Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we analyze a multiple winner rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences of the regulator. The model indicates that Cournot competitors can be better off than firms that are able to collude on output determination. 1 Table, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

Through questionnaires and phone interviews, this study provides a preliminary look at gender differences in reciprocity among correction officers (COs) employed in male prisons. Operationalized as the reported tendency to overlook minor rule infractions, no differences in reciprocity were found between men and women. Neither gender generally reported this practice. However, findings suggest that selective enforcement is the norm and that the facility is a more salient variable than gender. The study concludes that occupational socialization and the demands of the job account for the similarities between genders and suggests directions for further research.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the introduction of monopolistic competition into wage bargaining models: in addition to capital‐labour substitution, we also consider a cost‐push effect. The right‐to‐manage model requires strong restrictions on the objective functions and leads to problematic conclusions because the wage claims of the union are generally not compatible with the mark‐up requirement contained in the firm's price equation. In the efficient bargaining model, the union negotiates also the employment level, which gives it a way of extracting part of the monopoly rent: the firm's commitment to an efficient wage‐employment combination forces it to follow a pricing rule such that part of the surplus is transferred to the union.