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Aware of the high importance of consumers' private information concerning their willingness-to-buy fair trade goods and taking into account the superior price they are willing to pay for this kind of goods with respect to conventional ones, we choose to feed the debate relative to the appropriateness of the di¤erent potential retailing channels. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. It appears that the private information parameter as well as the nature of the relationship between suppliers on the one hand and the retailer on the other hand are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. We examine several competitive setting, that proves that only the presence of benevolent retailers can bring the outcome close to the socially optimal one in a simultaneous game whereas a sequential process cannot be implemented if the mainstream firm is not granted the leader role. We also propose other types of organisation (as a dedicated retailer, corresponding to a merged case) and of cooperative equilibrium, the latter resulting as a new direction to consider in order to reduce the double-margin e¤ect of the expropriating one resulting from the competitive schemes.

Fair trade actors have to deal with a significant degree of information asymmetry as regard their willingness-to-buy such goods and their willingness-to-pay for them. Many debates and controversies have paved the way for the development of fair trade, in particular concerning the distribution channel that had to be preferred. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. Both the private information parameter and the nature of the relationship between suppliers are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. If the choice of a dedicated structure does not appear relevant when costs or the number of competing producers are high, the framework of a sequential contracting process always results sub-optimal. What really matters is the nature of the firms involved and the convergence of interests. An equilibrium close to the socially optimal issue may emerge.

Aware of the high importance of consumers' private information concerning their willingness-to-buy fair trade goods and taking into account the superior price they are willing to pay for this kind of goods with respect to conventional ones, we choose to feed the debate relative to the appropriateness of the di¤erent potential retailing channels. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. It appears that the private information parameter as well as the nature of the relationship between suppliers on the one hand and the retailer on the other hand are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. We examine several competitive setting, that proves that only the presence of benevolent retailers can bring the outcome close to the socially optimal one in a simultaneous game whereas a sequential process cannot be implemented if the mainstream firm is not granted the leader role. We also propose other types of organisation (as a dedicated retailer, corresponding to a merged case) and of cooperative equilibrium, the latter resulting as a new direction to consider in order to reduce the double-margin e¤ect of the expropriating one resulting from the competitive schemes.

Fair trade actors have to deal with a significant degree of information asymmetry as regard their willingness-to-buy such goods and their willingness-to-pay for them. Many debates and controversies have paved the way for the development of fair trade, in particular concerning the distribution channel that had to be preferred. We use a common agency game framework to analyze the changes in the price level according various schemes of upstream-downstream organization and relationships. Both the private information parameter and the nature of the relationship between suppliers are the key variables that determine the price paid by consumers. If the choice of a dedicated structure does not appear relevant when costs or the number of competing producers are high, the framework of a sequential contracting process always results sub-optimal. What really matters is the nature of the firms involved and the convergence of interests. An equilibrium close to the socially optimal issue may emerge.

Taxation is the cornerstone of intergovernmental fiscal relations and is especially at stake when authorities address mobile tax bases. The EU case is particularly interesting to tackle. Evidences prove the existence of important tax interactions among member states and both theoretical and empirical analysis shed light on the di¤erent mechanisms at work. Likewise, the improved knowledge relative to tax avoidance strengthens the need to take into account this kind of phenomenom. In this paper we propose to compare various alternative settings to the current system so as to be able to estimate the relevance of granting EU the power to tax and in which way. In order to adopt a general and comprehensive framework, we introduce information asymmetries and examine di¤erent kinds of governments' objective function. We show that the best outcome would be reach if the EU tier only were allocated the power to tax firms' profits but also prove that, in a context of national governments acting in a competitive way aimed at attracting firms, conferring the EU layer the capacity to apply a tax on a base alreeady subject to member states' taxation could improve the current issue.

Taxation is the cornerstone of intergovernmental fiscal relations and is especially at stake when authorities address mobile tax bases. The EU case is particularly interesting to tackle. Evidences prove the existence of important tax interactions among member states and both theoretical and empirical analysis shed light on the di¤erent mechanisms at work. Likewise, the improved knowledge relative to tax avoidance strengthens the need to take into account this kind of phenomenom. In this paper we propose to compare various alternative settings to the current system so as to be able to estimate the relevance of granting EU the power to tax and in which way. In order to adopt a general and comprehensive framework, we introduce information asymmetries and examine di¤erent kinds of governments' objective function. We show that the best outcome would be reach if the EU tier only were allocated the power to tax firms' profits but also prove that, in a context of national governments acting in a competitive way aimed at attracting firms, conferring the EU layer the capacity to apply a tax on a base alreeady subject to member states' taxation could improve the current issue.

When same authorities belonging to a same level of government derive their receipts froma mobile tax base, a competition mechanism takes place among them that triggers externalities.Likewise, when di§erent layers of decision-makers exert their taxing power upon a commonbase, the choices made by one tier a§ect the receipts that the other governments can collect.Generally speaking, the decisions made by one government a§ect the tax revenue that can becollected by the decisionmakers belonging to the same tier of government or by stacked jurisdic-tions : externalities arise, the existence and the magnitude of which are closely related to thenature of the tax, to the mobility of the base and to the distribution of tax competence amongdecisionmakers. This paper proposes a model where both horizontal and vertical interactionstake place. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of capital likely to be inves-ted, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided in order to assess therobustness of traditional analyses results in a more general and realistic scheme. The analysisshows that horizontal and vertical externalities point towards opposite directions : while hori-zontal competition leads to ine¢ ciently low rates, the common pool problem arising from thestacking of decisionmakers taxing a same base gives rise to a phenomenon of over-taxation. Thepaper aims at Önding out whether the combination of both externalities yields higher or lowerglobal tax rates than the one that would emerge in a unique government case. It turns that anexcessively high level of taxation emerges. Nevertheless, the vertical tax externality is lessenedwith respect to the vertical competition case : the global tax rate sets at an intermediary level sothat the outcome is brought closer to the social optimum issue.

When same authorities belonging to a same level of government derive their receipts froma mobile tax base, a competition mechanism takes place among them that triggers externalities.Likewise, when di§erent layers of decision-makers exert their taxing power upon a commonbase, the choices made by one tier a§ect the receipts that the other governments can collect.Generally speaking, the decisions made by one government a§ect the tax revenue that can becollected by the decisionmakers belonging to the same tier of government or by stacked jurisdic-tions : externalities arise, the existence and the magnitude of which are closely related to thenature of the tax, to the mobility of the base and to the distribution of tax competence amongdecisionmakers. This paper proposes a model where both horizontal and vertical interactionstake place. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of capital likely to be inves-ted, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided in order to assess therobustness of traditional analyses results in a more general and realistic scheme. The analysisshows that horizontal and vertical externalities point towards opposite directions : while hori-zontal competition leads to ine¢ ciently low rates, the common pool problem arising from thestacking of decisionmakers taxing a same base gives rise to a phenomenon of over-taxation. Thepaper aims at Önding out whether the combination of both externalities yields higher or lowerglobal tax rates than the one that would emerge in a unique government case. It turns that anexcessively high level of taxation emerges. Nevertheless, the vertical tax externality is lessenedwith respect to the vertical competition case : the global tax rate sets at an intermediary level sothat the outcome is brought closer to the social optimum issue.