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Macroeconomic growth and incomes have been on the rise since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), but health service utilization and health outcomes in Indonesia have been slower to improve. Jamkesmas could provide valuable benefits by allowing cardholders to acquire preventative, curative, and catastrophic health care services without fees. When it promotes healthy households, keeps students active, alert, and participating in their education, returns adults to work sooner, and saves households from the high costs of healthcare, Jamkesmas' sizeable individual benefits should be matched by increased social benefits resulting from a healthy and productive population. Jamkesmas has been provided to poor households, but many non-poor have also received Jamkesmas benefits due to dual central and local targeting processes which have led to frequent mismatches and errors in coverage. Health service providers find Jamkesmas difficult and costly to implement resulting in fewer services provided, and funds spent, on Jamkesmas beneficiaries. Local regulations regarding public health center management often conflict with Jamkesmas mandates, leaving health service providers confused and unwilling to use Jamkesmas funds to provide Jamkesmas beneficiaries with planned services. The future costs of an improved Jamkesmas program have not been adequately publicized and Jamkesmas' financial, fiscal, and political sustainability is uncertain.

This report documents for the first time in over a decade the current stock of the publicly financed health workforce in PNG and their characteristics and deployment across the country by type of health facility and health cadre. It also documents the capacity of the health-related training institutions and presents the results of an important survey of health training institutions which enable unit costs, staffing and other aspects of the institutions to be analyzed together with a qualitative assessment of the quality of students and of facilities by training school principals. The report presents a set of five demand scenarios and draws out the implications for the health training system and of the health budget for these scenarios. The National Health Plan 2011-2020 (NHP) recognizes that the emerging crisis in the health human resources area is a critical issue confronting any viable strategy designed to implement the objectives it has set for the health sector. This report helps document the nature of this emerging crisis and makes specific recommendations on the way forward.

Adaptation to human-induced climate change is currently receiving a lot of attention in international development circles. But throughout human existence, natural resource-dependent people have exploited and coped with the effects of climate variability on the ecosystems from which they derive a living. Learning from this experience can help inform the design of appropriate policies for responding to human-induced climate change. This paper presents the results of a World Bank study which sought to better understand the role of local institutions in supporting adaptation to climate variability and change in Ethiopia, Mali and Yemen. The study raised three questions. First, what strategies have been adopted by rural households in the past to adapt to climate variability? Second, to what extent do institutions of various sorts assist households in adopting adaptation strategies? And third, what are the factors that prevent households from adopting appropriate adaptation strategies? For the purposes of this paper, institutions are defined as structured, formal or informal organizations. The study followed a three-step approach. First, drawing on original data from field surveys, focus group discussions and institutional stakeholder interviews, household vulnerability to climate variability was characterized in terms of its three constituent elements: exposure to climate-related shocks and stresses, and sensitivity and adaptive capacity in the face of such stressors. Sensitivity refers to the degree to which people are affected by climate variability and change. High levels of exposure and sensitivity and low levels of adaptive capacity generally result in high levels of vulnerability. But a high level of exposure need not necessarily result in a high level of vulnerability if the household's adaptive capacity is also high.

This report provides an assessment of accounting, financial reporting and auditing requirements and practices within the enterprise and financial sectors in Armenia. The report uses International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) formerly International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as benchmarks and draws on international experience and good practices in the field of accounting and audit regulation, including in European Union (EU) member states, to assess the quality of financial information and make policy recommendations. This assessment of accounting and auditing practices in Armenia is part of a joint initiative of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prepare Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). The assessment focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the accounting and auditing environment that influence the quality of corporate financial reporting and includes a review of both mandatory requirements and actual practice.

This assessment of accounting and auditing practices in Ukraine is part of a joint initiative of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prepare Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). The assessment focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the accounting and auditing environment that influence the quality of corporate financial reporting and includes both a review of both mandatory requirements and actual practice. The report uses International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as benchmarks and draws on international experience and good practice in the field of accounting and auditing regulation. All the key economic sectors in Ukraine rely on high quality financial information, which requires high quality private sector accounting and auditing. As Ukraine moves towards further reforms, liberalization and deregulation in efforts to foster an investment-friendly business environment enhanced financial transparency and improved accounting and auditing practices must support this. In this context, this report sets out policy recommendations to enhance the quality of corporate financial reporting and foster a financial reporting platform conducive to sustainable private and financial sector growth, thus increasing access to global financial markets and other tools of the market economy.

The Situation In The Middle East Letter Dated 1 February 2018 From The Secretary-General Addressed To The President Of The Security Council (S/2018/84) ; United Nations S/PV.8174 Security Council Seventy-third year 8174th meeting Monday, 5 February 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-03099 (E) *1803099* S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 2/17 18-03099 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Expression of thanks to the outgoing President The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, for his service as President of the Council for the month of January. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Umarov and his team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/84, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu. Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical-weapons programme. I remain in regular contact with the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met with the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this past Friday. At the time of my previous briefing, planning was under way with regard to the destruction of the remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am informed that the OPCW, working with the United Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to carry out the destruction, which I understand could be completed within two months. There have been some developments on the issues related to Syria's initial declaration and subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that this information provided clarifications on some issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow up with the Government of Syria on the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. The Director- General will submit a report in that regard to the next session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will take place in March. Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed of the results of the inspection via a separate note from the Director-General to the next session of the Executive Council. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon. In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has been looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus, at the invitation of the Government, to look into several of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that regard is also pending. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 3/17 There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013) can be considered to have been fully implemented, and for the international community to have shared confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated. Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have continued, including just this past weekend in the town of Saraqeb. That makes abundantly clear our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account. New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are pending. Should they conclude that there has been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): The news out of Syria this morning is following a troubling pattern. There are reports of yet another chemical-weapon attack on Sunday. Victims of what appears to be chlorine gas are pouring into hospitals. Few things have horrified my country and the world as much as the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against its people. The Security Council has been outspoken on ending Syria's use of chemical weapons, and yet they continue. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013), the Al-Assad regime's obligations are clear: it must immediately stop using all chemical weapons. It must address the gaps and inconsistencies in its Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. And it must destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These are worthy goals. These are urgent goals. Yet we spent much of last year in the Council watching one country protect the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons by refusing to hold them responsible. What do the American people see? What do people of all countries see? They see a Council that cannot agree to take action, even after the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, created by the Council, found that the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons. Now we have reports that the Al-Assad regime has used chlorine gas against its people multiple times in recent weeks, including just yesterday. There is obvious evidence from dozens of victims, and therefore we proposed a draft press statement by the Security Council condemning these attacks. So far, Russia has delayed the adoption of the draft statement — a simple condemnation of Syrian children being suffocated by chlorine gas. I hope Russia takes the appropriate step to adopt the draft text, thus showing that the Council is unified in condemning chemical-weapon attacks. Accountability is a fundamental principle, but it is just the first step. Our goal must be to end the use of these evil, unjustifiable weapons. When actions have consequences — when perpetrators are identified and punished — we come closer to reaching our goal. But if we cannot even take the first step of establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons, we have to seriously ask ourselves why we are here. The requirements for establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons have not changed since the Council voted unanimously to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism, in 2015. They have not changed since Russia acted alone to kill the Mechanism last year. Such a mechanism must be independent and impartial. It must be free of politics. It must be controlled by experts, not politicians or diplomats. And it must be definitive. The latest Russian draft resolution does not meet any of those criteria. Russia's draft resolution completely ignores the findings of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was an investigation that Russia supported until the investigators found the Al-Assad regime to be responsible. That should already be enough to make us sceptical. However, there are other deep problems. For their new investigation, Russia wants to be able to cherry-pick the investigators. It wants to insert unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards. And it wants the Security Council to be able to review all the findings of this investigation and decide what makes it into the final report. That is not an impartial mechanism; it is a way to whitewash the findings of the last investigation that Russia desperately wants to bury. No one should believe that the draft resolution is a good basis for discussion, when it is designed to undermine our core principles on chemical weapons. We cannot S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 4/17 18-03099 hope to end the use of chemical weapons if those who use them escape the consequences of their actions. Therefore, while we regret the need for its creation, we applaud the efforts of France to launch the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. That is yet another way to hold accountable the Al-Assad regime and any group that uses chemical weapons. The United States has also announced that we will contribute to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The United States strongly supports the Mechanism as a valuable tool to hold the Al-Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including its repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons. It is a true tragedy that Russia has sent us back to square one in the effort to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. But we will not cease in our efforts to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime — and ensure that the truth is known and acted on by the international community. That is why we hosted all 15 members of the Council at the United States Holocaust Museum last week. The exhibit was called "Syria: Please Don't Forget Us". All of us saw undeniable evidence of the Al-Assad regime's atrocities and human rights violations. We cannot, and should not, forget the Syrian people. The United States will not forget them. While the Council has not yet been able to act to provide real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United States will not give up on the responsibility to do so. That is the sincere wish of the American people, and I know that it is shared by many on the Council. We are not motivated by score-settling, payback or power politics. We are motivated by the urgent need to end the unique and horrible suffering that chemical weapons have inflicted on innocent men, women and children in Syria. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. We are holding this meeting in the open Chamber today after reports of a series of chemical attacks in eastern Ghouta within the past month, as the Al-Assad regime continues its merciless bombing and killing of civilians. Over the weekend, there were further allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib, as well as air strikes by pro-regime forces that reportedly hit three hospitals, leaving doctors scrambling to remove premature babies from their incubators in order to move them. I cannot say that they were moving them to safety, because the reality is that for the citizens of Idlib and eastern Ghouta, nowhere is safe. We are appalled by this violence and the reports of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and we call on all parties to the conflict to uphold international humanitarian law and protect civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is already investigating reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent weeks, but establishing who is responsible for that use will be much more difficult, because Russia has vetoed the continuation of the independent, expert OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) three times, in order to protect the Al-Assad regime. We would welcome any serious attempt to re-establish a properly independent investigative and attribution mechanism for continuing the JIM's meticulous work. Sadly, we do not yet see that in the Russian proposal. Any successor investigation must be empowered to investigate all use of chemical weapons, whoever the perpetrator may be. Yet the Russian proposal focuses only on non-State actors. We have repeatedly condemned Da'esh for its use of chemical weapons, which the JIM clearly reported. But given Al-Assad's track record of chemical-weapon use and its failure to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is imperative to ensure that any new mechanism also investigates the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. A second objection is the proposal that experts would merely gather evidence, leaving the Council to decide what it meant. No other United Nations expert panel that I know of is specifically prohibited from reaching conclusions and reporting to the Council on its findings on what has happened. We are not specialists on chemical weapons around this table. We rely on independent, United Nations-selected expert panels. The entire purpose of the JIM was that an independent panel would reach conclusions on the basis of the evidence, taking the issue out of the hands of us, the Member States and Council members, because we have been unable to agree. Russia's proposal looks as if it is designed to avoid the political embarrassment of having to use its veto power to defend the indefensible when independent bodies report on what has truly happened. The underlying intent seems to be to ensure that there are no clear conclusions in future reports. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 5/17 Thirdly, we object to the proposal's demands that the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. That standard has not been used in any other comparable past or current United Nations investigation. It is used in relation to criminal prosecutions in courts of law, which have significantly greater investigative powers and independence than those envisaged in Russia's text. Finally, the proposal insists on site visits, despite the explicit provision in the Chemical Weapons Convention for other ways to gather relevant evidence, recognizing the difficulty of safe and timely visits. There is no scientific basis for this proposal. It is simply an attempt to hamstring future investigations and discredit the JIM. Of course, Russia made much of the lack of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, despite the fact that the Al-Assad regime handed over to the United Nations samples from the site that contained chemical signatures unique to regime sarin, obviating the need for such a visit. It is for those reasons that the current text is unacceptable. The JIM set a high standard of impartiality and expertise. We expect that standard from any future mechanism. The Syrian regime, of course, claims not to have used chemical weapons. Yet over the years two separate reports from the JIM, under separate leadership panels, drawing on a broad range of respected independent international experts, concluded that the regime had used chlorine at least three times — in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin and Qmenas in March 2015 — and had used sarin to attack Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. We should also remember the infamous attack in eastern Ghouta in August 2013, when a separate United Nations investigation found that sarin was used to kill hundreds and injure thousands. That attack brought near-universal international condemnation, and following our concerted international pressure, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria promised, as it was legally obliged to do, to destroy and abandon its chemical-weapon programme. Yet it has been unable to satisfy inspectors that it has done so. We have to ask ourselves why that is. In 2013 Russia promised to act as a guarantor for the Al-Assad regime's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet month after month we all sit here and hear that Al-Assad has not done so. Why does Russia not compel the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations and make it impossible for it to use chemical weapons? Tragically, for the people of Syria, the regime continues to use chemical weapons with impunity. If it is confirmed that Al-Assad has again used chemical weapons on his own people, it would not only be another entry in the catalogue of his war crimes, it would also be another attack on us all, Members of the United Nations who have worked for decades — in the words of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the sake of all mankind — to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Throughout history, our peoples have said "never again" — among others, starting with the First World War battlefields, in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in Saddam Hussein's attacks on Iran and on Iraqi Kurds. Let us, the members of the Council, stand up for the peoples of the United Nations, determined that such abhorrent chemical weapons should never be used. Let us stand up for the people of Syria and give them a real investigation into those responsible for the use of chemical weapons — an investigation that pursues justice for the horrific crimes committed against them. Let us signal our determination to pursue accountability by all means available, even if one member of the Security Council is currently preventing us from taking action here. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on the start of its presidency of the Security Council. You can rely on France's support in the month to come. I would also like to thank Izumi Nakamitsu for her usual very informative briefing. This is the second time we have met in less than two weeks after reports of four new cases of the use of chlorine against Syria's civilian population, some of them in Idlib province, which is a de-escalation zone. We are examining the information that is available and waiting for the conclusions of the investigative mechanism, but the reality is that resorting to toxic substances as weapons has never ended in Syria. I would like to remind the Council that the Syrian regime has already been identified as the perpetrator in four such cases, one of which involved the use of sarin, in violation of international humanitarian law and the obligations that Syria assumed when it acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The challenges go beyond the Syrian issue. A century after the end of the First World War, in which mustard gas was used on a massive scale against civilians, what we are seeing is shocking. These weapons, which we had thought were a thing of the past, are once again being used methodically and systematically by the Syrian regime against its own people. Furthermore, there is a real threat of such S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 6/17 18-03099 weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The threat is all the greater given the fact that the dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapon programme remains at a deadlock. The cooperation of the Syrian regime with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has for months taken place in a piecemeal manner, and suspicions remain about the status of Syrian stockpiles. I would recall that OPCW expert teams have repeatedly found at Syrian sites indicators of undeclared substances, without any convincing explanation being provided by the country. Given that chemical weapons continue to be used, it seems that Syria has lied and maintained clandestine capacities. The situation is aggravating regional instability, undermining the non-proliferation regime and weakening the international security architecture, as well as jeopardizing the security of each of our States. It represents a violation of the law and flouts the most fundamental principles of humanity. The international community cannot downplay the situation and allow the perpetrators of these heinous crimes to remain unpunished. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to prevent this; it is our shared responsibility. The criminals who chose to design and use these barbaric weapons must be punished. At stake is the future of our collective security system; no one can be allowed to undermine its foundations without facing consequences. The hindrances and obstructions facing the international community's initiatives within existing bodies contribute to promoting impunity, and this we cannot accept. For that reason, France launched in Paris an open, pragmatic partnership that brings together States that reject impunity for individuals involved in chemical-weapon attacks or in the development of chemical-weapon programmes. It brings together all the States concerned about the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime and of strategic stability. It was designed to support all international bodies and investigative mechanisms in their efforts. This universal partnership applies to all instances of the use of such weapons throughout the world by all perpetrators, be they State or non-State actors. The partnership is open, and States that embrace these principles are invited to join. Like everyone else here, we hope that a mechanism for the identification of those responsible will be recreated as soon as possible. However, any sincere and credible effort to that end must align with the basic standards of independence, impartiality and professionalism that underpinned the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as the very reason for the establishment of such a regime is to determine the truth. Within the Council, France will be very vigilant with respect to the principles listed and will not accept a lesser mechanism. Impunity in Syria is not an option. The perpetrators of all of the crimes committed in Syria will be held accountable, sooner or later. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, which we support, is a part of that process. That is the only way to ensure lasting peace in Syria, and this can come about only in the framework of an inclusive political solution in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015), which more than ever before represents our shared compass. The repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria has been proved. We cannot turn a blind eye to this, for no one can now say that they did not know. Denial or hypocrisy, or a combination of of the two, cannot be presented as a strategy. The persistent use of chemical weapons in Syria represents a violation of the universal conscience as well as the most fundamental principles of international law. It also poses a potentially lethal threat to the sustainability of the international non-proliferation regime, which is the most comprehensive and successful of all of the international non-proliferation regimes. To allow it to be undermined without any response would be to accept the erosion of the entire international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that we have built together, stone by stone, over the course of decades and which constitutes the very backbone of the international security architecture as well as one of the paramount gains of multilateralism. On behalf of France, I call on all members of the Security Council to shift their attitudes and adjust their focus. The heavy responsibility that we all bear requires that we join together and take action. Mr. Llorenty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to congratulate you once again, Sir, as well as the Permanent Mission of Kuwait, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We are also grateful for the briefing provided by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu. We also 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 7/17 wish to acknowledge the letter sent by the Secretary- General (S/2018/84) concerning the periodic report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Bolivia believes that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons, regardless of circumstances and by whomsoever committed, as such use is a serious violation of international law and poses a grave threat to international peace and security. We therefore categorically condemn the use of chemical weapons or substances as weapons, as we deem this an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. In that context, we express our grave concern about the ongoing reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, especially in eastern Ghouta. If that is confirmed, the Council should remain united in order to ensure that the perpetrators are held accountable and brought to justice, so that there is no impunity for their actions. We commend the coordination between the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Project Services in all of the arrangements aimed at making possible the destruction of the two remaining facilities as well as the preparedness of the Syrian Government to achieve this end. We call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW on this initiative, as well as during the second inspection of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. We encourage the Fact-finding Mission to continue its investigation so that, in accordance with its mandate, it can investigate, in the most objective, methodical and technical manner, reports of the use of chemicals weapons on Syrian territory. In that regard, we highlight the latest visit to the city of Damascus during January, and we will await the results thereof. We call on all parties involved to cooperate fully as well as to provide viable and reliable information, so that an effective investigation of all of the ongoing cases can be conducted as soon as possible. Concerned about the reports of the use of chemical weapons, we deem it essential to establish as soon as possible an independent, impartial and representative mechanism to carry out a full, reliable and conclusive investigation of the cases referred by the Fact-finding Mission that will make it possible to identify those responsible for such acts. Nevertheless, if we want to create a new, transparent accountability mechanism, we have the major challenge and the responsibility of not instrumentalizing the Security Council for political ends. In that vein, we view the Russian proposal as a new and positive opportunity to reach this goal. We therefore call on the members of the Council to commit themselves to a process of purposeful negotiation, and we echo the words of the Secretary-General in his letter transmitting the current report, calling on the Security Council to demonstrate unity on this issue, which is so vital for the international community. Finally, we reiterate that the only option for resolving the conflict in Syria and prevent more people from becoming victims is through an inclusive political transition led by and benefiting the Syrian people that respects their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Since this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I would like to congratulate the delegation of Kuwait on the commencement of its presidency and wish it great success in implementing its ambitious programme of work. I am grateful to High Representative Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. Our position on this issue remains unchanged. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons and advocate that such threats must be eliminated in the future. We firmly believe that there must be accountability for perpetrators of such crimes. Today I would like to concentrate on three major points. First, we support the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as reflected in its fifty-second report (S/2018/84, annex). The speedy destruction, probably in two months, of the remaining chemical-weapon production facilities and resolving all outstanding issues relating to the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic are of the utmost importance. That would help to dispel all existing doubts on many principal issues and to comprehend the real situation in the country. It is commendable that, during the inspection of Barzah and Jamrayah, all samples were sealed, packaged and shipped to OPCW's laboratory and were received there in the presence of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, observing all established rules. We look forward to the follow-up to the OPCW's work, and we will also await the results S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 8/17 18-03099 of a thorough analysis of the documents submitted by Syria by the Declaration Assessment Team. Secondly, the continuing reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria are extremely alarming. But the most alarming fact is that the Council has not yet restored its investigative potential to properly respond to such cases. I recall the words of the Secretary-General, who pointed to the serious gap that had arisen at the end of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which leaves one with the feeling that impunity will continue without any strict monitoring. Thirdly, and lastly, considering the current developments, it is also most critical that a new mechanism be established as soon as possible. We here in the Council are not experts on chemical weapons — neither to judge or blame anyone — but must act on the basis of credible evidence provided to us by an independent, impartial and representative investigative body we can all trust. In that regard, we support the ongoing consultations on creating a new investigative instrument, in order to prevent any further use of chemical weapons and to bring perpetrators to justice. We are ready to participate actively and contribute to the earliest revival and ultimate realization of our investigative potential. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We join others in congratulating your delegation, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We support you in discharging your tasks, which we are sure you will do in full. We welcome the holding of this meeting and thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her valuable briefing on this topic. Peru condemns the use of chemical weapons by any actor, in any place and under any circumstance. Their use against the civilian population in Syria is a war crime and a flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the non-proliferation regimes. In that regard, Peru believes it is essential for the international community, and in particular the Security Council, to remain resolute and united in its support for the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring that those responsible for these atrocious crimes — which are also threats to international peace and security — be held accountable. We must continue to demand that the Syrian Government fulfil its commitment to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the elimination of all of its chemical weapons. We take note of some recent progress, such as the imminent destruction of the last two declared chemical-weapon production facilities, as verified preliminarily by the OPCW last November, and the allocation of new financial resources to that end. Nevertheless, we are concerned that key points of the Syrian Government's declaration have yet to be verified, more than four years after its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We hope that the 19 recently translated documents that were provided to the OPCW will help rectify errors and omissions and clear up discrepancies. We reaffirm our commitment and support to the OPCW, whose Executive Council Peru is honoured to be a member of. In the face of new reports of chemical-weapon attacks in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, Peru expresses its solidarity with the victims and reiterates the urgent need to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of such atrocities. Like a majority of Council members, we believe that accountability is essential to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regimes. Preventing this threat requires a credible deterrent. With that goal in mind, we believe it is urgent to establish an attributive mechanism with the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, transparency and, primarily, independence in order to fill the gap left by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. My delegation will continue to work constructively to create a new mechanism that addresses the legitimate concerns of all Council members and of the international community. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I also want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I also thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing today. In recent weeks there have been new, alarming reports of alleged chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. The most recent allegation was this weekend in Idlib. These reported attacks must be immediately investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission, to which we offer our full and unreserved support. We reiterate our strongest condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. It is a serious violation 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 9/17 of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Their use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Perpetrators of such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity. That is why Sweden joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France. As a member of the Security Council and of the OPCW Executive Council, we support all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike anywhere in the world. We count on this initiative to complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, both of which have important mandates in collecting information. I again thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today. She reminded us that work remains on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The outstanding issues relating to Syria's initial declaration must be resolved without further delay. We again call upon the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW in that regard. As the Secretary-General has stated, the continuing allegations highlight yet again our shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use chemical weapons on Syria. We need to heed his call, come together and act. That is why Sweden has engaged in the negotiations on establishing a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism. The Council has a responsibility to protect the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and for ensuring accountability. Negotiations need to be in good faith, but with the objective of establishing a truly independent, impartial and effective mechanism for accountability. Ms. Wronecka (Poland) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to take this opportunity to wish the delegation of Kuwait every success in implementing the programme of work for this month. (spoke in English) Let me thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. We appreciate the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Fact-finding Mission. We welcome the cooperation between the secretariat and the United Nations Office for Project Services, which facilitated the destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon production facilities. We look forward to the results of the analysis by the Declaration Assessment Team of a set of documents and declarations submitted by Syria. Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat to the people of Syria. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the recent ones, serve to underline the fact that there is still a challenge to international peace and security, as well as to the credibility of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. In that context, there is a genuine need for a clear message that impunity for perpetrators is not an option. We have clearly stated in various forums that the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike — anywhere and under any circumstances must be rigorously condemned and those responsible for such acts must be held accountable. We agree that the Security Council needs to take steps in order to establish a credible, professional and independent investigative mechanism. We have therefore engaged in the discussions to find the best solution for the future mechanism. I would like to focus on three points. First, Poland has supported the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and continues to support the establishment of an independent and credible investigative mechanism aimed at holding accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. However, a future mechanism will not operate in a void. The instrument must build on the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Not only should it build on the significant achievements of the JIM, but its mandate must not deviate from resolution 2235 (2015). Secondly, the mandate of the mechanism should be balanced. There is a need to identify not only the individuals, entities and groups but also the Governments responsible for any use of chemicals as weapons. Thirdly, one of the most important elements of the mandate must be to ensure that the mechanism is independent in its proceedings and conclusions and S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 10/17 18-03099 free from the pressure of political verification of its conclusions by the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Allow me once again to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the State of Kuwait on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success and assure you of our full support. Allow me also to express my congratulations and appreciation to Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her team for the presentation of the comprehensive and detailed briefing on the current political and humanitarian situation with regard to chemical weapons in Syria. The political — and in particular the humanitarian — crisis in Syria is reaching alarming proportions. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its solidarity with the families of the countless victims, as well as with the thousands of displaced people trapped by the hostilities and the more than 13 million people who currently need humanitarian assistance as a result of the continuing conflict. I would like to take this opportunity to condemn the loss of numerous civilian lives in this conflict, and I call on all parties to comply with international law on the protection of civilians and to distinguish between military and civilian objectives and refrain from firing rocket launchers into populated areas, as is being reported in eastern Ghouta. Equatorial Guinea can only express its satisfaction at the destruction of almost all the chemical-weapon production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic thanks to the technical assistance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, while we welcome the cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW, it is necessary to be vigilant and to continue to condemn in the strongest terms any possible use, development, acquisition or manufacture of chemical weapons in the country or transfers of such weapons to other States or non-State actors. In that regard, we vigorously condemn the recent use of toxic chemical weapons by whomsoever. The perpetrators of such horrendous acts must be brought to justice and sentenced appropriately. For seven years already, Syria has been a war scenario that crystallizes internal, regional and, even, international divisions. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security bestowed upon the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations should lead the 15 member countries of this principal organ of the United Nations to overcome their differences regarding the situation in Syria and to renounce their political and strategic interests in favour of the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to achieve well-being and prosperity. In that regard, it is appropriate that, as Russia has already proposed, another mechanism be established to replace the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism so that it can carry out the necessary investigations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and thereby arrive at a result that garners consensus among the members of the Council in order to again unify our criteria for an objective examination of the situation. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, at the beginning of your presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success. We also thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. We trust that, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the two remaining above-ground Syrian chemical-weapon facilities will be promptly destroyed. The Syrian side has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in that. The pending issues related to the initial declarations should be dealt with as part of the dialogue between the OPCW and the Syrian Government. We welcome such cooperation, by which Syria, as a conscientious party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides the necessary assistance, complies with its obligations and facilitates access to the relevant documents. Many people have raised false issues that should now be closed and put aside. Syria's chemical-weapon capacity was destroyed under the oversight of the OPCW. However, it seems that there are some who wish to contrive to fan the flames on the issue. The Syrians have provided exhaustive explanations. However, issues are being raised and questions are being asked in a endless cycle. The Syrian side consistently reports to the international community, including the Security Council, about the detection of toxic chemical substances in areas liberated from the terrorists. There 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 11/17 are reports from Syria about possible provocations that may be used by representatives of foreign intelligence services. All such reports must be investigated immediately by the experts of the OPCW. However, we note that, in general, tremendous efforts are necessary for The Hague to duly respond to the important message. There are numerous pretexts being put forward not to travel there and decisions are being delayed. In the light of last year's story of Khan Shaykhun and the Shayrat air base, such conduct suggests deliberate sabotage. However, the statements today have left us with the impression that it is not Syria that some delegations are interested in. The United States and the United Kingdom have used today's meeting to slander Russia, and it is quite clear why that is happening. Someone cannot tolerate the success of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi and the prospects it offers for injecting new momentum into the political process in Syria. That requires launching a major campaign of slander against Russia in order to try, not for the first time, to cast doubt on Russia's role in the Syrian political settlement. As always, the statements of these representatives contain a grain of truth mixed with mountains of lies. Russia has never contested the use of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. But who it was used by is still a mystery, because the absurd conclusions of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) have not convinced us. In the past few days there has been general uproar about alleged incidents involving the use of chlorine in some Damascus suburbs. There has already been talk of the use of sarin. Where? When? By whom? The outlines of this propaganda campaign are not new. The terrorists, through the social associations that are closely linked to them, foremost among them the notorious White Helmets, spread rumours via social networks. These are instantly picked up by the Western press, and then we get representatives speechifying in the Security Council, making unproved accusations about the so-called Syrian regime and spreading slander about Russia. I have said it before and I will say it again: has anyone thought to ask the basic question as to why the Syrian Government needs to use chemical weapons? What do we suppose that could do for it? The first thing we should do, and various speakers today, particularly the representative of Sweden, have discussed this, is to send an OPCW fact-finding mission to those areas to investigate. Where is the presumption of innocence? The speakers are blaming the so-called regime for everything in advance, before any investigation. What do they want an independent investigative mechanism for? Surely at least they know that an investigation has to precede any conclusions. But apparently they do not need one. In my opinion, it should be completely clear to everyone that that the capitals that these representatives represent in the Council have absolutely no interest in any investigation. They do not need facts or precise evidence. They need to see a political order carried out. On 23 January, Russia announced the launch in the Security Council of expert efforts to draft a resolution establishing a new investigative entity for incidents involving the use of chemical weapons to replace the defunct OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was killed by the United States and its allies when they blocked the draft resolution (S/2017/968) that we proposed, together with China and Bolivia, designed to ensure that the Mechanism could be genuinely independent and professional. Not only do they not recall that episode, they have made strenuous attempts to convince the Security Council and the world community of the opposite. It has become clear that some of our partners are not prepared to consider this possibility. They want a second JIM that would continue to rubber-stamp the scientifically and technically ridiculous anti-Damascus conclusions on the basis of disinformation generously supplied by militant groups. They have long had a persistent allergy to the pressing need to pay close attention to the activities of terrorist groups, both in Syria and beyond its borders, in the context of manipulating toxic substances. In the realization that we will not allow the now entirely discredited JIM to be revived, Syria's opponents are now attempting to take alternative routes, cobbling together narrow groups of like-minded people. However, they are forgetting that in doing that they are undermining the authority of international bodies, particularly the United Nations and the OPCW, and destroying the international architecture on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any initiatives in the context of the use of chemical weapons that circumvent the OPCW would be illegitimate. We certainly hope that the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat and the OPCW Technical Secretariat will make a firm show of will and distance themselves from such dubious projects. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 12/17 18-03099 We are ready to accept a press statement on the Syrian chemical issue, but not the one proposed by its sponsors, because in its current form its purpose is quite clearly to blame the Government of Syria for what is so far the unproved use of chemical weapons. Somehow the draft statement does not say anything about the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, but the reference to Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations leaves no doubt as to its essence. We cannot accept any still unconfirmed references to the use of chemical weapons without a credible investigation, nor can we accept any threats to a sovereign State for unproved actions. For some reason, eastern Ghouta has been dragged into the statement. I would like to remind the Council that last week we were prepared to accept an agreed-on draft presidential statement on the humanitarian situation in Syria. But our partners preferred to reject it. We are ready to accept a press statement, but not as it is proposed by our colleagues. We have proposed amendments to it that we are ready to circulate and agree on in that form. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): I would like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on its accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February, to wish it every success and assure it of Côte d'Ivoire's cooperation. I would also like to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her excellent briefing. My delegation commends the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through its Fact-finding Mission with regard to the dismantling of Syria's chemical-weapon stocks. We encourage the Syrian Government to comply with decisions regarding the destruction of its chemical arsenal. My delegation is seriously concerned about the reports in the past week once again alleging the possible use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta, where 21 cases of suffocation have been reported. They represent a significant reversal in our efforts to combat impunity with regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The suffering inflicted on the Syrian people is intolerable and must be ended. In that regard, my country calls for continued efforts to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which provides for the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapons arsenal. These new allegations of the use of chemical weapons once again call into question the Council's responsibility, particularly in terms of putting an end to these acts as soon as possible and of clearly identifying the perpetrators of such criminal acts. In its latest statement on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria (see S/PV.8164), my delegation warned against the Council's failure to act, which could be interpreted by those involved in the use of such weapons in Syria as a weakness of this organ and licence to act with impunity. Clearly, those who commit these despicable acts will continue to do so as long as the Council remains divided about the need to set up a consensus-based framework capable of identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice. My delegation therefore encourages all ongoing initiatives that support the establishment of an accountability mechanism acceptable to all. In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and calls upon the relevant United Nations mechanisms to shed light on the new allegations of the use of such weapons. My delegation eagerly awaits the conclusions of the report that will be submitted after the second round of inspections conducted at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Syria. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China congratulates Kuwait on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We also commend Kazakhstan for its accomplishments during its presidency last month. I wish to thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. China welcomes the progress achieved in the verification and destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon facilities within Syria's borders. We support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in continuing its coordination and cooperation with the Syrian Government so as to properly settle all the questions revolving around the initial declarations of chemical weapons by Syria through the OPCW platform. China expresses its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering as the result of chemical weapons. No use of chemical weapons will be tolerated. Lately, there have been some media reports of suspected use of chlorine and other poisonous chemicals as weapons within Syria's borders, over which China wishes to register its deepest concern. It is hoped that 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 13/17 the parties will carry out verification of the related incidents as soon as possible. When it comes to the question of chemical weapons, China's position is as clear cut as it is consistent. We stand firmly against the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual for whatever purpose and under any circumstances. China supports conducting comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations into any alleged use of chemical weapons within Syrian borders so as to come up with results that withstand the test of time, square with the facts and help bring the perpetrators to justice. Establishing a new chemical-weapon investigative mechanism is critical to getting to the bottom of the chemical-weapon incidents as well as warding off any future recurrences in Syria. All Council parties should work together to that end. China supports the efforts on the part of Russia to promote the establishment of a new investigative mechanism into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that the members of the Council will continue to engage in constructive consultations so as to achieve consensus at an early date. The chemical-weapon issue in Syria is closely related to a political settlement to the Syrian situation. Major achievements have been made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held recently in Sochi, which played a positive role in advancing the Syrian political process, while lending impetus to relaunching the Geneva talks. It is China's hope that relevant parties will support the Security Council and the OPCW in continuing to act as the main channel for tackling the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, adopt a constructive attitude, seek proper solutions through consultation, maintain the unity of the Council and work with the United Nations and with the relevant parties in advancing the political process in Syria. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): As this is the first time that I take the floor under the Kuwaiti presidency of the Security Council, I would like to congratulate and honour Kuwait's assumption of the presidency by trying to offer my thanks in Arabic: (spoke in Arabic) Thank you, Mr. President. (spoke in English) I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her comprehensive and clear briefing. I will address three issues today: first, reports of the renewed use of chemical weapons in Syria; secondly, the need for accountability; and, thirdly, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report at hand (S/2018/84, annex). With respect to the renewed use of chemical weapons in the past weeks, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is shocked at the recent reports of chemical attacks in Syria, including this weekend and last night. We are outraged. In Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and last night in Saraqeb, in Idlib, innocent civilians, including children, have become victims once again of horrible chemical-weapon attacks. Such attacks deserve the strongest condemnation of the Security Council as violations of international law. Furthermore, recent OPCW laboratory tests show that samples of the chemical attack on Ghouta in August 2013 correspond to the chemical-weapons arsenal declared by the Syrian regime in 2014 and the Khan Shaykun attack in 2017. This confirms once again that the Al-Assad regime uses chemical weapons against its own population. We pay tribute to the work of the White Helmets, who have saved more a 100,000 civilians from the rubble of the Syrian war. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished. Impunity erodes the important prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. It is inconceivable that impunity now reigns, which brings me to my second point, namely, the need for accountability. As others have said, we had a well-functioning and professional mechanism to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). The JIM repeatedly determined the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and by Da'esh. It had a strong mandate to investigate and identify perpetrators independently from the politics of the Security Council. And it did so accordingly, but the renewal of its mandate fell victim to the repeated use of the veto. However, that does not mean that we now need to settle for less. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is prepared to work together on any proposal that strengthens accountability and the international rule of law. But let me emphasize that a weak accountability mechanism is not an option. For us, the fundamental characteristics of any accountability mechanism are the principles of impartiality, independence, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 14/17 18-03099 In order to uphold those principles, a mechanism should at least meet the following requirements. First, it should operate independently from the Security Council, including when it comes to the attribution of guilt. It should be impartial. The separation of powers is necessary to prevent undue politicization. Secondly, the mechanism should be effective; it should independently decide how it will conduct its investigations, including when it comes to analysing facts and assessing the quality of evidence. Lastly, it should be comprehensive and investigate and identify perpetrators among all parties to the armed conflict — both State and non-State actors. The draft resolution that is currently being discussed has not yet met those important principles. That brings me to my third point, namely, the fifty-second OPCW report (S/2018/84, annex), which the High Representative presented very clearly in her briefing. The report points out that, unfortunately, too little progress has been made by the Syrian authorities in addressing the outstanding questions that the OPCW posed about the declaration of the Syrian authorities. It is essential that the Syrian authorities cooperate seriously with the OPCW. The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports the continuation of the work of OPCW Fact-finding Mission. We call on all States to ensure that the Fact-finding Mission can continue its work independently. In conclusion, we stand ready to adopt the draft press statement, as circulated before. We are convinced that the Security Council cannot allow the continued use of chemical weapons to go unpunished. Impunity is a curse; accountability is a must. The Council has to act. As long as the Council is blocked from achieving accountability by the use of the veto, we will also continue our efforts outside the Council. We therefore strongly support other accountability initiatives for Syria, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic and the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. We also support the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which was just highlighted by our French colleague. However, let me repeat what I have said in the Chamber before, the Council should refer the situation in Syria, especially the mass atrocities committed in the conflict, to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We are very pleased to see you, Mr. President, assuming responsibility for the presidency. I wish to thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing, which, as always, we found to be balanced, and therefore useful. We are in need of that kind of approach. Frankly speaking, we need that very desperately. During times such as this, when we seem to be so deeply divided, the role of United Nations officials like her becomes all the more critical. We thank her. We remain deeply concerned by the continued reports on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by any actor, State and non-State alike, in Syria or anywhere else. As we have stated repeatedly, the use of chemical weapons is totally unjustifiable under any circumstances. It constitutes a threat to international peace and security and undermines the international non-proliferation architecture. We cannot agree more with what the Secretary-General stated in the concluding paragraph of his letter of 1 February: "The fact of these continuing allegations again highlights the shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons." That is why the unity of the Council is absolutely important. Without it, the Council's ability to respond to grave threats to international peace and security, such as the use of chemicals as weapons, will be seriously hampered. In that regard, what High Representative Nakamitsu said a while ago is most relevant: "unity, not impunity". Let me say that we regret that the Council was not able to renew the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. If we are not able to address this institutional gap by drawing lessons from last year and forge the necessary unity and compromise, we will be sending the wrong message and encouraging impunity. The fact that chemical-weapon attacks have continued as recently as yesterday worries us very much. That is why it is so critical that we seek an independent way of establishing accountability. We appreciate the initiative taken by the Russian Federation to propose a draft resolution on the establishment of a new mechanism, which has been the basis for discussion in recent days. This is a conversation that we welcome. As we continue to discuss this very important matter, our consultations should be constructive and forward-looking. Of course, 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 15/17 we are not naive; we have no illusions about how matters are becoming more and more complicated by the day. However, we still hope that the Council will restore its unity to reach common ground and create an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that will be able to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, based on robust evidence. We welcome that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has continued to assist the Syrian Government in destroying the remaining stationary above-ground facilities. As the High Representative stated, we hope the facilities will be totally eliminated in the coming month. We have just heard a very encouraging statement from the High Representative. We note that the OPCW has translated and finalized its analysis of the 19 documents submitted by the Syrian Government. While we look forward to the final report, we encourage continued cooperation and meaningful communication between the Syrian Government and the OPCW that leads to tangible results to address the outstanding issues. We also note that its Fact-finding Mission has continued its investigation related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We look forward to its reports. Let me conclude by again reiterating, at the risk of sounding naive, how the unity of the Council is vital to ensuring accountability and deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. We only hope that the challenge we face in this area is not a reflection of the growing lack of trust that characterizes international relations today, making joint action in most critical areas more complicated than it should be. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Kuwait. At the outset, I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for the briefing she gave at the beginning of this meeting. We had hoped that the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), in September 2013 following the first incident involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, would have resolved this matter, since the Council had demonstrated unity and determination in confronting that crime with a view to ensuring that it not be repeated and that its perpetrators be held accountable. Consequently, we regret the substantial regression in addressing the chemical-weapon issue in Syria, which is a result of the divisions among Council members after the Council was unable to extend the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, which we feel carried out its tasks in a very professional, impartial and independent manner. We express our deep concern about the allegations of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, most recently during the attack in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, last week and during the attack that took place in Saraqeb, in Idlib, yesterday. This is the third such attack during the past few weeks, which means that the perpetrators of those crimes will go unpunished and that there is no guarantee that they, or anyone else, who commits such crimes in the future will be held accountable, after we lost the Joint Investigative Mechanism. The position of the State of Kuwait is a principled and steadfast one that strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as this is considered a grave violation of international law. We reiterate the need to hold accountable those responsible for such use, be they individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments. In that context, we condemn the use of heavy and destructive weapons as well as the targeting civilians and residential areas killing dozens of innocent victims. These weapons target health facilities and civilian locations in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and other areas. We therefore support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria in its quest to gather evidence and investigate the crimes committed against civilians in order to hold the perpetrators accountable. The State of Kuwait will support any alternative or mechanism that enjoys the consensus of all members of the Security Council and ensures the independence, neutrality and professionalism of any new future mechanism. In that regard, we reaffirm that the primary responsibility of any mechanism must be to determine the identity of those using chemical weapons in Syria, provided that the Security Council would then play its role and hold the perpetrators accountable, in implementation of the principle of ending impunity and of resolution 2118 (2013), which undoubtedly stipulates the imperative need for, and importance of, holding accountable those responsible for the use of chemical S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 16/17 18-03099 weapons in Syria. We also look forward to receiving the report that will soon be submitted by the Fact-finding Mission, as mentioned by Ms. Nakamitsu in her earlier briefing on the most recent incidents, as well as her reports on the use of chlorine gas in Saraqib. In conclusion, we reiterate our full readiness to take part in any efforts that are aimed at reaching consensus among Security Council members and at holding accountable the perpetrators of such internationally prohibited crimes. We assert that a political solution in Syria is the only way to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the crisis, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I disagree with a lot of what my Russian colleague said, but I will not stretch my colleagues' patience. But I do feel compelled briefly to respond to several of the points that he made. The first point is to say that this is not political for us. Preventing the use of these abhorrent weapons should transcend political disagreements. We do not oppose Russia's important role in Syria at all. We noted the outcomes of Sochi, and we look forward to the proposal for a constitutional committee returning to the next round of Geneva talks, with the full participation of Russia and the Syrian authorities, as was laid out in resolution 2254 (2015). The second point I would simply make is that the notion that it was anyone other than Russia that ended the Joint Investigative Mechanism is absurd. The voting records of the Council are clear and are available to all. Russia vetoed three different proposals for the extension of the Mechanism, the last of which simply extended it for a short period and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations, but even that was unacceptable. Finally, on a note of agreement, I just want, like my Dutch colleague, to praise the incredible work of the White Helmets, who risk their own lives on a daily basis to save thousands of Syrians civilians. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): My country condemns and rejects in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons or of any other weapon of mass destruction, as this constitutes a crime against humanity and an unethical and unjustifiable act, under any circumstances. The real target of such weapons is the Syrian people, who remain the primary victims of the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups, which have not hesitated to use chemical weapons against them. I reaffirm before the Security Council that my country has sought, and continues to seek, to identify the real perpetrators responsible for the use of chemical weapons in my country, Syria. Based on those steadfast principles, my Government joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and has honoured all of its commitments thereunder. My country achieved an unprecedented and definitive feat in the history of the Organization by ending the Syrian chemical-weapons programme in record time. That was corroborated in the report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to the Council in June 2014. My country is the party most desirous of uncovering the truth. We have always supported, and will continue to support, in principle any initiative by the Council whose aim is to establish the truth, identify those who are really trading in the blood of the Syrian people and using toxic chemical substances against Syrian civilians, including armed terrorist groups, as well as levelling false accusations against the Syrian Government. In that regard, on behalf of the Government of my country, I once again reiterate our condemnation of all American and Western allegations accusing us of committing chemical-weapon attacks in our country. I reaffirm that those accusations are groundless and cheap lies. International public opinion and the majority of United Nations Members now know that this is but standard procedure for the United States and its allies in the Council each and every time they learn that the armed terrorist groups that they finance, arm and support on the ground in Syria are at an impasse and losing ground to the advancing Syrian army and its allies. The latter are today waging a war, on behalf of the entire world, against terrorism, which, unfortunately, is being supported by certain Governments that have no interest 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 17/17 in ensuring international peace and security and are solely seeking to advance their own political agendas. My Government reaffirms once again that the United States, the United Kingdom and France are fully responsible for the paralysis of international investigative mechanisms concerning the use of toxic chemical substances, as the Governments of those States are seeking to shield the armed terrorist groups that they support. We recall before all present here that it is Syria that originally called for an investigation into instances of the use of toxic gas by armed terrorist groups. False accusations against my Government of using toxic chemical substances are attempts to cover up its efforts to reveal to the world that certain armed terrorist groups and their sponsors have continued to perpetrate crimes against innocent civilians through the use, more than once, of toxic substances. The Syrian Government has provided the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) with evidence that proves that such groups possess banned toxic substances. We have repeatedly called for the carrying out of investigations to corroborate such evidence. However, our calls have been ignored. All of my colleagues here recall that the United States and its allies destroyed the JIM. Through their practices here in the Council, they put an end to the Mechanism. They brought pressure to bear on its Chair and its members by pressuring them to refuse to visit Khan Shaykhun. Rather than conduct a field visit to collect real evidence, they merely sought to level accusations and offered up evidence trumped up by Western countries to undermine Syria, to support terrorist groups and to cover up their responsibility for this incident. That occurred after the United States and its partners rejected the call by the Russian Federation to stop the politicization of the work of the JIM and to rectify its methodology by refraining from using false evidence and, instead, limiting itself to scientific and legally sound and reasonable proof. My country continues to honour all of its commitments — the ones we assumed when we joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We shall persevere in our fight against terrorism — a war that we will wage despite any political or media blackmail or any exploitation of the blood of innocent civilians in Syria. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic will today circulate a letter of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in response to the United States allegations vis-à-vis the work of the JIM and the Fact-finding Mission of the OPCW. The letter proves with scientific and legal evidence that the accusations against my country are false and that Syria has never used such chemicals, and will we ever use them, because we do not possess them. Let us recall that those who level such false accusations against Syria are the Governments of the same States with a dark history of using such internationally prohibited weapons against millions of innocent people — in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Algeria and the list goes on. Finally, on behalf of my Government, I would like to extend our gratitude to the Russian Federation and to friendly countries in the Council, countries that seek to establish truth based on their awareness about the pernicious aims behind the false accusations. They have demonstrated their commitment to the supremacy of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their conviction that such abnormal practices undermine the credibility of international actions and institutions and jeopardize international peace and security. The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8225 Security Council Seventy-third year 8225th meeting Monday, 9 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-09955 (E) *1809955* S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 2/26 18-09955 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: This emergency meeting of the Security Council underscores the gravity of the events in recent days in Syria, of which there are severe consequences for civilians. It takes place at a time of increased international tensions, drawing national, regional and international actors into dangerous situations of potential or actual confrontation. It is an important meeting. There is an urgent need for the Council to address the situation with unity and purpose. How did we reach this point? The month of March saw devastating violence in part of eastern Ghouta, which resulted in at least 1,700 people killed or injured in opposition-controlled areas, dozens and dozens of people killed or injured in Government-controlled areas and, ultimately, the evacuation of 130,000 people, including fighters, family members and other civilians. However, in Douma there was a fragile ceasefire, which continued for most of March. The United Nations good offices played an important role in that regard. Since 31 March, the United Nations has no longer been able to be involved in talks, since, at that time, the Syrian Government did not agree to our presence, although we made efforts to propose concrete ways to address the issues that we understood were arising in the continuing contacts, including the proposal to activate the detainee working group agreed in Astana. However, that proposal was not taken up at the time. From 2 April, the evacuation of some 4,000 fighters, family members and other civilians from Douma to northern Syria took place. However, on 6 April there was a major escalation in violence. There were reports of sustained air strikes and shelling against Douma, the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks damaging health facilities. There were also reports of shelling on Damascus city, which reportedly again killed or injured civilians. Jaysh Al-Islam requested our involvement in emergency talks in extremis, but there was no positive response to that request when it conveyed the same message to the other side. At approximately 8 p.m. local time on 7 April, reports of an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma started to emerge. Pictures immediately circulated on social media showing what appeared to be lifeless men, women and children. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground claimed to have received hundreds of cases of civilians with symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. The same NGOs claimed that at least 49 people had been killed and hundreds injured. I wish to recall what the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, noted, namely, that the United Nations "is not in a position to verify these reports". However, he also made it very clear that he cannot ignore them and that he "is particularly alarmed by allegations that chemical weapons have been used against civilian populations in Douma" once again. He further emphasized "that any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation". I note that a number of States have strongly alluded to or expressed the suspicion that the Syrian Government was responsible for the alleged chemical attack. I also note that other States, as well as the Government of Syria itself, have strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations, depicting the attacks as a fabrication or/and a provocation. My comment is that this is one more reason for there to be a thorough independent investigation. 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 3/26 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said that it has made the preliminary analysis of the reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and is in the process of gathering further information from all available sources. My colleague Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who is with us in the Chamber today, will further address this matter. But I urge the Security Council, in accordance with its own mandate to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law, to, for God's sake, ensure that a mechanism is found to investigate these allegations and assign responsibility.Returning to the narrative of the events, at around midnight on 7 April, hours after the alleged chemical-weapons attack, Jaysh Al-Islam informed the United Nations that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Federation and the Syrian Government. The Russian Federation Ministry for Defence stated that the agreement encompasses a ceasefire and Jaysh Al-Islam fighters laying down their arms or evacuating Douma. The Russian Federation also reported that up to 8,000 Jaysh Al-Islam fighters and 40,000 of their family members were to evacuate.As I brief the Security Council now, we understand that additional evacuations from Douma are already under way. We have also received reports that some detainees — the ones we had heard about before — had begun to be released from Douma today. We note reports that the agreement provides for civilians who decide to stay to remain under Russian Federation guarantees, with the resumption of services in coordination with a local committee of civilians.I urge the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation to ensure the protection of those civilians so that as many civilians as possible can stay in their homes if they choose to, or leave to a place of their own choosing or return as per international law. I urge that there be, for there should be, an immediate refocusing for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). What we have see is basically an escalation before a de-escalation.Clearly, the dangers of further escalation arise from situations beyond Ghouta as well. We have received reports of missiles targeting the Syrian Government's Tiyas, or T-4, airbase early this morning. No State has claimed responsibility for that reported strike. The United States and France have explicitly denied any involvement. The Syrian Government, the Russian Federation and Iran have suggested that Israel could have carried out the attack, with Iranian State media reporting that over a dozen military personnel were killed or injured, including four Iranian military advisers. The Government of Israel has not commented. The United Nations is unable to independently verify or attribute responsibility for that attack, but we urge all parties to show their utmost restraint and avoid any further escalation or confrontation.We are also concerned about the dynamics in other areas of Syria. Syrians in Dar'a, northern rural Homs, eastern Qalamoun, Hamah and Idlib have all expressed to us their own fears that they may soon face escalations similar to what we have seen in eastern Ghouta. We therefore urge the Security Council and the Astana guarantors and those States involved in the Amman efforts to work towards reinstating de-escalation in those areas and elsewhere in Syria. The indications are the opposite at the moment.Meanwhile, following its operations in Afrin, the Turkish Government has indicated the potential for further operations in other areas of northern Syria if Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat and Kurdish People's Protection Units forces are not removed from those areas. Military operations in such areas have the potential of raising international tensions. We therefore urge all parties concerned to de-escalate, show restraint and find means to implement resolution 2401 (2018) through dialogue and fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Let me also highlight the fact that we have recently seen — and this is particularly tragic when we consider the efforts all of us, including all members of the Security Council, have made in the last year — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launch new operations within Syria, south of Damascus, in rural Damascus, in remote areas near the Iraqi border.I would like to conclude with some bottom lines, if I may.First, civilians are paying a very heavy price for the military escalation. We are not seeing de-escalation; we are seeing the contrary. Today our first priority must be to protect civilians from the war, from the conflict, from chemical weapons, from hunger. We call on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including humanitarian access across Syria to all people in need. We urge once S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 4/26 18-09955 more for concrete respect for resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, which is, after all, a resolution of the Security Council.Secondly, continued allegations of the use of chemical agents are of extremely grave concern. Those allegations must be independently and urgently investigated. Any use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited and constitutes a very serious violation of international law, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013). Preventing impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and upholding international law must be an utmost priority for all members of the Security Council.Thirdly, I have to say this very slowly because today is the first time, in over four years of briefing the Security Council in person, that I have reached a point in which I have to express a concern about international security, not just regional or national or Syrian security, but international security. Recent developments have more than ever before brought to the surface the dangers that the Secretary-General warned about recently at the Munich Security Conference, when he spoke of "different faultlines" in the Middle East that are interconnected and crossing each other, of conflicting interests of both global and regional Powers, and forms of escalation that can have absolutely devastating consequences that are difficult for us to even imagine. The Council cannot allow a situation of uncontrollable escalation to develop in Syria on any front. Instead, it must find unity and address the concrete threats to international peace and security in Syria today.I am sorry to have been this brief, but I wanted to focus on one specific concern, namely, the threat to international security related to what we are seeing now in Syria and the danger of the alleged chemical-weapons attacks being repeated. Next time I will brief the Council on humanitarian and other issues and on the political process, which I know we are all interested in focusing upon, but today is the day for talking about security — international security — and peace.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. De Mistura for his very informative briefing.I now give the floor to Mr. Markram.Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel.It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention.Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use of chemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations. Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 5/26 well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Markram for his informative briefing.I now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): If you imagine, Mr. President, that I derive pleasure from the subject of my statement today, or from speaking at great length, you are wrong. Unfortunately, however, the situation is such that I have a lot to say today. And you will have to listen to me.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.The Russian Federation asked that this meeting be convened under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security" because we are deeply alarmed about the fact that a number of capitals — Washington first and foremost, with London and Paris blindly following its lead — are purposely steering a course designed to supercharge international tensions. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France, with no grounds and no thought for the consequences, are taking a confrontational line on Russia and Syria and pushing others towards it too. They have a broad range of weapons in their arsenal — slander, insults, bellicose rhetoric, blackmail, sanctions and threats of the use of force against a sovereign State. Their threats against Russia are brazen, and the tone they take has gone beyond the limits of the permissible. Even during the Cold War their predecessors did not express themselves so crudely about my country. What next?I remember the rhetorical question that President Putin of Russia put to our Western partners, and especially the United States, from the rostrum of the General Assembly in 2015 (see A/70/PV.13), about their careless geopolitical experiments in the Middle East, when he asked them if they at least realized what they had done. At the time, the question went unanswered. But there is an answer, and it is that no, they do not realize what they have done. As they do not realize what they are doing now. It is not only we who are perplexed at their lack of any coherent strategy on any issue. It perplexes most of the people in this Chamber. They just do not want to ask them about it openly. Wherever they go, whatever they touch, they leave behind chaos in their wake in the murky water where they have gone fishing for some kind of fish. But the only fish they catch are mutants. I will ask them another rhetorical question. Do they understand the dangerous place they are dragging the world to?One of the areas where the hostility manifests itself most strongly is Syria. The terrorists and extremists supported by external sponsors are being defeated. Let me remind those responsible that these are the terrorists and extremists whom they equipped, financed and dumped into the country in order to overthrow the lawful Government. Now we can see why this is causing hysteria among those who have invested their political and material capital in such dark forces.In the past few weeks, thanks to Russia's efforts to implement the Security Council's resolutions, a massive operation has been carried out to unblock eastern Ghouta, whose residents have been forced to endure the humiliation of the rebel militias for several years. More than 150 thousand civilians were evacuated from this suburb of Damascus, completely voluntarily and under the necessary security conditions. Tens of thousands of them have already been able to return to liberated areas and many have been taken in by relatives. The changes in their demographic composition that the defenders of the Syrian opposition have been screaming about have not happened. That is a lie. Some extremely complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of the armed groups, as a result of which many left the neighbourhoods they were occupying, with full guarantees for their security. Incidentally, there were several attempted acts of terrorism during these transport operations when militias tried to bring suicide belts onto the buses and were prevented. Others preferred to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities. Thanks to the presidential amnesty, they will now be able to return to civilian life, and may even eventually be able to join Syria's security forces. That represents the implementation of the United Nations principle of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.However, not everyone is so keen on such positive dynamics. The outside sponsors — that is, the leading Western countries — were ready to grasp at any straw in order to hang on to any centre of terrorist resistance, however tiny, within striking distance of the Syrian capital, so that the militias could continue to terrorize ordinary residents, taking their food and begging humanitarian aid from the international community. Incidentally, they were not about to S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 6/26 18-09955 share medicines with those ordinary civilians, as an inspection of the strongholds left behind by the fighters revealed. As happened previously in eastern Aleppo, the improvised hospital facilities in basements were full of medicines that thanks to Western sanctions were not to be had for love or money in Damascus and other Government-controlled areas. Mass graves and bodies that showed evidence of torture were also discovered. The dimensions of the tunnels that the jihadists used were astonishing. Some of them could easily accommodate small trucks travelling in both directions. Those impressive underground facilities connected the positions of groups that some view as moderate to the strongholds of Jabhat Al-Nusra.On 6 April, at their sponsors' instructions, Jaysh Al-Islam's new ringleaders prevented the fourth group of militia fighters from evacuating Douma and resumed rocket and mortar fire on residential areas of Damascus, targeting Mezzeh, Mezzeh 86, Ish Al-Warwar, Abu Rummaneh and Umayyad Square. According to official data, eight civilians were killed and 37 were wounded. It is regrettable that we seen no statements from Western capitals condemning the shelling of a historic part of Damascus.The next day, 7 April, militias accused the Syrian authorities of dropping barrel bombs containing a toxic substance. However, they got their versions mixed up, referring to it sometimes as chlorine and sometimes as sarin or a mixture of poison gases. In a familiar pattern, the rumours were immediately seized on by non-governmental organizations financed by Western capitals and White Helmets operating in the guise of rescue workers. These so-called reports were also just as quickly disseminated through media outlets. I should once again point out that many of these dubious opposition entities have an accurate list of the email addresses of the representatives of Security Council members, which leads us to conclude that some of our colleagues, with a reckless attitude to their position, have been leaking sensitive information to those they sponsor. Incidentally, we all should remember the incident in which the White Helmets accidentally posted on the Internet a video showing the preparation stages for filming the next so-called victim of an attack allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian army. The chemical "series" that began in 2013 has continued to run, with each subsequent episode designed to top the impact of the previous one.In Washington, London and Paris, conclusions have immediately been reached as to the guilt of the Syrian authorities, or regime, as they call it. Has no one wondered why Damascus needs this? While the Syrian leadership has received its share of insults, the main burden of responsibility has been laid at the door of Russia and Iran, to no one's surprise, I believe. As is now customary, it has occurred at lightning speed and without any kind of investigation. On 8 April, Syrian troops searching the village of Al-Shifuniya, near Douma, discovered a small, makeshift Jaysh Al-Islam chemical-munitions factory, along with German-produced chlorine reagents and specialized equipment.The Istanbul-based opposition journalist Asaad Hanna posted a video on his Twitter feed that was allegedly from the area of the incident. In it, an unidentified individual in a gas mask, presumably from the White Helmets, is posing against a backdrop of a homemade chemical bomb that allegedly landed in a bedroom in a building in Douma. It is accompanied by commentary about what it calls another of the regime's attacks on civilians. There can be no doubt that this production was staged. The trajectory of the alleged bomb is entirely unnatural. It fell through the roof and landed gently on a wooden bed without damaging it in any way and was clearly placed there before the scene was shot.In an interesting coincidence, the chemical act of provocation in Douma on Saturday, 7 April, occurred immediately after the United States delegation in the Security Council was instructed to call for expert consultations for today, Monday, 9 April, on its draft resolution on a mechanism for investigating incidents involving chemical weapons. Today far-reaching changes were made to the initial text. In such murky circumstances, of course, we have to determine what happened. But we have to do it honestly, objectively and impartially, without sacrificing the principle of the presumption of innocence and certainly not by prejudging the process of an investigation.Despite this provocation, the Russian specialists have continued their efforts to resolve the situation in eastern Ghouta. On Sunday afternoon, 8 April, according to new agreements, the evacuation of Jaysh Al-Islam combatants was resumed. Following Douma's liberation from militants, Russian radiological, chemical and biological protection specialists were sent there to collect evidence. They took soil samples that showed no presence of nerve agents or substances 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 7/26 containing chlorine. Local residents and combatants who were no longer fighting were interviewed. Not one local confirmed the chemical attack. At the local hospital, no one with symptoms of sarin or chlorine poisoning had been admitted. There are no other active medical facilities in Douma. No bodies of people who had died from being poisoned were found, and the medical staff and residents had no information about where they might have been buried. Any use of sarin or chlorine in Douma is therefore unconfirmed. By the way, representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent refuted statements allegedly made on their behalf about providing assistance to victims of toxic gases. I call on those who plan to denounce the regime when they speak after me to assume that there was no chemical-weapon attack.Sweden has drafted a resolution calling for the incident to be investigated. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) does not need a resolution to investigate it, but we are willing to consider it. Today we propose to do what is envisaged in the draft resolution, which is to let the OPCW, which Mr. Üzümcü, Director-General of its Technical Secretariat, has announced is ready to deal with the situation, fly to Damascus immediately, if possible tomorrow. There the Syrian authorities and the Russian military will ensure the necessary conditions so that the OPCW experts can travel to the site of the alleged incident and familiarize themselves with the situation. That, by the way, is what President Trump and other Western leaders have been urging us to do.The Syrians have repeatedly warned that there might be chemical provocations. At the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic they are saying that the equipment needed to film the next purported chemical attack has already been brought in. We have also made statements to that effect in the Security Council. Everyone has heard those warnings, but has deliberately ignored them because they do not correspond to the doctrinal positions espoused by those who dream of seeing the legitimate Government of yet another Arab country destroyed.There has still been no attention given to the discovery in November and December 2017 of a significant quantity of chemical munitions on Syrian territory that had been liberated from militias. In terrorist warehouses in Az-Zahiriya and Al-Hafiya in Hama governorate, 20 one-ton containers and more than 50 pieces of ordnance containing toxic chemicals were discovered. In Tel Adel in Idlib governorate, 24 tons of toxic chemical, presumed to be chlorine, were discovered. At a storage site in Moadamiya, 30 kilometres to the north-east of Damascus, 240- and 160-millimetre-calibre munitions and plastic canisters of organo-phosphorous compounds were found. In the area around As-Suwayda in Idlib governorate, an manufacturing facility for synthesizing various toxic substances was found, along with 54 pieces of chemical ordnance and 44 containers of chemicals that could be used to manufacture toxic substances.Since the beginning of this year alone, four instances of militias using toxic chemicals against Government troop positions have been established in Suruj and Al-Mushairfeh districts, and more than 100 Syrian troops have been hospitalized. On 3 March, during the liberation of Khazram and Aftris in eastern Ghouta, soldiers from a sub-unit of Government troops discovered an auxiliary workshop for homemade chemical munitions. This far from exhaustive list is an indication of the misdeeds of the still unreconciled opposition. And yet we have seen no eagerness to send OPCW expert groups there to collect evidence of these events. We demand that the OPCW verify all of these areas. They are accessible. We are also seeing information that American instructors in the Al-Tanf camp have trained a number of groups of fighters to carry out provocations using chemical weapons in order to create a pretext for a rocket strikes and bombings.It has been clear to us that sooner or later there would be an attempt to bring the jihadists out of harm's way and at the same time to punish the regime that some Western capitals hate. The talking heads on television have thrown themselves into urging a repeat of last year's effort at a military attack on Syria. This morning there were missile strikes on the T-4 airfield in Homs governorate. We are deeply troubled by such actions.The provocations in Douma are reminiscent of last year's incident in Khan Shaykhun, with their shared element being the planned nature of the attacks. Analysis of the operations conducted by the United States in April 2017, on the eve of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and after it, shows that Washington prepared its operation in advance. From 4 to 7 April of last year — in other words, from the day that a toxic substance was used in Khan Shaykhun until the strike on the Al-Shayrat airbase — the USS Porter and Ross naval destroyers S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 8/26 18-09955 were already present in the Mediterranean Sea, where they were engaged in planned operations. They did not call into any ports where an exchange of munitions could have been effected as a way to increase their quantity of cruise missiles.Specifically, from 4 to 5 April, the USS Porter was located south-east of Sicily and the Ross was en route from the Rota naval base to an area south of Sardinia. Later, on 6 April, both ships were observed moving at accelerated speed towards the area of the firing positions to the south-west of Cyprus, from where they launched a massive strike on Al-Shayrat on 7 April. However, the 59 Tomahawk missiles that were launched would have exceeded the two destroyers' total munitions capacity if they had actually been engaged in the anti-missile defence operations that they were assigned to, which required only 48 units. That means, therefore, that even before the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun, these United States naval vessels undertook a military operation with a strike capability above the number of cruise missiles necessary for their anti-missile defence operations, which could be evidence of advance planning by Washington of an action against Damascus.Among other things, Saturday's fake news from Douma was aimed at diverting the public's attention from the circus that is the Skripal case, in which London has become terminally mired, hurling completely unproven accusations at Russia and accomplishing its basic purpose of extracting solidarity from its allies in order to construct an anti-Russian front. Now the British are shifting away from a transparent investigation and concrete responses to the questions they have been asked while simultaneously covering their tracks.At the Security Council meeting on 5 April on the Skripal case (see S/PV.8224), we warned the Council that the attempt to accuse us, without proof, of involvement in the Salisbury incident was linked to the Syrian chemical issue. There was an interesting new development regarding the issue yesterday. As Britain's Foreign Minister Boris Johnson was continuing his display of rapier wit "exposing" Russia, another gem emerged. The Times informed us that Royal Air Force experts in southern Cyprus had intercepted a message sent from outside Damascus to Moscow on the day of the Skripals' poisoning that contained the phrase "the package has been delivered" and said that two people had "successfully departed". Apparently this formed part of the intelligence that London provided to its allies before expelling our Russian diplomats. Is not it obvious to everyone that there is an irrefutable Syria-Russia-Salisbury connection? I will give the British intelligence services one more huge hint, for free. Why do they not assume that the Novichok they are so thrilled about reached Salisbury directly from Syria? In a package. To cover its tracks. How pathetic.Ambassador Haley recently stated that Russia will never be a friend of the United States. To that, I say that friendship is both reciprocal and voluntary. One cannot force a friendship and we are not begging the United States to be friends. What we want from it is very little — normal, civilized relations, which it arrogantly refuses, disregarding basic courtesy. However, the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it has friends. Its so-called friends are only those who cannot say no to it. And that is the only criterion for friendship that it understands.Russia has friends. And unlike the United States, we do not have adversaries. That is not the prism through which we view the world. It is international terrorism that is our enemy. However, we continue to propose cooperating with the United States. That cooperation should be respectful and mutual, and aimed at resolving genuine problems, not imaginary ones, and it should be just as much in the interests of the United States. Ultimately, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.Through the relevant channels, we already conveyed to the United States that military action conducted on false pretences against Syria, where Russian troops are deployed at the request of its legitimate Government, could have extremely serious repercussions. We urge Western politicians to temper their hawkish rhetoric, seriously consider the possible repercussions and cease their feeble, foolhardy efforts, which merely produce challenges to global security. We can see very good examples of what becomes of the military misadventures of the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. No one has invested Western leaders with the power to take on the roles of the world's policeman and its investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners as well. We urge them to return to the world of legality, comply with the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to address the problems that arise rather than attempting to realize its own selfish geopolitical dreams at every step. All our energy should be focused on supporting the political process in Syria, and for that, all stakeholders with influence must unite in a 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 9/26 constructive effort. Russia is always ready for that kind of cooperation.In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to request a briefing of the Security Council on the results of the United Nations assessment mission in Raqqa and on the situation in the Rukban camp. We can see how the coalition members are trying to complicate a resolution of the problems resulting from their actions in Syria, particularly the carpet-bombing operation designed to wipe out Raqqa. No chemical provocations will distract our attention from that issue.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Thomas Markram for their briefings.Only five days ago, here in this Chamber (see S/PV.8221), we mourned as we remembered the sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun that occurred a year ago. This weekend another devastating gas attack was carried out in the city of Douma, killing more than 45 civilians and injuring more than 500. It was another in a series of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. That is unacceptable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of nine Security Council members that requested today's emergency meeting because we all believed that it was critically important to address this horrific attack. We must reinstate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We must underscore the basic norms of the international legal order and stop the ongoing tragedy in eastern Ghouta and Douma.We almost met twice today because one permanent member of the Council seemed not to want a focused discussion on the issue at hand, the chemical attack in Douma. That begs the question of whether that particular member State would prefer the international community to stand by and watch like a spectator while it covers for the crimes of its ally, the Syrian regime, some of which amount to serious war crimes. The Council must not stand idly by. It is high time for us to act in three ways, condemning, protecting and holding to account. First, today we should condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons. International law has been trampled on. Silence and impunity are not an option. However, condemnation alone is not enough.Secondly, we must deliver on our responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians must remain an absolute priority. We call on the Astana guarantors to use their influence to prevent any further attacks. They must ensure a cessation of hostilities and a de-escalation of the violence, as per resolution 2401 (2018). An immediate ceasefire is needed in Douma so that humanitarian and medical aid can reach the victims of the attack and so that humanitarian personnel can continue their life-saving work. We owe it to the men, women and children of Douma and of Syria. We owe it to our own citizens.Furthermore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to point out that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations count on the permanent members of the Council not to use their veto in cases of mass atrocities. The international community should be able to count on the Council to uphold international humanitarian law and the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and to act when international law is trampled. Let me be clear. We support the humanitarian work of the White Helmets. They do extremely important humanitarian work for civilians in Syria in dire circumstances.Thirdly, all members of the Council regularly stress the importance of accountability for perpetrators who use chemical weapons. Yet the Council has not been able to move forward on that issue for months owing to one permanent member's use of the veto. We have been unable to tackle this crisis because one permanent member is a direct party to the conflict and has proved that it will defend the Syrian regime at all costs. We must intensify our efforts to establish a mechanism that can continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and investigate and identify perpetrators independently of the politics in the Council. The JIM has identified both the Syrian regime and a non-State actor as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As I said last week (see S/PV.8221), the discontinuation of the JIM mandate cannot be the end of the story — all the more so because since the JIM ceased to operate, we have received reports that the regime has carried out at least six more chemical-weapon attacks and perhaps even more. For those who claim that chemical-weapon attacks have not taken place or that such accounts have been fabricated, I have a clear message. The establishment of an effective, impartial and independent attribution and accountability mechanism must not be vetoed.Let us not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the helm of Organization and a powerful General S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 10/26 18-09955 Assembly. Both must consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The work should build on the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission and the JIM. We welcome the Fact-finding Mission's immediate investigation of the terrible incident in Douma this weekend. It should be given full access and cooperation by all parties. We reiterate our strong support for, first, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; secondly, the Commission of Inquiry; thirdly, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France; and fourthly, a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice.In conclusion, the Council must act. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission must complete an investigation as soon as possible, and there can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To do otherwise is tantamount to condoning such appalling attacks, failing in our responsibilities and undermining the international architecture that we have collectively designed to stop such attacks. It is time for the Council and the international community as a whole to act.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.Almost exactly one year ago, I stood on the floor of the Security Council and held up pictures of dead Syrian children (see S/PV.7915). After that day, I prayed that I would never have to do that again. I could; there are many truly gruesome pictures. Many of us have worked hard to ensure that one day we would not have to see images of babies gassed to death in Syria. However, the day we prayed would never come, has come again. Chemical weapons have once again been used on Syrian men, women and children. And once again, the Security Council is meeting in response.This time I am not going to hold up pictures of victims. I could; there are many, and they are gruesome. Worse are the videos imprinted in our minds that no one should ever have to see. I could hold up pictures of babies lying dead next to their mothers, brothers and sisters — even toddlers and infants still in diapers, all lying together dead. Their skin is the ashen blue that is now tragically familiar from chemical-weapon scenes. Their eyes are open and lifeless, with white foam bubbles at their mouths and noses. They are pictures of dead Syrians who are unarmed, not soldiers and fit the very definition of innocent and non-threatening. Rather, they are women and children who were hiding in basements from a renewed assault by Bashar Al-Assad. They are of families who were hiding underground to escape Al-Assad's conventional bombs and artillery, but the basements that Syrian families thought would shelter them from conventional bombs were the worst place to be when chemical weapons fell from the sky. Saturday evening, the basements of Douma became their tombs.It is impossible to know for certain how many have died, because access to Douma is cut off by Al-Assad's forces. Dozens are dead that we know of, and hundreds are wounded. I could hold up pictures of survivors — children with burning eyes and choking for breath. I could hold up pictures of first responders washing the chemicals off of the victims and putting respirators on children, or of first responders walking through room after room of families lying motionless with babies still in the arms of their mothers and fathers. I could show pictures of a hospital attacked with chemical weapons. I could show pictures of hospitals struck by barrel bombs following the chemical attack. Ambulances and rescue vehicles have been repeatedly attacked, maximizing the number of dead civilians. Civil defence centres have been attacked in order to paralyse the medical response so as to increase the suffering of the survivors. Who does that? Only a monster does that. Only a monster targets civilians, and then ensures that there are no ambulances to transfer the wounded, no hospitals to save their lives and no doctors or medicine to ease their pain.I could hold up pictures of all of that killing and suffering for the Council to see, but what would be the point? The monster who was responsible for those attacks has no conscience, not even to be shocked by pictures of dead children. The Russian regime, whose hands are all covered in the blood of Syrian children, cannot be ashamed by pictures of its victims. We have tried that before. We must not overlook Russia and Iran's roles in enabling the Al-Assad regime's murderous destruction. Russia and Iran have military advisers at Al-Assad's airfields and operation centres. Russian officials are on the ground helping direct the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 11/26 regime's starve-and-surrender campaign, and Iranian allied forces do much of the dirty work.When the Syrian military pummels civilians, they rely on the military hardware given by Russia. Russia could stop that senseless slaughter if it wanted, but it stands with the Al-Assad regime and supports without any hesitation. What is the point of trying to shame such people? After all, no civilized Government would have anything to do with Al-Assad's murderous regime. Pictures of dead children mean little to Governments like Russia, who expend their own resources to prop up Al-Assad.The Council, which saw the pictures last year, has failed to act because Russia has stood in its way every single time. For a year we have allowed Russia to hold the lives of innocent Syrians hostage to its alliance with the Al-Assad regime. That also allowed Russian to weaken the credibility of the United Nations. We are quick to condemn chemical weapons in the Security Council, but then Russia prevents any action. It vetoed five draft resolutions on this issue alone and used 11 vetoes all together to save Al-Assad. Our lives go on as usual.The Council created the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It found the Syrian regime responsible for the attack at Khan Shaykhun a year ago. Because Russia supported Al-Assad and his actions, Russia killed the Mechanism. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. We pushed for a ceasefire. The Council unanimously agreed, but it was immediately ignored by Russia and Al-Assad. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. Now here we are, confronted with the consequences of giving Russia a pass in the name of unity — a unity that Russia has shown many times before it does not want. Here we are, in a world where chemical-weapons use is becoming normalized — from an Indonesian airport to an English village to the homes and hospitals of Syria. Since the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun one year ago, chemical weapons have been reportedly used dozens of times, and the Council does nothing.What we are dealing with today is not about a spat between the United States and Russia. It is about the inhumane use of chemical agents on innocent civilians. Each and every one of the nations in the Council is on record opposing the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more rationalizations for our failure to act. We have already introduced and circulated to the Council a draft resolution demanding unrestricted humanitarian access to the people of Douma. Al-Assad is doing all he can to assure maximum suffering in Douma. Our priority must be to help the starving, the sick and the injured who have been left behind. We also call on the Council to immediately re-establish a truly professional and impartial mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, including the attack this weekend. We hope that our colleagues on the Council will join us, as they have before.That is a very minimum we can do in response to the attack we just witnessed. Russia's obstructionism will not continue to hold us hostage when we are confronted with an attack like that one. The United States is determined to see the monster who dropped chemical weapons on the Syrian people held to account. Those present have heard what the President of the United States has said about that. Meetings are ongoing. Important decisions are being weighed, even as we speak. We are on the edge of a dangerous precipice. The great evil of chemical-weapons use, which once unified the world in opposition, is on the verge of becoming the new normal. The international community must not let that happen. We are beyond showing pictures of dead babies. We are beyond appeals to conscience. We have reached the moment when the world must see justice done. History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Peruvian presidency for having convened this emergency Security Council meeting, at the request of France, together with eight other Council members. I also wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram, for their insightful briefings.There are times in the lives of nations where what is essential is at stake: life or death; peace or war; civilization or barbarism; the international order or chaos. That is the case today following the dreadful chemical carnage that once again pushed the boundaries of horror on Saturday in Douma. We are aware that two new and particularly serious chemical-weapons attacks took place in Douma on 7 April. The provisional toll of human life is appalling. There are nearly 50 dead, including a number of children, and 1,000 wounded. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 12/26 18-09955 That toll is likely to be even higher, as assistance cannot reach some areas. Once again, toxic substances have been dropped to asphyxiate, to kill and to terrorize civilians, reaching them even in the basements where they sought refuge. Chlorine gas has the particular characteristic of being a heavy gas, capable of entering basements. For that reason, it is used. That is the level of deadly cynicism that has been reached in Syria.There are no words to describe the horror of the images that surfaced on 7 April, nearly one year after the Khan Shaykhun attack, which killed nearly 80 people. What we see in the thousands of photos and videos that surfaced in the course of several hours after the 7 April attacks reminds us of the images we have seen far too often: children and adults suffocating due to exposure to concentrated chlorine gas. What we also see are people suffering from violent convulsions, excessive salivation and burning eyes, all of which are symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect. As I mentioned, in total more than 1,000 people were exposed to that deadly chemical compound.The experience and the successive reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism leave no room for doubt as to the perpetrators of this most recent attack. Only the Syrian armed forces and their agencies have the requisite knowledge to develop such sophisticated toxic substances with such a high degree of lethality. And only the Syrian armed forces and its agencies have a military interest in their use. This attack took place in Douma, an area that has been subjected to relentless shelling by the Syrian armed and air forces for several weeks. Unfortunately, the use of such weapons enables much swifter tactical progress than conventional weapons.We are all aware that the Syrian regime has already been identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as the party responsible for the use, on at least four occasions, of chlorine and sarin gas as a chemical weapon. There are no illusions as to the sincerity of the declaration delivered by Syria on the state of its chemical stockpiles in 2013. Unfortunately, we once again we have proof in the form of empirical evidence. This dovetails with the regime's strategy of terror against civilians. We have already experienced this. At the worst, this is bad faith or, even worse, complicity. The Damascus regime clearly seeks, by sowing terror, to accelerate the capture of other urban areas that it wishes to control. What could be more effective to prompt those who resist the regime to flee than sieges, a tactic worthy of the Middle Ages, in addition to chemical terror. Let us make no mistake: the children frozen in an agonizing death are not so-called collateral victims. They are deliberate targets of these chemical attacks, designed and planned for the purpose of waging terror. The Damascus regime is conducting State terrorism, with its litany of war crimes and even crimes against humanity.The offensive and the shelling conducted by the regime, as well as by its Russian and Iranian allies, over the past 48 hours prove the degree to which they have engaged in a military race without any consideration of the human cost. This latest escalation of violence, punctuated by a new instance of the use of chemical weapons, brings us face to face with the destructive madness of a diehard regime that seeks to destroy its people completely. And that regime's Russian and Iranian allies are either unable or unwilling to stop it. We are aware of the fact, and the Russian authorities have confirmed this on several occasions, that Russian military forces have a presence on the ground and in the air in eastern Ghouta. On 7 April, as the second chemical attack took place in Douma, Russian aircraft were also taking part in air operations in the Damascus region. Russian and Iranian military support is present on the ground and at all levels of the Syrian war machinery. No Syrian aircraft takes off without the Russian ally being informed. These attacks took place either with the tacit or explicit consent of Russia or despite its reluctance and military presence. I do not know which is more alarming when it comes to our collective security.The stakes revolving around this recent attack are extremely grave. This is the latest proof of the normalization of chemical weapons use, which we should attribute not only to a regime that has become uncontrollable and continues to gas civilians with complete impunity, but also to its supporters, including a permanent member of the Security Council. That member failed in its commitment to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which it, itself, co-sponsored. That member's responsibility in the endless tragedy that is the war in Syria is overwhelming.France therefore of course turns towards Russia today in order to put forward two demands. The first demand is a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire in Syria, in line with resolution 2401 (2018), adopted on 24 February, 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 13/26 which to date has never been upheld by the Damascus regime. France deeply deplores the fact that, although it was unanimously adopted, it was not possible to implement that resolution, which provides for a truce and emergency humanitarian access. The second demand is the establishment of a new international investigative mechanism that will be able to document all of the factors of the attack in Douma and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The end of the Joint Investigative Mechanism last November due to two successive Russian vetoes has stripped us of an essential tool of deterrence. For that reason, we support any initiative to bridge that gap. And in that spirit France has committed to a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons. In that same spirit, we endorse the draft resolution that has been put forward today by the United States.With this attack the Al-Assad regime is testing yet again the determination of the international community to ensure compliance with the prohibition against chemica-weapons use. Our response must be united, robust and implacable. That response must make it clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians will no longer be tolerated, and that those who flout that fundamental rule of our collective security will be held accountable and must face the consequences. The Al-Assad regime needs to hear an international response, and France stands ready to fully shoulder its role alongside its partners.Ultimately, we know that only an inclusive political solution will bring an end to the seven-year conflict, which has claimed the lives of 500,000 people and pushed millions to take the route of exile. That is why France will remain fully committed alongside the United Nations Special Envoy and in line with the Geneva process. However, in the light of this most recent carnage, we can no longer merely repeat words. Without being followed up by deeds, such words would be meaningless. I wish to reiterate here what President Macron has stressed on several occasions: France will assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. France's position is clear. It will uphold its commitments and keep its word.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and Mr. Markram for their briefings. I also thank all the United Nations teams on the ground for the important and incredibly difficult work they do.As Staffan de Mistura said, this is an important Security Council meeting. My Government shares the outrage that other colleagues have eloquently described today. It is truly horrific to think of victims and families sheltered underground when the chlorine found them.This is the third time in five days that the Council has convened to discuss chemical weapons. This is dreadful in the true sense of that word. The Council should dread what we risk happening — for chemical weapons to become a routine part of fighting. As one of the five permanent members of the Council (P-5), the United Kingdom believes that we have a particular responsibility to uphold the worldwide prohibition on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We agree with the Netherlands Ambassador that the P-5 has specific responsibilities. I believe that four members of the P-5 do believe that, but there is one that does not. The Russian Ambassador referred to a resurgence of the Cold War. This is not the Cold War. In the Cold War there was not this flagrant disregard for the prohibitions that are universal on the use of WMDs.The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also referred to the risks of escalation, and to international peace and security more broadly. We share his fears, but it is the Syrian Government and its backers, Iran and Russia, who are prolonging the fighting and risking regional and wider instability. There are real questions about what is happening in the T-4 airbase, with its foreign fighters and its mercenaries.We have been challenged today by our Russian colleague to say why we believe the attack was carried out by Syria and why we believe, further, that chemical weapons were used. The reasons are as follows. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism found six uses of chemical weapons between 2014 and 2017. Two it ascribed to Da'esh for the use of mustard gas, three it ascribed to the regime for the use of chlorine and one further use it ascribed to the Syrian regime for the use of sarin. That is the attacks that we talked about in the Council just last week at Khan Sheykhoun, which led to the United States strike — which we support — on Al-Shayrat. In addition, as the French Ambassador has said, we had reports of Russian and Syrian warnings before the chemical-weapon attack took place and of a pattern of Mi-8 Hip helicopters flying overhead. Those reports have come from the ground.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 14/26 18-09955 I listened carefully to the Russian Ambassador's argument. As I have just set out, we, as the United Kingdom believe that the Syrian regime is responsible for these latest attacks. But there is one way to settle this — to have an independent fact-finding mission followed by an independent investigation — as we all know that fact-finding missions are there to determine whether chemical weapons have been used and, if they have been used, what sort of chemical weapons. But only an investigation can determine who is responsible for their use, and therefore start the path to accountability.I was very interested to hear the Russian offer that an OPCW fact-finding mission could visit and would have the protection of Russian forces. I believe that this is an offer worth pursuing, but it would, of course, be necessary for the OPCW mission to have complete freedom of action and freedom of access. That still leaves us with the question of who committed these atrocities. That is why we support the United States text for a draft resolution and we believe that there is no legitimate reason not to support the call for the Council to set up an independent investigative mechanism. As I said before, we have nothing to hide, but it appears that Russia, Syria and their supporters, Iran, do have something to fear.The Russian Ambassador singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France for criticism. I would like, if I may, to turn to that. The responsibility for the cruelty in Syria belongs to Syria and its backers — Russia and Iran. The use of chemical weapons is an escalatory and diabolical act. It strikes me that what Russia is trying to do is to turn the debate in the Council away from the discussion of the use of chemical weapons into a dispute between East and West, presenting itself as the victim. It is far too important to play games with the politics between East and West in respect of chemical weapons. Russia's crocodile tears for the people of eastern Ghouta has an easy answer. It is to join us in the non-political attempt to get in humanitarian and protection workers from the United Nations to do their job of looking after and mitigating the risk to civilians. Russia's concern about attribution for the use of chemical weapons also has an easy answer. It is to join us in allowing the United Nations to set up an international investigative mechanism to pursue the responsible parties. I repeat here the two demands of my French colleague, and I hope we will be able to make progress.I had not intended to address the Skripal case in Salisbury, but since my Russian colleague has done so, I will address it today. He asked what the similarities were between Salisbury and Syria. I think it is important that I point out that the cases are different in the following respects. First, there is a thorough investigation under way in Salisbury. As we have heard, there is no investigation under way in Syria. The British Government in Salisbury is seeking to protect its people, as is its duty. The Syrian Government, on the contrary, as we have heard today, attacks and gasses its people. I am sorry to say that what the two do have in common though, is Russia's refusal to assume P-5 responsibilities to prevent the use of WMDs and its reckless support for the use of WMDs by its agents and by its allies.It is not we who want to alienate Russia. It alienates herself by not joining in the vast majority of the Council who wish to find a non-polemical way through and to address the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The Russian Ambassador mentioned friends of the United States. My Government and its people are proud to be a friend of the United States. We stand with everyone on the Council who wants to find a way through the chemical weapons problem, to have a proper fact-finding mission and to have a proper investigation as the first step to bringing this dreadful conflict to a close.Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Envoy de Mistura and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Markram, for their briefings. China takes note of the reports alleging that chemical weapons were once again used in Syria and caused civilian casualties. That is of great concern to China.China's position on chemical-weapons has been consistent and clear. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstances. Any use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever, must not be tolerated. China supports a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation of the incident concerned so that it can reach a conclusion based on substantiated evidence that can stand the test of history and facts so that the perpetrators and responsible parties can be brought to justice.The Syrian chemical-weapons issue is closely linked to to a political settlement of the Syrian situation. China 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 15/26 supports the ongoing important role of the Security Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the main channels for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapons issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take a constructive approach so as to seek a solution through consultations, establish the facts, prevent any further use of chemical weapons, preserve the unity of the Security Council and cooperate with the efforts by the parties concerned to advance the political process in Syria.The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and is inflicting tremendous suffering on the Syrian people. A political settlement is the only solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must remain committed to a political settlement of the question of Syria, while fully respecting its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.China has always opposed the use or threat of force in international affairs. We always advocate adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. All parties should increase their support for the United Nations mediation efforts and compel the parties in Syria to seek a political settlement under the principle of Syrian leadership and ownership in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).The fight against terrorism is an important and urgent issue in the political settlement of the Syrian question. The international community must strengthen its coordination, uphold uniform standards and combat all terrorist groups identified as such by the Security Council.At a recent Security Council meeting, China set out its principled position with regard to the Skripal incident (see S/PV.8224). China believes that the parties concerned should strictly comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention, carry out a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation and deal with the issues concerned within the framework of the OPCW. China hopes that the parties concerned will work in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and equality, engage in consultations, cooperate, avoid politicization and measures that might further exacerbate tensions and resolve their differences properly through dialogue.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings this afternoon. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for acceding to our request for an emergency meeting.We are dismayed by the general escalation of violence in Syria, as described today by Staffan de Mistura, in clear violation of the various resolutions, including resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I want to plea with the Syrian authorities represented in the Chamber and with the Astana guarantors to live up to the Security Council's resolutions.We asked for this meeting today because over the weekend we were yet again faced with horrifying allegations of chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, this time in Douma, just outside Damascus. There are worrying reports of a large number of civilian casualties, including women and children. The graphic material that has been shared is beyond repugnant. We are alarmed by those extremely serious allegations. There must now be an immediate, independent and thorough investigation.Let me reiterate that Sweden supports all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in armed conflict is always prohibited and amounts to a war crime. Those responsible must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria has become a central test of the credibility of the Council. How we respond to the most recent reports from Douma is therefore decisive. Despite the odds, we must put aside our differences and come together. Now is the time to show unity. In our view, the following needs to happen.First, we must condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria.Secondly, our immediate priority must be to investigate the worrying reports from Douma. In that context, we welcome the announcement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Fact-finding Mission for Syria — to which we reiterate our full support — is in the process of gathering information from all available sources. We express our hope that the Fact-finding Mission can be urgently deployed to Syria.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 16/26 18-09955 Thirdly, all States, as well as the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, must fully cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission. What is particularly needed is safe and unhindered access to the site in Douma, as well as any information and evidence deemed relevant by the Fact-finding Mission to conduct its independent investigation.Fourthly, we need to urgently redouble our efforts in the Council to agree on a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism to identify those responsible for chemical-weapons use.Finally, if the allegations of chemical-weapons use are indeed confirmed and those responsible are eventually identified, the perpetrators must be held to account.We are ready to work actively and constructively with other members for urgent Council action. To that end, we have circulated elements as input to our discussions. We must immediately engage in consultations in order to break the current deadlock and to shoulder our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. We owe that to the many victims of the crimes committed in this conflict.Mr. Radomski (Poland): Allow me to thank Special Envoy Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Mr. Thomas Markham for their important briefings.We are horrified by the news of another deadly attack in eastern Ghouta, which took place on Saturday evening. Dozens of people perished as a result of a vicious act of violence against civilians in Douma. The available information about the symptoms of the victims affirm that they are consistent with those caused by a chemical agent.Poland condemns that barbaric attack, and expects that it will be possible to hold the perpetrators accountable. No military or political goal can justify the extermination of innocent vulnerable people, especially those seeking help in medical facilities. That atrocious crime seems to be a cynical response to the debates in the Council last week, when we commemorated the first anniversary of the attack in Khan Shaykun (see S/PV.8221).We call on the actors affecting the situation in Syria, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take all the necessary actions to prevent any further use of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve the full cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Syria. We insist that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.As has been stated many times by members of the Council, as well as United Nations officials and European Union representatives, it is highly regrettable that the renewal of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was vetoed, thereby allowing those responsible for the subsequent chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Today we face the results of that impunity, witnessing further attacks against civilians with the use of chemicals as weapons.We urge all our partners in the Council to engage in a serious discussion in good faith in order to re-establish an accountability mechanism for chemical attacks in Syria. That is the minimum that we owe the victims of Ghouta, Khan Shaykun, Al-Lataminah and the numerous other places where chemical weapons have been used.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to thank Special Envoy De Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings.Reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on Saturday and the videos and pictures that we saw through media outlets are indeed very worrisome. It is also deeply disturbing that such reports of the use of chemical weapons have continued in the ongoing military activities in Syria. As we have repeatedly stated, we strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons by any actor under any circumstances. There is no justification whatsoever for the use of chemical weapons. Those responsible for these inhuman acts must be identified and held accountable. This is absolutely vital, not only for the sake of the victims of chemical weapons in Syria but also for maintaining international peace and security and for preserving the non-proliferation architecture.As the Secretary-General said in his 8 April statement, cited by the Special Envoy earlier, any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation. That includes the need to establish accountability — something on which the Council has yet to achieve consensus. In the meantime, we believe the reported use of chemical weapons in Douma, and in other parts of Syria, should be investigated by the Fact-finding Mission, and all parties should extend full cooperation in that 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 17/26 regard, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.While we all agree that accountability is indispensable for deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and beyond, there is currently, as has already be said, no independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify those individuals, entities, State or non-State actors that use chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Council should recover its unity and engage in a positive and constructive discussion that could address the existing institutional lacunae.We all know that the threats to international peace and security we face today are becoming increasingly more complex by the day. We are seeing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is posing a real danger and that the international norms on the use of chemical weapons are also being undermined. Since the end of the Cold War, the trust among major Powers has never been so low as it is currently, which has enormous implications not only for global peace and security but also for the transformative agenda that we have set for ourselves in the development sphere. We cannot think of making any meaningful headway towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals without creating the necessary global security environment. At the moment, we really cannot say that this is an environment conducive to making any progress on that account.The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, it has not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security that we are facing today. It has been all the more apparent that the lack of unity and cohesion among members is undermining the credibility of the Council. Perhaps we, the elected members, have to look for ways and means to have a greater impact, with a view to contributing to increasing the Council's effectiveness. Without dialogue among the major Powers to build the necessary trust and understanding, it will be extremely difficult to address some of the most difficult and complex security challenges we have ever seen, including the situation in Syria.Things are in fact bound to get even worse unless something is done. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand. The dangers are very palpable. That is why every opportunity should be seized. That is also why we consider the news about the upcoming summit-level meetings being planned to be encouraging. We can only hope that those meetings will help to defuse tensions and allow for serious discussions to take place with a view to finding a common approach to tackling current threats and challenges. The sooner those discussions happen, the better for preserving global peace and stability, which, as we speak, is becoming a source of extremely great concern. In fact, I am understating the magnitude of the potential danger we are facing.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The Ivorian delegation thanks Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their respective briefings on the latest developments in Syria, after the resumption of fighting in Douma and eastern Ghouta and the bombing of the city of Damascus, following the relative calm of recent weeks. My delegation would like to focus its statement on three main points.First, we remain deeply concerned about recent reports of chemical-weapons attacks against innocent civilian populations, which have reportedly resulted in numerous casualties who have shown symptoms of exposure to a chemical agent. While reaffirming its categorical rejection of any use or resort to chemical weapons, be it in times of peace or in times of war, Côte d'Ivoire strongly condemns such acts and calls for these events to be placed under an intense spotlight, with the contribution of all stakeholders.In the face of allegations of recurrent use of chemical weapons by the warring parties in the Syrian conflict, the Ivorian delegation stresses that it is more important than ever that the international community send a strong signal to show, beyond the usual principled condemnations, its determination to put a definitive end to this infernal cycle.The use of chemical weapons violates the most fundamental norms of international law and poses threats to our collective security. That is why we must engage in a unflagging fight against impunity in the use of chemical weapons and preserving the international chemical non-proliferation regime, which is one of the fundamental pillars of our common security.My second point concerns the need for the international community to put in place a mechanism for accountability and for the fight against impunity for those who use chemical weapons, in order to put an end to the repeated use of these weapons. In that regard, the Ivorian delegation expresses its readiness to work S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 18/26 18-09955 towards the establishment of such a mechanism and calls on the Council to return to the unity it had when it established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, whose mandate unfortunately could not be renewed despite our common efforts.Thirdly, Côte d'Ivoire notes with regret that resolution 2401 (2018), which remains the framework for our joint action, has not been implemented and that the humanitarian situation in Syria has further deteriorated. In the light of the distress of the civilian populations trapped in the fighting, the urgency for a cessation of hostilities remains more relevant than ever. In the face of the deteriorating situation, my country would like once again to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and to respect international humanitarian law, including unhindered humanitarian access to persons in distress, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018).In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that the solution to the crisis in Syria cannot be military. Only an inclusive political process can put a definitive end to this conflict. Such a political solution must be in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and imbued with the results of the Geneva negotiations. My country believes that the Geneva talks remain the right framework for achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram and their respective teams for their exhaustive briefings.The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its gratitude to the French Republic and to the other members of the Council that called for the convening of this afternoon's meeting. We also thank the President of the Security Council for having decided to hold this afternoon's meeting under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security: The situation in the Middle East". This is an appropriate topic, since recent events in the Middle East represent a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but at the international level as well. From the protests in the Gaza Strip, with their loss of human lives, to the missile attacks on Syria, as well as the horrendous chemical weapons attack in the Syrian town of Douma, those are all situations of deep concern for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.This past weekend we awoke to news that added a new low to the saddest and bloodiest episodes of the Syrian conflict. According to reports published in the international media, on 7 April, in the Syrian town of Douma in eastern Ghouta, more than 40 people, mostly women and girls, died from asphyxiation caused by inhaling a poison gas.As we heard in this Chamber on 4 April from the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram (see S/PV.8221), the conclusions and recommendations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are not binding and do not attribute responsibilities in the case of evidence of the use of chemical substances prohibited under the relevant international treaties. In the light of that fact, we take this opportunity to recall the obligation of all parties to take essential steps towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), and we underscore the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism of the United Nations whose task should be focused on preventing impunity, identifying those responsible and preventing future attacks to the best of its abilities.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, no use of chemical weapons should go uninvestigated or unpunished. As a result, the alarming information coming out of Syria, especially that pertaining to the use of chemical weapons targeting civilians, both the case of Douma, which we are discussing today, as well as similar events in the past, must be investigated exhaustively, fairly, objectively and independently by international bodies in accordance with OPCW standards. The results of such investigations must be made public and those responsible must answer for their crimes before the implacable face of justice.The fact that chemical substances continue to be used, especially against civilians, is cause for serious concern to the Government of Equatorial Guinea. During the general debate of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, condemned in the strongest terms the use, manufacture, possession and distribution of chemical weapons in armed conflicts (see A/72/PV.13). It is worth recalling that no member of the Council should be considered exempt from that obligation, which also reflects Chapter I of the Charter of the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 19/26 United Nations, which enshrines the determination of Member States to build a world of peace and ensure the well-being of humankind.The Security Council now finds itself at a crossroads with respect to its options. It can either strengthen the presence of international forces with a view to future military intervention, as some military Powers have been suggesting, or we can pursue international negotiations, be they in Geneva, Astana, Sochi or Ankara. However, history continues to teach us that military interventionism has never resolved conflicts; rather, it exacerbates and entrenches them, sowing desolation and ruin in its wake.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, the only solution to the Syrian conflict is to be found in the words spoken yesterday by Pope Francis in the traditional Sunday mass in Saint Peter's Square in the Vatican:"There is no such thing as a good war and a bad war. Nothing, but nothing, can justify the use of such instruments of extermination on defenseless people and populations . military and political leaders choose another path, that of negotiations, which is the only one that can bring about peace and not death and destruction."In conclusion, we reiterate the appeal made by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the countries and actors with influence in Syria, as well as in Israel and Palestine, to wield that influence in order to force all parties involved in those conflicts to mitigate the suffering of their people and to sit down to negotiate to put an end to that chronic threat to international peace and security which persists in the Middle East.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Thomas Markram, for their briefings. We express our gratitude to Council members for initiating this emergency meeting, which we hope will lead to the launching of a timely and objective investigation of the incident in Douma.We firmly believe that the Security Council remains the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the situation within the Council is becoming increasingly strained. In order to achieve an appropriate solution to these critical issues, it is of utmost importance that the Council act unanimously, in a balanced and pragmatic manner. To that end, we must demonstrate greater flexibility and negotiability, rising above our national interests in order to achieve peace and stability. Any controversy that involves prejudices and mutual accusations and lacks conclusive results and irrefutable evidence will have only a destructive effect and will not lead to the results that the world community expects from us.With regard to the chemical attacks in Syria, we mourn together with the families of those killed and express our solidarity with them in the face of such atrocities, by which innocent civilians become victims of the relentless confrontation of the opposing parties. Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stand, uncompromisingly condemning any use of chemical weapons as the most heinous action and an unacceptable war crime.With regard to the situation in Douma, we call for an investigation into this alleged incident to be carried out and for all the circumstances to be clarified as soon as possible. The Council has the great responsibility to act on verifiable facts, not only before the world community, but before ourselves. Furthermore, history itself will ultimately be the judge of our decisions. Therefore, we need to verify all the details of the incident. In that regard, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.First, are there any other reliable sources, in addition to White Helmets' claims, and who can verify the veracity of the assessments and testimonies of those sources? Some claim that the number of victims is 70, while others report that there were more than 150 victims and still others believe there were only 25 victims. Even one victim is too many. However, today, the Russian Federation denied the attack altogether. There are many allegations and assumptions regarding the very facts concerning the use of a toxic chemical substance.Secondly, we consider it important to take into account the fact that the Government of Syria has repeatedly notified us and requested that we check its reports that a number of terrorist groups on the side of the opposition were making attempts to transfer chemical weapons and prepare chemical attacks on the territory of eastern Ghouta. Actually, these allegations have not been given due attention and we have had no opportunity to verify all the facts. We are not advocating for any side in this conflict, but rather demanding a full S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 20/26 18-09955 and objective investigation on the basis of which we can make a thoughtful decision.Thirdly, we believe that it is imperative to conduct an independent investigation. We again recall the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, the establishment of which depends on the permanent members of the Council. They must make every possible effort to find common ground on the issue. We urgently need objective and verifiable information, as well as an immediate, independent, transparent and unbiased investigation before any decision or action, unilateral or otherwise, is taken.We fully support the proposal that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission be sent at the earliest. We are certain that the Syrian people are very interested in an objective investigation. Therefore, Damascus and opposing parties should provide all assistance and secure access for the speedy visit of the OPCW inspectors to the incident sites to collect facts on the ground.Finally, we again call for the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the Council to reach a consensus-based decision to preserve peace and stability in the world.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank you, Mr. President, for the prompt convening of today's meeting. We were one of the countries that requested it.We also thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.Since the beginning of this year, the State of Kuwait has occupied the Arab seat in the Security Council. One of our most important priorities, which we made clear before we joined it, is to defend and uphold Arab issues, voice the concerns about them and work to find peaceful solutions. We deeply deplore the lack of any real and genuine progress on any of these issues, in particular that of the Syrian crisis, which regrettably continues to deteriorate. Security Council resolutions on such issues are not implemented. The Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is unable to shoulder that responsibility. It is divided as it faces those dangers and threats. Therefore the crises continue, along with the suffering of the people in the region.The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest terms the heinous rocket and barrel bomb attacks against residential areas under siege in eastern Ghouta, including the latest attack on Douma, on 7 April. Five days ago we marked the first anniversary of the Khan Shaykhun incident (see S/PV.8221), in which chemical weapons were used, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also identified who used them.Two days ago, scores of civilians, including children and women, were killed or injured in attacks and air strikes against Douma. Many cases of asphyxiation were recorded. Several international reports confirmed that the crimes committed in both incidents were tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, which reminds us once again of the request we all made in the Chamber for the establishment of a new mechanism to determine whether or not and by whom chemical weapons had been used, and to hold the perpetrators in Syria accountable. The mechanism must guarantee impartial, transparent and professional investigations in all chemical attacks in Syria in order to end impunity. For the past five years — specifically, since August 2013 — the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria have enjoyed impunity. They have not been punished, even when we witnessed the very first crime of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta.We do not want to mark the first anniversary of the attack in Douma without a conviction. We call for the Council to establish an accountability mechanism that would determine the perpetrators of the chemical-weapons crimes anywhere in Syria — be they a Government, entity, group or individual — so that they can be held accountable in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013). The Council must shoulder its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in Syria is a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime. The continued attacks against civilians in medical facilities and residential areas, through air strikes or artillery, are all flagrant violations of the international community's will and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, at the very least, without delay.09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 21/26 The provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) are clear and definite. They call for accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, current events are a clear violation of the provisions of the resolution. As members of the Council, we cannot accept the status quo, which is the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is another disappointment for the Syrian people, whose suffering caused by the use of such weapons in different parts of Syria we have been unable to end.The Council has a collective responsibility. The suffering Syrian people are sick and tired of tuning into meetings of the Council without seeing tangible results on the ground. At several junctures throughout this bloody conflict the Council has been able to find common ground to end the crisis. However, we must overcome our political differences and establish a new accountability mechanism in Syria that is professional, credible and impartial. Such elements are available in the draft resolution under discussion, which has been put forward by the United States. It includes updates on the incident in Douma. We call on all members of the Council to build on that draft as a good basis for negotiations on a future mechanism.We continue to seek a political solution as the only means to end the crisis in all its dimensions. The political road map is clear and agreed, based on the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and on resolution 2254 (2015). It seeks to maintain the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria and meet the legitimate aspirations and ambitions of the Syrian people towards living a dignified life.Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma. Bolivia reiterates its condemnation of the use of chemical agents as weapons and considers it to be an unjustifiable criminal act. There can be no justification for their use, regardless of the circumstances or by whom they are used, as it constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to international peace and security.We believe that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, in line with its mandate, should verify in the most objective, methodological and technical manner the reported use of chemical weapons. Should their use be verified, it must be investigated in an effective and transparent manner in order to ensure that the perpetrators can be identified and tried by the appropriate bodies so as to prevent impunity. We therefore need an independent, impartial and representative entity that will conduct a comprehensive, credible and conclusive investigation. Our major challenge is to ensure that we do not politicize or exploit the Security Council for our own purposes. We regret that so far there have been obstacles to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on all the parties involved to make every effort to effectively implement it throughout Syrian territory. We emphatically reject the ongoing bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, especially those on civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, and we deplore all military activity in residential areas. Such actions only cause more displacements, injuries and deaths. We call on all the parties to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, including authorizing humanitarian access throughout Syria and to all persons in need, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that the only option is an inclusive, negotiated and coordinated political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, aimed at enabling sustainable peace to be achieved in the area without any foreign pressure, as provided for in resolution 2254 (2015). We also reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria.Bolivia wants to once again make clear its firm rejection of the use of force or the threat of use of force. We also reject unilateral actions, which are illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and undermine any effort to achieve a political solution.Lastly, with regard to the events in the city of Salisbury, we reiterate the importance of conducting an independent, transparent and depoliticized investigation in accordance with current rules and regulations of international law, especially as set forth by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 22/26 18-09955 We believe that cooperation among the relevant parties will be essential to making progress through the appropriate diplomatic channels in solving the crime and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings. Peru is deeply concerned about the new reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, including minors, in the town of Douma. In that regard, we note the urgent need for a thorough investigation. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons wherever it may take place. We want to point out that it is a heinous crime, a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and a violation both of the non-proliferation regime and international humanitarian law.In the short term, we believe that the Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict, including countries with influence on the ground, should abide by and implement the humanitarian ceasefire that the Council provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and to cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. To that end, we once again reiterate the importance of establishing an independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The investigations should result in the prosecution and punishment of those responsible. The members of the Council cannot permit impunity.We must also remember that any response to the conflict in Syria and the atrocities committed there must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Peru opposes any use or threat of use of force contrary to international law. We reiterate our deep concern about the serious consequences that the ongoing atrocities in the Syrian conflict may have for the stability of the Middle East and for an international order based on minimum standards of humanity and coexistence. In that regard, I would like to conclude by calling on the members of the Council to restore a sense of unity and the common good to our discharge of our high responsibilities. In the case of Syria, that means implementing the ceasefire and ensuring the effective protection of civilians, investigating and punishing atrocity crimes and resuming a serious process of political dialogue, based on resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), with a view to promoting the sustainable peace that the Syrian people so badly need.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like my Dutch colleague and friend, I too have three points to make.I would first like to respectfully request of my colleague Mrs. Nikki Haley, Permanent Representative of the United States, that from now on she refrain from labelling any legitimate Governments as "regimes". Right now I am referring specifically to Russia. I have made that request once before, but Ambassador Haley was not present, and I asked for it to be conveyed to her by her colleagues. Now I am requesting it personally. If it happens again, I will interrupt the meeting on a point of order.Secondly, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said that Syria is different from Salisbury in that there no investigation is being conducted in Syria, while one is under way in Salisbury. We would very much like to know more about the details of that investigation and would be grateful if she could communicate them to us. However, for the time being we know nothing other than that all of a sudden the alleged victims of a chemical warfare agent, thankfully, turn out to be alive and, apparently, almost completely well. However, nobody has seen them yet, and we fear for the condition of those important witnesses. At the moment, we have learned from newspaper reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has offered to shelter the Skripals in the United States under new identities. The CIA's participation in this is itself revealing. But it also means that we may never see these people, who are key witnesses to what happened, again.What else do we know? We know about the speedy euthanization of the Skripals' pets and the cremation of the cat and dead guinea pigs. We are also aware of the intention to demolish their house and the restaurant and pub they visited. We also know that Yulia Skripal's sister, Viktoria, who wanted to see her, was denied a British visa. Why? That is all we know. I repeat that we would very much like to learn more details about what is going on, and we would be grateful to our British 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 23/26 colleagues if they could keep us regularly informed during the investigation.Thirdly, and lastly, we did not meet here today to address the situation in Douma. The agenda item is entitled "Threats to international peace and security", although, needless to say, it was the situation regarding Douma and the so-called chemical attack that prompted the meeting. In today's meeting, as Mr. De Mistura mentioned and the Secretary-General has previously discussed, we are moving towards a dangerous area. Unfortunately, the people who are playing these dangerous games and spewing irresponsible threats do not understand that. Today we heard once again what we have already heard many times. None of our Western colleagues want to hear or listen to objective information. None of them has expressed any doubts about the one and only version that has been given of what transpired. So what is the point of an investigation? Why bother? They have accused Damascus of a chemical-weapon attack not just before any investigation has been carried out but before the incident was even known about.They are not convinced by the information that we have provided today. They simply do not want to listen. We have already said that there are no witnesses to the use of chemical weapons at all. There are no traces of chemicals, no bodies, no injuries, no poisoning victims. Nobody went to the hospital. The footage was all clearly staged by the White Helmets. We demand that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission immediately visit Douma and the area of the alleged chemical weapons attack, interview the residents and medical staff and and collect soil samples. My British colleague said that only an investigation can establish who is to blame. We agree, except that did not stop her from blaming the so-called Syrian regime. Those two things do not really jibe. We insist that the OPCW mission visit Douma immediately. The Syrian authorities and Russian troops are ready to provide the necessary conditions for this to take place.Lastly, we too wish there were an independent investigative mechanism. I would like to remind the Council that our draft resolution, which includes a proposal for establishing such a mechanism, is in blue, and we are ready to adopt it today, if necessary.The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I apologize for taking the floor again, but I want to clarify something. The Russian Ambassador's English is far too good for him not to have understood me when I spoke on 5 April (see S/PV.8224). The investigation of the Salisbury incident that is under way is an independent police investigation, and the United Kingdom will be very pleased to update the Council as and when we have something to say.If I may, I would like to add one more thing. The other difference between Salisbury and Syria is that the United Kingdom is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in good standing, and the Syrian Government has not complied with its obligations as certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The American representative said that Russia spends its resources to support what she calls the regime in Syria. My question to her is: What does the United States spend its resources on in Syria? Does it spend its resources providing milk and medicine to Syrian children, or on providing weapons and munitions to its terrorist groups, which have committed the most heinous crimes against the Syrian people? Or is it spending resources on the its alliance's aircraft, which have wreaked destruction in many places in Syria, particularly in the city of Raqqa? What about the continuous threats that are made against my country at nearly every meeting of the Security Council on this issue? Does she acknowledge that her Administration has no respect for the Security Council, this international Organization or the principles of international law?Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the United States Ambassador said. I ask members to note that I do not refer to the American Administration as the "American regime" because that would be legally shameful in this Chamber. Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the American Ambassador said when she asked the Security Council to act in order to achieve justice in Syria. Well, my test is to request that her Administration and her country allow the disclosure of the results of the United Nations Special Commission that investigated the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq for 18 years. The Commission was headed for some time by a Swede, Mr. Hans Blix.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 24/26 18-09955 As Council members know, after 18 years of investigation the Commission found no chemical weapons in Iraq. Nor did they find Coca-Cola or Pepsi Cola. Nevertheless, in a semi-confidential meeting towards the end of 2008, the Security Council decided to end the Commission's work and bury its archives in iron boxes. I repeat — it decided to bury its archives in iron boxes. Only the Secretary-General knows the code that opens those boxes. There was one condition, which was that the boxes could not be opened for 60 years. What is so shameful in those archives? Why did they have to be buried in boxes that cannot be opened for 60 years? That question is directed to the American Ambassador.The Government of my country condemns in the strongest terms the ruthless Israeli aggression that took place this morning on the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate, in which a number of civilians were killed and injured. It was a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and of various Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, and would not have occurred were it not for the American Administration's unlimited and consistent support for Israel. The American Administration guarantees Israel immunity so that it will not be held accountable in the Council. That allows Israel to continue to practice State terrorism and to threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. Of course, Western countries did not even mention the Israeli aggression in their statements today, which shows that the Governments of their countries are complicit in it and are covering for it. Unfortunately, my dear friend Mr. De Mistura did not hear Netanyahu say this morning that it was Israel that launched the attack. That is why I was surprised when he said that the United Nations has not been able to verify the identity of its perpetrators. If Netanyahu himself says that he launched this aggression, why does Mr. De Mistura not refer to Israel as the aggressor?This Israeli aggression is an indirect response to the successes of the Syrian Arab Army in expelling armed terrorist groups from the suburbs of Damascus, its rural area and other Syrian territory. Those groups have been killing the Syrian people, kidnapping civilians, detaining them and using them as human shields. They targeted Damascus alone with 3,000 missiles over the course of three months, killing 155 martyrs and injuring 865 civilians, most of them women and children. The Syrian Government underscores that the repeated Israeli aggression did not and will not protect Israeli agents operating within terrorist groups, nor will it divert the attention of the Syrian Army from its decisive military achievements in combating terrorism.The American anti-racism activist Martin Luther King Jr. said that "a lie is like a snowball: the further you roll it the bigger it becomes". It would seem that this wise saying holds true at any time and at any place. The Governments of some countries lie incessantly. Fortunately, though, they have not quite perfected the details of their web of lies, much like the famous Baron Munchausen of German literature. How many roosters truly believe that sunrise is the result of crowing?Some permanent members have become professional liars, and that in itself is a weapon of mass destruction. Through their lies, Palestine was stolen. The lies of these countries fuelled the war in the Korean peninsula. Through their lies, they invaded Viet Nam. Through their lies, they invaded Grenada. Through their lies, they destroyed Yugoslavia. Through their lies, they occupied Iraq. Through their lies, they destroyed Libya. Through their lies, they created takfiri terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam — and the list goes on and on. Through their lies, the same countries are trying to defeat Syria and prepare the ground for an assault today.It is worth noting that the today's negative statement of the United States representative is in absolute contradiction with a statement made by United States Secretary of Defence General Mattis in an interview with Newsweek two days ago with journalist Ian Wilkie. Mr. Wilkie used the following title for the interview: "Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People." That was said by the American Defence Secretary, not the Syrian Defence Minister. What a harmonious Administration!On 10 December 2012, some six years ago, we submitted a formal letter to the Council (S/2012/917), before the operators of terrorist groups claimed, for the first time, that sarin gas was used in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013. We informed the Council that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had launched a campaign of allegations claiming that the Syrian Government may have used chemical weapons. Back then, we warned that such allegations would encourage Governments that sponsor terrorists to provide chemical weapons to armed terrorist groups and then claim that the Syrian Government had used such weapons. What happened in the past few years 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 25/26 in Khan Al-Assal, Ghouta, Kafr Zita, Lataminah, Tal Minis, Khan Shaykhun and many other villages and towns in Syria confirms unequivocally what we had warned of five to six years ago, and during all these six years.The United States, the United Kingdom and France have been extremely eager to hold one meeting after another based on fabricated information. That is part of the deep crisis that we are witnessing. They want to involve other Council members in that crisis. Since 2013, those three countries have created a big elephant of lies and deceit in the Security Council. That elephant is living in the Chamber today and is stomping on the credibility of the Council with its huge feet. It seems that these countries called for the holding of today's meeting to support terrorists and to obstruct the agreement reached about Douma.However, those countries were a bit late because the terrorists had hoped this meeting would be held before they were forced to reach an agreement with the Syrian State to leave their strongholds and hand over their weapons. These countries were late in fulfilling their promises to the terrorists. It would have been better not to repeat their nasty story and not to rely on false reports from mercenaries — so-called White Helmets, founded by British intelligence officer James Le Mesurier. He is British, but his name is French. What proves that these countries were lying is that the residents of Douma left the city safely — 170,000 civilians left the city safely. Those terrorists chose to reach an agreement with the Syrian State as a last resort for them and their families. Many buses are transferring them and their families to the city of Jarabulus, after they refused to settle their affairs and chose to go there. However, the vast majority of residents chose to stay in their houses and resort to the Syrian State.It has been proven that the allegations of certain States, including some States members of the Council, on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta were lies, just as we saw in Aleppo and other places. As it turned out, terrorist group warehouses were full of medication and food, monopolized by their elements who sold some of those items to civilians at exorbitant prices. At this point, I must ask: Did the three countries call for this meeting in order to legitimize the Israeli aggression that occurred this morning or to impede the implementation of the agreement reached with their terrorist tools?In this context, I must thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for recognizing the true nature of what these countries were preparing for, and aptly called for the meeting to be held under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security". That is the correct agenda item.We have conveyed to the Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and what used to be called the Joint Investigative Mechanism 145 letters, the latest on 1 April 2018. I thank the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan for pointing out that the Council members do not read and that the Council does not respond to those letters. The letters contain accurate information. They indicate that armed terrorist groups possess toxic chemical substances, notably chlorine and sarin. We have warned time and again that those groups were preparing to commit crimes involving chemical weapons against innocent Syrians, and were working with the White Helmets to fabricate evidence, photograph locations and film Hollywood-like scenes with everything staged in order to blame the Syrian Government and influence public opinion against Syria and its allies. Those countries call for the holding of meetings such as this in order to create a pretext that would justify any military aggression against Syria.It seems that the directors of that terrorist scene failed to perfect their web of lies. We note that in each of those theatrical scenes on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government, the substances never seem to affect the armed elements, but only women and children. These chemical weapons seem to discriminate against women and children and do not affect armed men. It suffices to wash away these chemicals with water in front of the camera. Water appears to heal everything. Rescue workers never need to wear protective masks. The Syrian Arab Army does not use these substances because it does not possess them to begin with. The Americans destroyed them on the vessel MV Cape Ray in the Mediterranean. So, the Syrian Arab Army uses these substances, which it does not possess, only when it is making military progress. How strange that is!This vehement campaign lacks the minimum standards of credibility. It relies on fabricated information on social media by elements of armed terrorist groups and their operators. I announce from this table that the Syrian Government is fully prepared to facilitate an OPCW fact-finding mission to Douma, S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 26/26 18-09955 where the incident is alleged to have occurred, as soon as possible to investigate and verify these allegations. We endorse the Russian proposal to hear a briefing on the fact-finding mission's report after its visit to Al-Raqqa. We welcome this visit as soon as possible.I hope that this offer does not suffer the same fate as the first offer we made to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the Khan Al-Assal incident of chemical substance use in March 2013. At that time, we asked the Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Syrian Government in immediately investigating what happened in the town of Khan Al-Assal. It took the United Nations four months and 11 days to send Mr. Sellström, as Council members recall. Yes, it took the United Nations four months and 11 days. That is how the United Nations interpreted the term "immediately" — four months and 11 days. When Mr. Sellström arrived in Damascus to investigate what had happened in Khan Al-Assal, terrorists in Ghouta were instructed to use chemical substances again. Mr. Sellström therefore left Khan Al-Assal and moved to Ghouta. Council members should be aware that since March 2013, investigations into what happened in Khan Al-Assal have not taken place.Today, we directly accuse Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha and Ankara of providing Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and scores of other affiliated terrorist groups with toxic chemical substances to be used against Syrian civilians. We accuse them of inciting those massacres and of fabricating evidence to falsely blame the Syrian Government for the use of toxic chemical substances in order to prepare the ground for an aggression against my country, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did in Iraq in 2003.Yes, we say to the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in Syria and Iraq, we eliminated the vast majority of Da'esh elements within three years — not within 30 years, as President Obama has said. Those States have plans to justify undermining the stability of the region. Yes, we say to Saudi Arabia today that we cut off its terrorist tentacles — the gangs of Jaysh Al-Islam — in eastern Ghouta. Yes, we say to Qatar and Turkey that we cut off their terrorist tentacles — the gangs of the Al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman — in eastern Ghouta. I say to all those who sent moderate, armed, genetically modified opposition fighters to our land that we eliminated these toxic exports. We call on those exporters to bear the consequences of their actions, as some surviving elements will return to their original countries.The issue is very simple. Let me just say that on our borders with Turkey and in the separation zone in the Golan with Israel, there are tens of thousands of good, moderate terrorists with their light weapons, long beards, black banners and white helmets. Whoever wants to adopt them should submit an application to their operators. They are ready to go to Europe and the West as refugees.In conclusion, the Syrian Arab Republic stresses once again that it does not possess chemical weapons of any type, including chlorine. We condemn anew the use of chemical weapons at anytime, anywhere and in any circumstances. My country, Syria, reaffirms its readiness to cooperate fully with the OPCW in fulfilling its commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.The Russian Centre for Reconciliation in Syria announced today that Russian military experts have carried out investigations in Douma and confirmed that they have found no sign of the use of chemical weapons there. While treating the sick in the hospitals of Douma, Russian doctors have proven that these patients have not been subjected to any chemical substance. What we were seeing there was nothing but Hollywood-style scenes.The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

Security Council 8236th Meeting (Pm) ; 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 1/5 SC/13302 17 APRIL 2018 MEETINGS COVERAGE SECURITY COUNCIL > 8236TH MEETING (PM) Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council Casting a spotlight on the pressing needs of civilians in Raqqa and Rukban, the Security Council met this afternoon to hear a brie􀃒􍉮ng on recent developments and discuss ways forward. While people in those cities comprised 1 per cent of those requiring help, their needs were no less important than the remaining 99 per cent, said Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. In Raqqa, where 100,000 people had returned since October when Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) had been forced out, conditions were not conducive for returns because of high levels of unexploded ordinances and improvised explosive device contamination. In addition, there were scant basic services, a lack of electricity and mobile communications and food insecurity. Describing other concerns, he said in Rukban some 50,000 people were in need of sustained humanitarian assistance. Those remaining in the town of Douma and other areas of eastern Ghouta required urgent assistance after years of deprivation, he said, adding that the humanitarian community had not yet been able to provide help. On 25 March, the United Nations had requested permission from the Government of Syria to deploy an interagency surge team to scale up the United Nations operational capacity, he said, adding that he could not overstate the importance of sustaining and scaling up the international response. Council members underscored the need for sustained aid deliveries, with some calling on all Member States to make substantial commitments at the upcoming Brussels pledging conference and to swiftly disburse pledges. Some delegates said mine clearing should be a priority to ensure safe returns of displaced persons, while many members urged parties to return to negotiations to 􀃒􍉮nd a political solution to end the con􀃓􍍩ict. Echoing a common call, China's representative appealed to all parties in Syria to comply with Security Council resolution 2401 (2018) by ceasing hostilities and coordinating with United Nations humanitarian e􀃗􍝯orts. Any unilateral action would violate the basic norms of international law while complicating a settlement of the Syrian issue, he said, urging all sides to refrain from moves that would further escalate the situation. The representative of the Russian Federation, noting that Raqqa's destruction had been due to a United States-led coalition 􀃒􍉧ght against ISIL, criticized coalition members for their lack of reconstruction in that area. Civilians were regularly killed by landmines and no assessment of humanitarian needs had occurred until the Russian Federation had insisted on it. In addition, no practical steps had been taken to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of Rukban, which was located near an American airbase. Urging the Council and the humanitarian community to address the situation of those two cities, he said coalition members should outline how they themselves were implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Meanwhile, the United States delegate said that while the 75 members of the Global Coalition against Da'esh had targeted ISIL and liberated civilians, the Syrian Government had bombarded its own people. United Nations humanitarian convoys were welcome at any time in Raqqa and Rukhban, with any delays being the result of the Syrian Government and its failure to allow deliveries. Condemning the Russian Federation for its "cynical, thinly disguised diversions", she said it was clear that it had requested the Council meeting as a distraction from the atrocities committed by the Bashar Al-Assad regime. Providing another perspective, Syria's representative said three Council members continued to search for microscopic dust while ignoring the enormous "elephant in the room", which was the aggression they had launched against his country. Raqqa was a martyr city that had been destroyed by those very States, he said, adding that the coalition had never sought to combat terrorism. Indeed, the point had been to block the Syrian Government and its allies as they attempted to combat ISIL. Turning to the situation in the Rukban camps, he said coalition forces had prevented the Government from delivering aid. Moreover, he asserted that the situation in Syria did not require draft resolutions or semi-daily meetings. Instead, the Council must stand against the occupation of Syria by the United States, Israel and Turkey and aggressions carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Drawing attention to the e􀃗􍝥ects of the crisis on the Syrian people, Equatorial Guinea's representative said the situation in Raqqa required the international community's urgent attention. Calling for sustained humanitarian access and the intensi􀃒􍉣cation of e􀃗􍝯orts to reach a political solution, he reminded Council members that "the Syrian people have su􀃗􍝥ered enough." 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 2/5 Also speaking were the representatives of Kuwait, Sweden, France, United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Netherlands, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Peru. The meeting began at 4:48 p.m. and ended at 6:38 p.m. Brie􀃒􍉮ng MARK LOWCOCK, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, including in Raqqa and Rukban. While people in those cities totalled 1 per cent of those requiring help, their needs were no less important than the remaining 99 per cent. After a United Nations assessment mission on 1 April in Raqqa, where 100,000 people had returned since October when Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) had been forced out, reports showed that conditions were not conducive for returns because of high levels of unexploded ordinances and improvised explosive device contamination. Every week, 50 casualties had been reported due to the remnants of war. Also, an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of all buildings had been destroyed or damaged. While public services were slowly resuming, the city lacked electricity and mobile communications while water was being pumped at a very limited capacity to the outskirts. Meanwhile, up to 95 per cent of households that had returned to Raqqa were food insecure and health services were lacking. Some schools had reopened, but lacked supplies. United Nations agencies were planning deliveries of humanitarian assistance and programmatic interventions to support the work of humanitarian agencies already active in those areas. In Rukban, some 50,000 people were in need of sustained humanitarian assistance, he continued, noting that there was a pressing need for better service provision and medical help. Humanitarian agencies were working closely with the United States, Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to facilitate deliveries. At the same time, those remaining in the town of Douma and other areas of eastern Ghouta, under control of the Government of Syria, required urgent assistance after years of deprivation. The humanitarian community had not yet been able to provide that, he said, adding that access to reach the people of eastern Ghouta was critical. Of the 155,000 who had been displaced, he said, approximately 63,000 had moved north to Idlib and Aleppo, resulting in a 25 per cent increase in Idlib's displaced population. That situation placed incredible pressure on host communities and humanitarian actors working to provide assistance and services. Those remaining in Afrin were also in dire need of aid. Despite some positive developments, humanitarian partners were still struggling to gain sustained access to Afrin and freedom of movement for internally displaced persons remained severely limited. On 25 March, the United Nations requested permission from the Government of Syria to deploy an interagency surge team to scale up the United Nations operational capacity. Overall, he could not overstate the importance of sustaining and scaling up the international response. Statements VASSILY A. NEBENZIA (Russian Federation), noting that some delegations were constantly calling on his country to provide updates on its implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), said signi􀃒􍉣cant e􀃗􍝯orts had been undertaken to improve the situation in eastern Ghouta, where armed groups had long held populations hostage. "A bloodbath was prevented," he said, adding that some 60,000 people had also been helped to return to their homes. Joint work was ongoing between the Russian military police and Syrian law enforcement o􀃕􍕣cials, including debris clearance, re-establishment of services and food deliveries. However, the international community's attention was also required, he said, calling for additional support from other Member States. In contrast, he said, Raqqa — which had been destroyed by United States-led coalition air strikes — had seen no reconstruction e􀃗􍝯orts. Civilians were regularly killed by landmines, and no assessment of humanitarian needs had taken place until the Russian Federation had insisted on it. Buildings were in ruins, thousands of corpses remained buried and no school, hospital or basic services remained operational. No practical steps had been taken to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of the similarly damaged city of Rukban, located near an American airbase whose very existence constituted a blatant violation of Syria's sovereignty. Urging the Council and the humanitarian community not to ignore the situation of those two cities, he said members of the coalition should be courageous enough to outline how they themselves were implementing resolution 2401 (2018) in those cases. Events over recent days had revealed the hypocrisy of the "troika" — namely, the United States, United Kingdom and France, he said. By their acts of aggression, those countries and their supporters had taken sides in the Syrian con􀃓􍍩ict. The Russian Federation was instead working with all sides, committing to implementing Council resolutions and supporting the parties in making progress in the Geneva talks, which must resume without preconditions and especially without demands for a regime change. Given current developments, it was hard to imagine that the Government of Syria would want to talk about the situation in its country with any members of the troika, who sought to declare its President a war criminal. Indeed, before any progress could be made, "you 􀃒􍉲rst need to undo the damage that you yourself have created", he said, noting that the opposition must step back from its destructive position while embracing Council resolutions, and their patrons must end their militant rhetoric against the legitimately elected President of Syria. Meanwhile, he said, the establishment of a mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria made no sense, as Washington, D.C., and its allies were already acting like self-appointed executioners on that matter. Attempts to push the Russian Federation to change its position using air strikes and the threat of sanctions had never 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 3/5 worked in the past nor would they work in the future. The United States and its allies must end its threats to use force against Syria, as such actions 􀃓􍍯outed international law and only drove peace farther away. Warning against attempts to maintain foreign occupation in parts of Syria, loot its resources and stoke divisions between its people, he said military groups must also separate themselves from terrorists and Western parties should stop manipulating the humanitarian situation for political purposes. BADER ABDULLAH N. M. ALMUNAYEKH (Kuwait) said resolution 2401 (2018) had addressed the humanitarian situation across Syria, demanding a pause in hostilities for 30 days to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance and allow for the evacuation of the sick and wounded. Voicing frustration that it had not yet been implemented, he reiterated the call on parties to the con􀃓􍍩ict to allow the entry of weekly convoys and for an immediate end to all attacks against civilians, civilian infrastructure and medical facilities. Urging the Astana guarantors, in particular, to continue to support talks. Welcoming the O􀃕􍕣ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs preparations of plans for providing humanitarian assistance in Raqqa, he underscored the need to maintain sustained aid delivery to internally displaced persons camps in Rukban. OLOF ORRENIUS SKOOG (Sweden) said a greater e􀃗􍝯ort must be made to ensure full and immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, with the Astana guarantors living up to their commitments. He called on the Syrian authorities to immediately grant facilitation letters for humanitarian convoys to Douma and to facilitate sustained United Nations access to camps housing internally displaced persons. Referring also the situations in Raqqa, Rukban, Idlib and Afrin, he said the humanitarian community was undertaking a Herculean task. However, the acute lack of funding for United Nations humanitarian operations in in Syria was deeply troubling, he said, calling on all Member States to make substantial commitments at the upcoming Brussels conference and to swiftly disburse pledges. KELLEY A. ECKELS-CURRIE (United States) said the 75 members of the Global Coalition against Da'esh that had fought the terrorist group in Iraq had continued its eradication campaign in Syria. While the coalition had targeted ISIL and liberated civilians, the Syrian Government had bombarded its own people. Noting that United Nations humanitarian convoys were welcome at any time in Raqqa and Rukban, the United States stood ready to support deliveries. Any delays stemmed from the Bashar al-Assad regime and its failure to allow convoys to move. The United States had already provided assistance, clearing 3,000 remnants of war and contributing 300,000 pounds of food. Pointing out that the Russian Federation had called the Council meeting as part of a messaging campaign to distract the international community from the atrocities committed by the Assad regime, she reiterated that in addition to a cease􀃒􍉲re, the Council had called for unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. Yet, the regime had only allowed six convoys. Such calls by the Council needed to be implemented on the ground, but that required the Syrian Government's cooperation, she said, condemning the Russian Federation for its "cynical, thinly disguised diversions". FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said the humanitarian situation in Syria screamed for attention, including those 􀃓􍍥eeing safe areas, the bureaucracy preventing access to camps and conditions in Raqqa, where 90,000 people had returned. Humanitarian actors needed access to provide much-needed basic services and e􀃗􍝯orts must continue to remove landmines. For its part, France was helping with landmine clearance and had contributed €10 million for projects easing civilian returns to Raqqa. Concerning Rukban, he reiterated an urgent appeal to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access. In that context, he supported the draft resolution that his country, United Kingdom and the United States had tabled on 14 April with a view to making progress on the humanitarian front, put a de􀃒􍉮nite end to the Syrian chemical programme and begin conclusive political negotiations. That draft had sought areas of convergence to create conditions of real diplomatic progress in Syria and open the way for true negotiations. KAREN PIERCE (United Kingdom), regretting to note that some members had used the humanitarian situation to score political points, recalled that the United Kingdom had contributed a total of $3.5 billion to date for humanitarian assistance. Her Government continued to provide humanitarian support to Raqqa and surrounding areas and had aided with landmine clearance. Raising several concerns, she drew attention to the plight of displaced persons in Rukban and urged the regime to facilitate access to the United Nations and its partners to deliver aid to Douma and eastern Ghouta. She called on the Council to use recent events to get the political process back on track and was looking forward to the upcoming retreat in Sweden, which the Secretary-General would also attend. KANAT TUMYSH (Kazakhstan), welcoming the O􀃕􍕣ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs assessment mission to Raqqa in April, raised concerns that an estimated 100,000 people had returned to their homes in that city despite the wide presence of unexploded ordnances. Highlighting the signi􀃒􍉣cant destruction of Raqqa and the precarious fate of the Rukban and Hadalat refugee camps, he warned the Council of a dangerous tendency for those camps to become havens for foreign mercenaries. Kazakhstan supported the Russian Federation's proposal to establish humanitarian corridors for withdrawing refugees from El Tanf and the Rukban camp, based on the example provided by Russian and Syrian military troops during the assault on Aleppo. Calling on all parties immediately suspend hostilities, implement resolution 2401 (2018) and report periodically on those e􀃗􍝯orts, he said the questions of boundaries and territories following Syria's prolonged war should be addressed in line with that country's Constitution in order to prevent the re‑emergence of extremist groups. PAWEL RADOMSKI (Poland), raising concerns about new internally displaced persons reaching Idlib, said the military con􀃓􍍩ict in north-west Syria had further complicated the situation on the ground. He called on all parties, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take action towards a cessation of hostility and to comply with all their obligations under 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 4/5 international law. He also urged the Russian Federation, Iran and Turkey to ful􀃒􍉬l their responsibility as guarantors of the Astana process. There could be no military solution to the con􀃓􍍩ict, in Syria, he said, underlining that a political agreement remained the only sustainable solution. ANATOLIO NDONG MBA (Equatorial Guinea) said Council members had recognized the very high number of people 􀃓􍍥eeing Syria when they had adopted resolution 2393 (2017). In the former ISIL stronghold of Raqqa, military o􀃗􍝥ensives had led to signi􀃒􍉣cant destruction. Commending World Health Organization (WHO) e􀃗􍝯orts, he said Raqqa's residents continued to be deprived of aid because there were no nearby o􀃕􍕣ces of humanitarian agencies and local authorities were incapable of providing assistance. The situation required the international community and the Council's urgent attention, he said, calling for the provision of sustained access allowing humanitarian convoys to reach Raqqa. "The Syrian people have su􀃗􍝥ered enough," he said, calling for the intensi􀃒􍉣cation of e􀃗􍝯orts to reach a political solution centred on the needs of the Syrian people and in full respect for Syria's territorial integrity. THÉODORE DAH (Côte d'Ivoire), echoing expressions of regret that resolution 2401 (2018) remained unimplemented, called on all parties to ensure its full implementation across Syria including in Raqqa and Rukban. In the former, signi􀃒􍉣cant destruction, a dearth of basic services and the presence of unexploded ordnance posed serious obstacles for safe returns of civilians. Calling on the international community to address those situations, he said a needs assessment was urgently required to better understand the extremely precarious living conditions in Rukban's internally displaced persons camps. Such work must be part of a global e􀃗􍝯ort to reach a negotiated political solution based on inclusive dialogue and in line with resolution 2254 (2015). LISE GREGOIRE VAN HAAREN (Netherlands) emphasized the urgent need for access to Douma for humanitarian convoys and for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-􀃒􍉮nding mission. Calling for a humanitarian surge to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons, she emphasized the situation of more than 180,000 people displaced by hostilities in Afrin, adding to the strain felt by host communities. Clearing improvised explosive devices was a priority in Raqqa, while in Rukban, both food and medical aid must reach the remaining displaced persons via the fastest and easiest route. Resolution 2401 (2018) must be implemented across Syria and e􀃗􍝯orts must succeed in ensuring humanitarian access and the protection of civilians, in line with international humanitarian law. MA ZHAOXU (China) appealed to all parties in Syria to comply with resolution 2401 (2018), cease hostilities and coordinate with United Nations humanitarian e􀃗􍝯orts. Equal attention must be paid to the humanitarian situation and to helping displaced persons to return to their homes. Emphasizing China's adherence to the peaceful settlement of disputes and its rejection of the use of force in international regulations, he said any action taken must comply with the United Nations Charter. Any unilateral action would violate the basic norms of international law while complicating a settlement of the Syrian issue, he said, urging all sides to refrain from moves that would further escalate the situation. PEDRO LUIS INCHAUSTE JORDÁN (Bolivia) underscored the pressing need to pursue mine clearing and to remove improvised explosive devices and remnants of war. Such work was vital for reconstruction and the return of basic services. Expressing regret that violence had continued unfettered in major cities, he said it was even more repugnant that schools, hospitals and residential areas were being targeted. Bolivia called on all stakeholders to spare no e􀃗􍝯ort to implement resolution 2401 (2018) and for all parties to allow for unconditional humanitarian access. He went on to reiterate that the Syrian people should decide their political future through an inclusive process, free from external meddling. DAWIT YIRGA WOLDEGERIMA (Ethiopia) said the destruction of infrastructure and limited public services remained major challenges in Syrian cities. Demining e􀃗􍝯orts should be strengthened and aid must be delivered to all parts of Syria via safe and unhindered humanitarian access. Underscoring the importance of fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018), he said the Council should restore its unity through genuine and productive dialogue. GUSTAVO MEZA-CUADRA (Peru), Council President for April, speaking in his national capacity, welcomed e􀃗􍝯orts to clear "deadly booby-traps" laid by Da'esh in Raqqa and other areas. Recommendations from the O􀃕􍕣ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs mission to Raqqa would contribute to the safe return of displaced persons. While acknowledging the legitimate right of States to protect their borders, he said there should be unfettered access to Rukban, given the humanitarian situation there. It was vital that needs in Syria be met on a consistent basis, regardless of location, he said, adding that politicizing humanitarian assistance was unacceptable and a contravention of resolution 2401 (2018), which must be applied holistically throughout Syria. BASHAR JA'AFARI (Syria) said three Council members continued to search for microscopic dust while ignoring the enormous "elephant in the room", which was the aggression they had launched against Syria. His counterpart from the United States had declared that her country's forces had rid Raqqa of 3,000 landmines. Yet, the United States had also assisted 4,000 terrorists to safely leave the city without holding them accountable for planting them. While Sweden's representative had called out the Syrian Government many times, he had failed to call for an end to the United States, Turkish and Israeli occupation of Syria and to mention State-sponsored terrorism. Addressing France's delegate, he said Médecins Sans Frontières, like ISIL, had entered Syria without the Syrian Government's approval, behaving instead like "terrorists without borders". 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 5/5  Providing an update on the OPCW fact-􀃒􍉮nding mission in Douma, he said the Syrian Government had facilitated the arrival today of a United Nations security team, which had entered the city around 3 p.m. local time. If the team found the situation to be secure, the OPCW fact-􀃒􍉮nding team would begin its work 18 April. Claims that the mission had been blocked had only intended to distract the international community from reality, he said, expressing regret that countries launched cowardly attacks against Syria still failed to understand the Syrian people's desire to determine their own destiny. "The days of hegemony are gone," he said, adding that no threat of force or support for terrorists would change the fact that the world's people were tired of seeing big Powers continue to disregard international law with impunity. He said Raqqa was a martyr city that had been destroyed by those very States, with the O􀃕􍕣ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A􀃗􍝡airs declaring the destruction to be "100 per cent complete". Hundreds of thousands of people had 􀃓􍍥ed Raqqa and no basic services or operating hospitals remained, except for Médecins Sans Frontières facilities. The coalition had never sought to combat terrorism, he said, recalling its bloody massacres of civilians in various towns and villages across Syria. Indeed, the point had been to block the Syrian Government and its allies as they attempted to combat ISIL. On 8 February, United States forces had killed dozens of members of a popular force that had been 􀃒􍉧ghting ISIL along the Euphrates River. Meanwhile, terrorists had been spared and even armed so they could wreak further havoc. Turning to the situation in the Rukban camps, he said coalition forces had prevented the Government from delivering aid. The United States was using the area as a place to train terrorist forces, who would then be used to 􀃒􍉧ght other battles in the region. The situation in Syria did not require draft resolutions or semi-daily meetings. Instead, what was needed was for the Council to stand against the occupation of Syria by the United States, Israel and Turkey, aggressions carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom and the imposition of coercive measures against the Syrian people. For information media. Not an o􀃕􍕣cial record.

KEMAL'S INFIDELITY AND ITS INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN ORHAN PAMUK'S THE MUSEUM OF INNOCENCE Ayu Setya Rahayu English Department, Language and Arts Faculty, State University of Surabaya cosmeticmiracle@yahoo.com Drs. Much. Khoiri M.Si. English Department, Language and Arts Faculty, State University of Surabaya much_choiri@yahoo.com Abstract Infidelity is defined as unfaithfulness of being unreliable or being attracted to someone other than one relationship partner. There are two types of infidelity, emotional and sexual infidelity. What constitutes an act of infidelity varies within cultures and depends on the type of relationship that exists between people.This study is aimed to present infidelity as experinced by Kemal as the main character in Orhan Pamuk's The Museum of Innocence, and to reveal the most influential factor of his infidelity.The study uses descriptive qualitative research with psychoanalitic approach. The object of the study is The Museum of Innocence by Orhan Pamuk, published in New York by vintage books in 2009. The data are in the form of quotation, fragments, and dialogues or monologues that indicated the thoughts and action concerning form of infidelity, and also its most influential factor. The data is analyzed by applying the theory of infidelity by Dirgosta and Barta, and also the most influential factor of it. This study also uses the theory of love and will by Rollo May to reveal his influential factor that lead to his infidelity based on the concept above and the quotation depicted in the novel.The result of this study shows thatKemal, the main character of this novel, commits both sexual and emotional infidelity. Initially, he becomes emotionally connected with someone outside of his relationship named Fusun. One way of looking at emotional infidelity is, that it is very dangerous, because it is not only takes away time and energy from his relationship, but it lead him to sexual infidelity and to the end of his engagement. Andthe main factors of Kemal's infidelity represented from this novel is he falls in love with someone else named Fusun. Actually, this novel is story of love of Kemal and Fusun, then his feeling of love that prompted him to take an action in certain direction which can realize his purpose of love. Because in love, there is definitely a will to unite with beloved people, then it gives rise a boost in his heart to betray his fiancee. Keywords: Infdelity, love, will, novel Abstrak Perselingkuhan didefinisikan sebagai ketidaksetiaan, diandalkan atau tertarik pada orang lain di luar dari pasangannya . Ada dua jenis perselingkuhan , perselingkuhan emosional dan seksual . Yang merupakan suatu tindakan perselingkuhan bervariasi dalam budaya dan tergantung pada jenis hubungan yang ada antara manusia. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyajikan perselingkuhan yang di alami oleh Kemal sebagai sebagai tokoh utama dalam novel berjudul The Museum of Innocence karya Orhan Pamuk, dan untuk mengungkap faktor yang paling berpengaruh dalam perselingkuhannya.Penelitian ini menggunakan penelitian deskriptif kualitatif dengan pendekatan psikoanalisis . Objek penelitiaan ini adalah novel The Museum of Innocence karya Orhan Pamuk , yang diterbitkan di New York oleh vintage books tahun 2009 . Data tersebutdi peroleh dalam bentuk kutipan , fragmen , dan dialog atau monolog yang menunjukkan pemikiran dan tindakan mengenai bentuk perselingkuhan Kemal dan juga faktor yang paling berpengaruh. Data dianalisis dengan menerapkan teori perselingkuhan oleh Dirgosta dan Barta untuk mengungkapkan refleksi penggambaran perselingkuhan Kemal dan juga faktor yang paling berpengaruh. Penelitian ini juga menggunakan teori cinta dan keinginan oleh Rollo May untuk mengungkapkan faktor paling berpengaruh yang mengarah pada perselingkuhan yang didasarkan pada konsep di atas dan kutipan yang digambarkan dalam novel. Penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Kemal , tokoh utama dalam novel ini , melakukan perselingkuhan baik seksual mapun emosional . Awalnya , ia menjadi terhubung secara dengan seseorang di luar hubungannya, bernama Fusun . Salah satu cara untuk melihat perselingkuhan emosional adalah , bahwa sangat berbahaya , karena tidak hanya menghilangkan waktu dan energi dari hubungannya sebelumnya , namun membawanya ke perselingkuhan seksual, hingga merusak pertunangannya dengan Sibel. Dan faktor utama perselingkuhan oleh Kemal yang tergambar dalam novel ini adalah ia jatuh cinta dengan orang lain bernama Fusun . Sebenarnya , novel ini adalah kisah cinta Kemal dan Fusun , maka perasaannya cinta yang mendorongnya untuk mengambil tindakan dalam arah tertentu yang dapat mewujudkan tujuan cintanya . Karena di dalam cinta , pasti ada keinginan untuk bersatu dengan orang-orang yang di cintainya, kemudian memberikan dorongan dalam hatinya untuk mengkhianati tunangannya . Kata kunci: Infidelity, love, will, novel Introduction Within the context of intimate relationships, infidelity has been defined as a partner's violation of norms pertaining to the level of emotional or physical intimacy in which people engaged in outside the relationship (Drigotas & Barta, 2001:45). In the currentera,many strange phenomena appear and done by society. One of the interesting behavior in humansare donetoday is infidelity and that is very oftenaround environment. Not only household commit infidelity, but also in interpersonal relationship. The phenomenon of infidelity is dominant on the socioeconomic statu sof middle to top, especially in big cities. Moreover, the problem of infidelity is often atrigger forvarious cases of divorce or even murder. There are two kinds of infidelity that occurs in today's modern society, the emotional and sexual infidelity.Emotional infidelity in channeling emotional feeling for someone outside the relationship or marriage, whilesexual infidelity isi having sexual intercourse outside of relationship or marriage.The case of emotional infidelity begin when two beings of different sex, begin exchange of information, and the feelings that it was actually supposed to be feel just exclusive for partner. And started to be worse when there is no excitement and keep the distance with ypartner and began to yearn to talk to someone else, rather than the one romantic partners. The climax it will past the limit and begin to emerge the real problem in the relationship that shouldn't happen, that's secrets and lies. And when the lie begins,it will difficult to stop. Then, sexual infidelity is just waiting for the right moment. Talking about infidelity, nobody can remove it from the word "love", because if the lovethat isbuilt with the previous couple is strong and sturdy, then the affair could have been avoided. Love is a natural thingin human life. Love is a basic human emotion, but understanding how and why it happens is not necessarily easy. In fact, for a long time, many people suggested that love was simply something that they couldn't understand. Accoding to Erich Fromm, to love somebody is not just a strong feeling, but it is a decision, it is a judgement, and it is a promise,if love were only a feeling there would be no basis for the promise to love each other forever (McGee G. Mark, 1980:208).It means that if the love is just relying on feeling, without the underlying on bond and the sacred promise, as well as the commitment to be together forever, then that love won'tlast long. Psychologist Rollo May proposed that romantic love is made up of four elements: sex, eros, philia, and agape.In conclusion, adult personal relationships containing four forms of love, this relationship based on the sexual satisfaction, a desire for eternal unification and non egoistic concern for the welfare of others. But unfortunately, this kind of authentic love quite difficult to accomplish. At the same time, love hint of tenderness, passion, commitment, and devote themselves to the beloved personal interests, from there, love gives rise to will, the will is an impulse that comes from love, where lover have a will to unite with people they love (May, 1969: 146). In this case, if the love for partneris not strong enough to keep the relationship in order to survive and also the lack of commitment and promise, then sometime there will arise a feeling of love to others, and if the love is greater than the old partner, then the infidelity could happen. In literature like novel, many of whichraised issue of infidelity, where in novel, is related to the human's emotion and expression of feeling, Including ideas, motivation, and describe it by using language. Novel also has people or characters with their own personalities that can represent and act to carry issues that occur in the society. Morover, the dispositive of characters is described in outline only and the events described, contains a mental conflict, which resulted in a change of fortunes. A novel TheMuseum of Innocence by Orhan Pamuk has many sources in culture, love, social, combined into a variety of events and actions. The Museum of Innocence by Orhan Pamuk also depicts infidelity between a rich man and a poor shop girl, in the background of the Turkish city which at that time was experiencing modernization. These issues of infidelity in the background of love willbe discussed in more interesting and more complex from a variety of perspectives in one character. Orhan Pamuk was born in Istanbul in 1952 and grew up in a large family similar to those which he describes in his novelsCevdet Bey and His SonsandThe Black Book, in the wealthy westernised district of Nisantasi. As he writes in his autobiographical bookIstanbul, from his childhood until the age of 22 he devoted himself largely to painting and dreamed of becoming an artist. After graduating from the secular American Robert College in Istanbul, he studied architecture at Istanbul Technical University for three years, but abandoned the course when he gave up his ambition to become an architect and artist. He went on to graduate in journalism from Istanbul University, but never worked as a journalist. At the age of 23 Pamuk decided to become a novelist, and giving up everythingnelsenretreatednintonhisnflatnandnbeganntonwrite. His first novelCevdet Bey and His Sonswas published seven years later in 1982. The novel is the story of three generations of a wealthy Istanbul family living in Nisantasi, Pamuk's own home district. The novel was awarded both the Orhan Kemal and Milliyet literary prizes. The following year Pamuk published his novelThe Silent House, which in French translation won the 1991 Prix de la découverte européene.The White Castle(1985) about the frictions and friendship between a Venetian slave and an Ottoman scholar was published in English and many other languages from 1990 onwards, bringing Pamuk his first international fame. The same year Pamuk went to America, where he was a visiting scholar at Columbia University in New York from 1985 to 1988. It was there that he wrote most of his novelThe Black Book, in which the streets, past, chemistry and texture of Istanbul are described through the story of a lawyer seeking his missing wife. This novel was published in Turkey in 1990, and the French translation won the Prix France Culture.The Black Bookenlarged Pamuk's fame both in Turkey and internationally as an author at once popular and experimental, and able to write about past and present with the same intensity. In 1991 Pamuk's daughter Rüya was born. That year saw the production of a filmHidden Face, whose script by Pamuk was based on a one-page story inThe Black Book. His novelThe New Life, about young university students influenced by a mysterious book, was published in Turkey in 1994 and became one of the most widely read books in Turkish literature.My Name Is Red, about Ottoman and Persian artists and their ways of seeing and portraying the non-western world, told through a love story and family story, was published in 1998. This novel won the French Prix du meilleur livre étranger, the Italian Grinzane Cavour (2002) and the International IMPAC Dublin literary award (2003). From the mid-1990s Pamuk took a critical stance towards the Turkish state in articles about human rights and freedom of thought, although he took little interest in politics.Snow, which he describes as "my first and last political novel" was published in 2002. In this book set in the small city of Kars in northeastern Turkey he experimented with a new type of "political novel", telling the story of violence and tension between political Islamists, soldiers, secularists, and Kurdish and Turkish nationalists.Snowwas selected as one of the best 100 books of 2004 byThe New York Times. In 1999 a selection of his articles on literature and culture written for newspapers and magazines in Turkey and abroad, together with a selection of writings from his private notebooks, was published under the titleOther Colours. Pamuk's most recent book,Istanbul, is a poetical work that is hard to classify, combining the author's early memoirs up to the age of 22, and an essay about the city of Istanbul, illustrated with photographs from his own album, and pictures by western painters and Turkish photographers. Orhan Pamuk's books have been translated into 46 languages, including Georgian, Malayan, Czech, Danish, Japanese, Catalan, as well as English, German and French. Pamuk has been awarded The Peace Prize, considered the most prestigious award in Germany in the field of culture, in 2005. In the same year,Snowreceived the Le Prix Médicis étranger, the award for the best foreign novel in France. Again in 2005, Pamuk was honoured with the Richarda Huck Prize, awarded every three years since 1978 to personalities who "think independently and act bravely."In the same year, he was named among world's 100 intellectuals byProspectmagazine. In 2006,TIMEmagazine chose him as one of the 100 most influential persons of the world. In September 2006, he won the Le Prix Méditerranée étranger for his novelSnow.Pamuk is an honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and holds an honorary doctorate from Tilburg University. He is an honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters as well as the Chiese Academy for Social Sciences. Pamuk gives lectures once a year in Columbia University. Lastly, he received the 2006 Nobel Prize for Literature, becoming the second youngest person to receive the award in its history. Apart from three years in New York, Orhan Pamuk has spent all his life in the same streets and district of Istanbul, and he now lives in the building where he was raised. Pamuk has been writing novels for 30 yearsnandnneverndonenanynothernjobnexceptnwriting.(http://www.orhanpamuk.net/biography.aspx) The Museum of Innocenceis the latest Orhan Pamuk's novel, published on August, 2009.Pamuk has been working on the novel for many years and it has been hinted by himself in many interviews during this period. The story, which takes place in Istanbul between 1975 and today, is about obsessive love and the great questionof what is love. This colorful and fabulous novel will not only challenge the reader's thoughts about love, but also those about marriage, sex, passion, family, friendship, and happiness. The story begin with the apparent narrator named Kemal who is engaged to be married to Sibel. Kemal is a rich man when he by chance encounters a long-lost relation, Fusun, a young shopgirl whose beauty stirs all the passion denied him in a society where sex outside marriage is taboo. But Kemal, a young man with high passion has several times having sex with Sibel, and of course it is also more likely to do so with Fusun. Kemalwho really falls in love with Fusun,goes ahead anyway with his long-planned engagement to perfect partner Sibel, then Fusundisappears. Kemal finally breaks off with Sibel, finds Fusun, waits eight years for her to dump her husband (by going to her family's home some four times a week). In relationship, there will be many problems. The union of two different people, usually can cause contention and eventually lead to big problems. Feelings of love, affection, understanding, and accepting shortcomings of couple, is the very need in a relationship. Because according to psychologist Erich Fromm in his book The art of loving (2006:99) love is an essential of human need. That is, if theneed love is not fullfilled it will cause the problems.In this novel, Kemal who had been engaged to a woman with equal social class with him, women withwell education and from a wealthy family, it seems perfect to be his life partner. Kemal eventually leaveshis fiancée in order to pursue his dream to be unite with Fusun.The infidelity issues in the novel has the most significant cause,Kemal lack of affection to his fiancee, so that makes him fall in love with another woman. This novel begin at Istanbul in 1975. Kemal is a rich and engaged manBut when Kemal encounters Füsun, a poor beautiful shopgirl and a distant relation, he becomes enthralled. And once they violate the code of virginity, when sex before married considerd as taboo at that time.The firsttime hemetwithFusunwaswhenhe boughtjennycolon bag tohis fiancee, sibel, an upper-class beautiful girl. The city of Intanbul is captured by pamuk with a romantic touch, sturdy apartments of the rich man, once supported. The lovers met in Merhamet Apartments, in a flat abandoned by his mother. He dated his first secret meeting with Fusun to the spring of 1975. At that time, Pamuk initially planned Kemal to marry Sibel, a fashionable young woman with enlightened views of life, she goes without limits enlightened with Kemal. Love becomes the main motive, when someone can destroy virginity code. Fusun ends their relationship when she learns of Kemal's engagement with Sibel. But Kemal cannot forget her. It will take Kemal almost a year to find her again, a year of driving through every neighbourhood of the enormous city, months of heavy drinking in which he loses all interest in Sibel, even after they move in together. Sibel hopes to save him from what seems an inexplicable sadness, and learning the truth enrages her. To her, Füsun is just "a common shopgirl", a slut, even though they have each only slept with one man. Both sexual and emotional infidelity bound this novel. How kemal lie and keep his secret relationship to sibel, while he loves someone else and having sexual intercourse with Fusun. Psychologist Rollo May defines love into various types, such as sex, eros, philia, and agape. Sex is defined in category where someone loves another person just because of an underlying sexual appetite. Eros is defined as a lover which includes not only sexual intimacy, but also the feeling of love, attention, care so as to make the relationship last. Philia is defined as a sincere friendship, while gape is defined as selfless feeling or don't expecting reward (Jess Feist and Gregory J. Feist, 2009:58-59). In the case of Kemal in this novel, his love for Sibel does not meet all of four elements above, thus making their relationship is not too strong to survive. Then he finds Fusun, and feel the perfect love. In analyzing Kemal's infidelity and the most influential factor, it is used some related concept and one theory. In this thesis, the problem statement is divided into two. The first problem statement deals with how Kemal's infidelityreflected in this novel. While the second problem deals with the most influential factor of Kemal's infidelity. Those problems can be analysed by using the psychological approach as the base of the guide and theory. The first statement is how Kemal's infidelity reflected in The Museum of Innocence. This statement will use the concept of infidelity by American psycologyst, Dirgostra and Barta. This concept is united and merged with the bases of marital or extramarital relationship. There are two kinds of infidelity in this concept. The writer will analyses which kind of infidelity that Kemal uses through the quotations and monologues. Then the second statement is what is the most influential factor of Kemal's infidelity. This statement will also apply the concept of infidelity factor. Actually, the are a lot of infidelity factos, but the writer only use one factor that tha most represent based on quotation in this novel. The factor is love.So, ithe writer will use the theory of love and will that become the most influential factor of Kemal's infidelity. This concept is developed by existential psychologyst, Rollo May. It is about the unity between love and will, this circles of love and will is however affected to his infidelity. Methods Research methodolgy that used in this analysis here must be qualified as an applying in literary appreciation. The thesis is regarded as a descriptive-qualitative study and uses a library research.The data obtained to answer research question study. This study uses novel of Orhan Pamuk entitled The Museum of Innocence that published in 2009 as the data source of this study. The datas are in the form of direct and indirect speech of the characters, dialogues, epilogues and quotations which indicate and represent aspect of infidelity and love and will which is experienced by the main character. This thesis is using the library method in collecting the data. It does not use the statistic method. That is why it is not served in numbering or tables. Library research used an approach in analyzing this study. The kind of library research which is used here is intensive or closely reading to search quotations or phrases. It also used to analyze the literary elements both intrinsic and extrinsic. The references are taken from library and contributing ideas about this study from internet that support the idea of analyzing. Some steps of how the data is analyzed will be described as follows: Classification based on the statement of the problems. This classification is used to avoid the broad discussion. There are two classifications in this study. They are infidelity and The main factor that lead to his infidelity. Describing Kemal's infidelity which is stated from the quotations or statements by using theory of infidelity to be applied to the data. Describing the most influential factor of Kemal's infidelity which is stated from the quotations or statements by using theory of love and will to be applied to the data. RESULT How is the students' writing ability of SMP Muhammadiyah 5 in writing descriptive text after they being taugh by picture puzzle. Infidelity, is the main topic that will be analyzed. Many couples are under the misconception that infidelity only occurs when a man and a woman have sex together. Yet, there are other forms of infidelity such as emotional infidelity.Emotional infidelity may take on different forms, but in general it is the act of forming an emotional connection with someone outside of one's formal relationship. Kemal Brasmaci, the main character of the novel, born as a wealthy and well eucated instanbul family in Nisantasi. His fascinating live, ranging from being a socialite among A class people, and he prefers to live as a modern Turkish, in which at the time, Turkey was undergoing modernization with the influence of European culture. 30-year-old Kemal Basmaci, works as a bussinessman and lives in Merhamet Apartment which will be a silent witness to his secret love adventure with his distance relation, Fusun. Initially, Kemal is set to be engaged to a well educated and high socety girl named Sibel. Kemal first meetsFusun when he bought a Jenny Colon bag to Sibel in Sazalize boutique where Fusun works in. When he step up in Sazalize boutique, Kemal looks like very attentive to every detail in Fusun's clothes and shoes, her yellow skirt, her empty shoe over her long bare legs, her long till Dexterous fingers. Kemal begins to admire Fusun's beauty. Knowing that, because it was less than 10 years they had not met. There was a silence. I looked again into one of the pockets she had just pointed to inside the bag. Her beauty, or her skirt, which was in fact too short, or something else together, had unsettled me, and I couldn't act naturally. (Pamuk, 2009:6) Based on quotation above, Kemal gives the impression of a "darting" man by notices detail of what Fusun wear. Her skirts that look very short, her beauty, and anything else that can not be said. Actually, it does not really matter, but there is something rustled in Kemal's heart. It became the beginning of Kemal's interest feeling to Fusun. Moreover, Kemal also admittes that he can't act naturally when dealing with Fusun, he feels uneasy, but rather, look awkward in front of the opposite sex, there is definitely something special, something that raises passions and encouragement in his heart, even if it happens on the first time he meet. In this case, Kemal commits emotional infidelity by having eventual emotional connection, or a feeling of interest with someone other than one his romantic partner. Beside perform emotional infidelity, Kemal also perfor sexual infidelity has been defined as behaviour of a sexual nature carried out with someone other than one's primary partner.Usually, cheating involves people meeting face – to - face, and then engaging in physical intimacy. Beside having emotional infidelity with Fususn, he also comitted sexual infidelity, because the emotional affair can lead to phsycal affair. the intimate nature of the communication, plus the emotional investment made by the people involved, places an emotional infidelity become more intimate, and perform sexual intercourse, such as having sex kissing, touching, etc. The verry first page in this novel Tells about Kemal's happiest moment of his life. Having sexual intercourse with Fusun in his appartement. We felt the same coolness rising from the musty mattress on which we were making love, the way children play, happily forgetting everything else.(Pamuk, 2009:1) Based on quoatation above, it is clearly mentioned that Kemal comittes sexual infidelity by having sexual contact with Fusun, a woman other than his one romantic partner. In the firs page of this novel, Kemal explained clearly how and the steps of having sex with Fusun, and describes the atmosphere when they were in apartment when doing so. Because having sex is actually become a necessity. They look really enjoyed with the secret relationship, the way the kids played, happy to forget everything else seemed to describe what they both feel at that moment, as if they feel in pleasure without limits and make them forget themselves, forget about all the obstacles and problems that never happened, that there was only pleasure at that time. The second analysis is about The most influential factor of Kemal's infidelity. In this novel, Kemal Brasmaci a perfect gentleman, well educated, came from a wealthy, and respectable family in the city, is set to be married to perfect Sibel, who comes from an equal family as him. Many people assume if they are a perfect match. Kemal actually love Sibel, the woman who would soon be engaged to him. They both underwent a romantic date, having a harmonious family, came into exclusive places, even they both also have made love, although in that era, having sex outside of marriage is considered as taboo. Psychologist Rollo May argues that love is a pleasure, love is a pleasure to the presence of someone, as well as a confirmation of the value and development of the beloved person, just like themselves. Love is able to make a big motivation to someone, which raises the desire to realize the dream to be unite with someone they love. While Will of its own, generating an action to self directed, so that certain goals can be achieved. Kemal actually has already realized if what he has done is the most fatal mistake in his life, even he can not imagine how the devastation that can occur, as a result of these actions. But Still his love for Fusun become a big power that able to beat all obstacle. Kemal has been trying to forget Fusun, consider if he never loved Fusun. But, it can be covered by his feelings love that he could never lose, and always encouraged him to betray his old partner. Finally, Kemal continued to repeat the days of their togetherness, having sexual intercourse in his apartement. I am certain that the fire at the heart of my tale is the desire to relive those moment of love, and my attachment to those pleasure. For years, whenever I recalled those moments, seeking to understand the bond I still felt with her, images would from before my eyes, crowding out reason; for example, Fusun would be sitting on my lap, and I would have taken her large left breast into my moth. (Pamuk, 2009:53) From the quotation above, it is illustrated that Kemal feels her turmoil, that grows more fiery, he even wants to revive the her passion of making love with Fusun, because it is considered as a pleasure for him. Kemal is very attached, and no longer awkward in doing his pleasure in his secret relationship with Fusun. His tremendous sex desire to make love with Fusun, bring it into delusion when they're together. Kemal always be remembered while they are making love, for example when Fusun sits on his lap, and he holds the Fusun's left breast, then puts into his mouth. The thing that Kemal does based on description above is sexual infidelity, because he was having sex with a woman other than his partner. Kemal pleasure in making love with Fusun, is the Will of Kemal who loves Fusun. That is, the Kemal's impulse to commit sexual infidelity influenced by his love for Fusun. It was proved that Kemal has strong emotional ties to Fusun like people who really love his partner, even for many years, Kemal still remember the time they spent together, which can not be removed from his memory. Conclusions From overalls of this study, can be conclude that Kemal comitts infidelity, by having a relationship with Fusun, and violate her engagement to Sibel. In this novel, Kemal commits two types of infidelity, they are emotional and sexual infidelity. Kemal enjoying passionate sexual intercourse and perform a deep emotional attachment with Fusun. Kemal committs both infidelities at the same time. At first, Kemal perform emotional infidelity with Fusun, starting when he met with Fusun in Sanzalize boutique, where Fusun work, he began to admire Fusun, beauty, watching his every movement, pay attention to her clothes. From there, came a strange feeling inside Kemal's heart that he had not been aware of. But over time, that feeling grow stronger. Moreover, the two lovers are getting often met. Emotional Infidelity sounds fairly simple, but it is not as simple as that. Precisely emotional infidelity more dangerous than those who experienced only sexual infidelity. Because sometimes emotional infidelity could lead to a more intimate relationship, and over time will be difficultto integral, as experinced by kemal. As already described above, that emotional infidelity can lead to sexual infidelity, because the people who are already emotionally attached, will also certainly have the desire to have sexual intercourse.In this novel, Kemal also perform sexual activities that are engaged in with someone other than one 's partner. Activities that constitute sexual infidelity include all forms of physical intimacy, from kissing to sexual intercourse. Its pretty clearly described through the evidents in this novel, that Kemal and Fusun often make an appointment to meet at the apartment and Kemal to meet, it is like two people in a drunken romance.It has been shown clearly to the quotation analysis of the first statement problem that Kemal perform his first sexual infidelity, starting by giving a kiss, till make a love. Second conclusion is, actually there must bereasonsbehindKemal's infidelity. But themost crucial factor that is found based on the novel's quotation is his love for Fusun since the beginning of his meeting in a boutique. Initially, Kemal did not have any shortage in his relationship with Sibel, his fiancee.He admitts that he loves Sibel. Even though it is not described implicitlythe describtion of his love for Sibel, but it can be inferredeksplicitly that Kemal was not really love Sibel, it is proven when Kemal seems too easy to fall in love with someone else, and since then, his attention on sibel start to reduced, and even when his relationship with Fusun grows further, he decides to break his engagement with Sibel. People who really love their partner sincerely, certainly will not to do so. Love, which is built by Kemal and Fusun is very great anf strong, exceeding Kemal's love to Sibel, probably thi is because Kemal and Sibel's relationship came from matchmaking. Kemal who love Fusun, give birth to a Will for betraying his fiancee, Sibel. It means that the Will here, is an impulse to do something, without being influenced by the values of the good or bad.Those impulse can take him into a particular direction in which the desired goal can be realized. People who loves someone, like Kemal, definitely have a desire to be happy with Fusun, or want to united with her, So that it can give rise animpulse in his heart to betray his partner, so he could be much longer having relationship with Fusun, a person he love. Refference Drigotas, S.M., & Barta, W. 2001. The cheating heart:Scientific explorations of infidelity.New York: Guildford Press Feist, Jess and Feist, Gregory J. 2009.Teori Kepribadian:Theory of Personality. Terjemahan Sjahputri Smita Prahita. Jakarta:Salemba Humanika --- . 2009. Theories of Personality. Terjemahan Santoso Yudi. Jakarta:Pustaka Belajar Friedman S., Howard, Miriam W. Schustack.(2006). Kepribadian Teori Klasik dan Riset Modern. Jakarta:Erlangga Fromm, Erich, 2006. The Art of Loving.Seoul:Choun Publishing Co. Glass, S. P., & Wright, T. L. 2004. The relationship of extramarital sex, length of marriage,and sex differences on marital satisfaction and romanticism:Athanasiou's data reanalysed. Journal of Marriage and the Family May, R. 1967. Pshycology and the Human Dillema. Princeton, NJ:Van Nostrand McGee, Mark G. 1980. Introductory Psychology Reader. St. Paul: West Publishin CO. Pamuk, Orhan.2009. The Museum of Innocence. New York: Vintage Internet Source: http://www.orhanpamuk.net/biography.aspx

Background Non-native tree species (NNT) whose natural range is outside Europe have long been part of the cultural development of the European forest landscape, providing numerous benefits as well as posing risks to biodiversity and other ecosystem services. On the one hand, NNT are valued for their timber properties, high growth rates and resistance to drought for improving forestry or adapting forests to climate change. On the other hand, they can potentially negatively impact the environment and economy, particularly when they spread into protected areas, become established there and can only be controlled at great expense under risk management. Given their (potential) negative impacts, some NNT are classified as invasive in multiple European countries based on the results of risk assessments. The ones classified as invasive may be included in regional, national, or EU legislation, which may result in imposing restrictions on their cultivation. However, the methods applied in risk assessments across Europe were not specifically developed for NNT, and countries differ in their approaches. Existing methods may therefore not sufficiently identify the ecological risks associated with NNT unless they explicitly address the characteristics of tree species and site-specific aspects of forest management. Moreover, country-specific approaches may hamper the harmonisation of information and hinder risk assessments that extend across European borders. No studies to date have investigated the methods of risk assessments for NNT used in European forestry. Since NNT can have both risks and benefits, a careful and scientifically sound risk assessment is thus vital to provide clear evaluations for management, policy decisions and scientific purposes. Research objectives The main purpose of this thesis was to improve risk assessment approaches for the use of NNT in European forestry. In this context, the first objective was to review current risk assessment methods in Europe in terms of their suitability in identifying the ecological risks associated with NNT, thereby supporting both forest and risk management decisions (first objective). Based on the analysis of existing methods, it became obvious that it is necessary to improve the data base for risk assessments, e.g. by using forest inventory data (second objective), and to establish new criteria for assessing the risks of NNT (third objective). In summary, the main research objectives were as follows: (1) analyse the methods of existing risk assessment schemes in Europe for their practical applicability and consistency for potentially invasive non-native tree species. (2) strengthen the evidence base for risk assessments of widespread non-native tree species in Europe, using systematically collected data from forest inventories. (3) develop a risk assessment method that permits a more generalisable consideration of the costs and benefits of using non-native tree species in forests. Methods (1) Analysis of existing risk assessment tools Several risk assessment tools currently used in Germany and neighbouring countries were analysed for their practical applicability and consistency using four NNT (Fraxinus pennsylvanica Marsh., Paulownia tomentosa (Thunb. Ex Murray), Pseudotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco, and Quercus rubra L.) as case studies. Literature reviews were carried out to collect the required information on the invasion biology of the four NNT in Europe. Different methods were applied by assessing the tools' criteria for each NNT using the information derived from the literature review based on the same reference area (Germany). (2) Strengthening the evidence base for risk assessments The relevance of using large scale forest inventory data for risk assessments was demonstrated using the two potentially invasive NNT, Quercus rubra and Pseudotsuga menziesii, in Germany as case studies. For this purpose, the establishment success of natural regeneration was quantified in terms of cover and height classes using national forest inventory data for Germany. The current extent of spread into protected forest habitats was investigated using a regional dataset for the State of Baden-Württemberg (south-west Germany). (4) Developing a risk assessment method for NNT First, basic principles and steps were identified and formulated for the development of a new methodological framework in order to assess the risks of NNT. Subsequently, four workshops were conducted with interdisciplinary groups of experts, public authorities, and stakeholders from the areas of forest conservation, silviculture, and nature conservation. Workshop participants were encouraged to evaluate each component of the proposed method and suggest improvements. Results and discussion Using different tools to classify risks for the same NNT yielded inconsistent results for all NNT. Different criteria are used in the methods and/or similar criteria are weighted differently. In most cases, no differentiation is made between the risks posed by NNT at different sites and ecosystem types. When data quality was poor, the precautionary principle (of considering only the worst observed effect) was typically applied without ranking the available ecological studies by their evidence. As a result, observations of small case studies are often extrapolated to large spatial scales by providing one single risk classification, i.e., typically 'invasive' or 'potentially invasive'. Such a single undifferentiated risk classification is unlikely to provide meaningful guidance for a wide range of different ecosystems and regions. Large-scale forest inventories can provide valuable data across a range of different forest types to support the risk assessments of widespread NNT in forests. Based on the assessment of Pseudotsuga menziesii and Quercus rubra, there was no evidence of high establishment and spreading potential for the majority of forest types in Germany. Natural regeneration of both NNT has been reported in a small proportion of protected forest habitats. Semi-natural forests with sufficient light in the understory and competitively inferior tree species can be considered most sensitive to invasion. To mitigate any potential negative effect of both NNT, management approaches may involve buffer zones around sensitive ecosystems. When natural regeneration of NNT is systematically recorded, the approach could also be applied in other countries or regions. A new methodological framework was developed to mitigate risks associated with the use of NNT in European forestry while taking advantage of their ecosystem services. In contrast to the previously developed risk assessment approaches, the proposed method takes different ecosystem sensitivities to NNT into consideration as well as existing silvicultural methods to control or exclude potential risks. The framework comprises eight steps and is based on the existing knowledge as well as collecting new data. In addition to the use of the proposed method, several changes of environmental policy and forest management are recommended in order to achieve positive outcomes in the sustainable management of NNT. Conclusions The analysis of existing risk assessment tools (first objective) has shown that the results of the different risk assessment methods applied in Central Europe cannot be used as a reliable decision support tool for both forest and risk management of NNT. To strengthen the evidence base for risk assessments (second objective), forest inventories can provide important data for assessing the establishment and spreading potential of widespread NNT across a range of sites, thus identifying sensitive ecosystem types. The risk assessment criteria developed in this thesis enable NNT with a low current risk to be identified and considered for planting. The criteria thus provide a framework for integrating risk mitigation into forest management and represent an important step towards reliable, Pan-European risk assessments of NNT (third objective). The knowledge derived from such risk assessments should be made available for various stakeholders. In addition, clear communication is necessary between practitioners, policymakers, and the public about the risks of NNT regarding different forest types, sites and regions, as well as available management options and uncertainties in the data. At the same time, further monitoring of NNT and more research on potential impacts are required to continuously improve the information basis for risk assessments. To strengthen the benefits of NNT while mitigating their risks, new political approaches based on unifying principles are needed in Europe. These issues need to be addressed to arrive at risk assessments that are of high practical value for the responsible use of NNT in European forestry. ; Hintergrund Nichtheimische Baumarten (engl: non-native tree species – NNT) mit einem natürlichen Verbreitungsgebiet außerhalb Europas sind seit langem Teil der kulturellen Entwicklung der europäischen Waldlandschaft und bieten zahlreiche Vorteile, können aber auch Risiken für die biologische Vielfalt und andere Ökosystemleistungen darstellen. Einerseits werden NNT wegen ihrer Holzeigenschaften, hohen Wachstumsraten und Trockenheitstoleranz geschätzt, um die Waldbewirtschaftung zu verbessern, oder die Widerstandsfähigkeit der Wälder gegenüber dem Klimawandel zu erhöhen. Andererseits können NNT sich potentiell negativ auf die Umwelt oder Wirtschaft auswirken, insbesondere, wenn sie sich in Schutzgebiete ausbreiten, sich dort etablieren und im Rahmen des Risikomanagements mit großem Aufwand reguliert werden müssen. Angesichts der möglichen negativen Auswirkungen kommen Risikobewertungen zu dem Ergebnis, dass einige NNT in mehreren europäischen Ländern als "invasiv" gelten. Wenn NNT als invasiv eingestuft werden, können sie in regionale, nationale oder EU-Gesetze aufgenommen werden, was zu Anbaubeschränkungen führen kann. Die Methoden, die derzeit zur Risikobewertung in Europa angewandt werden, wurden allerdings nicht speziell für NNT entwickelt und die Ansätze zur Bewertung sind über die Länder hinweg uneinheitlich. Daher ermitteln bestehende Methoden die ökologischen Risiken von NNT möglicherweise unzureichend, wenn sie weder die Eigenschaften von Baumarten noch die Grundsätze einer auf standörtlicher Planung differenzierten Waldbewirtschaftung berücksichtigen. Außerdem können länderspezifische Ansätze die Harmonisierung von Informationen und grenzüberschreitende Risikobewertungen erschweren. Da NNT sowohl Vor- als auch Nachteile haben können, ist eine sorgfältige wissenschaftlich fundierte Risikobewertung wichtig, um der Waldbewirtschaftung und den politischen Entscheidungsträgern klare Bewertungen zu liefern und den wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisstand zu erweitern. Forschungsziele Das zentrale Ziel dieser Arbeit war die Verbesserung der Methodik der Risikobewertung für NNT, die forstwirtschaftlich in Europa genutzt werden. Dazu war es erforderlich zu prüfen, ob mit den derzeitigen Risikobewertungsinstrumenten in Europa die mit NNT verbundenen ökologischen Risiken ermittelt werden können und die Instrumente somit zur Entscheidungsfindung von Maßnahmen der Waldbewirtschaftung und des Risikomanagements dienen können (1. Ziel). Aus der Analyse wurde deutlich, dass es wichtig ist, die Datengrundlage der Risikobewertung z.B. anhand von Waldinventurdaten zu verbessern (2. Ziel), sowie neue Kriterien aufzustellen, die für Risikobewertungen von NNT notwendig sind (3. Ziel). In der Zusammenfassung stellen sich die Forschungsziele also wie folgt dar: (1) Analyse bestehender Instrumente der Risikobewertung in Europa auf ihre praktische Anwendbarkeit und Konsistenz für potenziell invasive nichtheimische Baumarten. (2) Stärkung der Evidenzbasis für Risikobewertungen von weit verbreiteten nichtheimischen Baumarten in Europa unter Verwendung systematisch erhobener Daten aus Waldinventuren. (3) Entwicklung einer Risikobewertungsmethode, die eine generalisierbare Betrachtung von Kosten und Nutzens nichtheimischer Baumarten in Wäldern ermöglicht. Methodik (1) Analyse bestehender Instrumente der Risikobewertung Es wurden mehrere derzeit in Deutschland und den Nachbarländern angewendete Risikobewertungsinstrumente auf ihre praktische Anwendbarkeit und Konsistenz hin untersucht, wobei vier NNT (Fraxinus pennsylvanica Marsh., Paulownia tomentosa (Thunb. Ex Murray), Pseudotsuga menziesii (Mirb.) Franco, und Quercus rubra L.) als Fallstudien verwendet wurden. Es wurden Literaturrecherchen durchgeführt, um die erforderlichen Informationen zur Invasionsbiologie der vier NNT in Europa zu sammeln. Die verschiedenen Bewertungsinstrumente wurden angewandt, indem die Kriterien der Instrumente für jede NNT anhand der aus der Literaturübersicht abgeleiteten Informationen auf der Grundlage desselben Referenzgebiets (Deutschland) bewertet wurden. (2) Stärkung der Evidenzbasis für Risikobewertungen Die Relevanz von Waldinventurdaten für die Risikobewertung wurde anhand der beiden in potentiell invasiven NNT Quercus rubra und Pseudotsuga menziesii in Deutschland in Fallstudien gezeigt. Im Rahmen dessen wurde der Etablierungserfolg der Naturverjüngung anhand von Deckungsgraden und Höhenklassen unter Verwendung der Bundeswaldinventur für verschiedene Waldtypen in Deutschland quantifiziert. Das aktuelle Ausmaß der Ausbreitung in geschützte Waldlebensräume wurde anhand eines regionalen Datensatzes für das Bundesland Baden-Württemberg (Südwestdeutschland) untersucht. (3) Entwicklung einer neuen Risikobewertungsmethode Zur Entwicklung eines neuen methodischen Rahmens zur Bewertung der Risiken von NNT wurden zunächst die erforderlichen Grundlagen und Komponenten identifiziert und beschrieben. Im Anschluss wurden vier Workshops mit interdisziplinären Gruppen aus Experten, Behörden und Interessenvertretern aus den Bereichen Waldschutz, Waldbau und Naturschutz, durchgeführt. Zur Validierung der für europäische Waldökosysteme neu vorgeschlagenen Methode, bewerteten die Workshop-Teilnehmer alle Komponenten der neuen Methode und waren aufgerufen Verbesserungen vorzuschlagen. Ergebnisse und Diskussion Verschiedene Instrumente zur Risikobewertung führten für dieselbe NNT bei allen vier NNT zu uneinheitlichen Ergebnissen. Die Ursachen sind unter anderem die Verwendung von unterschiedlichen Kriterien innerhalb der Methoden und/oder die unterschiedliche Gewichtung ähnlicher Kriterien. Bei den meisten Instrumenten wird nicht zwischen den Risiken unterschieden, die von NNT an verschiedenen Standorten oder innerhalb verschiedener Ökosystemtypen ausgehen. Wenn die Datenlage unsicher ist, wird häufig das Vorsorgeprinzip (Annahme des schlimmsten möglichen Falls) angewandt, ohne die verfügbaren ökologischen Studien gemäß ihrer Evidenz zu berücksichtigen. Infolgedessen werden Beobachtungen aus kleinen Fallstudien auf große räumliche Maßstäbe extrapoliert, indem eine einzige Risikoeinstufung vorgenommen wird, in der Regel "invasiv" oder "potenziell invasiv". Eine solche undifferenzierte Risikoklassifizierung liefert keine aussagekräftigen Anhaltspunkte für das Management verschiedener Ökosysteme und Regionen. Groß angelegte Waldinventuren können wertvolle Daten für verschiedene Waldtypen liefern und so die Risikobewertungen von weit verbreiteten NNT verbessern. Die Bewertung von Pseudotsuga menziesii und Quercus rubra ergab zum Beispiel keine Hinweise auf ein hohes Etablierungs- und Ausbreitungspotenzial beider Baumarten in den meisten Waldtypen in Deutschland. Naturverjüngung beider NNT wurde nur in einem kleinen Teil der geschützten Waldstandorte festgestellt. Naturnahe Wälder mit weniger konkurrenzstarken Baumarten und ausreichend Licht im Unterholz können als besonders anfällig für eine Invasion angesehen werden. Zur Abschwächung möglicher negativer Auswirkungen beider NNT empfiehlt es sich daher, Pufferzonen um empfindliche Ökosysteme einzurichten. Wenn die Naturverjüngung von NNT systematisch erfasst wird, könnte solch eine Risikobewertung auch in anderen Ländern oder Regionen angewendet werden. Um die mit der Verwendung von NNT in europäischen Wäldern verbundenen Risiken zu verringern und gleichzeitig die Vorteile ihrer Ökosystemleistungen zu nutzen, wurde in dieser Arbeit ein neuer methodischer Rahmen entwickelt. Im Gegensatz zu früher entwickelten Ansätzen ermöglicht die vorgeschlagene Methode die Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Empfindlichkeiten von Ökosystemen gegenüber NNT und bestehende waldbauliche Steuerungsmöglichkeiten zur Risikokontrolle und -vermeidung. Die Methode ist in acht Schritte gegliedert und basiert sowohl auf vorhandenem Wissen als auch auf Erhebung neuer Daten. Um eine verantwortungsvolle Nutzung von NNT zu forcieren, wurden neben der Anwendung der vorgeschlagenen Methode auch verschiedene Änderungen in der Umweltpolitik und der Waldbewirtschaftung empfohlen. Schlussfolgerungen Die Analyse der bestehenden Instrumente zur Risikobewertung (1. Ziel) hat gezeigt, dass die in Mitteleuropa angewandten Methoden keine zuverlässige Entscheidungshilfe für Maßnahmen der Waldbewirtschaftung und des Risikomanagements von NNT sind. Die Erweiterung der Datengrundlage (2. Ziel) mithilfe von Waldinventuren kann wertvolle Informationen zur Etablierung und natürlichen Ausbreitung von NNT über die ganze Bandbreite von Waldökosystemen liefern und somit zur Identifikation besonders sensibler Ökosysteme beitragen. Die in dieser Arbeit entwickelten Bewertungskriterien ermöglichen es, NNT mit einem geringen aktuellen Risiko zu identifizieren und beim zukünftigen Anbau zu berücksichtigen. Die Kriterien bieten somit einen Rahmen zur Risikominderung innerhalb der Waldbewirtschaftung und stellen einen wichtigen Schritt in Richtung einer zuverlässigen, europaweiten Risikobewertung von NNT dar (3. Ziel). Die aus solchen Risikobewertungen gewonnenen Erkenntnisse sollten den verschiedenen Interessengruppen zur Verfügung gestellt und mit Praktikern, politischen Entscheidungsträgern und der Öffentlichkeit klar kommuniziert werden. Dies beinhaltet eine differenzierte Darstellung der Risiken in Bezug auf verschiedene Waldtypen, Standorte und Regionen, sowie den Möglichkeiten der waldbaulichen Steuerung der NNT und mögliche Unsicherheiten der Datengrundlage. Gleichzeitig ist ein laufendes Monitoring der NNT und mehr Forschung zu möglichen Auswirkungen erforderlich, um die Informationsgrundlage für Risikobewertungen zu verbessern. In Europa sind einheitliche Regularien auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Prinzipien erforderlich, um die mit NNT einhergehenden Risiken zu mindern und ihre Vorteile zu nutzen. All diese Punkte sind essentiell, um Risikobewertungen von NNT so durchzuführen, dass sie von hohem praktischen Nutzen für einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit NNT in der europäischen Forstwirtschaft sind.

This thesis studies decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory cultural governance in Croatia from 2000 to 2017. Decentralization as a process implies territorial dispersion of cultural policy's competences and resources but is also a method for devolution of power/authority, enabling amplification of cultural democracy and participative governance practices (Katunarić, 2003; Kawashima, 2004). Participatory governance is situated in "institutional voids", or institutional cracks of the traditional state where the practices of participatory governance are reflected in a "proliferation of new forms of social and political association" (Fischer, 2006:20). This implies the rise of political and social relevance of the civil society and non-governmental actors that, by questioning the legitimacy and accountability of the state, open new organisational spaces taking over public activities to "such a degree that some see them as reconfiguring public sector" and affecting policies of the mainstream institutions (Fischer, 2006:20). The examples of decentralised power in the Croatian cultural system are found in a small number of arm's length bodies and institutions, while the selected examples of participatory governance in culture situated in Dubrovnik (Lazareti) and Zagreb (Pogon) follow the evolution of socio-cultural centres involving the use of public space/infrastructure by platforms of civil society organisations based on the principles of sharing, inclusion, social engagement and sustainability. These main lines of research interests respond to the key concerns of cultural policy development that critically reflect and question the levels of democratization in cultural policy needed for securing and widening public traits, access and participation in culture. Detected concerns indicate the issues of representation, which has been ever-present maladie of the cultural policy discourse and practice in Croatia. Its most blatant manifestation is found in the limited permeability of cultural policy processes and the disparate levels of inclusion of institutional (politically controlled) vs. non-institutional cultural sector representatives in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of cultural policy. In the process of the decentralising shift from government to governance, the overarching questions address the issues on who makes the decisions in the cultural field in Croatia, who is represented in the process of decision-making and in what capacity, what is the balance between "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches in the cycles of Croatian cultural policymaking, and how decentralised and participatory are the decision-making processes in culture? The decentralisation and participatory governance are analysed through interdisciplinary theoretical lenses, with a distinctively sociological approach encompassing the analysis of the social changes that influence dynamics, direction and extent of shifts within the framework of cultural policy and its progression towards a more balanced and democratic form (Katunarić, 1997; Švob Đokić, 2000; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015). To this end, the thesis unravels the links between the cultural policy research and sociological inquiry, exploring the key concepts of the thesis through the theories of structuration, modernisation, transformations and transition both from a general theoretical perspective (Giddens, 1984; 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 2007; Eisenstadt, 2010) to a more contextual one (Kalanj, 1998; Rogić, 2001; Švob-Đokić, 2004b; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015; Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b). Building on the literature sources that amalgamate Giddens› (1984) and Touraine›s (2000) clarifications on the role and position of actors by with specific social processes of transition and transformation from the sources of Croatian scholars to the analysis of the discourses of power in cultural policy through the theoretical readings of Foucault (1978;1995), Bourdieu (1990; 2012 [2014]) and Habermas (Kellner, 2000; Fernander, 2008; Wang, 2017) and their contesting interpretations by Bennet (1992; 1995; 1998) and McGuigan (1996; 2004), the thesis focuses on these changes and tracks their influence on the dynamics and directions of cultural policy evolution and change. Through the detection of structural position and role of main actors involved in the power play and struggles for cultural policy modernisation in Croatia, attention is given to bottom-up initiatives for cultural policy change detectable in normative policy provision for decentralisation of authority and the emergence of new modes of governance. The research findings indicate that the Croatian cultural system has been experiencing the profound changes in the cultural policy evolution that entail the association and the role of the civil society actors and the rise of the locale, i.e. the city as the origin of the progressive cultural policy changes. The empirical evidence from the policy analysis and investigation of the Lazareti and Pogon cases contributes to the argument that the role of civil society actors in the devolving power in the cultural policy adds to the potentials of social mobilisation and self-actualisation through the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). However, the thesis shows that while the non-institutional, civil society actors do retain power in sense of the transformative capacity of their actions, the extent of that transformation is limited due to cultural policy constraints in the devolution and sharing of authority. This is amplified with insufficient knowledge about what participatory governance means as a principle and what it should entail in practice, which exacerbates difficulties amongst relationships between key actors, especially on the side of public authorities. To this end, this thesis results in new considerations of the role and implications of decentralised cultural policy and participatory governance in culture as a necessity in achieving structural modernisation and democratisation of the rationales, values and norms of Croatian cultural policy. ; Ova disertacija proučava decentralizaciju kulturne politike i sudioničko upravljanje u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju od 2000. do 2017. godine. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja pojavljuju se u hrvatskom kulturnom sustavu i kulturnoj politici kroz proliferaciju nove generacije kulturnih centara, tzv. društveno-kulturnih centara u kojima organizacije civilnog društva upravljaju javnim prostorima i infrastrukturom po načelu civilno-javnog partnerstva što uključuje sudjelovanje, dijeljenje prava i odgovornosti te uključivanje i održivost. Sudioničko upravljanje podrazumijeva uspon političke i društvene važnosti civilnog društva i nevladinih aktera koji, propitivanjem legitimiteta i odgovornosti države, otvaraju nove prostore za javne aktivnosti "do takvog stupnja da ih neki smatraju rekonfiguriranjem javnog sektora" (Fischer, 2006:20). Pojava novih oblika kulturnih institucija koje se izravno bave izazovima i neuspjesima demokratskih vrijednosti u suvremenom kulturnom sustavu zahtijeva stvaranje novih veza i mreža koje se temelje na otvorenim, sudioničkim, djelotvornim i dosljednim procesima. Ovakve promjene ističu problem upravljanja i raspodjele kulturnih resursa, osobito javne prostorne infrastrukture naglašavajući ulogu (mikro)lokaliteta kao ishodišta inovativnih i naprednih koncepata suvremenog kulturnog razvoja. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi potiču promjene u kulturnoj politici i pratećim osovinama decentralizacije i devolucije ovlasti i moći. Tema decentralizacije i nastanka sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi se u ovoj disertaciji analizira kroz interdisciplinarni teorijski okvir s naglašenim sociološkim pristupom u analizi društvenih promjena koje imaju utjecaj na dinamiku, smjer i opseg pomaka unutar okvira kulturne politike, kao napretka kulturne politike prema uravnoteženom i demokratičnijem obliku (Katunarić, 1997.; Švob-Đokić, 2000.; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015.). Naime, decentralizacija podrazumijeva teritorijalnu disperziju nadležnosti i resursa kulturne politike, no ona je ujedno i metoda za prijenos vlasti koji omogućuje afirmaciju i primjenu paradigme kulturne demokracije te omogućuje uvođenje praksi sudioničkog upravljanja. Kao sredstvo za smanjenje političke centralizacije u donošenju odluka, decentralizacija se temelji na načelu supsidijarnosti. Supsidijarnost je norma u kulturnoj politici mnogih nacija i može se smatrati najprimjenjivijom metodom za sudioničko stvaranje politika i upravljanje, pri čemu se to odnosi na odnos između centra i lokane razine, ali isto tako i na odnos između vlade i ne-vlade (Katunarić, 2003.; Kawashima, 2004.). Strukturalni i teritorijalni aspekti decentralizacije spajaju se u suvremenoj ulozi gradova koji su se "uzdignuli kao glavni komandni centri svijeta; ne samo ograničeni unutar nacionalnih zemljopisnih granica, već i sa proširenom i složenom međunarodnom ulogom" (Sarikakis, 2012.:17). Uz gradove koji su identificirani kao «ključna mjesta djelovanja u inicijativama globalne politike kako bi se prepoznala važna uloga kulture u održivom razvoju i integrirala kultura u kontekste politike na svim razinama»(Duxbury, 2015.: 69), znakovite promjene u procesima devolucije moći unutar okvira kulturne politike prate se u rastućoj važnosti uloge organizacija civilnog društva u procesima demokratizacije i modernizacije kulturne politike. Lokacija i akteri koji rastvaraju okvir i strukturu kulturne politike su u samoj srži istraživačkog interesa zastupljenog u ovoj disertaciji. Promjene kulturnih politika u smjeru decentralizacije i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi proučavaju se kroz metodološki okvir koji se temelji na kvalitativnom istraživanju postavljenom na dva osnovna stupa dizajna istraživanja: policy analizu i tzv. ugniježdenu ili kompozitnu studiju slučaja s dvije jedinice analize. Točnije, prvi dio istraživačkog procesa obuhvaća analizu hrvatske kulturne politike u postavljenom istraživačkom razdoblju, ali i pregled faza razvoja kulturne politike prije istraživačkog perioda te provođenje studije slučaja kroz odabrane primjere sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi u Dubrovniku (Lazareti) i Zagrebu (Pogon). Ova dva pravca istraživanja odgovaraju na ključne probleme razvoja hrvatske kulturne politike te se kritički analiziraju razine demokratizacije kulturne politike potrebne za osiguravanje i proširivanje javnog karaktera, pristupa i sudjelovanja u kulturi. Ključni problemi se odnose na pitanje zastupljenosti u procesima kulturne politike, a što je sveprisutna boljka diskursa i prakse kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj. U osnovnom obliku, to uključuje ograničenu propusnost procesa kulturne politike i disparatne razine uključenosti i zastupljenosti institucionalnih (politički kontroliranih) aktera naspram izvaninstitucionalnih aktera kulturnog sektora u formulaciji, implementaciji i evaluaciji kulturne politike. U procesu decentralizacijskog pomaka od vladanja (eng. government) prema upravljanju (eng. governance), postavljaju se sveobuhvatna pitanja poput: kako je postavljena kulturna politika u Hrvatskoj; tko donosi odluke u kulturnom polju; tko je zastupljen u procesima donošenja odluka i u kojem kapacitetu; koji je odnos u pristupima "odozgo" i "odozdo" u ciklusima donošenja od luka i formulaciji kulturne politike; kako je kulturna politika decentralizirana i koliko je otvorena sudjelovanju i donošenju odluka u kulturnoj politici? U cilju utvrđivanja sociološki utemeljenih odgovora na ova pitanja, disertacija se temelji na teorijskom okviru koji započinje s analitičkim razmatranjem poveznica između istraživanja kulturne politike i sociologije te postavljanjem teorija strukturacije, modernizacije, transformacije i tranzicije kao teorijske podloge. Ove se teorije razmatraju iz širih, tj. općih perspektiva kako ih vide Giddens (1984.; 2000.), Inglehart i Welzel (2005.; 2007.) i Eisenstadt, (2010.) te iz kontekstualne perspektive kako je artikuliraju Kalanj (1998.), Rogić (2001.), Švob-Đokić (2004.b), Tomić-Koludrović (2015.) i Tomić-Koludrović i Petrić (2005.b). Međupovezanost promjena u kulturnoj politici sa širim društvenim okvirom se u disertaciji prati kroz kombinaciju Giddensovih (1984.) i Touraineovih (2000.) shvaćanja uloge i pozicije aktera uz proučavanje specifičnih procesa transformacije i tranzicije te analizu diskursa moći u kulturnoj politici kroz teorijske ideje Foucaulta (1978.; 1995.), Bourdieuaa (1990.; 2012. [2014.]) i Habermasa (Kellner, 2000.; Fernander, 2008.; Wang, 2017.) kao i njihovih teorijskih sljedbenika Benneta (1992.; 1995.; 1998.) i McGuigana (1996.; 2004.). U detekciji strukturnih pozicija i uloga ključnih aktera unutar raspodjele moći i napora za modernizaciju kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj, posebna se pozornost daje inicijativama "odozdo" koje ulažu napore u promjenu normativnih postavki kulturne politike prema decentralizaciji ovlasti i stvaranju novih oblika upravljanja. Nalazi istraživanja ukazuju na to da je hrvatski kulturni sustav iskusio značajne promjene u evoluciji kulturne politike koje uključuju pomake u tome gdje se kulturna politika stvara i tko je stvara. U tom smjeru se ističu, kako je već navedeno, pozicija grada i uloga aktera civilnog društva kao ishodišta progresivnih promjena (i pritisaka za promjene) u okviru i strukturi, ali i vrijednostima kulturne politike koji se usko uvezuju s koracima ka modernizaciji i demokratizaciji kulturnog sustava. Empirijski dokazi iz analize kulturne politike i istraživanja primjera Lazareta i Pogona u studiji slučaja nadograđuju argumentaciju o ulozi aktera civilnog društva u raspodjeli moći u kulturnoj politici i njihovom doprinosu potencijalima društvene mobilizacije i samo-aktualizacije kroz razvoj novih strukturnih, institucijskih i kulturnih značajki i formacija (Deutch, 1961. u Eisenstadt, 2010.: 1). Međutim, disertacija jednako tako pokazuje da su velike razlike između sistemske pozicije i uloge civilnih aktera u kulturi. Premda izvaninstitucionalni, civilni akteri u kulturi zadržavaju određenu moć u smislu transformativnog potencijala i kapaciteta njihovog djelovanja, raspon posljedičnih učinaka transformativnog djelovanja civilnih aktera je uvjetovan i znatno otežan ograničenjima koje postavlja kulturna politika u mogućnostima raspodjele i dijeljenja ovlasti. Ova su ograničenja dodatno ojačana s nedostatnim razinama znanja o tome što sudioničko upravljanje znači kao princip rada te kako bi trebalo biti primijenjeno u praksi, a što uzrokuje poteškoće u odnosima između ključnih aktera, pogotovo kod javnih vlasti. U tom smislu, disertacija rezultira novim saznanjima o ulozi i implikacijama decentralizirane kulturne politike i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi kao potrebnih nadogradnji kulturne politike u smjeru postizanja strukturne modernizacije i demokratizacije postavki, vrijednosti i normi hrvatske kulturne politike.

This thesis studies decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory cultural governance in Croatia from 2000 to 2017. Decentralization as a process implies territorial dispersion of cultural policy's competences and resources but is also a method for devolution of power/authority, enabling amplification of cultural democracy and participative governance practices (Katunarić, 2003; Kawashima, 2004). Participatory governance is situated in "institutional voids", or institutional cracks of the traditional state where the practices of participatory governance are reflected in a "proliferation of new forms of social and political association" (Fischer, 2006:20). This implies the rise of political and social relevance of the civil society and non-governmental actors that, by questioning the legitimacy and accountability of the state, open new organisational spaces taking over public activities to "such a degree that some see them as reconfiguring public sector" and affecting policies of the mainstream institutions (Fischer, 2006:20). The examples of decentralised power in the Croatian cultural system are found in a small number of arm's length bodies and institutions, while the selected examples of participatory governance in culture situated in Dubrovnik (Lazareti) and Zagreb (Pogon) follow the evolution of socio-cultural centres involving the use of public space/infrastructure by platforms of civil society organisations based on the principles of sharing, inclusion, social engagement and sustainability. These main lines of research interests respond to the key concerns of cultural policy development that critically reflect and question the levels of democratization in cultural policy needed for securing and widening public traits, access and participation in culture. Detected concerns indicate the issues of representation, which has been ever-present maladie of the cultural policy discourse and practice in Croatia. Its most blatant manifestation is found in the limited permeability of cultural policy processes and the disparate levels of inclusion of institutional (politically controlled) vs. non-institutional cultural sector representatives in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of cultural policy. In the process of the decentralising shift from government to governance, the overarching questions address the issues on who makes the decisions in the cultural field in Croatia, who is represented in the process of decision-making and in what capacity, what is the balance between "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches in the cycles of Croatian cultural policymaking, and how decentralised and participatory are the decision-making processes in culture? The decentralisation and participatory governance are analysed through interdisciplinary theoretical lenses, with a distinctively sociological approach encompassing the analysis of the social changes that influence dynamics, direction and extent of shifts within the framework of cultural policy and its progression towards a more balanced and democratic form (Katunarić, 1997; Švob Đokić, 2000; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015). To this end, the thesis unravels the links between the cultural policy research and sociological inquiry, exploring the key concepts of the thesis through the theories of structuration, modernisation, transformations and transition both from a general theoretical perspective (Giddens, 1984; 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 2007; Eisenstadt, 2010) to a more contextual one (Kalanj, 1998; Rogić, 2001; Švob-Đokić, 2004b; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015; Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b). Building on the literature sources that amalgamate Giddens› (1984) and Touraine›s (2000) clarifications on the role and position of actors by with specific social processes of transition and transformation from the sources of Croatian scholars to the analysis of the discourses of power in cultural policy through the theoretical readings of Foucault (1978;1995), Bourdieu (1990; 2012 [2014]) and Habermas (Kellner, 2000; Fernander, 2008; Wang, 2017) and their contesting interpretations by Bennet (1992; 1995; 1998) and McGuigan (1996; 2004), the thesis focuses on these changes and tracks their influence on the dynamics and directions of cultural policy evolution and change. Through the detection of structural position and role of main actors involved in the power play and struggles for cultural policy modernisation in Croatia, attention is given to bottom-up initiatives for cultural policy change detectable in normative policy provision for decentralisation of authority and the emergence of new modes of governance. The research findings indicate that the Croatian cultural system has been experiencing the profound changes in the cultural policy evolution that entail the association and the role of the civil society actors and the rise of the locale, i.e. the city as the origin of the progressive cultural policy changes. The empirical evidence from the policy analysis and investigation of the Lazareti and Pogon cases contributes to the argument that the role of civil society actors in the devolving power in the cultural policy adds to the potentials of social mobilisation and self-actualisation through the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). However, the thesis shows that while the non-institutional, civil society actors do retain power in sense of the transformative capacity of their actions, the extent of that transformation is limited due to cultural policy constraints in the devolution and sharing of authority. This is amplified with insufficient knowledge about what participatory governance means as a principle and what it should entail in practice, which exacerbates difficulties amongst relationships between key actors, especially on the side of public authorities. To this end, this thesis results in new considerations of the role and implications of decentralised cultural policy and participatory governance in culture as a necessity in achieving structural modernisation and democratisation of the rationales, values and norms of Croatian cultural policy. ; Ova disertacija proučava decentralizaciju kulturne politike i sudioničko upravljanje u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju od 2000. do 2017. godine. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja pojavljuju se u hrvatskom kulturnom sustavu i kulturnoj politici kroz proliferaciju nove generacije kulturnih centara, tzv. društveno-kulturnih centara u kojima organizacije civilnog društva upravljaju javnim prostorima i infrastrukturom po načelu civilno-javnog partnerstva što uključuje sudjelovanje, dijeljenje prava i odgovornosti te uključivanje i održivost. Sudioničko upravljanje podrazumijeva uspon političke i društvene važnosti civilnog društva i nevladinih aktera koji, propitivanjem legitimiteta i odgovornosti države, otvaraju nove prostore za javne aktivnosti "do takvog stupnja da ih neki smatraju rekonfiguriranjem javnog sektora" (Fischer, 2006:20). Pojava novih oblika kulturnih institucija koje se izravno bave izazovima i neuspjesima demokratskih vrijednosti u suvremenom kulturnom sustavu zahtijeva stvaranje novih veza i mreža koje se temelje na otvorenim, sudioničkim, djelotvornim i dosljednim procesima. Ovakve promjene ističu problem upravljanja i raspodjele kulturnih resursa, osobito javne prostorne infrastrukture naglašavajući ulogu (mikro)lokaliteta kao ishodišta inovativnih i naprednih koncepata suvremenog kulturnog razvoja. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi potiču promjene u kulturnoj politici i pratećim osovinama decentralizacije i devolucije ovlasti i moći. Tema decentralizacije i nastanka sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi se u ovoj disertaciji analizira kroz interdisciplinarni teorijski okvir s naglašenim sociološkim pristupom u analizi društvenih promjena koje imaju utjecaj na dinamiku, smjer i opseg pomaka unutar okvira kulturne politike, kao napretka kulturne politike prema uravnoteženom i demokratičnijem obliku (Katunarić, 1997.; Švob-Đokić, 2000.; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015.). Naime, decentralizacija podrazumijeva teritorijalnu disperziju nadležnosti i resursa kulturne politike, no ona je ujedno i metoda za prijenos vlasti koji omogućuje afirmaciju i primjenu paradigme kulturne demokracije te omogućuje uvođenje praksi sudioničkog upravljanja. Kao sredstvo za smanjenje političke centralizacije u donošenju odluka, decentralizacija se temelji na načelu supsidijarnosti. Supsidijarnost je norma u kulturnoj politici mnogih nacija i može se smatrati najprimjenjivijom metodom za sudioničko stvaranje politika i upravljanje, pri čemu se to odnosi na odnos između centra i lokane razine, ali isto tako i na odnos između vlade i ne-vlade (Katunarić, 2003.; Kawashima, 2004.). Strukturalni i teritorijalni aspekti decentralizacije spajaju se u suvremenoj ulozi gradova koji su se "uzdignuli kao glavni komandni centri svijeta; ne samo ograničeni unutar nacionalnih zemljopisnih granica, već i sa proširenom i složenom međunarodnom ulogom" (Sarikakis, 2012.:17). Uz gradove koji su identificirani kao «ključna mjesta djelovanja u inicijativama globalne politike kako bi se prepoznala važna uloga kulture u održivom razvoju i integrirala kultura u kontekste politike na svim razinama»(Duxbury, 2015.: 69), znakovite promjene u procesima devolucije moći unutar okvira kulturne politike prate se u rastućoj važnosti uloge organizacija civilnog društva u procesima demokratizacije i modernizacije kulturne politike. Lokacija i akteri koji rastvaraju okvir i strukturu kulturne politike su u samoj srži istraživačkog interesa zastupljenog u ovoj disertaciji. Promjene kulturnih politika u smjeru decentralizacije i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi proučavaju se kroz metodološki okvir koji se temelji na kvalitativnom istraživanju postavljenom na dva osnovna stupa dizajna istraživanja: policy analizu i tzv. ugniježdenu ili kompozitnu studiju slučaja s dvije jedinice analize. Točnije, prvi dio istraživačkog procesa obuhvaća analizu hrvatske kulturne politike u postavljenom istraživačkom razdoblju, ali i pregled faza razvoja kulturne politike prije istraživačkog perioda te provođenje studije slučaja kroz odabrane primjere sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi u Dubrovniku (Lazareti) i Zagrebu (Pogon). Ova dva pravca istraživanja odgovaraju na ključne probleme razvoja hrvatske kulturne politike te se kritički analiziraju razine demokratizacije kulturne politike potrebne za osiguravanje i proširivanje javnog karaktera, pristupa i sudjelovanja u kulturi. Ključni problemi se odnose na pitanje zastupljenosti u procesima kulturne politike, a što je sveprisutna boljka diskursa i prakse kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj. U osnovnom obliku, to uključuje ograničenu propusnost procesa kulturne politike i disparatne razine uključenosti i zastupljenosti institucionalnih (politički kontroliranih) aktera naspram izvaninstitucionalnih aktera kulturnog sektora u formulaciji, implementaciji i evaluaciji kulturne politike. U procesu decentralizacijskog pomaka od vladanja (eng. government) prema upravljanju (eng. governance), postavljaju se sveobuhvatna pitanja poput: kako je postavljena kulturna politika u Hrvatskoj; tko donosi odluke u kulturnom polju; tko je zastupljen u procesima donošenja odluka i u kojem kapacitetu; koji je odnos u pristupima "odozgo" i "odozdo" u ciklusima donošenja od luka i formulaciji kulturne politike; kako je kulturna politika decentralizirana i koliko je otvorena sudjelovanju i donošenju odluka u kulturnoj politici? U cilju utvrđivanja sociološki utemeljenih odgovora na ova pitanja, disertacija se temelji na teorijskom okviru koji započinje s analitičkim razmatranjem poveznica između istraživanja kulturne politike i sociologije te postavljanjem teorija strukturacije, modernizacije, transformacije i tranzicije kao teorijske podloge. Ove se teorije razmatraju iz širih, tj. općih perspektiva kako ih vide Giddens (1984.; 2000.), Inglehart i Welzel (2005.; 2007.) i Eisenstadt, (2010.) te iz kontekstualne perspektive kako je artikuliraju Kalanj (1998.), Rogić (2001.), Švob-Đokić (2004.b), Tomić-Koludrović (2015.) i Tomić-Koludrović i Petrić (2005.b). Međupovezanost promjena u kulturnoj politici sa širim društvenim okvirom se u disertaciji prati kroz kombinaciju Giddensovih (1984.) i Touraineovih (2000.) shvaćanja uloge i pozicije aktera uz proučavanje specifičnih procesa transformacije i tranzicije te analizu diskursa moći u kulturnoj politici kroz teorijske ideje Foucaulta (1978.; 1995.), Bourdieuaa (1990.; 2012. [2014.]) i Habermasa (Kellner, 2000.; Fernander, 2008.; Wang, 2017.) kao i njihovih teorijskih sljedbenika Benneta (1992.; 1995.; 1998.) i McGuigana (1996.; 2004.). U detekciji strukturnih pozicija i uloga ključnih aktera unutar raspodjele moći i napora za modernizaciju kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj, posebna se pozornost daje inicijativama "odozdo" koje ulažu napore u promjenu normativnih postavki kulturne politike prema decentralizaciji ovlasti i stvaranju novih oblika upravljanja. Nalazi istraživanja ukazuju na to da je hrvatski kulturni sustav iskusio značajne promjene u evoluciji kulturne politike koje uključuju pomake u tome gdje se kulturna politika stvara i tko je stvara. U tom smjeru se ističu, kako je već navedeno, pozicija grada i uloga aktera civilnog društva kao ishodišta progresivnih promjena (i pritisaka za promjene) u okviru i strukturi, ali i vrijednostima kulturne politike koji se usko uvezuju s koracima ka modernizaciji i demokratizaciji kulturnog sustava. Empirijski dokazi iz analize kulturne politike i istraživanja primjera Lazareta i Pogona u studiji slučaja nadograđuju argumentaciju o ulozi aktera civilnog društva u raspodjeli moći u kulturnoj politici i njihovom doprinosu potencijalima društvene mobilizacije i samo-aktualizacije kroz razvoj novih strukturnih, institucijskih i kulturnih značajki i formacija (Deutch, 1961. u Eisenstadt, 2010.: 1). Međutim, disertacija jednako tako pokazuje da su velike razlike između sistemske pozicije i uloge civilnih aktera u kulturi. Premda izvaninstitucionalni, civilni akteri u kulturi zadržavaju određenu moć u smislu transformativnog potencijala i kapaciteta njihovog djelovanja, raspon posljedičnih učinaka transformativnog djelovanja civilnih aktera je uvjetovan i znatno otežan ograničenjima koje postavlja kulturna politika u mogućnostima raspodjele i dijeljenja ovlasti. Ova su ograničenja dodatno ojačana s nedostatnim razinama znanja o tome što sudioničko upravljanje znači kao princip rada te kako bi trebalo biti primijenjeno u praksi, a što uzrokuje poteškoće u odnosima između ključnih aktera, pogotovo kod javnih vlasti. U tom smislu, disertacija rezultira novim saznanjima o ulozi i implikacijama decentralizirane kulturne politike i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi kao potrebnih nadogradnji kulturne politike u smjeru postizanja strukturne modernizacije i demokratizacije postavki, vrijednosti i normi hrvatske kulturne politike.

Historic-Archaeological Research of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milano on the Indus Delta (2010-2018). The following text is only an abridged note on the excavations at Banbhore and some significant extra-moenia surveys carried out by the Italian Team within the Institutional framework of a "Pak-French-Italian Historical and Archaeological Research at Banbhore" on the basis of a Licence issued by the competent Pakistani Authorities (2010-2015 - Coordinator of the Project Dr Kaleemullah Lashari), and, some later, within a new institutional asset: a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU) signed in the 2017 between the Director General of the Department of Antiquities of Sindh (Manzoor A. Kanasro) and the Magnifico Rettore of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan (Prof. Franco Anelli). Aims of the said MoU are: (a) historical-archaeological research-work at Banbhore and Rani Kot; (b) training (theoretical and on the job) to selected students and officers of the DAS. The Italian group works under the sponsorship of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (now Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation/MAECI). Scientific director for the Italian Team is Prof. Valeria Piacentini, member of the Board of Directors of the Research Centre CRiSSMA of the Catholic University.
In the following dissertation I won't linger on the debated issue about the identification of the site of Banbhore with historic sites on the Indus delta (the historical Mihrān river) mentioned and described in the written sources of the past. Too many respected scholars and archaeologists have entered this debate since the end of the 19th Century, for which I refer to a well-known exhaustive literature. In the "50s of the previous century, Leslie Alckok – then official to the Department of Archaeology of Pakistan – carried out some preliminary excavations, followed by Dr Rafique Mughal and F.A. Khan. This latter carried out a systematic and extensive archaeological campaign of several years between the "50s and the "60s, well backed by one of the most authoritative Pakistani historians, N.A. Baloch. Khan brought to light extraordinary archaeological and architectural evidence, but, unfortunately, his excavation-notes have gone lost and little or nothing has been published. Thence, our research-work had to start from nothing.
First of all and most urgent was an updated planimetric and altimetric study of the site by kite-photos: a massive wall of c. 1,4 km with 55 towers, 7 posterns, and major and secondary accesses to the citadel (2010-2012 by Y. Ubelman, S. Reynard, A. Tilia), regularly updated with advanced technologies (A. Tilia).
Then, in collaboration with Dr M. Kervran, head of the French Team, we undertook an accurate study of the bastions and the shapes of its towers (squared, U-shaped, circular), which has brought to envisage three main occupational phases of the intra-moenia area: 1. Indo-Parthian/Indo-Kushan phase (c. III-II Century b.CE – III-IV Century CE); 2. Sasanian/Indo-Sasanian phase (c. III-IV Century – early VIII Century CE); 3. Islamic phase (VIII – XII/early XIII Century CE). Decay and/or abandonment and end of any settled life on the site can be dated around the XII-early XIII Century, due to attacks and pillaging by Turco-Mongol nomadic tribes, and/or the deviation of this branch of the Indus delta and consequent filling of the harbour, or both. Archaeological evidence come to light confirms the historical information.
Our third aim (2010-2015) was to arrive to a first chronological panorama of the site through levels in stratigraphy and the assemblage of pottery and other significant evidence with the individual levels (N. Manassero – A. Fusaro – A. Tilia). Deep trenches were excavated (T/7 and T/9 on the Italian side; T/1 on the French side near the western portion of the bastions skirting the Hindu Temple. These brought to the very early Sasanian period or late Indo-Parthian (c. II-III Century CE), then the water-table invaded the trenches preventing us to go deeper; however, drillings (T/9) have allowed to go deeper for c.1,8 mt of shards …thus reaching a much earlier occupational phase. The question about an Hellenistic occupation at the bottom of the site (Arrian's harbour of Alexander) is still unanswered… a dream…but the importance of Banbhore has induced to take it seriously and include it within our priorities.
Ours and the French trenches have also produced significant information on the architectural panorama of the site for its earlier periods of life. A main N-S and E-W road axis was traced. The site was organised in insulae, each insula with its pits of organic and inorganic refusals, densely built along narrow roads by small mono-nuclear houses, roofed, bases in local stones and the elevation in unbacked bricks. Interesting the presence of refusals of some crafts, as if each building had at the same time the function of "home" and workshop. The refusals shew activities of ivory-working (T/1,T/4, T/9), and other crafts carried out "within the bastions of the citadel", such as glass, shells and mother of pearl, alloys and various metallurgic activities, too, and so on. Significant the presence of a wealth of clay-moulds. T/5 has produced a clay-mould nearly intact in its shape. No less interesting, in the deeper layers, the presence of a well arranged organisation of the hydraulic resources (small canals, little domed cisterns in roughly cut local stones, wells..: T/9).
One element of the site attracted our attention: the so called "Partition Wall". It has a North-South direction; then, it bends Eastwards, including the Mosque and the Eastern lagoon, but cutting out the majestic Southern Gate. So far, it had been interpreted as a Wall that had a "religious" or "social" function to separate – after the Islamic conquest – the Muslims from the non-Muslim inhabitants of the site. Manassero dedicated the 2014 Field-Season to investigate: T/7 and T/8 were the trenches that gave a new profile to this structure and to the general occupational organisation of the citadel during its last period of life. The round-shaped tower in mud-bricks and the walls on both sides show that they had been hurriedly erected in a late phase of the life of the citadel (around the end of the X – early XI Century CE). They had been built on the top of pre-existing buildings either abandoned and collapsed or hastily flatted-down, likely to defend this eastern portion of the site and its Mosque by some human ravage that had succeeded to open a breach in the lower western bastion leaving the higher north-eastern area exposed to attacks (the skeleton found by Dr Kervran on her portion of the wall, and Khan's skeletons with arrow-heads in their skulls and chests). According to F.A. Khan's excavations and what he left us in his little booklet that so far – printed and re-printed – is the guide for visitors to Banbhore, in the eastern portion of the site during the latest stage of its life still stood beautiful palaces, the Friday Mosque, markets, and an eastern gate where a staircase (still in situ in the 2015) brought to a lagoon at the foot of the eastern bastions and to the river.
At the end of this first stage of our historical and archaeological research-work, the identification of the site of Banbhore with the historic Sasanian/Indo-Sasanian fortified harbour-town seemed quite feasible. When we resumed our field-work in the 2017, we decided to go deeper in this direction. In the meantime, Dr Manassero had resigned due to personal choices of life. Dr Simone Mantellini bravely accepted to be our Field-Director for the archaeological sector. T/9 had unearthed an imposing Building (Building 1) running along the East-West road-axis, parallel to a second Building (Building 2). The road – wide about 5 meters – must have been a major road, that had played a central role within the general architectural urban asset of the site. Building 2 had the typical structure of the local houses: base in rough stones, elevation in mud-bricks. Excavations of Building 1 produced fillings well flatted and an endless chronological procession of floors in row mud, likely the re-occupation of an important palace during the last phase of the occupational life of Banbhore. The material (pottery and others) associated with the various levels in stratigraphy (Dr A. Fusaro) confirmed the dating of the dug portion from c. the early XIII to the XI Century CE. Historically speaking, it makes sense: chronicles of the time report about the invasion of Lower Sindh by the Seljuks (second half of the XI Century CE); they indulge on the assaults against the walls of its great harbour-town named Daybul, its long siege concluded with a peace-treaty that fixed the border with Makrān at Gwadar and gave to Daybul an autonomous status (nāḥiya) within the Seljuk dominion of Qāvurd-Khān ibn Chaghrī Beg. More interesting was the copious filling with ivory refusals. Along Building 2, were found semi-worked shells, glass, iron and brass rivets, iron instruments, alloys, coins and other. This induced to think to a late quarter of work-shops outside the Partition Wall, built on previous buildings. Lastly, some surveys extra-moenia and in the Lahiri Bandar and Mullah-ka Kot islands have revealed a close connection and interaction between these spaces and the citadel. Around the bastions: the remains of a densely settled area and a well organised regulation of the waters and the territory, rock quarries, urban quarters, dwellings, cairn-tombs (some of them re-used), an artificial lake of sweet water delimited to the south by a "barrage", wells, and a vast so called "industrial area" to the north-northwest of the bastions, pottery kilns and others completed the image of a urban asset at least for a given span of time. Architectural and archaeological evidences have regularly been graphically, photographically and topographically documented (A. Tilia).
Archaeometric analyses on the job (pottery, metals, alloys, coins…) and in Italy (ivory, glass, clay-moulds, shards…) have provided precious support and new elements to the archaeological work.
We are now confronted with the plan of a positive shahristān. Banbhore is no longer only a fortified citadel. Written sources in Arabic and Persian confirm this feature. After the Jan.-Feb. 2018 field-season, the Islamic occupational phase of Banbhore and the "archaeological park" surrounding it enhanced this image: a positive fluvial and maritime system stemmed out, a well-fortified system and harbour-town, a centre of mercantile power, production and re-distribution of luxury goods, an international centre of pilgrimage and religious learning, too, outlet to the sea of the capital-city of the moment.
For the forthcoming field-seasons, it was decided to concentrate the attention on the sector where the North-South axis crosses the East-West one. In particular: to further investigate Building 1; to look for the ivory-workshops that must be there around – given the copious pieces so far brought to light and used as refilling (more than 9.000 fragments) and some fragments of rough ivory (specialist of the Italian Team G. Affanni); to organise a deep-trench in the Pakistani sector (T/11), in order to resume Manassero's investigations on the urban and architectural features of the pre-Islamic phases...and (why not?) try to overcome the water-table problem with the technological support offered by the Bahrya University of Karachi…the much dreamed quest of Alexander the Macedonian's port.
All in all and to conclude. Nowadays, at the end of this first stage of historical and archaeological research-work in collaboration with the DAS, the identification of the site of Banbhore and its surrounding area with the Sasanian/Indo-Sasanian and the Early-Islamic well-fortified harbour-town of Daybul/Debol can be confirmed. No other site with the characteristics described by the written sources of the time (chronicles, geographies, travelogues…plus Marco Polo and some significant Genoese archival documents) has so far come to light on the Indus deltaic region. Conversely, still un-answered are other queries: Banbhore can be identified also with the great harbour of Alexander the Macedonian? Or with the Barbaricum/Barbarikon/Barbariké, harbour-town of Parthian rulers or local lords of "Skuthia", also mentioned in the Periplus Maris Erythraei? Or again with Dib/Deb, harbour mentioned in a Parthian-Manichaean text? Or again the Dibos of Greek sources? Or the Dêbuhl/Dêphul of an Arminian text à propos of the Prophet Mani? Wishful thinking; however, these queries represent some amongst the ambitious aims of our future research-work.

Gli eurobond non sono un tema nuovo. Sono presenti nella letteratura economica, meno in quella giuridica, da oltre trent'anni, con denominazioni che spesso mutano a seconda delle formulazioni proposte. Rientrano in quella categoria di idee che hanno valore non solo sotto il profilo della tecnica finanziaria o della finanza pubblica, ma anche perché rappresentano un primo passo verso la realizzazione di un'unione politica dell'Europa. I favorevoli vedono in questo tipo di proposte non solo una risposta alla crisi attraverso il finanziamento degli investimenti pubblici, ma anche la costruzione di una politica fiscale europea da affiancare a quella monetaria della Banca centrale europea. Gli scettici pongono, invece, l'accento sui tempi troppo lunghi che tali proposte richiederebbero per essere attuate e sul consenso non unanime che esse riscuotono da parte dei Paesi dell'Eurozona. L'introduzione degli eurobond presenta, infatti, ostacoli legali e distributivi. Quelli legali hanno a che fare, in particolare, con l'articolo 125 del Trattato sul Funzionamento dell'Unione europea (TFUE), che dispone il divieto di salvataggio da parte dell'Unione a favore di un Paese membro in difficoltà e, in particolare, vieta a ciascuno Stato membro di rispondere o di subentrare nei debiti di altri Stati membri (cosiddetta "clausola di no bail out"). Gli ostacoli distributivi sono legati alle modalità di partecipazione dei Paesi membri alle emissioni congiunte dei titoli del debito europeo in termini di risorse finanziarie e ai timori dei Paesi virtuosi del Nord Europa di dover fornire un contributo maggiore rispetto ai Paesi meno virtuosi del Sud Europa. La tesi affronta, innanzitutto, il tema della fragilità della costruzione europea, che dipende essenzialmente dall'aver creato – contrariamente a quanto avvenuto nella storia dei popoli – "una moneta senza Stato". Questa circostanza ha condotto, alla fine del 2009, alla crisi dell'euro e dei debiti sovrani. Per rimediare a tale fragilità istituzionale, bisognerebbe por mano a una serie di riforme come il rafforzamento del ruolo della Banca centrale europea come prestatore di ultima istanza, il completamento dell'unione bancaria, l'approfondimento dell'unione del mercato dei capitali, l'allargamento del bilancio europeo e l'accentramento delle politiche fiscali nazionali. Tra queste riforme rientra anche quella di dar vita all'emissione congiunta di debito sovrano a livello di Eurozona, o, in alternativa, a schemi che non prevedono la mutualizzazione del debito. Al riguardo, la ricerca prende in esame l'esistenza di eventuali basi giuridiche per emettere un debito federale dell'Unione europea, distinto dal debito degli Stati membri o, in alternativa, per procedere alla mutualizzazione dei debiti degli Stati membri. La tesi passa, poi, in rassegna le varie proposte avanzate in tema di eurobond, classificandole in due gruppi principali, a seconda che prevedano o meno la mutualizzazione del debito. Nell'ambito delle proposte che si basano sulla mutualizzazione del debito rientrano gli eurobond in senso stretto, gli union bond, gli stability bond, le obbligazioni blu e rosse. Tali proposte, in quanto fondate sulla mutualizzazione del debito, non sono compatibili con l'articolo 125 del TFUE e richiederebbero pertanto la sua modifica. Nel secondo gruppo di proposte – che non contemplano la mutualizzazione del debito e pertanto non richiedono la modifica del TFUE – rientrano il programma PADRE (Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in Europe), il Fondo di ammortamento del debito a livello europeo (European Redemption Fund), gli European Safe Bond - ESB (acronimo inglese di "Titoli europei sicuri"), i Sovereign Bond Backed Securities - SBBS (acronimo inglese di "Titoli garantiti da obbligazioni sovrane"). La ricerca esplora i possibili approcci alla prosecuzione del progetto europeo: la via della riduzione del rischio (risk-reduction), la via della condivisione del rischio (risk-sharing), la via della sintesi tra riduzione e condivisione del rischio. Quest'ultima via appare a chi scrive come l'unica politicamente percorribile. La stessa unione monetaria si è realizzata come combinazione tra i due approcci: il processo di convergenza delle finanze pubbliche (risk reduction) ha condotto alla creazione di un'unica banca centrale con il compito di mettere in atto un'unica politica monetaria e del cambio (risk sharing). Vi è però la necessità per l'Italia di fare la propria parte invertendo la traiettoria del rapporto debito-Pil attraverso un serio e rigoroso piano pluriennale di rientro dal debito (risk reduction), per acquisire, agli occhi dei principali partner europei, quella credibilità necessaria per convincerli a dar vita a un vero e proprio debito federale europeo (risk sharing). Gli eurobond non sono l'unico mezzo per raggiungere la finalità di una unificazione politica dell'Europa ma hanno il pregio di mettere insieme l'approccio funzionalista dei passi graduali con quello federalista della meta finale. Analogamente a quanto avvenuto nella storia di alcuni popoli (in particolare negli Stati Uniti d'America) in cui il processo di unificazione dei debiti ha segnato la nascita dello Stato, anche nel vecchio continente l'europeizzazione del debito degli Stati membri, al di là della valenza in termini di finanza pubblica, potrebbe assurgere a un vero e proprio atto "costitutivo" di un futuro Stato federale europeo. Sotto il profilo metodologico, la ricerca è stata condotta attraverso la strumentazione propria dell'analisi economica del diritto, nella consapevolezza che il mercato – vale a dire il meccanismo economico che orienta il comportamento di individui e gruppi – da solo non è sufficiente ma ha bisogno di regole per poter funzionare. Anzi, se ben regolato, il mercato può essere fattore di sviluppo e di benessere. Questo ragionamento vale anche per il mercato comune e per la moneta unica europea, che da soli non bastano più. Come si è tentato di mostrare in questo lavoro, anche l'Eurozona, per poter sopravvivere e progredire, ha bisogno di un adeguamento delle proprie istituzioni che passa anche attraverso l'emissione congiunta di debito sovrano. Coerentemente con tale impostazione, l'indagine cerca di avere un approccio critico al tema degli eurobond, tentando di analizzarne i singoli aspetti con indipendenza di giudizio. La stesura dei capitoli e dei singoli paragrafi è stata preceduta da un lavoro di documentazione e consultazione di testi, riviste specializzate e articoli. Le conoscenze teoriche acquisite e le idee maturate sono state verificate sul campo, grazie ad un confronto diretto con i dirigenti che, nell'ambito del Dipartimento del Tesoro del Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, hanno la responsabilità dell'emissione e della gestione del debito pubblico italiano. Chi scrive lavora presso la direzione del Debito pubblico del Dipartimento del Tesoro; cionondimeno, le opinioni che qui esprime sono personali e non rappresentano o impegnano in alcun modo l'amministrazione di appartenenza. Alla luce delle considerazioni svolte, si ritiene che davvero gli eurobond possano spingere l'Eurozona verso una maggiore integrazione politico-istituzionale. L'analisi economica e giuridica può dare il proprio contributo alla comprensione della questione, ma la scelta dei passi da compiere in concreto spetta alle leadership politiche europee in quanto investite del consenso popolare. Il ricercatore può esporre gli effetti che derivano dall'adozione di una particolare misura o di uno specifico strumento. Oltre non può andare. ; Eurobonds are not a new topic. They have been present in the economic literature, less in the legal literature, for thirty years, with denominations which change according to the proposed formulations. They are relevant not only in terms of financial economics or public finance, but also because they represent a first step towards the realization of a political union of Europe. Those in favor look at eurobonds not only as a response to the crisis through the financing of public investments, but also as a tool to build up a European fiscal policy in addition to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. On the contrary, the skeptics underline the fact that such proposals would require too mach time to be implemented and the fact that they have short consent in the Eurozone countries. The introduction of eurobonds presents legal and distributive barriers. The legal barriers are linked to the Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides for so-colled "no bail out clause" ("A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public under¬ takings of another Member State"). The distributive obstacles, on the other hand, are linked to the way in which Member States could participate in joint issuance of European debt securities. In particular, the virtuous countries of Northern Europe are afraid that they would pay a greater share than the less virtuous countries of the Southern Europe. First of all, the thesis analyzes the fragility of the European institutions, which depends essentially on having created – contrary to what has happened in the history of peoples – "a currency without a State". In the end of 2009, this fragility led Europe to the crisis of euro and sovereign debts. To face this fragility, some institutional reforms should be carried out, such as the strengthening of the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort, the completion of the banking union, the deepening of the capital market, the enlargement of the European budget and the centralization of national fiscal policies. These reformes also include the joint issuance of sovereign debts of Eurozone Member States. In this regard, the research examines the existence of possible legal bases for issuing a federal debt of the European Union, different from the debt of the Member States or, alternatively, for joint issuing the debt securities of the Member States. Secondly, the thesis examines the various proposals of eurobonds, classifying them in two main groups. The first group, based on the joint issuance of debt, includes eurobonds in the strict sense, union bonds, stability bonds, blue and red bonds. These proposals, being based on the joint issuance of debt, are contrary to Article 125 of the TFEU and therefore would require its modification. The second group of proposals – which do not contemplate the joint issuance of debt and therefore do not require the modification of the TFEU – include the PADRE program (Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in Europe), the European Redemption Debt Fund, the European Safe Bonds, the Sovereign Bond Backed Securities. Thirdly, the research explores the possible approaches to the continuation of the European project: the risk-reduction path, the risk-sharing path, the synthesis between risk reduction and risk sharing. This third path seems to be the only politically feasible. As we know, also the monetary union was realized as a combination of the two approaches: the process of convergence of public finances (risk reduction) led to the creation of a single central bank with the task of managing a single monetary policy (risk sharing). However, Italy has to reverse the trend of the debt-to-GDP ratio through a serious and rigorous long-term debt reduction plan (risk reduction), in order to convince the main European partners to issue European federal debt (risk sharing). Eurobonds are not the only tool to achieve the goal of a political unification of Europe but they have the merit of putting together the functionalist approach based on the gradual steps with the federalist approach based on the final goal. Similarly to what has happened in the history of some peoples, such as the United States of America, where the process of unification of debt of the single States has marked the birth of the federal State, even in Europe the consolidation of debt of the Member States might be a constitutive act of the United States of Europe. Methodologically, the research is based on the economic analysis of law. According to this view, market – the economic mechanism which guides the behavior of individuals and groups – is not enough but needs good regulation. Indeed, if it is well regulated, market may be a factor of development and welfare. This way of thinking is also valid for the European single market and for the euro, which are no longer enough. As we have tried to show in this work, also the Eurozone institutions need a deep reform – including the joint issuance of sovereign debt – for their surviving and progress. This work tries to have a critical approach to the topic of eurobonds. The theoretical knowledge and ideas have been checked thanks to a direct dialogue with managers who, within the Treasury Department of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, are responsible for issuance and management of the Italian public debt. The author of this research works in the Public Debt Directorate at Treasury Department; nevertheless his opinions are personal and do not represent the Treasury Department. For these considerations, eurobonds might really push the Eurozone towards a greater political and institutional integration. The economic and legal analysis may give its contribution to the debate, but the actual choices are up to the European policy-makers.

Pitanje mogućnosti formiranja ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji u kontekstu postsocijalistiĉke transformacije društva i procesa evrointegracija, predstavlja predmet bavljenja ove doktorske disertacije. Rad se sastoji iz tri veće celine i poglavlja u kome su izneta zakljuĉna razmatranja. U prvom delu rada, razvijeni su uporedno-istorijski, kontekstualni, konceptualni i metodološki okvir istraţivanja, kao polazne osnove za dalje analize. Kako bi mogle biti obuhvaćene sve relevantne dimenzije kompleksnog fenomena ekološkog pokreta i sloţena mreţa ĉinilaca koji utiĉu na njegov nastanak i razvoj, u istraţivanju su kombinovano korišćene razliĉite metodološke tehnike: anketno ispitivanje stavova i praksi na reprezentativnom uzorku graĊana Srbije (N=1952) i predstavnika lokalnih samouprava (N=232), polustrukturisani intervjui sa predstavnicima nevladinih organizacija (N=44), kao i dve studije sluĉaja zajednica sa izraţenim ekološkim problemima - Panĉeva i Bora. Drugi deo rada je posvećen opisu i analizi pojedinaĉnih elemenata ekološkog pokreta: ekoloških aktivista, ekoloških grupa / organizacija, ekoloških mreţa, kolektivnog identiteta i ekoloških konflikata. Na osnovu detaljne analize karakteristika osnovnih elemenata pokreta, u zakljuĉnom poglavlju drugog dela rada daje se odgovor na pitanje: da li u Srbiji postoji ekološki pokret? Osnovni istraţivaĉki nalaz je da u Srbiji nije došlo do formiranja klasiĉnog participativnog tipa ekološkog pokreta, kakav je prisutan u zemljama Zapada. TakoĊe, nema ni naznaka znaĉajnijeg prisustva elemenata transakcionog ekološkog aktivizma (pokreta), ĉiji je prisustvo zabeleţeno u zemljama Centralne Evrope. Umesto toga, svedoci smo razvoja specifiĉnog modela ekološkog kolektivnog delanja koji smo nazvali "ekološkim trećim sektorom". Naime, za razliku od participativnog i transakcionog delanja, koji imaju naglašeno politiĉku dimenziju, aktivnosti organizacija u okviru trećeg sektora su preteţno "apolitiĉne" po karakteru, usmerene na pruţanje usluga u oblastima iz kojih se, u sklopu neoliberalnih reformi, drţava povukla. Pored nerazvijenosti konfliktne (politiĉke) dimenzije, ekološki treći sektor odlikuje i atomizovano delanje profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija, koje samo izuzetno (pod spoljnim pritiscima ili podsticajima) uspostavljaju fiziĉke veze (mreţe) meĊu sobom, dok se na planu kolektivnog identiteta razvija samo kognitivna dimenzija (formalno prihvatanje odreĊenih ekoloških vrednosti i naĉela koja ĉine sastavni deo ekološkog diskursa dominantnog na Zapadu). GraĊani, po pravilu, nisu ukljuĉeni u rad ovih organizacija, izuzev kao korisnici usluga. U trećem delu rada se razmatraju razlozi usled kojih ne dolazi do razvoja participativnog i/ili transakcionog ekološkog pokreta (aktivizma). Za potrebe objašnjenja nastanka specifiĉne hibridne forme ekološkog trećeg sektora, kreiran je sintetiĉki eksplanatorni model koji kombinuje elemente razvijene u okviru razliĉitih teorijskih pristupa fenomenu društvenih pokreta. Eksplanatorna shema je formulisana na sledeći naĉin: za pokretanje kolektivnog delanja i nastanak ekološkog pokreta neophodno da prethodno budu ispunjeni sledeći uslovi: potrebno je da postoji izvesno socijalno-konstruisano nezadovoljstvo (problem) kod većeg broja pojedinaca / profesionalnih zastupniĉkih organizacija (socijalno-konstruktivistiĉka reinterpretacija klasiĉnih pristupa); zatim, grupa pojedinaca koja oseća dati problem / zalaţe se za njegovo rešavanje, mora posedovati odreĊene resurse za pokretanje i odrţavanje 5 kolektivne akcije (pristup teorije mobilizacije resursa); šire okruţenje treba da bude relativno povoljno kako bi nagovestilo mogućnost pozitivnog ishoda aktivnosti koja se ţeli realizovati (pristup strukture politiĉkih mogućnosti), a vrednosni okvir na takav naĉin podešen da usmerava na delanje predstavnike profesionalnih ekoloških organizacija i / ili neposredno ugroţenu populaciju (nezadovoljne) i (eventualno) širi krug podrţavalaca (pristup Novih društvenih pokreta). Na proces formiranja ekološkog pokreta, kroz ĉetiri neposredna faktora (socijalna-konstrukcija ekoloških rizika, dostupnost i karakteristike resursa, struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti, vrednosni sistem),indirektno deluju širi društveni procesi - postsocijalistiĉka transformacija i evropeizacija srpskog društva, kao i ĉinioci duţeg trajanja ((pred)socijalistiĉko nasleĊe). Testiranje postavljenih eksplikativnih hipoteza je pokazalo da ni jedan od uslova neophodnih za formiranje ekološkog pokreta, nije delimiĉno ili u potpunosti zadovoljen. Postojeći ekološki problemi su dominantno odreĊeni u kategorijama niskog rizika i male vaţnosti u odnosu na druga društvena pitanja, usled ĉega je i njihov podsticajni kapacitet za kolektivnu (re)akciju bitno sniţen. Pored toga, vladajuće shvatanje prema kome u ekološkoj modernizaciji leţi rešenje za gotovo sve ekološke probleme, pokazuje se kao ĉinilac koji nepovoljno utiĉe na graĊanski aktivizam, jer upućuje na pasivno išĉekivanje uvoĊenja obećanih mehanizama odrţivog razvoja. Većini graĊana na raspolaganju stoji vrlo ograniĉena koliĉina resursa, usled ĉega, u velikom broju sluĉajeva, oni odustaju od uĉešća u ekološkim akcijama. Ekološke organizacije, takoĊe, imaju poteškoća da obezbede neophodne resurse za rad, a dodatni problem predstavlja i naĉin njihove mobilizacije, usled kojeg gube samostalnost postajući zavisne od stranih izvora finansiranja. Kao posledica, ekološko delanje je atomizovano, a rivalitet i konflikti unutar ekološkog civilnog sektora, naglašeni; ekološke mreţe se teško formiraju i odrţavaju, kolektivni identitet je slab (nad njim prevagu odnose partikularni interesi), a kritiĉko delovanje ekoloških organizacija, nerazvijeno. Struktura politiĉkih mogućnosti se, uprkos postojanju relativno povoljnog zakonskog okvira, pokazuje zatvorenom prema uĉešću graĊana u donošenju odluka. GraĊani percipiraju predstavnike vlasti kao neprijemĉive za njihove potrebe, što se nepovoljno odraţava na njihovu spremnost da se organizuju i pokušaju da nametnu svoje zahteve. S druge strane, ekološke organizacije su iskljuĉene iz procesa odluĉivanja i svedene na ulogu asistenata u podizanju kapaciteta drţave za sprovoĊenje programa u oblasti zaštite ţivotne sredine. Konfliktno delanje organizacija je ograniĉeno, s jedne strane, time što ne dobijaju podršku moćnih aktera (meĊunarodne ekološke organizacije, strani donatori), a sa druge, finansijskim uslovljavanjem od strane drţavnih struktura. Karakteristike kulturološkog konteksta se, takoĊe, pokazuju nepovoljnim za razvoj ekološkog pokreta u Srbiji. Dominacija materijalistiĉkog sistema vrednosti i s njim povezano visoko vrednovanje ekonomskog razvoja, koje u senci ostavlja ekološke probleme, negativno utiĉe na ekološko aktiviranje graĊana. Ipak, uprkos preteţno materijalistiĉkoj vrednosnoj orijentaciji, graĊanima su vrlo bliske vrednosti Nove ekološke paradigme. MeĊutim, od naĉelnog prihvatanja vrednosti karakteristiĉnih za ovu paradigmu do aktivnog delanja, u kontekstu materijalne oskudice, put je dug i vrlo neizvestan. Zakljuĉno poglavlje je posvećeno rezimiranju i diskusiji empirijskih nalaza, kao i razmatranju širih implikacija nerazvijenosti ekološkog pokreta na zaštitu ţivotne sredine u Srbiji. ; he environmental movement in Serbia, in the context of post-socialist transformation and the EU integration process. The paper consists of three major parts and the concluding chapter. In the first part a comparative - historical, contextual, conceptual and methodological framework of the research is developed, as a starting point for the further analyses. In order to capture all relevant dimensions of the complex phenomenon of environmental movement and the composite set of factors that influence its emergence and development, the study is using a combination of different methodological techniques: a survey of attitudes and practices based on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N = 1952) and local government representatives (N = 232), in parallel with the semi-structured interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations (N = 44), and the two case studies of communities with serious environmental problems – the municipalities of Pancevo and Bor. The second part contains the description and analysis of individual elements of the environmental movement: environmental activists, environmental groups / organizations, environmental networks, collective identity and environmental conflicts. Based on a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the key elements of environmental movement, the concluding chapter of this part of the paper offers an answer to the question - is there an environmental movement in Serbia? The main research finding is that participatory type of environmental movement that is typical for the Western countries has not been formed in Serbia. There are even no indications of the existence of significant elements of transactional environmental activism (movement), that is present in the countries of Central Europe. Instead, we are witnessing the development of a distinct model of collective environmental action that we have named "the third environmental sector". Different from the participative and transactional activism which have an emphasized political dimension, the nature of the activities of the third sector organizations is mostly "non-political", aimed at providing services in those areas that the state has withdrew from, in the context of neo-liberal reforms. In addition to the underdeveloped conflict/political dimension, the environmental third sector is characterized by atomized actions of professional environmental organizations, which establish physical connections (networks) among themselves only as an exception (under external pressures or incentives), while at the level of collective identity only the cognitive dimension is being developed (the formal acceptance of the environmental values and principles which form an integral part of the environmental discourse dominant in the West). Citizens, as a rule, are not included in the work of these organizations, except as users of services. In the third part, the reasons for the absence of the participatory and / or transactional environmental movement (activism) are discussed. In order to explain the emergence of the specific hybrid form of the environmental third sector, a synthetic explanatory model was established, combining elements developed within different social movement theories. The explanatory scheme has been formulated as follows: for the launch of collective action and the emergence of the environmental movement certain conditions are necessary to be met - a certain level of socially-constructed 8 dissatisfaction (problem) needs to be generated in large numbers of individuals / professional advocacy organizations (social constructivist reinterpretation of classical approaches); then, a group of individuals who perceive the problem / advocates for its solution must possess appropriate resources to initiate and sustain a collective action (the Resource Mobilization Theory approach); the wider context should be relatively favorable as to suggest the possibility of a positive outcome of the action (the Political Opportunities Structure approach); the value framework should be set up in such a way to initiate the action of professional environmental organizations and / or the directly affected population, and possibly also of a wider circle of supporters (the New Social Movements approach). Through the four direct factors (social – construction of environmental risks, the availability and characteristics of resources, the structure of political opportunities, the value system), the process of development of the environmental movement is indirectly affected by wider-scale social processes – the post-socialist transformation and Europeanization of Serbian society, as well as by the factors of longer duration ((pre-) socialist heritage).The testing of the set of explicative hypotheses showed that the necessary pre-conditions for the formation of the environmental movement in Serbia have neither been fully, nor even partially met. In comparison with other issues, the existing environmental problems are dominantly defined in the terms of low-risk and low-importance, due to which their capacities to induce collective (re)action are significantly reduced. In addition, the prevailing concept of environmental modernization, presented as a solution to almost all environmental problems, proves to be a factor that adversely affects civic activism, as it leads to passive anticipation of the promised introduction of mechanisms for sustainable development. Since the majority of citizens have access only to very limited resources, they, in many cases, tend to give up their participation in environmental actions. Environmental organizations also face difficulties in obtaining necessary resources for their operation. An additional problem lies in the way resources are being mobilized: becoming increasingly dependent on foreign funding, organizations tend to lose their autonomy. As a result, the environmental action is atomized and rivalries and conflicts within the environmental civil society accentuated; environmental networks are difficult to establish and maintain and the collective identity is weak (due to domination of particular interests); the conflictual dimension of environmental organizations remains undeveloped. Despite the relatively favorable legal framework, the structure of political opportunities seems closed to the participation of citizens in the decision-making process. Citizens perceive government representatives as unresponsive to their needs, which negatively affects their readiness to act in an organized way and to attempt to impose their demands. On the other hand, environmental organizations are excluded from the decision-making process and reduced to the assisting role in the capacity building of the state bodies for the implementation of programs in the field of environmental protection. Conflicting action of such organizations is limited, on the one hand by the lack of support from powerful actors (international environmental organizations, international donors), and on the other - by the financial preconditions imposed by the state authorities. The characteristics of the cultural context also appear to be unfavorable for the development of the environmental movement in Serbia. The dominance of the materialistic value system and the related high priority attributed to the economic 9 growth, leaves the environmental problems on the margins, thus negatively affecting the environmental activation of citizens. However, despite the predominantly materialistic value orientation, the values of the New environmental paradigm are very familiar to the citizens. Still, in the context of material insecurity, the road from the general acceptance of such values to active action towards reaching them, is long and very uncertain. The concluding chapter is devoted to summarizing and discussing the empirical findings, as well as to considerations of implications of the under-developed environmental movement to the overall state of environmental protection in Serbia.