervermögen bei kurzzeitigen Volumenstößen, wie sie kommunale Kläranlagen nach Starkregenereignissen belasten, wurde getestet. Die Abbauleistung des Sandfilters mit Längsgräben, des Teiches mit Pflanzenschwimmmatten und des Unbepflanzten Teiches für 18 Pharmaka verschiedener Zusammensetzung und 11 Metabolite wurde in zwei Messkampagnen untersucht. Diese Feldstudie war begleitet von einem Photoabbauexperiment in situ. Die geringen Stickstoffzulaufkonzentrationen von gesN = 11 mg/l wurden von allen Anlagen ganzjährig durch Denitrifikation vermindert, im Mittel um 35 % (Bepflanzter Teich) bis 70 % (Sandfilter mit Lehm). Der Sandfilter mit Längsgräben und der Graben erreichten die besten Flächenabbauleistungen (0,53 Nitratstickstoff g/(m²∙d) durch ihre höhere hydraulische Belastbarkeit. Die bewachsenen Bodenfilter zeichneten sich besonders im Winter durch geringere Redoxpotenziale in den Abläufen aus. Das dämpfte den temperaturbedingten Leistungsabfall der Denitrifikation und führte zu einer stabileren Leistung im Vergleich mit den Teichanlagen. Ermöglicht wurde die nachgeschaltete Denitrifikation ohne externe Kohlenstoffquelle durch die Eigenversorgung mit leichtabbaubaren Kohlenstoffen aus der Photosynthese der Pflanzen in den technischen Feuchtgebieten. In der Abwasserdesinfektion wurde die E. coli-Zahl im Zulauf von 3,9 Zehnerpotenzen/ 100 ml durch die technischen Feuchtgebiete um 1,7 Zehnerpotenzen (Graben und Unbepflanzter Teich) bis 2,3 Zehnerpotenzen (Sandfilter mit Lehm) gesenkt. Wider Erwarten wirkten sich Anlagentyp, Zulaufvolumenstrom und Temperatur nicht signifikant auf die hygienisch-mikrobiologische Ablaufqualität aus. Die Abläufe des Teichs mit Pflanzenschwimmmatten und des Bepflanzten Teiches entsprachen ausgezeichneter Badegewässerqualität gemäß EU-Bade¬gewässer-richtlinie [2006] und waren, wie auch der Ablauf des Sandfilters mit Längsgräben, zur Bewässerung von Obst und Gemüse zur Konservierung geeignet [DIN 19650 1999]. Sowohl die Filterpassage als auch die Wasserphase trugen zur Hygienisierung bei. Ein Einfluss des Pflanzenbewuchses konnte nicht festgestellt werden. Die Höhe des Volumenstroms wirkte sich in den getesteten Bereichen nicht auf die Ablaufkonzentrationen aus. Doch die Anlagentypen unterschieden sich eindeutig in ihrem Durchlaufverhalten und ihrer hydraulischen Belastbarkeit: Sandfilter, Sandfilter mit Lehm und Bepflanzter Teich nutzten ihr Wasservolumen zu weniger als 20 % aus. Im Gegensatz dazu lag der hydraulische Wirkungsgrad des Sandfilters mit Längsgräben bei über 90 %. Seine Längsgräben wirkten sich günstig aus und ermöglichen eine dauerhafte hydraulische Belastung dieses Bodenfilters von 100 mm/d. Dagegen war der Sandfilter mit Lehm zu wenig wasserdurchlässig für den dauerhaften Betrieb. Kurzzeitige Volumenstöße zwischen 160 mm/8 h und 200 mm/6,5 h wurden von den technischen Feuchtgebieten hydraulisch, stofflich und hygienisch gut abgepuffert. Der Sandfilter mit Längsgräben und der Graben hielten sogar der höchsten getesteten Belastung von 240 mm/8 h bzw. 250 mm/6,5 h stand. Erst bei der drastischen langfristigeren Überlastung mit 1.300 mm/d verschlechterte sich die Abwasserdesinfektionsleistung des Sandfilters mit Längsgräben auf 0,9 Zehnerpotenzen E. coli-Reduktion. Von den untersuchten Arzneimitteln und Arzneimittelrückständen wurden 13 Substanzen (Diclofenac, 3-Hydroxycarbamazepin (3-OH-CBZ), Venlafaxin (VLX), O-Desmethylvenlafaxin (O-DM-VLX), Tramadol (TMD), Trimethoprim, Erythromycin, Clarithromycin, Metoprolol, Atenolol, Bezafibrat, Acyclovir und Codein) in wenigstens einer der drei getesteten Anlagen um mehr als 70 % entfernt. Das Photoabbauexperiment in situ zeigte, dass der lichtinduzierte Abbau ein wichtiger Eliminationsmechanismus für Diclofenac, O-DM-TMD, O-DM-VLX und 2-Hydroxycarbamazepin (2-OH-CBZ) und 3-OH-CBZ war. Dabei wur-de kein biologischer Abbau beobachtet außer für Metoprolol. Folglich sind Teichboden und Filtermaterial wichtige Aufwuchsflächen für Biofilme, die den mikrobiologischen Pharma-kaabbau fördern. Die geringen Redoxbedingungen des Sandfilters mit Längsgräben und des Teiches mit Pflanzenschwimmmatten ermöglichten den anaeroben Abbau von Diatrizoat und Sulfametoxazol, welche sich unter aeroben Bedingungen persistent verhalten. Andererseits war in diesen Anlagen der aerobe Abbau limitiert. Deshalb wird für den Spurenstoffabbau eine Hybridanlage empfohlen, die das Abwasser verschiedenen Umgebungsbedingungen in Folge aussetzt. Die von nachgeschalteten technischen Feuchtgebieten verursachten Klimagase und Kosten liegen in einer ähnlichen Größenordnung wie die anderer Abwasserreinigungsverfahren. Technische Feuchtgebiete erbringen als Nachreinigungsschritt robuste Leistungen in der Nitratentfernung, Abwasserdesinfektion und partiellen Spurenstoffentfernung. Für die Auslegung ist die hydraulische Belastbarkeit das Schlüsselkriterium der Reinigungsleistung. ; Nitrogen, micropollutants and pathogens, even in small amounts, may cause damage to the aquatic environment and even to humans. This thesis reveals the feasibility of constructed wetlands as a post treatment step. For this purpose, seven constructed wetlands and ponds were installed at a technical scale following the conventional biological wastewater treatment at a municipal wastewater treat-ment plant equipped for nutrient removal. A sandy subsurface flow constructed wetland (sandy SSF), a sandy loamy SSF, and a sandy SSF with longitudinal ditches were operated at water levels higher than the filter bed, providing vertical flow conditions. The aquatic systems were: a surface flow wetland (SF), a pond with floating plants, an unplanted pond and a ditch planted at the banks. Tracer tests and measurements of the water permeability characterized the flow regimes and the actual retention times for each system. For seven years, influent and effluents were analysed regularly for nitrogen, phosphorus and other wastewater stand-ard parameters for flows ranging between 25 und 200 mm/d. The hygienic water quality was determined through the bacterial indicators E. coli and enterococci over 11 measurement phases. Occasional analyses of the viral indicator somatic coliphages completed the picture. The ability to buffer short hydraulic overloads of the type that strain municipal wastewater treatment plants after heavy storm events was examined. Removal and fate of 18 pharma-ceuticals of different compound classes and 11 human metabolites were investigated in the sandy SSF with ditches, the unplanted pond and the pond with floating plants during two measurement phases. This field-site study was accompanied by an in situ photodegradation experiment. The low nitrogen concentrations of Ntot = 11 mg/l were reduced by denitrification through-out the year by an average value of 35 % (SF) and even up to 70 % (sandy loamy SSF). The sandy SSF with ditches and the ditch achieved the best areal nitrate removal rate (0.53 nitrate nitrogen g/(m²∙d) because of their higher hydraulic loading capacity. The SSFs were characterized by lower redox potentials in the effluents, especially during winter. These favourable conditions curbed the decrease of performance caused by lower temperatures, thereby stabilizing the performance of the SSFs in comparison with the SF and the ponds. The CW's litter pro-vided the carbon necessary for downstream denitrification, indicating an advantage compared to the technical treatment systems. In the field of wastewater disinfection, the influent (3.9 orders of magnitude / 100 mL E. coli) underwent a reduction of 1.7 (ditch) to 2.3 (sandy loamy SSF) orders of magnitude. Contrary to expectations, neither type of treatment, loading or temperature affected the count of E. coli significantly. The effluents of the pond with floating plants and of the SF comply with the threshold values of the European Union [2006] for excellent bathing water quality. Together with the effluent of the sandy SSF, they are suitable for the irrigation of fruits or vegetables for conservation according to the German standard DIN 19650 [1999]. According to the WHO guideline [2006] all effluents can be reused as irrigation water, if drip irrigation is applied or the products are washed after harvesting. The processes of disinfection occurred during the passage through the filter medium as well as through the water phase. An influence of the plant cover could not be observed. The magnitude of the flow rate did not show any effect on the effluent concentrations within the tested range. However, the designs clearly differed in terms of flow regime and hydraulic loading capacity: the sandy SSF, the sandy loamy SSF and the SF used less than 20 % of their water volume. In contrast, the sandy SSF with ditches was characterized by a hydraulic efficiency of more than 90 %. Its longitudinal ditches provided favourable conditions allowing a long-lasting hydraulic loading of 100 mm/d. By contrast, the water permeability of the sandy loamy SSF is too low to even recommend its design for permanent operation. Short term overloads between 160 mm / 8 h and 200 mm / 6.5 h were well buffered with regard to hydraulic conditions, nitrogen concentrations and hygienic indicators. The sandy SSF with ditches and the ditch withstood even the highest loading of 240 mm / 8 h and 250 mm / 6.5 h, respectively. Only the drastic and longer overloading of 1,300 mm/d decreased the E. coli reduction capacity of the sandy SSF with ditches to 0.9 orders of magnitude. Thirteen of the analysed pharmaceuticals and transformation products (diclofenac, 3-hydroxycarbamazepine (3-OH-CBZ), venlafaxine (VLX), O-desmethylvenlafaxine (O-DM-VLX), tramadol (TMD), trimethoprim, erythromycin, clarithromycin, metoprolol, atenolol, bezafibrate, acyclovir and codeine) were consistently removed by more than 70 % in at least one of the three treatment systems during summer. In the open water pond, photodegradation was found to be an important process for the removal of diclofenac, O-desmethyltramadol (O-DM-TMD), O-DM-VLX as well as 2-hydroxycarbamazepine (2-OH-CBZ) and 3-OH-CBZ. In contrast to the field-site study, no removal of target compounds by biodegradation was observed in the in situ degradation experiments without sediment additions except for metoprolol. This suggests that biodegradation of most substances is improved by the presence of microbially active surfaces such as those provided by the sediment in the pond, and, to a higher extent, by the filter passage in the SSF. Low redox conditions (absence of nitrate) within the SSF and the pond with floating plants were favourable for the anaerobic degradation of some compounds that are aerobically quite persistent, such as sulfamethoxazole (SMX) and diatrizoate. In contrast, the results indicated that at least during summer months, the prevailing low redox conditions can limit the aerobic biodegradation in the SSF. As a conclusion, a hybrid treatment-sequence of various constructed wetland designs is suggested to provide suitable degradation conditions for micropollutants. The greenhouse gases and costs associated with downstream constructed wetlands are in the same range as other wastewater treatment technologies. Constructed wetlands perform well as post-treatment steps for denitrification, wastewater disinfection and partial elimination of micropollutants. For the dimensioning of constructed wetlands as a post treatment, the hydraulic loading capacity is the key parameter for its removal capacity.

In einer Welt, die sich zunehmend der Wichtigkeit des Umweltschutzes bewusst wird, ist es an der Zeit, über ein Thema zu sprechen, das nicht nur unsere Ökosysteme betrifft, sondern auch tiefergreifende soziale Ungerechtigkeiten aufdeckt. Wir sind alle Zeugen und Verursacher des Klimawandels und seiner verheerenden Auswirkungen. Nun wollen wir genauer hinsehen und verstehen, wie dieser Wandel bestimmte Gemeinschaften in unverhältnismäßigem Maß betrifft. Die Rede ist von Umweltrassismus.Im Folgenden soll gezeigt werden, dass Umweltprobleme nicht gleichmäßig auf alle Bevölkerungsgruppen verteilt sind, sondern oft die treffen, die bereits benachteiligt sind. Dafür wird zuerst der Begriff Umweltrassismus aus verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet. Anschließend wird an Beispielen genauer aufgezeigt, was für Arten es gibt, bevor es um Lösungsvorschläge gehen wird.In dem Beitrag wird von BIPoC gesprochen. BIPoC steht für "Black, Indigenous and People of Colour". Das Akronym setzt sich also aus politischen Selbstbezeichnungen von Menschen zusammen, die von rassistischer Unterdrückung betroffen sind.Ursprung des Begriffs "Umweltrassismus"?Dass die Folgen des Klimawandels immer verheerender werden, ist nichts Neues. Und dass dies enorme Gesundheitsfolgen mit sich bringt, ist auch bekannt. Dabei wird zwischen direkten (primären) Folgen und indirekten (sekundären und tertiären) Folgen unterschieden. Zu den direkten Folgen zählen eine erhöhte Sterbe- und Erkrankungsrate durch Ereignisse wie Hitzewellen, Überschwemmungen oder Waldbränden. Zu den indirekten Folgen gehören Auswirkungen wie Nahrungsmittelknappheit, Zunahme von Infektionskrankheiten und Allergien. Außerdem gibt es sozial bedingte Folgen, beispielsweise Hungersnöte, Entwicklungsstagnation oder Kriege (Kuehni, Egger 2012, S. 190). Doch was ist, wenn Teile der Erde oder bestimmte Gruppen schlimmer unter den Folgen des Klimawandels leiden als andere? In diesem Zusammenhang wird mittlerweile immer häufiger von "Umweltrassismus" gesprochen.Der Begriff kam Anfang der 1980er Jahre auf. Damals suchte der Bundesstaat North Carolina einen Ort, an dem man mit Polychlorierte Biphenylen (PCB) verseuchte Erde entsorgen kann. Zuerst war eine Entsorgungsdeponie in einem Bezirk mit hauptsächlich weißen Menschen geplant. Eine Bürgerinitiative verhinderte dies. Daraufhin war schnell klar, dass die Deponie in einem der Bezirke mit hauptsächlich schwarzen, armen oder anderweitig benachteiligten Nachbarschaften errichtet werden sollte.1982 wurde beschlossen, die verseuchte Erde in einer kleinen Gemeinde namens Afton zu entsorgen. Diese Stadt liegt in Warren County, dem damals ärmsten Landkreis in North Carolina mit einem schwarzen Bevölkerungsanteil von 65 %. Die Bevölkerung versuchte dagegen anzugehen. Zuerst gerichtlich, doch als das nichts half, gab es über sechs Wochen Sitzblockaden, Straßensperren und Demonstrationen. Dabei wurden mehr als 500 Demonstrierende verhaftet. Doch alle Bemühungen halfen nichts. Die Mülldeponie wurde dennoch gebaut. (Ituen/Tatu Hey 2021, S. 4-5). Kurz darauf wurde PCB weltweit verboten, da es sich als hochgiftig, krebserregend und erbgutschädigend herausstellte (Warda 2020).Trotz der Niederlage bei dem Bau der Deponie waren diese Proteste von großer Bedeutung und wurden von vielen anderen als Vorbild genommen. Aus Kämpfen gegen diese Art von Umweltrassismus ist schließlich die Bewegung für Klimagerechtigkeit hervorgegangen, welche erstmals Fragen sozialer Gerechtigkeit im Zusammenhang mit umweltpolitischen Aspekten betrachtete (FARN, o.J.). Geprägt wurde der Begriff Umweltrassismus von dem Bürgerrechtler Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis Jr., der an den Demonstrationen in Afton beteiligt war. Er definiert Umweltrassismus als"the intentional siting of polluting and waste facilities in communities primarily populated by African Americans, Latines, Indigenous People, Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, migrant farmworkers, and low-income workers" (Ihejirika 2023)Chavis veröffentlichte im Jahr 1987 gemeinsam mit der United Church of Christ (UCC) Kommission eine Studie zum Thema "Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States". Aus der Studie ging hervor, dass drei von fünf BIPoC nahe einer Giftmülldeponie wohnen. In einem Dokumentarfilm sagte Davis:"The issue of environmental racism is an issue of life and death. It is just not an issue of some form of prejudice where someone doesn't like you because of the color of your skin. This is an issue that will take your life away, if you don't get involved." (United Church of Christ 2023 / o.J.).Die Protestaktion und der Film löste eine nationale Debatte über Umweltrassismus aus (United Church of Christ 2023). Die Studie von 1987 wurde bis 2007 fortgesetzt und zeigte, dass nach wie vor eine Ungleichheit herrscht und Menschen aufgrund ihrer Hautfarbe einem höheren Risiko von umweltschädlichen Stoffen ausgesetzt sind. Noch immer werden Mülldeponien eher an Standorten mit einem hohen Anteil an BIPoC erbaut, als dort, wo weiße Menschen leben (Bullard et. al. 2007, S. 155).Seither gibt es immer mehr Studien zu Umweltrassismus. Diese bestätigen, dass PoC viel stärker Umweltrisiken ausgesetzt sind als weiße Personen. Die Ursache liegt vor allem darin, dass die Industrie sich meistens dort ansiedelt, wo hauptsächlich BIPoC leben. Deshalb sind schwarze Menschen 1.5 Mal, Hispanics 1.2 Mal und einkommensschwache Menschen 1.3 Mal so viel Feinstaub ausgesetzt wie weiße Menschen bzw. einkommensstarke (Warda 2020). Durch die Studien und Veröffentlichungen zum Thema Umweltrassismus hat sich der Begriff weiterentwickelt. Der amerikanische Soziologe Robert Bullard definiert ihn als"any policy, practice or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (where intended oder unintended) individuals, groups or communities based on race or color" (Batiste 2022, S. 1).Das Projekt "ENRICH" (Environmental Noxiousness, Racial Inequities, and Community Health) unterscheidet zwei Bestandteile des Umweltrassismus. Zum einen gibt es die räumliche Verteilungsungerechtigkeit, die sich auf die Standortwahl industrieller Umweltverschmutzer und anderer umweltgefährdender Projekte bezieht. Zum anderen handelt es sich um die Verfahrensungerechtigkeit. Dabei stehen die institutionellen Mechanismen und Richtlinien im Mittelpunkt, welche die Ungerechtigkeit aufrechterhalten (ENRICH o.J.).Umweltrassismus, Klimawandel und Kolonialismus Durch den Klimawandel werden weitere, ganz neue Seiten von Umweltrassismus aufgezeigt. Die Ursachen und Folgen des Klimawandels sind ungleich über den Planeten verteilt. Länder im globalen Süden sind meist viel stärker von den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels betroffen. Und das, obwohl sie deutlich weniger CO2-Emissionen erzeugen als der globale Norden (Warda 2020). Das zeigt, dass die Klimakrise die (globale) soziale Krise und somit den Umweltrassismus in großen Dimensionen enorm beeinflusst. Um dieses Ungleichgewicht von Nord- und Südkugel, welches mit dem Klimawandel einhergeht, zu erfassen, muss der Kolonialismus berücksichtigt werden.Im Zuge der Kolonialisierung kam es zu neuartigen globalen Handels- und Machtbeziehungen, welche bis heute anhalten. Dadurch blühte der globale Norden auf und erreichte Reichtum und Wohlstand (Bendix 2015, S. 273). Die Länder des globalen Südens galten als "Ressourcen- und Absatzmärkte" und halfen den Ländern auf der Nordhalbkugel, ihren Reichtum zu vermehren (Öztürk 2012, S. 2).Viele westliche Firmen wollen günstig in ärmeren Ländern produzieren. Meist haben die ärmeren Länder zudem eine fragile staatliche Struktur. Westliche Länder und Firmen nutzen dies aus und verschmutzen dadurch dort vor Ort die Natur und achten wenig auf Einheimische (Warda 2020). Der globale Süden wird ausgebeutet und leidet unter den massiven Eingriffen in deren Ökosysteme von außerhalb (Ziai 2012, S. 23).Aktuell zeigt sich eine erhebliche Diskrepanz im durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Ausstoß von Emissionen zwischen den ärmsten Ländern, zu welchen Niger, Somalia und die Zentralafrikanische Republik gehören. Dieser Ausstoß ist in den ärmsten Ländern mehr als 140 Mal niedriger als beispielsweise in Deutschland. Dazu kommt die historische Verantwortung des Globalen Nordens hinsichtlich des Klimawandels. Der größte Teil der Emissionen, der sich seit Beginn der Industrialisierung in der Atmosphäre gesammelt hat, geht auf den Globalen Norden zurück (Kurwan 2023).Eine interessante Abbildung zu den Pro-Kopf-CO2-Emissionen im Jahr 2021 findet ihr hier. Dort wird der durchschnittliche Verbrauch von fast jedem Land dargestellt. Durch Klicken auf das Land kann man sehen, dass zum Beispiel Deutschland einen durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch an Emissionen von 8.09 hatte. Eine klare Nord-Süd Trennung der Welt ist erkennbar.Damals wie auch heute sind die Länder im globalen Süden zudem stark von der Landwirtschaft abhängig. Ihre Existenz steht babei auf dem Spiel. Um sich vor den Auswirkungen zu schützen, fehlt den Menschen, aber auch den Ländern, oftmals das Geld. Von außerhalb kommt wenig Hilfe und das, obwohl der Klimawandel ein globales Problem ist. Dennoch gibt es auf politischer Ebene einen einseitigen Fokus, welcher nur auf den vergleichsweise geringen Auswirkungen auf den globalen Norden liegt. Die Länder des globalen Südens werden mit den schlimmen gesellschaftlichen und ökologischen Folgeschäden nahezu allein gelassen.Das bedeutet nicht, dass einzelne Personen, welche die Entscheidungen treffen, eine konkrete diskriminierende Absicht haben (Bellina 2022, S. 64), aber dass viele die globalen Konsequenzen außen vor lassen und nicht bedenken. Die Folge? Sie müssen fliehen. Menschen können aufgrund der Probleme, die durch den Klimawandel ausgelöst werden, nicht in ihrer Heimat bleiben (Warda 2020).Laut einem Bericht des Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC) aus dem Jahr 2015 verlassen seit 2008 jedes Jahr durchschnittlich 26.4 Mio. Menschen, ihre Heimat aufgrund von Naturkatastrophen. Das ist eine Person pro Sekunde. Die Zahl der geflohenen Personen sollen sich in den nächsten Jahren vervielfachen. Hauptursachen hierbei sind wetterbedingte Katastrophen wie Stürme, Überschwemmungen und Sturmfluten. Zu eher schleichenden Umweltproblemen wie Dürren oder dem ansteigenden Meeresspiegel gibt es (noch) keine konkreten Zahlen. Das sind deutlich mehr Personen, die aufgrund von Naturkatastrophen fliehen müssen, als aufgrund von Krieg. Oft stehen Umweltkatastrophen mit anderen Konflikten im Zusammenhang, beispielsweise Wasserknappheit (Yonetani 2015, S. 8). Umweltrassismus beeinflusst also das reale Überleben dieser Menschen.Doch nicht nur zwischen Süd und Nord gibt es Unterschiede. Auch die Einkommensunterschiede innerhalb eines Landes tragen dazu bei. So treffen die Folgen des Klimawandels die Menschen mit weniger Einkommen oft härter. Zum einen, weil sie weniger Wohnraum und somit weniger Rückzugsorte haben, zum anderen haben Einkommensschwache meist auch kein Auto oder eine andere Möglichkeit, am Straßenverkehr teilzunehmen und vor der Katastrophe zu fliehen (Adick 2022).Es kann auch Diskriminierung zwischen Geschlechtern und Generationen geben. Besonders Frauen und Kinder sind von den Folgen der Klimakrise betroffen (Kurwan 2023). Und das, obwohl Männer durchschnittlich mehr zur Klimaerwärmung beitragen als Frauen. Ein Grund dafür ist, dass Warnungen bei Naturkatastrophen größtenteils im öffentlichen Raum stattfinden, Frauen sich allerdings eher zuhause aufhalten und sich dort um Kinder und Haushalt kümmern und darum erst später davon erfahren. Sie sind auch bei der Flucht für Kinder und die Pflege der älteren Angehörigen zuständig (DGVN 2016). Ein weiterer Grund ist gerade bei Flutereignissen, dass Frauen seltener schwimmen können und schlechteren Zugang zu Verkehrsmitteln haben (Kurwan 2023).Eine Folge von Umweltkatastrophen, die nichts direkt mit Umweltrassismus zu tun hat, möchte ich dennoch nicht unerwähnt lassen. Laut Studien steigt die Anzahl der gewaltsamen Übergriffe auf Frauen nach Umweltkatastrophen enorm. Oftmals verdoppeln sich die Zahl der Gewalttaten von Männern gegenüber Frauen. Warum das konkret nach Katastrophen häufiger auftritt, hängt wahrscheinlich mit den fehlenden Strukturen im Chaos zusammen. Frauen sind dadurch weniger geschützt (DGVN 2016).Umweltrassismus kann also gegen einzelne Personen, Gruppen oder auch Länder auftreten. Aus den Kämpfen gegen Umweltrassismus erfolgten verschiedene Bewegungen für Klimagerechtigkeit. Einige sind uns allen bekannt, wie "Fridays for Future". Sie setzen sich nicht nur für Klimapolitik und Klimaschutz ein, sondern auch für Klimagerechtigkeit, wodurch dem Umweltrassismus entgegengewirkt werden soll (Fridays for Future 2020). Es handelt sich dabei also nicht nur um eine Klimabewegung, sondern um eine Klimagerechtigkeitsbewegung.FallbeispieleUm noch deutlicher zu zeigen, was für Arten von Umweltrassismus es auf der Erde gibt und wie oft diese auftreten, werden im Folgenden einige Beispiele aufgeführt.Das erste Beispiel handelt von den USA, genauer gesagt von den Gemeinden eines über 130 km langen Landstrichs entlang des Mississippi von Baton Rounge bis New Orleans in Louisiana. Hier haben sich insgesamt über 150 Ölraffinerien, Kunststofffabriken und andere chemische Anlagen angesiedelt, die viele Emissionen ausstoßen. Und das direkt an den zuvor bestehenden Siedlungen. Gleichzeitig weist der Abschnitt eine sehr hohe Inzidenz- und Sterblichkeitsrate im Vergleich zum Rest der USA auf. Auch die Krebsrate ist viel höher als im Rest des Landes. Aufgrund dessen wird dieser Abschnitt auch "Cancer Alley", die Allee der Krebskranken, genannt. In kaum einem anderen Bundesstaat ist die Luft so schlecht wie in Louisiana (Batiste 2022, S. 1).Doch nicht alle Menschen am Mississippi sind gleichermaßen betroffen. Vor allem die hier lebenden schwarzen Menschen auf der einen Seite des Flusses kämpfen gegen den Krebs. Verantwortlich dafür wird die Industrie gemacht. Auf der anderen Seite des Flusses leben hauptsächlich weiße Menschen, oftmals derselben Gemeinde. Aufgrund von Protesten wurden dort keine Industrieanlagen erbaut. Diese sehen die Industrie mittlerweile als Chance für neue Arbeitsplätze und Steuereinnahmen. Aber nur, wenn sie in einem bestimmten Abstand erbaut werden. Studien haben gezeigt: Je näher die Menschen an den Industrieanlagen wohnen, desto höher das Gesundheitsrisiko. Und da sich die Industrie hier auffällig nahe in Nachbarschaften mit hauptsächlich BIPoC oder Armen angesiedelt haben, gehen diese von einem rassistischen Motiv aus. Sie haben das Gefühl, geopfert zu werden, an zweiter Wahl zu stehen (Schmidt 2023).Eine Studie aus den USA zeigt, dass es eine besonders hohe Sterberate bei BIPoC gibt im Zusammenhang mit Hitzewellen. Vor allem in Großstädten sterben doppelt so viele wie weiße Menschen. Das liegt an den Temperaturdifferenzen innerhalb der schwarzen und weißen Nachbarschaft, welche bei bis zu 1.7° Celsius liegen kann (Ituen/Tatu Hey 2021, S. 12/13).Doch Umweltrassismus gibt es auch in Deutschland. So wurde durch verschiedene Studien festgestellt, dass es beispielsweise in Kassel eine erhöhte Luftverschmutzung in den Bezirken gibt, in welchen Menschen mit niedrigen sozioökonomischen Status und Migrationshintergrund wohnen (Ituen/Tatu Hey 2021, S. 9). Auch andere marginalisierte Gruppen, wie Sinti*zza und Rom*nja erleben dies immer wieder. Meistens werden sie in Gegenden mit einer hohen Umweltbelastung geschoben und von Umweltgütern wie sauberem Trinkwasser ausgeschlossen (Ituen/Tatu Hey 2021, S. 8).Eine neue Studie aus Chicago verdeutlicht, dass Schwarze während der Pandemie für 50 % der Corona-Infektionen und sogar 70 % der Todesfälle verantwortlich waren. Und das, obwohl sie lediglich 30 % der Bevölkerung von Chicago ausmachen. Und auch in Großbritannien zeigt sich, dass schwarze Menschen fast doppelt so häufig wie weiße Menschen einem erhöhten Risiko ausgesetzt sind, an Covid-19 zu sterben (Ituen/Tatu Hey 2021, S. 13).Ebenso können ganze Länder von Umweltrassismus betroffen sein, wie beispielsweise Senegal. Der globale Süden ist durch Kolonialisierung und jahrhundertelange Ausbeutung viel später in die Industrialisierung eingestiegen. Bis dahin haben die Länder des Nordens schon viel, viel mehr CO2 ausgestoßen, welches über 100 Jahre in der Atmosphäre bleibt. Trotzdem sollen die Länder des globalen Südens genau so viel CO2 einsparen wie die Länder auf der Nordhalbkugel. Gleichzeitig sollen sie die Schulden gegenüber dem globalen Norden abbauen. Das führt dazu, dass Länder im Süden (z.B. Senegal) ihre fossilen Energieträger von Industrienationen ausbeuten lassen, um nicht noch tiefer in die Schulden zu stürzen (Adick 2022).Umweltrassismus bekämpfenDie Bekämpfung von Umweltrassismus wird von Land zu Land unterschiedlich gehandhabt. Der gemeinsame Kern ist jedoch, dass das Leid der betroffenen Personen gemindert werden soll. Diese wollen auf sich aufmerksam machen und gegen das Unrecht ankämpfen. So war es auch bei Cancer Alley. Gemeinsam mit Anwälten wurden Klagen gegen staatliche Einrichtungen oder chemische Fabriken angestrengt (Schmidt 2023). Robert Taylor, der Gründer der Initiative gegen die Chemiefabriken, kämpft für eine bessere Zukunft. Vor allem für die BIPoC-Kinder der Gemeinden. Weitere Forderungen sind Verschärfungen von Vorschriften der EPA (Envioronmental Protection Agency), welche eine unabhängige Behörde der USA ist und sich für den Umweltschutz und den Schutz der menschlichen Gesundheit einsetzt, und eine Wiedergutmachung für die betroffenen und hinterbliebenen Personen (Batiste 2022, S. 29).Mittlerweile hat auch Präsident Joe Biden davon gehört und Taylor ins Weiße Haus eingeladen. Hier soll er verdeutlichen, dass Umweltschutz oberste Priorität hat und somit auch dem Umweltrassismus entgegengewirkt werden kann. Es gibt den Anwohner*innen und Umweltgruppen Hoffnung. Außerdem verlangen sie mehr Forschung zu dem Thema, um besser ihr Leid belegen zu können. Sie glauben, dass die Politik ihnen dann mehr Glauben schenkt (Schmidt 2023). Die daraus resultierende nationale Aufmerksamkeit soll der Wendepunkt von Cancer Alley sein (Batiste 2022, S. 29).Ein weiteres einzigartiges und innovatives Projekt wurde 2012 von Dr. Ingrid Waldron in Kanada ins Leben gerufen. Dabei handelt es sich um das sogenannte ENRICH-Projekt (Environmental Noxiousness, Racial Inequities, and Community Health), welches sich auf die sozialen, ökologischen, politischen und gesundheitlichen Auswirkungen von Umweltrassismus in Mi´kmaq-Gemeinden (Ureinwohner*innen) und Nova Scotia, einer kleinen Provinz in Kanada, spezialisieret (ENRICH o.J.). Die hauptsächlich dort lebenden BIPoC berichten von Krankheiten wie Krebs oder Diabetes, welche aufgrund von Mülldeponien, die 1974 und 2006 eröffnet wurden, hervorgerufen wurden. Außerdem hatten sie kaum Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser, da das Wasser viele Giftstoffe enthielt. Der Müll zog zudem Bären, Waschbären und Insekten an (Klingbeil 2016).Das Projekt will Wege finden, um räumliche wie verteilungstechnische Arten des Umweltrassismus in diesen Gemeinden anzugehen und mithilfe der Bürger*innen die Politik bzw. Politiker*innen zum Handeln zu zwingen. Des Weiteren wollen sie national über die Ansiedlung und Regulierung von Industrieanlagen im Zusammenhang mit Umweltrassismus informieren. Das machen sie mithilfe von Interessenvertretungen, gemeinschaftlichem Engagement, Mobilisierung und Kapazitätsaufbau in betroffenen Gemeinden, öffentlicher Bildung, Studierendenausbildung, sektorübergreifenden Partnerschaften, Workshops und Kommunikation (ENRICH o.J.). Auch ihnen ist es in erster Linie wichtig, auf diese Umstände aufmerksam zu machen. Die Beteiligten schafften es, dass im Jahr 2015 zum ersten mal in Kanada ein Gesetzesentwurf zum Thema Umweltrassismus eingebracht und bis zur zweiten Lesung durchgebracht wurde. Allerdings wurde das Gesetz nicht verabschiedet (Klingbeil 2016).Das Projekt sorgte weltweit für Aufsehen. Im April 2018 veröffentlichte Waldron das Buch "There´s something in the water" und verwendete Nova Scotia als Fallbeispiel, um die Auswirkungen von Umweltrassismus und dessen gesundheitliche Folgen auf indigene und schwarze Gemeinschaften in Kanada zu untersuchen. Das Buch erhielt zwei Preise. 2019 wurde der gleichnamige Dokumentarfilm veröffentlicht.Das sind einzelne Projekte, die wichtig sind und von denen Betroffene profitieren können. Jedoch können sie nicht dem globalen Umweltrassismus entgegenwirken, welcher heute enorme Dimensionen angenommen hat. Nicht nur Bevölkerungsgruppen, sondern auch Länder sind unterschiedlich von den Folgen des Klimawandels betroffen. Die Politik kann und muss dagegen ankämpfen. Es gibt schon Lösungsideen, wie dem Umweltrassismus entgegengewirkt werden kann.Ein Prinzip, das dabei beachtet werden sollte, ist das Verursacherprinzip. Dabei sollen nicht nur die aktuellen Emissionen berücksichtigt werden, sondern auch die historische Verantwortung. Das bedeutet, dass beachtet werden muss, welches Land wie viel CO2 in der Vergangenheit ausgestoßen hat. Dadurch verändert sich das CO2-Budget der Länder im Norden. Teilweise wäre das Budget schon komplett aufgebraucht. Außerdem sollen die Nationen des globalen Nordens die Verantwortung als hauptsächliche Verursacher des Klimawandels auf sich nehmen und für die Kosten von Anpassungsstrategien und klimabedingten Schäden in Ländern des globalen Südens aufkommen müssen (Kurwan 2023).Eine weitere Lösung, die das Problem beheben könnte, ist ein Schuldenerlass. Das führt dazu, dass fossile Energieträger des globalen Südes im Boden bleiben können und die Länder das Geld anders investieren können. Beispielsweise in eine Veränderung, die sozial und ökologisch gerecht wäre. Des Weiteren könnten sie mit dem Geld die Klimaanpassung (mit-)finanzieren. Viele Wissenschaftler*innen oder auch der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) haben sich positiv zu dieser Lösung geäußert. Somit könnte den ärmeren Ländern mehr finanzieller Spielraum gegeben werden. Das kann ein Hilfsmittel gegen die Ungerechtigkeit sein. Jedoch kann es diese nicht komplett lindern. Der Norden muss definitiv noch mehr investieren. Denn wie schon weiter oben gesagt, hängt die Klimakrise eng mit der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und somit dem Umweltrassismus zusammen.FazitDer Beitrag beleuchtete das komplexe Thema des Umweltrassismus. Der Begriff wurde Anfang der 1980er Jahre geprägt und bekommt immer mehr Bedeutung. Umweltrassismus hat viele Facetten. Es tritt auf, wenn Umweltprobleme und Umweltverschmutzung unverhältnismäßig stark bestimmte Gemeinschaften betreffen. Meist betrifft es die Menschen, die bereits benachteiligt sind.Umweltrassismus ist also nicht nur eine Frage der Umwelt, sondern auch eine der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, wenn nicht sogar eine Frage von Leben und Tod. Neben BIPoC können auch Geschlechter und Generationen sowie ganze Länder direkt oder indirekt betroffen sein. Häufig trifft es Frauen, Kinder und Einkommensschwache am stärksten.Der globale Norden, der historisch für einen Großteil der CO2-Emissionen verantwortlich ist, leidet weniger unter den Folgen des Klimawandels als der globale Süden. Und das, obwohl der Süden deutlich weniger Emissionen verursacht.Um dem Umweltrassismus entgegenzuwirken, gibt es verschiedene Lösungsansätze. Diese reichen von gemeindebasierten Initiativen und internationaler Zusammenarbeit bis hin zu Gerichtsverfahren und politischen Maßnahmen. Ein wichtiger Schritt dabei ist es, die historische Verantwortung anzuerkennen und den globalen Norden zur Verantwortung zu ziehen. Ein Schuldenerlass für die Länder des globalen Südens könnte ihnen zudem finanzielle Ressourcen verschaffen, die sie in umweltfreundliche Technologie stecken können.Mit diesem Beitrag soll ein Bewusstsein für Umweltrassismus geschaffen werden. Das Ziel ist es, dass weniger CO2 freigesetzt wird, um eine nachhaltige Welt zu schaffen, in der Umweltressourcen und Chancen fair verteilt werden und niemand aufgrund seiner Hautfarbe oder seines sozialen Status benachteiligt wird. Es erfordert Engagement auf individueller und globaler Ebene, um die notwendigen Veränderungen herbeizuführen.LiteraturverzeichnisAdick, Katharina (2022): SPEZIAL: Klimagerechtigkeit – So wird Klimaschutz sozialer (Audio-Podcast). 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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

In my postgraduate formation during the last years of the 80's, we had close to thirty hospital beds in a pavilion called "sépticas" (1). In Colombia, where abortion was completely penalized, the pavilion was mostly filled with women with insecure, complicated abortions. The focus we received was technical: management of intensive care; performance of hysterectomies, colostomies, bowel resection, etc. In those times, some nurses were nuns and limited themselves to interrogating the patients to get them to "confess" what they had done to themselves in order to abort. It always disturbed me that the women who left alive, left without any advice or contraceptive method. Having asked a professor of mine, he responded with disdain: "This is a third level hospital, those things are done by nurses of the first level". Seeing so much pain and death, I decided to talk to patients, and I began to understand their decision. I still remember so many deaths with sadness, but one case in particular pains me: it was a woman close to being fifty who arrived with a uterine perforation in a state of advanced sepsis. Despite the surgery and the intensive care, she passed away. I had talked to her, and she told me she was a widow, had two adult kids and had aborted because of "embarrassment towards them" because they were going to find out that she had an active sexual life. A few days after her passing, the pathology professor called me, surprised, to tell me that the uterus we had sent for pathological examination showed no pregnancy. She was a woman in a perimenopausal state with a pregnancy exam that gave a false positive due to the high levels of FSH/LH typical of her age. SHE WAS NOT PREGNANT!!! She didn't have menstruation because she was premenopausal and a false positive led her to an unsafe abortion. Of course, the injuries caused in the attempted abortion caused the fatal conclusion, but the real underlying cause was the social taboo in respect to sexuality. I had to watch many adolescents and young women leave the hospital alive, but without a uterus, sometime without ovaries and with colostomies, to be looked down on by a society that blamed them for deciding to not be mothers. I had to see situation of women that arrived with their intestines protruding from their vaginas because of unsafe abortions. I saw women, who in their despair, self-inflicted injuries attempting to abort with elements such as stick, branches, onion wedges, alum bars and clothing hooks among others. Among so many deaths, it was hard not having at least one woman per day in the morgue due to an unsafe abortion. During those time, healthcare was not handled from the biopsychosocial, but only from the technical (2); nonetheless, in the academic evaluations that were performed, when asked about the definition of health, we had to recite the text from the International Organization of Health that included these three aspects. How contradictory! To give response to the health need of women and guarantee their right when I was already a professor, I began an obstetric contraceptive service in that third level hospital. There was resistance from the directors, but fortunately I was able to acquire international donations for the institution, which facilitated its acceptance. I decided to undertake a teaching career with the hope of being able to sensitize health professionals towards an integral focus of health and illness. When the International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) was held in Cairo in 1994, I had already spent various years in teaching, and when I read their Action Program, I found a name for what I was working on: Sexual and Reproductive Rights. I began to incorporate the tools given by this document into my professional and teaching life. I was able to sensitize people at my countries Health Ministry, and we worked together moving it to an approach of human rights in areas of sexual and reproductive health (SRH). This new viewpoint, in addition to being integral, sought to give answers to old problems like maternal mortality, adolescent pregnancy, low contraceptive prevalence, unplanned or unwanted pregnancy or violence against women. With other sensitized people, we began with these SRH issues to permeate the Colombian Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, some universities, and university hospitals. We are still fighting in a country that despite many difficulties has improved its indicators of SRH. With the experience of having labored in all sphere of these topics, we manage to create, with a handful of colleagues and friend at the Universidad El Bosque, a Master's Program in Sexual and Reproductive Health, open to all professions, in which we broke several paradigms. A program was initiated in which the qualitative and quantitative investigation had the same weight, and some alumni of the program are now in positions of leadership in governmental and international institutions, replicating integral models. In the Latin American Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FLASOG, English acronym) and in the International Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FIGO), I was able to apply my experience for many years in the SRH committees of these association to benefit women and girls in the regional and global environments. When I think of who has inspired me in these fights, I should highlight the great feminist who have taught me and been with me in so many fights. I cannot mention them all, but I have admired the story of the life of Margaret Sanger with her persistence and visionary outlook. She fought throughout her whole life to help the women of the 20th century to be able to obtain the right to decide when and whether or not they wanted to have children (3). Of current feminist, I have had the privilege of sharing experiences with Carmen Barroso, Giselle Carino, Debora Diniz and Alejandra Meglioli, leaders of the International Planned Parenthood Federation – Western Hemisphere Region (IPPF-RHO). From my country, I want to mention my countrywoman Florence Thomas, psychologist, columnist, writer and Colombo-French feminist. She is one of the most influential and important voices in the movement for women rights in Colombia and the region. She arrived from France in the 1960's, in the years of counterculture, the Beatles, hippies, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre, a time in which capitalism and consumer culture began to be criticized (4). It was then when they began to talk about the female body, female sexuality and when the contraceptive pill arrived like a total revolution for women. Upon its arrival in 1967, she experimented a shock because she had just assisted in a revolution and only found a country of mothers, not women (5). That was the only destiny for a woman, to be quiet and submissive. Then she realized that this could not continue, speaking of "revolutionary vanguards" in such a patriarchal environment. In 1986 with the North American and European feminism waves and with her academic team, they created the group "Mujer y Sociedad de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia", incubator of great initiatives and achievements for the country (6). She has led great changes with her courage, the strength of her arguments, and a simultaneously passionate and agreeable discourse. Among her multiple books, I highlight "Conversaciones con Violeta" (7), motivated by the disdain towards feminism of some young women. She writes it as a dialogue with an imaginary daughter in which, in an intimate manner, she reconstructs the history of women throughout the centuries and gives new light of the fundamental role of feminism in the life of modern women. Another book that shows her bravery is "Había que decirlo" (8), in which she narrates the experience of her own abortion at age twenty-two in sixty's France. My work experience in the IPPF-RHO has allowed me to meet leaders of all ages in diverse countries of the region, who with great mysticism and dedication, voluntarily, work to achieve a more equal and just society. I have been particularly impressed by the appropriation of the concept of sexual and reproductive rights by young people, and this has given me great hope for the future of the planet. We continue to have an incomplete agenda of the action plan of the ICPD of Cairo but seeing how the youth bravely confront the challenges motivates me to continue ahead and give my years of experience in an intergenerational work. In their policies and programs, the IPPF-RHO evidences great commitment for the rights and the SRH of adolescent, that are consistent with what the organization promotes, for example, 20% of the places for decision making are in hands of the young. Member organizations, that base their labor on volunteers, are true incubators of youth that will make that unassailable and necessary change of generations. In contrast to what many of us experienced, working in this complicated agenda of sexual and reproductive health without theoretical bases, today we see committed people with a solid formation to replace us. In the college of medicine at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the College of Nursing at the Universidad El Bosque, the new generations are more motivated and empowered, with great desire to change the strict underlying structures. Our great worry is the onslaught of the ultra-right, a lot of times better organized than us who do support rights, that supports anti-rights group and are truly pro-life (9). Faced with this scenario, we should organize ourselves better, giving battle to guarantee the rights of women in the local, regional, and global level, aggregating the efforts of all pro-right organizations. We are now committed to the Objectives of Sustainable Development (10), understood as those that satisfy the necessities of the current generation without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own necessities. This new agenda is based on: - The unfinished work of the Millennium Development Goals - Pending commitments (international environmental conventions) - The emergent topics of the three dimensions of sustainable development: social, economic, and environmental. We now have 17 objectives of sustainable development and 169 goals (11). These goals mention "universal access to reproductive health" many times. In objective 3 of this list is included guaranteeing, before the year 2030, "universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including those of family planning, information, and education." Likewise, objective 5, "obtain gender equality and empower all women and girls", establishes the goal of "assuring the universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in conformity with the action program of the International Conference on Population and Development, the Action Platform of Beijing". It cannot be forgotten that the term universal access to sexual and reproductive health includes universal access to abortion and contraception. Currently, 830 women die every day through preventable maternal causes; of these deaths, 99% occur in developing countries, more than half in fragile environments and in humanitarian contexts (12). 216 million women cannot access modern contraception methods and the majority live in the nine poorest countries in the world and in a cultural environment proper to the decades of the seventies (13). This number only includes women from 15 to 49 years in any marital state, that is to say, the number that takes all women into account is much greater. Achieving the proposed objectives would entail preventing 67 million unwanted pregnancies and reducing maternal deaths by two thirds. We currently have a high, unsatisfied demand for modern contraceptives, with extremely low use of reversible, long term methods (intrauterine devices and subdermal implants) which are the most effect ones with best adherence (14). There is not a single objective among the 17 Objectives of Sustainable Development where contraception does not have a prominent role: from the first one that refers to ending poverty, going through the fifth one about gender equality, the tenth of inequality reduction among countries and within the same country, until the sixteenth related with peace and justice. If we want to change the world, we should procure universal access to contraception without myths or barriers. We have the moral obligation of achieving the irradiation of extreme poverty and advancing the construction of more equal, just, and happy societies. In emergency contraception (EC), we are very far from reaching expectations. If in reversible, long-term methods we have low prevalence, in EC the situation gets worse. Not all faculties in the region look at this topic, and where it is looked at, there is no homogeneity in content, not even within the same country. There are still myths about their real action mechanisms. There are countries, like Honduras, where it is prohibited and there is no specific medicine, the same case as in Haiti. Where it is available, access is dismal, particularly among girls, adolescents, youth, migrants, afro-descendent, and indigenous. The multiple barriers for the effective use of emergency contraceptives must be knocked down, and to work toward that we have to destroy myths and erroneous perceptions, taboos and cultural norms; achieve changes in laws and restrictive rules within countries, achieve access without barriers to the EC; work in union with other sectors; train health personnel and the community. It is necessary to transform the attitude of health personal to a service above personal opinion. Reflecting on what has occurred after the ICPD in Cairo, their Action Program changed how we look at the dynamics of population from an emphasis on demographics to a focus on the people and human rights. The governments agreed that, in this new focus, success was the empowerment of women and the possibility of choice through expanded access to education, health, services, and employment among others. Nonetheless, there have been unequal advances and inequality persists in our region, all the goals were not met, the sexual and reproductive goals continue beyond the reach of many women (15). There is a long road ahead until women and girls of the world can claim their rights and liberty of deciding. Globally, maternal deaths have been reduced, there is more qualified assistance of births, more contraception prevalence, integral sexuality education, and access to SRH services for adolescents are now recognized rights with great advances, and additionally there have been concrete gains in terms of more favorable legal frameworks, particularly in our region; nonetheless, although it's true that the access condition have improved, the restrictive laws of the region expose the most vulnerable women to insecure abortions. There are great challenges for governments to recognize SRH and the DSR as integral parts of health systems, there is an ample agenda against women. In that sense, access to SRH is threatened and oppressed, it requires multi-sector mobilization and litigation strategies, investigation and support for the support of women's rights as a multi-sector agenda. Looking forward, we must make an effort to work more with youth to advance not only the Action Program of the ICPD, but also all social movements. They are one of the most vulnerable groups, and the biggest catalyzers for change. The young population still faces many challenges, especially women and girls; young girls are in particularly high risk due to lack of friendly and confidential services related with sexual and reproductive health, gender violence, and lack of access to services. In addition, access to abortion must be improved; it is the responsibility of states to guarantee the quality and security of this access. In our region there still exist countries with completely restrictive frameworks. New technologies facilitate self-care (16), which will allow expansion of universal access, but governments cannot detach themselves from their responsibility. Self-care is expanding in the world and can be strategic for reaching the most vulnerable populations. There are new challenges for the same problems, that require a re-interpretation of the measures necessary to guaranty the DSR of all people, in particular women, girls, and in general, marginalized and vulnerable populations. It is necessary to take into account migrations, climate change, the impact of digital media, the resurgence of hate discourse, oppression, violence, xenophobia, homo/transphobia, and other emergent problems, as SRH should be seen within a framework of justice, not isolated. We should demand accountability of the 179 governments that participate in the ICPD 25 years ago and the 193 countries that signed the Sustainable Development Objectives. They should reaffirm their commitments and expand their agenda to topics not considered at that time. Our region has given the world an example with the Agreement of Montevideo, that becomes a blueprint for achieving the action plan of the CIPD and we should not allow retreat. This agreement puts people at the center, especially women, and includes the topic of abortion, inviting the state to consider the possibility of legalizing it, which opens the doors for all governments of the world to recognize that women have the right to choose on maternity. This agreement is much more inclusive: Considering that the gaps in health continue to abound in the region and the average statistics hide the high levels of maternal mortality, of sexually transmitted diseases, of infection by HIV/AIDS, and the unsatisfied demand for contraception in the population that lives in poverty and rural areas, among indigenous communities, and afro-descendants and groups in conditions of vulnerability like women, adolescents and incapacitated people, it is agreed: 33- To promote, protect, and guarantee the health and the sexual and reproductive rights that contribute to the complete fulfillment of people and social justice in a society free of any form of discrimination and violence. 37- Guarantee universal access to quality sexual and reproductive health services, taking into consideration the specific needs of men and women, adolescents and young, LGBT people, older people and people with incapacity, paying particular attention to people in a condition of vulnerability and people who live in rural and remote zone, promoting citizen participation in the completing of these commitments. 42- To guarantee, in cases in which abortion is legal or decriminalized in the national legislation, the existence of safe and quality abortion for non-desired or non-accepted pregnancies and instigate the other States to consider the possibility of modifying public laws, norms, strategies, and public policy on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to save the life and health of pregnant adolescent women, improving their quality of life and decreasing the number of abortions (17).

Zielgruppe und Reichweite von TikTok"Die Bundesregierung hasst dich. Sie will dir das wegnehmen, was du dir erarbeitet hast."Das erzählt der AfD-Politiker Maximilian Krah seiner Community auf TikTok, wo er knapp 37.000 Follower hat, seine Videos aber bis zu einer Million Aufrufe haben. Möglich macht das vor allem der Algorithmus und die For-You-Page (FYP) von TikTok. Die Plattform wird als "schärfste (…) Waffe (der AfD) im Kampf um die Meinungsführerschaft" (Korth/Többen/Wald 2024) beschrieben."Same, but different!?" Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat - und jetzt auch noch TikTok. Soziale Medien nehmen eine immer wichtigere Rolle im Leben vieler Menschen ein und haben daher auch einen starken Einfluss auf den Prozess der Meinungsbildung, was in einer Demokratie einerseits positive Aspekte hat, andererseits aber auch ein Gefährdungspotential.Die Menge an Social Media-Kanälen ist groß und deshalb lohnt es sich, einmal zu hinterfragen, was die Plattform TikTok für viele besonders macht, wie sie funktioniert und weshalb sie gerade von Rechtspopulisten besonders gerne für ihre Zwecke genutzt wird.Medien haben zum einen die Funktion des Informationsvermittlers, zum anderen spielen sie eine zentrale Rolle als "vierten Gewalt", da sie der Politik kritisch auf die Finger schauen und diese damit unter eine Art Dauerinspektion stellen."Information ist die Währung der Demokratie" - das wusste schon Thomas Jefferson, dritter Präsident der USA und Verfasser der Unabhängigkeitserklärung, vor über 200 Jahren. Und noch nie in der Menschheitsgeschichte gab es so viele Informationen wie heute; noch nie war es so leicht, an Informationen zu gelangen. Das Internet und somit auch TikTok schafft Informationszugang für (fast) jeden, jederzeit, an jedem Ort und zu jedem Thema. Kein Mensch kann stets jede einzelne Nachricht auf ihre Richtigkeit prüfen, um die Fakten sauber von den Lügen zu trennen. Das nützen manche aus, um uns unbemerkt zu manipulieren und z.B. ihre politischen Ideen mit unlauteren Mitteln durchzusetzen.TikTok ist eine App, in der kurze, meist mit Musik unterlegte Filme zu sehen sind. Die Nutzer können sich Videos ansehen oder auch selbst kurze Videos auf der Plattform präsentieren. Dabei bietet TikTok zwei Möglichkeiten, die angezeigten Filme auszuwählen. Zum einen können die Nutzer Akteuren folgen und so von deren neuen Videos erfahren. Zum anderen wählt die App selbst Videos aus und bietet sie den Nutzenden in einem dauerhaften Strom auf ihrer "For You"-Page (FYP) an. Wer die App nutzt, bekommt Videos gezeigt und entscheidet selbst, oft in ein paar Sekunden, ob man das Video bis zum Ende sieht oder ob durch Wischen das nächste Video dran ist.Bei Facebook, Instagram und Co. geht es darum, sich mit Freunden in Verbindung zu setzen und zu schauen, was andere veröffentlichen und dann selbst Inhalte zu posten. Bei TikTok ist es eher so, dass man sich von neuen Creators inspirieren lässt und dann selbst dazu animiert wird, Content zu erstellen. Nutzer erstellen so Inhalte, über die ein kontinuierlicher Austausch stattfindet: Zentrales Merkmal der TikTok-App ist demnach die Interaktivität (vgl. Kuhn 2022).Die Nutzer können Videos liken, kommentieren und an andere weiterschicken oder die Inhalte selbst weiterverarbeiten und genau diese Aktionen informieren den Algorithmus über Vorlieben der Nutzenden. Auch nicht-öffentliche Direktnachrichten sind möglich. Man stellt sich die Frage: Soll in diesem Umfeld über Politik gesprochen werden?Es handelt sich also grundsätzlich um eine stark musikorientierte Unterhaltungs-App, in der vornehmlich junge Leute sehr kurze Videos sehen. Mindestens 39% der 16- bis 24-Jährigen in Deutschland nutzen die App laut einer Studie der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung vom Mai 2023 (Roose 2023).Zwei von fünf der jungen TikTok-Nutzenden informieren sich auf der Plattform über Politik, wobei politische Information eine nachgeordnete Rolle spielt und meist nach ihrem Unterhaltungswert beurteilt wird. Politische Inhalte müssen sehr kurz sein und schnell auffallen. Am ehesten finden laut der Studie politisch wenig Interessierte Politik auf TikTok ansprechend.Die Idee hinter den technischen Funktionen stammt aus China. Das Unternehmen Byte Dance kaufte das (chinesische) soziale Netzwerk musical.ly auf und übernahm Funktionen und Ideen, z.B. mit Musik unterlegte Videos. Daraus entstand 2018 die App "TikTok". Die Nutzerzahl steigt täglich weltweit, mittlerweile sind es fast zwei Milliarden Nutzer, davon 21 Millionen User in Deutschland, vor allem junge Menschen. Während andere soziale Netzwerke an Reichweite verloren haben, gewann TikTok an Reichweite hinzu.Dabei war TikTok als Plattform zunächst nicht daran interessiert, als politische Plattform wahrgenommen zu werden oder sich zu einer solchen zu entwickeln. Es war eher ein Ort für Tanz-Challenges und sogenannte Lip-Sync-Videos. Doch die Möglichkeiten, die TikTok bietet, um politische Inhalte unterhaltend und spielerisch zu vermitteln, haben dazu geführt. Nutzer schauen sich auch Nachrichten an oder reagieren auf politische Ereignisse. Die Grenzen zwischen News und Entertainment auf TikTok verschwimmen dabei immer mehr.Eine der wichtigsten Funktionen von TikTok ist das bereits erwähnte Alleinstellungsmerkmal: Die For You-Page (FYP). Die User bekommen hier ein Video nach dem anderen gezeigt, indem sie scrollen. Die Auswahl des nächsten Videos erfolgt dann automatisch durch den TikTok-Algorithmus. Das macht es den Creators möglich, mit ihren Videos viral zu gehen, obwohl sie oft im Verhältnis gar nicht so viele Follower haben. Jeder Nutzer erhält so ein Programm, das auf die eigenen Vorlieben zugeschnitten sein soll.Zu den demografischen Daten der TikTok-Nutzung kann man sagen, dass im Vergleich zur Gesamtbevölkerung die Nutzung der App bei den unter 20-Jährigen am stärksten ist. Die Plattform konnte in den vergangenen Jahren allerdings über alle Altersgruppen hinweg an Relevanz und Reichweite zulegen (Studie im Auftrag des SWR zu TikTok: Granow/Scolari 2022).Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus Bevor man nun gezielt auf die Thematik dieses Beitrags "TikTok und Rechtspopulismus" zu sprechen kommt, sollte man diesen Begriff zunächst einmal definieren: Rechtspopulismus ist eine Ausformung des Populismus im Bereich der politischen Rechten.Populisten im allgemeinen nehmen einen allgemeinen Volkswillen an, der politisch nicht repräsentiert ist. Die Meinung der "schweigenden Mehrheit" hat danach keine oder nur eine geringe Chance auf eine Präsenz im öffentlichen Raum. Dem Volk wird hierbei lediglich eine Rolle als machtloses politisches Objekt zugesprochen, dessen Bedürfnisse und Ziele nicht durch politisches Handeln der systemrelevanten Akteure wie Regierung oder Parteien umgesetzt werden.Populismus geht von einem Gegensatz zwischen dem Volk und einer korrupten Elite bzw. einem korrupten politischen System überhaupt aus. Die Elite verfolge eine eigene, gegen die Interessen des Volkes gerichtete politische Praxis. Komplexe sozioökonomische Problemlagen werden dabei auf einfache Ursachen und entsprechende Lösungen reduziert. Populisten stellen sich also als einzig wahre Vertreter des allgemeinen Volkswillens dar, wobei es dabei oftmals Forderungen nach mehr direkter Demokratie gibt.Populismus operiert außerdem mit Feindbildern und schlägt meist autoritäre Lösungen vor (Mediendienst Integration 2024). Er lebt von Polarisierung, die über TikTok gut funktioniert. Populismus ist sozusagen eine bestimmte Art der Anrufung der Gesellschaft und bezeichnet die Methode, wie sich Politiker, Bewegungen und Parteien zum "umworbenen Volk" in Beziehung setzen (Decker 2000).Der Linkspopulismus hat zum Ziel, möglichst viele Bevölkerungsteile an der gesellschaftlichen Reichtumsproduktion und an der politischen Partizipation teilnehmen zu lassen. Es geht dabei um die Einbeziehung (Inklusion) möglichst Vieler an der gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe.Der Rechtspopulismus hingegen hat zum Ausgangspunkt, welche Teile der Bevölkerung eben nicht zum Volk gehören (Exklusion) und somit keinen Anspruch auf politische, soziale und ökonomische Repräsentanz haben. Ausgeschlossen werden diejenigen, die aufgrund ihrer Herkunft oder ihrer Lebensweise als nicht zugehörig zur Nation betrachtet werden und eine Bedrohung darstellen (z.B. Migranten oder Homosexuelle). Die Bedrohung kann dabei beispielsweise in dem Verfall der inneren Sicherheit, der kulturellen Gefährdung, der ungerechten Steuerpolitik der Regierung oder der Globalisierung bestehen. Mit Hilfe des Ausschlusses wird so ein Gesamtwohl für das Volk konstruiert und konstituiert.Außerdem ist der Rechtspopulismus eher als strategisches Konzept zu sehen und nicht als geschlossene Ideologie. Das bedeutet nicht, dass er keine ideologischen Elemente hätte, er präsentiert sich allerdings nicht als ideologisches Gesamtkonstrukt. Bei vielen politischen Inhalten bleibt der Rechtspopulismus eher diffus, wobei gerade in dieser Diffusität sein Erfolg begründet ist, denn so ermöglicht er eine große Projektionsfläche für viele unterschiedliche Gruppen in der Bevölkerung.Rechtspopulisten treten betont bürgerlich auf. Sie vermeiden eindeutig (extrem rechts) konnotierte Begriffe wie "völkisch" oder "Blutabstammung", um so eine erhöhte Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung zu erreichen. So wird zum Beispiel Rassismus über die Kultur begründet: Statt dem deutschen Volk, das von Ausländern bedroht sei, würde die deutsche bzw. abendländische Kultur durch Einflüsse einer außenstehenden Kultur (also Migranten) zerstört.Rechtspopulistische Agitation greift Stimmungen "aus dem Volk" auf, lenkt sie und schmiedet sie zusammen, letztlich um eigene Ziele und Machtansprüche zu verwirklichen. Er ist dabei schwer zu greifen und anpassungsfähig; genau dies ist seine Stärke. Er wandelt geschickt seine jeweilige Gestalt und nimmt mal die eine, mal die andere Zielgruppe seiner Abwertung ins Visier (Küpper / Zick / Krause 2015).Allerdings kann man auch sagen, dass der Rechtspopulismus als Schnittstelle zwischen extremer Rechte und Rechtskonservatismus fungiert. Er vertritt autoritäre Politikkonzeptionen, ohne jedoch eine völlige Abschaffung des demokratischen bzw. parlamentarischen Systems zu fordern. Direkte Bezüge zur extremen Rechten werden inhaltlich wie personell vermieden.Die Abgrenzung des Rechtspopulismus von der extremen Rechten ist nicht immer trennscharf, schließlich haben beide viele Elemente gemeinsam (z.B. Xenophobie, völkisches Denken, Autoritarismus). Die extreme Rechte wird oft als radikalisierte, extremere Variante des Rechtspopulismus gesehen. Man könnte den Rechtspopulismus aber auch als "Wolf im Schafspelz" ansehen.Im Unterschied zum Rechtsextremismus hat der Rechtspopulismus nicht den Systemsturz, wohl aber eine Einschränkung politischer Partizipation zum Ziel. Gewalt ist beim Rechtspopulismus kein konstituierendes Merkmal. Im Rechtspopulismus besteht eher der Gedanke einer nationalen Erneuerung bzw. einer verstärkten Orientierung auf die Nation, während für die extreme Rechte eine vollständig neue völkische Gesellschaft geschaffen werden soll (Caballero 2016).Außerdem bemüht sich der Rechtspopulismus um ein bürgerliches, seriöses Auftreten und tritt weniger militant auf. Zumindest in der Öffentlichkeit soll nicht der Eindruck einer intensiven Zusammenarbeit mit der extremen Rechten entstehen. Der Grad der Demokratiegefährdung ist allerdings bei beiden Phänomenen gegeben. Es ist von einer funktionalen Arbeitsteilung und Kooperation zwischen Beiden mit wechselseitiger Radikalisierung auszugehen.Zu den wichtigsten Narrativen des Rechtspopulismus gehört die Inszenierung als Opfer und Außenseiter. Vom Gegensatz zwischen "Wir hier unten" und "Die da oben" ausgehend wird das Volk als Opfer begriffen. Dieses werde durch die Eliten betrogen und hätte im bestehenden Parteiensystem keine Chance, seinen Volkswillen auszuüben, wobei auch Verschwörungstheorien eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Rechtspopulismus sieht Migration als Bedrohung von außen und versucht außerdem, die Angleichungen von Lebensverhältnissen zwischen den Geschlechtern rückgängig zu machen oder zumindest wieder einzuschränken. Die Familie wird als Keimzelle der Nation gesehen.(Rechts)Populisten wissen Fake News (Falschmeldungen), Social Bots und Filterblasen für sich zu nutzen, um (politische) Meinungen zu manipulieren und ihre Reichweite zu vergrößern. Social Bots sind Softwareprogramme, die menschliche Verhaltensweisen simulieren, um Internetnutzer gezielt zu täuschen. Bei Filterblasen bekommt der User nur noch eine eingeschränkte bzw. homogene Auswahl an Meinungen und Nachrichten gezeigt, die zu seinen Interessen passt. Dadurch werden andere Meinungen und Ansichten bzw. die Fähigkeit zum kritischen und konstruktiven Diskurs zurückgedrängt oder gehen ganz verloren (vgl. Breyer / Holderried / Schmid / Mutschler 2019).Posts, Tweets oder Wortmeldungen der Rechtspopulisten sollen gezielt Emotionen ansprechen bzw. hervorrufen und provozieren, die Nutzer wütend machen und quasi "wachrütteln". Ein weiteres großes Problem ist auch, dass oft radikale Positionen mit dem Grundrecht auf freie Meinungsäußerung gerechtfertigt werden. Auch als Lehrer muss man sich dann die Frage stellen, ob und wann das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung Grenzen hat.Rechtspopulismus und TikTok Weshalb Rechtspopulismus auf TikTok so erfolgreich ist, liegt untere anderem daran, dass der TikTok-Algorithmus polarisierende Inhalte belohnt. Mehr Kommentare bedeuten mehr Interaktion. Und mehr Interaktion bedeutet mehr Reichweite. Aber nicht nur der Algorithmus und die For You-Page sind entscheidend für den Erfolg, sondern natürlich auch der Aufwand, die Mühe und der Einsatz, den z.B. AfD-Politiker betreiben.Grundsätzlich eröffnen neue Medien auch stets neue Möglichkeiten der politischen Manipulation. Nicht zufällig fiel der Aufstieg des Faschismus im frühen 20. Jahrhundert in eine mediale Zeitenwende; und nicht ohne Grund mussten die Demokratien Regeln für den Umgang mit Medien finden, die die Realitätswahrnehmung der potenziell manipulierbaren Massen prägen. Der klassische Faschismus gehörte jedenfalls zu den eifrigsten Nutzern neuer Technologien wie Massenpresse, Film und Radio. Und auch heute ist es unverkennbar, dass sich Rechtspopulisten digitale Medientechnologien wie die sozialen Medien, Messenger-Dienste und bildbasierte Foren gezielt zunutze macht, um ihre Mythen der nationalen Bedrohung zu verbreiten und sich gegenseitig in ihnen zu bestärken (vgl. Filitz / Marcks 2020).Das Gefährdungspotential des Rechtspopulismus für die Demokratie beurteilt Frank Decker (Decker 2006) gemischt. In Form von Oppositionsparteien gehe mittelfristig keine Gefahr für die demokratischen Systeme aus. Er empfiehlt allerdings, die Bevölkerung über plebiszitäre Elemente stärker in die Politik einzubinden, um dem Rechtspopulismus so dabei zuvorzukommen, Volksabstimmungen im eigenen Interesse voranzutreiben.Als Beispiel erfolgreicher Rechtspopulisten kann man den bereits am Anfang zitierten AfD-Politiker Maximilian Krah nennen, der im Wahlkampf für die Europawahl 2024 in seinen Videos der "grünen Politik" die Schuld daran gab, dass Rentner Flaschen sammeln müssen. Er sagte, dass die Grünen "alles, wofür Deutschland steht, abschaffen" und "unser Volk durch Masseneinwanderung ersetzen" wollen. Oder in anderen Videos heißt es: "Echte Männer sind Patrioten, dann klappt's auch mit der Freundin" oder "ARD und ZDF sind linke Propaganda" oder auch "Echte Männer sind rechts". Für jedes Video erntet der 47-jährige Krah ca.1,4 Millionen Klicks. Auch wenn Internetuser ihm in ihren Kommentaren nicht alle Recht geben, spielen genau diese Krah in die Karten: Seine Videos werden so vom Algorithmus noch häufiger ausgespielt.  Rechtspopulistische Influencer produzieren am laufenden Band Inhalte, die auf ein größeres Publikum zugeschnitten sind, wobei sie - durch die wechselnde Inszenierung von realweltlichen und virtuellen Erlebnissen - ihr eigenes Leben für andere erlebbar machen. Der Follow-Button fungiert als Eintrittskarte in eine Erlebniswelt, die nicht mehr trennt zwischen politischer Agitation und emotionaler bzw. auch persönlicher Ansprache. Daher radikalisieren die Influencer nicht nur andere Menschen, sie werden häufig auch selbst weiter radikalisiert in ihrem Bemühen, jenen Durst zu befriedigen, der durch Algorithmen fortwährend angeregt wird. Entsprechend müssen im Kampf um Aufmerksamkeit und Sichtbarkeit immer aufsehenerregendere Inhalte produziert werden, um die Fans bei der Stange zu halten (Fielitz / Marcks 2020).Auf TikTok hat die AfD deutlich mehr Reichweite als die restlichen Parteien. Dahinter steckt eine klare Strategie: Rechtspopulisten richten sich mit ihrer Propaganda in kurzen Clips verstärkt an Kinder und Jugendliche, die Gefahr der Indoktrinierung ist groß. Ein Netzwerk aus Influencern dient außerdem als Multiplikator und trägt AfD-Inhalte in verschiedene Subgruppen - beispielsweise die LGBTQ-Community - hinein, ohne direkt mit dem Parteilabel versehen zu sein.Wer den TikTok-Erfolg der AfD auch mit für sich beansprucht, ist Erik Ahrens. Der rechte Aktivist aus dem Umfeld der "Identitären Bewegung" hat für den AfD-Spitzenkandidaten Maximilian Krah eine Reihe von Videos erstellt und "betrieb" nach eigenen Angaben dessen TikTok-Kanal. Ahrens sagte, dass die Videos von allein ihr Publikum fänden. Das sei so, wie man sich 1923 gefühlt haben müsse, als man das Radio für sich entdeckt habe. So fühle er sich heute, wenn er seine TikTok-Accounts anschaue. Ein bewusst gewählter historischer Vergleich? Für den Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus war das Radio eine zentrale Technologie. "Unsere Botschaft, wie wir sie formulieren, nicht wie die Medien sie framen, nicht wie sie aus zweiter, dritter Hand gefactchecked, debunked ist", beschrieb Ahrens einen Vorzug sozialer Medien.Mit Blick auf die durchschnittliche Nutzungsdauer von TikTok unter 14-19-Jährigen in Deutschland sagte er: "Man hat 90 Minuten am Tag ein Fenster in deren Gehirn, wo man reinsenden kann" (ZDF Nachrichten 2024). Ziel ist es, Propaganda zu verbreiten und Nachwuchs zu rekrutieren, junge Menschen, die noch keine feste moralische Haltung oder politische Meinung haben. Hier entsteht der Erstkontakt mit entsprechendem Gedankengut, Einstellungen und Haltungen.TikTok-Videos des offiziellen Kanals der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion erreichten zwischen Januar 2022 und Dezember 2023 im Schnitt 430.000 Impressionen pro Video. Die FDP kam auf rund 53.000, die restlichen Parteien lagen noch weiter zurück. Die Zahl der Impressionen gibt an, wie häufig der Inhalt Nutzern angezeigt wurde."Andere Parteien überlassen der AfD nicht nur einzelne Plattformen wie TikTok, sondern auch die politischen Emotionen im Land. Es mangelt den anderen Parteien an einer effektiven Social-Media-Kommunikation auf Basis demokratischer Emotionen." (Statistiken in Metzger u.a. 2024).Von den zehn erfolgreichsten Politikern auf TikTok kommen sechs von der AfD, hat der Politikberater Martin Fuchs in einer weiteren Studie erhoben. Der AfD-Landtagsabgeordnete Ulrich Siegesmund aus dem vom Verfassungsschutz als rechtsextrem eingestuften Landesverband Sachsen-Anhalt steht an der Spitze im deutschen Polit-TikTok, gemessen an der Anzahl seiner Follower: Mehr als 404.000 User folgen seinem Account (Stand Mai 2024, Statistik). Er hat sich zunächst nicht als Parteimitglied zu erkennen gegeben und so seine Fanbase erst einmal inkognito aufgebaut. Erst nach Recherchen des ZDF-Formats "Die Da Oben" wurde öffentlich, dass hinter dem Account @mutzurwahrheit90 ein AfD-Politiker steckt.Gefahren für junge NutzerJugendliche oder sogar schon Kinder sind über Apps wie TikTok gut erreichbar und somit ein begehrtes Objekt der Beeinflussung, denn sie sind "permanently online, permanently connected" und können so stets und überall mit rechtsextremistischen Inhalten in Berührung kommen, ohne danach speziell suchen zu müssen. Deshalb sind sie längst zu einer sehr wichtigen Zielgruppe rechtsextremistischer Propaganda geworden und es besteht eine hohe Gefahr der Radikalisierung, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sie ihre politische und soziale Identität gerade erst ausbilden. Man erhält auf komplexe Fragen vermeintlich einfache Antworten und fühlt sich als junger Mensch dann dort zugehörig und verstanden.Die einfachen Strukturen und Regeln können ein Gefühl von Überlegenheit und Macht vermitteln und so den eigenen Eintritt in die Szene erleichtern. TikTok ist hierfür besonders geeignet, weil die App relativ einfach zu verstehen ist, vor allem die Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten.Ein weiteres Problem stellen die Fake News dar in Meinungs- und Erklärvideos oder Erfahrungsberichten mit extremen politischen Ansichten, Verschwörungstheorien oder Hassbotschaften. Wecken diese Interesse bei den Jugendlichen, werden sie gelikt, geteilt oder kommentiert, worauf neue Videos in der Art gezeigt werden und so das Bild nochmals vertieft werden kann. Junge Nutzer werden oft auf subtile Art angesprochen und die Inhalte verharmlost, indem z.B. rechte TikTokerinnen sich schminken und eher beiläufig dabei ihre rechtsextremistische Weltanschauung erzählen.Die größte Gefahr dabei ist, dass die Akteure oft nicht als rechtsextrem zu erkennen sind. Es handelt sich oft um rechte Influencer, die vermeintlichen Lifestyle-Content machen. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die sogenannte Tradwife-Bewegung, also Frauen, die über traditionelle Rollenbilder sprechen und ihre rechten Ideologien scheinbar nebenher einfließen lassen. Sie sprechen über häusliche Tätigkeiten wie Kochen oder Backen und lassen ihre völkischen und nationalistischen Ideen in ihren Content mit einfließen, der auf den ersten Blick harmlos wirkt. Die Jugendlichen hinterfragen das Ganze dann nicht weiter und halten das für normal, im schlimmsten Fall sympathisieren sie dann mit den Influencerinnen (Weichsel 2024).Über die Hauptthemen Migrationsfeindlichkeit, Leugnung der Klimakrise, Verschwörungsideologie, Queerfeindlichkeit und Antifeminismus lassen sich auch noch weitere rechtspopulistischen Influencer nennen, wie z.B. Eingollan, Ketzerderneuzeit, Malischka, AfD-Chefkoch, Heimatliebe_de, Marie-Thérèse Kaiser oder Freya Rosi. Mit Einrichtungs-Inspirationen, Kochrezepten, Beauty-Tipps oder Landschaftsfotos des deutschen Waldes nutzen sie TikTok, um ihr rechtes Weltbild, persönlich und emotional verpackt, beim Publikum zu verbreiten.Die Gefahr, in ein sogenanntes "rabbit hole" (dt. "Kaninchenbau") zu geraten, also nur noch Inhalte zu bestimmten Themenbereichen angezeigt zu bekommen, ist extrem hoch. Immer skandalösere Videos rufen Reaktionen bei den Nutzern hervor und werden dadurch wiederum noch häufiger vom Algorithmus ausgespielt. Ein kritisches Abwägen von Informationen ist auf TikTok dann kaum möglich (Groß 2023).Ein weiteres Thema ist der Jugendschutz: TikTok gibt für die Nutzung ein Mindestalter von 13 Jahren vor. Die Altersprüfung erfolgt einmalig beim Erstellen des Profils, dazu ist jedoch kein Altersnachweis nötig. Gewisse Funktionen (z.B. Sperren bestimmter Features) können von Kindern durch die Angabe eines falschen Geburtsdatums umgangen werden. Nicht zu unterschätzen ist auch das von Amnesty International konstatierte Suchtpotential der TikTok-App (Suki Law 2023: Amnesty-Berichte).TikToks Umgang mit rechtspopulistischen InhaltenDie Plattform hat zuletzt im April 2024 ihre neuen Community-Richtlinien veröffentlicht. Sie enthalten Regeln dazu, was auf TikTok erlaubt ist, und die Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen. Um neu auftretende Risiken und potenzielle Schäden anzugehen, werden die Richtlinien fortlaufend aktualisiert. Die Menschenwürde und faires Handeln haben oberste Priorität.Zur herausfordernden Moderation von Inhalten ist zu sagen, dass es TikTok wichtig ist, "die Plattform sicher, vertrauenswürdig und dynamisch zu halten." Deshalb müsse ein Gleichgewicht zwischen der Möglichkeit zur kreativen Entfaltung und der Prävention von Schaden gefunden werden. Dafür wird eine Kombination aus verschiedenen Möglichkeiten bzw. Maßnahmen genutzt:Inhalte, die gegen die Regeln verstoßen, werden laut TikTok entfernt.Inhalte, die nicht für Minderjährige geeignet sind, werden beschränkt.Es wird für die Unzulässigkeit von Inhalten für den Für-dich-Feed gesorgt, wenn diese nicht den Empfehlungsvoraussetzungen von TikTok entsprechen.Falls nötig, werden Warnhinweise oder andere Kennzeichnungen hinzugefügt.Die Inhalte durchlaufen zunächst ein automatisiertes Prüfungsverfahren. Wenn sie als potenzielle Verstöße identifiziert werden, werden sie laut TikTok automatisch innerhalb von 24 Stunden entfernt oder zur weiteren Überprüfung durch die Moderatoren gekennzeichnet.Mutmaßliche Verstöße können aber auch in der App und auf der Webseite gemeldet werden. Die Person, die den Beitrag gepostet hat, soll laut den Richtlinien über die Löschung des Beitrags informiert werden und erhält ggf. auch eine Sperre.Häufig liegen die Videos allerdings an der Grenze zum juristisch Verfolgbaren, müssen also nicht gelöscht werden. Und selbst wenn ein Kanal gesperrt wird, dann kann derjenige sich einfach einen neuen Account erstellen. Die Person kann dann in kürzester Zeit dieselbe Reichweite erzeugen, weil sie in der Zielgruppe schon bekannt ist. Das ist ein großer Kritikpunkt an TikToks Handhabung problematischer Inhalte.Gegenstrategien und PräventionBei der Medienkompetenzförderung junger Nutzer spielen sowohl die Eltern als auch die Schulen eine große Rolle und haben entsprechende Verantwortung. Wichtig bei der Einrichtung eines TikTok-Accounts ist, dass Eltern und Kinder gemeinsam entsprechende Privatsphäre-Einstellungen aktivieren und besprechen. Indem das Konto des Kindes auf "privat" gestellt wird, können nur bestätigte Kontakte die Beiträge des Kindes sehen und mit diesem interagieren. Über die Funktion "Digital Wellbeing" kann die Bildschirmzeit geregelt werden.Mit den Jugendlichen sollte von Seiten der Eltern und der Bildungseinrichtungen über Inhalte gesprochen werden. Es ist wichtig, einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang zu vermitteln, anstatt nur Verbote auszusprechen. Eltern können in der Schule dafür eintreten, dass es mehr medienpädagogische Angebote zu Chancen und Risiken der digitalen Welt gibt.Auch Angebote von etablierten Medien und Organisationen können helfen, jungen Menschen eine kritische Haltung beizubringen. Und diese ist nötig, denn soziale Netzwerke wie TikTok und Co. sind und bleiben fester Teil der Lebensrealität der meisten Kinder und Jugendlichen heute, weshalb der richtige Umgang mit ihnen so wichtig ist.Aber auch die anderen (demokratischen) Parteien müssen handeln und alternative, aufklärende Inhalte auf der Plattform stärken. TikTok und andere Plattformen müssen zu einem wirksamen Vorgehen gegen rechte Inhalte verpflichtet werden.Rechtliche und ethische AspekteGerade in sozialen Netzwerken verhalten sich Menschen im Schutz der Anonymität häufig so, als sei das Internet ein rechtsfreier Raum. Der Staat muss grundsätzlich die freie Äußerung von Meinungen gestatten. Das ordnet schon der erste Absatz des Artikels 10 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention an. Aber schon der zweite Absatz dieses Artikels mahnt, dass "die Ausübung dieser Freiheiten mit Pflichten und Verantwortung verbunden" ist.Die Freiheit, Meinungen zu äußern, kann daher Schranken unterworfen sein, die "in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft notwendig" sind. Deshalb können sich Lügner und Fake-News-Produzenten nicht auf die Meinungsfreiheit berufen.Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention erlaubt Staaten nicht nur, solche Äußerungen zu löschen; sie fordert Menschen sogar ausdrücklich auf, die Meinungsfreiheit verantwortungsvoll und pflichtbewusst auszuüben. Darum kann die Holocaustleugnung ebenso wenig auf den Schutz durch die Meinungsfreiheit hoffen wie die Unterstellung, dass der Nachbar ein Serienkiller sei. Unsere offene Gesellschaft soll sich vor jenen schützen können, die sie unterwandern (Horaczek / Wiese 2018, S. 57, 208).Die begrenzte Erfahrung und das begrenzte Bewusstsein der Bevölkerung in Bezug auf Datenschutz verschärfen die ethischen Bedenken. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, die Meinungsfreiheit mit dem Schutz eines beeinflussbaren Publikums in Einklang zu bringen. Dabei tragen vor allem die Plattformbetreiber eine große Verantwortung. Ein weiteres Problem sind auch die unterschiedlichen Standards von Datenschutz in verschiedenen Ländern und der Flickenteppich aus Altersbeschränkungen und Kindersicherheitsgesetzen auf der ganzen Welt (Rau / Kero / Homann / Dinar / Heldt 2022).Ausblick und FazitDie Welt des Internet und der sozialen Medien und damit die TikTok-Welt mit ihren vollkommen neuen Regeln, Strukturen und Dynamiken fordert unsere demokratische Gesellschaft nicht nur in vielerlei Hinsicht heraus, sondern drängt sie regelrecht in einen Konflikt mit den eigenen Normen. Mit erweiterten Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten erweitern sich auch die Möglichkeiten intoleranter Kräfte, wie wir gesehen haben, und können eine Gefahr für Jugendliche und die Demokratie darstellen.Wie können nun in diesem Spannungsfeld Maßnahmen aussehen, die Rechtspopulismus im Netz entgegenwirken, ohne selbst die Demokratie zu schwächen? Klar scheint, dass regulative Eingriffe nötig sind – auch wenn dies einer Gratwanderung gleicht, bei der Vorteile und Probleme der Maßnahmen genau abzuwägen sind, damit sie der Demokratie nicht am Ende mehr schaden als nutzen.LiteraturBreyer, Katharina / Holderried, Anika / Schmid, Alessa / Mutschler / Bela (2019): "Social Media und der Einfluss auf die politische Meinungsbildung; online unter: https://ereignishorizont-digitalisierung.de/.Caballero, Luis (2016): Rechtspopulismus: Inhalte, Funktionen und Akteure; in: Forschungsbericht Forschungsgruppe Rechtspopulismus, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.Decker, Frank (2000): Parteien unter Druck. Der neue Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokratien, Leske + Budrich.Fielitz, Maik / Marcks / Holger (2020): Digitaler Faschismus – Die sozialen Medien als Motor des Rechtsextremismus, Dudenverlag.Granow, Viola Carolina / Scolari, Julia (2022): "TikTok – Nutzung und Potenziale der Kurzvideo-Plattform" in: Media-Perspektiven 4/2022; online unter: https://www.ard-media.de/fileadmin/user_upload/media-perspektiven/pdf/2022/2204_Granow_Scolari.pdf.Groß, Denis (2023): "TikTok als Radikalisierungsmotor"; online unter; https://www.belltower.news/algorithmus-tiktok-als-radikalisierung/.Horaczek, Nina / Wiese, Sebastian (2018): "Informiert euch!", Czernin-Verlag.Koall, Carsten (2023): "Wie Rechtspoplisten au TikTok um junge Leute werben", online unter: https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article23909605 1 /tiktok-afd/.Korth, Dune / Többen, Jens / Wald, Carlotta (2024): "Jung, schnell, witzig, rechts"; Die Zeit 10/2024.Küpper, Beate / Zick, Andreas / Krause, Daniela (2015): Wie rechtspopulistisch ist Deutschland?; in: Wut, Verachtung, Abwertung – Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung).Kuhn, Manuel (2022): "Same but different" – TikTok ; online unter : https://www.towa-digital.com/blog-post/same-but-different-tiktok/.Law, Suki (2023): "TikTok: Jugendliche sind schädlichen Inhalten zu Depressionen und Suizid ausgesetzt; online unter: https://www.amnesty.at/presse/amnesty-berichte-zu-tiktok-tiktoks-geschaeftsmodell-als-gefahr-fuer-kinder-und-jugendliche/.Mediendienst Integration (2024); online unter: https://mediendienst-integration.de/desintegration/rechtspopulismus/.Metzger, Nils /Hillje, Johannes / Ahrens, Erik (2024): "AfD hängt alle anderen Parteien auf TikTok ab", online unter: https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/afd-tiktok-erfolg-strategie-jugendliche-100.html.Rau, Jan / Kero, Sandra / Hofmann, Vincent / Dinar, Christina / Heldt, Amélie Pia (2022): "Rechtsextreme Online-Kommunikation in Krisenzeiten"; Hans-Bredow-Institut.Roose, Jochen (2023): "Lohnt Politik auf TikTok?" in: Monitor Wahl- und Sozialforschung Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Mai 2023; online unter https://www.kas.de/de/monitor/detail/-/content/lohnt-politik-auf-tiktok.Spier, Tim (2006): "Populismus und Modernisierung" in: Decker, Frank (Hrsg.): Populismus.Weichsel, Michel: "Wie junge Nutzer bei TikTok und Co. subtil radikalisiert werden sollen" (2024); online unter: https://www.sr.de/home/nachrichten/panorama/safer_internet/.

David J. Caswell (" Analysis of National Strategies to Counter a Country's Nuclear Weapons Program ") is an officer in the U.S. Air Force and a research affiliate with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. David has served in various positions ranging from operational simulation development to operations analysis for national intelligence. He currently serves as an operations analyst in support of regional air and space employment in the Pacific. David received his Ph.D. in management science and engineering at Stanford University. His current research continues to apply computer science and operations research methods for gaining insights for nuclear policy and other international security issues. Address: http://www.stanford.edu/group/ERRG/davidc1.htm ; e-mail: david.caswell33@gmail.com . Kjell Hausken (" Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game ") has since 1999 been a professor of economics and societal safety at the University of Stavanger, Norway. His research fields are strategic interaction, risk analysis, reliability, conflict, and terrorism. He holds a Ph.D. (thesis: "Dynamic Multilevel Game Theory") from the University of Chicago (1990–1994), and was a postdoc at the Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies (Cologne) from 1995 to 1998 and a visiting scholar at Yale School of Management from 1989 to 1990. He holds a doctorate program degree in administration from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and an M.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from the Norwegian Institute of Technology. He completed military service at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, has published 110 articles, and is on the editorial board for Theory and Decision and Defence and Peace Economics. Address: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway; e-mail: kjell.hausken@uis.no . Ronald A. Howard (" Analysis of National Strategies to Counter a Country's Nuclear Weapons Program ") is a professor of management science and engineering in the School of Engineering at Stanford University. Professor Howard directs teaching and research in the Decision Analysis Program of the department, and is the director of the Decisions and Ethics Center, which examines the efficacy and ethics of social arrangements. He defined the profession of decision analysis in 1964 and has supervised more than 80 doctoral theses in decision analysis and related areas. His experience includes dozens of decision analysis projects that range over virtually all fields of application, from investment planning to research strategy, and from hurricane seeding to nuclear waste isolation. He has been a consultant to several companies and was a founding director and chairman of Strategic Decisions Group. He is president of the Decision Education Foundation, which he and colleagues founded to teach decision skills to young people. He has written four books, dozens of technical papers, and provided editorial service to seven technical journals. His society affiliations have included the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (Fellow); The Institute of Management Sciences, which he served as president, and the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) (Fellow). Continuing research interests are improving the quality of decisions, life-and-death decision making, and the creation of a coercion-free society. In 1986 he received the Frank P. Ramsey Medal "for Distinguished Contributions in Decision Analysis" from the Decision Analysis Special Interest Group of the Operations Research Society of America (the predecessor to the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS). In 1998 he received from INFORMS the first award for the Teaching of Operations Research/Management Science Practice. In 1999 he was elected to the National Academy of Engineering. Address: Management Science and Engineering, Huang Engineering Center, 475 Via Ortega, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4121; e-mail: rhoward@stanford.edu . Joseph B. ("Jay") Kadane (" Partial-Kelly Strategies and Expected Utility: Small Edge Asymptotics ") is Leonard J. Savage University Professor of Statistics and Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Carnegie Mellon University. He received a B.S. in mathematics from Harvard and a Ph.D. in statistics from Stanford. He was recently elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His theoretical interests center on subjective Bayesian theory. His current applied interests include Internet security, medicine, law, physics, marketing, and air pollution. He serves as an expert witness in legal cases. His most recent book is Principles of Uncertainty, which is scheduled to be released in May 2011 by Chapman and Hall and will be available free on the Web for any noncommercial purpose. Address: Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail: kadane@stat.cmu.edu . Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos (" Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, Performance, and the Emerging Theory and Practice ") holds a Ph.D. in industrial engineering and operations research from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and is currently a senior research scientist at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. He has been a visiting assistant professor of operations research at the Naval Postgraduate School and of systems engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has made contributions to the theory of bounded rationality and its applications to decisions "in the wild" in fields such as engineering design and medicine. Address: Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany; e-mail: katsikop@mpib-berlin.mpg.de . L. Robin Keller (" Investment and Defense Strategies, Heuristics, and Games: From the Editor … ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Jeryl L. Mumpower (" Playing Squash Against Ralph Keeney: Should Weaker Players Always Prefer Shorter Games? ") is Director of the Master of Public Service and Administration Program at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where he holds the Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Chair in Business and Public Policy. Previously he was at the Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York at Albany, where he was a professor of public administration, public policy, public health, and information science and served in a variety of University-level administrative positions. His previous experience includes six years as a program director and policy analyst at the National Science Foundation. Mumpower received his B.A. from the College of William and Mary and his Ph.D. in social and quantitative psychology from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is author or editor of nine books and more than 50 book chapters and articles. His research has addressed basic and applied topics in negotiation and bargaining, environmental policy, individual and group decision-making processes, the use of scientific expertise in public policy making, and risk analysis and management. Address: Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 1092 Allen Building, 4220 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4220; e-mail: jmumpower@bushschool.tamu.edu . M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell (" Analysis of National Strategies to Counter a Country's Nuclear Weapons Program ") is the Burt and Deedee McMurtry Professor and Chair, Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. Her specialty is engineering risk analysis with application to complex systems (including space systems and medical systems). Her research has focused on explicit consideration of human and organizational factors in the analysis of failure risks and, recently, on the use of game theory in risk analysis. Applications in the last few years have included counterterrorism and nuclear counterproliferation problems. She is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and of several boards (Aerospace, Draper, InQtel, etc.). She was a member of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board until December 2008. She holds an engineer degree (Applied Math/CS) from the Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble (France), and an M.S. in Operations Research and a Ph.D. in Engineering-Economic Systems, both from Stanford University. Address: Management Science and Engineering, Huang Engineering Center, 475 Via Ortega, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4121; e-mail: mep@stanford.edu . Jun Zhuang (" Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game ") is an assistant professor of industrial and systems engineering at the University at Buffalo, the State University of New York. He has been a faculty member at SUNY Buffalo since he obtained his Ph.D. in summer 2008 from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Dr. Zhuang's long-term research goal is to integrate operations research and game theory to better prepare for, mitigate, and manage both natural and man-made hazards. Other areas of interests include health care, transportation, logistics and supply chain management, and sustainability. Dr. Zhuang's research has been supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation, and by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 403 Bell Hall, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260; e-mail: jzhuang@buffalo.edu .