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"Since the early days of the 1979 revolution, Iran and the United States have seen each other as archenemies. Iranian leaders have dubbed Washington the Great Satan and have articulated American presence in the Middle East (and elsewhere) as the primary reason for instability and chaos. On the other hand, almost with no exception, all U.S. administrations since President Carter have seen Tehran as a sworn enemy whose hate is being driven by Shia ideology and a desire to export its revolution, destabilize its neighbors and destroy Israel. Within this context, since 1984 the Islamic Republic has been designated by the Department of State as the world's leading state-sponsor of terrorism. The United States has also adopted a negative perception of Iran's nuclear program, whose genesis, ironically, lies in the support given to the Shah of Iran to build a civil nuclear research program in anticipation of putting in place from the 1980s a comprehensive national nuclear power program. Since the 1980s Washington has eyed with suspicion the Islamic Republic's efforts to revitalize the moribund program and has systematically accused Tehran of seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, while Iranian leaders categorically deny the American accusations and adamantly claim that the nuclear program has no military applications"--

For decades the United States has forged close relations with a number of key allies in the Arab world, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These close ties were based largely on perceived national interest, not mutual values. The fundamental changes in the Arab world since early 2011 (the so-called Arab Spring) have drastically altered the regional strategic landscape. This essay examines the US response to the political upheaval in the Arab world. It argues that the United States should distance itself from the changes in the Arab world and give the newly established regimes the space they need to sort out their futures. Meanwhile, Washington should further strengthen relations with the non-Arab Middle Eastern "peripheries," specifically, Israel and Turkey. Also, the nuclear deal signed between Iran and major global powers in November 2013 provides a significant opportunity to open a new chapter in relations between Tehran and Washington.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have generated controversy because of their size, the speed of their growth, their ownership, their investment decisions and, most importantly, what they stand for in a changing global economy ₆ a new group of investors controlled, managed and backed by states. The debate initially tilted towards those countries receiving the most investment: investment from SWFs was threatening the national interest by hollowing out their economies and flagship companies, taking over resources and controlling their infrastructure. Politicians in some OECD countries even managed to create an atmosphere that SWFs were the 'Trojan horse' of non-democratic countries, undermining their political and economic systems and stealing their national wealth. This book provides a counter-balance: a comparative study of the seven largest SWF-holding countries primarily from a domestic perspective. In the volume, several contributors conclude that the creation and operation of these SWFs would appear to be driven more by domestic politics than external considerations. This calls for a radical re-examination of the impact of the SWFs from non-OECD countries, as well as the reaction and response to them by the United States and EU/OECD.