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The study communication processes within modern political parties is impossible without establishing the basic principles of the party. Throughout the history of political parties of their organizational structure has undergone great changes. In modern developed democratic countries, political party structure consists of a number of different interest groups and pressure.Despite the common association ideological, social and political objectives and interests of these groups within the political parties are trying to fiht and compete for leadership in the policy-making process.The most important internal feature of modern political parties is forming the system of coordination of interests within the party. First of all this is achieved by creating a system of communication interaction interest groups, the party elite and counter-elite. The relationship between these elements of the party depends largely on the existing system of party discipline, party ethics and the existing hierarchical system of interaction between the party leadership and «ordinary» members of the party, between central hierarchical structures of the party and the local, between party members included in the various parliamentary and governmental and nonparliamentary groups within the party and so on.Ensure optimal form of inner communication is the formation of interest groups Institute of party democracy. In most developed countries, certain elements of party democracy established by law. Similar rules exist in the legislation of Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Albania, Andorra, Armenia, France, Romania, Czech Republic and Portugal. Internal party democracy is not threatened by party discipline and intervention of public authorities in the hierarchical and organizational features of inner communication. A clear manifestation of internal party democratization process of interaction is the introduction of «primaries» (internal party elections). This allows you to adjust the relationship between interest groups within political parties without increased competition for leadership and possible negative consequences (such as the collapse of the party). ; Исследование коммуникационных процессов внутри современных политических партий невозможно без установления основных принципов организации партии.На протяжении истории развития политических партий их организационная структура претерпела большие изменения. В современных развитых демократических странах структура политической партии состоит из определенного количества различных группинтересов и давления. Несмотря на объединенность совместными идеологическим, соцальным и политическими целями и интересами, эти группы внутри политической партии пытаются бороться за лидерство и конкурируют в процессе принятия политических решений.Важнейшей внутренней функцией современной политической партии является формирование системы согласования интересов внутри партии. Прежде всего это достигается с помощью создания системы коммуникационного взаимодействия групп интересов, партийной элиты и контрэлиты. Взаимоотношения между этими элементами полтической партии во многом зависит от сложившейся системы партийной дисциплины, партийной этики и существующей иерархической системы взаимодействия между партийной верхушкой и «рядовыми» членами партии, между центральными иерархическими структурами партии и местными, между членами партии, которые входят в различные парламентские и правительственные структуры и внепарламентскими группами внутри партии и др.Оптимальной формой обеспечения внутрипартийной коммуникации групп интересов является становление института партийной демократии. В большинстве развитых стран определенные элементы партийной демократии устанавливаются на законодательном уровне. Подобные нормы существуют в законодательстве Германии, Италии Испании, Греции, Албании, Андорры, Армении, Франции, Румынии, Чехии, Португалии. Внутрипартийная демократия не угрожает партийной дисциплине и вмешательству государственных органов власти в иерархические и организационные особенности внутрипартийной коммуникации. Ярким проявлением процесса демократизации внутрипартийного взаимодействия является внедрение «праймериз» (внутрипартийных выборов).Это позволяет регулировать взаимоотношения групп интересов внутри политических партий без обострения конкурентной борьбы за лидерство и возможных негативных последствий (например, распада партии). ; Дослідження комунікаційних процесів всередині сучасних політичнихпартій неможливе без встановлення основних принципів організації партії. Протягомісторії розвитку політичних партій їх організаційна структура зазнала великих змін. Всучасних розвинених демократичних країнах структура політичної партії складаєтьсяз певної кількості різноманітних груп інтересів та тиску. Незважаючи на об'єднаністьспільними ідеологічним, соціальними та політичними цілями і інтересами ці гру -пи всередині політичної партії намагаються боротися за лідерство та конкурують впроцесі прийняття політичних рішень.Найважливішою внутрішньою функцією сучасної політичної партії є формуваннясистеми узгодження інтересів всередині партії. Перш за все це досягається за допо -могою створення системи комунікаційної взаємодії груп інтересів, партійної еліти таконтреліти. Взаємовідносини між цими елементами політичної партії багато в чомузалежить від сформованої системи партійної дисципліни, партійної етики та існуючоїієрархічної системи взаємодії між партійної верхівкою та «рядовими» членами партії,між центральними ієрархічними структурами партії та місцевими, між членами партії,які входять до різноманітних парламентських та урядових структур та позапарла -ментськими групами всередині партії та ін.Оптимальною формою забезпечення внутріпартійної комунікації груп інтересів є ста -новлення інституту партійної демократії. В більшості розвинених країн певні елементипартійної демократії встановлюються на законодавчому рівні. Подібні норми існуютьв законодавстві Німеччини, Італії, Іспанії, Греції, Албанії, Андорри, Вірменії, Франції,Румунії, Чехії, Португалії. Внутрішньопартійна демократія не загрожує партійнійдисципліні та втручанню державних органів влади в ієрархічні та організаційніособливості внутріпартійної комунікації. Яскравим проявом процесу демократизаціївнутрішньопартійної взаємодії є впровадження «праймеріз» (внутрішньопартійнихвиборів). Це дозволяє регулювати взаємовідносини груп інтересів всередині політичнихпартій без загострення конкурентної боротьби за лідерство та можливих негативнихнаслідків (наприклад, розпаду партії).

В июле 2013 г. в Издательстве НТЛ вышла книга «Принципы практического менеджмента: от Конфуция до наших дней». В ней систематизирован материал в области управленческой мысли в хронологическом порядке на русском и английском языках, начиная с Древнего мира и кончая нашим временем. Мудрые мысли ученых, мыслителей прошлого и настоящего, общественных и политических деятелей это принципы практического менеджмента и правила поведения сегодня. Они не должны забываться и к ним необходимо периодически обращаться и прислушиваться. Книга является результатом плодотворного сотрудничества трех структурных подразделений Национального исследовательского Томского государственного университета. ; In modern society, management is a subject which both scientists and practitioners pay close attention to, and this is not by accident. After all, management allows us to understand how to effectively control the actions of personnel, increase production efficiency, and successfully complete socio-economic tasks. In literature management is examined from two basic aspects: firstly, it is the science of managing people in specific organisational systems, and secondly, it is the art of administration, which includes a set of principles, methods, techniques and means of administration, in which a professional manager or entrepreneur has become proficient. O.S. Vikhansky and A.I. Naumov, leading specialists in management, affirm that there cannot be a singular definition of management, as it is multifaceted, but, undoubtedly, it is a specific type of action which supports the vital functioning of an organisation. In management, the worker occupies the central position; it is he who brings innovation to a company and makes it attractive for investment. That is why a market economy specifies strict requirements for the personnel's professional knowledge, skills, abilities, and business activity. The term "management" in scientific literature appeared relatively recently at the turn of the 20th century, and was introduced by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915). The father of "scientific management", he was the first to use the terms "management" and "manager" in their modern-day meaning. The birth of management theory is connected with both Henri Fayol (1841-1925), who was the head of a large mining and smelting company in France for 40 years, and Walther Rathenau (1867-1992) in Germany, who, for the first time, addressed labour organisation and organisational structure in business. Further research showed that organisational structure is not an end in itself, but a tool to increase joint labour productivity. Each organisational structure is necessary in order to complete particular tasks under specified conditions and in a specified amount time. Thus, management is focused on the organisation of any form of ownership that achieves the planned results, which appear only in an external environment. The greatest and the most unique achievement of management in the 20 th century was higher labour productivity in manufacturing. The most valuable parts of any organisation in the 21 st century are its intellectual capital, knowledge workers, and their productivity, which is measured by the quality of their results. The term "knowledge worker" was introduced by Peter Drucker in the late 1960s. International experience in management is indisputable, but at the same time we should remember the important contribution made by Russian scientists and experts to the scientific organization of labour and production management. The period of 1920-1930 was the most productive for Russian administrative ideas. Even the simple enumeration of names shows the invaluable contribution to the advancement of science in organisation (A.A. Bogdanov), social engineering (A.K. Gastev), scientific organisation of labour and administration (O.A. Yermansky), management activity (P.M. Kerzhent-sev), social and labour concepts of production management (N.A. Vitke), and the theory of administrative capacity (F.R. Dunayevsky). In this work an attempt was made to examine the positions stated by scientists, philosophers, political figures, economists, writers, and businessmen in various epochs and time periods. As a matter of fact, these wise thoughts are the principles of practical management today. They should not be forgotten and it is necessary for us to consider and refer to them periodically. Considering that administrative thought has a long history, the material is arranged in chronological order alphabetically, from antiquity until the present day. There are no comments; the right to think is reserved for the reader. Our goal has predetermined the work's structure. It is composed of an introduction, nine sections, an afterword, tasks for evaluation and discussion, and a list of references. The foreword and tasks have been written by E.V. Nekhoda, a professor in the Department of Economics at Tomsk State University. This work is an illustrative example of the productive cooperation by the Department of Economics, the Biological Institute, and the Department of Foreign Languages at Tomsk State University. It is presented in both Russian and English. This anthology is dedicated to students, graduate students, lecturers, and everyone who is interested in the problems of effective management.

The article examines the heritage of poet, mystic and diplomat Oscar Milosz (1877–1939) from the point of politically significant ideas. The aim is to grasp the understanding of the unity of Europe from the selected political articles "Deux messinismes politiques" as well as metaphysical poems "Ars Magna" and "Les Arcanes". The premises of Milosz are situated in the intelectual context of European unity ideas of his contemporaries. The analysis shows that Milosz is critical about the situation of interwar Europe that he faces. As an alternative to this he suggests the unity in spiritual an political sense. It is argued in the paper that poet tries to capture the main questions of his epoch, although in very exclusive manner by lumping together geopolitical, mithological, messianistic arguments.In the 21st Century most of the discussions about Europe are based on the question How and not Why. Fundamental debates on the identity of Europe are left for the representatives of the Catholic Church or the scolars, while politicians occupy themselves with the bureaucratic activities in EU institutions. Oscar Milosz (1877–1939) was also involved in politics, during the interwar period he worked as a respresentative of Lithuania in France. However he was a writer and mystic as well, who left not only his works of fiction and poetry, but some political writings too. He is not well-known for Lithuanian readers, still his heritage is rather analysed in the academic literary field as well as from the philosophical point of view. However there is a question on Europe which has not been raised and answered, though Milosz had paid some attention to it in his metaphysical poems and political writings. The aim of the paper is to grasp the understanding of the unity of Europe from the selected political articles "Deux messinismes politiques" and metaphysical poems "Ars Magna" and "Les Arcanes" of Milosz and situate it in the context of the ideas of his contemporaries, in particular catholic pro-federalists and the Paneuropean movement.The analysis shows that Milosz is critical about the situation of interwar Europe which he faces. On the one hand, the countries are too interested in material goals and politics is not based on moral principles. On the other hand, poet reflects the wrong metaphysics of his time, because the people are sceptical towards the faith. Nevertheless Milosz should not be considered as a pessimist, because he proposes ideas how to save Europe. His premises on the unity of Europe can be divided in three parts: goal, manner and foundation.The first one is a goal of European unity. From the Milosz point of view, the unity is natural situation, which is going to be reached together with the moral evolution of European people. This differs from mostly pragmatic approach to this question by his contemporaries paneuropists. The second one is about a manner of the unification. Milosz criticizes attemps to unite on the basis of one exceptional country, rather he favours the collaboration of nations. It does not mean that nations are all the same – poet notes – they can prosper because of differences among them. For example ancient nations such as Lithuanians can renew other ones due to their exceptional history and spirit. On the political grounds as well as his contemporaries catholic pro-federalists he was favourable of federalism which respects the differences among nations and does not try to melt them away. In addition to this, Milosz as well as mentioned thinkers stresses the role of the Catholic Church which can create spiritual affinity among the nations of Europe. That is an answer to the third part – the foundation of European unity. It is argued that the main commonalities between catholic pro-federalists and Milosz are the antropoligical premises (person is in the centre of thinking about new political order) and an appeal to Europe's christian heritage Despite eclectic set of his arguments, which includes some aspects of messianism and creation of his own mythology, Milosz might be attributed to this group of thinkers. ; Straipsnyje poeto, mistiko, diplomato Oskaro Milašiaus (1877–1939) palikimas nagrinėjamas iš politinių idėjų perspektyvos. Keliamas klausimas, kaip autorius supranta Europos vienybę, siekiama vienijimosi prielaidas iš­vesti iš publicistinių raštų politinėmis temomis bei metafizinių poemų "Ars Magna" ir "Slėpiniai". Milašiaus įžvalgos galimo Europos šalių susivieniji­mo klausimu analizuojamos to meto idėjiniame lauke, pabrėžiant bendrumus ir išryškinant Milašiaus savitumą. Svarstoma, ar ir kokiu laipsniu poeto, ra­šiusio apie Jungtines Europos Valstijas, idėjos galėtų būti priskiriamos kuriai nors tarpukariu egzistavusiai federalistų stovyklai – liberalams paneuropis­tams ar katalikams. Milašiaus Europos vienybės samprata analizuojama tri­mis aspektais – tikslo, būdo ir pagrindo. Daroma išvada, jog Milašius kriti­kuoja faktinę Europos būklę po Pirmojo pasaulinio karo ir kaip alternatyvą siūlo vienybę ir dvasiniu, ir politiniu požiūriu. Teigiama, kad poetas siekia atsakyti į savo epochos klausimus savitu būdu, pasitelkdamas ne tik geopoli­tinius, bet ir mitologinius bei mesianistinius argumentus.

This publication contains the collection of papers related to the European Seminar on 'Complementarities and synergies between juvenile justice and social services sector' of the European Network of National Observatories on Childhood (ChildONEurope) held in Florence, Istituto degli Innocenti, on 19 April 2012. Throughout a decision of the ChildONEurope Assembly of 24th of February 2012, the ChildONEurope Secretariat convened a European seminar on the issues pertaining to the synergic collaboration between juvenile justice and the social services dedicated to children ended in conflict with the law. Its main aim was to stimulate a wide-ranging discussion on the different criticalities and implications of juvenile justice more sensitive to the child needs and rights. The timing of this Seminar was particularly appropriate. The so-called 'third period' of the history of juvenile justice law, which may be said to date back to the end of the 20th century, is the one characterised by the transformation of institutions (1960-1990) and the drafting of major international documents (Beijing, Riyad and Havana). This period is very rich, it is marked, in turn, by the emphasis on the model of protection, its critical analysis, a tendency towards moving away from the judiciary and having recourse to extra-judiciary solutions. Whereas, some scholars define the period starting from 1990 onwards as the 'implementation period' of these international standards. But several questions on criticalities remain not answered. Therefore, the implementation cannot be so smoothly operated simply on the basis of their formulation in the international standards. Several are the issues at stake, but one is obtaining and increasing attention: how to include and to enhance the social services action in the child best interest. Today's research shows that juvenile justice requires a specific, supple and flexible law that can call upon a range of responses based on aid and education. The development of probation and parole also can be estimated as success in some national experiences. The recidivism and revocation rates have decreased through the use of more constructive and rehabilitative community sanctions. The prevailing new trend on the international scene is to search for alternatives to the deprivation of liberty. Focusing on the reality coming from the European experiences, mainly referring to the context of the European Union, the Seminar represents an attempt to place children at the centre of the debate, focussing attention on the main problems facing the implementation of a juvenile justice national frameworks in line with the International standards and on the role that social services should play in order to reach the final aim of setting up a restorative and reintegrative juvenile justice system. The plenary debate started with the contribution of Renate Winter, Justice Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) who provided a critical overview over the fulfilment of children's rights in the juvenile justice framework and the crucial role of social services for child care and reintegration. The European dimension of the debate was introduced throughout two contributions. The first was an analysis of the European Union Agenda of action on the EU Strategy and aimed at verifying the possible synergies of work with the social services in this specific context. It was provided by Margaret Tuite, EU Commission-Coordinator for the Rights of the Child DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and rights of the child. The second contribution, based on the presentation of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child-friendly justice and on social services friendly to children and families, was carried out by Gioia Scappucci, Council of Europe, Children's Rights Division. The plenary section was concluded with the contribution of Cédric Foussard, Director of the International Juvenile Justice Observatory who delivered a critical introduction of the national dimension through the presentation of a comparative European analysis of national experiences on practices of reintegration. The proceedings reproduced in this publication include as well the outcomes of the three working groups minded to further develop the discussion of three specific issues, namely: (1) the promotion of 7 alternative to detention in Europe; (2) the participation of social services in the youth court and their potential for the prevention of re-offending; (3) unaccompanied migrant children in conflict with the law. Each one of the working groups was opened with the introductive speech of experts coming from academia and international civil society. The expert involved in the working groups' discussion was: Frieder Dünkel, University of Greifswald, Germany, with the coordination of Isabella Mastropasqua, Director of the Study, Research and International Activities Bureau, European Study Center of Nisida, Italy, Stephanie Rap, Researcher, Utrecht University, Netherlands, with the coordination of Benoît Parmentier, Director, Birth and Childhood's Office (ONE), Brussels, Belgium, and Damien Nantes, Director of the Association Hors la Rue, France, with the coordination of Marie-Paule Martin Blachais, Chairperson ChildONEurope Assembly.

[spa] Rafael Mitjana (1869–1921) desarrolló una importante labor en el campo de la investigación musical, cuyos frutos más conocidos son el «descubrimiento» del Cancionero de Uppsala (Venecia, 1556) y "La musique en Espagne" (1914 y 1920), que es considerada la primera historia de la música española escrita de manera sistemática. Dentro de la obra musicológica de Mitjana destacan también numerosos trabajos sobre música y músicos españoles de los siglos XVI y XVII; por la calidad de sus investigaciones, Mitjana es considerado uno de los padres de la musicología española. Sin embargo, a pesar de la reconocida importancia de esta figura de la música española, poco se sabía hasta ahora sobre su biografía, su trayectoria y su obra como musicólogo, compositor y diplomático. Esta Tesis Doctoral estudia la figura de Rafael Mitjana desde una nueva perspectiva a partir de fuentes primarias localizadas en España y Suecia hasta ahora desconocidas. La Tesis consta de un Estudio dividido en cuatro capítulos (Vol. I) y de once Apéndices (Vol. II, en CD) que contienen la transcripción de 705 documentos (muchos de ellos traducidos del sueco y del francés) y diez partituras autógrafas de Mitjana. En el Capítulo I se ofrece una detallada descripción de las fuentes documentales investigadas en archivos y bibliotecas, entre los que destacan el Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, en Madrid, la Biblioteca de Catalunya en Barcelona (donde se encuentra la correspondencia con Felipe Pedrell, 1841–1922), la "Kungliga bibliotek-Sveriges national-bibliotek", en Estocolmo, y la "Uppsala universitetsbibliotek", en Uppsala. En los Capítulos II y III se reconstruye la biografía y la actividad diplomática de Mitjana a partir de las nuevas fuentes investigadas, revelándose su ambiente familiar y su relación con personalidades del mundo musical, social, artístico y político de Italia, los Países Bajos, Francia, Suecia, Rusia y España. En el Capítulo IV se comentan sus escritos musicológicos y de crítica musical para vincularlos con el pensamiento regeneracionista, así como sus composiciones musicales. La Bibliografía incluye la lista más completa de publicaciones de Rafael Mitjana (110 ítems, muchas de ellas en la prensa diaria hasta ahora desconocidas) y el Catálogo de sus obras musicales. Esta Tesis Doctoral descubre a Rafael Mitjana como musicólogo, compositor y diplomático cosmopolita e internacionalista, aportando una nueva dimensión al estudio de su figura y su obra. ; [eng] Rafael Mitjana (1869—1921) developed an important role in the field of musical research; his more wellknown achievements are the discovery of the Cancionero de Uppsala (Venecia, 1556) and La musique en Espagne (1914 and 1920), which is considered the first history of Spanish music written in a systematic way. He also conducted several studies on Spanish music and Spanish musicians from the 16th and 17th centuries; due to the soundness of his research Mitjana is considered one of the founders of Spanish musicology. Nevertheless, despite the importance of this personality of Spanish music, very little is known about his biography and his activity as a critic, composer and diplomat. This Doctoral Dissertation studies the personality of Rafael Mitjana from a new perspective after unknown primary sources in Spain and Sweden. This Dissertation is composed by a Study divided into four chapters (Vol. I) and eleven Appendices (Vol. II) which include the transcription of more than 700 documents (many of them translated from the French and the Swedish) and nine musical manuscripts on which the research is based. Chapter I contains a detailed description of the documentary sources investigated in archives and libraries of Spain and Sweden among which stand out the Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, in Madrid, Biblioteca de Catalunya (correspondence with Felipe Pedrell, 1844--1922), in Barcelona, Kungliga bibliotek-Sveriges nationalbibliotek, in Stockholm, and Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, in Uppsala. Chapters II and III contain the reconstruction of Rafael Mitjana's biography after the new sources investigated; this new biography reveals Mitjana's family environment and his connections with personalities of the musical, social, artistic and political worlds from Italy, Low Countries, France, Sweden and Spain. Chapter IV includes a commentary of Mitjana's writtings as a musicoligist and music critic with the aim of linking him to the regenerationist thought; this chapter also contains the analysis of several musical works by Mitjana. The bibliography contains the most complete list of the 107 published works by Mitjana (many of them unknown in journals) and the catalogue of his musical works. This Doctoral Dissertation reveals the figure of Rafael Mitjana as a cosmopolitan and internationalist musicologist, composer and diplomat, providing a new dimension from which study his figure and his works.

Book review in this ArticleClaude Mossé. Ancient Culture and Society: The Ancient World at Work.P. J. Ucko and G. W. Dimbleby (Eds.). The Domestication and Exploitation of Plants and Animals.N. Rubinstein (Ed.). Florentine Studies. Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence.Raymond de Roover. The Bruges Money Market around 1400.Henri Touchard. Le commerce maritime breton à la fin du Moyen Age.Guillermo Lohmann Villena. Les Espinosa, une famille d'hommes d'affaires en Espagne et aux Indes à l'époque de la colonisation.J. H. Shennan. Government and Society in France, 1461–1661.Marcel Couturier. Recherches sur les structures sociales de ChâteaudunF. Jaupart. L'activité commerciale de Bayonne au XVIIIe siècle.Pierre Jeannin. L'Europe du Nord‐Ouest et du Nord aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles.T. Emmons. The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861.Helmuth Stoecke (Ed.). Kamerun unter Deutscher Kolonialherrschaft.Dieter Petzina. Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan.Carl Bridenbaugh. The Beginnings of the American People: Vexed and Troubled Englishmen, 1590–1642.Vincent Ponko, Jr. The Privy Council and the Spirit of Elizabethan Economic Management, 1558–1603.Darrett B. Rutman. Husbandmen of Plymouth: Farms and Villages in the Old Colony, 1620–1692.Brooke Hindle. Technology in Early America.Sam Bass Warner, Jr. The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth.N. Rosenberg (Ed.). The American System of Manufactures. The Report of the Committee on the Machinery of the United States and the Special Reports of George Wallis and Joseph Whitworth.Harry N. Scheiber. Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820–1861.Grace Rogers Cooper. The Invention of the Sewing Machine.Melvin M. Leiman. Jacob N. Cardozo: Economic Thought in the Antebellum South.Ralph D. Gray. The National Waterway.Stanley Buder. Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880–1930.Philip Taft. Labor Politics American Style: the California State Federation of Labor.M. Melnyk. Long Fluctuations in Real Series of American Economy.Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The Agrarian years, 1910–1940.Karl Schriftgiesser. Business and Public Policy: The Role of the Committee for Economic Development, 1942–1967.C. A. Blyth. American Business Cycles, 1945–50.A. W. Coats and Ross M. Robertson (Eds.). Essays in American Economic History. Acta Historiae Neerlandica. M. A. Arnould. L'impôt direct dans le Tournaisis au début régime espagnol (1523–1571).H. Bauduin and J. Jansen. Aspecten van de Limburgse landbouwgeschiedenis.W. Berghuis. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse beleggingsfondsen tot 1914.W. P. Coolhaas. Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs‐Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie.A. M. de Jong. Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank (1814–1914).J. A. de Jonge. De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914.A. C. J. de Vrankrijker. Belastingen in Nederland, 1848–1893. De strijd om een modernisering van het stelsel.H. Galle. La "Famine du coton", 1861–1865. Effets de la Guerre de Sécession sur l'industrie cotonnière gantoiseP. Harsin and E. Helin. Problèmes de mortalité. Méthodes, sources et bibliographie en démographie historique.J. Leaonard‐Etienne. Recherches sur l'investissement et la rentabilité dans l'industrie liégeoise.A. Louant. Le journal d'un bourgeois de Mons, 1505–1536.B. Lyon and A. Verhulst. Medieval Finance. A Comparison of Financial Institutions in Northwestern Europe.A. Moureaux‐van neck. Assistance publique, 1856–1956.J. G. Nanninga. Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel. Recherches sur l'histoire des finances publiques en Belgique. J. Ruwet, E. Helin, F. Ladrier, and L. van Buyten. Le marché des céréales à Ruremonde, Luxembourg, Namur et Diest aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles.G. Spitaels. Le mouvement syndical en Belgique.M.‐R. Thielemans. Bourgogne et Angleterre. Relations politiques et economiques entre les Pays‐Bas bourguignons et l'Angleterre, 1435–1467.F. van Bocxlaer. De evolutie van de economische pers in België.J. M. G. van der Poel. Honderd jaar landbouwmechanisatie in Nederland.G. Vandewalle. De conjuncturele evolutie in Kongo en Ruanda‐Urundi van 1920 tot 1939 en van 1949 tot 1958.M. van Durme. Les archives générales de Simancas et l'histoire de la Belgique, IX‐XIXe sièdes.M. van Durme. Les archives générales de Simancas et l'histoire de la Belgique, IX‐XIXe siècles.J. A. van Houtte. Bruges. Essai d'histoire urbaine.D. van Rijssel. De Gentse huishuren tussen 1500 et 1795. Bijdrage tot de kennis van de konjunktuur van de Stad. Pro Civitate.F. van Tyghem. Op en om de Middeleeuwse bouwwerf. De gereedschappen en toestellen gebruikt bij het bouwen van de Vroege Middeleeuwen tot omstreeks 1600.H. van Werveke. Miscellanea Mediaevalia. Verspreide opstellen over economische en sociale Geschiedenis van de Middeleeuwen.A. Verhulst. Het landschap in Vlaanderen in historisch perspectief.Ch. Verlinden, E. Scholliers, H. Desmedt‐Coppejans, J. Craeybeckx, and G. Impens. Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant.H. Wouters. Documenten betreffende de geschiedenis der arbeidersbeweging (1853–1865). Bedrijf en Samenleving. Economisch‐historische studies over Nederland in de negentiende en twintigste eeuw aangeboden aan Prof. Dr I. J. Brugmans bij zijn aftreden als hoogleraar aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. L'impôt dans le cadre de la ville et de l'Etat. De belasting in het raam van stad en staat.

Book reviewed in this article:FICTION Ann Vickers. By Sinclair Lewis.FICTION Ways of Escape. By Philip Gibbs.CRIMINOLOGY: THE REAL THING. Criminology. By Robert H. Gault.CRIMINOLOGY: THE REAL THING. The Lawbreaker. By E. Roy Calvert and Theodora Calvert.CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. The Moscow Trial.1 By A. J. Cummings.CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. Wrecking Activities at Power Stations in the Soviet Union.1 (Allen and Unwin.CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. Courts and Judges in France, Germany and England. By R. C. K. Ensor.CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. English Justice.1 By "Solicitor".CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. From the Bench. By Cecil Chapman.CRIMINAL COURTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. Magisterial Law, 1932. By Albert Lieck and Sophie Lieck.THE PROBATION SYSTEM ON PROBATION. Probation and Criminal Justice. Essays in Honour of Herbert C. Parsons. Edited by Sheldon Glueck.THE PROBATION SYSTEM ON PROBATION. Probation in New York State. (Special Report by Commission to Investigate Prison Administration and Construction, presented to the Legislature of the State of New York. 1933. 66 pp.)THE PROBATION SYSTEM ON PROBATION. Prediction Factors in Probation. (A Study of 1,515 Probation Cases of Ramsey County, Minnesota, for the years 1923–1925 inclusive. Elio D. Monachesi, Ph.D.ENGLISH PRISON LIFE, ABOVE STAIRS AND BELOW. The Recollections of a Prison Governor. By Lt.‐Col. C. E. F. Rich, D.S.O.ENGLISH PRISON LIFE, ABOVE STAIRS AND BELOW. Dartmoor from Within. By Ex‐Convict No. —.THREE BOOKS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME. Reviewed by Dr. William Moodie. Studies in the Psychology of Delinquency. By Grace W. Pailthorpe, M.D.THREE BOOKS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME. What We Put in Prison. By Dr. Grace W. Pailthorpe.THREE BOOKS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME. Psychology in Court. By A Doctor.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. Prisoners: their Crimes and Sentences. The Classification of Prison Inmates of New York State. (V. C. Branham, M.D., Deputy Commissioner and Dr. Walter N. Thayer, Jr., Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correction.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. Limey. By James Spenser.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. Men's Misdemeanants' Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. A Report of the Bureau of Municipal Research of Philadelphia.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. A Preliminary Report on an Educational Project at Elmira Reformatory. Special Report by the Commission to Investigate Prison Administration and Construction to the Legislature of the State of New York.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. Crime, Law and Social Science. By Jerome Michael, Professor of Law in Columbia University, and Mortimer J. Adler, Associate Professor of Law in the University of Chicago.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. The Problem of Crime. By Clayton J. Ettinger, M.D., Ph.D.AMERICAN BOOKS ON PENOLOGY. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, including the American Journal of Police Science. Century of Progress Number.BOW STREET AND THE OLD BAILEY. The History of the Bow Street Runners (1729–1829). By Gilbert Armitage.BOW STREET AND THE OLD BAILEY. The Old Bailey. By Albert Crew.MISCELLANY. The Trial of John Watson Laurie. Edited by William Roughead.MISCELLANY. The Judicial Wisdom of Mr. Justice McCardie. Edited by Albert Crew.MISCELLANY. The Police‐woman's Handbook. By Eleonore L. Hutzel.MISCELLANY. Behind the Green Lights. By Capt. Cornelius Willemse.MISCELLANY. Clues and Crimes. By Henry T. F. Rhodes.MISCELLANY. Marriage, Children and God. By Claud Mullins. With a Preface by the Bishop of Southwark.MISCELLANY. Tu Ne Tueras Point. By Serge Brisy.MISCELLANY. The Thibaults. By Roger Martin du Gard. Translated from the French by Stephen Haden Guest.MISCELLANY. The Tragedy of Lynching. By Arthur Raper.MISCELLANY. Prohibition: A National Experiment. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 163.MISCELLANY. Transactions of the Medico‐Legal Society for the Session 1931–32.MISCELLANY. The Causes of Suicide. By Dennis H. Geffen, M.D., D.P.H., Medical Officer of Health for Enfield.MISCELLANY. Individual and Social Interpretations in the Study of the Psychological Disorders of Childhood. By Emanuel Miller, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., D.P.M.MISCELLANY. The Liberty of the Subject from the Legal and Medical Aspect. By Lionel A. Weatherly, M.D.MISCELLANY. Sudden Death. By Gerald Slot, M.D., M.R.C.P., D.P.H. A very interesting catalogue of post‐mortem findings.MISCELLANY. Abortion: Some Medical, Legal and Sociological Points. By L. A. Parry, M.D., B.S., F.R.C.S.MISCELLANY. The Gynaecologist in the Law Courts. By J. Bright Banister, M.B., F.R.C.S.MISCELLANY. Some Disadvantages of Medical Evidence on Venereal Diseases, to the Public Health and the Administration of Justice. By Lt.‐Col. L. W. Harrison, D.S.O., M.B.MISCELLANY. Should the Criminologist be Encouraged? By Alexander Paterson.MISCELLANY. The Medico‐Legal and Criminological Review: incorporating the Transactions of the Medico‐Legal Society. Vol. I., Part I. January, 1933.MISCELLANY. Medico‐Legal Practice. By Sir John Collie, C.M.G., M.D.MISCELLANY. The Medico‐Legal Significance of Impotence in the Male and in the Female. By Frederick J. McCann, M.D., F.R.C.S.

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) learned with immense shock and sadness of the passing on of Professor Samir Amin on Sunday, 12th August 2018. Subsequently, Prof. Samir Amin's body was interned at Père Lachaise in Paris on 1st September 2018 at a site provided by the French Communist Party. The Council was represented at the burial by Prof. Fatow Sow and Dr. Cherif Sy; two members of the CODESRIA community who have worked with Samir Amin for a while.
For CODESRIA, this marks nothing less than the end of an era in the history of African social research given the many pioneering roles the late Professor Amin played as a scholar, teacher, mentor, friend, and revolutionary. Samir was many things to us as a Council; for the younger members of the community, it meant much more to be in his company at the numerous CODESRIA meeting he attended. A model for three generations of African and, indeed, radical scholars globally, Samir was that giant Baobab tree whose grandeur of intellect and spirit made him a worthy role model. While serving as Director of the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), he hosted the initial scaffolding of the CODESRIA at IDEP, brought together and nurtured new talent that laid the foundations which launched Council on a path of growth and resilience to what it is to-date. As the final note on his reflections contained in this Bulletin illustrates, while serving as CODESRIA's founding Executive Secretary, Samir worked very closely with Abdalla Bujra and later Thandika Mkandawire, to shape the initial years of CODESRIA's intellectual identity and trajectory.
After CODESRIA relocated from the premises of IDEP to a new home in the Fann Residence part of Dakar, Samir Amin remained engaged with Council and its community of scholars, participating actively and effectively in all its activities. This 15th General Assembly of CODESRIA is perhaps the first Assembly without Samir Amin presence. In all previous General Assemblies, Samir has been a notable presence even giving the Cheikh Anta Diop Lecture at the 10 Assembly in Kampala, Uganda. It is at the General Assembly that many young academics interacted with Samir, often for the first time and indeed experiencing the awe of his presence. Though Samir is absent at the current Assembly, there is no doubt that his intellectual and revolutionary spirit is definitely present just as the thoughts and ideas that he shared so generously and to the very end will continue to inspire reflection and debate.
Samir Amin's intellectual journey was a long and illustrious one. It was a journey marked by commitments that distinguished him as a scholar of unparalleled convictions. He died still an unapologetic socialist academic or, as the title of his memoir reads, 'an independent Marxist' whose work was driven by an unshakeable conviction to confront and oppose totalizing economic orthodoxies. He treated this confrontation and opposition as a prelude to social transformation. He was steadfast in his belief that the world must shift away from capitalism and strive to build new 'post-capitalist' societies. He described capitalism as a small bracket in the long history of human civilization. His works identify and record the multiple crises of capitalism, a system he described as senile and obsolete. In its place, Samir Amin formulated a political alternative that he envisioned would proceed by i) socializing the ownership of monopolies, ii). definancializing the management of the economy and iii) deglobalising international relations [cited in Campbell, 2015: 286]. For him, these three directions provided the basis of an active politics of dismantling capitalism; a politics he committed his skill and energy mobilizing for. Even as he grew older, he mustered fresh bursts of energy to continue the struggle and to the very last days when he was in Dakar, he was apart of the team of scholar/ activists gathered together by International ENDA Third World Network to draft the Alternative Report on Africa (Dakar, 2018). CODESRIA was apart of this process and the Report will by shared at this General Assembly.
Many of Samir Amin's writings make the point repeatedly on the urgent necessity to dismantle the 'obsolete system' known as capitalism. However, none was as emphatic in rethinking the underlying cultural underpinning of the 'obsolete system' like Eurocentricism. In that engaging publication, he provided a rggesounding critique of world history as is centered around Eurocentric modernity and invites us to understand modernity as an incomplete process that, to survive its current crises, will need 'economic, social and political reconstruction of all societies in the world.' Embedded in this argument is a long held position about the importance of the Bandung moment (1955) as a moment of an alternative globalization based on Afro-Asian solidarity. It is from this perspective that one understands why Samir Amin emphasized the importance of China [see tribute by Sit Tsui and Yan Xiaohui in this bulletin]. Afro-Asian solidarity was the basis upon which Samir Amin located his alternative politics which also defined his towering global outlook and presence.
There is no doubt that Samir Amin's intellectual presence was defined by depth of knowledge, complexity of thought and fidelity to Marxist organising principles. There is no way of summarizing the corpus of work he produced, the revolutionary engagements he undertook and the transformative potential that led him to remain steadfast even when many others were only too happy to find a good reason to backtrack and conform. His work is enormous in volume but also in the depth of its knowledge and relevance to society. He provoked and joined debates across the globe but more importantly with comrades in Latin America and Asia, those of the dependency and underdevelopment school but also later from a South-South perspective. In CODESRIA's flagship journal Africa Development alone, Samir Amin published twenty articles. A biodata document he shared with the Council has 24 books in English and 41 in French. He is published in English, French, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish to name but these few languages. In all these publications and in the various languages, Samir Amin articulated his belief in alternatives, and as indicated above, this belief remained strong even to the last month of his life on earth.
Born to an Egyptian father and French mother on 3rd September 1931 in Cairo, Egypt, Samir Amin's convictions owe much to the context of his childhood all the way from Port Said in northern Egypt to Cairo where he schooled. He spent his early life in Egypt where he attended his formative schooling before proceeding to France to pursue higher education at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris ("Sciences Po"). Here, he earned a diploma in 1952 and later a PhD in 1957 at the Sorbonne. Samir later earned another diploma in mathematical statistics from L'institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques. He had always been interested in radical thought and action from early on, noting in an interview that he already considered himself a communist in Secondary School. Even though he and his cohort did not know what communism really meant in their early childhood, they assumed it meant "equality between human beings and between nations, and it meant that this has been done by the Russian revolution." It is not surprising that with this pedigree, Samir Amin focused in his graduate research on "The origins of underdevelopment – capitalist accumulation on a world scale" and emphasized in his work that underdevelopment in the periphery was, in large measure, due to the working of the capitalist system. He consequently underscored the need to search for socialist alternatives to liberal globalisation.
Samir Amin returned to Cairo in 1957, worked briefly in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Institute for Economic Management (1957–1960) before heading to work as an adviser in the Ministry of Planning in Mali (1960- 1963). Subsequently, Samir Amin's intellectual life became largely internationalist in orientation, and anchored principally on the question of accumulation as key to understanding underdevelopment. He maintained the sojourn between France where he took up a Professorship in 1966 and Dakar, Senegal his adopted home where he worked for ten years, from 1970 to 1980 at IDEP. Later in 1980, he founded the Third World Forum, originally hosted at the CODESRIA Secretariat, and lent his considerable weight to the institutionalisation of ENDA and the World Forum for Alternatives. His support for revolutionary politics is marked not just in the books and papers he published but also in the lecture circuit where he spoke to audiences about the undeniable relevance of radical politics.
Samir Amin's thinking was in large measure defined by the solidarity built around the Bandung Confer- ence of 1955. This remained a critical touchstone in his work in which non-western civilisations and his- tories played an important role. Bandung, for him, inaugurated a different pattern of globalisation, the one he called 'negotiated globalisation.' Though not asufficientbasisforcomplete"de-linking"from'ob- solescent capitalism', Samir Amin saw in Afro-Asian solidarity possibilities and pathways to that delinking; the process, as he explained, by which you submit "ex- ternal relations to the needs of internal progressive so- cial changes and targets." The notion of 'delinking' oc- cupied a major place in Samir Amin's thinking and is positioned in contrast to 'adjustment' that was the pre- ferred approach of the Bretton Woods Institutions. As Mamdani shows elsewhere in this Bulletin, there are major problematic elements of this notion that Samir Amin continued to grapple with. But ultimately, Samir Amin noted that delinking is in fact a process that, de- pending on the societies implementing it, can be used to install graduated level of autonomous development instead of countries in the periphery remaining locked into and merely adjusting to the trends set by a funda- mentally unequal capitalist system.
In Samir Amin, we found the true meaning of praxis; a thinker who insisted that his work has immediate relevance to society. His departure deprives us of the practical energy he brought to our meetings and debates; and denies radical thinkers a model around whom they found the compass that enabled them to navigate the treacherous, indeed murderous, waters of capitalism. We however are lucky to have lived in his company, to have learned from his fountain of knowledge and to have shared in the passion of his convictions. The Council plans to invigorate the value of his legacy by celebrating him during this 15th General Assembly but also beyond the confines of the Assembly.
Thus, this edition of the Bulletin contains two intertwined sets of essays; all organised around Samir Amin. In the one instance, we have a selection of messages in his memory. One the other, we have a selection of essays he authored. Separately, we will re-publish all the essays he published in Africa Development in a special issue of the journal to provide them in one collection for posterity. But whichever way, and as his own reflection in the essay published in this volume and his memoirs show, CODESRIA is an inheritance that Samir Amin bequeathed the African social science community. As such, it is fitting that the Bulletin designed for the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly is also a Bulletin that publishes essays in his honour.
The choice of theme for the General Assembly predates the passing on of Samir Amin. But the theme itself is one that was dear to Samir Amin. It is our pleasure therefore to present the essays contained here as essays that shed light on a life lived fully but also that open up a space to explore the unfulfilled promises of globalisation. We hope that at the end of it, this will be a fitting study in honour of our departed icon but also a commentary on the key issues the 15th General Assembly explored.

The disastrous consequences of Brexit in Northern Ireland (NI) have brought forth an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements for the whole island. The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists. In its origins, Northern Ireland (NI) was not necessarily meant to be a permanent territorial entity. The Treaty that ended the Irish War of Independence provided for a Border Commission to revise the territorial settlement. Independent Ireland aspired from the beginning to reunify the island, while northern Unionism aspired to maintain the status quo of the union with Great Britain. Historically, after the conquest of Ireland, there was a kingdom of Great Britain and a separate kingdom of Ireland, under the same monarch, but with separate Parliaments. In 1798, Protestant landowners and Catholic small farmers united in a revolt for independence and sought the help of France. French help arrived too late, and the rebellion was quashed brutally.However, the fear of a united opposition on the island of Ireland led to an Act of Union in 1800 that created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It also inspired the deliberate promotion of a sectarian divide between Protestants and Catholics that would prevent any united opposition in the future. But, after 26 of Ireland's 32 counties became independent in 1921, the UK became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.The division of Ireland had neither historical precedents nor a geographical logic. It was a calculated decision that turned identity into the motor of northern Irish politics. Despite the official commitment to reunification, independent Ireland did little to achieve it, and the overwhelming unionist majority in NI did everything it could to maintain its union with the UK and to deprive northern nationalists of any possibility of determining their own fate.Membership of the European Union diluted the role of national sovereignty among member states and the fact that both parts of Ireland belonged to the EU encouraged the development of an all-island economy. Two events brought the partition of Ireland into question. The crisis of mad cow disease that began in Great Britain in the 1990s led to a blockade of British beef by the EU. There was no mad cow disease on the island of Ireland, so Ireland could continue to export beef to the rest of the EU. Northern Irish farmers assumed that they could do the same, because they were on the same island, but the UK government forbade them from doing so because they were part of the UK. For once, Partition was a prejudice to the northern economy. The second event was Ireland joining the Euro. The tourist trade in NI was suddenly faced with the incomprehension of EU tourists who crossed the border from the Republic into NI, expecting to use Euros and surprised by the need to change currencies. This led to the NI tourist industry proposing a dual currency, something the UK government vetoed (although it now exists defacto). Brexit and identity politicsThe Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 facilitated North-South cooperation on the island, and the all-island economy grew – one example being the fact that many northern farmers processed their milk in the south. Northern haulers accessed France directly by ferries from the south. The logic of an all-island economy became evident. However, Brexit put a stop to that. Brexit played to identity politics because its promoters insisted that it had to do with sovereignty and to the maintenance of the British identity. This identity is the essence of Unionist thinking, and it trumped the logic of economics and geography. During the mad cow crisis, Irish farmers benefited from direct mediation by the Irish government in the European Commission, but northern Irish farmers had no such direct access to mediation and found themselves at a disadvantage.During all the discussions previous to Brexit referendum, the majority of elected representatives in NI and the business and farming communities wanted to maintain easy access to the EU Single Market, but Unionists were willing to sacrifice such access to ideological notions of sovereignty. Now, the disastrous consequences of Brexit for the UK are gradually becoming much clearer. But, the consequences for NI are worse. As a result, an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements on the island of Ireland has begun to emerge. Old terminology like a 'United Ireland' is unacceptable to Unionists. The Irish government is promoting a process of discussion under the heading of a 'Shared Island'. Some unionist thinkers speak of a 'union of Ireland'. Unionists objected viscerally to the 'Northern Ireland Protocol' agreed by the UK with the EU because it separated NI from the UK semantically. So, the UK proposed an alternative 'Windsor Framework', combining semantically an all-UK context with a monarchical reference, although from the point of view of the EU, there is no substantial difference between the Protocol and the Framework. The same is basically true of the latest 'Strengthening the Union' package that has persuaded the Democratic Unionist Party to return to government in NI.The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists.NI is not a viable state from an economic point of view. Tax income is only 60% of administrative costs. It must be subsidised by the UK. The British government uses a formula to calculate the basic needs of NI and Wales in comparison to England that is based on six variables: the proportion of the population who are under 16, retired, on benefits, from an ethnic minority, in a settlement with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and with a long-term illness. By these calculations, the official need for NI should be 121% of England's needs, but as recently as 2019, it actually cost 140% of England's needs. Any talk of a union of Ireland will have to take economics into consideration. For most of recent history, the Republic was much poorer than NI and offered inferior health services. This had been a cause for reluctance to unite the two parts of the island, even among the northern nationalist community. This has now changed radically. The Republic is wealthier and offers better services. But southern Irish voters may wonder what the cost will be for them to finance a reintegrated NI.In fact, southern voters have yet to seriously consider what reintegration might entail. It cannot simply be the absorption of NI into existing structures and institutions. It could be federal or confederal. It could require a new Constitution. Would it have the same flag and national anthem (both closely associated with Republicanism and therefore anathema to unionists). Could citizens have dual nationality (Irish and British)? Should Ireland rejoin the Commonwealth of Nations? The Irish Times has begun an in-depth study of attitudes north and south on the implications of uniting the island. Both nationalists and unionists will have to profoundly rethink what a new Ireland would be.Keywords: Northern Ireland, reunification, referendum, UK, Brexit, Good Friday Agreement, unionists, identity politicsAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

The disastrous consequences of Brexit in Northern Ireland (NI) have brought forth an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements for the whole island. The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists. In its origins, Northern Ireland (NI) was not necessarily meant to be a permanent territorial entity. The Treaty that ended the Irish War of Independence provided for a Border Commission to revise the territorial settlement. Independent Ireland aspired from the beginning to reunify the island, while northern Unionism aspired to maintain the status quo of the union with Great Britain. Historically, after the conquest of Ireland, there was a kingdom of Great Britain and a separate kingdom of Ireland, under the same monarch, but with separate Parliaments. In 1798, Protestant landowners and Catholic small farmers united in a revolt for independence and sought the help of France. French help arrived too late, and the rebellion was quashed brutally.However, the fear of a united opposition on the island of Ireland led to an Act of Union in 1800 that created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It also inspired the deliberate promotion of a sectarian divide between Protestants and Catholics that would prevent any united opposition in the future. But, after 26 of Ireland's 32 counties became independent in 1921, the UK became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.The division of Ireland had neither historical precedents nor a geographical logic. It was a calculated decision that turned identity into the motor of northern Irish politics. Despite the official commitment to reunification, independent Ireland did little to achieve it, and the overwhelming unionist majority in NI did everything it could to maintain its union with the UK and to deprive northern nationalists of any possibility of determining their own fate.Membership of the European Union diluted the role of national sovereignty among member states and the fact that both parts of Ireland belonged to the EU encouraged the development of an all-island economy. Two events brought the partition of Ireland into question. The crisis of mad cow disease that began in Great Britain in the 1990s led to a blockade of British beef by the EU. There was no mad cow disease on the island of Ireland, so Ireland could continue to export beef to the rest of the EU. Northern Irish farmers assumed that they could do the same, because they were on the same island, but the UK government forbade them from doing so because they were part of the UK. For once, Partition was a prejudice to the northern economy. The second event was Ireland joining the Euro. The tourist trade in NI was suddenly faced with the incomprehension of EU tourists who crossed the border from the Republic into NI, expecting to use Euros and surprised by the need to change currencies. This led to the NI tourist industry proposing a dual currency, something the UK government vetoed (although it now exists defacto). Brexit and identity politicsThe Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 facilitated North-South cooperation on the island, and the all-island economy grew – one example being the fact that many northern farmers processed their milk in the south. Northern haulers accessed France directly by ferries from the south. The logic of an all-island economy became evident. However, Brexit put a stop to that. Brexit played to identity politics because its promoters insisted that it had to do with sovereignty and to the maintenance of the British identity. This identity is the essence of Unionist thinking, and it trumped the logic of economics and geography. During the mad cow crisis, Irish farmers benefited from direct mediation by the Irish government in the European Commission, but northern Irish farmers had no such direct access to mediation and found themselves at a disadvantage.During all the discussions previous to Brexit referendum, the majority of elected representatives in NI and the business and farming communities wanted to maintain easy access to the EU Single Market, but Unionists were willing to sacrifice such access to ideological notions of sovereignty. Now, the disastrous consequences of Brexit for the UK are gradually becoming much clearer. But, the consequences for NI are worse. As a result, an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements on the island of Ireland has begun to emerge. Old terminology like a 'United Ireland' is unacceptable to Unionists. The Irish government is promoting a process of discussion under the heading of a 'Shared Island'. Some unionist thinkers speak of a 'union of Ireland'. Unionists objected viscerally to the 'Northern Ireland Protocol' agreed by the UK with the EU because it separated NI from the UK semantically. So, the UK proposed an alternative 'Windsor Framework', combining semantically an all-UK context with a monarchical reference, although from the point of view of the EU, there is no substantial difference between the Protocol and the Framework. The same is basically true of the latest 'Strengthening the Union' package that has persuaded the Democratic Unionist Party to return to government in NI.The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists.NI is not a viable state from an economic point of view. Tax income is only 60% of administrative costs. It must be subsidised by the UK. The British government uses a formula to calculate the basic needs of NI and Wales in comparison to England that is based on six variables: the proportion of the population who are under 16, retired, on benefits, from an ethnic minority, in a settlement with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and with a long-term illness. By these calculations, the official need for NI should be 121% of England's needs, but as recently as 2019, it actually cost 140% of England's needs. Any talk of a union of Ireland will have to take economics into consideration. For most of recent history, the Republic was much poorer than NI and offered inferior health services. This had been a cause for reluctance to unite the two parts of the island, even among the northern nationalist community. This has now changed radically. The Republic is wealthier and offers better services. But southern Irish voters may wonder what the cost will be for them to finance a reintegrated NI.In fact, southern voters have yet to seriously consider what reintegration might entail. It cannot simply be the absorption of NI into existing structures and institutions. It could be federal or confederal. It could require a new Constitution. Would it have the same flag and national anthem (both closely associated with Republicanism and therefore anathema to unionists). Could citizens have dual nationality (Irish and British)? Should Ireland rejoin the Commonwealth of Nations? The Irish Times has begun an in-depth study of attitudes north and south on the implications of uniting the island. Both nationalists and unionists will have to profoundly rethink what a new Ireland would be.Keywords: Northern Ireland, reunification, referendum, UK, Brexit, Good Friday Agreement, unionists, identity politicsAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

The disastrous consequences of Brexit in Northern Ireland (NI) have brought forth an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements for the whole island. The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists. In its origins, Northern Ireland (NI) was not necessarily meant to be a permanent territorial entity. The Treaty that ended the Irish War of Independence provided for a Border Commission to revise the territorial settlement. Independent Ireland aspired from the beginning to reunify the island, while northern Unionism aspired to maintain the status quo of the union with Great Britain. Historically, after the conquest of Ireland, there was a kingdom of Great Britain and a separate kingdom of Ireland, under the same monarch, but with separate Parliaments. In 1798, Protestant landowners and Catholic small farmers united in a revolt for independence and sought the help of France. French help arrived too late, and the rebellion was quashed brutally.However, the fear of a united opposition on the island of Ireland led to an Act of Union in 1800 that created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It also inspired the deliberate promotion of a sectarian divide between Protestants and Catholics that would prevent any united opposition in the future. But, after 26 of Ireland's 32 counties became independent in 1921, the UK became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.The division of Ireland had neither historical precedents nor a geographical logic. It was a calculated decision that turned identity into the motor of northern Irish politics. Despite the official commitment to reunification, independent Ireland did little to achieve it, and the overwhelming unionist majority in NI did everything it could to maintain its union with the UK and to deprive northern nationalists of any possibility of determining their own fate.Membership of the European Union diluted the role of national sovereignty among member states and the fact that both parts of Ireland belonged to the EU encouraged the development of an all-island economy. Two events brought the partition of Ireland into question. The crisis of mad cow disease that began in Great Britain in the 1990s led to a blockade of British beef by the EU. There was no mad cow disease on the island of Ireland, so Ireland could continue to export beef to the rest of the EU. Northern Irish farmers assumed that they could do the same, because they were on the same island, but the UK government forbade them from doing so because they were part of the UK. For once, Partition was a prejudice to the northern economy. The second event was Ireland joining the Euro. The tourist trade in NI was suddenly faced with the incomprehension of EU tourists who crossed the border from the Republic into NI, expecting to use Euros and surprised by the need to change currencies. This led to the NI tourist industry proposing a dual currency, something the UK government vetoed (although it now exists defacto). Brexit and identity politicsThe Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 facilitated North-South cooperation on the island, and the all-island economy grew – one example being the fact that many northern farmers processed their milk in the south. Northern haulers accessed France directly by ferries from the south. The logic of an all-island economy became evident. However, Brexit put a stop to that. Brexit played to identity politics because its promoters insisted that it had to do with sovereignty and to the maintenance of the British identity. This identity is the essence of Unionist thinking, and it trumped the logic of economics and geography. During the mad cow crisis, Irish farmers benefited from direct mediation by the Irish government in the European Commission, but northern Irish farmers had no such direct access to mediation and found themselves at a disadvantage.During all the discussions previous to Brexit referendum, the majority of elected representatives in NI and the business and farming communities wanted to maintain easy access to the EU Single Market, but Unionists were willing to sacrifice such access to ideological notions of sovereignty. Now, the disastrous consequences of Brexit for the UK are gradually becoming much clearer. But, the consequences for NI are worse. As a result, an unprecedented climate of talk about new political and territorial arrangements on the island of Ireland has begun to emerge. Old terminology like a 'United Ireland' is unacceptable to Unionists. The Irish government is promoting a process of discussion under the heading of a 'Shared Island'. Some unionist thinkers speak of a 'union of Ireland'. Unionists objected viscerally to the 'Northern Ireland Protocol' agreed by the UK with the EU because it separated NI from the UK semantically. So, the UK proposed an alternative 'Windsor Framework', combining semantically an all-UK context with a monarchical reference, although from the point of view of the EU, there is no substantial difference between the Protocol and the Framework. The same is basically true of the latest 'Strengthening the Union' package that has persuaded the Democratic Unionist Party to return to government in NI.The Good Friday Agreement provides for a referendum on reunification whenever the Secretary for NI sees that a majority would vote in favour. The fact that the Catholic community is now the majority has encouraged speculation that a referendum could be celebrated sooner rather than later, although surveys show that no such majority yet exists.NI is not a viable state from an economic point of view. Tax income is only 60% of administrative costs. It must be subsidised by the UK. The British government uses a formula to calculate the basic needs of NI and Wales in comparison to England that is based on six variables: the proportion of the population who are under 16, retired, on benefits, from an ethnic minority, in a settlement with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and with a long-term illness. By these calculations, the official need for NI should be 121% of England's needs, but as recently as 2019, it actually cost 140% of England's needs. Any talk of a union of Ireland will have to take economics into consideration. For most of recent history, the Republic was much poorer than NI and offered inferior health services. This had been a cause for reluctance to unite the two parts of the island, even among the northern nationalist community. This has now changed radically. The Republic is wealthier and offers better services. But southern Irish voters may wonder what the cost will be for them to finance a reintegrated NI.In fact, southern voters have yet to seriously consider what reintegration might entail. It cannot simply be the absorption of NI into existing structures and institutions. It could be federal or confederal. It could require a new Constitution. Would it have the same flag and national anthem (both closely associated with Republicanism and therefore anathema to unionists). Could citizens have dual nationality (Irish and British)? Should Ireland rejoin the Commonwealth of Nations? The Irish Times has begun an in-depth study of attitudes north and south on the implications of uniting the island. Both nationalists and unionists will have to profoundly rethink what a new Ireland would be.

Security Council 8221st Meeting ; 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 1/5 MEETINGS COVERAGE Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Accountability Mechanism After more than four years of work, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was still unable to verify that Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme was accurate, delegates told the Security Council today, underlining that questions remained about the use of such weapons in that country. Discussions between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Government were continuing, although they had not led to the resolution of any of the remaining issues regarding the completeness and accuracy of Syria's initial declaration, said Thomas Markram, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament A􀃗􍝡airs. Stressing that resolving those outstanding issues would allow for shared con􀃒􍉤dence in Syria's declaration across the international community, he emphasized: "The persistent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria underscore the need to identify solutions and reach agreement on an appropriate accountability mechanism." The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission was continuing its work and was currently in Damascus looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons that were brought to the attention of the OPCW Director-General by the Government, said Mr. Markram. The next report of the Fact-Finding Mission would be submitted when it considered that it had su􀃕􍕣cient information and was in a position to draw a conclusion. In the meantime, the Syrian Government had continued e􀃗􍝯orts to destroy the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities in the country, he said, adding that destruction of those facilities was expected to be complete within two to three months from the start date and would be veri􀃒􍉥ed by OPCW. Expressing concern that OPCW was still unable to verify Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme, the representative of Sweden noted there were still a number of serious outstanding issues that had yet to be resolved. Speci􀃒􍉣cally, the Director-General last month reported that the initial 5 outstanding questions had grown to 22, including the case of the Syrian Scienti􀃒􍉣c Studies and Research Centre. Emphasizing that sarin and chlorine stocks did indeed exist in Syria, France's representative said that the country had either deceived the Council or pursued a clandestine chemical weapons programme. Given those two options, France called on Syria to respond to all unanswered questions, "and there are many of them". The Damascus-based regime's responsibility for the use of chemical weapons had been publicly and unambiguously established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism and any attempt to discredit its clear conclusion could not change that reality, he said, stressing that impunity for those who used chemical weapons was not an option. The speaker for the United States said a few years ago, a single chemical weapons attack would have united the Council in shock and anger, but now there was a regime that used them "practically every other week". Letting one regime o􀃗􍜠 the hook emboldened others, she said, adding that the world was rapidly sliding back to a time when people lived in fear of colourless, shapeless gas leaving them gasping for air. Her country refused to believe that the Council could not come together once again on chemical weapons, despite di􀃗􍝥erences between its members. Echoing those concerns, the United Kingdom's representative noted that, in the absence of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, there was no proper channel to ensure accountability. Substantive gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria's declaration remained and the seriousness of the situation had increased over time. Turning to the recent poisoning in the town of Salisbury in her country, she said no explanation had been provided as to how a military-grade nerve agent had come to be used to sicken two people. There should be no more victims of chemical weapons attacks, whether they took place in the war zones of Syria or in an English town, she stressed. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the conclusions of the Joint Investigative Mechanism were nothing more than a pre-ordained, pre‑programmed result aimed at accusing the Syrian authorities. The Russian Federation was unable to support extension of the Mechanism's mandate in an unchanged form, he said, highlighting that his delegation had proposed a speci􀃒􍉣c alternative and circulated a draft resolution which was currently "in blue". Syria's representative said that his Government had ful􀃒􍉬lled its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Council resolution 2118 (2013). It had eliminated its chemical weapons programme in record time, which was a 􀃒􍉲rst in the history of OPCW, he stressed, and the Joint Investigative Mechanism had con􀃒􍉲rmed that fact in its June 2014 report. The 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 2/5 Syrian Army did not use chemical weapons nor did it possess them, rather they had been used against civilians by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Nusrah Front and other associated entities. Also speaking today were the representatives of the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Ethiopia, China, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Poland, Equatorial Guinea and Peru. The meeting began at 10:03 a.m. and ended at 11:47 a.m. Brie􀃒􍉮ng THOMAS MARKRAM, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament A􀃗􍝡airs, said that the Syrian Government had continued e􀃗􍝯orts to destroy the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities in the country. Destruction of those facilities was expected to be complete within two to three months from the start date and would be veri􀃒􍉥ed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), he said, stressing that the long-awaited and veri􀃒􍉥ed destruction of the two facilities was an essential step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Discussions between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Government were continuing, although they had not led to the resolution of any of the remaining issues. "The OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to be unable to con􀃒􍉲rm the completeness and accuracy of Syria's declaration," he said, underscoring that resolving those outstanding issues would permit shared con􀃒􍉤dence in Syria's declaration within the international community. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission was continuing its work and was currently in Damascus looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons that were brought to the attention of the OPCW Director-General by the Government, he said. The next report of the Fact-Finding Mission would be submitted when it considered that it had su􀃕􍕣cient information and was in a position to draw a conclusion, although those conclusions would not entail attribution of responsibility in those cases where the use of chemical weapons was determined. "The persistent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria underscore the need to identify solutions and reach agreement on an appropriate accountability mechanism," he emphasized, adding that the Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament A􀃗􍝡airs had repeatedly underlined the need to avoid impunity and ensure that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons were identi􀃒􍉥ed and held responsible. Statements NIKKI R. HALEY (United States) said the Council often talked about chemical weapons, but she worried that sometimes it lost sight of the human side of chemical weapons attacks. A century had lapsed between the 􀃒􍉲rst use of chemical weapons in the First World War and the chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykun one year ago today, and in that time, several international instruments sought to prohibit such weapons. The international community dared to believe that once day chemical weapons would be relegated to the history books. Then came Syria, where shared disgust led the Council to adopt resolution 2118 (2013) requiring the scheduled destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, followed in 2015 by the creation of the Joint Investigative Mechanism on Chemical Weapons Use in Syria. The United Nations found that the Assad regime, as well as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), had been responsible for the use of chemical weapons, and the Council dared to believe that consensus over the use of such weapons would hold. "But, we know what happened next," she said. The Assad regime continued to use chemical weapons, with one Council member shielding that regime from the consequences. The world today was a more dangerous place, with the Assad regime dropping chlorine bombs on men, women and children, she said. A few years ago, a single chemical weapons attack would have united the Council in shock and anger, but now there was a regime that used them "practically every other week". Letting one regime o􀃗􍜠 the hook emboldened others, she said, adding that the world was rapidly sliding back to a time when people lived in fear of colourless, shapeless gas leaving them gasping for air. Even as the Council remained deadlocked, some had stood up to demand accountability, with the General Assembly approving an impartial mechanism to investigate serious crimes in Syria and France establishing a partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, people in Syria were facing the terrifying reality of such heinous weapons. She invited Marmoun Morad, a Syrian physician who treated victims of the Khan Shaykun attack, present in the Council chamber this morning, to stand up, and saluted him for his courage and determination. He was present today to be an inspiration for all Council members, she said, adding that, if Mr. Morad was not going to stop treating victims of chemical weapons attacks, then the Council must not stop working to eliminate such weapons and to hold to account anyone, anywhere who used them. Concluding, she said her country refused to believe that the Council could not come together once again on chemical weapons, despite any di􀃗􍝥erences between its members. KAREL JAN GUSTAAF VAN OOSTEROM (Netherlands) recalled that Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention almost 􀃒􍉶ve years ago, having promised to destroy and abandon its chemical weapons programme; yet month after month there was news that the Syrian regime's declaration could not be considered complete or accurate. One year ago, the Assad regime carried out the heinous 4 April 2017 chemical attack against Khan Shaykhun that resulted in the deaths of about 100 innocent Syrian civilians, including many children. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished, he stressed. The Council must act upon the conclusions of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the outcomes of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. Further, the Council must intensify its e􀃗􍝯orts to achieve a mechanism that could continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism. 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 3/5 KAREN PIERCE (United Kingdom) recalled that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission had concluded that sarin had been used at Khan Shaykhun and the Joint Investigative Mechanism had concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for that attack. After more than four years of work, OPCW had yet to verify that Syria's declaration was accurate. Gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies remained which were not trivial points of minor detail — they were substantive and the seriousness of the situation had increased over time. There could be no impunity, she said, pointing out that, in the absence of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, there was no proper mechanism to ensure accountability. There was still no explanation provided as to how a military-grade nerve agent had come to be used in the poisoning in Salisbury. There should be no more victims of chemical weapons attacks; whether they took place in the war zones of Syria or in an English town. KAIRAT UMAROV (Kazakhstan) said that the use of chemical weapons was absolutely unacceptable under any circumstances. His delegation was pleased that during the reporting period there had been some progress towards the destruction of the remaining two chemical weapons production facilities in Syria, although, at the same time, he expressed concern about the lack of progress in clarifying all outstanding issues regarding the Government's initial declaration. The Council had not yet restored its investigative potential, he noted, stressing the need for every e􀃗􍝯ort to be made to 􀃒􍉮nd common ground on the issue. It was extremely important and necessary to overcome all di􀃗􍝥erences among Council members that prevented the complete elimination of the threat of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said the responsibility of the Damascus-based regime for the use of chemical weapons had been publicly and unambiguously established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Any attempt to discredit and to cast into oblivion the clear conclusion of the Joint Investigative Mechanism could not change that reality. Emphasizing that sarin and chlorine stocks did, indeed, exist in Syria, he said that country had either deceived the Council or pursued a clandestine chemical weapons programme. Given those two options, France called on Syria to respond to all unanswered questions, "and there are many of them". Reiterating his country's full support for OPCW, he said the use of chemical weapons was a moral o􀃗􍝥ense that undermined the fundamental standards of international law, as well as the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. A taboo had been broken in Syria, as in Salisbury and elsewhere. He went on to emphasize that impunity for those who used chemical weapons was not an option. Their use against civilians was a war crime and a crime against humanity, and perpetrators must be held to account. If there was an area in which the Council's credibility was at stake, it was chemical weapons, he said, delivering an urgent appeal for Council members to overcome their political di􀃗􍝥erences and put an end to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. That much was owed to civilians, who were the main victims of such weapons, and to the international non-proliferation regime. MANSOUR AYYAD SH. A. ALOTAIBI (Kuwait) said that, due to divisions within the Council, the justice he had hoped for in the Khan Shaykun incident had "vanished into thin air". The continued use of chemical weapons in Syria four years after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) was unacceptable. His delegation backed any mechanism that could achieve consensus in the Council and hold those responsible for committing such crimes to account, according to the principles outlined in resolution 2118 (2013). Indeed, the draft resolution tabled by the United States contained such elements. As such, he called on Member States to use that draft as the basis for future negotiations on any such mechanism. Stressing the importance of bringing perpetrators of chemical crimes to justice, he expressed support for the work of Joint Investigative Mechanism in assisting in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes in Syria and looked forward to hearing the results of its 􀃒􍉲rst report, which would be discussed on 17 April in the General Assembly. TEKEDA ALEMU (Ethiopia) expressed concern for the "barbaric" chemical attack in Khan Shaykun one year ago and called for those responsible to be held accountable. Without a uni􀃒􍉥ed response from the Council, damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime could not be repaired. He expressed hope that the Syrian Government — with the support of OPCW — would eliminate its two remaining stationary above-ground facilities. In that connection, he reiterated the importance of continued communication between OPCW and the Syrian Government with the ultimate objective of addressing remaining gaps and inconsistencies. Meanwhile, it was imperative that the investigative work of the OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission continued on all allegations of chemical weapons use. Nevertheless, the Council had to address the current institutional gap by creating an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify all State and non-State actors responsible for such crimes. WU HAITAO (China) said that his delegation was greatly concerned by the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria and 􀃒􍉲rmly opposed the use of such weapons under any circumstances. Recent incidents of suspected use of toxic chemicals were deeply concerning, and in that regard, establishing a new investigative mechanism to 􀃒􍉮nd out the truth and prevent the recurrent use of such weapons was of vital importance. All parties should continue to insist that the Security Council and OPCW should be the main channels for addressing the use of chemical weapons. He hoped that the Syrian Government would continue to cooperate with OPCW on the resolution of the initial declaration and properly resolve the outstanding issues. Political settlement was the only way to resolve the Syria issue, and in that context, the international community should support the next round of Geneva talks. JUAN MARCELO ZAMBRANA TORRELIO (Bolivia) expressed concern about the latest reports of alleged uses of chemical weapons in Syria and believed that there could be no justi􀃒􍉣cation for the use of such weapons, irrespective of the circumstances. His delegation strongly supported the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission and called on all parties to ensure an investigation could be carried out in a transparent and e􀃗􍝥ective manner. However, there was still the need for a mechanism 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 4/5 to identify the perpetrators so they could stand trial before the competent bodies. The Security Council must not be politicized or exploited on that issue, he said, calling on the parties to seek greater dialogue to create an investigative mechanism. The only way to resolve the con􀃓􍍩ict was through a political process led by the Syrian people. CARL SKAU (Sweden) said the failure to agree on a new, independent and impartial attributive mechanism for chemical weapons use in Syria cast a particularly dark shadow on the Council. He condemned the continued and repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, which constituted a serious violation of international law and a threat to international peace and security. Regarding the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), he expressed concern that OPCW was still unable to con􀃒􍉲rm whether Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme was accurate and complete. Indeed, there were still a number of serious outstanding issues. More speci􀃒􍉣cally, the Director-General last month reported that the initial 5 outstanding questions had grown to 22, including the case of the Syrian Scienti􀃒􍉣c Studies and Research Centre. He went on to express deep regret that the Council had failed to agree on an extension of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was essential to protect the international disarmament and non‑proliferation regime and ensure accountability. BERNARD TANOH-BOUTCHOUE (Côte d'Ivoire) said cooperation among the Syrian Government, OPCW and the United Nations O􀃕􍕣ce for Project Services (UNOPS) aimed at the destruction of remaining chemical weapons production units was encouraging. He also thanked those States which had contributed to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. However, major challenges persisted, he said, urging Syria to continue its cooperation with OPCW to address outstanding issues, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons facilities. Any use of chemical weapons was a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a violation of hard-won international standards banning such weapons. He encouraged OPCW, the Fact-Finding Mission and the Syrian Government to continue their cooperation, and called for a political settlement to the Syrian con􀃓􍍩ict. PAWEL RADOMSKI (Poland) said his delegation had taken note with utmost concern that the OPCW Technical Secretariat had been unable to con􀃒􍉲rm whether declarations submitted by Syria were accurate and complete. Once again, Poland joined the Secretary-General in calling on Syria to extend its fullest cooperation with the declaration assessment team. A clear message must be sent that the use of chemical weapons by anyone would not be tolerated, and the international community must be empowered to address each and every chemical weapons attack and to hold perpetrators accountable. Poland believed that the United States draft resolution was a good basis for further discussion on investigating the use of chemical weapons. He emphasized that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, as well as collective security were at stake. Poland also hoped that those responsible for the reckless act in Salisbury would soon be held accountable. ANATOLIO NDONG MBA (Equatorial Guinea) said the use of chemical weapons posed a clear threat to international peace and security. The divergent positions of Council members had demonstrated that the end to the use of chemical weapons in Syria hinged on an inclusive political agreement. His delegation a􀃕􍕲rmed the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, calling it a collective responsibility and moral obligation to the victims of the con􀃓􍍩ict. He called for Council members to recall their important role in the promotion of international peace and security. VASSILY A. NEBENZIA (Russian Federation) said it would be constructive to conduct a thorough analysis of the Khan Shaykhun incident and the consequences of that event in the context of global and regional security. The circumstances around that incident remained obscure. The so-called work done by the Joint Investigative Mechanism could not be taken seriously by professionals. The conclusions of that Mechanism were nothing more than a pre-ordained, pre‑programmed result aimed at accusing the Syrian authorities. They ran counter to the laws of physics, chemistry, aviation, ballistics and explosive matters. Experts did not travel to the location where the incident occurred and they had built their guesses on information received from armed groups and dubious structures that supported terrorist groups, including the white helmets. The Russian Federation was unable to support the extension of the Joint Investigative Mechanism mandate in an unchanged form, he said. Armed groups had amassed considerable capacity in chemical warfare. His delegation had proposed a speci􀃒􍉣c alternative to the former Joint Investigative Mechanism and circulated a draft resolution which was currently "in blue". The urgent need was to conduct an analysis of the production of chemical weapons by non-State actors, as well as their e􀃗􍝥ective use of those toxic substances. Nevertheless, Western colleagues were insisting on the recreation of a mechanism that was convenient for them and that would rubber stamp their own conclusions. International law fell to pieces when suspicions became the queen of evidence. Countries continued to con􀃒􍉤dently announce that chemical weapons were being used by Damascus, despite the absence of evidence and the clear political and military objectives behind such allegations. Lastly, he called for a Council meeting on Thursday regarding the incident in Salisbury. GUSTAVO MEZA-CUADRA (Peru), Council President for April, speaking in his national capacity, said chemical weapons attacks were atrocities committed in open de􀃒􍉡ance of the non-proliferation regime, as well as a threat to international peace and security which the Council could not allow. He expressed Peru's concern about the accuracy of the Syrian Government's declarations, adding that the Syrian authorities must be encouraged to provide all information without delay. Paying tribute to the Fact-Finding Mission, he said its work must be complemented by an independent mechanism that would make it possible to assign responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in line with international law. 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 5/5  MOUNZER MOUNZER (Syria) said Syria had ful􀃒􍉬lled its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Council resolution 2118 (2013). It had also always fully cooperated — in a positive, transparent and 􀃓􍍥exible manner — despite great challenges and a complicated and di􀃕􍕣cult security situation. The Syrian Government had been able to eliminate its chemical weapons programme in record time, which was a 􀃒􍉲rst in the history of OPCW. The Joint Investigative Mechanism con􀃒􍉲rmed that in its June 2014 report. But, rather than commending the Government for its e􀃗􍝯orts, some Council members — including the United States, which had not destroyed its chemical arsenal, United Kingdom and France — had mastered the art of deception and misinformation to dominate the world and take it back to the era of colonialism and trusteeship. They were investing in new Council meeting formats with one clear goal: to obstruct the Syrian army's progress against armed terrorist groups which they supported. He referred to theatrics staged by "white helmets" whose claims about the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta coincided with its liberation from armed terrorist groups. Recalling the incident in Khan Shaykhun, he said the Joint Investigative Mechanism had refused to visit that location, relying instead on false witness statements and so-called open sources whose work was unfounded and lacking in credibility. His Government had insisted before the Council and the OPCW Executive Council that it condemned the use of chemical weapons and any other weapon of mass destruction for any reason in any place. The Syrian Army did not use chemical weapons nor did it possess them, he said. Rather, they had been used against civilians by ISIL, Nusrah Front and other associated entities. He said his Government had sent the Council and specialized agencies 130 letters on the possession, production and use of chemical weapons by armed terrorist groups, but, unfortunately, it never got an answer regarding measures that the Council might take against those States which facilitated terrorist access to such weapons. He went on to ask how the United States, United Kingdom and France could claim to be committee to justice while having carried out "blood-curdling attacks" in several countries in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean over many years. The partnership against impunity established by France represented an attempt to set up a politicized parallel mechanism that would serve the interests of States opposed to the Syrian Government, he said. His Government was committed to implementing its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and it would continue its war against terrorists regardless of political blackmail and cheap attempts to exploit the su􀃗􍝥ering of the Syrian people. Concluding, he asked the representative of the Netherlands why no information had been provided about chemical agents aboard an aircraft that fell on Amsterdam in 1992, creating an orange-coloured explosion. For information media. Not an o􀃕􍕣cial record.

On March 17 Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended its military agreement with the United States after a visit by senior U.S. officials to the capital, Niamey. A CNSP spokesman said the decision was made after the U.S. delegation warned the military regime against partnering with Russia and Iran. Niger, which hosts around 1,000 U.S. troops and a drone base, has been an important partner in Washington's counterterrorism operations in the region. But relations have deteriorated considerably since July 2023, when Niger's presidential guard removed democratically elected Mohamed Bozoum and installed General Abdourahamane Tchiani.Russian influence looms large in Western discourse on the Sahel, and now informs U.S. policy and decision-making in places like Niger. This is a mistake. Outsized focus on Russia misunderstands the scale and scope of Moscow's presence. More importantly, it ignores longstanding patterns of governance and denies the role of Africans in emerging pro-sovereignty movements and political blocs. Neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to force Africans to choose sides, efforts to do so will only result in rebuke.African governments seek to balance outside powers while retaining the ability to work with each. Historically, local elites leverage these often unequal relations with powerful states to enhance their own domestic position. In francophone Africa, the cozy relationship between French officials, companies, and African autocrats came to be known as Françafrique. Niger had become somewhat of an exception among its peers, however, when it pursued close military ties with the United States.Recent years have seen a wave of anti-French sentiment hit the Sahel. Military regimes seeking political legitimacy have helped foment anti-French sentiment, but they do not control it. The backing of Paris is politically poisonous; kicking the French military out of Niger was necessary to the CNSP's survival.Neither the U.S. nor Russia have a policy to address the humanitarian, economic, and security implications of France's departure from the Sahel, which explains, in part, the focus on ideological narratives.Without a clear strategy, Russia responds opportunistically to events on the ground. And while Moscow has enjoyed more success than America in exporting security to Africa recently, it lacks comparable experience and capabilities in the humanitarian field. "We understand everything through Africa Corps," a Russian security expert in the region says. "We can strengthen it, expand it, redirect it. There are now some aspects of soft power, your matryoshkas and balalaikas. But now we need to do serious things, and that requires a lot of time, money, and people."Even though Washington historically ceded policy priorities in francophone Africa to France, anti-French sentiment did not carry over to anti-American sentiment in Niger. Close military relations, and leadership in the humanitarian field still carried weight.It appears that the U.S. delegation's visit to Niamey in March — led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley — did significant damage. Sahel expert Alex Thurston noted the reportedly uniliteral announcement of the U.S. delegation's visit, and the relatively low rank of visiting officials, may have played a part.The subject of the talks — Niger's turn towards Russia and Iran — appears to have been equally insulting. Ironically, the U.S. delegation's attempt to counter Russian influence in Niger has further pushed the CNSP to seek ties with Russia.U.S. focus on Russia misses the reality that Africans, not Russians or Americans, are driving major political shifts in the Sahel. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), for example, was a project initiated by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger first and foremost to counteract the military threat from a regional bloc, ECOWAS. That Russia welcomed the development does not mean Moscow inspired it.Indeed, the overthrow of Bozoum was as unexpected in Moscow as it was in Washington. "The coup was a surprise with no obvious advantage," a Russian diplomat in the region admitted. Western media were still quick to divine a Russian hand. Implicit was the belief that Russian influence thrives in instability and can "spill" across borders.Such tropes, however, fail to account for a basic building block of politics: personal relationships. Russia's arrival in Mali was not a product of information warfare — it was the result of collaboration between Russian advisers in Mali and Malian military officers who trained in Russia, the history of which goes back to the Soviet era. Malians, not Russians, cleared the way politically, working to secure the buy-in of trade unions and other powerbrokers in Bamako.There is no equivalent history in neighboring Niger. The U.S. has the monopoly on relations with Niger's officer corps. Moscow doesn't have an embassy in Niamey. Lacking strong, proven connections, Russian diplomats and security officials feel they don't have a good read on the junta. Moreover, Russian officials have little gauge over the mood within the broader Nigerien military. "Pressure to break with the U.S.," a high-ranking Nigerien military officer adds, "comes from within, not Russia."Sensing wariness on both sides, the CNSP has tried to attract, rather unsuccessfully thus far, the Kremlin's attention. When a CNSP delegation visited Moscow in January, they couldn't land a meeting with Vladimir Putin or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Still, Niamey was among the first countries to congratulate Putin on his election victory.The saga of Niger reflects a strange, transitory phase between Washington's "War on Terror" and "Great Power Competition," the strategic rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia, in which geopolitical foes find themselves on the same side against al-Qaida and ISIS-affiliated armed groups.The Kremlin views and frames its intervention in the Sahel in counterterrorism terms — a fact likely to continue following the recent terror attacks in Moscow. This resonates far better with Sahelian leaders than geopolitical rivalry. "If the United States does not participate in the fight against terrorists, then why are they here?" the Nigerien officer asked. "To track and contain the Russians? This is not their business. We respect America, we need their help. But this does not mean that we are ready listen to reproaches and accusations from incompetent people."Some time has passed now since the U.S. delegation's visit and the denunciation of Niger's military agreement with the U.S., and it appears that the initial tension from the Nigerien authorities' categorical statement has subsided. There is still a chance that the denunciation was a strong-arm tactic to coerce Washington into dialogue.At the same time, the AES continues to gather steam, with Chad now expressing interest in joining. Niger is an integral part of this new alliance and is closer to the U.S. and further from Russia compared to Mali and Burkina Faso.If the U.S. loses a foot in the alliance, which is very possible, it will be the result of efforts to force Africans to choose sides. In the long run, if the U.S. and Russia wish to continue fighting Islamist militancy in the Sahel, they will need to find a way to, if not cooperate, at least deconflict and accommodate for each other's presence. If not, they'll both find themselves on the outside looking in.

This paper examines humanitarianism in the Global South through engaging with resilience projects in the
Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (LCB). It addresses how recent humanitarianism has moved away from top-down interventions which seek to either intervene to save those that have been rendered "bare life" (Agamben, 1998, p. 4) by their own governments or improve the state's —especially fragile and failing ones— capacity to govern, towards society-based projects which seek to produce resilient subjects through addressing the broader social milieu. While previous accounts of security and development emphasized why fragile states and authoritarian regimes could constitute a threat to the international system, society or community which thus serves as justification for interventions, sometimes militarily, which such regimes flouted specific international norms and conventions. However, humanitarianism has become less targeted at regime change as was evident with the reluctance that followed the unproductive cases in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya where assumptions that regime change, or democracy promotion could promote the ends of liberal governance. Moving away from these statist focus, post-intervention has moved towards strengthening the capacities of communities to withstand shocks, but this is merely a pre-requisite for the objectives of the resilience project.
My contention is that the move towards resilience is not only an acknowledgement of the cognitive imperfections of the liberal subject but more importantly (Chandler, 2013b), it raises questions —about liberal subjecthood. These imperfections have historically been reserved for non-whites and non-Europeans since the Enlightenment, for example, issues related to (ir-)rationality and (un-)reason; the homo economicus is a myth after all (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; Chandler, 2013a). By moving away from humanitarian activities that require intervention to post-intervention, which involves claims about the subject's internal capacity to "self-govern" (Chandler, 2012; Chandler, 2013a), migration, development and security have become closely intertwined with some suggesting a migration-development-security nexus where humanitarian aid serves the purpose of accomplishing global governance of complexity (Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Truong and Gasper, 2011; Deridder et al., 2020). While useful, this paper problematizes this understanding of resilience which concerns itself with the biopolitics of enhancing life's capacity to self-govern by unpacking the various ways in which "resilience processes are marked by inequities and by the consequences of a history of the coloniality of power, oppression, and privilege" (Atallah et al., 2021, p. 9), which manifest when these projects are implemented within contexts or on bodies from the Global South. In particular, the move towards resilience has entailed further incursions into people's lives such that various rationalities and techniques of governmentality are directed at the population which may raise further questions when these populations are those of other countries or within regions that have a history of colonisation and subjugation.
By reconceptualising biopolitics as a racial biopolitics and by decentring the state and instead looking at assemblages, that is, a multiplicity of actors and rationalities and technologies, and practices which function as totalities and produce passive or active agents with or without capacity for resistance, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of agencement which is translated to English as "Assemblages", is useful to capture the rationalities and techniques of resilience projects in the Sahel and LCB. I reconceptualise this powerful concept as "racialised assemblages", made up of a set of "racial components" that produce "racialised ensembles", that is, a multiplicity of actors and rationalities and technologies, this paper shows how resilience projects by Western state and non-state actors such as the United Kingdom, France and the EU and other humanitarian actors such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the Sahel and the LCB are both exclusionary and raced and how these attempts seek to exploit the historical infantilization of the non-white subject or subjectivity within the Sahel and the LCB. Engaging with some humanitarian activities in the Sahel and LCB, the paper argues that through a racialised and exclusionary racial biopolitics that function through racialised assemblages, European humanitarian aid and assistance through upstreaming border control management through biometrics, exploit and sustain colonialities that seek achieve European outcomes. While projects such as migration and border control in the Niger-Nigeria border through biometric management and development projects that seek to address the root causes of insecurity, underdevelopment and forced displacement are promoted as humanitarian issues and facilitated through development aid, such racialised discourses are a continuation of racist historical depictions associated with whiteness and non-whiteness which made assumptions about humans, the environment, and the relationship between the two.
For those who emerged in European discourse as lacking the capacity to transform their environment, Access to full personhood was either denied or delayed which remerges in claims that attempt to interpellate persons and communities in the Sahel as vulnerable, poor, fragile, failing to highlight their deficient resilience and how this could impact on others who have achieved better resilience. For example, the attempts to build resilience through border control and management in the Sahel and LCB through the regularization of some types of desirable movements and criminalisation of irregular movement within the Sahel and LCB, especially where these are viewed as potentially constituting a risk to European security interests. For example, border policing and management posts in Konni-Illela and Eroufa in the Tahoua region of Niger which both seek to manage and control movement across the Niger-Nigeria border are promoted as enhancing Niger's own border management policy while it was set up through collaborative humanitarian efforts of various actors and was funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the U.S. Department of State (IOM, 2023). In addition to the other actors, these all constitute racialised biopolitical assemblages which attempt to govern complexity within the African context which is a continuation of various historical colonialities. Finally, in addition to the various infantilizing tendencies of racialised versions of resilience where the subject is viewed as incapable of full self-governance, and self-transformation, these projects when enforced on non-Western contexts such as the Global South perpetuate colonialities and within the Sahel, may stifle other possibilities of non-Western resilience such as those associated with human relationality. It becomes necessary to problematize the various resilience projects, including those that have apparently explicit humanitarian dimensions such as assistance and aid by asking critical questions about what they do which could also expose the ways in which those that are exposed to these rationalities and technologies resist these attempts. Further research should investigate the various ways in which individuals and communities in the
Sahel interact with these resilience projects and also how various so-called African partners —state and non- state— who play integral roles in facilitating and implementing them are positioned and how they position themselves. Such research could adopt focus groups, in-depth interviews, or ethnographic methods to capture ways in which these attempts may be reproduced, modified or even resisted by these people that emerge as targets of European post-interventionist biopolitics.