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Russia's invasion of Ukraine opened with a march toward Kyiv. The northern thrust of this push came from Belarusian territory. To this day, Belarus remains a hub for Russian attacks on its southern neighbor. Worryingly, the country now hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons, a situation unthinkable a few years earlier. Why did Belarus, previously keeping its distance from Russian power, throw in its lot with Moscow? Could the United States have prevented such an outcome?Since its independence, Belarus has had close relations with Russia but always stayed out of the Kremlin's overwhelming shadow. Following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Minsk refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Russia's insistence. A dispute over dairy product exports led to the 2009 "Milk War." Relations became so poor that Russian TV channels aired programs presenting President Alexander Lukashenko as a despicable tyrant, something unimaginable today.Before 2014, Americans and Europeans had little sympathy for "Europe's last dictatorship." But the Crimean annexation, the Donbas war, and the Russian threat's resurrection changed the West's outlook. Some envisioned pulling Belarus away from Russia's orbit and associating it with Europe instead. Western capitals put democracy promotion on hold for dialogue's sake. Belarus, too, felt an existential threat and pursued better relations with the West. It became defiant toward Moscow and tried to limit Russian influence over the national military.Belarus released all its political prisoners in 2015 to please the United States. In turn, Washington ended some sanctions on the regime. While the Russians pushed hard to establish an air base, the Belarusians resisted. They also distanced themselves from Russia's most confrontational policies. For instance, Lukashenko invited NATO observers to the massive 2017 Russian-led Zapad military maneuvers, fearing the exercises would scare away its Western neighbors.Bilateral U.S.-Belarus relations kept improving. In October 2018, Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell was the first senior American diplomat to travel to Belarus and meet Lukashenko in over a decade. Diplomatic contacts intensified, and the two countries signed a bilateral "Open Skies" agreement, a sign of increasing trust. Then-national security adviser John Bolton visited Minsk in August 2019. Lukashenko responded enthusiastically to American openings, encouraging him to resist Russian pressure to accelerate political and economic integration in the supranational "Union State." That year also saw Belarus take significant steps to hedge against the Russian risk. Minsk introduced a policy of "Belarusianization" to mobilize the populace's nationalism and insulate it from Russian societal influence while introducing a visa-free regime for EU and American citizens' short-term travels. The country intensified its efforts to modernize the military and sent security cooperation feelers toward Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, all countries at odds with Russia. Minsk expressed hope for building up ties with NATO.In February 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Belarus. Never had U.S.-Belarus relations been so cordial, and never had Russia-Belarus relations been so poor. When Belarus faced an oil price dispute with Russia, Pompeo quickly agreed to sell it oil, justifying that this deal "strengthens Belarusian sovereignty and independence," a wise policy if one fears Russian influence. But the U.S.-Belarusian honeymoon was not to last, and the Russians soon gained more than they ever bargained for.In 2020, Lukashenko's decision to run for the upcoming presidential election profoundly disgruntled the liberal opposition, as the election would likely be rigged in his favor. Indeed, he won the August election in a landslide. This engendered a mass protest movement against the regime. Following the EU, the United States refused to recognize Lukashenko's victory, sanctioned his regime, and openly sided with the opposition. U.S.-Belarus ties became nonexistent. After relations with the West collapsed, Belarus threw in its lot with Moscow. Sensing the opportunity, Putin was quick to congratulate Lukashenko for his victory. He assured Minsk he would deploy Russian security forces if the protest movement got out of control. Now in the Kremlin's debt, Lukashenko and Putin had a flurry of conversations and meetings, and Lukashenko accelerated the Union State integration process in exchange for Russian money. In retaliation to the West's hostility, Minsk engineered a migrant crisis by pushing large numbers of refugees toward the Polish border. Throughout 2021 and early 2022, military cooperation reached a height unseen before, which we know in hindsight was preparation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The two countries' air defense units started joint combat duties, and Belarus finally agreed to host the Russian air force. In November 2021, Lukashenko promised to intervene in a future war in Ukraine and acknowledged Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Belarus also decided to amend its constitution to introduce Russian nuclear weapons. Previously, Russian forces could enter Belarus only during prearranged exercises. But pretexting military maneuvers, Russian troops arrived en masse. Ultimately, Belarus received the West's opprobrium for accepting that Russian forces use its territory to attack Ukraine on February 24, 2022.This sequence shows that adroit statecraft can accomplish much at little cost and that ideology can create widespread, unforeseen damage to U.S. interests. Minsk resisted aligning with Moscow until 2020 despite intense Russian pressure. Indeed, the U.S. and European engagement policy after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis offered Belarus leverage over the Kremlin. However, following the 2020 elections, Washington abandoned engagement and opted for maximum pressure, perceived as regime change. Out of options, Lukashenko requested Russian help. Now forced to do Putin's bidding, he accepted the Russian military on his soil, enabled the thrust toward Kyiv in early 2022, and now even hosts Russian nuclear weapons. Washington had no direct interest in openly siding with the opposition against Lukashenko. Had the protesters seized power, it could have endorsed them. Had Lukashenko triumphed, it could have maintained the course of strengthening Belarus's hand against Russia. But America's urge to support the losing side for ideological motives sank U.S.-Belarus relations to the bottom and made it impossible for Minsk to play the West against Russia. Lukashenko was then forced to follow the orders of Putin, his last backer, ultimately leading to Belarusian support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Now under Russian military control, independent Belarus's race is run. The current regime might remain in office as a Russian satrap. But the Kremlin will probably conclude that annexing the country represents the safest option to guarantee long-term domination and grow Russia's power base. Counterfactuals are always risky, but Moscow would have struggled to subjugate Lukashenko had the United States not jettisoned engagement for maximum pressure in 2020.Although Belarus's fate is sealed, Washington must not repeat the same mistake elsewhere. Many potential partners to counterbalance Russian and Chinese power are unsavory authoritarian states. Preaching non-proliferation and liberalization, legacy neoconservative policies pushed North Korea toward Beijing despite Pyongyang expressing fear of China's rise. While Iran traditionally eschewed great power alignment, American intransigence and Trump's abandonment of the 2015 nuclear deal encouraged Tehran to embrace China and Russia, even supporting Putin's war effort. Washington can continue growing Beijing and Moscow's spheres of influence by letting ideology drive American foreign policy. In that case, China and Russia will gain additional means to threaten the United States and its allies. Otherwise, it could use efficient statecraft, such as its pre-2020 Belarus policy, to secure new partners and limit its rivals' opportunities. Of prudence or ideology, which will prevail?

The existing trajectory of U.S. policy risks sacrificing Western Europe for the sake of Ukraine, and U.S. policymakers need to wake up to this risk. If this were to happen, it would be one of the worst bargains in the entire history of U.S. strategy. Western and Central Europe, and not Ukraine, are and have been for more than a century the area of truly vital U.S. interests on the European continent. Moreover, the crippling of Western Europe and the European Union would destroy Ukraine's own real chances of future democratic prosperity and stability; for these depend chiefly on links to the E.U., not the United States. All the evidence at present suggests that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed, with only very small gains and enormous losses. Nor is there any evidence-based reason to hope for greater Ukrainian success next year, given the balance of military and economic forces between Ukraine and Russia. Faced with this reality, there is increasing official and unofficial talk of arming and supporting Ukraine for an indefinite struggle (though of course this cannot in fact be guaranteed given the opposition of one faction of the Republican Party). An analogy has been made to the case of Israel, which developed as a prosperous and secure quasi-democracy while remaining in a state of frozen conflict and unresolved territorial disputes with its neighbors.Quite apart from the dreadful events of recent days, there are many reasons why this idea is profoundly foolish. They include the fact that if Syria were Russia, Israel would not be Israel. In other words, if Israel had bordered not on a shambolic and impoverished country with a fraction of its GDP and technological capacity, but a nuclear armed power with fourteen times its GDP, Israel would most certainly not have developed as a successful and prosperous democracy. There is no way that the U.S. can secure Ukraine permanently in an open-ended war with Russia.Perhaps most important of all however is the way in which this vision totally ignores the effects on Europe, and U.S. interests in Europe. This would not matter much if European countries were economically successful and politically stable, but this is rapidly ceasing to be the case.In the old heartland of the EU, liberal democratic politics are crumbling. Italy is ruled by a radical conservative government. Opinion polls in France suggest that if elections were held today, Marine Le Pen would win by a wide margin. In Sweden — almost unbelievably for someone who lived through the long dull summer of Abbaesque Swedish social democracy — the army is being called on for help in combating violence by immigrant drug gangs, and the radical nationalist Sweden Democrats are the second largest party. Above all, there is Germany, without which no stable and successful European Union is possible. As German historian Tarik Cyrul Amar has written: "Germany's perfect adherence to Western policy on Russia and China has an ominous price…We have assumed that the first country to buckle under the economic strain of the war over Ukraine would be Russia. But what if it is Germany that stumbles first? Germans stressed about their economy, distrusting their elites as favoring foreign interests, and disenchanted with centrist values and methods— a picture too familiar for comfort." The state elections in Bavaria and Hesse this month showed a surge in support for the right-wing nationalist Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) and Freie Waehler (Free Voter) parties. According to opinion polls, AfD now has the second largest support nationwide, behind the Christian Democrats but pushing the Social Democrats into third place, and far ahead of the Greens and the Liberals.Up to now, all the traditional mainstream parties have been united in their refusal to form coalitions with the AfD. If continued, the rise in the party's support will however make this approach increasingly unworkable. Either the CDU will have to form governing coalitions with the AfD (as the CDU's sister party, the Christian Social Union, has already done with the Freie Waehler in Bavaria), or all the mainstream parties will have to form permanent coalitions to keep them out of office.The latter course would recall the last years of the Weimar Republic, and would almost certainly strengthen the radical parties still further, since critics of government policies would have nowhere else to go. The most radical proposal is to dub AfD a neo-Nazi party and ban it, but this would lead to massive protests and drive its supporters towards violence. Whatever happens, Germany seems set for a prolonged period of deep political instability and polarization.The original roots of support for AfD and similar parties in Europe lie in fear of mass migration and hostility to the centralizing (and sometimes dictatorial) tendencies of the European Union. Their support has however been greatly increased by the deepening economic recession into which Germany has been plunged by the rise in energy prices consequent on the war in Ukraine. German economic success in recent decades was largely built on cheap, plentiful and reliable Russian gas.This factor helped mask worsening structural defects in the German economy, which the present crisis is exposing. Coupled with the end of the Chinese boom and U.S.-driven economic warfare against China, the result is that there is now serious talk in Germany of "de-industrialization." Should this in fact occur, the political, social, cultural and psychological results could be catastrophic; for the rebuilding of the German national identity after 1945 took place largely on the basis of the "economic miracle," and the belief that this reflected a superior German model of cooperation between capital and labor, and a strong industry-based middle class (the so called Mittelstand). If belief in these collapses, we could be looking at something akin to a national nervous breakdown.An unending semi-frozen war in Ukraine would drastically worsen Germany's — and Europe's – economic decline and consequent political disorder. Especially if coupled with repeated crises in the Middle East, it would make the restoration of stability in energy prices impossible. Such a conflict would inevitably break out periodically into major battles, possibly leading to new Russian victories. There would be the perpetual risk that an unintended collision between Russia and NATO could escalate towards nuclear war. It should not be hard to imagine what this would do to business confidence in Europe.There is a tendency now for Americans to congratulate themselves on the submission of Europe to American strategy as a result of the war in Ukraine. This underestimates the threat to Europe and of U.S. interests there. The threat, as described, is overwhelmingly an internal one, resulting from a deadly cocktail of economic stagnation, uncontrolled migration, and political extremism, worsened by the war in Ukraine. If present patterns continue, the result will be to cripple Europe both economically and politically.Economic prosperity and liberal democracy in Europe form a key pillar of America's own power in the world and therefore a vital U.S. national interest. Without them, America's own economic power will be gravely weakened, and the prestige of democracy in the world shattered. There will be little point in the U.S. presenting itself as the leader of democracy in Asia if it has collapsed in Europe.Moreover, the United States waged two world wars and a Cold War in Europe to prevent the great economies of Western Europe from falling under the control of a hostile great power. Until a decade or so ago, no American ever dreamed of seeing Ukraine in this way. If therefore the U.S. analysis is that Ukraine cannot win, for the sake of Europe and U.S. vital interests there, Washington should lend all its efforts to bring about an early peace.Sophia Ampgkarian contributed to the research for this article.

The latest elections showed that the radical right within the EU Parliament has increased its seats and hence political influence. The conservative group of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) gained 7 seats while the Identity and Democracy (ID) group has enlarged its membership by 9.[1] In addition, the radical right can count on the support of 15 MEPs from Alternative für Deutschland and the 11 belonging to the Hungarian Fidesz party. If united, the bloc would gather support from 160 MEPs, being the second political force in the Parliament.
However, the so-called radical right is not a cohesive force and therefore its relevance will be highly dependent on political factors. Even because of that, the majority supporting the future Commission is unlikely to change.[2] In a scenario where another centrist majority faces such a right-wing surge, the most critical phase may be the presentation of the EU Agenda 2024-2029, which – aiming at a broad consensus – needs to reconcile not only different national interests but also opposing political views in a coherent framework. The new landscape may drive the future Commission to seek votes from the aforementioned right-wing groups, trading some strategic priorities to avoid the creation of a large anti-Commission bloc in the Parliament. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose importance has grown during the current legislative term due to recent crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, is one of the policy areas that could be impacted by the outlined scenario.Conservatives, radical right and EU foreign policy
In the EU Parliament, the radical right is composed of two distinct political families, namely the ECR and the ID group. Despite an approach tendentially Eurosceptic and mistrustful of the current EU integration processes, the ECR group has over the years taken positions more aligned with those of the European People's Party (EPP), especially in foreign policy, where there is a growing pro-Atlantic proclivity, coupled with hawkish attitudes towards Russia.[3]
In contrast, the ID group has so far been characterised by a nationalist nature and takes openly hostile positions to the EU, uncooperative in the European Parliament and opposed to any further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU dimension. The group's markedly nationalistic nature makes it challenging to find a synthesis between the different national claims, which in turn renders a structural and effective collaboration within the group, with the ECR or the EPP more complex. This cooperation is even more difficult in topical areas such as foreign policy whose relevance is steadily growing.Support for Ukraine
As of today, it seems likely that the next European Parliament will continue providing financial, logistical and military support to Kyiv, regardless of the electoral results. Therefore, the elections should not translate into a reversal of the EU's support for Ukraine, even in consideration of the positions to date assumed by the ECR, which are often aligned with the current majority.[4] On the Ukrainian issue, the ID group is more fragmented; there are parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) that are traditionally close to Russia and others, such as the Polish and Baltic, which look particularly hawkish on Moscow. Many parties within the group are today openly campaigning to cut the EU aid for Ukraine, sometimes supporting pro-Russian narratives.
In October 2023, the European Parliament voted by a vast majority for an aid package supporting Ukraine within the multi-annual financial framework 2024-2027.[5] This same majority might be slightly thinner after the elections. The most sceptical and hostile parties towards the Ukrainian cause may attempt to exploit the budgetary instruments and negotiations in the aftermath of the EU elections to condition the Union's choices in this area, especially concerning reconstruction or new financial loans. Another complex issue to unravel in the next years will be Ukraine's access to the common EU market and its repercussions on the Common Agricultural Policy; the topic is expected to be highly polarising especially within the right-wing camp, as the boycott of Ukrainian grain showcased in 2022.Enlargement
After years of stagnation, the enlargement process has been reinvigorated by the war in Ukraine. In the last years, the Commission imprinted to enlargement a new speed, conferring the candidate status upon Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in 2023 and opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, while the situation in Georgia has been made muddled by the recent approval of the so-called "Foreign Agents Law" by the national Parliament. ECR and ID's political stances about enlargement are taking quite divergent trajectories. The parties that constitute the ID group are openly opposed to the enlargement process, mainly because of the consequences in terms of expected migration flows as well as the potential impact on cohesion funds and the overall financial budget of the Union. Differently, the parties within or close to ECR pursue purely national interests in favouring the inclusion of specific candidates while opposing others. This is what happened with the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS) supporting the enlargement towards Ukraine for national security reasons, or Fidesz's favouring the Western Balkans while opposing Ukraine.[6]
ECR's positions on enlargement are therefore more blurred and have been profoundly affected by the invasion of Ukraine. The partial narrowing of the gap between ECR and the incumbent majority on this issue is testified by the document that outlines ECR's priorities for the next legislature, where enlargement is defined as "a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity",[7] and will be supported in the next future by the parliamentarian group.[8] Yet, as the enlargement debate is increasingly linked to the reform of the EU Treaties, the ECR group tried to disconnect this relationship, stating that "the enlargement process must not be used as a backdoor to introduce […] treaty changes and new powers such as qualified majority voting in the Council on foreign policy issues".[9] The wording indicates a positive attitude towards the enlargement process as long as it will not trigger real institutional changes.
Therefore, an increased centrality of the conservatives and the far right may hurdle any reform aimed at relinquishing the member states' veto power in foreign policy or approving any voting mechanisms in the EU Council that may diminish the perceived national influence. Although this attitude may not necessarily halt the enlargement process, the opposition to any reforms at the institutional level could indirectly put the brakes on it in light of the nexus between enlargement, governability and reforms.[10]Defence funding
One of the primary fears of a potential right-wing Parliament is the stalling of the shy advancements recently made in the defence field. The latest progress in the CSDP domain has been initiated by the Juncker Commission with the establishment of the European Defence Fund, an instrument intended to improve joint military research and development. The von der Leyen Commission updated this framework with the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which, according to proponents, should encourage member states to purchase European defence systems rather than relying on external procurement (mostly the US and South Korea). The significance of these steps should not be underestimated in consideration of the forthcoming rearmament carried out by EU member states, which necessitate topping off the inventories that were supplied to Ukraine. Besides the armament industry, the EU is also focusing on the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Capacity, a small operative standing unit composed of rotating European brigades. The settlement of this force was endorsed by the 2022 Strategic Compass,[11] the EU's major strategic document published (after months of fruitless elaboration) in response to the Ukrainian invasion.
When it comes to the radical right groups, the two aspects of defence (industry and operational) must be distinguished. For instance, in terms of development and joint acquisition, the ECR has been a staunch backer of a stronger European defence (and its lawmakers even contributed to the EDIRPA's regulation),[12] while the ID's attitude has been more ambiguous, and the group looks poorly integrated. However, in terms of operational steps, both political groups are extremely suspicious about the formation of a European army or any joint deployment force. The leaders of all of these parties have expressed concern that such an instrument would either threaten the states' sovereignty in a sensitive subject like defence (especially ID)[13] or weaken NATO (especially ECR).Maintenance with no leap forwards
Although the two groupings have similarities, it is important to note that the alignments in the future EU Parliament may be more fluid and unpredictable due to current political circumstances. In this regard, two factors could be significant: the formation of the next EU Commission (with the associated political dynamics) and the possible election of Donald Trump in November. From a European standpoint, especially this latter point is sensitive, owing to the growing concern that Europe alone would not be able to sustain Ukraine militarily and economically for long in case of a US disengagement.
With these caveats in mind, in the three outlined sectors – Ukraine, enlargement and defence – the first challenge for the ID and ECR groups is to align their respective agendas. The specific political weight of the two formations is linked to their unity and the ability to put forward a set of coherent proposals (or vetoes). While the greater presence of MEPs from the two groups will be noticed across sectors, their ability to influence the next Parliament's policy agenda and especially CFSP will be closely linked to their ability to overcome their internal fragmentation. It is precisely this latter aspect, in light of the heterogeneous nature of the two groups, that seems to limit their effective ability to intervene effectively in the policy areas under consideration. The different stances held by the radical right on the dossiers considered – also subject to the political contingencies of the moment – will hardly undermine EU policy in support of Ukraine. Likewise, defence investments should not suffer profound deviations. The only field at risk of circumvention is enlargement, where the game and the players however transcend the simple divide left-right wing.
Against this background, the majority of the radical right in the next EU Parliament will likely endorse the CFSP initiatives at play, but hardly come up with new ideas or proposals, nor accept deep revisions of the current foreign policy framework. Arguably, the different formations on the right side of the Parliament will try to limit any possible reform of the institutional set-up of the CFSP, following the traditional skepticism over an enlargement of the EU competencies in this area. The obstructionism of the radical right on a possible CFSP reform will not necessarily translate into interference with the current initiatives, which mostly maintain an intergovernmental and voluntary approach.Federico Castiglioni and Luca Cinciripini are Researchers in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] European Parliament, 2024 European Election Results, https://results.elections.europa.eu.[2] Andrew Gray, Michel Rose and Julia Payne, "EU's von der Leyen Seeks Centrist Allies after Far-Right Election Gains", in Reuters, 10 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-von-der-leyen-seeks-centrist-allies-after-far-right-election-gains-2024-06-10.[3] ECR Group, The ECR Will Stand by Ukraine until Russia Is Defeated and Beyond, 9 February 2023, https://ecrgroup.eu/article/legutko_the_ecr_will_stand_by_ukraine_until_russia_is_defeated_and_beyond.[4] EPP Group, EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA and ECR Leaders Call on EUCO to Deliver on Ukraine, 31 January 2024, https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/leaders-call-on-euco-to-deliver-on-ukraine.[5] European Parliament, A Long-Term Solution for Ukraine's Funding Needs, 17 October 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231013IPR07125.[6] Rosa Balfour and Stephan Lehne (eds), Charting the Radical Right's Influence on EU Foreign Policy, Brussels, Carnegie Europe, April 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/charting-the-radical-rights-influence-on-eu-foreign-policy.[7] The wording adopted by the ECR's document resounds the conclusions of the European Council of December 2023. See: European Council Conclusions, 14 and 15 December 2023, point 13, https://europa.eu/!VTprkk.[8] ECR Group, Priorities 2024-2029, April 2024, point 11, https://ecrgroup.eu/priorities#11.[9] Ibid. However, it is worth noting that Meloni's Italy joined the group of countries in favour of qualified majority voting on foreign policy, thereby contradicting the ECR stance. See Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministries on the Launch of the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 4 May 2023, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2595304.[10] Luigi Scazzieri, "The European Parliament Elections: A Sharp Right Turn?", in CER Insights, 30 April 2024, https://www.cer.eu/node/10889.[11] Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 14 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410976_en.[12] Sebastian Clapp, "European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)", in EPRS Briefings, November 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)739294.[13] Jordan Bardella, "Défense nationale: il faut à la France les moyens de la puissance et de l'indépendance", in L'Opinion, 9 November 2022, https://www.lopinion.fr/politique/defense-nationale-il-faut-a-la-france-les-moyens-de-la-puissance-et-de-lindependance-la-tribune-de-jordan-bardella.

The news that four Russian warships are in Havana for naval exercises brings to mind the old mariner's aphorism, "Any port in a storm." Cuba is in desperate need of economic help, and Russia has been providing it. The result is a deepening partnership that has geopolitical echoes of the Cold War, although the Cubans are now drawn to Moscow less by ideological affinity than economic necessity.Ever since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Cuban economy has been wracked by the gales of a perfect storm — a confluence of intensified U.S. sanctions imposed by President Trump, a pandemic that shuttered the tourism industry, and ill-conceived government policies that have made things worse rather than better. Desperately short of foreign exchange currency, the Cuban government is unable to import sufficient basic necessities like food, fuel, and medicine, let alone the requisite inputs for domestic production, which has plummeted. Shrinking production means declining foreign exchange earnings from exports and an even greater need for imports — a vicious circle that has no easy exit. Some of the economic reforms the government has undertaken may help restart the economy in the medium and long-term, but in the short run, Cuba's only hope to alleviate the immediate crisis, to put food on people's tables and, literally, keep the lights on, is foreign help. That's where Russia comes in.In the early 1960s, the assistance from the Soviet Union saved the Cuban economy from the ravages of the U.S. embargo, thwarting the plans of successive U.S. presidents to subdue the revolutionary government. The Soviets saw Cuba as a valuable ideological outpost in Latin America and Cuba saw the Soviet Union as a necessary partner in its struggles to break free of U.S. domination.Although that partnership collapsed with the end of the Cold War, Vladimir Putin has worked hard to rebuild it ever since his first term as Russian president. His principal lever has been economic assistance. Putin forgave 90 percent of Cuba's Soviet-era debt and has extended larger and larger amounts of economic assistance ever since. In 2009, the economic relationship expanded into the political and diplomatic spheres when the two countries declared a "strategic partnership."When the Cuban economy suffered an 11 percent decline as a result of the pandemic, Russia sent desperately needed food and medical supplies that saved Cuban lives — a move that rekindled the affection for Russians felt by some Cubans, especially those who studied in the Soviet Union when they were young.Russia's invasion of Ukraine strained the new partnership. Cuba had a close relationship with Ukraine dating from the 1990s, when it provided medical treatment to more than 18,000 Ukrainian children suffering from radiation sickness due to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Moreover, non-intervention and opposition to Great Power spheres of influence have been cornerstones of Cuban foreign policy and a rallying cry against U.S. policies of regime change ever since Fidel Castro rode into Havana in 1959. At first, Cuba tried to steer a middle course on Ukraine, reiterating its opposition to intervention and calling for a negotiated end to the conflict, while at the same time blaming the United States and Western Europe for provoking Moscow by expanding NATO to Russia's borders. At the United Nations, Cuba abstained on resolutions calling for Russia to withdraw, but opposed resolutions imposing sanctions on Moscow.Over the past year and half, however, Cuba's position has gradually become less equivocal and more closely aligned with Russia's. Since President Miguel Díaz-Canel visited Moscow in November 2022, and declared "Russia is not responsible" for the war, a parade of Russian and Cuban officials have travelled between the two capitals, signing more than a dozen new economic cooperation agreements. On a trip in June 2023, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev met with Raúl Castro, who, according to the Russian news agency Tass, "expressed full support for Russia in regard to the situation in Ukraine and confidence in Russia's victory."Last month, Díaz-Canel visited Moscow again and, in his meeting with Putin, repeated Cuba's condemnation of NATO expansion, declaring, "We wish you and the Russian Federation every kind of success in the special military operation."The visiting Russian warships are Putin's way of reminding President Biden that Moscow can challenge Washington in its own sphere of influence, a symbolic counterpoint to U.S. assistance to Ukraine. For the past several years, the U.S. Southern Command's annual Posture Statement has cited the growing influence of "Strategic Competitors" — especially Russia and China — as the top national security challenge to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.On this issue, like the issue of migration, U.S. sanctions against Cuba have proven counterproductive. By exacerbating the economic hardships Cubans face, Washington's policies have accelerated migration and left Cuba no alternative but to seek help from those same strategic competitors. As Southcom commander General Laura J. Richardson told Congress, referring to Latin America more broadly, "When you need a rope to grab, you aren't necessarily looking to see who threw it. We must be the ones throwing the rope, not our strategic competitors." That, in a nutshell, is a good explanation for Cuba's evolving relationship with Russia and sound advice for U.S. Cuba policy.

Problem Statement. The process of solving tasks at the country level and at the enterprise level always requires certain financial resources, access to which may be limited. This as well as the unsatisfactory state of the country's financial system and other factors significantly affect financial safety and determine the relevance of our research. Analysis of recent research and publications has shown that despite the existence of some scientific achievements in the study of financial safety of countries and enterprises, aspects related to changes in such safety due to new market challenges, as well as explications of the interrelation between financial safety at contry and enterprise levels, have not yet been considered. The purpose of our study is to explain the interrelation between the financial safety of a country and an enterprise. Materials and methods. Our information base was the data from the National Bank of Ukraine, the Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine, the results of own and other scientific studies, etc. Throughout this research, we used methods of comparison, systematization, induction and deduction, abstract-logical, critical analysis, graphical modeling.Research results. It has been found that today scholars and practitioners use different approaches to defining the essence of financial safety. At the country level, they were systematized into: combined; target and functional approaches; and at the enterprise level, they were systematized into the approaches from the positions of: the enterprise' financial condition; financial constraints; dynamic capabilities of the enterprise. It is proposed to consider the financial safety of an enterprise as the ability to create and maintain at this enterprise such financial conditions in which the impact on it external and internal factors does not lead to processes that are negative in terms of financial provide and development of an enterprise, its stable financial condition, which is necessary to achieve its goals. At the same time, the authors's vision of the country's financial safety is defined from four positions as: a component of economic safety; hierarchy and heterogeneity of financial interrelations; target approach; ability to provide satisfactory financial support. According to one of the authors's definitions, the financial safety of the country is the ability to maintain the state of the financial system and the provision of financial resources that does not contain real threats to further development and socio-economic stability of the country even with a high probability and level of financial risks.The explication of the interrelation between financial safety of the enterprise and the country has clearly shown that financial safety of the country always creates the preconditions for providing financial safety of the enterprises that located and operating in this country (or in those countries where they carry out foreign economic activity). Conversely, the financial safety of all enterprises in the country creates the basis for the stability of the country's financial system, and therefore is an important element in the process of providing its financial safety.According to the dynamics of the integral indicator of economic safety, which includes the subindex of financial safety, and the index of financial stress in Ukraine since 2008, it is established that the worst safety of the Ukrainian financial system was in 2014-2015. In 2020 Ukraine is experiencing financial stress again (primarily due to the situation caused by the coronavirus).The main risks of providing financial safety are identified. It is emphasized that many countries face threats related to cybercrime and cyber terrorism in the financial sphere nowadays.Conclusions. The peculiarities of providing the financial safety of different countries and enterprises are substantiated in practice. It is determined that for the implementation of Ukraine' development strategy it is very important to establish modern effective forms of cooperation between various government agencies and institutions in the organization of permanent financial monitoring, creation and maintenance of financial safety conditions. It is substantiated that the main risks of providing the financial safety of the enterprise include the following risks: reduction of financial stability; insolvency; lost profits; inflation; interest rate; investment; currency and fraud risks. At the same time, for a comprehensive research of the country's financial safety, it is proposed to focus on the study of changes in country risk. Prevention of the risks is one of the key precondition for providing financial safety. The results of our study can be further used to improve the process of managing the financial safety of an enterprise or a country. ; У статті систематизовано наявні наукові підходи до визначення понять «фінансова безпека країни» та «фінанова безпека підприємства» та надано авторське бачення розкриття їх суті. Проаналізовано динаміку інтерального показника економічної безпеки, до складу якого входить субіндекс фінансової безпеки, та індексу фінансового стресу в Україні, на основі яких можна оцінювати безпеку фінансової системи країни. Проведено експлікацію взаємозв'язку між фінансовою безпекою країни та підприємств. Ідентифіковано ризики забезпечення фінансової безпеки підприємства та країни. Обгрунтовано висновки щодо особливостей забезпечення на практиці фінансової безпеки різних країн та підприємств. Визначено, що для реалізації стратегії розвитку України нині дуже важливо налагодити сучасні дієві форми взаємодії різних владних структур й інституцій у питаннях організації перманентного фінансового моніторингу та створення і підтримки умов для забезпечення фінансової безпеки країни, у т.ч. українських підприємств, без належного рівня фінансової безпеки яких просто неможливо сподіватися на загальнонаціональне економічне зростання.

Information is a key aspect of the European integration process in Ukraine. Ukrainians support the Euro-integration course, but note that they haven't enough information about the European Union, the existing European programs, the implementation of the Association Agreement, etc.The author identified the main stages of informational support for Euro-integration of Ukraine: a stage of discussion of the advantages of European integration and specific benefits of Ukraine; information pressure stage; a stage of increasing information anxiety and increasing tension in society; the stage of a sharp protest public information reaction of society; the stage of renewal of the course on European integration and strengthening of information and communication support.The analysis of target audiences shows that different socio-demographic groups in different ways have information about the peculiarities and nature of the relationship between Ukraine and the EU.The public authorities have primary responsibility for informing citizens about European integration, but they do not possess the methodological and practical tools of information campaigns. Therefore in the article analyzes the peculiarities of the mechanisms of informing in the Concept of realization of the state policy in the field of informing and establishing communication with the public on the urgent issues of European integration of Ukraine for the period until 2017 and the Strategy of Communication in the field of European integration for 2018–2021 years. These documents are the mechanism for the division of responsibility for conducting information policy on European integration (including financial) between public authorities and interested non-governmental organizations, international donors and business structures. In this regard, the role of public institutions whose task is to inform Ukraine's European integration processes and work with different target groups, on the one hand, and the establishment of communication between government and civil society in the planning and implementation of information campaigns on European integration on the other, is increasing.The local authorities have sufficient tools to influence public opinion, but often ignore the issue of European integration. In addition, an important condition for the implementation of the Strategy at the regional level is the establishment of cooperation between local authorities and public organizations. ; Успех евроинтеграции связывается в значительной мере с информационным обеспечением этого процесса. Существует прямая корреляция между информированностью человека и его способностью принимать более структурированные, рациональные, сознательные решения по политике, а, следовательно, и позиционировать себя относительно определенных процессов в стране, в том числе и евроинтеграции.В статье выделены основные этапы информационного обеспечения процесса евроинтеграции Украины, а именно: этап обсуждения преимуществ евроинтеграции; этап информационного давления; этап усиления информационной тревоги и рост напряженности в обществе; этап резкой протестной реакции общества; этап восстановления курса на евроинтеграцию.Дифференциированно целевую аудиторию по уровню владения информацией об особенностях и характере взаимоотношений между Украиной и ЕС, согласно которой проанализированы особенности механизмов информирования в Концепции реализации государственной политики в сфере информирования и налаживания коммуникации с общественностью по актуальным вопросам европейской интеграции Украины на период до 2017 и Стратегии коммуникации в сфере европейской интеграции на 2018–2021 годы. Указанные документы являются механизмом распределения ответственности за проведение информационной политики по вопросам европейской интеграции (в том числе и финансовой) между органами государственной власти и заинтересованными неправительственными организациями, международными донорами и бизнес-структурами. В связи с этим возрастает роль общественных институтов, задачами которых является информирование о евроинтеграционных процессах Украины и работа с различными целевыми группами, с одной стороны, и налаживание коммуникации между властью и гражданским обществом при планировании и реализации информационных кампаний по евроинтеграции, с другой.Установлено, что местные органы власти в своем распоряжении имеют достаточно инструментов для воздействия на общественное мнение, однако достаточно часто игнорируют вопросы европейской интеграции. Кроме того, важным условием осуществления стратегии на региональном уровне является налаживание сотрудничества между местными властями и общественными организациями. ; Успіх євроінтеграції пов'язується значною мірою з інформаційним забезпеченням цього процесу. Існує пряма кореляція між інформованістю людини та її здатністю ухвалювати більш структуровані, раціональні, свідомі рішення щодо політики, а отже і позиціонувати себе відносно певних процесів у країні, зокрема і євроінтеграції. В статті виокремленні основні етапи інформаційного забезпечення процесу євроінтеграції України, а саме: етап обговорення переваг євроінтеграції; етап інформаційного тиску; етап посилення інформаційної тривоги та зростання напруженості в суспільстві; етап різкої протестної реакції суспільства; етап відновлення курсу на євроінтеграцію. Диференційовано цільову аудиторію за рівнем володіння інформацією про особливості та характер взаємовідносин між Україною та ЄС, відповідно до якої проаналізовано особливості механізмів інформування в Концепції реалізації державної політики у сфері інформування та налагодження комунікації з громадськістю з актуальних питань європейської інтеграції України на період до 2017 та Стратегії комунікації у сфері європейської інтеграції на 2018–2021 роки. Зазначені документи є механізмом розподілу відповідальності за проведення інформаційної політики з питань європейської інтеграції (у тому числі й фінансову) між органами державної влади та зацікавленими неурядовими організаціями, міжнародними донорами і бізнес-структурами. У зв'язку з цим зростає роль громадських інституцій, завданнями яких є інформування щодо євроінтеграційних процесів України та робота з різними цільовими групами, з одного боку, та налагодження комунікації між владою т громадянським суспільством при плануванні та реалізації інформаційних кампаній з євроінтеграції, з іншого.Встановлено, що місцеві органи влади у своєму розпорядженні мають достатньо інструментів для впливу на громадську думку, проте досить часто ігнорують питання європейської інтеграції. Крім того, важливою умовою імплементації Стратегії на регіональному рівні є налагодження співпраці між місцевою владою та громадськими організаціями.

Розкрито роль громадського контролю в запобіганні та виявленні корупції у сфері публічних закупівель, доведено наявність законодавчого підґрунтя та баз даних для виявлення, оцінки та усунення корупційних ризиків та фактів корупції в діяльності розпорядників публічних коштів, наведено приклади нормативних документів, які регламентують діяльність громадських рад, впровадження громадського контролю в публічних закупівлях, обов'язковість оприлюднення інформації про публічні фінанси, зазначені причини гальмування розвитку громадського контролю в Україні, зокрема в сфері публічних закупівель, та запропоновано шляхи активізації громадського контролю. Акцентовано на ролі держави при налагодженні ефективної взаємодії влади з інститутами громадянського суспільства, на прикладі двох міністерств доведено недієвість громадських рад як безпосередніх органів громадського контролю при центральних органах виконавчої влади. ; Problem setting. One of the main prerequisites for the detection of corruption offenses and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is active citizens who are interested in overcoming this phenomenon. An active, influential and developed civil society is an important element of any democratic state. Such civil society plays a key role in implementation of urgent social changes, development and realization of effective public policies in various spheres, solving political, socio-economic and humanitarian problems.Recent research and publications analysis. A. Mykhnenko, Yu. Surmin, E. Nevmerzhytskyi, M. Mesiuk and other scientists investigated the issues of civil society development and, accordingly, the introduction of effective public control, including in the public procurement sphere. Scientists consider the influence of civil society on various spheres of state activity, reveal the problems of interaction between government authorities and civil society institutions as well as study the foreign experience of civil society activities and public control. The study of the reasons for the low interaction of government authorities with the public in our country and ways of improving the state-management mechanisms of such interaction are urgent.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. In order to reveal the role, possibilities and influence of public control on socio-economic, political and other processes and transformations in the state, including public procurement, it is necessary to clarify and realize the meaning of this concept.The purpose of the research paper is to reveal the role of public control in the fight against corruption, to prove the necessity of creating the proper normative basis for the development of civil society institutions, reporting and accountability to the society for the fulfillment of public duties.Paper main body. It was established that the definition of the term "public control" in the Ukrainian legislation is currently absent. However, the following interpretation can be considered as accurate: public control is one of the types of social control exercised by associations of citizens as well as by citizens themselves. At the same time, it is indisputable from the practice of developed civilized countries that the level of public control is a reflection of democracy in the state, an indicator of the influence of citizens on the management of society and state.The role of public control in preventing and detecting of corruption in the public procurement sphere was disclosed as well as the existence of legislative bases and databases in order to identify, assess and eliminate corruption risks and corruption cases in the activities of public funds managers was proved. Examples of normative documents regulating the activities of public councils, introduction of public control in public procurement, mandatory publication of information on public finances and the reasons for the inhibition of the development of public control in Ukraine, in particular in the public procurement sphere, were provided.It was proved that the work of the public councils needs the assessment and changing of the approaches to the functioning. In order to extend the legitimate rights of civil society institutions to access to public finances, unimpeded attendance at commissions, committees, working groups, etc., it is proposed to supplement the Provision on the Public Council with the following paragraph 6: "Have the right to unimpeded presence (without the right to vote) in the amount not more than two representatives from a public association at meetings of commissions, committees, working groups, etc., whose purpose is the formation, use or distribution of public resources, with the possibility of photo, video or audio fixation of the meeting". The attention is focused on the role of the state in establishing effective cooperation between government authorities and civil society institutes; on the example of the two ministries the ineffectiveness of public councils as direct bodies of public control at the central executive authorities is proved.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. A consistent, powerful and independent cell of adequate interaction, and in some cases, the struggle for democracy, freedom of speech and human rights has not yet been created in Ukraine due to insufficient activity, consciousness, lack of motivation of civil society and despite open access to information sources, the opportunity to influence on socio-economic and political processes in the state. Only by creating favorable conditions for the development of civil society institutions, by establishing effective safeguards for possible abuse by representatives of public entities and by establishing the interaction between government authorities and the public, it is possible to achieve the desired goal: to build a conscious, active and modern civil society, which will ensure the implementation of one of the key functions of a democratic state – public control over socioeconomic processes, including public procurements.

The objectives are to analyze the development of the relations in the sphere of the culture between Switzerland and Germany in the 1930-40's and to determine the reasons for termination of the cultural dialogue between the countries after the arrival of national socialists in German and conditions of its recovery after the Second World War. The historical-genetic and comparative methods were chosen for the study. With the use of the historical-genetic method, the evolution of the GermanSwiss cultural relations in the first half of the XX c. was explored. Appeal to the comparative method has enabled to draw the conclusions about the features of the bilateral cultural relations between Switzerland and Germany in the period between the two world wars, during the war of 1939 – 1945 and post-war years. Scientific novelty of the proposed article is that for the first time in Ukrainian historiography an attempt to explore the development of the cultural relations between Switzerland and Germany in 1930 – 40's was made. Conclusions. The main reasons of the Swiss efforts to withdraw from the involvement in the German cultural world in the late 1930's – 40's were memories of the First World War, when the conflict between the French and German communities had put in jeopardy the peace within the Swiss society, and a desire not to create the pretext for the global public accusations against Switzerland of its involvement in the crimes of the national socialists, which could raise doubts about the issue of Swiss neutrality. The background for the restoration of the cultural dialogue between the countries was the desire of Swiss to support the formation of a new democratic regime in the neighboring country, which was realized through the activities of both individual private artistic associations and institutions, and the work of the Swiss diplomacy, which through the analysis of the cultural situation of the particular German states was searching for the potential areas and ways of cooperation. ; Мета роботи – проаналізувати розвиток відносин у сфері культури між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у 30-40-х роках ХХ ст.; визначити причини припинення культурного діалогу між країнами з приходом до влади у Німеччині націонал-соціа- лістів та передумови його відновлення після завершення Другої світової війни. Для висвітлення теми були обрані такі методи дослідження, як історико-генетичний та порівняльний. За допомогою історико-генетичного методу досліджено еволюцію німецько-швейцарських культурних зв'язків у першій половині ХХ ст. Звернення до порівняльного методу дало змогу зробити висновки про особливості двосторонніх культурних відносин між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у період між двома світовими війнами, у роки війни (1939-1945 рр.) та повоєнні роки. Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історіографії здійснена спроба дослідити розвиток культурних зв'язків між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у 30–40-х роках ХХ ст. Висновки. Основними причинами намагання швейцарців наприкінці 30–40-х років відсторонитися від причетності до німецького культурного світу були пам'ять про події Першої світової війни, коли протиріччя між німецькою та французькою громадами ставили під загрозу спокій всередині швейцарського суспільства, та бажання не створювати привід світовій громадськості для звинувачень на адресу Швейцарії у її причетності до злочинів націонал-соціалістів, що, в свою чергу, ставило під сумнів швейцарський нейтралітет. Основною передумовою відновлення культурного діалогу між країнами стало бажання швейцарців підтримати становлення нового демократичного режиму в сусідній країні, яке реалізовувалося через діяльність як окремих приватних мистецьких об'єднань та інституцій, так і через роботу швейцарських дипломатів, які крізь призму аналізу стану культури окремих німецьких земель шукали потенційні напрями та шляхи налагодження співпраці. ; Мета роботи – проаналізувати розвиток відносин у сфері культури між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у 30-40-х роках ХХ ст.; визначити причини припинення культурного діалогу між країнами з приходом до влади у Німеччині націонал-соціа- лістів та передумови його відновлення після завершення Другої світової війни. Для висвітлення теми були обрані такі ме- тоди дослідження, як історико-генетичний та порівняльний. За допомогою історико-генетичного методу досліджено еволюцію німецько-швейцарських культурних зв'язків у першій половині ХХ ст. Звернення до порівняльного методу дало змогу зробити висновки про особливості двосторонніх культурних відносин між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у період між двома світовими війнами, у роки війни (1939-1945 рр.) та повоєнні роки. Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що вперше в українській історіографії здійснена спроба дослідити розвиток культурних зв'язків між Швейцарією та Німеччиною у 30–40-х роках ХХ ст. Висновки. Основними причинами намагання швейцарців наприкінці 30–40-х років відсторонитися від причетності до німе- цького культурного світу були пам'ять про події Першої світової війни, коли протиріччя між німецькою та французькою громадами ставили під загрозу спокій всередині швейцарського суспільства, та бажання не створювати привід світовій громад- ськості для звинувачень на адресу Швейцарії у її причетності до злочинів націонал-соціалістів, що, в свою чергу, ставило під сумнів швейцарський нейтралітет. Основною передумовою відновлення культурного діалогу між країнами стало бажання швейцарців підтримати становлення нового демократичного режиму в сусідній країні, яке реалізовувалося через діяльність як окремих приватних мистецьких об'єднань та інституцій, так і через роботу швейцарських дипломатів, які крізь призму аналізу стану культури окремих німецьких земель шукали потенційні напрями та шляхи налагодження співпраці.

У статті розкриваються поняття особистості військового професіонала, необхідність формування особистості військового професіонала, сутність соціальної відповідальності військового професіонала. Доводиться, що соціальна відповідальність є важливою соціальною якістю особистості сучасного військового професіонала, яка виявляється у ставленні до виконання громадянського і військового обов'язку. ; В статье раскрываются понятия личности военного профессионала, необходимость формирования личности военного профессионала, сущность социальной ответственности военного профессионала. Доказывается, что социальная ответственность является важным социальным качеством личности современного военного профессионала, которое проявляется в отношении к выполнению гражданского и воинского долга. ; Threats and challenges of the modern world put forward ever increasing demands as to a military professional's individuality, his/her occupational, moral and psychological qualities. In this context the problem of a military professional's social responsibility is of particular importance. In order to resolve it the essence of social responsibility is to be determined. The issue of servicepersons' social responsibility has been highlighted in a number of works by both Ukrainian and foreign researchers. In particular, O. Petrov, S. Karpukhin, Yu. Chernavin, Ye. Kireev, O. Glasunov and some others initiated its scientific foregrounding, singled out some important aspects and ways of their further investigation. At the same time, the question of the essence of the social responsibility of a military professional's individuality still remains unresolved. The initial point for the analysis of the essence of the social responsibility of a military professional's individuality lies in understanding it as a specific manifestation of the social responsibility of social subjects which reflects its ontological traits and particularities. However, it's necessary to state that among the scientists there is no mutual understanding as to the essence of the social responsibility of social subjects. The main difficulty here lies in understanding the essence and the meaning of the notions of «responsibility», «social responsibility» and «social subject's social responsibility». According to this, the analysis of servicepersons' social responsibility first of all requires the clarification of these notions by determining their categorical status. From the standpoint of hermeneutics methodology the introduction of the notion of social responsibility came as a logical consequence of scientific investigation of the problem of responsibility in general. Thus, it was initiated by the fact that responsibility cannot be reduced to social sanctions and mutual demands alone. Social responsibility is the way of social existence, and of relations among social subjects (people, social and sociopolitical institutions). In this respect it does not equal responsibility as a sum of certain sanctions but has its own meaning. The meaning of social responsibility reflects two aspects of cooperation among social subjects: the character of social subject's fulfillment of its destination and duties; social sanctions applied against social subject by society for social consequences of its activity or inactivity.The notion of «social subject's social responsibility» (including servicepersons) – is the one that reflects one of the aspects of social responsibility, namely the attitude of the social subject towards the implementation of its mission and destination, fulfillment of its civil and professional duties.From the standpoint of gnosiological approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as a social phenomenon, whose evolution and development are determined by the place, role and function of the Armed Forces, historical mission of servicepersons and their social-typological characteristics as a specific professional group in the society.From the standpoint of ontological approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as a social quality whose aim lies in the attitude to the realization of servicepersons' destination and mission as well as in the fulfillment of civil and military duties.According to the structural-functional approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as a synthesizing component of the system of subject's relations with the surrounding world, as a system-building element and as a system of coordinates for public life, grounded on the degree of subject's identification with society, its understanding of the essence of life, historical mission and determines the content and direction, way and character of an individual's life as well as life of communities in different spheres of social being. According to the sociological approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as a social responsibility of different groups of servicepersons depending on their categories. Separate elements of servicepersons social responsibility act as dominant components which acquire corresponding status under corresponding circumstances.According to the axiological approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as an important military-professional and social value that synthesizes servicepersons' system of values and stands up as their embodiment into servicepersons' lives. From the standpoint of synergetic approach social responsibility of the military professional is seen as a system with the following characteristics: openness and nonlinearity of development; changeability and steadiness; subordination to randomness in the general process of functioning and development; subordination to random impact on the process of natural functioning and development; choice of the development direction; alternativeness of development directions; existence of social responsibility's own development tendencies as a self-organizing system; controlled development under self-organizing conditions.Thus, we can claim that social responsibility of the military professional is his/her attitude to fulfilling civil and military duties determined by the place and role of servicepersons in the life of the society and by the Armed Forces functions. Social responsibility is implemented in the choice of the action and behavior modes.

VIENNA/MUNICH - "Wars belong in museums" reads an inscription in front of the Museum of Military History in Vienna, Austria. As the crow flies, there are less than 400 miles between Lviv in western Ukraine and Vienna. In the Austrian capital, however, the distance feels much greater. Unlike many German cities, no Ukrainian flags are seen in Vienna's institutional buildings. In Vienna, one of the few reminders of the ongoing war in Ukraine is to be found behind the Soviet War Memorial, where a wall is painted in the colors of the Ukrainian flag.Recent regional elections in Germany have been shaped by growing discontent with the country's Ukraine war policy. Meanwhile, to Germany's south, slight attention is paid to the ongoing war in Ukraine ahead of the Austrian parliamentary elections on September 29. The public debate in Austria is instead dominated by topics such as migration and asylum politics, and future coalition options. The limited weight of foreign policy in the conversation can partly be explained by Austria's specific circumstances as a neutral country. Austria has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995 but is not a member of NATO. After Sweden and Finland joined NATO in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only three other European countries (Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta) share Austria's category.But foreign policy could play a significant role in negotiations to form a government coalition after the elections. The far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which is polling first at 27%, could put European Ukraine aid under the microscope. In its election program, the FPÖ opposes sanctions against Russia and demands a halt to Austria's contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), the mechanism through which the EU has provided $6.8 billion in military support to Ukraine. Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has long used its veto power within the EU to block military aid packages for Ukraine or allow them to be approved in exchange for concessions. Orbán, who has an alliance with the FPÖ in the European Parliament, is seen as a role model by Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ's candidate for chancellor. The FPÖ has never won a national election but it finished first in the elections to the European Parliament in Austria last June. A win for the FPÖ would not guarantee its participation in government, let alone the privilege of appointing the new Austrian chancellor. Still, forming a government coalition while bypassing the far-right party would be complicated. The FPÖ is followed closely in the polls by the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), led by Chancellor Karl Nehammer. He currently leads a coalition government with the Green Party. Third in the polls comes the center-left Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ). The two traditional center-right and center-left political forces would probably need a third party to reach a parliamentary majority. The ÖVP and the FPÖ, on the contrary, are likely to gain over 50% of the seats in parliament.The conservatives appear ready to reach out to the FPÖ after the elections, although they have announced their opposition to Kickl, the FPÖ leader, serving in a future cabinet. The two parties already shared the government in the early 2000s and again later on, from 2017 to 2019. On both occasions, the ÖVP filled the chancellor position. It could be different this time, especially if the FPÖ wins by a significant margin over the ÖVP.Christoph Schwarz, a Research Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, said if the FPÖ enters the government, "one can assume that Austrian support for EU initiatives in support of Ukraine will be harder to attain." Even so, he adds, much would depend on "political bargaining and the composition of such a government." The FPÖ and United Russia, Vladimir Putin's party, signed a Friendship treaty in 2016. The FPÖ's Russian connections have led to bizarre moments. Karin Kneissl, appointed Austria's foreign minister on the FPÖ's recommendation in 2017, danced with Putin at her wedding in 2018. Kneissl now lives in Russia, where she was recently appointed goodwill ambassador for Siberian tiger conservation. The FPÖ has since distanced itself from the Friendship treaty, but ties between the far-right party and Moscow have survived. Austria's neutral status is key to understanding its foreign policy. Following its annexation into Nazi Germany in 1938, Austria did not fully recover its sovereignty until 1955 after reaching an agreement with the former Allied powers. An independent Austria was something both the U.S. and the USSR could accept as long as the country renounced union with Germany and remained neutral. On October 26, 1955, the Austrian parliament approved a declaration of neutrality. The date is Austria's national holiday, underscoring the importance of neutrality for Austrian national identity. During the Cold War, Austria's neutrality contributed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, establishing their headquarters in Vienna. Vienna also hosts the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (or OSCE) and is one of the four major U.N. headquarter sites. Recent polls indicate that neutrality remains popular with some three-quarters of the Austrian population in favor of it. The Ukraine war has not had a major impact on the numbers. Schwarz argues that, in Austria, "foreign policy thinking has been largely outsourced to Brussels and any topic that could lead to a potentially uncomfortable discussion on neutrality is avoided at all costs." The meaning of Austria's neutrality, however, is certainly far more diffuse nowadays than it was during the Cold War. As an EU member, Austria is part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. The country has also participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace since 1995. Some recent developments have brought Austria closer to NATO. In July 2023, Austria joined the German-led Sky Shield initiative, which seeks to strengthen Europe's air defenses in light of the Ukraine War. The FPÖ opposes this step, whereas the ÖVP promoted it in the government.Broad support for neutrality does not necessarily mean Austrians want to keep their army small. A slim majority supports increasing military expenditures and the government has taken steps in that direction. As of 2022, only three EU countries were spending less than Austria on their armies in proportional terms. Back then, Vienna spent 0.8% of its GDP on defense. This year, it will be close to 1%. Schwarz believes that, regardless of the composition of the next government coalition, the current commitment to a military expenditure of 1.5% of the GDP by 2028 will be maintained. In comparison to other EU countries, Austria retains significant ties with Russia even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Austria's Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) is the largest Western bank still operating in Russia. The Austrian government successfully lobbied in December 2023 for RBI to be excluded from the EU's 12th package of Russia sanctions. Since then, the European Central Bank and U.S. authorities have continued to exert pressure on RBI and the government in Vienna. Nevertheless, in 2024, over half of RBl's profits came from its operations in Russia and Belarus. Although the bank's stated objective is to "heavily scale back" from these markets, there is no clear path to repatriate the profits. The situation was further complicated in early September when a Russian court blocked any potential sale of RBI's Russian subsidiary. Aside from banking ties, Austria is heavily dependent on Russian gas. This year, Austria has imported at least 80% of its natural gas from Russia every month. That percentage is higher than in the previous two years. In this sense, Austria represents the reverse image of Germany, which has progressively diversified its energy supply away from Russia since 2022. Although there was no time for parliamentary approval before the elections, the Austrian government recently agreed to review the current national security strategy, which dates back to 2013. Back then, Russia was described as a "partner." The new national strategy, however, would define Moscow as a "threat" and emphasize the need to decrease Austria's energy dependency on it. Schwarz argues that "there is a good chance of this strategy being adopted in more or less its current form" if the next government does not involve the FPÖ. There will be far more uncertainty about the next national security strategy, and Austria's foreign policy overall, if the FPÖ enters the government, especially if it fills the position of chancellor. The elections on September 29 will determine the negotiating strength of the different parties, but talks to create a government are expected to take time. The EU will pay particular attention to the negotiations in hopes of avoiding a new Austrian government that complicates EU sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine.

 The first thing we have learned after one year of war in Ukraine is that there is no evidence that Vladimir Putin wanted to rebuild the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire, or the Warsaw Pact. His present post-imperial concern is to regain and consolidate the Russian Federation's borders. Despite its huge losses of territory, Russia keeps being, by far, the largest country in the world. To prevent its further disbanding, which is always a latent danger due to its ethnic diversity and territorial dispersion, control of its borders is a national security priority.On
the Eastern side, the Russian rulers are strongly interested in maintaining
control over Siberia, which gives the country an exit to the Pacific; thus,
their geopolitical interest in having friendly relations with China. On the
Western side, Russia retains an exit to the Baltic Sea in Saint Petersburg and managed
to keep the enclave of Kaliningrad despite the independence of the three Baltic
republics. The third border, on the South, which affects Crimea, implies having
access to the Black Sea, which is the gate to the Mediterranean and the Suez
Canal.  If
Putin were a new Peter the Great or a new Stalin, a settlement between great powers
would be within reach: a kind of Yalta-Potsdam division of spheres of
influence. But as a country in decline and with repeated loss of territories, it
feels hostility from its neighbors as an existential threat, to which it
responds in exasperated despair.The
invasion has not worked as well for Russia as Putin expected. We have learned
that, in war, it is more difficult to conquest than defend. Some experts in
military history and strategy estimate that for an attack to succeed in
conquering adverse territory, the attacker may need three times more resources,
in troops and weapons, than the defender. This alone can explain why, so far,
the Russians haven't entered Kyiv or Kharkiv, while the Ukrainians have not arrived
in Crimea or most of the Donbas. The
attacker's disadvantage is aggravated by bad management, typical of
authoritarian governments. As stated by strategist Lawrence Freedman, "A lot of
most catastrophic decisions from autocracies is the lack of open and often
critical feedback. They dig themselves in by believing that their advantage is
bold decision-making."In
addition, some crucial potential allies have not joined Russia's adventure. A
few weeks before the invasion, Putin and Xi Jinping signed an agreement for
"unlimited cooperation", but the invasion of Ukraine moved the Chinese to keep their
distance. India's prime minister Narendra Modi told Putin in public that
today's era is not an era of war. From
the current protracted stalemate without a winner, the conflict has a difficult
outcome. In a lecture at Georgetown University a couple of weeks ago, the
director of the CIA, William Burns, said that the next six months will be
critically decisive. He suggested that the alternatives are either a quick
military overturn followed by negotiation and peace or an escalation towards a
long-durable war.A
negotiated peace would require that none of the two sides gets an absolute
defeat, and thus not an absolute victory either. Joe Biden said in Warsaw that
"Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia", which is something different from
saying that it might be a victory for Ukraine or a total defeat for Russia. But
so far, the two parts are still at the rhetoric stage of being maximalist in
their demands with the expectation to be in a strong position if a real
negotiation ever starts. A few months ago, Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly stated
he could accept to concede on Crimea and Donbas, which were the original
objectives of the Russian "special military operation". But now he proclaims
his determination to move back to the borders in 2014 and insists on the
country's unlikely EU and NATO membership. Russia, in turn, verbally rejects
any concession of moving backward. For
an escalation, the Kremlin would need risky domestic moves, including new
conscriptions and mobilizations, to make Russian politics the continuation of
war by other means (which is what Clausewitz meant even if he phrased it the
other way). It is from impatience and distress that Putin toys with using
tactical nuclear weapons over Kyiv –as if he were playing a challenging Chicken
game in which the US would not retaliate to avoid risking World War III. In
turn, Ukraine might be able to sustain its belligerence for as long as the US
and NATO keep providing increasingly effective and lethal weapons, including
drones, tanks, etc. But political calculations and concern about excessive
financial costs may make the US Congress and several European countries lean
toward restricting further overheads.The
conflict has already lasted longer than many regional wars and might degenerate
into attrition. An end might come from changes away from the war fronts. There
should be elections in Russia and Ukraine twelve months from now. They are
uncertain not only about their results, including whether Putin would remain in
power but about whether the elections will be actually held. There will also
be elections in the United States, Great Britain, and the European Parliament
in 2024, when nobody may be interested in running an electoral campaign in the
middle of a war.One
thing we certainly know and can be sure about is that war is the worst human
activity, whose only secure consequence is death and destruction. We have
plenty of information and images about the disasters in Ukraine, but if you
want an additional compelling display of this truth, watch the movie All Quiet on the Western Front, probably the best war movie ever, which strikingly
shows the horrors of it. ---





























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The article is devoted to the definition of the possibilities of the concept of modern international maritime law on the regime of historical waters to the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait application. The weak development of the concept of historical waters in the modern legal doctrine is observed, especially concerning the Azov-Kerch waters. This defines the purpose of the article, and namely, to establish the appropriateness of classifying them as historical waters on the basis of the modern relations characteristics concerning the establishment of the maritime spaces' regime of this region. The methodological basis of the article consisted of dialectical, historical methods, methods of analysis and synthesis, formal-legal and prognostic methods. The article studies the main scientific approaches to the development of grounds and mechanisms for recognizing certain marine areas as state historical waters. The absence of at list such grounds and mechanisms in modern international public maritime law and national legislation of Ukraine is emphasized. The Azov-Kerch water spaces is among of priority of Ukrainian national interests and the importance of creating the favorable environment for the development of seaports in the region. The attention is paid to the fact that the delimitation of the Azov-Kerch waters was discussed for a long time, but so far no mutually acceptable solution was reached: the attitudes of the parties and their justifications are different, and taking into account the temporary occupation and lasting conflict between two countries the search for a compromise may be delayed indefinitely. The idea of holding an international conference to determine the legal status and use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the signing of the relevant international agreement was supported. It is possible to terminate the current bilateral agreements because of this: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait in 2003 and the Fishery Agreement on Fishing in the Sea of Azov in 1993. It is concluded that the historicity of Azov-Kerch waters belonging to the inland waters of only two countries has now exhausted itself. The interests of the much larger number of countries meet in this region, and the development of the universal international agreement concerning it has long been "felt" not only bilaterally but also regionally in order to build the balanced neighborhood policy and respect the interests of all concert parties. ; Статья посвящена определению возможностей применения концепции современного международного морского права о режиме исторических вод в Азовское море и Керченский пролив. Изучаются основные научные подходы к выработке оснований и механизмов признания отдельных морских пространств историческими водами государства. Подчеркивается отсутствие в современном международном публичном морском праве и национальном законодательстве Украины перечня таких оснований и механизмов. Отмечается пребывание Азово-Керченской акватории в сфере приоритетных национальных интересов Украины и важность создания благоприятной среды для развития морских портов региона. Обращается внимание на то, что вопрос разграничения Азово-Керченской акватории обсуждается уже длительный период, однако до настоящего времени прийти к взаимоприемлемому решению все же не удалось: позиции сторон и их обоснования различны, а учитывая временную оккупацию и продолжающийся конфликт между двумя странами, поиск компромисса может затянуться на неопределенное время. Поддержана идея о проведении международной конференции с целью определения правового статуса и режима использования Азовского моря и Керченского пролива и подписания соответствующего международного соглашения. Отмечается возможность прекращения в связи с этим действия действующих двусторонних соглашений: Договора о сотрудничестве в использовании Азовского моря и Керченского пролива 2003 г. и Соглашения по вопросам рыболовства в Азовском море 1993 г. Автор приходит к выводу о тому, что историчность принадлежности Азово-Керченской акватории к категории внутренних вод только двух государств в настоящее время исчерпала себя. В данном регионе пересекаются интересы значительно больше- го числа государств и выработка единой международной договоренности по нему уже давно «чувствуется» не только на двустороннем уровне, но и на региональном с целью построения взвешенной политики добрососедства и уважения интересов всех заинте- ресованных сторон. ; Статтю присвячено визначенню можливостей застосування концепції сучасного міжнародного морського права про режим історичних вод до Азовського моря та Керченської протоки. Вивчаються основні наукові підходи до вироблення підстав та механізмів визнання окремих морських просторів історичними водами держави. Підкреслюється відсутність у сучасному міжнародному публічному морському праві та національному законодавстві України переліку таких підстав та механізмів. Відзначається перебування Азово-Керченської акваторії у колі пріоритетних національних інтересів України та важливість створення сприятливого середовища для розвитку морських портів регіону. Звертається увага на те, що питання розмежування Азово-Керченської акваторії обговорюються же тривалий період, проте до теперішнього часу дійти до взаємоприйнятного рішення не вдалося: позиції сторін та їх обґрунтування є різними, а зважаючи на тимчасову окупацію та триваючий конфлікт між двома країнами, пошук компромісу може затягнутися на невизначений час. Підтримано ідею про проведення міжнародної конференції з метою визначення правового статусу та режиму використання Азовського моря та Керченської протоки та підписання відповідної між- народної угоди. Відзначається можливість припинення у зв'язку з цим дії діючих двосторонніх угод: Договору про співробітництво у використанні Азовського моря і Керченської протоки 2003 р. та Угоди з рибальства з питань рибальства в Азовському морі 1993 р. Підсумовується, що історичність приналежності Азово-Керченської акваторії до складу внутрішніх вод лише двох держав на теперішній час вичерпала себе. У цьому регіоні перетинаються інтереси значно більшої кількості держав і вироблення єдиної міжнародної домовленості щодо нього уже давно «відчувається» не лише на двосторонньому рівні, але й на регіональному з метою побудови виваженої політики добросусідства та поваги інтересів усіх зацікавлених сторін.

The article is devoted to the definition of the possibilities of the concept of modern international maritime law on the regime of historical waters to the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait application. The weak development of the concept of historical waters in the modern legal doctrine is observed, especially concerning the Azov-Kerch waters. This defines the purpose of the article, and namely, to establish the appropriateness of classifying them as historical waters on the basis of the modern relations characteristics concerning the establishment of the maritime spaces' regime of this region. The methodological basis of the article consisted of dialectical, historical methods, methods of analysis and synthesis, formal-legal and prognostic methods. The article studies the main scientific approaches to the development of grounds and mechanisms for recognizing certain marine areas as state historical waters. The absence of at list such grounds and mechanisms in modern international public maritime law and national legislation of Ukraine is emphasized. The Azov-Kerch water spaces is among of priority of Ukrainian national interests and the importance of creating the favorable environment for the development of seaports in the region. The attention is paid to the fact that the delimitation of the Azov-Kerch waters was discussed for a long time, but so far no mutually acceptable solution was reached: the attitudes of the parties and their justifications are different, and taking into account the temporary occupation and lasting conflict between two countries the search for a compromise may be delayed indefinitely. The idea of holding an international conference to determine the legal status and use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the signing of the relevant international agreement was supported. It is possible to terminate the current bilateral agreements because of this: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait in 2003 and the Fishery Agreement on Fishing in the Sea of Azov in 1993. It is concluded that the historicity of Azov-Kerch waters belonging to the inland waters of only two countries has now exhausted itself. The interests of the much larger number of countries meet in this region, and the development of the universal international agreement concerning it has long been "felt" not only bilaterally but also regionally in order to build the balanced neighborhood policy and respect the interests of all concert parties. ; Статья посвящена определению возможностей применения концепции современного международного морского права о режиме исторических вод в Азовское море и Керченский пролив. Изучаются основные научные подходы к выработке оснований и механизмов признания отдельных морских пространств историческими водами государства. Подчеркивается отсутствие в современном международном публичном морском праве и национальном законодательстве Украины перечня таких оснований и механизмов. Отмечается пребывание Азово-Керченской акватории в сфере приоритетных национальных интересов Украины и важность создания благоприятной среды для развития морских портов региона. Обращается внимание на то, что вопрос разграничения Азово-Керченской акватории обсуждается уже длительный период, однако до настоящего времени прийти к взаимоприемлемому решению все же не удалось: позиции сторон и их обоснования различны, а учитывая временную оккупацию и продолжающийся конфликт между двумя странами, поиск компромисса может затянуться на неопределенное время. Поддержана идея о проведении международной конференции с целью определения правового статуса и режима использования Азовского моря и Керченского пролива и подписания соответствующего международного соглашения. Отмечается возможность прекращения в связи с этим действия действующих двусторонних соглашений: Договора о сотрудничестве в использовании Азовского моря и Керченского пролива 2003 г. и Соглашения по вопросам рыболовства в Азовском море 1993 г. Автор приходит к выводу о тому, что историчность принадлежности Азово-Керченской акватории к категории внутренних вод только двух государств в настоящее время исчерпала себя. В данном регионе пересекаются интересы значительно больше- го числа государств и выработка единой международной договоренности по нему уже давно «чувствуется» не только на двустороннем уровне, но и на региональном с целью построения взвешенной политики добрососедства и уважения интересов всех заинте- ресованных сторон. ; Статтю присвячено визначенню можливостей застосування концепції сучасного міжнародного морського права про режим історичних вод до Азовського моря та Керченської протоки. Вивчаються основні наукові підходи до вироблення підстав та механізмів визнання окремих морських просторів історичними водами держави. Підкреслюється відсутність у сучасному міжнародному публічному морському праві та національному законодавстві України переліку таких підстав та механізмів. Відзначається перебування Азово-Керченської акваторії у колі пріоритетних національних інтересів України та важливість створення сприятливого середовища для розвитку морських портів регіону. Звертається увага на те, що питання розмежування Азово-Керченської акваторії обговорюються же тривалий період, проте до теперішнього часу дійти до взаємоприйнятного рішення не вдалося: позиції сторін та їх обґрунтування є різними, а зважаючи на тимчасову окупацію та триваючий конфлікт між двома країнами, пошук компромісу може затягнутися на невизначений час. Підтримано ідею про проведення міжнародної конференції з метою визначення правового статусу та режиму використання Азовського моря та Керченської протоки та підписання відповідної між- народної угоди. Відзначається можливість припинення у зв'язку з цим дії діючих двосторонніх угод: Договору про співробітництво у використанні Азовського моря і Керченської протоки 2003 р. та Угоди з рибальства з питань рибальства в Азовському морі 1993 р. Підсумовується, що історичність приналежності Азово-Керченської акваторії до складу внутрішніх вод лише двох держав на теперішній час вичерпала себе. У цьому регіоні перетинаються інтереси значно більшої кількості держав і вироблення єдиної міжнародної домовленості щодо нього уже давно «відчувається» не лише на двосторонньому рівні, але й на регіональному з метою побудови виваженої політики добросусідства та поваги інтересів усіх зацікавлених сторін.

Problem setting. Environmental issues are one of the most important in today's globalized world. Environmental protection, rational use of natural resources, maintenance of environmental safety are determined by the legislation of Ukraine as a necessary condition for sustainable economic and social development of the country. NGOs in the field of environmental protection are formed by active members of society and play a key role in implementing the principles of public participation in decision-making. The activity of such organizations is aimed at expanding environmental activities into society, awareness and active public addressing of environmental issues.Recent research and publications analysis. The problems of NGOs' participation in the processes of formation and implementation of state policy were studied by E. Afonin, R. Voitovich, L. Honyukova, G. Hoshovska, V. Namestnik, T. Fedorenko, S. Teleshun, T. Alexandrov, T. Andriychuk, M. Vihlyaev, A. Voloshin, K. Glubochenko, M. Latsiba, N. Oksha, S. Stetsenko, O. Fedorov and others. The research of the environmental movement in Ukraine, its role in the processes of formation of ecological consciousness and ecological culture of Ukrainian society were accomplished by M. Aleksiyovets, S. Vasyuta, T. Hardashchuk, S. Gensiruk, V. Krysachenko, V. Namestnik, O. Stegnii, M. Hilko and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite many studies in the field of NGOs' activity, their participation in the formation and implementation of public policy, the issues of effective interaction of environmental organizations with public authorities are poorly studied and require more detailed analysis.The purpose of the article is to substantiate public participation in the process of public-administrative decision-making in the field of environmental protection as the main factor of democracy and development of civil society in the country.Paper main body. One of the main prerequisites in the development of democracy is the participation of wide population' groups in the process of decision-making. The regulations for interaction of public authorities and organizations of civil society in the formulation and implementation of public policies are generally created in democratic Ukraine. However, public organizations do not always effectively use the mechanisms of cooperation with the government.Engaging citizens to participate in decision-making should be based on relevant principles. The fundamental principles of public participation in policy making are: the principle of citizen' confidence in the government, the principle of government openness and transparency, the principle of objectivity, the principle of coordination, the presence of effective mechanisms to inform citizens, alternatives in discussing of practical aspects of problem-solving and others.The level of citizen' participation at different stages of the decision-making process may vary depending on the intensity of the attraction. There are four levels of participation, from the lowest to the highest engagement. These include information, consultation, dialogue and partnership.The real impetus for the development of the issues of public participation in the management of public affairs in environmental protection sphere was the ratification of the Aarhus Convention, UN/ECE, by Ukraine.Public participation in policy making and democracy in the western world have always been a part of environmental movement and environmental political theory.Environmental democracy is based on the idea that active public participation is crucial to ensure equitable consideration of public interests in decision-making considering the land and other natural resources. At its core, environmental democracy involves three mutually reinforcing rights: the right to free access to information on the quality and environmental issues; the right to democratic and constructive participation in decision-making; the right to enforce environmental regulations or compensation for damages. Even though these rights are widely recognized as fundamental for a responsible, equitable and effective environmental management, the extent to which countries have established them by means of laws and regulations still must be systematically measured. If ecological democracy is designed to ensure sustainable development, the rights to access to information, participation and justice on environmental issues should be recognized and enshrined by regulations of the country.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Rational use of natural resources and provision of environmental safety, enhancement of public awareness level and environmental awareness should be the priorities of public environmental policy. Public participation in environmental policy-making processes, defining the ways of management and environmental protection is a decisive factor and has a decisive influence on policy making in developed countries.Environmental democracy is defined as public participation and an environmentally sound form of collective decision-making that determines their priority, based on long-term public interests. The principles of environmental democracy should be used not only to criticize the existing institutional mechanisms of public-state interaction, but also to find other ways of their interaction.The prospect of further research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the issues of public environmental awareness in the countries with different economic development level. ; Аргументовано, що підвищення рівня інформаційної обізнаності громадськості з питань охорони довкілля та забезпечення її широкої участі у прийнятті державно-управлінських рішень щодо охорони навколишнього середовища має бути пріоритетом держави, яка прагне налагодити ефективну взаємодію з громадськістю. Зазначено, що, своєю чергою, участь громадськості при розробленні державної політики допомагає вирішенню складних соціальних та екологічних проблем суспільства. Доведено, що зазначене є однією з основних передумов розвитку демократії. Розглянуто основні міжнародні та національні нормативні акти у сфері охорони навколишнього природного середовища. Наведено рівні участі громадян на різних етапах процесу прийняття державно-управлінських рішень. Розглянуто поняття екологічної демократії та визначено, що розвиток освіти і поширення екологічної інформації стимулюють відповідальність громадськості у вирішенні екологічних питань.

Problem setting. Environmental issues are one of the most important in today's globalized world. Environmental protection, rational use of natural resources, maintenance of environmental safety are determined by the legislation of Ukraine as a necessary condition for sustainable economic and social development of the country. NGOs in the field of environmental protection are formed by active members of society and play a key role in implementing the principles of public participation in decision-making. The activity of such organizations is aimed at expanding environmental activities into society, awareness and active public addressing of environmental issues.Recent research and publications analysis. The problems of NGOs' participation in the processes of formation and implementation of state policy were studied by E. Afonin, R. Voitovich, L. Honyukova, G. Hoshovska, V. Namestnik, T. Fedorenko, S. Teleshun, T. Alexandrov, T. Andriychuk, M. Vihlyaev, A. Voloshin, K. Glubochenko, M. Latsiba, N. Oksha, S. Stetsenko, O. Fedorov and others. The research of the environmental movement in Ukraine, its role in the processes of formation of ecological consciousness and ecological culture of Ukrainian society were accomplished by M. Aleksiyovets, S. Vasyuta, T. Hardashchuk, S. Gensiruk, V. Krysachenko, V. Namestnik, O. Stegnii, M. Hilko and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite many studies in the field of NGOs' activity, their participation in the formation and implementation of public policy, the issues of effective interaction of environmental organizations with public authorities are poorly studied and require more detailed analysis.The purpose of the article is to substantiate public participation in the process of public-administrative decision-making in the field of environmental protection as the main factor of democracy and development of civil society in the country.Paper main body. One of the main prerequisites in the development of democracy is the participation of wide population' groups in the process of decision-making. The regulations for interaction of public authorities and organizations of civil society in the formulation and implementation of public policies are generally created in democratic Ukraine. However, public organizations do not always effectively use the mechanisms of cooperation with the government.Engaging citizens to participate in decision-making should be based on relevant principles. The fundamental principles of public participation in policy making are: the principle of citizen' confidence in the government, the principle of government openness and transparency, the principle of objectivity, the principle of coordination, the presence of effective mechanisms to inform citizens, alternatives in discussing of practical aspects of problem-solving and others.The level of citizen' participation at different stages of the decision-making process may vary depending on the intensity of the attraction. There are four levels of participation, from the lowest to the highest engagement. These include information, consultation, dialogue and partnership.The real impetus for the development of the issues of public participation in the management of public affairs in environmental protection sphere was the ratification of the Aarhus Convention, UN/ECE, by Ukraine.Public participation in policy making and democracy in the western world have always been a part of environmental movement and environmental political theory.Environmental democracy is based on the idea that active public participation is crucial to ensure equitable consideration of public interests in decision-making considering the land and other natural resources. At its core, environmental democracy involves three mutually reinforcing rights: the right to free access to information on the quality and environmental issues; the right to democratic and constructive participation in decision-making; the right to enforce environmental regulations or compensation for damages. Even though these rights are widely recognized as fundamental for a responsible, equitable and effective environmental management, the extent to which countries have established them by means of laws and regulations still must be systematically measured. If ecological democracy is designed to ensure sustainable development, the rights to access to information, participation and justice on environmental issues should be recognized and enshrined by regulations of the country.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Rational use of natural resources and provision of environmental safety, enhancement of public awareness level and environmental awareness should be the priorities of public environmental policy. Public participation in environmental policy-making processes, defining the ways of management and environmental protection is a decisive factor and has a decisive influence on policy making in developed countries.Environmental democracy is defined as public participation and an environmentally sound form of collective decision-making that determines their priority, based on long-term public interests. The principles of environmental democracy should be used not only to criticize the existing institutional mechanisms of public-state interaction, but also to find other ways of their interaction.The prospect of further research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the issues of public environmental awareness in the countries with different economic development level. ; Аргументовано, що підвищення рівня інформаційної обізнаності громадськості з питань охорони довкілля та забезпечення її широкої участі у прийнятті державно-управлінських рішень щодо охорони навколишнього середовища має бути пріоритетом держави, яка прагне налагодити ефективну взаємодію з громадськістю. Зазначено, що, своєю чергою, участь громадськості при розробленні державної політики допомагає вирішенню складних соціальних та екологічних проблем суспільства. Доведено, що зазначене є однією з основних передумов розвитку демократії. Розглянуто основні міжнародні та національні нормативні акти у сфері охорони навколишнього природного середовища. Наведено рівні участі громадян на різних етапах процесу прийняття державно-управлінських рішень. Розглянуто поняття екологічної демократії та визначено, що розвиток освіти і поширення екологічної інформації стимулюють відповідальність громадськості у вирішенні екологічних питань.