Suchergebnisse

Most Asian cities have grown more congested, more sprawling, and less livable in recent years; and statistics suggest that this trend will continue. Rather than mitigate the problems, transport policies have often exacerbated them. In this book, ADB outlines a new paradigm for sustainable urban transport that gives Asian cities a workable, step-by-step blueprint for reversing the trend and moving toward safer, cleaner, more sustainable cities, and a better quality of urban life.

"Electric bikes (e-bikes) provide low-cost, convenient, and relatively energy-efficient transportation to an estimated 40 million–50 million people in the People's Republic of China (PRC), quickly becoming one of the dominant travel modes in the country. As e-bike use grows, concerns are rising about lead pollution from their batteries and emissions from their use of grid electricity, primarily generated by coal power plants. This report analyzes the environmental performance of e-bikes relative to other competing modes, their market potential, and the viability of alternative battery technologies. It also frames the role of e-bikes in the PRC's transportation system and recommends policy for decision makers in the PRC's central and municipal governments."

Hamas's attack on Israel last week was what any reasonable person would consider an atrocity deserving of moral outrage. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed, and dozens more were taken into captivity. It thus is understandable that such an event would elicit intense emotion and a thirst for revenge.Being understandable is not the same as being wise or effective, for Israel itself or for regional peace and security.Israel has now embarked on a violent offensive against the Gaza Strip and its residents. However, as much as that offensive may be defended as intended to establish deterrence or to destroy a hostile military force, it is in large part an act of raw revenge. It is a national catharsis amid an atmosphere of intense grief and anger.The casualty count from the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip is rising too fast to venture an up-to-date figure, but Palestinian health authorities reported that as of Monday, 2,800 Palestinians had been killed and 10,000 wounded, with more than half of the dead being women and children. In addition, Israel — which already had maintained a blockade of Gaza — cut off all movement of food, fuel, water, and electricity to the territory. This is quickly generating a humanitarian disaster of a proportion commensurate with the Strip's population of more than two million, with specific consequences ranging from hospitals lacking the supplies and electric power needed to treat the wounded to families running short of food.On top of all this, Israel, through a pre-invasion warning leaflet, has told the more than one million residents of Gaza City and the rest of the northern half of the Strip to head south. Given the lack of food, water, and housing wherever those people could go, such a movement, as U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has stated, ranges between the "extremely dangerous" and the "impossible." Evacuation does not even buy safety, as indicated by lethal Israeli attacks on convoys that were using what Israel had designated as a "safe route."The scale of physical human suffering in the Gaza Strip already exceeds what Hamas inflicted on Israel last week. And Israel is just getting started as the Israeli aerial assault is likely to transition to a ground offensive.Given the extensive and careful planning that clearly went into the recent Hamas attack, it can be assumed that Hamas's planning did not end there. The group surely anticipated a strong Israeli reprisal, has done all it can to prepare for that reprisal, and has calculated that when the whole episode is over it will have served Hamas's interests more than Israel's. Drawing Israel into an extremely difficult urban warfare campaign on Hamas's own turf may have been one of the group's objectives.The hostages Hamas seized in southern Israel (as many as 150) vastly complicates any Israeli military operation. Hamas claims that Israeli airstrikes already have killed 13 of the hostages — an unconfirmed but plausible claim given the destruction from the airstrikes. The remaining hostages will be in grave danger from a ground assault, regardless of whether Hamas positions them to function as human shields.Animosity across the region and much of the rest of the world will be substantial and will work against Israeli interests and Israeli security. Arab governments will be less inclined than before to expand relations with Israel.In the occupied West Bank — where even before October 7, anger over Israeli policies and actions made the chance of a new popular uprising or intifada significant — heightened anger over more Israeli killing of Palestinian brethren in Gaza increases that chance. There already are signs of the current violence in Gaza spilling over into the West Bank, with at least 46 Palestinians killed and 700 injured in clashes with Israeli security forces and settlers since the Hamas attack.In Gaza itself, an expansion of Israeli-inflicted bloodshed among the Palestinian residents will feed expanded anger against Israel among the remaining residents, with all the potential for new violence that such anger always has entailed. Destruction of Hamas's military capability, even if that could be completely achieved, does not remove the problem. Hamas was never the whole story of violent Palestinian reaction to Israeli policies. Much of the recent rocket fire from Gaza has been carried out by the Palestine Islamic Jihad, a smaller and more radical Gaza-based group. The anger and the violence will find other channels — perhaps through groups and cells not yet formed — even if neither Hamas nor the PIJ were still functional.The Israeli objective in a new ground invasion of Gaza may go beyond "mowing the lawn," to use the Israelis' term for their periodic surges in military attacks against Palestinians, and extend to destroying the ability of Hamas to function any more as Gaza's de facto government. But even if that objective is achieved, then a big unanswered question is, who does govern the Gaza Strip? The Palestinian Authority is widely discredited among Palestinians and seems unable to rise above its residual role as a security auxiliary to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Direct Israeli rule of Gaza would be a prescription for even more resentment over occupation and more potential for violent Israeli-Palestinian clashes.U.S. policy on the crisis shows signs of having been swept up in some of the same emotions and rage as most Israelis have. In this respect, the policy is tracking with a broader mood that the Hamas attack has generated in the American body politic, in which the safest public posture is expression of unflinching support for Israel. It is even more hazardous to one's political health than it usually is to say anything that places the crisis within the context of longstanding Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. Related to this, the Biden policy of essentially going all in with Israel likely has domestic political calculations behind it.The administration's pronouncements have often reduced the crisis to an easy-to-emote-over tale of good versus evil, which ignores likely motivations for what was a carefully calculated attack undertaken in response to Israeli policies and actions.Continuing this theme, administration officials have likened what Hamas did to the Islamic State or ISIS. The brutal tactics that Hamas used during its incursion into southern Israel can indeed be compared to some notorious actions by ISIS, but beyond that the comparison is meaningless. ISIS is not part of any longstanding situation comparable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. ISIS is an international terrorist group whose ideology and ambitions know no international boundaries.Hamas is a nationalist group seeking political power in a Palestinian state and has no interest in international terrorism beyond that theater. ISIS has never spoken about observing an open-ended truce to live peacefully next to a state that is currently its adversary. Hamas has. ISIS has never competed in, much less won, a free and fair election. Hamas has. Why and how the tactics and objectives of Hamas have evolved into what it displayed this month have to do with peaceful avenues of competition being closed. To reduce the entire conflict into a matter of one set of outrageous tactics is to miss all the other dimensions of that conflict.Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been calling for de-escalation. Russia and China have called for an immediate cease-fire, and Russia is proposing a U.N. Security Council resolution to that effect.The Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on social media endorsed Turkish efforts to secure a cease-fire, but later deleted the post. While President Biden said on Sunday that Israeli occupation of Gaza would be a "big mistake," current administration policy is to otherwise endorse the escalation of the violence that Israel currently is conducting in the Gaza Strip.The administration should think carefully about how U.S. interests differ from Israeli interests and objectives. Israel violently exacting revenge in this case is not a U.S. interest. Given that the foremost responsibility of a government is ensuring the safety and security of its own citizens, one of the important U.S. interests at stake concerns how some of those citizens may have become hostages in the Gaza Strip and will be greatly endangered by escalated Israeli military attacks.In addition to Americans among the hostages Hamas seized, an estimated 500 to 600 other U.S. citizens — mostly Palestinian Americans — are in the Gaza Strip. They are hostages, too — trapped there after the Israeli shutdown of all movement in and out of the territory, and in serious danger of becoming casualties of Israeli air or ground operations. One of those Americans, a woman whose home is Salt Lake City and currently is stuck in Gaza with her family, said, "I feel like I've been abandoned by my country. We're American citizens and we're not being treated as American citizens."Another U.S. interest is preventing the current warfare to spread regionally. The more that the fighting involving Israelis and Gazans escalates, the greater is the danger of such spread, even though other actors in the region are not seeking a wider war. Those in the U.S. who habitually try to stir up conflict with Iran are using the current crisis to do more stirring. This is despite the fact that no evidence has emerged of any direct Iranian role in the Hamas attack — as attested to most convincingly by official Israeli spokespeople, given that the Israeli government usually is eager to implicate Iran in anything condemnable. Press reports citing sources within the U.S. government indicate that Iranian government officials were surprised by Hamas's action.The Biden administration nonetheless has foolishly picked this moment to draw Iran into the Gaza crisis in a way by reneging at least temporarily on its commitment, under a recent prisoner swap deal that freed five imprisoned Americans, to permit some frozen Iranian assets to be used for humanitarian purposes inside Iran. Accusations by opponents of the administration that this money had some connection, however indirect, with Hamas military operations are patently false, given that none of the money involved had yet been expensed. The administration's move will further damage U.S. credibility regarding a willingness to make good on commitments, thereby making it more difficult for the U.S. to reach beneficial agreements with any other government, not just Iran.The administration evidently wanted to make a critical statement about the longstanding and well-known supply relationship between Iran and Hamas. If a patron that has supplied arms or money to a client is to be punished — to the extent even of previous agreements being reneged upon — this raises a question about yet another U.S. interest at stake in the current crisis: avoiding opprobrium and repercussions stemming from some other state's actions.If Iran is to be condemned for any actions by Hamas, even actions Iran did not instigate or control, then what is the attitude to be taken toward the United States regarding destructive and anger-inducing actions in Gaza by its client Israel, the recipient of voluminous U.S. financial, military, and diplomatic support?The world won't likely remember gentle admonitions from President Biden about observing the rule of law. It will instead focus on the U.S. effectively giving a green light for — and materially assisting — an assault that not only flouts the laws of war but brings death and suffering to thousands of innocent persons.There will be hostile reactions to all this, including from violent extremist groups. Revenge is an urge that is not unique to Israelis. Those who are quick to make comparisons with ISIS should reflect on the fact that probably the most consistent theme in the propaganda, interrogations, and claims of terrorists — including al-Qaida — who have attacked U.S. interests has been U.S. support for Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians.

L'Etat de droit face au terrorisme, défi majeur des démocraties européennes L'année deux mille vingt et un sonne le glas de vingt ans d'une lutte entamée au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre et communément évoquée sous le terme de « guerre contre le terrorisme ». En effet il y a vingt-ans, le monde occidental découvre que la guerre auparavant délocalisée se retrouve dans leurs localités. Jamais un tel scénario n'aurait été envisageable pour une majorité d'individus, le sentiment d'invincibilité et la supériorité d'un régime démocratique débellicisé grandissant alors à l'époque depuis une dizaine d'années dans les mœurs. Pourtant, la menace terrorisme ne cessera dès lors d'augmenter pour atteindre son paroxysme chronique à partir de l'attaque dans les locaux de Charlie Hebdo en janvier deux mille quinze. Cette même année, la France connaît en novembre une tuerie de masse sans précèdent depuis la seconde guerre mondiale. Tous deux filmés pour l'Histoire à l'instar des procès de Nuremberg, les procès très médiatiques et hors normes de ces attentats ont débuté l'année dernière pour le premier et il y a quelques mois pour le second. Ces deux évènements marquent ainsi sans aucun doute le début d'une nouvelle ère au sein de l'arène judiciaire européenne, complétée par un cadre policier et législatif actualisé, composée à la fois de nouveaux combats mais aussi et surtout de nouveaux moyens. De l'état d'urgence à la justice de précaution, en passant par un désintérêt profond pour des problématiques ayant trait au socle législatif sur lequel se base notre société, les gouvernements démocratiques occidentaux revendiquent une place de faiseurs de normes sur l'échiquier diplomatique international. En y regardant de plus près, ces démocraties cauteleuses s'engouffrent pourtant dans une faille faisant basculer la balance en faveur d'une plus forte poussée du droit au détriment de la consécration des libertés. Ce phénomène, qui est censé plutôt résulter sur un équilibre afin de construire leur légitimité, entache fortement les gouvernements successifs en charge de la question terroriste. Bien qu'une opinion éclairée de la population appelle à plus de rigueur et de respect des normes fondatrices de l'Etat de droit, une grande majorité semble accepter cet écart sous couvert d'un climat sécuritaire se renforçant au fil du temps. Les représentants des Etats européens se sont lancés de plein fer dans cette guerre contre le terrorisme, à l'origine nonobstant frileux à employer ce ton martial au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre, à l'instar de Jacques Chirac qui affirmait en 2001« Je ne sais pas s'il faut utiliser le mot guerre. Ce qui est sûr, c'est que nous avons un conflit d'une nouvelle nature »1. Ce « conflit d'une nouvelle nature » a engendré des politiques de prévention et de proactivité de l'Etat questionnant la gouvernance démocratique de l'Etat lui-même. Si le terrorisme a toujours existé, jamais autant de théories complémentaires ne se sont d'ailleurs glissées dans le contexte académique et sociétal, témoignant d'un véritable engouement pour la problématique. Certainement, se demander si l'intention vaut faute appelle une réponse qui semble sempiternelle. En revanche une dimension s'impose, celle de la mutation de l'éthique des relations internationales qui, bien que toujours présente face aux enjeux sécuritaires, a évolué avec certitude. Comment traiter des combattants étrangers élevés sur le sol européen partis rejoindre Daech en Syrie ? Que faire de leurs enfants ? Ces défis sont liés au fait que la « menace terroriste n'est plus seulement exogène » (Esposito & Baudouï, 2021), mais grandit et mature sur le sol des démocraties européennes. Il n'en reste pas moins que pour tenter d'endiguer une menace diffuse mais certaine, l'État de droit s'est paré de tout un arsenal législatif et judiciaire lui permettant de prévenir toute radicalisation et passage à l'acte. Les règles d'exception s'inscrivent pourtant dans une durée plus longue que celle de leur établissement, et comme « les dispositifs d'exception resteront en vigueur encore longtemps » (Ibid., 2021), cela implique ainsi de se questionner sérieusement. La question des enfants de combattants étrangers et de leur traitement se place comme un point de départ assez pertinent pour questionner l'affaiblissement de l'État de droit. Les États européens sont tous signataires de la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant, ce qui implique que leur prise de position originelle, rejetant en majorité l'hypothèse d'un rapatriement, peut être considérée comme une violation de ce traité. En effet, les conditions de vie dans les camps de réfugiés de la zone irako-syrienne sont « déplorables » (Winkel, 2018, p.4), « indignes » (Baudouin, 2019, p.6) et les besoins sont multidimensionnels : santé, éducation, hygiène, alimentation. Les Nations Unies ont par exemple dénombré pas moins de 11 000 enfants âgés de 6 à 18 ans n'ayant pas rejoint les bancs scolaires depuis au moins 5 ans (OCHA, 2019, p.4). Sans compter ceux qui n'ont même pas encore la conscience de comprendre la situation dans laquelle ils se trouvent. N'étant pas scolarisés, vivant dans des conditions plus que déplorables, et constituant potentiellement des menaces aux yeux des États, ces enfants sont au cœur d'un véritable dilemme qui mêle des enjeux sécuritaires, humanitaires, politiques, légaux et moraux. Chaque État adopte une stratégie qui lui est propre, car compte-tenu de la complexité des positions en jeu, il devient impossible d'établir une réponse commune. Certains décident donc d'être entreprenants, tandis que d'autres préfèrent détourner le regard, ce qui soutient l'idée d'une « compassion à géométrie variable » (Belporo, 2020). La position des États se heurte à celle du Conseil des droits de l'homme, sur laquelle viennent se greffer les alertes des ONG qui n'hésitent pas à désigner le camp d'Al-Hol « Guantánamo bis ». Ainsi, l'intérêt supérieur de l'État est confronté à l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant. La situation résulte donc d'une rupture complète avec le droit international, laquelle s'étant formée depuis le début des années 2000 dans le cadre de la guerre contre le terrorisme.Les réponses des pouvoirs publics aux questions du terrorisme doivent s'appréhender au regard de la lumière visiblement médiatique, au sein de laquelle à la fois les terroristes et finalement les politiques tirent leur épingle du jeu. Le traitement médiatique de chaque attaque, accentué par la diffusion instantanée sur différents canaux d'informations, s'impose comme un oxygène pour les premiers tandis qu'il se place comme l'initiateur d'un enjeu ayant intérêt à être intégré à l'agenda politique pour les seconds. L'opinion publique s'engouffre dans ce qu'il est possible de qualifier de « guerre des valeurs », où le phénomène de co-radicalisation, compris comme une montée exacerbée de l'altérité et d'une poussée terroriste identitaire, côtoie des manquements étatiques. Les enfants européens de combattants étrangers laissés pour compte sont des victimes malheureuses et collatérales de tels agissements. La littérature s'accordant sur « l'impassibilité du public devant les évènements à distance » (Sreberny, 2006, p.230), distance qui en l'occurrence ici est autant spatio-géographique que socio-culturelle, il devient plus aisé de comprendre ce manque d'intérêt et de sensibilité à l'égard des mineurs détenus dans les camps de réfugiés. A cela s'ajoute le fait qu'ils sont assimilés à la terreur de Daesh car en effet « c'est la vérité que ces enfants nous rappellent » (Giraud, 2020, p.229). Ainsi, face aux actes terroristes et particulièrement depuis les attentats du onze septembre, pléthore de réactions dans les médias s'imbibent de démonstration émotionnelle manifeste (Sreberny, 2006, p.232). Ce rejet est caractéristique de l'insensibilité qui se développe face à la question du rapatriement, y compris envers les enfants.Si l'on peut tenir les parents pour responsables de leurs progénitures, la réciproque est fausse. En effet, selon le réseau européen de sensibilisation à la radicalisation, le RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network), ces enfants sont avant tout des « victimes » (RAN, 2017, p.50). De plus, ils auront de grandes difficultés à devenir citoyen d'un Etat et se sentir appartenir à la communauté de ce dernier en ayant été socialisés dans l'horreur. D'une part, comme le montre l'expertise de l'anthropologue Dounia Bouzar (2019), l'objectif du groupe jihadiste est de transmettre aux enfants « une idéologie totalitaire » (Bouzar, 2019, p.82) dès leur plus jeune âge, et surtout de les amener à appréhender le monde à travers une vision guerrière et haineuse. D'autre part, dans les camps de réfugiés de la zone irako-syrienne, dont notamment celui d'al-Hol où se trouve la majorité des ressortissants mineurs européens, les conditions de vie sont « apocalyptiques », digne d'un « enfer désertique » (Baudouin, 2019, p.6). La socialisation de ces mineurs ne répond donc à aucun standard européen et une fois de retour dans leur pays d'origine, leur réinsertion sera un défi complexe (Heinke, Raudszus, in Coolsaet & Renard, 2018, p.54). Les experts onusiens exhortent donc sans plus tarder les États ayant des ressortissants mineurs dans les camps de réfugiés irako-syrien à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour respecter « l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant »2. Les mécanismes qui bloquent le rapatriement de ces mineurs dans les pays européens semblent résulter d'un triptyque sécuritaire, confortée par une incertitude des services de sécurité quant à la menace qu'ils peuvent représenter mais également émotionnel, avec un désintérêt de la population à leur égard, et enfin politique, car les gouvernements en place peuvent être réticents face à la prise en charge de ces enfants pour ne pas avoir à assumer un coût d'audience nationale qui leur serait probablement défavorable « face à une problématique peu porteuse électoralement » (Winkel, 2018, p.18). Par exemple, la France avait mis sur pied un plan global de rapatriement mais face à une opinion publique française très défavorable à cette idée, le plan a été abandonné (Mazoue, 2019). C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi les plaidoyers de retour sont plutôt l'œuvre d'organisations non-gouvernementales ou de collectifs de familles ayant des proches sur place.Les tensions entre les intérêts sécuritaires et ceux éthiques se retrouvent également dans la question du retour des mères radicalisées, ayant pris la décision de rejoindre le proto-Etat de Daesh. En effet, les Etats « s'opposent au rapatriement des femmes considérées comme dangereuses et répugnent à rapatrier des enfants sans leur mère3 ». Elles constituent un facteur de radicalisation pour leurs enfants et leur retour est fortement décrié, ce qui explique que le rapatriement des orphelins soit plus aisément réalisable et légitime vis-à-vis de la population. En outre, depuis la tentative d'attentat de 2016, les femmes terroristes sont systématiquement judiciarisées et les mères d'enfants radicalisés déplorent le manque d'empathie de la population à l'égard de leur problématique (Bannani, 2019). Le cadrage dont elles font l'objet est effectivement en rupture totale avec celui de la figure de la femme terroriste que l'on retrouve dès la fin du XVIIIe siècle avec Charlotte Corday où la « femme « terroriste » est une beauté héroïque, emportée par son émotion, influencée par ses sentiments, exaltée plus que dotée d'une réelle conviction politique » (Salomé, 2010, p.10). Bien au contraire, la femme radicalisée et djihadiste est perçue comme une menace, et indéniablement coupable d'avoir mis sa capacité de conception au service de l'ennemi en lui permettant d'alimenter le vivier de ses jeunes recrues.L'Europe semble confrontée à un défi. Une personne qui porte atteinte à son État origine via un acte terroriste ou bien un citoyen qui part rejoindre les rangs d'une organisation terroriste étrangère implique en effet une réponse qui s'accorde avec les lois en vigueur sur le territoire d'origine ou de départ. Or, les États européens tiennent une posture moins respectueuse de ces normes qu'intrinsèquement hypocrites : leur double jeu consiste en effet d'une part à promouvoir des traités favorisant le respect des droits humains ou à condamner des gouvernements ne respectant pas ces derniers, mais de l'autre, ne pas afficher une position ferme à l'égard de leurs ressortissants se trouvant dans les couloirs de la mort en Irak dans l'atteinte de leur peine ou encore d'être intraitables aux frontières de la Biélorussie. Cela ouvre la porte à certains questionnements, dont notamment celui de l'adéquation des moyens utilisés dans la lutte contre le terrorisme en Europe face aux valeurs établissant le fondement de l'État de droit.

It is increasingly recognized that young people are central to issues of crime and violence in South Africa. While research, policy and programming have historically focused on children and adults, there is a growing emphasis on youth as both victims and perpetrators of violence. This report presents the findings of a country assessment commissioned by the World Bank to support its incorporating human rights into youth violence programming and policy dialogues in Mexico and South Africa project. This aims to encourage policy dialogue on youth and violence with the South African government and other stakeholders. The report: (i) examines the current situation of youth violence in South Africa; (ii) summarizes the policy response by the government and the prevailing legal and institutional framework; (iii) identifies innovative programming by civil society organisations; and (iv) identifies entry points for deeper policy dialogue and improved interventions to address youth violence.

Kenya withstood another difficult year in 2012 as policy tightening and weaker global demand slowed economic activity. With decisive fiscal and monetary policies, the government managed to restore confidence in Kenya's medium term prospects. Kenya's growth rate is still below its potential and its peers, external imbalances remain which threaten its future growth, and the pace of economic growth is not generating enough modern sector wage jobs. With the passage of the new constitution in 2010 and its implementation, stronger institutions are emerging, putting Kenya on a sound footing ready to take off. In the very short term, what remains to be done is for Kenya to deliver a credible and peaceful election in March 2013, and thereafter a smooth transfer of power. In the medium term, Kenya will need to start building a stronger foundation for growth, and undertake structural reforms to correct the external imbalances. To generate more jobs for the burgeoning educated youth population, Kenya will also need to reduce the transaction cost for firms, by reducing job-smothering corruption and the cost of doing business (particularly in transport and energy).

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective, privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with accountability. This article introduces the concept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbing hands of public and private actors by providing information and accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers. Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provide estimates of the relative importance and strength of private and formal chains of governance. The framework and empirical benchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizations and suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to be sure to get the most out of future privatization activity.

In 2011, women and girls represented 50.6 percent of the total Montenegrin population (620,029 persons). Different aspects of gender inequality vary by region and ethnicity. The present World Bank country partnership strategy in Montenegro is based on two pillars that include supporting Montenegro s accession to the European Union (EU) through boosting institutions and competitiveness. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of gender inequality in Montenegro. Using a number of data sources, gender differences in various outcomes are analyzed with the intention of highlighting gender inequalities in human wellbeing. Results are used to prioritize possible avenues for future research to better understand such inequalities and or suggest areas that require more focus from policymakers. This report operates under the premise that gender equality is both an issue of human rights and of critical economic consequence. In line with the world development report (WDR) 2012, the nomenclature of gender gaps in endowments, access to economic opportunities, and agency will be used to elaborate upon these arguments and their relevance to Montenegro. The findings of this diagnostic suggest that there are gender gaps in Montenegro, particularly in: (i) agency, although available data in this area is limited; (ii) access to economic opportunities; and (iii) human capital among some population subgroups. The structure of the report is as follows: section one gives introduction. Section two addresses gender disparities in endowments, including education, health, and assets. Section three presents disparities in economic opportunities in the forms of labor force participation, unemployment, employment and wages, and entrepreneurship. Section four focuses on agency and its implications for gender equality. Section five discusses relationships across issues and suggests areas for further research.

This discussion paper is one of five discussion papers for the Thailand public financial management report. It focuses on efficiency and equity in the financing of health services, and the evolving role of central and local government in the health sector. Over the last few decades, Thailand has seen significant improvements in health outcomes, reflecting sustained public investment in both infrastructure and human resources. Thailand has also succeeded in expanding the coverage of health protection schemes, culminating in the introduction of the Universal Coverage (UC) scheme in 2001. These efforts have broadened access to health services, contributed to greater and more equitable utilization, and helped reduce the financial burden and the risk of impoverishment associated with health care expenses. However, there are fewer data on broader measures of health system performance, including dimensions of quality. Overall, available evidence suggests a mixed picture. For instance, while there has been improvement in the management of chronic conditions, a significant number of cases remain undiagnosed or untreated. Similarly, Thailand has seen recent improvement in 2-year survival rates from cancer and heart attacks, but still lags far behind Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While the achievements of Thailand's health system are undeniable, this paper highlights three key challenges: (i) inequalities in utilization and spending; (ii) mounting cost pressures; and (iii) fragmentation of financing and unresolved issues concerning the respective roles of central and local government. This paper provides evidence of regional differences in diagnosis and management of chronic disease, and of survival rates from cancer and heart attacks. These data do not suggest a strong relationship between the health system and spending on the one hand, and on quality or health outcomes on the other. Indeed, efficiency may be a greater concern, with over-provision now a growing problem in some parts of the health system. However, more evidence is needed on these issues. For example, while high levels of spending and utilization in the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) are often noted, it is less clear whether this is associated with better outcomes (e.g. higher cancer survival rates or improved health outcomes for the elderly). The implications of geographic disparities in spending in the Social Security Scheme (SSS) and the CSMBS also warrant further attention.

This review of public expenditures on Social Protection (SP) in Nicaragua is based on the analytical framework of Social Risk Management (SRM) developed by the World Bank. The concept of managing social risk comes from the notion that certain groups in society are vulnerable to unexpected shocks which threaten their livelihood and/or survival. Social protection focuses on the poor since they are more vulnerable to the risks and normally do not have the instruments to handle these risks. This prevents the poor from taking more risky activities that usually yield higher returns and that could help them overcome gradually their poverty situation. Social risk management involves policies and programs aimed at reducing key risks, breaking inter-generational cycle of poverty and vulnerability. Risk management consists in the choice of appropriate risk prevention, mitigation and coping strategies to minimize the adverse impact of social risks. Social protection under SRM is defined as public interventions to assist individuals, households and communities to better manage risk and provide support to the critically poor. Thus Social protection should provide: a safety net, particularly for the poor that are likely to fall in the cracks of established programs; and a springboard for the poor to bounce out of poverty.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Gaza war and an enraged Arab street, the future of 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq is once again in question. Despite a full withdrawal in 2011, the government of Iraq "invited" U.S. forces to return in 2014 to combat Daesh, or ISIS. But seven years after the "Caliphate" was pronounced defeated, the multinational Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve maintains a large military presence in Iraq, ostensibly to "work by, with and through regional partners to militarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability."Despite those laudable intentions, attacks against U.S. military personnel have intensified and so has political pressure to conclude the mission, far beyond similar calls for expulsion following the targeting of Qassim Soleimani in 2020. The presence of foreign forces in general and the U.S. troops in particular is vexing to Iraq with its long history of occupation (although calling 2,500 non-combat forces an occupation is a bit of a stretch), but is also an opportunity, particularly among Iranian-backed political parties and militias, to create a strawman responsible for all of the country's ills.For many Iraqis the counter-ISIS coalition is like the guest who has overstayed his welcome."The presence of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil has been increasingly causing problems to Iraq and its neighbors; it also gives a pretext to terrorists to resume their attacks on Iraqis," said Dhia Al-Asadi, former minister of state who headed the Al-Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc in parliament. "These forces should withdraw immediately so that a legitimate, nationalist Iraqi government can take the lead and build its military and security capacity without unsolicited U.S. interference."Yet, not all Iraqis concur with those views."Despite the considerable strength of militia forces in Iraq, surpassing that of the Iraqi national army, their calls for the withdrawal of Americans and allies are primarily rhetorical," said Nahro Zagros, editor in chief of Kurdistan Chronicle and former vice president of Soran University in Erbil. "If the decision rested with the Iraqi populace, the majority would prefer the continued presence of Americans. However, Iraqi affairs are not under Iraqi control but influenced by neighboring powers."According to Falah Mustafa, a close adviser to the president of the Kurdistan Region on Foreign Policy Affairs, "any decision [on the future of the coalition forces] must be based on national consensus.""For the Kurdistan Region, certainly we are part of Iraq and we will abide by any decision that Iraq makes, but one single group of Iraqi society cannot determine this alone, because Iraq is a diverse country. Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Christians, we all need to agree on this issue because it is about the stability, security of this country," he said.While the U.S. has sought to maintain a military presence in Iraq, arguments to keep them there do not stand up to scrutiny. There is an unspoken proposition that Iraq could be used as a launch platform for attacks against Iran or elsewhere, but this is specifically prohibited by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which remain the foundational document for the Iraq-U.S. relationship. It says, "The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq."Besides, Iraq is not needed for this purpose. The U.S. currently has a major logistical base in Kuwait with over 13,000 army troops, a naval base in Bahrain housing the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Al Udeid Air Base in Doha is the largest military installation in the region with over 8,000 troops. The Persian Gulf can fit a Carrier Battle Group with ease. These, in addition to other bases in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan and Turkey, maintain more than sufficient ground, air and naval assets to challenge any military force in the region. A second argument is the often-stated rhetorical trope that leaving Iraq would be a victory for the Iranians. While it may be a rhetorical victory for Iran, rhetoric should not be the basis for foreign policy. A military withdrawal from Iraq would be seen in Tehran as stabilizing Iran's western borders, but it must be acknowledged that the U.S. seeks the same outcome on its borders. The Monroe Doctrine has been the cornerstone of U.S. hemispheric policy for 200 years, just as Persian influence has driven similar aspirations towards Iraq for over a millennium. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif famously said, "Look at the map. The U.S. military has travelled 10,000 kilometers to dot all our borders with its bases. There is a joke that it is Iran that put itself in the middle of U.S. bases."The U.S. argument conflates influence with interference. The economies and cultures of the two societies are vastly intermingled, shown most clearly with the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims which peacefully cross the borders annually to visit Qom and Najaf. Yet, the fundamental U.S. concern should not be one of Iranian influence but of Iranian interference, of which its insinuation into the political and economic structures will continue, regardless of the U.S. troop presence.Last, some would argue for a continued U.S. troop presence, asserting that the counter-ISIS mission is not finished, and ISIS remains a significant threat to both Iraq and the international community. While there may be some validity to this argument, it begs the question whether the Iraqis need continued foreign assistance or can accomplish this mission unilaterally. A U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission has recently been meeting to analyze these and other concerns to determine the rationale for a continued military mission. Mustafa, who previously served as head of KRG's Department of Foreign Relations, said it is important to remember that "this should not be emotional; it should not be affected by other factors.""Iraqis, the U.S. — the relevant people — need to sit down together, discuss and assess the situation on the ground, review the extent of engagement, assess the threats, Iraqi capabilities and determine together the nature and shape of future arrangements and future relations between Iraq and the U.S., and the rest of coalition countries," he said.According to Al-Asadi, "Daesh, like al-Qaida before it, will not cease to exist as a threat not only to Iraq but to the region and the entire world. Names, strategies and means may change, but the masterminds and beneficiaries of such groups will always keep them ready to strike, and sometimes they serve as a hired gun."However, he added: "Iraqi forces are qualified and capable of dealing with this threat. They may need some up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation with regional and world countries who ought to share the same amount of concern about the growing danger of these terrorist groups."While the need for "up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation" is important, it could be provided by other nations' forces, contractors or remotely, rather than by the physical presence of U.S. forces.A final argument suggests the continued presence of U.S. forces is an insurance against internal Iraqi threats. According to Zagros, "the most significant danger originates from within Iraq itself, where militia forces persist in attacking fellow Iraqis and opposing factions.""I firmly believe that without the presence of Americans and their allies, Iraq and the broader region face the risk of fragmentation and collapse," he said.Yet, those same militia forces are using the presence of U.S. forces as a casus belli to wage a deadly campaign against the forces of occupation, aligning themselves with the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" to receive equipment, training and funding from the Quds Force. Counterintuitively, the very presence of U.S. troops strengthens the hands of the militias and creates instability, especially when the United States unilaterally targets militia leaders and infringes on Iraqi territorial sovereignty to do so.These four factors, alone, imply that the U.S. troop presence comes at high costs and marginal benefits. The U.S. continues to be painted as an occupier, an aggressor, a foreign agitator and the cause of Iraqi society's near-collapse since the 2003 invasion.As Al-Asadi notes, "Why does the U.S. want to negotiate its withdrawal from Iraq? If they really want to stabilize Iraq and the region, they should withdraw their military troops first, then they can diplomatically negotiate their future relations with Iraq. Given the fragility of the situation and institutional dysfunctionality, we cannot hope for a better situation. The major denominator is the existence of foreign military troops in Iraq."Since October 7, U.S. support for Israel has aggravated the anger, and has brought the question of continued U.S. presence to the fore. While some arguments for remaining may exist, and Iraq is certainly more important than Otto von Bismarck's famous quote that the Balkans are not "worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," the U.S. should reflect, clear-eyed, on the risk to American lives, the provocation to Iran, the almost paternalistic view that the Iraqi security establishment can't succeed against ISIS on its own, or can't find other alternatives, and the significant animosity against U.S. policy throughout the region. The Counter-ISIS Coalition performed brilliantly, but it is time to say, "Mission Accomplished."

The state of intellectual freedom is, in many ways, both a Treflection of the degree of openness and inclusiveness of our societies and of the state of democracy. Academic freedom, in the words of Thandika Mkandawire, is, in truth, about the building of a new civilization. It is a site of struggle for democracy, and one could argue that where intellectual freedom really exists, authoritarianism and fundamentalism will find it more difficult to go unchecked.
When, in November 1990, participants in a CODESRIA conference held in Kampala, Uganda, were adopting the Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility, the continent was experiencing profound political changes, with authoritarian regimes collapsing one after the other, or receding as democratic space expanded with the struggles and intense pressures for democratic change coming from civil society and social movements. The state was then still seen as the main perpetrator of academic and intellectual freedom violations, but it certainly was no longer seen as the only institution or actor that was guilty of such restrictions. As can be seen in the conference papers and report1, most of the phenomena that we are witnessing more clearly today were already quite discernible then: groups based in civil society could harass scholars or public intellectuals for writing or making public statements that were considered to be contrary to religious principles, or to national interests, or to dominant social values, customs and 'traditions'. Donors could also restrict the freedom of research in many different ways.
Within the academia itself, the violations of academic freedom could take forms ranging from sexual harassment, through the trading of grades for different kinds of favours, to student groups threatening academic staff or other students and wreaking havoc on university campuses. The triumph of neoliberalism, and dominant notions of political correctness, and the rise of fundamentalisms of different kinds have led to the shrinking of spaces for critical thinking, not only in society, but also on our campuses. What were emerging phenomena then have now become major problems, with university campuses like Garissa University College in Garissa, Kenya, and the Ahmed Baba library in Timbuktu being raided by armed fundamentalist groups or rebel movements. Disciplines like history are barely surviving. Although it is now recognized that higher education and research have been key to all the successful and sustainable structural transformation and development experiences of the past few decades, most policy makers of our continent tend to be dismissive of the social sciences and humanities. Yet without the social sciences and humanities, no deep understanding of global and local challenges, and therefore no genuine human and people-centered development and meaningful empowerment of civil society and ordinary citizens are possible.
The good news is, as one of the participants in the conference held in Lilongwe, Malawi, in April this year to celebrate the 25th anniversary conference of the Kampala Declaration, rightly pointed out, there are provisions explicitly protecting academic freedom in the constitutions of fifteen African countries, and in many of these cases, the inspiration came from the Kampala Declaration.
The part of the Kampala Declaration that is rarely mentioned, but which is equally important, is the part dealing with the social responsibility of academics and intellectuals, more generally. The number of professors and lecturers who pay insufficient attention to ethical issues is, unfortunately, very large. This could be anything from the neglect of teaching and the responsibility to supervise theses and dissertations and mentor graduate students and junior colleagues, to a total lack of interest in the issues and challenges facing the communities where the universities are located. Too large a number of academics are prioritizing moonlighting activities instead of their duties at the institutions where they are employed. Yet the defense of academic freedom and the autonomy of the institutions of higher learning are best done if they go with a strict adherence to ethics, accountability, and the fulfillment of the social responsibility of academics.
The development of a vibrant knowledge economy in Africa is something that CODESRIA has always taken keen interest in and researched with relentless vigour over the years through its programmes. At its 14th CODESRIA General Assembly held in June 2015, which focused on the creation of Africa's futures in an era of global transformation, one of the key points over which there was a broad consensus is the need for research and new knowledge, and to critically interrogate the narrative and counter- narratives, not only on Africa's development, but also on innovations and technology as engines of growth and development in Africa. One critical issue today is, precisely, that of the private appropriation, out of power and profit motives, of knowledge produced through scholarship that has been funded with public resources, thus making the availability of that knowledge to African universities or African and southern development extremely difficult.
The future of Africa's knowledge economy is, therefore, a subject that has continued to generate vigorous debate. In one of the articles featured in this issue of CODESRIA Bulletin, titled: Defining Structural Transformation in Africa, Carlos Lopes calls for a shift away from the present economic models in various African countries. He identifies poor investment in research and development as one of the banes of growth in Africa, in addition to several other political, social, environmental and economic factors.
Henning Melber's article in this issue of the Bulletin: Development and Environment: The Challenges for Research Collaboration in and with Africa underscores the importance of new research and new knowledge for development while drawing attention to the gap in knowledge production between the North and the South. He however noted that ''relevant insights for local policy makers and communities in the South generated by new research end in peer reviewed journals whose commercial publishing priority remains prohibitive for access by those who might benefit most from it.''
The subject of restricted access to scientific knowledge and scholarly communication (which, in effect, is a form of restriction of research and academic freedom), which Melber decried in his article, was the focus of an international conference hosted by CODESRIA in Dakar, 30 March - 1 April 2016, with the theme: ''Open Access and the Future of the African Knowledge Economy''. The conference which drew participants from 20 countries in Africa and across the globe focussed on the value of open access to scholarly communication in an increasingly globalised knowledge economy. The urgent need for the African scientific community to engage the open access movement as a driver of change and development on the continent was emphasized. A call was also made for a stronger South-South dialogue and cooperation on open access and scholarly communication at the conference which also had a strong participation by UNESCO, the Latin America Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), the Indian Citation Index, Africa Journals Online (AJOL), the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa, the Academy of Social Sciences of South Africa (ASSAF), and several other partner institutions such as the Human Sciences Research Council, the Nordic Africa Institute, and the African Studies Centre of Leiden. A report from the conference is included in this Bulletin.
Also in this Bulletin, we have featured tributes to two of Africa's great scholars: Thandika Mkandawire and Helmi Sharawy, who are both among the founding fathers of CODESRIA. The tributes are in recognition of their long association with and service to CODESRIA, and the African social science community.
Thandika is one of the leading global scholars of the day, whose devotion to the African cause and contribution to knowledge on the continent is very widely acknowledged. In the words of Jimi Adesina, ''Thandika was always driven by giving voice to Africans and elevating African voices. His was not simply being Africa-focused but facilitating the authentic interlocution for Africa and its peoples''. The Kampala Declaration was adopted during his tenure as executive secretary of CODESRIA. The theme chosen for the colloquium held in Malawi to celebrate Thandika the scholar, mentor, pan Africanist, institution-builder, friend, and eternal CODESRIA militant, was Thinking African: Epistemological Issues. Indeed, both as a CODESRIA leader and in his own work, Thandika has consistently engaged social science concepts and theories from a critical point of view, interrogating their significance for Africa and the continent's peoples. He has tried to enhance the visibility of African scholarship both within Africa and globally, and promoted scholarship that contributes to the enhancement of the freedom, well-being and dignity of the peoples of the continent.
Helmi Sharawy is also one of the most illustrious leaders of our community who played a pioneering role in the development of CODESRIA, in the promotion of the study of Africa, and in the formation of a number of institutions and associations, such as the African Association of Political Science (AAPS). He was elected and served two terms as a member of CODESRIA's Executive Committee. Helmi has also been a great champion of African liberation. Many great leaders, such as Amilcar Cabral, Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane and others, who visited Cairo during the years when Gamal Abdel Nasser was the President, were invited to his home and enjoyed the hospitality of his family. On 11 May 2016, CODESRIA and the Arab and African Research Centre in Cairo organized a round table to celebrate Professor Helmi Sharawy. Some of the tributes to Sharawy and Mkandawire are published in this issue of the Bulletin.
The people who have made, and continue to make, great contribution to scholarship in Africa and to the growth and development of CODESRIA are many. More celebrations, taking different forms, will therefore follow. We also invite articles on, or critically engaging the work of, great African intellectuals and their contributions for publication in the CODESRIA Bulletin, or in other CODESRIA journals.
Bonne lecture!

At the end of 2012 the Republic of Croatia adopted a new legal framework for awarding concessions, based on the Draft Directive on the award of concession contracts from 2011. The Concession Contract Directive 2014/23EU on the award of concession contracts was adopted in February 2014, with an implementation period of two years for all Member States. Until the Concessions Directive the award of works concessions was subject to a limited number of secondary law provisions, while service concessions were covered only by the general principles of the Treaty of the functioning of the EU (TFEU). Concessions Directive defines both works and services, and relies on CJEU case law, which is analysed in this thesis. EU countries had to transpose this directive into their national legislation by 2016. Also, public procurement is guided by doctrines developed by the CJEU, which try to combine the basic principles of public procurement regulation with the basic principles established by the EU Treaties. EU procurement law is set out in principal directives, namely the 2014 Concession Contracts Directive 2014/23/EU, the 2014 Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU, the 2014 Utilities Contracts Directive 2014/25/EU, (together known as 'the 2014 Procurement Directives'). New directives have been adopted due to the fact that 2004 Public Procurement Directives only partially covered concessions and the absence of clear EU rules led to legal uncertainty and obstacles to free provision of services. It also caused distortions to the functioning of the internal market, such as the direct award of contracts without transparency or competition which risked national favouritism, fraud and corruption. Therefore, it was inevitable for the EU to bring the new Directives. Viewed from multiple sides, concessions are a successful way of entrusting public services, entrusting public works to private persons, and attracting foreign capital in the EU countries. Concession regimes allow the involvement of private investors and their financial resources to achieve public benefits, accelerate the construction of public infrastructure facilities, liberate the state and local and regional government units, exposing them to the lower financial risks, and by giving them the right to oversee objects of public interest. This thesis analyses the legal status of the airport concession model in the Republic of Croatia, presents existing regulations in detail, lists all the advantages and disadvantages of current regulations and proposes amendments and solutions de lege ferenda. First chapter, Introduction, gives an overview of concessions in the Republic of Croatia and the situation at the level of EU Member States, and learns about complex legal issues in the process of awarding concessions. Second chapter, Analysis of Current Events Prior to Directive 2014/23, provides detailed review of all Croatian Acts concerning concession regimes until today, and refers to the example of Zagreb International airport and gives an overview of the concession contract awarded for the period of 30 years. The Third chapter, The Current Status of Concession Regimes in the Republic of Croatia and the EU, refers to different kinds of concessions according to the Croatian Concessions Act and as a legal institute in the EU Directives, it also provides examples of positive and negative elements of the Croatian legal system. Fourth chapter, Case Law – from the view of the European Court of Justice, analyses the most influential cases in concessions, PPPs and public procurement. Also, it provides insight into CJEU practice, showing that in most of the rulings of the CJEU it is evident that contracting authorities were advised to make decisions based upon the award criteria. Fifth chapter, Analysis of the Future Law – The Lege Ferenda, gives an overview of the importance of parallel development of all three roles of the airport (traffic, industrial and commercial), in order for the airport to develop not only one-way but also economically and raise the importance of the entire region. Sixth chapter, Comparative Analysis on Models of Airports in Terms of Geographical and other Functional Differences, widely explains different types of management, describes the three different airports in Europe and compares it to the only Croatian example. The Seventh chapter, The Aviation Industry and Coronavirus, gives insight into the current situation of the aviation industry and the consequences occurred after the appearance of COVID-19 virus. Moreover, how much it affected the aviation sector, the decrease in passenger transport and the further development of the aviation industry. Also, the chapter provides proposals for actions in case of force majeure and the concession provider's ability to act under the concession contract for the construction and management of "Franjo Tudjman" Airport. Eighth chapter, Research Results - De Lege Ferenda, learns about the need to amend the Concessions Act, the Airports Act, the Air Traffic Act, by-laws such as Spatial Plans of local governments in order to free the concession provider from the operational risk that would have to be transferred to the concessionaire by signing the concession agreement and binding the concessionaire to develop all airport roles, and not just transport role through the development of passenger transport. Ninth chapter, Conclusion, provides a summary of all major points in this thesis and emphasizes the importance of airport development through the concession model, as an important element for the regional development of the Republic of Croatia. ; Republika Hrvaška je konec leta 2012 sprejela nov zakonski okvir za podeljevanje koncesij na podlagi osnutka direktive o podeljevanju koncesijskih pogodb iz leta 2011. Direktiva 2014/23/EU o podeljevanju koncesijskih pogodb je bila sprejeta februarja 2014 za obdobje izvajanja dveh let za vse države članice. Pred direktivo o koncesijah so podelitev koncesij za gradnje urejale nekatere določbe sekundarne zakonodaje, koncesije za storitve pa samo splošna načela Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU). Direktiva o koncesijah opredeljuje tako gradnje kot storitve in se opira na sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije, ki je analizirana v tej disertaciji. Države članice EU so morale omenjeno direktivo prenesti v svojo nacionalno zakonodajo do leta 2016. Poleg tega javno naročanje vodijo doktrine, ki jih je razvilo Sodišče Evropske unije in skušajo združiti osnovna načela ureditve javnega naročanja in osnovna načela, ustanovljena s pogodbami EU. Zakonodajo EU o javnih naročilih določajo glavne direktive, in sicer Direktiva 2014/23/EU o podeljevanju koncesijskih pogodb iz leta 2014, Direktiva 2014/24/EU o javnem naročanju iz leta 2014 in direktiva 2014/25/EU o gospodarskih javnih službah iz leta 2014 (skupaj poznane kot direktive o javnem naročanju iz leta 2014). Nove direktive so bile sprejete, ker so direktive o javnem naročanju iz leta 2004 le delno urejale koncesije in je zaradi nejasnih pravil na ravni EU prihajalo do pravne negotovosti in ovir pri svobodi opravljanja storitev. Prihajalo je tudi do izkrivljanja delovanja notranjega trga, kot je neposredna podelitev pogodb brez preglednosti ali konkurence, pri čemer je obstajalo tveganje za favoriziranje, goljufije in korupcijo na nacionalni ravni. Zato je bilo sprejetje novih direktiv za EU neizogibno. Z veliko vidikov so koncesije uspešen način za zaupanje javnih storitev in javnih gradenj posameznikom in privabljanje tujega kapitala v države EU. Ureditve koncesij omogočajo udeležbo zasebnih vlagateljev in njihovih finančnih virov za doseganje javnih koristi, pospeševanje izgradnje javne infrastrukture, sprostitev državnih ter lokalnih in regionalnih upravnih enot, zaradi česar so izpostavljene manjšemu finančnemu tveganju in imajo pravico do nadzora nad objekti v javnem interesu. V disertaciji analiziram pravno stanje modela koncesije letališča v Republiki Hrvaški, podrobno predstavim obstoječe predpise, naštejem vse prednosti in slabosti trenutnih predpisov ter predlagam spremembe in rešitve de lege ferenda. V prvem poglavju (Uvod) je na voljo pregled koncesij v Republiki Hrvaški in stanja na ravni držav članic EU ter opis kompleksnih pravnih vprašanj pri podeljevanju koncesij. Drugo poglavje (Analiza aktualnih razmer pred Direktivo 2014/23/EU) vključuje podrobno obravnavo vseh hrvaških zakonov v zvezi z ureditvijo koncesij do danes in primer zagrebškega mednarodnega letališča ter pregled podeljenih koncesijskih pogodb za obdobje 30 let. V tretjem poglavju (Trenutno stanje ureditve koncesij v Republiki Hrvaški in EU) obravnavam različne vrste koncesij v skladu s hrvaškim zakonom o koncesijah in kot pravni institut v direktivah EU, sledi pa tudi predstavitev primerov pozitivnih in negativnih elementov v hrvaškem pravnem sistemu. V četrtem poglavju (Sodna praksa – z vidika Sodišča Evropske unije) analiziram najvplivnejše primere na področju koncesij, javno-zasebnih partnerstev in javnega naročanja. Podam tudi vpogled v prakso Sodišča Evropske unije, ki pokaže, da je v večini odločitev Sodišča razvidno, da to naročnikom svetuje, naj se odločajo na podlagi meril za dodelitev. V petem poglavju (Analiza prihodnje zakonodaje – The Lege Ferenda) sledi pregled pomembnosti vzporednega razvoja vseh treh vlog letališča (na področju prometa, industrije in gospodarstva), da se letališče ne bi razvijalo le enosmerno, ampak tudi v gospodarskem smislu, obenem pa bi prispevalo k pomembnosti celotne regije. V šestem poglavju (Komparativna analiza modelov letališč glede na geografske in druge funkcijske razlike) obširneje pojasnim različne vrste vodenja, opišem tri različna letališča v Evropi in jih primerjam z edinim hrvaškim primerom. Sedmo poglavje (Letalska industrija in koronavirus) daje vpogled v trenutno stanje letalske industrije in posledice zaradi pojava virusa COVID-19. Poleg tega opišem, v kolikšni meri je virus vplival na letalski sektor, upad potniškega prometa in nadaljnji razvoj letalske industrije. V sedmem poglavju podam tudi predloge za ukrepe v primeru višje sile in zmožnost dajalca koncesije za ukrepanje v skladu s koncesijsko pogodbo za gradnjo in upravljanje Letališča Franjo Tuđman. Osmo poglavje (Rezultati raziskave – De Lege Ferenda) se osredotoča na potrebo po spremembi zakona o koncesijah, zakona o letališčih, zakona o zračnem prometu ter lokalnih predpisov kot npr. prostorskih načrtov lokalnih uprav, da bi dajalca koncesije razbremenili operativnega tveganja, ki bi se moralo prenesti na koncesionarja s podpisom koncesijske pogodbe, ki bi koncesionarja zavezovala, da razvija vse vloge letališča, ne le prometne vloge z razvojem potniškega prometa. V devetem poglavju (Zaključek) povzamem vse bistvene točke disertacije in opozorim na pomembnost razvoja letališča s pomočjo modela koncesije kot pomembnega elementa za regionalni razvoj Republike Hrvaške.

Perennial crops play a valuable role in agricultural economics, as they provide goods for export and jobs for the workforce as well as contribute significantly to economic prosperity at the national level. Vietnam has a high potential for perennial crop development, and thereby achieve an explosive growth in agricultural commodities. In terms of perennial crops, Vietnam now ranks among the top five international exporters of coffee, pepper and cashew. Vietnam is the second-largest producer of coffee worldwide, while it is the leading exporter of pepper globally. In 2018, the planted area of the dominant perennial crops (coffee, pepper, rubber, tea and cashew nut) reached around 2.2 million hectares (ha) nationwide, an increase of 9,000 ha compared to 2017. The Western Highlands has the largest region of perennial crop production with an area of 1.151 million ha. Dak Lak province has favorable conditions of soil (1,450 ha of basaltic soils of volcanic origin, which equals two thirds of the total basaltic soil area nationwide), as well as weather and amount of arable land, which creates an advantageous situation for the culture of perennial crops. Remarkably, the planted area of coffee and pepper dominated production at about 30% of the whole country's production in 2018, respectively. Over the years, perennial crops have changed considerably being usual dynamics of requirements. Despite its advantages and positive development trends, provincial perennial crop production has faced numerous constraints due to price fluctuation, unpredictable climatic trends, and incidence of pests and diseases. Thus, perennial crop production needs further research to ensure more evidence. Based on a systematic survey, focus group discussion, key informant interviews and participatory observation, this research project was undertaken to evaluate the practices and socio-economics of perennial crop systems in Dak Lak province, namely monocultures and intercropping systems. The aims of this project are to understand the distinct stages of perennial crop systems and to identify the socio-economic benefits of different systems concentrating on coffee and pepper crops. Additionally, the remaining aim of the study finds determinants affecting the farm's decision of adoption. The results provide critical references for farmers and policymakers on implementation or decision to plant a particular perennial crop and strategies. The findings show that the type of crop that was planted by the farmers evolved considerably in terms of crop types, crops grown, farm size, type of system and an increase of total cultivated surface. In addition, under driving forces including socio-economic transformation, political changes and ecological movement, perennial crop systems are well changed. Indeed, for many years, perennial crop systems have experienced an evolution through five stages, namely large-scale coffee and rubber plantations; perennial crop systems which are state-owned farms and cooperatives; intensified perennial crop systems; mixed crop systems, and the specialized and diversified perennial crop systems. At present, perennial crop systems are put into practice which take into account climate change, marketing and losses of fertile lands. These systems include monocultures and intercropping, which are two representative models of perennial crop systems which are investigated in this study. Simultaneously, a comparative assessment of the socio-economic benefits between two monocultures (coffee and pepper mono cropping) and an intercropping system (coffee and pepper intercropping) is presented in which the intercropping is more efficient than the monoculture under the context of constraints on key resources, risk and uncertainty. Respectively, intercropping is not only demonstrated to have high economic returns and limitations of economic risk due to the volatile market but also to have the benefits of extended seasonal employment and attraction for women as farmworkers on small farms. In other words, coffee and pepper intercropping is the most desirable option to obtain socio-economic benefits in perennial crop systems. In addition, the classifications in different approaches and groups producing are also organized to clarify these economic performances by cost-benefit analysis. The further results are obtained that intercropped farm approaches, especially in intercropped coffee farms (ICFs) generate more economic earnings than intercropped pepper farms (IPFs) while group producing coffee (GpC) appears to be more appropriate for smallholders than group producing pepper (GpP) does. At the same time, conclusions from binary and multiple logistic regression analysis highlight factors affecting decision-making of farms' decision in adopting. These factors include household characteristics, farm profits and crop profiles. This study supplies information that will allow farmers to develop productive planning with respect to choosing suitable perennial crop systems, and assist policymakers in forming small-scale perennial crop production strategies in Dak Lak province. In addition, the factors highlighted here are taken into account in the development of perennial crops. ; Les cultures pérennes jouent un rôle essentiel dans l'économie agricole, car elles fournissent des biens destinés à l'exportation et des emplois pour la main-d'œuvre, tout en contribuant de manière significative à l'essor économique au niveau national. Le Vietnam a connu un fort potentiel de développement des cultures pérennes, et atteint ainsi une croissance explosive des produits agricoles. En termes de cultures pérennes, le Vietnam se classe désormais parmi les cinq premiers exportateurs internationaux de café, de poivre et de noix de cajou. Le Vietnam est le deuxième producteur mondial de café et le premier exportateur de poivre au monde. Fait remarquable, les superficies plantées en café et en poivre dominent la production, avec respectivement environ 30 % de la production de l'ensemble du pays en 2018. Au fil des ans, les cultures pérennes ont considérablement évolué étant donné la dynamique habituelle des besoins. Malgré ses avantages et les tendances positives de son développement, la production provinciale de cultures pérennes a dû faire face à de nombreuses contraintes dues à la fluctuation des prix, aux tendances climatiques imprévisibles et à l'incidence des parasites et des maladies. Par conséquent, la production de cultures pérennes nécessite des recherches plus approfondies afin d'obtenir davantage de preuves. Sur la base d'une enquête systématique, de discussions de groupe, d'entretiens avec des informateurs clés et d'une observation participative, ce projet de recherche a été entrepris pour évaluer les pratiques et la socio-économie des systèmes de cultures pérennes, à savoir les monocultures et les systèmes de cultures intercalaires. Les objectifs de ce projet sont de comprendre l'évolution des systèmes de cultures pérennes dans le temps et l'espace, et d'identifier les avantages socio-économiques des différents systèmes en se concentrant sur les cultures de café et de poivre. En outre, le dernier objectif de l'étude consiste à trouver les déterminants qui influent sur la décision d'adoption de l'exploitation. Les résultats fournissent des références essentielles aux agriculteurs et aux décideurs politiques sur la mise en œuvre ou la décision de planter une culture pérenne particulière et sur les stratégies à adopter. Les résultats montrent que les cultures pérennes ont considérablement évolué en termes de types de cultures, de cultures cultivées, de taille des exploitations, de types de systèmes et d'augmentation de la surface totale cultivée. En outre, sous l'effet de moteurs tels que la transformation socio-économique, les changements politiques et le mouvement écologique, les systèmes de cultures pérennes ont bien changé. En effet, depuis de nombreuses années, les systèmes de cultures pérennes ont connu une évolution en cinq étapes, à savoir les grandes plantations de café et d'hévéas ; les systèmes de cultures pérennes qui sont des exploitations agricoles d'État et des coopératives ; les systèmes de cultures pérennes intensifiées ; les systèmes de cultures mixtes et les systèmes de cultures pérennes spécialisées et diversifiées. Actuellement, les systèmes de cultures pérennes sont mis en pratique en tenant compte du changement climatique, de la commercialisation et des pertes de terres fertiles. Ces systèmes comprennent les monocultures et les cultures intercalaires, qui sont deux modèles représentatifs des systèmes de cultures pérennes, qui sont étudiés. Simultanément, l'évaluation comparative des avantages socio-économiques entre deux monocultures (monoculture de café et de poivre) et un système de cultures associées (culture intercalaire de café et de poivre) a montré que la culture intercalaire est plus efficace que la monoculture dans le contexte de contraintes sur les ressources clés, de risque et d'incertitude. Il est respectivement démontré que les cultures intercalaires ont non seulement un rendement économique élevé et une limitation du risque économique en raison de la volatilité du marché, mais aussi qu'elles présentent les avantages d'un emploi saisonnier prolongé et qu'elles attirent les femmes en tant que travailleuses agricoles dans les petites exploitations. En d'autres termes, la culture intercalaire du café et du poivre est l'option la plus souhaitable pour obtenir des avantages socio-économiques dans les systèmes de cultures pérennes. En outre, les classifications dans les différentes approches et groupes de production sont également organisées pour clarifier ces performances économiques par une analyse coût-avantage. Les autres résultats obtenus montrent que les approches de cultures intercalaires, en particulier les plantations intercalaires de café (ICF), génèrent plus de revenus économiques que les plantations intercalaires de poivrons (IPF), tandis que la production groupée de café (GpC) semble plus appropriée pour les petits exploitants que la production groupée de poivrons (GpP). Dans le même temps, les conclusions de l'analyse de régression logistique binaire et multiple mettent en évidence les facteurs qui influent sur la prise de décision concernant l'adoption des exploitations. Ces facteurs comprennent les caractéristiques des ménages, les bénéfices des exploitations agricoles et les profils des cultures. Cette étude fournit des informations qui permettront aux agriculteurs de développer une planification productive en ce qui concerne le choix de systèmes de cultures pérennes appropriés, et d'aider les décideurs politiques à élaborer des stratégies de production de cultures pérennes à petite échelle à Dak Lak. En outre, les facteurs mis en évidence ici sont pris en compte dans le développement des cultures pérennes.

Background. Health is the highest value not only in the context of the perception of a person, but also society and the state as a whole. According to the content of international documents approved by the UN General Assembly, the WHO, the World Medical Association, governments should be responsible for the health of the population, ensure the implementation of the human right to life and health. Previously, the state of affairs in Ukraine regarding the pharmaceutical provision of privileged categories of citizens was studied. However, for forming a powerful and effective health care system in Ukraine for the pharmaceutical provision of privileged categories of citizens, it is useful to analyze the experience of providing health care in economically developed countries. The purpose of the research was to study the Great Britain experience with the organization of a healthcare system for the pharmaceutical provision of medicines to privileged population groups. Materials and methods. Common methods of normative legal, documentary, retrospective and comparative analysis used to gain that purpose. Results. The system of financing health care in the Great Britain provides getting finances mainly from the state budget, while the division takes place on the management vertical from the highest level to the lower one. The taxes that make up about 90% of the health care system budget are the financial basis of the national health system of the Great Britain. For comparison, only 7.5% comes from employers. Therefore, can argue that the healthcare system of the Great Britain in fact completely financed by financial contributions from taxpayers and by the government. There are three main models of financing health care allocated in the world practice: private, budget (model Beveridge), mixed (Bismarck model). A private financing model exists through the creation of sustainable competition between healthcare facilities. The part of private insurance is about 40% of total costs, and the patient himself covers the cost of pharmaceutical provision. A private financing model is typical for such developed countries as the United States of America and Japan. The budget model of funding or the Beveridge model means covering a large part of the costs of pharmaceutical provision by state institutions. This model is also typical for Great Britain. A mixed financing model or Bismarck model based on the three foundations: the state, enterprises and personal funds of a citizen. This system of insurance financing is typical for Germany, Austria and France. Private medicine in the Great Britain is one of the most advanced and most expensive in the world. There are about 300 non-state hospitals in the country, that receive a license at a local the National Health Service unit and tested twice a year. There are no queues here and medical care provided in full and to the extent necessary. The services of pay-doctors and cabinets paid either by insurance companies or by patients themselves. Large companies in Britain have health insurance as an additional paycheck bonus. Conclusions. According to the Great Britain experience, compulsory medical insurance takes place in countries with predominantly state funding. The Beveridge model is widespread in many countries where the state provides coverage of 80% or more of health care costs (Canada, Australia, Greece, Sweden, and Spain). Despite significant changes in the health care system of the Great Britain, the opportunity to choose the type of insurance and to take advantage of the benefits for the purchase of medicines and medical products, that allowed to increase competition between health facilities and, accordingly, to improve the quality and speed of pharmaceutical provision of patients. Thus, budget medicine of Great Britain is a priority for many world countries and a guarantee of state financing of pharmaceutical provision for privileged categories of citizens, regardless of income level and social status. ; Актуальность. Здоровье – найвысшая ценность не просто в контексте восприятия конкретным лицом, но и общества и государства в целом. Согласно содержания международных документов, утвержденных Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН, ВОЗ, Всемирной медицинской ассоциацией правительства несут ответственность за здоровье населения, обеспечивют реализацию права человека на жизнь и здоровье. Однако, для формирования мощной и действенной системы здравоохранения в Украине для фармацевтического обеспечения льготных категорий граждан полезным является опыт организации обеспечения здравоохранения в экономически развитых странах. Цель работы заключалась в изучении опыта Великобритании по организации организации системы здравоохранения для фармацевтического обеспечения лекарственными средствами льготных категорий населения. Материалы и методы. Для достижения поставленной цели были использованы общепринятые методы нормативно-правового, документального, ретроспективного и сравнительного анализа. Результаты. Система финансирования здравоохранения Великобритании предусматривает поступление преобладающей части средств из государственного бюджета, при этом распределение осуществляется по управленческой вертикали от высшего звена к низшему. Именно галоги, которые составляют около 90% бюджета здравоохранения, являются финансовым основанием национальной системы здравоохранения Великобритании. Для сравнения, только 7,5% средств поступают от работодателей. Поэтому можно утверждать, что система здравоохранения Великобритании фактически полностью обеспечивается за счет финансовых платежей со стороны плательщиков налогов и собственно государственного обеспечения. В мировой практике принято выделять три основные модели финансирования сферы здравоохранения: частная, бюджетная (модель Бевериджа), смешанная (модель Бисмарка). Частная модель финансирования существует за счет создания устойчивой конкуренции между заведениями здравоохранения. Частное страхование составляет около 40% от общих затрат, а остаток стоимости фармацевтического обеспечения покрывает сам пациент. Частная модель финансирования характерна для таких развитых стран как США и Япония. Бюджетная модель финансирования или модель Бевериджа предусматривает покрытие значительной части затрат на фармацевтическое обеспечение государственными учреждениями. Такая модель характерна и для Великобритании. Смешанная модель финансирования или модель Бисмарка базируется на «трех китах»: государство, предприятия и личные средства гражданина. Данная система финансирования на страховой основе характерна для Германии, Австрии и Франции. Частная медицина Великобритании — одна из наиболее передовых и наиболее дорогих в мире. В этой стране около 300 негосударственных госпиталей, каждый из которых получает лицензию в местном подразделении Национальной системы здравохранения и проходит проверку дважды в год. Здесь отсутствуют очереди, а медицинскую помошь предоставляют в полном и необходимом объеме. Платные услуги врачей и кабинетов оплачивают или страховые компании, или пациенты самостоятельно. В крупных компаниях Великобритании распространено медицинское страхование как дополнительный бонус к зарплате. Выводы. Опыт Великобритании по обязательному мединскому страхованию распространен в странах с преимущественным государственным финансированием. Модель Бевериджа распространена во многих странах, в которых государство обеспечивает компенсацию 80% и более затрат на здравоохранение (Канада, Австралия, Греция, Швеция, Испания). Значительные подвижки в системе здравоохранения Великобритании, возможность выбрать вид страхования и воспользоваться льготами на получение лекарственных средств позволила искусственно повысить конкуренцию между учреждениями здравоохранения, а соответственно – улучшить качество и скорость фармацевтического обеспечения пациентов. Таким образом, бюджетная медицина Великобритании – приоритет для многих стран мира и залог государственного финансирования фармацевтического обеспечения льготных категорий населения, независимо от уровня доходов и социального статуса. ; Актуальність. Здоров'я – найвища цінність не просто в контексті сприйняття певної особи, але й суспільства та держави загалом. Згідно до змісту міжнародних документів, затверджених Генеральною Асамблеєю ООН, ВООЗ, Всесвітньою медичною асоціацією уряди мають нести відповідальність за здоров'я населення, забезпечити реалізацію права людини на життя і здоров'я. Однак, для формування потужної та дієвої системи охорони здоров'я в Україні для фармацевтичного забезпечення пільгових категорій громадян корисним є аналіз досвіду організації забезпечення охорони здоров'я в економічно розвинених країнах. Мета роботи полягала у вивченні досвіду Великої Британії щодо організації системи охорони здоров'я для фармацевтичного забезпечення лікарськими засобами пільгових категорій населення. Матеріали та методи. Для досягнення поставленої мети було використано загальноприйняті методи нормативно-правового, документального, ретроспективного та порівняльного аналізу. Результати. Система фінансування охорони здоров'я у Великій Британії передбачає надходження переважної частини коштів з державного бюджету, при цьому розподіл відбувається по управлінській вертикалі від вищої ланки до нижчої. Саме податки, які складають близько 90% бюджету охорони здоров'я, є фінансовим підґрунтям національної системи охорони здоров'я Великої Британії. Для порівняння, лише 7,5% коштів надходять від роботодавців. Тому можна стверджувати, що система охорони здоров'я Великої Британії фактично повністю забезпечується за рахунок фінансових внесків із боку платників податків та власне державного забезпечення. У світовій практиці прийнято виділяти три головні моделі фінансування сфери охорони здоров'я: приватна, бюджетна (модель Беверіджа), змішана (модель Бісмарка). Приватна модель фінансування існує за рахунок створення стійкої конкуренції між закладами охорони здоров'я. Частка приватного страхування складає близько 40% від загальних видатків, а залишок вартості фармацевтичного забезпечення покриває сам пацієнт. Приватна модель фінансування характерна для таких розвинених країн як США та Японія. Бюджетна модель фінансування або модель Беверіджа передбачає покриття значної частини витрат на фармацевтичне забезпечення державними установами. Така модель характерна і для Великої Британії. Змішана модель фінансування або модель Бісмарка базується на «трьох китах»: держава, підприємства та особисті кошти громадянина. Дана система фінансування на страхових засадах характерна для Німеччини, Австрії та Франції. Приватна медицина у Великій Британії — одна з найбільш передових і найдорожчих у світі. У цій країні близько 300 недержавних госпіталів, кожен з яких отримує ліцензію в місцевому підрозділі Національної системи охорони здоров'я Великої Британії і проходить перевірку два рази на рік. Тут немає ніяких черг, а медичну допомогу надають у повному та необхідному обсязі. Послуги платних лікарів і кабінетів оплачують або страхові компанії, або пацієнти самостійно. У великих компаніях Британії поширено медичне страхування як додатковий бонус до зарплати. Висновки. За досвідом Великої Британії обов'язкове медичне страхування має місце у країнах із переважним державним фінансуванням. Модель Беверіджа поширена у багатьох країнах, де держава забезпечує компенсацію 80% і більше витрат на охорону здоров'я (Канада, Австралія, Греція, Швеція, Іспанія). Значні зрушення у системі охорони здоров'я Великої Британії, можливість обрати вид страхування та скористатися пільгами на придбання лікарських засобів дозволила штучно підвищити конкуренцію між закладами охорони здоров'я, а відповідно – і покращити якість та швидкість фармацевтичного забезпечення пацієнтів. Отож, бюджетна медицина Великої Британії – пріоритет для багатьох країн світу та запорука державного фінансування фармацевтичного забезпечення пільгових категорій населення, незалежно від рівня доходів та соціального статусу.