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The past few years have witnessed a trend of increased delegation of authority to central banks. Increasing central bank independence is a recommended strategy for governments to establish a credible commitment to price stability as the final objective of the monetary authority, even at the cost of other objectives that may be more appealing to the political authorities. Existing literature on measuring central bank independence focuses on developed countries where quantifying the independence of central banks is easier, since quantifying the legal charter is sufficient to reflect the degree of central bank independence. However, in developing countries this task is laborious as quantifying the legal charter is often insufficient, since laws are often incomplete, ambiguous, or simply not respected. This paper attempts to quantify the degree of independence in the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), from both a legal and behavioral context, since its establishment in 1960 until 2004. The study used four indices in line with the work of Jacome (2001), Cukierman, et al. (1992), and Cukierman and Webb (1995), where each index is designed in such a way to capture a somewhat different aspect of independence. This study captures the discrepancies between the degree of independence conferred to the Central Bank of Egypt by law and actual practice. Results from this exercise offers insights that direct monetary policy conduct and the Central Bank legislations towards areas where efforts should be made to enhance the Central Bank of Egypt independence which is the key to achieving price stability and the stability of the financial system in general. .

Long reviews 'Freedom, Trauma, Continuities: Northern India and Independence' edited by D. A. Low and Howard Brasted.

Taiwan's democratization has placed Taiwan independence as one of the most important issues for its domestic politics and for the security balance in the Taiwan Strait. Surveys have been conducted regularly to track shifts in Taiwanese public sentiment on this issue. This article presents a new measure of the Taiwan independence issue and shows how voters' preferences can be influenced.

Aus marxistischer Sicht wird die Abhängigkeit der sozialis tischen Länder des südlichen Afrika von den kapitalistischen Staaten kritisiert. Der Neokolonialismus ist in erster Linie durch den Export von Monopolkapital gekennzeichnet, wobei die multinationalen Konzerne eine herausragende Rolle spielen. Bei der Aufrechterhaltung von Abhängigkeit ist ferner ihr Monopol beim Technologietransfer von wachsender Bedeutung. Als Gegenstrategie wurde 1980 die "Southern African Development Coordination Conference" (SADCC) von neun Ländern des südlichen Afrika gegründet, die ökonomische Unabhängigkeit, Entwicklung und regionale Kooperation zum Ziel hat. (DÜI-Ker)

AbstractThere have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real.

In this article is given information about thе history of the southern cities of Uzbekistan in independence years. The information is given and analyzed about that оne of the southern regions of the Republic of Uzbekistan is considered Kashkadarya region, and during the independence years the number of population of cities of the region have been significantly increased, the plots of land for the construction of houses have been allocated, the modern buildings have been built by the government, they have been given to use, existing buildings have reconstructed and certain beautification works have been carried out in the cities.

Many young people may need support during their transition to independence, particularly if they have been forced to leave home or care before they are ready for independent living. A good practice guide has just been published jointly by the Chartered Institute of Housing and Local Government Association.

This comprehensive publication analyzes numerous aspects of the relationship between judicature and the fair trial principle in a comparative perspective. In addition, it examines the manifestation of some of the most significant elements inherent to the fair trial concept in different legal systems. Along with expansion of judicial power during the past century and with the strengthening of judicial independence, the fair trial requirement has appeared more often, especially in different international agreements and national constitutions, as the summarizing principle of what were formerly constitutional principles pertaining to judicature. Despite its generality and supranational application, the methods of interpreting this clause vary significantly among particular legal systems. This book assumes that the substantive content of this term conveys relevance to the organizational independence of judicial power, the selection of judges, and the mutual relationship between the branches of power. The comparative studies included in this collection offer readers a widespread understanding of the aforementioned correlations and will ultimately contribute to their mastery of the concept of fair trial

In the early years of independence, Ukraine's crucial accomplishment was the establishment a degree of sovereignty and independence that few thought possible. Since that time, Ukrainian foreign policy has largely stagnated. Despite attempts of various internal leaders to adopt decisive policies, and despite significant external pressure, Ukraine has done very little. This paper reviews the first 20 years of Ukrainian foreign policy and accounts for the inertia that has developed. Ukraine's foreign policy passivity results from three uneasy balances: an external balance between the pulls of Russia and the West; an internal balance between Ukraine's regions, and an internal balance between forces of democracy and authoritarianism. These balances mean that while few are happy with Ukraine's policy, no one has been able to decisively change it. While Ukraine's domestic regional division is unlikely to change, change in the balance between domestic political forces or that between international forces could reduce the inertia in Ukrainian foreign politics, most likely leading to a drift toward Russia.

SINCE THE PROCLAMATION OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE IN DECEMBER 1991, WESTERN ATTENTION HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ATTENDANT ON THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW, POPULOUS, AND POTENTIALLY POWERFUL STATE IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. GENERALLY LOST IN THE EXCITEMENT HAS BEEN THE CONDITION OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY, WHICH HAS REGRESSED FROM BAD TO WORSE AND COULD POSSIBLY COLLAPSE, LEADING TO THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER AND, ULTIMATELY, TO THE LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE. THE CURRENT WOES OF THE ECONOMY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO TWO SEPARATE BUT INTERRELATED CAUSES: (2) A STUBBORN REFUSAL TO INTRODUCE MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC REFORMS AND (2) THE LACK OF FUEL RESOURCES NEEDED TO POWER THE ECONOMY. THIS STUDY FOCUSES ON THE SECOND PROBLEM, KYIV'S EFFORTS TO SECURE THE REQUIRED FUEL FROM ITS TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS -- RUSSIA AND TURKMENISTAN -- AS WELL AS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, PRIMARILY IRAN. FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST HAVE COMPLICATED UKRAINE'S QUEST FOR FUEL AS RUSSIA, IN PARTICULAR, BENEFITS FROM A WEAK UKRAINE.

Although central bank independence is a core tenet of monetary policy-making, it remains politically contested: In many emerging markets, populist governments are in frequent public conflict with the central bank. At other times, the same governments profess to respect the monetary authority's independence. We model this conflict drawing on the crisis bargaining literature. Our model predicts that populist politicians will often bring a nominally independent central bank to heel without having to change its legal status. To provide evidence, we build a new data set of public pressure on central banks by classifying over 9000 analyst reports using machine learning. We find that populist politicians are more likely than non-populists to exert public pressure on the central bank, unless checked by financial markets, and also more likely to obtain interest rate concessions. Our findings underscore that de jure does not equal de facto central bank independence in the face of populist pressures.