Suchergebnisse

Review.

'Military Mayhem' is an anthology of writings on the British Military by Kipling, Wyndham Lewis, Robert Graves, T.E. Lawrence, Evelyn Waugh, John Betjeman and Ernest Hemingway to name a few.

THIS SECTION ENUMERATES THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY LED BY SOME FORM OF MILITARY REGIME. MOST HAVE HAD THEIR GOVERNMENTS OVERTURNED, OR THREATENED TO BE OVERTURNED, BY MILITARY COUPS. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA ALSO SEEMS INCREASINGLY SUPERFICIAL. IN THIS INAUSPICIOUS POLITICAL CONTEXT, THERE ARE FEW CLEAR-CUT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ARMY RULE, MILITARY SPENDING, AND DEVELOPMENT.

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes the ways in which civil–military relations shape professional military education (PME). Its main argument is that military education benefits from a civil–military partnership. In doing so, the article examines the role of civil–military relations in shaping PME in India. While describing the evolution of military education in India, it analyzes its weaknesses and argues that this is primarily due to its model of civil–military relations, with a limited role for civilians. Theoretically, this argument challenges Samuel Huntington's notion of "objective control"—which envisaged a strict separation between the civil and military domains. Conceptually, this article argues for a greater dialogue on military education among civilians, both policy makers and academics, and military officers and not to leave it to the military's domain—as is currently the practice in most countries.

As in any field, there are great positive changes in the training of military personnel. The requirements for officers and sergeants are growing. Because the current officer and sergeant is not only a narrowly skilled specialist with limited knowledge in a particular field, but also a person with deep intellectual ability, broad outlook, high culture and spirituality, with his own knowledge, personal example there must be an educator who can educate and train his subordinates.

THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT KEEPING TO THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD IS NEITHER POSSIBLE, NOR RELEVANT. IT EXAMINES SOME SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHANGED MILITARY-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE BALKANS IS SUCH THAT BULGARIA MIGHT GET INVOLVED IN A MILITARY CONFLICT EVEN BECAUSE OF A "SPILL" OF CRISES IN COUNTRIES AND SUBREGIONS CLOSE TO ITS BOUNDARIES. TO BE PREPARED IN THIS CASE MEANS TO BE PREPARED FOR THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICTS.